Matias - Rem1 - Case Digest - CrimPro PDF

MATIAS, Michelle Dulce Candelaria Remedial Law Review 1
2014-0659 Atty. Jose Parungo
Remedial Law Review 1
Criminal Procedure Compilation of Case Digest
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
*On Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the
Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action,
unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. For the Sandiganbayan to have
exclusive jurisdiction under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 over crimes
committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate
relation between the office and the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
Information—it is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by
the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.
ARNEL ESCOBAL
vs.
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, xxx, Hon. David C.
Naval, RTC Judge
G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004; CALLEJO, SR., J.
*Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan vis-à-vis of the RTC
FACTS: Arnel Escobal (Escobal) is a graduate of the PMA, a member of the AFP and the Philippine
Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the
petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at a café bar and restaurant in Naga
City when he somehow got involved with a shooting incident that resulted to the death of Rodney Nueca.
Petitioner Escobal was preventively suspended from the service. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that the court martial, not the RTC, had
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers. RTC denied the motion.
Trial proceeded. The prosecution rested its case and petitioner presented his evidence. On July 20, 1994,
the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he
argued that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The RTC dismissed the motion but ordered the conduct of a preliminary
hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his
office as a member of the PNP.
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged
while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that nonetheless, upon the
enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic since the amendatory law
transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC. The petitioner
did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof.
The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in
Republic v. Asuncion and R.A. No. 7975, and to include therein an allegation that the offense charged was
not committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.
The petitioner filed a MR of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those of his
witnesses, the offense charged was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that
R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense
charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his
office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same to the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan returned the records of the case to the RTC, contending that the latter has jurisdiction
over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case falls in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of the RTC
HELD: Yes, the case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00.
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public
officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office
of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to
merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his
office because that would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the
petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge
of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it
ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed
the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the
Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect.
Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but
occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal
Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner
was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by
reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to
Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It
bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law, which may be applied retroactively.
###
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY T GO
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
*Corrupt practices of public officers, R.A. 3019, Conspiracy

FACTS: A certain Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals
for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was Henry T Go, who was then the Chairman and
President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary
Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein
respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted
because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. The Sandiganbayan issued
an Order to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged
co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case. The Sandiganbayan grants the
Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed. Hence
this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
has died prior to the filing of the Information.
HELD: Yes. The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A.
3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer.
The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the
public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the
present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. If two or more
persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation
of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.
This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of
the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no
difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.
The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.
###
G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004

JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division), ALBANO & ASSOCIATES and the
ASSOCIATION OF GENERALS & FLAG OFFICERS, INC., respondents.
DOCTRINE: In finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with
the said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman which has full control of the case.
FACTS: Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were
charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The
Information alleged that Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted the amount of P250,318,200.00
for their personal use from the funds of AFP-RSBS.
Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.” He argued, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case
because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito.
The Urgent Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
In a Resolution issued, the Sandiganbayan sustained Ramiscal, et. al.’s contention that the AFP-RSBS is
a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of their criminal
case. Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special civil action for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the AFP-RSBS is not a government entity.
HELD: No, the AFP-RSBS is a government entity.
It was created by Presidential Decree 361. Its purpose and functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the
SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military
service.
Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are expressly excluded
from the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997.
Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the
administration of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation benefits.
Its enabling law further mandates that the System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines through an agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and
organized by him and subject to such rules and regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time.
Moreover, the investment of funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense. The funds of the AFP-RSBS,
except for the initial seed money, come entirely from contributions and that no part thereof come from
appropriations. While it may be true that there have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to
the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide
additional benefits to them.
The above considerations indicate that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with
public interest. As such, we hold that the same is a government entity and its funds are in the nature of
public funds.
###
People of the Philippines vs Alfredo Benipayo
G.R. Nos. 154473 & 155573
April 24, 2009
*DOCTRINES:
1. Jurisdiction in libel cases belong to the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts
2. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative
relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
3. The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are
charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers.
FACTS: Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the COMELEC, delivered a speech in the "Forum on
Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay Kalinaw, UP-Diliman
Campus, Quezon City and in an television interview before “Point Blank”, a show hosted by Ces Orena
Drilon at ANC.The speech was subsequently published in the issues of the Manila Bulletin.
Photokina Marketing Corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the Benipayo when he stated
in his speech that: “Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly
disadvantageous to the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5
billion-peso price tag.”, filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint for libel.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer and even assuming that he can be charged with libel, the same
should be lodged with the Sandiganbayan, Benipayo questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for libel against
the respondent with the RTC of Quezon City
In both instances, the RTC ruled in his favor, thus Photokina elevated the case to the Supreme Court on
question of law on whether the utterances were made in relation to his office; and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not (1) utterances of Benipayo were made in relation to his office, and (2) RTC
had jurisdiction over the libel case.
HELD: Jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. Article 360 of
the RPC, as amended by RA4363, is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written
defamations, thus: “The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided
for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the RTC]
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense…”
In case of Jalandoni v. Endaya: The SC held that there is no need to make mention again that it is a court
of first instance [now, the RTC] that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical;
its meaning is free from doubt.
In case of Bocobo v. Estanislao: Jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous act is committed
"by similar means", and despite the fact that the phrase "by similar means" is not repeated in the latter
portion of Article 360.
In case of Manzano v. Hon. Valera: The applicable law is still Article 360 of the RPC, which categorically
provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (RTC).
While in People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah V. Red : a similar question of jurisdiction over
libel was raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had jurisdiction
due to the enactment of RA7691. Upon elevation of the matter, respondent judge's orders were nullified for
lack of jurisdiction.
The contention that RA7691 divested the RTC of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained. While
libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two months (Art. 360,
RPC) which imposable penalty is lodged within the MTC’s jurisdiction under RA7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law
however, excludes therefrom “cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts”.
The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, correctly cited by the CA, has laid down the
rule that RTC have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred
by RA7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases.
###
Panfilo Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999
FACTS: On 18 May 1995, 11 members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, were killed along Commonwealth
Ave., QC by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Supt. Jewel
Canson of PNP. One of the components of ABRITG is the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission-Task Force
Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Supt. Panfilo Lacson.
SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes told the media that what happened was a summary execution (or a rub out)
and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG.
Omb. Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Omb. for Military Affairs,
Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel found that the incident was a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Omb. Francisco Villa recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against 26 respondents, including Lacson.
Lacson was among those charged as principal in information for murder before the Sandiganbayan. All the
accused filed separate motions questioning its jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the QC RTC which has original and exclusive jurisdiction
under RA 7975 (An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan,
Amending for that Purpose PD 1606, as Amended), as none of the principal accused has the rank of PNP
Chief Supt. or higher (Lacson is NOT a PNP Chief Supt.)
The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration. While it is pending, RA 8249 (An Act
Further Defining thr Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose PD 1606, as Amended,
Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes) was enacted to law which deletes the word “principal”
from the phrase “principal accused”. Thus, the Sandiganbayan takes cognizance again of the case.
Lacson now questions the constitutionality of Secs. 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 because the provisions are: (a)
introduced by the Congress in bad faith, (b) ex post facto legislation and (c) misleading as to the law’s title.
The OSG asserts otherwise.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination
whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
HELD: RTC HAS JURISDICTION.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if
it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of
his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official
duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the
victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the
exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
###
G.R. No. Nos. 111771-7 November 9, 1993
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, vs. The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in
his capacity as Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE
LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six
respondents in their official capacities as members of the State Prosecutor's Office), Respondents.
DOCTRINE: The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the information.
FACTS: Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez and six other accused were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of seven (7) counts of rape with homicide on seven counts and sentenced each one of them to suffer
the penalty of seven reclusion perpetua. The prosecutions version of the events was based mainly on the
recollections of its star witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan - coconspirators turned state
witnesses. Both admitted having taken part in the abduction of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, but
denied any personal involvement in the rape of Eileen and the twin killings that followed. In this appeal, the
pith of the assigned errors and the focus of the appellants arguments is the issue of witnesses Centeno
and Malabanans credibility, whose opencourt narrations served as principal basis for the trial courts
rendition of a guilty verdict.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the petition of Sanchez to quash on the
grounds that he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons.
HELD: The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide
committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as
there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising
its penalty to the highest degree.
Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent
offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance.
However, by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special complex
crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree. The petitioner and his six
co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six.
Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping
Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was
raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the
other six.
Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta. Every one of
the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of
merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her.
The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is
complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her
seven attackers.
The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of
Sarmenta. The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and
to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the record. The trial courts
impressions of the star witnesses for the State bind this Court, for we accord great respect if not finality, to
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. Further, all the appellants relied on the defense
of denial/alibi but positive identification by credible witnesses of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime, demolishes the alibi.
Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging the order
of the respondent Judge Demetriou denying his motion to quash the Information filed against him and six
other persons for alleged rape and homicide.
One of the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was discrimination against him because of the non-
inclusion of two other persons in the Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the prosecution
of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie
case. However, if there was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutors, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges
against said two other persons.
###
G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, Petitioner,vs
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DOCTRINE: It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan—the
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
FACTS: Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student regent of UP Cebu, to
serve a one-year term. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex
failed to materialize. The Ombudsman filed estafa case against her before the Sandiganbayan. She moved
to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent because the Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction over estafa; the petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged
was not committed in relation to her office; and the funds in question personally came from President
Estrada, not from the government. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a UP student
regent, she is not a public officer who held the position in an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Serana’s case.
HELD: No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that while
the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities, or educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No.
1606. Thus, her position as a board of regent (UP student regent) is among those enumerated and the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her.
###
*On Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335,
FEBRUARY 18, 2014
Doctrine: It is well-settled rule that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function.
Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
FACTS: Jose Disini, Rowena Disini, Ivy Medina, Janette Toral, Ernesto Tosido as taxpayers assail the
validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks
to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the
system.
The following provisions were questioned: 1. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access; 2. Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference; 3. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting; 4. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft; 5. Section 4(c)(1)
on Cybersex; 6. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography; 7. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications; 8. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel; 9. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the
Commission of Cybercrimes; 10. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher; 11. Section 7 on the
Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175; 12. Section 8 on Penalties; 13.
Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data; 14. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data; 15.
Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data; 16. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of
Computer Data; 17. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data; 18. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking
Access to Computer Data; 19. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice; 20. Section 24 on Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and 21. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions
ISSUE/S: Which court has jurisdiction over cases covered by RA 10175?
HELD: As provided in Sec. 21 that the RTC shall have jurisdiction over any violation of the provisions of
RA 10175 including any violation committed by a Filipino national regardless of the place of commission.
Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements was committed within the Philippines or committed with the use
of any computer system wholly or partly situated in the country, or when by such commission any damage
is caused to a natural or juridical person who, at the time the offense was committed, was in the Philippines.
There shall be designated special cybercrime court manned by specially trained judges to handle
cybercrime cases.
###
Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses
G.R. No. 178607
December 5, 2012
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative of UNLAD SHIPPING &
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court
of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and MARKOS
AVGOUSTIS, Respondents.
DOCTRINE: The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can
represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the
CA or in the SC.
FACTS: In 2003, Jimenez, the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, filed a complaint-
affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against Antzoulatos, Alamil, Gaza and
Avgoustis listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), for syndicated and large scale
illegal recruitment, alleging that Antzoulatos, et al. falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles
of incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA).
An Information was then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Mandaluyong. Subsequently, the City
Prosecutor reconsidered resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information.
The RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause to hold
Antzoulatos, et al. for trial. Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against Antzoulatos,
et al. Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of
the warrants of arrest, which was denied. Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause
with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest., which was denied for being moot and
academic. Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco Umali, for being biased
or partial. Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did not resolve Alamil’s motion
for reconsideration and the Jimenez's motion to expunge. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214,
presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
The RTC granted Alamil’s motion for reconsideration, and treated the motion for judicial determination as
a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. Jimenez moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence
of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any
relief from the RTC, which was denied.
The RTC ordered the motion expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public
prosecutor’s conformity. Jimenez filed a notice of appeal. Alamil moved to expunge the Jimenez' notice of
appeal since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the
case. The RTC denied the Jimenez's notice of appeal since Jimenez filed it without the conformity of the
Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed
to the CA.
Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records. Jimenez elevated his case to the
CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, which was dismissed outright by the CA for Jimenez’s lack of legal
personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. The CA denied the motion for
reconsideration that followed.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Jimenez, the private complainant, has legal personality in assailing the
RTC Orders.
HELD: NO. It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to
the avails of the suit."
Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest.
When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible. Procedural law
basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before the
CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several
cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine. While there may be rare occasions when the offended
party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due
process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case.
###
*On Sufficiency of Complaint/Information
People vs Valdez
DOCTRINE: The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.
FACTS: On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 in the evening, Estrella Sayson was at a canteen (which also
includes a jai alai betting station) located at 77 Corregidor St, Bago Bantay, Quezon City. Estrella was
preparing for the 2nd celebration of her 2nd husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later that evening.
Estrella’s son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson, owned the
said canteen and betting station. At about 9:00, Estrella’s other sons, Joselito and Ferdinand Sayson arrived
at the canteen to greet their stepfather. At about 10:00 of the same evening, the celebration was interrupted
by the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin who alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai betting station.
Eduardo and Edwin, agitated, asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio, to come out. Jonathan was then
attending to other customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and
tried to reason with them. He advised them not to force Jonathan to go out. Estrella then heard one of the
accusedappellants threaten Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin kita?” Moises replied “Huwag”.
Successive gunshots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon. Ferdinand
immediately approached the scene to help his brother. He was however, was also shot on the left temporal
portion of his head and fell. Joselito, ran away but was also hit at the back while running. The RTC convicted
the 2 accused of 3 counts of murder and sentenced them to suffer Resclusion Perpetua for each count of
murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions. In this appeal, PO2 Valdez contended that the state
failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery
ISSUE/S: Whether the prosecution sufficiently established the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
HELD: For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein
the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions
and essentials of the specified crimes The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused
"with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x
assault, attack and employ personal violence upon" the victims "by then and there shooting them with a
gun, hitting [them]" on various parts of their bodies "which were the direct and immediate cause of their
deaths" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each
of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him
with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured
without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an
instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal
purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone,
was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and
circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the
informations. x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the
nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. This requirement
accords with the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in
the body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried
thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, x x x.
###
MIGUEL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms
and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense
charged.
FACTS: Vice Mayor and other local officials of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging the petitioner, Fernando Miguel, of violations of R.A.
3019 (Antigraft and Corrupt Practices Act) in connection with the consultancy services for the proposed
Koronadal Public Market. The Ombudsman directed the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit. After
moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit. Thereafter, the Ombudsman found
probable cause against the petitioner and some other private individuals for violation of RA 3019 and
against the petitioner alone for Falsification of Public Documents under Art. 171 par. 4 of the RPC. The
Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan ordered
the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan gave the
petitioner 10 days to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP. Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit,
petitioner asked for another 3-day extension and afterwhich another 20-day extension. Despite the given
extensions, the petitioner still failed to file his counter-affidavit prompting prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to
declare the petitioner to have waived his right to submit countervailing evidence. Ombudsman approved
the resolution. After several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or
Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion
because of the pending OSP reinvestigation this, despite the OSPs earlier termination of the reinvestigation
for the petitioner’s continuous failure to submit his counteraffidavit. After the arraignment, the OSP file a
Motion to Suspend Pendente Lite. The petitioner filed his Vigorous Opposition based on the obvious and
fatal defect in the information. The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the
petitioner pendent lite. petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded pre-
suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him to file this certiorari petition to
challenge the validity of the suspension order.
ISSUE/S: Whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension order
against the petitioner.
HELD: No. In Bedruz vs Sandiganbayan, the court considered the opposition of the accused (Motion to
Suspend Pendente Lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s motion for
hearing. In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the
information/suspension, the court believed that the pleadings filed for and against them achieved the goal
of the procedure. The right to due process is satisfied not by just oral arguments but by the filing and the
consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings, memoranda and other position papers. Since a pre-
suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an
adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against a mandatory suspension under RA
3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well
settled that to be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded,
no denial of procedural due process exists.
###
People vs Soria
DOCTRINE: The allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be
regarded as a description of only one of ense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the
ground of multifariousness.
FACTS: Version of the Prosecution: The victim, AAA, is the daughter of the accused. On February 26,
2000, AAA and her siblings enjoyed the spaghetti their father brought home for merienda. After eating, AAA
went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, appellant also entered the room and positioned himself on top of
AAA, took off her clothes and “felt” that he inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt intense pain from her
breast down to her vagina and thus told her father that it was painful. At that point, appellant apologized to
his daughter, stood up, and left the room. The whole incident was witnessed by AAA’s brother, BBB. The
pain persisted until AAA’s vagina started to bleed. She thus told her aunt about it and they proceeded to a
hospital for treatment. Her mother was also immediately informed of her ordeal. AAA was taken into the
custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Version of the Defense: Appellant admitted
that he was at home on the day and time of AAA’s alleged rape but denied committing the same. Instead,
he claimed that the filing of the rape case against him was instigated by his wife, whom he confronted about
her illicit affair with a man residing in their community. According to appellant, he could not have molested
AAA because he treated her well. In fact, he was the only one sending his children to school since his wife
already neglected them and seldom comes home.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt which would warrant his
acquittal?
2. Whether the information is sufficient to justify the conviction of the accused?
HELD:
1. Rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is referred to as rape through sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge is the
central element and it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, rape under paragraph
2 of Article 266-A is commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator commits this kind of rape
by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital
or anal orifice of another person. The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of rape through sexual
intercourse but It is evident from the testimony of AAA that she was unsure whether it was indeed
appellant’s penis which touched her labia and entered her organ. AAA stated that she only knew that it was
the “bird” of her father which was inserted into her vagina after being told by her brother BBB. Clearly, AAA
has no personal knowledge that it was appellant’s penis which touched her labia and inserted into her
vagina. Hence, it would be erroneous to conclude that there was penile contact based solely on the
declaration of AAA’s brother, BBB, which declaration was hearsay due to BBB’s failure to testify. The court
however found it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object
that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into
her vagina. Moreover, the prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant accomplished the act of
sexual assault through his moral ascendancy and influence over “AAA” which substituted for violence and
intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped AAA by sexual assault. It is also improbable for
appellant’s wife to have dared encourage their daughter AAA to file the charges publicly expose the
dishonor of the family unless the rape was indeed committed.
2. The Information in this case did not specify with certainty whether appellant committed the rape through
sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual assault as described in paragraph
2 thereof. The Information stated that appellant inserted his penis into the genital of "AAA," which
constituted rape by sexual intercourse under the first paragraph of Article 266-A. At the same time, the
Information alleged that appellant used force and intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While
these allegations cause ambiguity, they only pertain to the mode or manner of how the rape was committed
and the same do not invalidate the Information or result in the automatic dismissal of the case. "[W]here an
offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed
in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the different means
of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the
information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one
offense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness." Any
objection from the appellant with respect to the Information is held to have been waived failing any effort to
oppose the same before trial. He therefore can be convicted of rape through sexual intercourse or rape by
sexual assault, depending on the evidence adduced during trial. In determining whether appellant is indeed
guilty of rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, it is essential to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of "AAA". There must be proof that his penis
touched the labia of "AAA" or slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof,
to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse. We reviewed the testimony of "AAA" and found
nothing therein that would show that she was raped through sexual intercourse. While "AAA" categorically
stated that she felt something inserted into her vagina, her testimony was sorely lacking in important details
that would convince us with certainty that it was indeed the penis of appellant that was placed into her
vagina. Based on the evidence adduced, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of rape by sexual assault.
###
*Venue is Jurisdictional in Criminal Cases
Union Bank vs People
DOCTRINE: The venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information
states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court
FACTS: Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accusation stemmed from Union
Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie
and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe, filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City; and filed and raffled
to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the
Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of
the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint
that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or
agency. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that the venue was improperly laid since
it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not
the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction
over he perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a)
the third element of perjury – the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood – was not alleged with
particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues
in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court when
the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the
allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit. The MeTC-Makati City denied
the Motion to Quash and subsequently denied Tomas’ motion for reconsideration. Union Bank and Tomas
filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC Makati City orders
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, which was dismissed. The RTC-Makati City subsequently
denied Union Bank and Tomas’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, the review under Rule 45.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Makati City, where the Certificate Against Forum Shopping was notarized, is the
proper venue for the case of perjury.
HELD: YES. Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the
case. The reason for this rule is two- fold.
First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear
and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the
locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of
province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available. Unlike in civil cases, a finding
of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences.
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction
over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that subject to
existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where
the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. The above provision should
be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from
its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place
within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where
the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
###
Rule 111 Prosecution of Civil Actions
Solidum vs People
DOCTRINE: 1. Civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence. 2. The civil action
for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising
from the offense charged.
FACTS: Two days after his birth, Gerald Gercayo, who was born with an imperforate anus, underwent
colostomy, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. In 1995,
Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr.
Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella
Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and Dr.
Fernando Solidum. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma
lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or
move. Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) then lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s
Office filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum Dr. Solidum were pronounced guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals
(CA). He then filed an appeal to the SC. The SC acquitted Dr. Solidum because circumstances, taken
together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in
administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Dr. Solidum, through his acquittal, is exempt from civil liability.
2. Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila should be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the accused.
HELD:
1. YES. The circumstances that have been established do not present the factual and legal bases for validly
doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent
showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the
anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia
experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the
cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.
2. NO In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with
the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial
entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and
whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the
proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the
CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling
rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only
when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital
ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital
ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means
any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and
is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry
conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng
Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng
Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such
employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr.
Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his
being insolvent.
###
Castillo vs Salvador
DOCTRINE: An acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused is not exempt from civil
liability, which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
FACTS: Phillip R. Salvador and his brother, Ramon Castillo, was charged with Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code by petitioner Cristina B. Castillo, a businesswoman engaged in
real estate business, educational institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by Phillip
and Ramon to engage in freight and remittance business. As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with
respondent Salvador and since she trusted him very much as he even acted as a father to her children
while her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the remittance business. She agreed with
respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be equally divided among them and
that respondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, and Ramon would take
charge of the operations of business in the Philippines and she would be financing the business. The
business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital for the
actual operation. When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to respondent Salvador,
which was witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the proposed business never
operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days. When she asked respondent about the
money and the business, the latter told her that the money was deposited in a bank. However, upon further
query, respondent confessed that he used the money to pay for his other obligations. Since then, the
US$100,000.00 was not returned at all. Upon their arraignment, Phillip and Ramon pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. The RTC rendered a Decision finding Phillip
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and ordered him to pay Castillo, US$100,000.00 or its equivalent in
Philippine currency. Ramon was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Phillip appealed his conviction to
the CA, which overturned the RTC decision. Castillo filed a petition for review on certiorari on the civil aspect
of the case, arguing that the Court should have at least retained the amount of damages to her.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the acquitted accused are still liable for damages.
HELD: YES. In Manantan v. CA, we discussed the consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the
accused as follows. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being
no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted
must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule
III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability, which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or
omission." x x x. A reading of the CA decision would show that Phillip was acquitted because the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [S]ince the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt, [Phillip] is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., we explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side
and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
In discrediting [Castillo's] allegation that she gave [Phillip] US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that:
(1) [Castillo] failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of time and even
gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) [Castillo]failed to require respondent to sign a
receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was
allegedly hand-carried toHong Kong; (3) [Castillo's] claim of trust as reason for not requiring [Phillip] to sign
a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4)
[Castillo's] behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of
someone who had been swindled.
###
*Suspension of Civil Actions
Lim Vs Kou Co Ping
DOCTRINE: If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of
the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. Because
of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the of
ended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without of ending
the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.
FACTS: FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several
withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt.
These withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from
the plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is valid for six months from its date of
issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing Department. Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their
administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement
to Co for the amount of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag. Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim
allegedly at the price of P64.00 per bag or a total of P3.2 million. Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim
withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of
cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co. FRCC did not allow
Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter
with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the
goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected
and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought
legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money
had failed.
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co. The private
complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to prove her damages. She prayed for Co to
return her money amounting to P2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal interest, and for an award of
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. The RTC of Pasay acquitted Co for insufficiency
of evidence. After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of
civil liability to Lim. Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has presented
preponderant evidence that Co committed estafa against her. The trial court denied the motion. Lim filed
her notice of appeal. A month later, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before
Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The defendants in the civil case were Co and all other parties to the
withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement, and La Farge
Corporation. The complaint asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Lim commited forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and
damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa.
HELD: NO. A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender: (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the
criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil
liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may
be based on “an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,” as provided in
Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or
omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by
specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries”). The
civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the
criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil
liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto
is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until
the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court
hearing the criminal action declares that “the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.” The independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that: ART. 31. When the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Because of
the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended
party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules
on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.
###
*Independent Civil Actions
Casupanan vs Laroya
DOCTRINE: The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused
of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which
states that the counterclaim of the accused “may be litigated in a separate civil action.”
FACTS: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Capitulo and
driven by petitioner Casupanan, figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the MCTC.
Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property,
while Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi- delict. When the civil case was
filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case,
filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the
criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration,
Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.
The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued
by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been
an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the
civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion. Casupanan and Capitulo
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same.
ISSUE/S: Whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file
a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case.
HELD: Yes. Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section
2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved
or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for
quasi-delict—without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously
and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend
the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file
a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his
employer or guardians. Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case.
This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused “may be litigated in a separate civil action.” This is only fair for two reasons.
First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted
in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the
offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period
may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. Second, the accused,
who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the
offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused
from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal
case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law. Thus, the
civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper
###
Caterpillar Inc vs Samson
FACTS: Petitioner filed a criminal case against the respondent for unfair competition. Subsequently,
petitioner also commenced a civil action against respondent and his business entities, with the IPO as a
nominal party. Respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment in Criminal Cases in the RTC citing that
the resolution of the civil case in the IPO will determine the outcome of the instant criminal cases. The RTC
suspend the arraignment of the said criminal case which the Petitioner appealed. The Appeal was denied.
Hence this case.
Issue:Whether the action of the Petitioner can be tried as a separated Civil action and not subject to
suspension due to Prejudicial Question.
Held:Yes, the civil case filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon City, was for unfair competition, damages
and cancellation of trademark, while Criminal Cases were the criminal prosecution of Samson for unfair
competition. A common element of all such cases for unfair competition – civil and criminal – was fraud.
Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may
be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution. Secondly, a civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be
considered a prejudicial question by which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal cases for unfair
competition. A prejudicial question is that which arises in a civil case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issues to be determined in the criminal case. It must appear not only that the civil case
involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
the civil action will necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.
###
*Effect of Death on the Civil Actions
People vs Romero
DOCTRINE: The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability ex delicto.
FACTS: Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz was a radio commentator of Radio DXRB, Butuan City. He came to
know the business of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation (SAIDECOR) when he
interviewed accused Martin Romero and Ernesto Rodriguez regarding the corporation’s investment
operations in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte. Romero was the president and general manager of
SAIDECOR, while Rodriguez was the operations manager. SAIDECOR started its operation on August 24,
1989 as a marketing business. Later, it engaged in soliciting funds and investments from the public. The
corporation guaranteed an 800% return on investment within fifteen (15) or twenty one (21) days. Investors
were given coupons containing the capital and the return on the capital collectible on the date agreed upon.
It stopped operations in September, 1989. Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz went to SAIDECOR office in
Butuan City to make an investment, accompanied by his friend Jimmy Acebu, and SAIDECOR collection
agent Daphne Parrocho. After handing over the amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00)
to Ernesto Rodriguez, complainant received a postdated Butuan City Rural Bank check instead of the usual
redeemable coupon. The check indicated P1,000,200.00 as the amount in words, but the amount in figures
was for P1,200,000.00, as the return on the investment. Complainant did not notice the discrepancy. When
the check was presented to the bank for payment on October 5, 1989, it was dishonored for insufficiency
of funds, as evidenced by the check return slip issued by the bank. Both accused could not be located and
demand for payment was made only sometime in November 1989 during the preliminary investigation of
this case. Accused responded that they had no money.
Daphne Parrocho testified that complainant, with his friend Jimmy Acebu, approached her to invest the
amount of P150,000.00 at SAIDECOR. As she has reached her quota, and therefore, no longer authorized
to receive the amount, she accompanied them to the office of SAIDECOR at Ong Yiu District, Butuan City.
Accused Ernesto Rodriguez accepted the investment and issued the check signed by him and Martin
Romero. For their defense, accused Martin Romero testified that he issued a check in the amount of
P1,200,000.00 corresponding to the total of the P150,000.00 investment and the 800% return thereon. He
claimed that the corporation had a deposit of fourteen million pesos (P14,000,000.00) at the time of the
issuance of the check and four million pesos (P4,000,000.00) at the time SAIDECOR stopped operations.
Romero knew these things because he used to monitor the funds of the corporation with the bank. He was
not aware that the check he issued was dishonored because he never had the occasion to meet the
complainant again after the September 14, 1989 transaction. He only came to know about this when the
case was already filed in court sometime in the second or third week of January 1990. On appeal, both
accused did not deny that complainant made an investment with SAIDECOR in the amount of P150,000.00.
However, they denied that deceit was employed in the transaction. They assigned as errors: (1) their
conviction under P.D. 1689 due to the prosecution’s failure to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
and (2) the trial court’s failure to consider the joint stipulation of facts in their favor. Ernesto Rodriguez, died
pending appeal.
ISSUE/S: What is the effect of the death of an accused on the case?
HELD: Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action
is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal
case. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains
only to the remaining accused-appellant, Martin L. Romero.
###
*Prejudicial Questions
Magistrado vs People
DOCTRINE: There is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other.
FACTS: Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against petitioner
Magestrado with the Office of the City Prosecutor. After the filing of petitioner’s counter-affidavit and the
appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for perjury
against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury
with the MeTC. Petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question.
Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-9834308, a case for
Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
77, must be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil
cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.
ISSUE/S: Whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending final outcome of
Civil Case No. Q98-34349 and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 on the ground of prejudicial question.
HELD: No. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that: Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question.—A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed
in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial
question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The rationale behind the principle
of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. A
prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the
question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause
the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites
must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must
be lodged in another tribunal. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity “that
the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,” therefore, the civil case does not
involve a prejudicial question.
###
Pimentel vs Pimentel
DOCTRINE: Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case for parricide. Further, the
resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal
action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action
may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
FACTS: On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito R. Pimentel with the RTC Quezon City. Less than four months thereafter, Joselito received
summons to appear before the RTC in Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between Maria and Joselito on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed an urgent
motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. He asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage would have a bearing
in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City denied the motion,
holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants
the suspension of the criminal case before it. It held that the issues in the parricide case are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage
with respondent is in question. Petitoner filed a petition for certiorari with application of WPI and/or TRO
before the Court of Appeals, assailing the denial of RTC Quezon City. The CA dismissed the petition. The
CA ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the
crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required
for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still
subsisting.
ISSUE/S: Whether the resolution of the action in annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question.
HELD: NO. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action.
Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As
such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since
the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. Further, the resolution of the civil
action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a
prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil
action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case. A prejudicial question is defined as: “x x x one that arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend
the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.”
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage is granted, it will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent.
###
JM Dominguez vs Liclican
DOCTRINE: As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence
rests on the concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
FACTS: During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioner JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc.
(JMD) held at the Baguio City Country Club, the election for its new set of directors was conducted. This
event was presided by then company president respondent Cecilia Liclican (Liclican), and attended by her
co-respondents Norma Isip (Isip) and Purita Rodriguez, and by petitioners Helen Dagdagan (Dagdagan),
Patrick Pacis, Kenneth Pacis, and Shirley Dominguez (Dominguez) as well. Conflict ensued when
petitioners Patrick and Kenneth Pacis were allegedly not allowed to vote on the ground that they are not
registered stockholders of JMD.
As pointed out, it was their mother and grandmother, both deceased, who are the stockholders in JMD, and
that there is still no settlement of their respective estates to effectively transfer their shares in the company
to Patrick and Kenneth Pacis. But since the remaining stockholders with outstanding shares constituted a
quorum, the election of officers still proceeded. In reaction to the foregoing developments, petitioners filed
a Complaint against respondents before the RTC Baguio Branch 59 for nullification of meetings, election
and acts of directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs. After a failed mediation, was referred for
appropriate Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) to Branch 7 of the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner stockholders immediately took hold of corporate properties, represented themselves
to JMD’s tenants as the true and lawful directors of the company, and collected and deposited rents due
the company to its bank account. Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners, executed an Affidavit-
Complaint charging respondents Liclican and Isip with qualified theft. Petitioners alleged in the complaint
that Liclican and Isip, without any authority whatsoever, conspired to withdraw the amount of P852,024.19
from the corporation’s savings account with the Equitable-PCI Bank; and that the following day, they issued
a check in the amount of P200,000, payable to cash, and to be drawn against JMD’s account with
Robinson’s Savings Bank. In a separate complaint, the corporation claimed that respondents Liclican and
Isip likewise issued a check payable to one Atty. Francisco Lava, Jr. for P200,000 to be debited from the
corporation’s account.
The City Prosecutor of Baguio City recommends for approval of the Informations for Qualified Theft against
LICLICAN and ISIP. Thereafter, Judge Tiongson-Tabora of RTC Baguio found probable cause and issued
a warrant of arrest. In due time, respondents lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA, to annul and set
aside the two Orders by the RTC, branch 7 anchored, among others, on the alleged existence of a
prejudicial question. According to respondents, petitioner stockholders, by filing the complaint-affidavit, are
already assuming that they are the legitimate directors of JMD, which is the very issue in the intra-corporate
dispute pending in the RTC, Branch 59. The CA granted the petition, holding that Judge Tiongson-Tabora
should have refrained from determining probable cause since she is well aware of the pendency of the
issue on the validity of JMD’s elections. As the judge overseeing the JDR of the said intra-corporate dispute,
she knew that there was still doubt as to who the rightfully elected directors of JMD are and, corollarily, who
would have the authority to initiate the criminal proceedings for qualified theft.
The CA further noted that even as corporate officers, as they claim to be, petitioners Dagdagan and Patrick
Pacis cannot file the Complaint-Affidavit in the exercise of corporate powers without authority from the
board of directors under Sec. 23,18 in relation to Sec. 2519 of the Corporation Code
Section 23. The board of directors or trustees.—Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate
powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all
property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees to be elected from
among the holders of stocks, or where there is no stock, from among the members of the corporation, who
shall hold office for one (1) year until their successors are elected and qualified. x x x
ISSUE/S: (1) Whether or not the civil case constituted a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of
criminal proceedings; (2) Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Tabora
in disregarding the pending case on the validity of JMD’s election, by issuing the warrants;
HELD: (1) YES. As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action
is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. The rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the
concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Here, the CA aptly observed the intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to Criminal Case. To
be sure, the Civil involves the same parties herein, and is for nullification of JMD’s meetings, election and
acts of its directors and officers, among others. Court intervention was sought to ascertain who between
the two contesting group of officers should rightfully be seated at the company’s helm. Without resolution
of the civil case, petitioners’ authority to commence and prosecute the Criminal case against respondents
for qualified theft in JMD’s behalf remained questionable, warranting the suspension of the criminal
proceedings.
(2) YES. In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-Tabora acted with grave abuse of
discretion when she ordered the arrests of respondents Isip and Liclican despite the existence of a
prejudicial question. Judge Tiongson-Tabora cannot deny knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No.
6623-R as the judge presiding over its JDR. As correctly held by the CA.
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of the existence of said prejudicial question that should have barred
the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioners Liclican and Isip, for the simple reason that a juridical
person can only act through its officers, and the issue in the main case submitted for JDR before Judge
Tiongson-Tabora is one for nullification of meetings, election and act of directors and officers, injunction
and other reliefs. Thus, she knows for a fact that there is a question as to who are the legitimate directors
of JMD such that there is doubt as to whether private respondents are in a position to act for JMD.
###
Rule 112 Preliminary Investigation
Fenequito vs Vergara
DOCTRINE: It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has authority to file an appeal with
the RTC. Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of1987, mandates the OSG to represent “the Government in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings.” On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree
No. 1275, entitled “Reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the
Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution
Service,” which was the law in force at the time the appeal was filed, provides that the provincial or the city
fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor) “shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors
and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein
discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal prosecutions.”
FACTS: An Information for falsification of public documents was filed with the MTC of Manila by the
Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila against herein petitioners. Herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause. After respondent’s Comment/Opposition was filed, the
MeTC issued an Order dismissing the case on the ground of lack of probable cause. Aggrieved, respondent,
with the express conformity of the public prosecutor, appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila. The RTC rendered judgment setting aside the Order of the MeTC and directing the said court to
proceed to trial. Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. The CA rendered its
presently assailed Resolution dismissing the petition. The CA ruled that the Decision of the RTC is
interlocutory in nature and, thus, is not appealable. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
CA denied the same. Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds that the (1) CA erred in
outright dismissal of the petition on the ground that the remedy is improper and (2) RTC Ruling is final and
unappealable. The petitioners relies on “Strict enforcement of the Rules may be suspended whenever the
purposes of justice so require.”
ISSUE/S: (1) Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition on improper remedy; (2) Whether or
not the RTC ruling is final and unappealable;
HELD: (1) NO. The Court notes at the outset that one of the grounds relied upon by the CA in dismissing
petitioners’ petition for review is the latter’s failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent to the petition filed, as required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. While
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, they, however, failed to comply with these requirements.
Worse, they did not even mention anything about it in the said Motion. Section 3, Rule 42 of the same Rules
provides:
“Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements.—The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of
the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs,
proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.”
Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites
laid down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict
attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed
cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by
appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants. In
the instant case, petitioners had all the opportunity to comply with the Rules. Nonetheless, they remained
obstinate in their non-observance even when they sought reconsideration of the ruling of the CA dismissing
their petition. Such obstinacy is incongruous with their late plea for liberality in construing the Rules. On the
above basis alone, the Court finds that the instant petition is dismissible.
(2) NO. A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.
Upon the other hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be done upon its merits. The RTC Decision is beyond cavil interlocutory in nature. It is
essentially a denial of petitioners’ motion to quash because it leaves something more to be done x x x, i.e.,
the continuation of the criminal proceedings until the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined.
Specifically, the MeTC has yet to arraign the petitioners, then proceed to trial and finally render the proper
judgment.
Petitioners contend that the PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report, submitted as evidence
by respondent to the prosecutor’s office, showed that the findings therein are not conclusive and, thus,
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The Court is not persuaded.
It is clear from a perusal of the cited PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report No. 048-03 that
the document examiner found that the signatures appearing in the questioned Deed of Sale as compared
to the standard signatures “reveal divergences in the manner of execution and stroke structure [which is]
an indication that they WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.” The Court agrees
with the prosecutor’s pronouncement in its Resolution dated September 22, 2003, that although the
findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory were qualified by the statement contained in the Report that “no
definite conclusion can be rendered due to the fact that questioned signatures are photocopies wherein
minute details are not clearly manifested,” the fact that an expert witness already found that the questioned
signatures were not written by one and the same person already creates probable cause to indict petitioners
for the crime of falsification of public document.
In the instant case, the Court finds no justification to depart from the ruling of the RTC that the offense
charged was committed and that herein petitioners are probably guilty thereof.
With respect to respondent’s legal personality to appeal the Order of the MeTC, suffice it to say that the
appeal filed with the RTC was made with the express conformity of the public prosecutor who handles the
case.
###
Burgundy Realty Corporation vs Reyes
DOCTRINE: It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a
preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of
a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions
of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative
Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary
over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which
holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by
an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by
courts. This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely
determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires
after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A
preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence.
Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective
claims.
FACTS: Respondent Josefa “Jing” C. Reyes (Reyes), sometime in 1996, offered her services to petitioner
as the latter’s real estate agent in buying parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be developed
into a golf course. She informed petitioner that more or less ten (10) lot owners are her clients who were
willing to sell their properties. Convinced of her representations, petitioner released the amount of
P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be used in buying those parcels of land. Reyes, instead of buying those
parcels of land, converted and misappropriated the money given by petitioner to her personal use and
benefit. Petitioner sent a formal demand for Reyes to return the amount of P23,423,327.50, to no avail
despite her receipt of the said demand. As such, petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of Estafa against
Reyes before the Assistant City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati City.
Reyes, while admitting that she acted as a real estate agent for petitioner, denied having converted or
misappropriated the involved amount of money. She claimed that the said amount was used solely for the
intended purpose and that it was petitioner who requested her services in procuring the lots. According to
her, it was upon the petitioner’s prodding that she was constrained to contact her friends who were also
into the real estate business, including one named Mateo Elejorde. Meanwhile, Reyes received information
that her sub-broker Mateo Elejorde had been depositing the involved money entrusted to him under his
personal account. On March 28, 2000, through a board resolution, petitioner allegedly authorized Reyes to
institute, proceed, pursue and continue with whatever criminal or civil action against Mateo Elejorde, or
such person to whom she may have delivered or entrusted the money she had received in trust from the
firm, for the purpose of recovering such money. Thus, Reyes filed a complaint for the crime of estafa against
Mateo Elejorde before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati City. Thereafter, an Information for the crime
of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was filed against Reyes and raffled
before the RTC Makati City. Undeterred, Reyes filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice
(DOJ), but it was dismissed by the Secretary of Justice. Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration,
and in a Resolution on the said motion was granted.
Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Secretary of Justice. Eventually, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. The latter, however, affirmed
the questioned Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. Hence, the petition for review to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE/S: Whether of not the CA erred in not finding that the element of misappropriation was not sufficiently
established in the case but instead concurred with the decision of the DOJ Secretary;
HELD: It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary
of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,9 exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Review
as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence
committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected
by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. In the present case, after review and
reconsideration, the Secretary of Justice reversed the investigating prosecutor’s finding of probable cause
that all the elements of the crime of estafa are present. Estafa, under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code, is committed by― ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).―Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned herein below: x x x x 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(a) x x x (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation
be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property; x x x
In reversing the finding of probable cause that the crime of estafa has been committed, the Secretary of
Justice reasoned out that, [the] theory of conversion or misappropriation is difficult to sustain and that under
the crime of estafa with grave abuse of confidence, the presumption is that the thing has been devoted to
a purpose or is different from that for which it was intended but did not take place in this case.
The CA, in sustaining the questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, ruled that the element of
misappropriation or conversion is wanting. It further ratiocinated that the demand for the return of the thing
delivered in trust and the failure of the accused to account for it, are circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation, however, the said presumption is rebuttable and if the accused is able to satisfactorily
explain his failure to produce the thing delivered in trust, he may not be held liable for estafa.
###
Abando vs Bayona
DOCTRINE: The Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as
practicable.” Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.
FACTS: The case sprang from Criminal Case entitled People of the Philippines v. Cresencio Palo, Sr. City
Prosecutor Abanado filed the Information2 in the MTCC, Bacolod, which was eventually raffled to Judge
Bayona. In connection with the issuance of a warrant of arrest against accused Palo, Judge Bayona issued
an order directing complainant Abanado to present
1. a copy of the Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation, 2. Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor

Dennis Jarder, 3. Memorandum of the transfer of case assignment from designated Investigating
Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor, and 4. Exhibit to the Court, to enable his court to evaluate and determine
the existence of probable cause.
As to item 3, complainant stated that there was no memorandum of transfer of the case from Investigating
Prosecutor Jarder to him. Judge Bayona didn’t take the explanation stating that the Jarder Resolution
dismissing the complaint was part and parcel of the official records of the case and must form part of the
records of the preliminary investigation. Because there was a conflict between Jarder’s and complainant’s
resolutions, those documents were necessary in the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence to
establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Palo. He ordered complainant to
complete the records of the case by producing the Jarder’s Resolution. The Office of the City Prosecutor
again said that it is impossible to submit the same, the Resolution was no longer part of the records of the
case as it was disapproved by complainant.
Judge Bayona did not accept the explanations made by the Office of the City Prosecutor. He required
complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. Complainant requested for a ten-day
extension to comply with it but was denied. He also ordered the Clerk of Court to issue a subpoena duces
tecum ad testificandum to Jarder directing him to testify on the existence of his resolution dismissing the
case against Palo and to Office of the City Prosecutor’s Records Officer Myrna Vañegas to bring the entire
record of the preliminary investigation of the Palo case. Complainant then filed an inhibition against the
judge and a certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain
respondent from proceeding with the hearing of the contempt proceedings. Complainant’s prayer for a TRO
was granted by Presiding Judge Pepito Gellada of the RTC Bacolod.
Judge Gellada granted the petition for certiorari holding that when a city or provincial prosecutor reverses
the investigating assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding probable cause replaces the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The result would
be that the resolution of dismissal no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case. It is no longer
required that the complaint or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted
to and be examined by the judge. The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not intend to unduly
burden trial judges by requiring them to go over the complete records of the cases all the time for the
purpose of determining probable cause for the sole purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest against the
accused. What is required is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make
his independent judgment or at least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence
of probable cause.
Complainant executed an administrative complaint and the same was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). He alleged that Judge Bayona was guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure
and gross misconduct. He asserted that respondent unduly burdened himself by obsessing over the
production of the records of the preliminary investigation, especially Jarder’s Resolution. Judge Bayona, in
his comment with Counter-Complaint for Disbarment of Prosecutor Abanado, reiterated the importance of
the Jarder’s Resolution in deciding whether to issue a warrant of arrest. The OCA submitted its report and
recommendation noting Judge Gellada’s Order which held that the resolution of the city or provincial
prosecutor finding probable cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor. In such
case, the resolution recommending the dismissal is superseded, and no longer forms an integral part of the
records of the case and it need not be annexed to the information filed in court.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the conduct of a preliminary investigation is an executive function.

HELD: Yes, the conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function. The courts must
consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations
whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. The Department of Justice-National
Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be
attached to the information only as far as practicable. Such attachment is not mandatory or required under
the rules.
###
Heirs of Nestor Tria vs Obias
DOCTRINE: The justice secretary is not precluded from exercising his power of review over the
investigating prosecutor even after the information has already been filed in court; The justice
secretary’s subsequent resolution withdrawing the information or dismissing the case does not
cause the court to lose jurisdiction over the case.
FACTS: On May 22, 1998, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning at the Pili Airport in Camarines Sur, Engr.
Nestor Tria, Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region V and
concurrently Officer-In-Charge of the 2nd Engineering District of Camarines Sur, was shot by a gunman
while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was brought to a hospital but died the following day from the
lone gunshot wound on his nape. Subsequently, the incident was investigated by the NBI. On July 31,
1998, NBI Regional Director Alejandro R. Tenerife, Chairman of Task Force Tria, recommended to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of Roberto Aclan, Juanito, Ona and Atty. Epifania
"Fanny" GonzalesObias, for the murder of Engr. Tria. On the basis of statements given by 26 individuals,
autopsy and ballistic examination reports, and relevant documents gathered the NBI found that: ACLAN
and ONA had been conducting an almost daily stakeout, for about two weeks prior to the incident, at Dir.
TRIA’s office. They would observe TRIA’s arrival and departure from office and would even ask the security
guard on duty if TRIA has already arrive or left the office. Around 8:00 o’clock in the morning of May 22,
1998, ACLAN and ONA were spotted in their usual places at the DPWH Office. Shortly after, Administrative
Officer JOSE PECUNDO announced to those who had some documents for signature of Director TRIA to
proceed to Pili Airport where TRIA would sign them before leaving for Manila.
Upon hearing this, ACLAN and ONA left hurriedly on board a red motorcycle. Shortly after 10:00 a.m. on
that day, Director TRIA arrived at the Airport. After signing some documents at the parking lot he proceeded
towards the pre-departure area on the second floor of the airport building. ONA, who was waiting on the
stairway, immediately followed TRIA as the latter was going up the stairs. As TRIA was approaching the
pre-departure area he was met by Atty. [E]PIFANIA OBIAS who shook his hands and started conversing
with him. It was at this juncture that a gunshot rang out and TRIA dropped like a log on the floor, bleeding
profusely from a gunshot wound at the back of his head. Atty. EPIFANIA OBIAS, on the other hand,
admitted that she was with ACLAN in the early morning of May 22, 1998; that at about 7:00 a.m. on that
day she went to the residence of Director TRIA at Liboton, Naga City, had a brief talk with the latter and left
immediately after agreeing to meet at the airport later on. She also volunteered the information that
ROBERTO ACLAN was not the gunman who had fired the fatal shot at Director TRIA. She was also the
last person seen talking with Director TRIA when the latter was gunned down. A practicing lawyer, Atty.
OBIAS also engages herself in real estate business on the side. In 1997 she had brokered a sale of real
estate between and among spouses JEREMIAS, as Vendors, and Spouses NESTOR and PURA TRIA, as
Vendees, over a land in Balatas, Naga City. It was Atty. OBIAS who received, for and in behalf of the
vendors, the full payment of P2.8 Million of the sale but the latter deliberately avoided the TRIA family and,
despite verbal and written demands, she failed and refused, as she still fails and refuses, to fulfill her legal
obligation to the TRIA family. During the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, respondent filed her CounterAffidavit denying that she was in anyway involved with the killing
of Engr. Tria and denied most of the allegations made by the NBI. On July 2, 1999, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur issued a resolution8 directing the filing of an information for murder
against Aclan and Ona but dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence as against herein respondent,
Atty. Epifania Obias. This was, however, modified on January 25, 2000 by then Justice Secretary Serafin
Cuevas directing the Provincial Prosecutor to include respondent in the information for murder filed against
Aclan and Ona. Respondent along with Aclan and Ona filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ’s
January 25, 2000 resolution. In the meantime, the information charging Aclan and Ona has already been
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur. Upon request however, the venue was
transferred to the RTC Quezon City by resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 00-3145-RTC.16 After so much
petition and appeal, the DOJ eventually directed the Provincial Prosecutor to forward the records of the
case to the Office of the President in compliance. In his Order dated March 24, 2004, Presidential Assistant
Manuel C. Domingo granted respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reversed the DOJ resolutions.
The OP concluded there was no interlocking circumstantial evidence of respondent’s acts before, during
and after the killing of Engr. Tria that would establish conspiracy among Aclan, Ona and respondent to
commit the crime. Accordingly, the case against respondent was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioners filed a series of motions, which reached the CA, who denied their petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the appeal or motion for reconsideration filed
by the respondent had deprived them of the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses on
those affidavits belatedly submitted by the respondent. –-- No. 2. Whether the CA gravely abused its
discretion in affirming the OP’s reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of Justice. –-- Yes.
HELD: Under the procedure for preliminary investigation provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, in case the investigating prosecutor conducts a hearing where
there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or witness, "[t]he parties can be present at the hearing
but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer
questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned." Hence, the non-referral by the OP to the
DOJ of the motion for reconsideration of respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, did not violate
petitioners’ right to due process. The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-
existence of probable cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the Secretary of Justice
may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned
either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to
dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. In reversing the
DOJ’s finding of probable cause, the OP found merit in the argument of the respondent that the DOJ’s
finding that she was with Aclan when she went to the residence of Engr. Tria early in the morning of May
22, 1998, was not sufficiently established. The OP gave more weight to the affidavit of Calayag stating that
Aclan was not around when they and respondent, among other visitors, were at Engr. Tria’s house at that
time -- than that account given by SA Eduarte, which was uncorroborated. As to the double sale allegedly
committed by the respondent from which the latter’s strong motive to liquidate Engr. Tria was inferred, the
OP found this as a mere expression of opinion by the investigators considering that Engr. Tria’s widow,
Mrs. Pura Tria, categorically admitted her knowledge of the said transaction. Neither was the OP persuaded
by the NBI’s "kiss of death" theory since it is but a customary way of greeting a friend to shake hands and
hence it cannot imply that respondent utilized this as a signal or identification for the gunman to shoot Engr.
Tria. Respondent’s alleged indifference immediately after Engr. Tria was gunned down while conversing
with her, was also negated by the affidavit of an employee of Philippine Air Lines based at the Pili Airport,
stating that right after the incident took place he saw respondent in the radio room in shock and was being
given water by another person.
###
Uy vs Javellana
DOCTRINE: The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation
prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or
information for an of ense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day without regard to the fine.
FACTS: This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Gerlie M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug
(Bascug) of the (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding Judge Javellana of the MeTC, La Castellana,
Negros Occidental. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their complaint:Judge
Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and
Bascug cited several occasions as examples: In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People v. Cornelio, for
Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section
16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled People v. Celeste, et al.,
for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge Javellana did not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the
Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that
said motion was a prohibited pleading; Also in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana refused to dismiss
outright the complaint even when the same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein
complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v.
Lopez, et al., for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in accordance
with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite
confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts
alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case.
Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued
warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their witnesses to
determine the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody.
As a result, Judge Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily
surrendered or when a warrantless arrest had been effected. Judge Javellana failed to observe the
constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge Javellana
set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v. Bautista, for preliminary investigation even when the accused
had no counsel, and proceeded with said investigation without informing the accused of his rights to remain
silent and to have a counsel Judge Javellana stressed that the charges against him were baseless and
malicious; and the acts being complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not
the proper subject of an administrative complaint. Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of
the instant complaint against him. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report, found Judge
Javellana liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure in cases appropriately covered by said Rule.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
HELD: Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in
People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case
was never previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) ofthe
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. A case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply
with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, we find irrelevant
Judge Javellana’s argument that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. The following facts
are undisputed: People v. Celeste, et al. were not referred to the Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to
Dismiss based on this ground. Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the Motion to Dismiss
(albeit without prejudice) filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al. (hindi ko sure) Judge Javellana
did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez,
et al.
Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down
by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case,
and defeating the express purpose of said Rule. Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio
and People v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described
in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code the appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor
in its medium and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be
imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, these two cases should be
governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
###
PCGG vs Navarro-Guttierez
DOCTRINE: 1. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require
an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. 2. Preliminary investigation is merely an
inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion
and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence
to secure a conviction. "[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of [the prosecution's] evidence. The presence and absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits." Hence,
"the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level."
FACTS: PCGG filed against former officers/directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
namely, Ferry, Tengco, Zosa, Zalamea, Castell, and Sison, as well as former officers/stockholders of
National Galleon Shipping Corporation (Galleon), namely, Cuenca, Tinio, and Roque charging them of
violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.
PCGG alleged that on October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) issued
Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
(Ad Hoc Committee) in order to identify various anomalous loans entered into by the Philippine Government
in the past. Thereafter, the Ad Hoc Committee, with the assistance of a Technical Working Group (TWG)
examined and studied documents relative to loan accounts extended by GFIs to various corporations during
the regime of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) -one of which is the loan account
granted by the DBP to Galleon. TWG found anomalies after examining the loans of Galleon. PCGG then
files a case against the individual officers. Only Roque, Zalamea, Tengco, and Castell filed their counter-
affidavits. In their defense, Roque stated that he was only a minor stockholder and in no position to influence
such loan. Zamalea was only chairman of DBP after the transaction. Tenco argued that the charges already
prescribed, and Castell argued that his job is only supervision of employees. Ombudsman found no
probable cause against them hence the case was dismissed on the basis that pieces of evidence attached
to the case records were not sufficient to establish probable cause against the individual respondents,
considering that the documents presented by the PCGG consisted mostly of executive summaries and
technical reports, which are hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value. PCGG move for
reconsideration but was also denied.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman in finding
no probable cause to indict the respondents.
HELD: Yes. It must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion
of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an
Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's
action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power
must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
The Court's pronouncement in Ciron v. Gutierrez is instructive on this matter, to wit: xxx this Court's
consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the determination of the Ombudsman of the
existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This
observed policy is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the
Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much
the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.] (Emphasis and underscoring in the
original)
In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings - whether by
the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause
exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v.
Vergara, Jr., the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in finding the existence thereof in the
following manner, to wit: Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined
as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require
an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
###
De Lima vs Reyes
DOCTRINE: The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes
that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that
pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
FACTS: The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to act on any matter that
may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. This action may
include, but is not limited to, the conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 questioning the regularity of preliminary investigation becomes moot after the trial court completes
its determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of arrest. Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), was a
veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at around 10:30 am, he
was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San PedroPuerto Princesa City, Palawan.
Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that
he shot Dr. Ortega and also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando
"Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr. Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division
of the National Bureau of Investigation where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel
T. Reyes (former Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima
issued Department Order No. 0918 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct
preliminary investigation. Dr. Ortega's wife, filed a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former
Governor Reyes as the mastermind of her husband's murder On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded
its preliminary investigation and issued the Resolution dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint. On September
7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators
(Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case "in the interest of service and due process" to
address the offer of additional evidence denied by the First Panel. But it was also revoked. Pursuant to the
revocation, Second Panel issued a Subpoena requiring former Governor Reyes to appear before them and
to submit his counter-affidavit and supporting evidence. Dr. Ortega filed before the Secretary of Justice a
Petition for Review (Ad Cautelam) assailing the First Panel's Resolution. Governor Reyes filed before the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel. He argued that the
Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel. He also argued that
the parties were
already afforded due process and that the evidence to be addressed by the reinvestigation was neither new
nor material to the case. On March 12, 2012, the Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable
cause and recommending the filing of informations on all accused, including former Governor Reyes.
Regional Trial Court of Palawan subsequently issued warrants of arrest but the warrants were ineffective
since the Gov. Reyes allegedly left the country days before the warrants could be served. Gov. Reyes filed
a petition for review alleging that the resolution of the second panel was void. CA affirmed. Court of Appeals
stated that the Secretary of Justice had not shown the alleged miscarriage of justice sought to be prevented
by the creation of the Second Panel since both parties were given full opportunity to present their evidence
before the First Panel. It also ruled that the evidence examined by the Second Panel was not additional
evidence but "forgotten evidence" that was already available before the First Panel during the conduct of
the preliminary investigation.
ISSUE/S: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion when she issued Department Order No. 710.
HELD: The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings
of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Under the
Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasijudicial functions." A quasi-judicial function is "the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature." Otherwise stated, an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards,
determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment of a
court. In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused.
The prosecutor only determines "whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed and the respondent-is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." As
such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions. In Santos v. Go: [T]he prosecutor in a
preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare-his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting
as a quasi-court, for it. is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. Though
some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial
in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.
###
Rule 113 Arrest
Saraum vs People
DOCTRINE: The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating
to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they
inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers
were justified in seizing them. Considering that Saraum’s arrest was legal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and
seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and
seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court
has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction.
FACTS: Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article II (Possession of Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads: That on or about the 17th day of August, 2006, at about
12:45 A.M., The accused did then and there have in his possession the following: 1 = One (1) lighter, 2 =
One (1) rolled tissue paper, 3 = One (1) aluminum tin foil, which are instruments and/or equipments fit or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the
body. Sarum pleaded not guilty and was released due to his application of bail.
According to the prosecution, the police officers conducted a buy-bust operation and coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) regarding the operation. During the operation, "Pata" eluded
arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the house, which was divided with a curtain as partition,
the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter Esperanza, who were holding drug paraphernalia apparently
in preparation to have a "shabu" pot session. They recovered from Saraum’s possession a lighter, rolled
tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter). PO3 Larrobis confiscated the items, placed them in the plastic
pack of misua wrapper, and made initial markings ("A" for Saraum and "P" for Esperanza). At the police
station, PO3 Larrobis marked as "AIS-0817-2006" the paraphernalia recovered from Saraum. After the case
was filed, the subject items were turned over to the property custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor.
Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified that on the date and time in question,
he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his parents-in-law when he was held by
men with firearms. They were already with "Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were his neighbors. Believing
that he had not committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge only
when he was brought to the court. RTC ruled against Sarum. CA sustained the RTCs decision.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Arrest of sarum was valid

HELD: Yes. Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or capriciousness on
the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts, such findings deserve great weight and are deemed
conclusive and binding. Besides, a review of the records reveals that the CA did not err in affirming his
conviction. The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia
for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the
accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such
possession is not authorized by law. In this case, the prosecution has convincingly established that Saraum
was in possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all
of which were offered and admitted in evidence. Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime,
which instance does not require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is
committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraum’s statement that he was not committing a crime at the time of
his arrest. PO3 Larrobis described in detail how they were able to apprehend him, who was then holding a
disposable lighter in his right hand and a tin foil and a rolled tissue paper in his left hand, while they were
in the course of arresting somebody. The case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pata," who, in eluding arrest,
entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza were incidentally caught in possession of the illegal
items. Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory explanation with regard to his presence at the vicinity of the
buy-bust operation and his possession of the seized items that he claims to have "countless, lawful uses."
On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses have adequately explained the respective uses of the items to
prove that they were indeed drug paraphernalia. There is, thus, no necessity to make a laboratory
examination and finding as to the presence or absence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or any illegal
substances on said items since possession itself is the punishable act. The valid warrantless arrest gave
the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia
they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As
these items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that Saraum’s
arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence
for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction.
Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection thereto when
he did not raise the issue before entering his plea. "The established rule is that an accused may be estopped
from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him
before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection
is deemed waived." In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested its objection to the admission of the seized
drug paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest and search, only during the formal offer of evidence by the
prosecution.
###
Comerciante vs People
DOCTRINE: The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced
police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should
have the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves observe - whether an individual is acting
in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
FACTS: Comerciante was caught having in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet (sic) each containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white crystalline
substance with a total of 0.43 grams which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug. According to the prosecution, the Police
were patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong
City. when they spotted two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla7 (Dasilla)
- standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets
to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached
Comerciante and Dasilla. The police officer arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2)
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed
that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. After the prosecution rested its
case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due
to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived
and ordered him to present his evidence. In his defense, Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking
for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who
were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station.
There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in
exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police
station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. The RTC found that PO3 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which yielded
two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation, the RTC opined that there was probable cause to
justify the warrantless arrest, considering that PO3 Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was carrying
the said sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found that absent
any proof of intent that PO3 Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be presumed to have
properly performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante. CA Affirmed the RTCs ruling.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the there was a valid warrantless arrest and “stop and frisk” conducted by the
Police
HELD: No, the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision,
would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and
while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of white
crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes
that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3
Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts
of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and
unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a
lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.31 That
his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in
possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the
province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed
shabu.
###
Luz vs People
DOCTRINE: At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter
of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might
make could be used against them.
FACTS: Police Officer II Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without
a helmet and this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires
all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle. He invited the accused to come inside
their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the sub-station to
where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer. While he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation
ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket. He was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket
of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged and slowly put out the contents
of the pocket of his jacket which included two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu. The RTC convicted
petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that
he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. Upon review, the CA affirmed
the RTCs Decision.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the search and seizure of the alleged subject shabu was incident to a lawful
arrest.
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed. There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged
down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is
the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the
part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136,
or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not
the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter. At the time that he was
waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest.
There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into
custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may
be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that
the only reason they went to the police substation was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front
of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no
intention to take petitioner into custody. Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was
deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his
ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. At the time a person is arrested, it
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted
that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after
petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
###
Antiquera vs People
DOCTRINE: The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to
sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
FACTS: At around 4:45 A.M. of February 11, 2004, police officers Gregorio and Laurence while onboard a
patrol car, saw two unidentified men rush out of a house in David St., Pasay City. Sensing something amiss,
the police officers approached the house and peeked inside the partially opened door, where they saw
George holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter, and beside him, his live-in partner, Corazon.
Because of this, they entered the house, and arrested George and Corazon. A search of the immediate
surroundings revealed a wooden box containing improvised tooter, scoop 10 sachets of suspected shabu,
and strips of aluminum oil. Because of they, they were charged with illegal possession of drugs
paraphernalia. Only George appealed the decision rendered by the RTC convicting him as charged, since
Corazon jumped bail. The Court of Appeals denied his appeal, hence he elevated his case to the Supreme
Court. Both lower courts justified the conviction of George, citing his arrest was a valid warrantless arrest
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: The Supreme Court: The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a
case of valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door
of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as
well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found
there. The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were
no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug
into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu,
said the prosecution, had no bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the
arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to question the validity
of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a “peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt
act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. But the
circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto. 1. The police officers claim
that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay
City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give
chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle.
Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the
house even when they heard no cry for help from it. 2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything
amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its
partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:
THE COURT:
Q – By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door, how was the
door open?Was it totally open, or was it partially open?
A – It was partially open Your Honor.
Q – By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
A – More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor. Q – So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the
house if the door was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door? A – We pushed the door,
Your Honor.
Q – Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped inside it, as a
police officer?
A – Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may…
Q – Are you not allowed to – Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can search the interior
of the house?
A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching the interior of the
house?
A – Yes, Your Honor.
Q – So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate the house,
considering your admission that you suspected that there was something wrong inside the house? A –
Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.
Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through its opening because
you did not know what was happening inside?
A – Yes, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of
accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule.
Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and
seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the
accused. One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not
enough to sustain his conviction.
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.” Accused acquitted.
###
People vs Vasquez
DOCTRINE: Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea on arraignment.
FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision of CA which affirmed the joint decision of RTC in a consolidated
case, convicting the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan (Don) of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of regulated drugs. Initially the case of illegal possession of drugs was raffled but upon motion
it was consolidated with the case of illegal sale of drugs. On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty
to both charges. The pre-trial conference of the cases was held, but the same was terminated without the
parties entering into any stipulation of facts. During the trial of the case the prosecution stated the events.
There was a confidential informant reported to PO2 Trambulo about the illegal drug activities. Fajardo form
a buy-bust team. It was in the buy-bust operation that Don was arrested. RTC convicted the appellant of
the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s evidence given that the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. On
appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. Hence this appeal. He argues that the
police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred
despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him.
Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was
inadmissible in court.
ISSUE/S: Whether the appellant Don may assail the validity of arrest.
HELD: NO. At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest.
We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be
made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the
legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s
jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto
of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within
the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made
without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the
Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in
People v. Cabugatan55 that: This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not
absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches,
(4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a
lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped
prisoners. (Citation omitted.)Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity
of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
###
Rule 114 Bail
Zuno vs Cabebe
DOCTRINE: The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed,
these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
FACTS: The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn complaint of Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño of the Department of Justice, against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe ,then Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court. The charges are knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of
the law and partiality. In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuño alleged that Criminal Case for illegal
possession of prohibited or regulated drugs was filed with the Regional Trial Court, against Rey
DaquepArcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William Roxas Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn Malabed
Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment, all the accused, assisted by their counsel de
parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss
invoking as ground the right of the accused to a speedy trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent judge
motu propio issued an Order granting bail to the accused, fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or
property bond at P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in
cash. Respondent judge issued the Order without the accused’s application or motion for bail. The
prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon, respondent judge issued an
order inhibiting himself from further proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was patently
irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent judge be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law. In his comment, respondent denied the charges. While
admitting that he issued the Order granting bail to the accused without any hearing, “the same was premised
on the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial.” The prosecution did not object to the grant of
bail to the accused. On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired. In his Report dated July 7,
2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the
law and recommended that a fine ofP20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law by granting bail without hearing.
HELD: YES. In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,we held that jurisprudence is replete with
decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of
bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
where bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail
whether it is a matter of right or discretion.It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases
where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion
which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct
a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no
petition for bail, a hearing should still be held. There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to
the accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge
in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond (Section
19, id.); otherwise the petition should be denied. Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing,
the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and
based thereon, the judge should formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is
strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and
procedure enumerated in Cortes.
He did not conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an
opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or
weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter
made a summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of
evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail. Respondent’s contention
is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the records of the criminal case that the prosecution has
intentionally delayed the trial of the case.
Even assuming there was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter
disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In
the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and the Rules
and maintain professional competence; and by the very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the
performance of his duties. He must render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.
Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these standards.
###
Government of HK Special Adm Region vs Olalia
DOCTRINE: The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases—clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
FACTS: Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a
final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region
filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by
the private respondent. The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting
the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear
and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders
and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash
bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court; 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate
notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition
proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to
require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition
that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that
the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said
order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE/S: WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
HELD: A potential extraditee is entitled to bail. Ratio Decidendi Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private
respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. On the other hand, private
respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty. In
this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo
G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan
Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the
following trends in international law: 1. the growing importance of the individual person in public
international; 2. the higher value now being given to human rights; 3. the corresponding duty of countries
to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and 4. the duty of this Court to
balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on
the other. In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of
the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held
that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
###
Leviste vs CA
DOCTRINE: Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial
liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. An erroneously convicted
accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed; Under what
circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal is a delicate balance between the interests of
society and those of the accused; In the exercise of discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal, the
proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal
should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that
the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the
RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he field an application
for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The CA denied his application on the ground that the
discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical
care outside the prison facility. On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of
the conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That
when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending
appeal.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail of
Leviste.
HELD: No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty
impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by
the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other circumstances: 1. that he is a recidivist,
quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration; 2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification; 3. that he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon; 4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or 5. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA committed
grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
###
Enrile vs Sandiganbayan
DOCTRINE: Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good
measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to
the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. Bail is a right
and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.”
FACTS: On June 5, 2014, Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis
of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in
an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant
for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender. Petitioner again asked the
Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a)
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his
advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail
and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong. a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that
if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua. b. Whether or not
prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.
HELD:
1. YES. Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence. Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the
1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail. The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be
high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Bail as a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in Sec.
13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to
wit: Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable. Exception: Unless
he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence
of his guilt is strong. Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence
of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of
the court. Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides: Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during
the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the penalty
imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his
bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances: a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; b) That he has previously escaped from
legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; c) That
he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; d) That the circumstances
of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in
either case. Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose
of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre
vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong. The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral: a) In all cases, whether bail
is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended); b) Where bail
is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra) c) Decide whether the guilt of
the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; d) If the guilt of the accused
is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.
2. YES. Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail The Supreme Court took note of the
Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising from its commitment to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
(emphasis in decision) Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. They arbitrarily ignored the
objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded
the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
###
Rule 115 Rights of the Accused
Del Castillo vs People
DOCTRINE: While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is
under appellants control or possession.
FACTS: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu,
police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation
at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del
Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a
small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his
men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of Del
Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned
with two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner
allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the
barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs
containing white crystalline substance. Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not
be presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.
ISSUE/S: Whether the search made in the nipa hut is valid.
HELD: No, the records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor
was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed
that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an
electrician by profession. The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence
and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With
the prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own
starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent
of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt,
or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
###
Miguel vs SB
DOCTRINE: To be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been
accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.
FACTS: Then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials[3] of Koronadal City, South Cotabato
filed a lettercomplaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman)[4] charging the
petitioner, among others,[5] with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the
consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering design, and the construction supervision
and management of the proposed Koronadal City public market (project).[6] In a June 27, 1996 order, the
Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among others, to submit his counter-affidavit. On October 23, 1996,
after moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit. The Sandiganbayan ordered the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On August 21, 2000, the petitioner,
through counsel, followed suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan likewise
granted. The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-affidavit with
the OSP. The petitioner asked for extension twice and still failed to file his counter-affidavit. Despite the
extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit, prompting Prosecutor
Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived his right to submit countervailing evidence (April
25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution. The
OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. The petitioner filed his Vigorous Opposition
based on the obvious and fatal defect of the information in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted
benefits and advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, since he was not accorded a presuspension hearing.
ISSUE/S: Whether the information against petitioner and petitioner's suspension valid.
HELD: Yes to both. In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and
the cause of the accusation against him,[31] Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Rules) requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute
and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires
that these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The test of the information sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In
particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged
in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in
the law. The raison detre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard
of a person of common understanding in appreciating the import of the phrase acting with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality. A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase acting with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner,
and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and
advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the
information would yield. Suspension is valid. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads: Section 13. Suspension
and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him. Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when
an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against
the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that
no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that to be heard does not only mean oral arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.
###
People vs Lara
DOCTRINE: The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part
of custodial investigation.
FACTS: Information charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC. • Following Lara's
plea of not guilty, trial ensued.
PROSECUTION: 3 witnesses: Enrique Sumulong, SPO1 Bernard Cruz and PO3 Efren Calix
SUMULONG: May 31, 2001, 9:00 AM, he withdrew the amount of P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini
Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian and while at around 10:30 AM,
while the pickup he was riding was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara
suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na
ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?”; • Bautista, one of those who accompanied him told him not to give the bag.
He threw the bag in Bautista's direction and Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran. Seeing Bautista,
Lara ran after him while firing his gun • He then ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San
Sebastian to relay the incident and when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the
rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; • He was informed by one bystander that Bautista
was shot and the bag was taken away from him;
On June 7, 2001: While on his way to Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel,
Pasig City and he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested. At the police station, he, Atie and
Manacob (other companions at pickup) identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San
Sebastian's money.
SPO1 CRUZ: • Around 7:55 PM on June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him
that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street • 4 police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street
where they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified and they then approached Lara and invited him for
questioning. • At the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by
Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently
detained.
PO3 CALIX: • May 31, 2001: he was informed of a robbery that took place and he, together with 3 other
police officers, proceeded to the crime scene wherein upon arriving one of the police officers who were able
to respond ahead of them, handed to him 11 pieces of empty shells and 6 deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol;
• As part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station; and before
Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the
incident.
DEFENSE: LARA • May 31, 2001: he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo,
was constructing a comfort room which was corroborated by his sister, Edjosa Manalo and neighbor,
Simplicia Delos Reyes. • June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one
of his cousins, police officers arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara and after confirming that he was
Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall. He voluntarily went with
them and while inside the patrol car, one of the policemen said,"You are lucky, we were able to caught you
in your house, if in another place we will kill you”. • He was brought to the police station and not the barangay
hall as he was earlier told where he was investigated for robbery with homicide and when he told the police
that he was at home when the subject incident took place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses
but when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police officers told them to come back the following
day. • While he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie,
"Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he
will be subjected to an inquest.
RTC: GUILTY of robbery with homicide sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Rejected Lara's defense of alibi as follows because Enrique Sumulong positively identified accused Arturo
Lara as the person who carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, and the one who
shot Joselito Bautista which caused his instantaneous death on the same day. Also, it is not impossible for
him to be at the place.
ARGUMENTS: • On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First,
that he was arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered
void all proceedings including those that led to his conviction. • Second, he was not assisted by counsel
when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial investigation and his right to
counsel had already attached. • Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the prosecution failed to present a witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts.
Sumulong merely presumed that he was the one who shot Bautista and who took the bag of money from
him. The physical description of Lara that Sumulong gave to the police was different from the one he gave
during the trial, indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to
the possibility that it was his unidentified companion who shot Bautista and took possession of the money.
Hence, it cannot be reasonably claimed that his conviction was attended with moral certainty.
• Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing that they
were impelled by improper motives in testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have been given the
credence they deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not by itself
suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.
CA: AFFIRMED conviction. - AUTOMATIC APPEAL TO SC as the penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua.
ISSUE/S: Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is
inadmissible because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel? (NO, identification not custodial
investigation)
HELD: DENY appeal. - NO. There was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up
since the latter is not part of custodial investigation and this does not constitute a violation of his right to
counsel.
That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong's identification
of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial
investigation.
People v. Amestuzo: The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called
Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.
Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by
the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation
process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to
the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
statement in the course of the line-up.
An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of the
investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses
from a group of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was
interrogated at all or that a statement or confession was extracted from him. During the police line-up, the
accusatory process had not yet commenced.
Assuming there was interrogation, any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a
prosecution witness and not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission.
###
People vs Ayson
DOCTRINE: The rights guaranteed a person under Art. III, Sec. 12 of the Constitution are not
available when he is not under custodial investigation. Thus, a statement or confession
voluntarily given by an employee during an administrative investigation that he had malversed his
employer’s funds is admissible although without a prior information of said rights and without the
assistance of counsel.
FACTS: Certain Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio
City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed
by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was
sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were
given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from
settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime
of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained
Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without
the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused
was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE/S: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission
and statement of accused.
HELD: No, the handwritten admission and statement of accused were declared to be admissible.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is
accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in
any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself.”
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry.” It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a
party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which
has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific
question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as
required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed
to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the
strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other
officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his
right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the
well-known axiom that everyone is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one.
Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in
advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If
not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right
may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
###
Villaroel vs People
DOCTRINE: The right to a speedy trial is violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and
for no cause or justifiable motive.
FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). The neophytes, including
victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites. After the second day of initiation rites has ended,
accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially
refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity
members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds
of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to
the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the
carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They
then slept at the carport. After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering
and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was
just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started
helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When
his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans. The case however did not
proceed until 2002. The unexplained length of time in which the case remained dormant caused the
dismissal of the case for being in violation of the accuseds’ constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
trial.
ISSUE/S: Whether the CA correctly dismissed the case for violation of the accuseds’ right to speedy trial
HELD: Yes. The SC did not see any grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.
The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were elevated
to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it
to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as
September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the
Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The
prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a
quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It
is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the
said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the
said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion. It is likewise noticeable that
from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action
at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners,
the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on
August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of
time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon.
###
Rule 116 Arraignment and Plea
People vs Estomaca
DOCTRINE: Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the
judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the
list of witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and
asking him what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or
dialect that the accused understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said
Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of
implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed
of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able
to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under
the Constitution.
FACTS: Respondent Estomaca is an illiterate laborer accused of raping his own daughter, Estelita. 5
complaints were filed and 2 of them are being challenged. These instances happened sometime in 1993
and 1994 which both took place in their residence in Iloilo. The court imposed the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for the sexual assault in 1993 and the penalty of death for the alleged rape in 1994. The records
show, however, that there was an irregularity in his arraignment where the complaints were supposed to
have all been read to him in the Ilonggo/local dialect. In this said arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty
to all 5 complaints but subsequently stated the he wasn’t guilty of the other 3 cases against him.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the arraignment was valid or not.
HELD: No. The transcript of the arraignment shows that it merely consisted of the bare reading of the 5
complaints. It was reported in the transcript that “Reading the information/complaint to the accused in
Ilonggo/local dialect”. Since it was stated in the singular, the court speculates whether all 5 complaints
were actually ready, translated or explained to him on a level within his comprehension considering his
limited education. Parenthetically, there was no statement of record that appellant fully understood that
medium of expression. This assumes added significance since Ilonggo, or properly called Hiligaynon, is a
regional language, spoken in a major part of Iloilo province, Negros Occidental and, with variations, in
Capiz. Within a province or major geographical area using a basic regional language, there may be other
local dialects spoken in certain parts thereof. If said indication in the aforequoted portion of the transcript
intended to convey that Ilonggo is merely a local dialect and was also the idiom referred to, the same is
egregious error; it would be different if local dialect was used to denote an alternative and different medium
but, inexplicably, without identifying what it was. The significance of this distinction is found right in the
provision of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which, cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations, deliberately
required that the complaint or information be read to the accused in the language or the dialect known to
him, to ensure his comprehension of the charges. The Court takes judicial notice, because it is either of
public knowledge or readily capable of unquestionable demonstration, that in the central and northwestern
part of Iloilo province and all the way up to and throughout Antique, including necessarily San Joaquin
where the offenses were committed and of which appellant and his family are natives, the local dialect is
known as kinaray-a. Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extended social or commercial
intercourse, kinaray-a is not readily understandable to nor spoken by those born to the Hiligaynon regional
language or who have lived in the areas under its sway for an appreciable period of time. The converse is
true for those whose native tongue is the dialect of kinaray-a, since they are generally not well-versed in
Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints are not only in English but in technical legal language, we
are again at sea as to whether and how the indictments were translated to Ilonggo and/or to kinaray-a, or
that the appellant was truly and honestly made aware of the charges and, especially, the consequences of
his guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and do not reveal anything on this point, nor how the dialogue
between the presiding judge and appellant was translated. Yet a mans life is at stake while this Court
wrestles with that dilemma created by an omission of official duty. Since no valid judgments can be had
upon an invalid arraignment, the cases were set aside and were remanded to the trial court.
###
People vs Pangilinan
DOCTRINE: Procedural defect of belated arraignment was cured when the counsel of the accused
participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned.
FACTS: Respondent Alfredo Pangilinan was charged with 2 informations for raping his daughter, AAA. He
was arrested and detained with no bail recommended.
He then filed a petition for bail. The petition for bail was heard and prosecution presented evidence. The
Regional Trial Court denied petition Defense then presented its evidence.
The RTC after having discovered that Pangilinan was not yet arraigned, scheduled his arraignment.
Pangilinan pleaded not guilty. RTC convicted him and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the arraignment was valid.
HELD: YES.
Pangilinan assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he was arraigned only after
the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural error which is prejudicial
to the appellant and is tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation
against him. He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings
because at the time the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his
person.
The accused is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had
already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.19 In the case at bar, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not his
arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to
apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized
against him.
Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. The question is: Were
appellant’s rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the
proceedings? We do not think so. Appellant’s belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural
defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had
yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s
active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him;
otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest
was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure
undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences,
that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural
defect. This Court will not allow it.
In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised under similar circumstances,
we held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for
decision, the error is non- prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellant’s rights and interests were
not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated.
###
Daan vs Sandiganbayan
DOCTRINE: 1. Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval—it usually involves the
defendant’s pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. 2. Ordinarily, plea bargaining is
made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings but it may also be made during the trial proper and even
after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case.
FACTS: Accused Joselito Raniero Daan (together with his other co-accused) was charged for three counts
of malversation of public funds and three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee before the Sandiganbayan. In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea
of "not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of
confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if
such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the
crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the
lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty",
but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Prosecution found this acceptable. Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was
likewise amenable to the offer of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts.
The Sandiganbayan, however, denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable
recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its
approval.
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration.
Daan filed a Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Daan’s
motion to plea bargain.
HELD: YES.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading
guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a
lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule
118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial
conference,viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special
laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d)
waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits
the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial
of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions
made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters
referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its
evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not
made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several
witnesses.9
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be
made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,10 and that the plea
of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules
however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the
trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind
that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter
of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a
lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed
entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the
prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its
discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner and
the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public. The
Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the
charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they
are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the economic
benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing
them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in
government."
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However,
subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be
accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction.
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total
amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February
26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover, the
accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.
###
People vs Janjalani
TOPIC: Valentine’s Day Bombing by Abu Sayyaf; Trinidad and Baharan plead guilty for multiple murder but
plead not guilty for frustrated multiple murder. DOCTRINE: 1. All trial judges must refrain from accepting
with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty
bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the
meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction; The requirement for a judge to conduct a
searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. 2. The requirement to conduct a searching
inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused—the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of
judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under
coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea. 3. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if
such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.
FACTS: An RRCG bus was plying its usual route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus
terminal via EDSA. Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-
EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on
getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in. According to Elmer Andales, the bus
conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the
two sat away from each other—one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the
bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the
men were reddish. When he approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying
for two passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying
for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid
for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that the two were up to no good,
and that there might be a holdup. Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on
asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted
on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off the bus,
because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually,
the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the bus and
ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing
the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He
saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a
statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident. Shortly before the explosion, the
spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group—Abu Solaiman— announced over radio station DZBB that the
group had a Valentine’s Day “gift” for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he
again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks. As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave
ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident, confessing his participation in
the Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan
likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus
conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had
entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group—namely
Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat
Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other “John” and “Jane Does”—were then charged with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the
other accused remain at-large. On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge, Baharan, Trinidad,
and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder
charge, accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to
both charges. In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and
Trinidad were amenable to changing their “not guilty” pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder,
considering that they pled “guilty” to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained
to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and
manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad
pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants’ plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
said plea.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital of ense; reception of evidence.—
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People v.
Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant’s original plea was “not guilty,” the trial court should
have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to “guilty.” Likewise, the requirement
to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel
who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v.
Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already
signified in open court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he
understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still
be meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened. The conduct of a searching
inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused
had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance,
effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory. Nevertheless,
the High Court is not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of the
factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused
Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge— multiple murder—based on the same act
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea
to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt—one through an
extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and
the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it
unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the “searching inquiry” in this instance. Remanding the case for
re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment under consideration.
###
ABS CBN Corporation vs Gozon
TOPIC: SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.—Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the
resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President;
provided that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office.
DOCTRINE: The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after
the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
FACTS: The controversy arose from GMA-7’s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino overseas
worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz. As summarized by the CA: Overseas Filipino worker Angelo
dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition for his release, a demand was made for the
withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he was released by his captors and was scheduled
to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July 2004. Occasioned by said homecoming and the public
interest it generated, both GMA Network, Inc. and petitioner made their respective broadcasts and
coverage of the live event. Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was
airing footages of ABS-CBN. GMA-7’s news control room staff saw neither the “No Access Philippines”
notice nor a notice that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS-CBN. ABS-CBN filed the
Complaint for copyright infringement against Dela Pena-Reyes and Manalastas to which the prosecutor
found probable cause to indict the latter. Respondents filed the Petition for Review before the Department
of Justice. DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents and held that good faith may be
raised as a defense in the case. Both parties moved for reconsideration of the Gonzalez Resolution. The
trial court granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed earlier by Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas.
The Motion to Suspend was granted.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Trial Court is correct in granting the Motion to Suspend.
HELD: The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas’
arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It had full
control and direction of the case. The suspension of the arraignment should always be within the limits
allowed by law. The doctrine in Crespo v. Judge Mogul was reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of
Appeals where this court reminded the Department of Justice Secretary to refrain from entertaining petitions
for review when the case is already pending with this court: In order to avoid a situation where the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in the Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. The trial court should have proceeded with
respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the
Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It was only on September 13, 2010
that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals. The trial court erred when it did
not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. As Judge
Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the arraignment
“disregards the requirements of due process and erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.”
###
Enrile vs People
DOCTRINE: The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the
Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless
grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is
shown.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused
of the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such
that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the Information means. The general
function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard against surprises during
trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the
prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence relating to how the
people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of
factual information included in the bill of particulars.
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile, Napoles, et. al before
the Sandiganbayan. Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion
(motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for
bail), and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information,.
The Sandiganbayan heard both motions. Thereafter, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to
both motions. The Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest
on the plunder case against the accused. Soon after, Enrile received a notice of hearing informing him that
his arraignment would be held before the Sandiganbayan. The day before his arraignment, Enrile filed a
motion for bill of particular as well as a motion for deferment of arraignment since he was to undergo medical
examination at the PGH. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion for Bill of Particulars on the following
grounds: 1. the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information; and 2. the
details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
Enrile then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Thus, he filed a petition for
certiorari before the High Court claiming that the Sandiganybayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
his motion for bill of particulars.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars;
HELD: YES. The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the
Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless
grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is shown.
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion
for a bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized or specified are all evidentiary
without any explanation supporting this conclusion constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Some of the
desired details are material facts that must be alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and prepare
his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be specified,
and made the necessary determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact,
particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of
documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the
presence of these desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from these
voluminous documents what the desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made
available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent defense.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the scope of the proof;
it limits the evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in the Information as
supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure of an accused to move for a bill of particulars
deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an
information of more or less general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.
Sec, 9 Rule 116, Bill of particulars.—The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to
enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the
complaint or information and the details desired.
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action, which an
accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
In civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been defined as a complementary procedural document
consisting of an amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and is in the nature of a more
specific allegation of the facts recited in the pleading. The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil
cases is to enable a party to prepare his responsive pleading properly. In criminal cases, a bill of particulars
details items or specific conduct not recited in the Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included in
the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused: to know the theory of the government’s case; to
prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another
prosecution for the same offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering
evidence.
In dealing with a motion for a bill of particulars in a criminal case, judges should observe that: (a) the remedy
is distinct from a motion to quash in the sense that it presupposes that the acts or offenses constituting the
offense (or the ultimate facts that comprise the crime’s component elements) are already stated in the
Information, albeit may be couched in vague language; (b) the remedy is, as mentioned, not meant to
supply evidential information (or evidentiary facts); and (c) the particulars to be allowed are only those
details that would allow a man of ordinary intelligence, as may be reasonable under the circumstances, to,
again, properly plead during his arraignment and to prepare his defense for trial. Accordingly, the analysis
involved in motion for bill of particulars should go beyond a simple ultimate facts-evidentiary facts
dichotomy.
If the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order the
government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
granting the bill to give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights. Notably, the
government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt acts through the Information
and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to prove at the trial. This is the type
of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. The accused is entitled to the observance of all
the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present case where
the crime charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of
several predicate criminal acts involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable period
of time.
###
Rule 117 Motion to Quash
People vs Lacson
DOCTRINE: The interpretation of Sec. 8 of Rule 117 to the effect that in the event that the accused is
prosecuted anew with the same offense, albeit under an identical information, the new proceedings being
conducted as if the accused has been charged afresh has in its favor the soundest policy considerations
based no less on the fundamental objectives of procedural rules
Section 1 (g) of Rule 116—Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular,
the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. The time of the pendency or a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other
causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period.
FACTS: Before the Court is the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 28,
2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 on the dismissal
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with
the said court. The respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and
killing of eleven persons bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for
said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the
requirements for its application are attendant.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the requirements for valid motion to quash were attendant;
HELD: NO.
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent
of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of
any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the
respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal
of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court
issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served
with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph of the new rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to
a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the
criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included
therein.
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent
one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed
to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal
on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution6 without the criminal case having been revived.
The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of
the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct,
unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes
on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity,
the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere
inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional
dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case
may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would
not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the
accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by
the statute of limitations.
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the
filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be
no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a
criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their
testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged,
a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is
filed.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of
the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal
cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and
for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and
the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to
conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
respondent and to have the prosecution’s witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The
respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall have personally determined the presence
of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against the respondent and if one had already
been issued, the warrant should be recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein that: 1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this
Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and 2) warrants for the arrest of the
accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the
cases.
###
Panaguiton vs DOJ
DOCTRINE: The prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the office of the City
Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged
under B.P. Blg. 22.
FACTS: Cawili borrowed money from petitioner. As payment for the loan, Cawili and Tongson jointly issued
three checks in favor of petitioner. The checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by
closure of the account. Petitioner filed a complaint for violation of BP 22. The prosecutor found probable
cause only with respect to Cawili as Tongson’s defense that his signatures on the checks had been falsified.
Petitioner then filed a partial appeal before the DOJ even while the case against Cawili was already filed in
court. The Chief State Prosecutor directed the city prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation and to refer the
falsified document to the NBI. After reinvestigation, still only probable cause with respect to Cawili was
sustained. In the city prosecutor’s resolution, it was held that the case with respect to Tongson had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe
after four (4) years. n this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or
on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on
24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial,
and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years
had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed. Ultimately, the DOJ held that the action on the crime has
prescribed.
In justifying its resolution, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do
not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does
not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not
Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
ISSUE/S: WON the running of the prescriptive period tolled upon the filing of the information in court or
upon the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
HELD: Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own
prescriptive periods. Act 3326 provides:
“Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.”
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation
of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that
once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the
offense is halted. “the term ‘proceedings’ should now be understood either executive or judicial in
character”. To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control.
###
People vs Dumlao
DOCTRINE: Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash—

insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its
case.
FACTS: An Amended Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondents Dumlao and
Lao, Aber P. Canlas, Jacobo C. Clave, Roman A. Cruz, Jr. and Fabian C. Ver with violation of Section 3(g)
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
accusatory portion of the information reads: “That on or about May 10, 1982, or for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
Hermenegildo C. Dumlao, Aber Canlas, Jacobo C. Clave, Roman A. Cruz, Jr., and Fabian C. Ver, being
then the members of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which is
a government corporation and therefore all public officers, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, while in the performance of their official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally enter into contract of lease-purchase with Emilio G. Lao, a private person whereby
the GSIS agreed to sell to said Emilio G. Lao, a GSIS acquired property consisting of three parcels of land
with an area of 821 square meters together with a 5-storey building situated at 1203 A. Mabini St., Ermita,
Manila, known as the Government Counsel Centre for the sum of P2,000,000.00 with a down payment of
P200,000.00 with the balance payable in fifteen years at 12% interest per annum compounded yearly, with
a yearly amortization of P264,278.37 including principal and interest granting Emilio G. Lao the right to sub-
lease the ground floor for his own account during the period of lease, from which he collected yearly rentals
in excess of the yearly amortization which contract is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.”
Respondent Dumlao, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. A
Joint Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Exhibits was submitted to the court on 10 January 2005; after
which the court issued Pre-Trial Order; Respondent Dumlao then filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He argued that the allegedly approved Board
Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS Board of Trustees, contrary to the allegations in the
information. Since the signatures of Fabian Ver, Roman Cruz, Aber Canlas and Jacobo Clave did not
appear in the minutes of the meeting held on 23 April 1982, he said it was safe to conclude that these
people did not participate in the alleged approval of the LeasePurchase Agreement. This being the case,
he maintained that there was no quorum of the board to approve the supposed resolution authorizing the
sale of the GSIS property. There being no approval by the majority of the Board of Trustees, there can be
no resolution approving the Lease-Purchase Agreement. The unapproved resolution, he added, proved his
innocence. He further contended that the person to be charged should be Atty. Luis Javellana, who sold
the subject property to respondent Lao without the proper authority. Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of
respondent; the People through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
45 seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dismissing the case against
respondent Dumlao, arguing that it was denied its right to due process when the court a quo dismissed the
case against respondent Dumlao after pre-trial and before it could present its witnesses and formally offer
its exhibits.
ISSUE/S: WON facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essentials elements of the
crime defined by law.
HELD: Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. Insufficiency of evidence
is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests
its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative
after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused with or without leave of court.
In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for
insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so
doing, it violated the prosecutions right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to
prosecute its case and to prove the culpability of the accused. It was therefore erroneous for the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it not consider the ground invoked by
respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not raised by him, and not at the appropriate
time. The dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.
###
Soriano vs People
DOCTRINE: The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a),19 Rule 117
of the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is,
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense
charged as defined by law.20 The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the
criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge
under the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute
proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not
constitute the offense.
FACTS: State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia charged Soriano in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, with violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No. 337) or the General Banking Act,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, or Violation of the Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related
Interest (DOSRI) Rules (DOSRI Rules) An information for estafa thru falsification of commercial document
was also filed against Soriano and Ilagan. The informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-
M-2000 and 1720-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to Branch 14, presided by Judge Petrita Braga
Dime. Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended, was filed against
Soriano, this time, covering the P15,000,000.00 loan obtained in the name of Rogelio Mañaol. Soriano and
Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of commercial document for obtaining said loan. The
cases were docketed as 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to Branch 77,
presided by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman. Petitioners Soriano and Ilagan filed an MQ before both salas.
Petitioners argued that the prosecutor charged more than one offense for a single act. Soriano was charged
with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly securing
fictitious loans. They further argued that the facts as alleged in the information do not constitute an offense.
Both salas of RTC denied the MQs Petitioners filed a Rule 65 before the CA but it was dismissed.
Petitioners filed a Rule 45 before the SC
ISSUE/S: Whether the 2 judges correctly denied the Motion to Quash
HELD: YES. Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the ground that more than
one (1) offense is charged. They point that Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI Rules and with
estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly obtaining loans from RBSM. Thus, they claim
that the informations were duplicitous; hence, they should be quashed.
Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information under Section
3(e), Rule 11713 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous
information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. By duplicity of charges is meant a
single complaint or information that charges more than one offense.15 Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly states: Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information must charge
but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses. Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges
more than one offense. In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more
than one offense, but with more than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI
rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand,
was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus,
petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. Petitioners also
contend that Soriano should be charged with one offense only, because all the charges filed against him
proceed from and are based on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans. Thus, Soriano argues that he
cannot be charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial document, considering that he is already
being prosecuted for obtaining a DOSRI loan.
The contention has no merit. Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident might
offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, thus justifying the filing of several
charges against the accused.
In Loney v. People, this Court, in upholding the filing of multiple charges against the accused, held: As early
as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or
more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more
than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." In People v. Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses
arising from the same act are not "the same" — x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional
fact or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of
the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which
is not an essential element of the other. Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners,
although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine. As aptly pointed out by the BSP
in its memorandum, there are differences between the two (2) offenses.
A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling
requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related
interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to
enter such approval into corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising
department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are
essential to the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges
against Soriano was, therefore, proper.
Petitioners next question the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations, contending that the same do
not constitute an offense. The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3
(a), Rule 117 of the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information;
that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined by law.
The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information.
Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge under the information must be proved
by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash
the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense. We have reviewed
the informations and find that they contain material allegations charging Soriano with violation of DOSRI
rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. In Criminal Case Nos. 1719 & 1980 for violation
of DOSRI rules, the informations alleged that Soriano was the president of RBSMI, while Ilagan was then
its general manager; that during their tenure, Soriano, with the direct participation of Ilagan, and by using
the names of Virgilio Malang and Rogelio Mañaol, was able to indirectly obtain loans without complying
with the requisite board approval, reportorial and ceiling requirements, in violation of Section 83 of R.A. No.
37722 as amended.
Similarly, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981 charge petitioners with estafa thru
falsification of commercial document. They allege that petitioners made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and
Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans and received the proceeds thereof when they did not in fact secure said
loans or receive the amounts reflected in the promissory notes and other bank records. The information in
Criminal Case No. 1720 further alleges the elements of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b)23 of the RPC to wit:
(i) that money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same;
(ii) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt; (iii) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (iv) that there is demand made by the offended party to the offender. The information in Criminal Case
No. 1981, on the other hand, further alleged the following essential elements of estafa under Article 315 (2)
(a)24 of the RPC: (i) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (ii) that such
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; (iii) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means—that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of
the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (iv) that, as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage. The informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981, thus, charge petitioners with the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. Verily, there is no justification for the
quashal of the Information filed against petitioners. The RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motions. In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not
the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such
a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special
defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.25 Thus, petitioners should not have
forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and
reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional
circumstances in the present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari.
Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition.
###
Cerezo vs People
DOCTRINE: Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests
on the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice. It is the court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and
this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation
of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
FACTS: In 2002, Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and
Vicente Afulugencia, as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo). Finding probable cause to indict Yaneza, et al.,
the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information against them before the
RTC. Yaneza, et al. thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate
Prosecution’s Evidence before the OP-QC. In its resolution, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and
recommended the withdrawal of the Information. Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw
Information was filed before the RTC.During the intervening period, Yaneza, et al. were arraigned. All of
them entered a "not guilty" plea. In deference to the prosecutor’s last resolution, the RTC ordered the
criminal case dismissed. Aggrieved, Cerezo moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the
OP-QC resolution has not yet attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for
Review filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ). The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await
the resolution of the DOJ. In 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting
aside the OP-QC’s resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier Information for libel. The RTC
issued its Order granting Cerezo's motion for reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the DOJ
Secretary. Yaneza, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the RTC. Relentless,
Yaneza, et al. elevated their predicament to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The CA annulled the impugned RTC Orders. Cerezo interposed the appeal when his motion
for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the dismissal of the case by the RTC was valid.
2. Whether double jeopardy set in after the RTC's dismissal of the case.
HELD:
1. No, because there was independent assessment of the merits of the motion on the part of the RTC.
2. No. The elements of double jeopardy are not attendant in the present case. Well-entrenched is the rule
that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. In
thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely
and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the court’s bounden
duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written
order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of
Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. By relying solely on the manifestation of the public
prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion
and violated the complainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced
no effect whatsoever. This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on
the merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to
Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew.
It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites
are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only
(a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Since we have held that the Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of
discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of
the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal
of the case without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
###
Co vs New Prosperity Plastic Products
DOCTRINE: While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of
speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute
criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what
offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.
FACTS: New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private complainant in
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22
filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City. In
the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open
court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules). On July 2, 2004,
Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding
Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied Co’s motion for
reconsideration. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of
Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases. It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit on
May 23, 2005. Co’s motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on December 16, 2005. Co then
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 171096. We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006.There being no motion
for reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006. Before the MeTC
Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-raffled after the inhibition
of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a “Motion for Permanent Dismissal” on July 13, 2006. Uy opposed the motion,
contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No.
171096. In spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006 granting
Co’s motion. When the court subsequently denied Uy’s motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006,
Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside
the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed
with the trial of the criminal cases.Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid,
dismissed the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer
for TRO/WPI. Petitioner’s contention: Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the
ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. He reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002
until the initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a “vexatious, capricious and oppressive” delay, which
is in violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) and Section 2, Paragraph 2,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandating that the entire trial period should not
exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that the MeTC
lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion
because its revival would already put him in double jeopardy.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner on the ground of denial of
his right to speedy trial constitutes final dismissal of these cases;
HELD: The petition is unmeritorious. Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless.
Obviously, he failed to show any evidence that the alleged “vexatious, capricious and oppressive” delay in
the trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on
the part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that “‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and necessarily
a flexible concept.”In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should
be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration
of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by
such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of
everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that
particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. “While the Court
recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice,
we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified
postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the
accused to speedy trial.”
###
People vs De Leon
DOCTRINE: A Buy-bust operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending
drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
FACTS: Rodante de Leon was charged with violation of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002). A buy-bust team was formed to act on the illegal activities of De Leon upon the report of a
confidential informant at the AntiIllegal Drug Special Operation Task Force at the Novaliches Police Station
in Quezon City. De Leon was arrested upon selling to PO2 Magcalayo, posing as buyer, shabu for P200.
The seized drug was identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence.
The RTC and CA both found De Leon guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the buy-bust operation, allegedly full of irregularities was legal.
HELD: YES. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for
the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this
jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug
peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
The Court upheld the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and ruled that the
elements of the crime were sufficiently established, thereby affirming the decision of the CA.
###
Rule 118 Pre-trial
Estipona vs Lobrigo
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused,
with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty
to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial,
the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty.
No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)RULE 118 (Pre-trial):SEC.
1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws
or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:(a) plea
bargaining;(b) stipulation of facts;(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of
objections to admissibility of evidence;(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge
but interposes a lawful defense; and(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
FACTS: Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] is the constitutionality of Section 23 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,"
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the
imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs).
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement,[5] praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender
and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3,
Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.
The prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which
is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining.
In a Comment or Opposition [7] dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the
accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section
2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea
bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."... respondent Judge
Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying
Estipona's motion
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches
on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea
bargaining is a "rule of procedure."... the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it
allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165,
to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal
drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed.
However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of
paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13
December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise
stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that
is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied... hence, this petition
ISSUE/S: WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA
BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
HELD:
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. In the case of Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower
courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates
procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. By the
same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal
charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly
desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the administration of justice.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.” There is
give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality –
can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor
take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather
than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present
Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has
full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any
lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.
Plea bargaining, when allowed
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution
already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion should not
amount to a grave abuse thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution
rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully
act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the
evidence on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the
defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.
###
Rule 119 Trial
Salvanera vs People
DOCTRINE: In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions
must be present, namely: (1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case; (3) The prosecution is
required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge; (4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and (5) The trial court is
satisfied that: a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused; c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points; d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and, e) Said accused has not at
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
FACTS: Petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo
Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane, by feloniously assaulting and attacking Parane
using a firearm causing his death. Petitioner was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman;
Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the commission of the crime;
while Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter. All the accused have been arrested and detained,
except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large. Respondent Lucita Parane is the spouse of victim Ruben
Parane.
Petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, moved for the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix, to
serve as state witnesses. In an order, the trial court granted petitioner’s application for bail and denied the
prosecution’s motion for the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix. The prosecution moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied.
The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. It contended that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state
witnesses. It alleged that the testimonies of the two accused are absolutely necessary to establish that
petitioner masterminded the murder of Ruben Parane. The prosecution likewise claimed that it was
premature and baseless for the trial court to grant petitioner’s application for bail because the prosecution
had not yet rested its case in the hearing for the discharge of the two accused.
The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused Abutin and Tampelix from the
Information to become state witnesses, and cancelled the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera. The Court of
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not there was substantial corroboration of Abutin and Tampelix’s testimony to
discharge them and serve as State Witnesses.
HELD: YES. In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions
must be present, namely: (1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case; (3) The prosecution is
required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge; (4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and (5) The trial court is
satisfied that: a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused; c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points; d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and, e) Said accused has not at
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
To require Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same
points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence available for
the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness." The
corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence as will
be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. The Supreme Court ruled that a conspiracy is more readily
proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the
conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the
confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the
truth in other respects. It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other
witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies
of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other’s testimonies and the
circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent
that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
As co-conspirators, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime
is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they have
knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact,
there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the
accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission
of the crime.
###
VDA. DE MANGUERRA VS. RISOS G.R. No. 152643; August 28, 2008
DOCTRINE: It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case
is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject
to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate
that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and
answer.
FACTS: Respondents, Risos et.al. were charged with Estafa before the RTC of Cebu City which arose
from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they
made it appear that petitioner De Manguerra, the owner of the mortgaged property affixed her signature to
the document. Petitioner was then confined in a hospital in Manila for gastro-intestinal bleeding.
Respondents filed a motion for suspension of criminal proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question
alleging that the action for the declaration of nullity of mortgage should first be resolved. The RTC granted
the motion. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA to nullify the RTC orders.
Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to take her deposition due to petitioner’s weak physical condition. The
RTC granted the motion and ordered petitioner’s deposition to be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati.
Respondents assailed the order of the RTC granting the motion to take petitioner’s deposition but the RTC
denied the MR stating that “procedural technicalities should be brushed aside due to the urgency of the
situation.” Respondents assailed the RTC orders before the CA, with the CA ruling in their favor stating that
Rule 119, Section 15 and not Rule 23 applies in this case.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Rule 23 applies to the deposition of De Manguerra.
HELD: NO. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence
of the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they
deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this
rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses’ demeanor. This rule, however, is not absolute. As
exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be
resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses
or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both
the defense and prosecution witnesses.
It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It
is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to
waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be
conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
###
PEOPLE VS. JIMENEZ G.R. No. 152643; August 28, 2008
DOCTRINE: The requirement is that a state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he
or she should not only "appear to be the most guilty."
FACTS: Montero, a former employee of the BSJ company owned by the Jimenezes executed sworn
statements confessing his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda and naming petitioner
Jimenez, Lope Jimenez, Descalso, Ponce and Fernandez as his coconspirators. The statements of
Montero led to the recovery of a cadaver encased in a drum near or practically at the place Montero pointed
to.
The state prosecutors charged the accused of murder for the killing of Barrameda. Montero thereafter filed
a motion for his discharge as state witness. Petitioner opposed the motion. The RTC denied the motion to
discharge Montero as state witness ruling that the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements of
Sec. 19, Rule 119 of the ROC. This was however reversed by the newly-appointed regular Judge Docena
ruling that the prosecution complied with the requisites of Sec. 17, Rule 119 further ruling that Montero is
qualified to be discharged as state witness. Petitioner filed with the CA petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment of Judge Docena’s orders. The CA initially ruled in favor of petitioner but on MR, reversed its
ruling in favor of respondents agreeing with Judge Docena’s decision. Upon denial of petitioner’s MR,
petitioners filed the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Montero’s discharge as a state witness complied with the requirements of Sec.
17, Rule 119 of the ROC.
HELD: YES. The requirement is that a state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he or
she should not only "appear to be the most guilty."
By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all
the accused may be given the same penalty due to conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser
or the least guilt taking into account his degree of participation in the commission of the offense. What the
rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty
in terms of participation would be penalized.
Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a state witness, what are
controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime committed.
The SC ruled that from the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion to discharge
Montero, it appears that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation, and execution stage as most
of his co-accused had been, he had no direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby Rose. While Lope
allegedly assigned to him the execution of the killing, the records do not indicate that he had active
participation in hatching the plan to kill Ruby Rose, which allegedly came from accused Lope and Jimenez,
and in the actual killing of Ruby Rose which was executed by accused Lennard. Montero’s participation
was limited to providing the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s body was placed, welding the
steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug boat, and, together with his co-accused,
dropping the steel box containing the cadaver into the sea.
The discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most
guilty is highly factual in nature as it largely depends on the appreciation of who had the most participation
in the commission of the crime. The appellate courts do not interfere in the discretionary judgment of the
trial court on this factual issue except when grave abuse of discretion intervenes.
###
PEOPLE VS. DE GRANO 588 SCRA 550
DOCTRINE: Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused
to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,
whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c)
at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by
counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be
waived.
FACTS: An Information for the murder of Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the RTC of Tanauan Batangas
against Joven de Grano, Armando de Grano, and Estanislao Lacaba, together with their co-accused
Leonides Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and Leonardo Genil, who were at-large. Duly arraigned, Joven,
Armando, and Estanislao pleaded “not guilty.”
Grano filed a motion for bail contending that the prosecution’s evidence was not strong. RTC found the
accused guilty of the offenses charged. An order was issued that modified the previous decision, which
downgraded the charge of murder to homicide.
However, Joven, Armando, and Domingo were not present during promulgation. Petitioner maintained that
while they were not present during the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police
custody, attended the promulgation. Therefore, when they filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration which
included that of Estanislao, the RTC was not deprived of its authority to resolve the joint motion.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration despite
the absence of the other accused during the promulgation of judgment.
HELD: The RTC erred in taking cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration despite the absence of
the other accused during the promulgation of judgment. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution,
authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the
proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever
necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense,
in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings,
his presence is required and cannot be waived. When the Decision was promulgated, only Estanislao
was present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence,
Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant
disregard of the Rules, RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also
took cognizance of the joint motion. RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint
MR with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a MR
that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in
court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he
loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed
to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
###
ASISTIO VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 200465; April 20, 2015
DOCTRINE: “Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the
evidence does not show that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not
decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding,
either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the
offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not
valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc."
FACTS: Jocelyn Asistio was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines
(Republic Act No. [RA] 6938). The accused being the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative entered into a contract with Coca Cola Products
in her own personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused fully well knew, the sale of Coca-
Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative should have accrued
to Cooperative to the damage and prejudice of the said Cooperative.
The school principal directed petitioner to submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson.
Instead, petitioner claimed that the principal had no business and authority to require her to produce
financial statements, and that the said
reports had been posted on the school bulletin board. The principal ordered to conduct an auditing. Based
on the documents obtained from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual deliveries and sales, and the
financial statements prepared by petitioner, the audit committee found that petitioner defrauded the
Cooperative and its members for 3 years.
After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss the case by
way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other matters, that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged
(Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally
liable.
Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The private respondent appealed the
decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals which was granted. Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts
to an acquittal, hence final and cannot be appealed. 2. Whether or not the right of the accused against
double jeopardy has been violated.
HELD: 1. NO. In this case, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for
insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not
decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the
evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case the RTC order of dismissal does not operate as
an acquittal hence may still be subject to an appeal under Rule 41 of the ROC. “Acquittal is always based
on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that the defendant's
guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant
is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc."
2. NO. The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon this
appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her filing of a
demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction. The
requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been
convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused.
There is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the accused-appellee's consent, that is,
by moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to evidence he is deemed to have waived his
protection against double jeopardy.
###
CABRADOR VS. PEOPLE 602 SCRA 760
DOCTRINE: One can avail of a demurrer to evidence only after the plaintiff or the prosecution has rested
its case. Resting one’s case requires a formal offer of evidence which has been commented on or has
been opposed and the court has already ruled on the formal offer of evidence together with the opposition
or comment thereto.
FACTS: The public prosecutor accused Cabador of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty. Valerio.
After 5 years of trial and 5 witnesses, RTC ended the prosecution's presentation of witnesses and required
the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice.
The public prosecutor asked for 3 extensions of time but was still not able to make the offer. Cabador
filed a motion to dismiss the case, invoking his right to a speedy trial. Moreover, he claimed that the trial
court could not consider any evidence against him that had not been formally offered. 4 days before such
filing, without the knowledge of Cabador, another extension was asked for, and an offer was made on the
day Cabador filed his MTD.
RTC issued an order treating Cabador's MTD as a demurrer to evidence. And since he filed his motion
without leave of court, he waived his right to present evidence in his defense. RTC submitted the case for
decision. Cabador filed a MR which the RTC denied. CA likewise denied his petition and affirmed RTC. CA
denied his MR.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the motion filed by Cabador was demurrer to evidence or a motion to dismiss.
HELD: The SC ruled that Cabador filed a motion to dismiss, not a demurrer to evidence. He did not waive
his right to present evidence. There are 2 stages in the trial proper of a criminal case: (1) prosecution's
presentation of evidence against the accused; and (2) accused's presentation of evidence in his defense.
If after the first stage, the evidence appears insufficient to support a conviction, the trial court may at its own
initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second stage, and dismiss the criminal action.
There is no point for the trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution
bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an
acquittal. But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the
case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall
be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for
judgment. To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the
Court must consider the ff: the allegations in it were made in good faith; the stage of the proceeding at
which it is filed; the primary objective of the party filing it.
Cabador in his MTD pointed out how the trial dragged on for years; the gaps between hearings were long,
with hearings often postponed due to the absence of the prosecutor. And it was compounded by the
repeated motions for extension by the prosecutor to make the formal offer, and its failure to make such
offer. He invoked his right to speedy trial.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused's right to speedy
trail. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the
accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the main thrust
of Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.
Cabador did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects
such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime, something that is fundamental in ay demurrer. It
did not touch on any particular testimony or documentary exhibit. He could not do so because he did not
know that the prosecution finally made its offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his MTD.
A demurrer assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. In this case, after the prosecution
filed its formal offer, the trial court still needed to give Cabador an opportunity to object to the admission of
those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the prosecution
be deemed to have rested its case. The MTD was filed before he could object to the offer, before the trial
court could rule on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case. It cannot be said that he
intended his MTD to serve as a demurrer. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present
evidence in his defense.
###
PEOPLE VS. TAN 625 SCRA 388
DOCTRINE: The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned
and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his
express consent. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS: Information for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1, in relation to Sections 32 (a)-1 and 56 of the Revised
Securities Act were filed against Tan in the RTC. After arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to both charges
and trial commenced. He made his formal offer of evidence. RTC issued an Order admitting some (Exhibits
A, B, W and X) but denied admission of all the other exhibits. Tan filed a MR but this was denied by the
RTC. He filed an omnibus motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and to admit the attached demurrer
to evidence. RTC granted the motion for leave to file the demurrer and admitted the attached demurrer.
The RTC issued an Order granting the respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA assailing the Orders of the RTC. CA denied the petition, ruling that the dismissal of a
criminal action by the grant of a demurrer to evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for
which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not double jeopardy applies in this case.
HELD Double jeopardy applies. In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court explained the general rule that the
grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and cannot be appealed. The
elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated
that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
This exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it
conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is "did the RTC violate
petitioner’s right to due process?" Petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case as
gleaned from the factual antecedents which led to the grant of respondent’s demurrer.
Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting the demurrer to evidence,
no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the 29-page Order granting the demurrer was
arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto. As correctly observed by the CA, RTC extensively
discussed its position on the various issues brought to contention by petitioner. One of the main reasons
for the RTC’s decision to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares
that the Best World Resources Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred shares
as well as common shares, or even which type of shares respondent had acquired.
Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against
double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.
###
IMPERIAL VS. JOSON 635 SCRA 71
DOCTRINE: The right to speedy trial is considered violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
FACTS: A truck, owned by petitioner Imperial and being driven by petitioner Francisco, collided with a truck,
owned by respondent. After colliding with respondent’s truck, Imperial’s truck rammed into a KIA Besta Van
killing the driver and 7 of its passengers, and inflicting serious physical injuries upon 3 other passengers. A
criminal complaint for Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damages to Property was
filed against petitioners with the MTC. Francisco proposed a series of facts for stipulation with the
prosecution. Prosecutor Zabella refused to stipulate. Court issued pre-trial order to that effect. Francisco
filed motion to “compel and disqualify Prosecutor Zabella and to correct the pre-trial order”, on the ground,
among others, that the latter cannot refuse to stipulate on matters which he has personal knowledge. MTC
denied motion. However, it directed another pre-trial conference in view of the reassignment of the case to
another prosecutor, and appearance of a new private prosecutor. Francisco filed petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with the RTC. He further moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that
his right to speedy trial was violated in view of the 9 postponements of the pre-trial conference. This was
denied, so again he filed a CPM petition with the RTC, which was consolidated with the previous CPM
petition. Both CPM petitions were dismissed for lack of merit. Francisco elevated this to the CA. CA upheld
the RTC.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not double jeopardy applies in this case.
HELD: The accused’s right to speedy trial was not violated. Designed to prevent the oppression of the
citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time and to prevent delays in
the administration of justice, said right is considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
###
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 645 SCRA 726
DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and the dismissal
order may not be appealed because it would place accused in double jeopardy. It is still reviewable but
only through certiorari under Rule 65.
FACTS: The Vice Mayor Manuel Barcenas of Toledo City in Cebu failed to liquidate cash advances P62,
765.00 despite demands to the damage and prejudice of government. He was charged with violation of
Sec. 89 PD 1445 before Sandiganbayan. He was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. Prosecution
presented lone witness COA State Auditor Villad. Thereafter, prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence
and rested its case. Barcenas filed motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence. Sandiganbayan granted
the motion on ground that prosecution failed to prove that government suffered any damage from Barcenas’
non-liquidation of subject cash advance.
ISSUE: W/N Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: No. Actual damage to government arising from non-liquidation of cash advance is not an essential
element. Instead, mere failure to timely liquidate is the gravamen of the offense. Even if Sandiganbayan
proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of law, the error committed was an error of judgment and not
of jurisdiction. The error committed is of such nature that can no longer be rectified on appeal by prosecution
because it would place accused in double jeopardy. Such error cannot be corrected because double
jeopardy had already set in.
###
BANGAYAN, JR. VS. BANGAYAN 659 SCRA
DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, acquittal of accused or dismissal of case against him can only be
appealed by Solicitor General. Court cannot review an order granting demurrer to evidence.
Acquitting the accused on ground by insufficiency of evidence is of such based on the merits,
thus to do so will place accused in double jeopardy.
FACTS: Sally Go filed complaint accusing Bangayan, Jr and Resally having committed bigamy. Sally Go
learned that Bangayan, Jr had taken Resally as is concubine. Sally Go further discovered that Bangayan
Jr also married a certain Azucena in Caloocan City. After arraignment, both Bangayan Jr and Resally
pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented and offered evidence. Both Bangayan Jr and Resally separately
filed their respective motions for leave to file demurrer to evidence. RTC dismissed case for insufficiency
of evidence. Sally Go elevated case to CA via petition for certiorari. CA held that the pieces of evidence
presented by prosecution were sufficient to deny demurrer to evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated by CA when it reversed
RTC order dismissing criminal case against them.
HELD: Yes. Double jeopardy already set in. All 4 elements of double jeopardy are present. A valid
information for bigamy was filed against petitioners. They pleaded not guilty to charges against them and
subsequently case was dismissed after the prosecution rested its case. If the court finds that the evidence
is not sufficient and grants demurrer, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent
to acquittal of the accused. Even if trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against petitioners, it
only committed an error of judgment and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by certiorari. It
must be shown that a party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard.
###
PEOPLE VS. JOSE GO AUGUST 6, 2016
DOCTRINE: Court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict of guilt. To be sufficient, evidence must prove: (1) that commission of crime and
(2) precise degree of participation by the accused. Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the
court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the
conviction of accused beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS: Fictitious loans in favor of two entities – Timmy’s Inc and Asia Textile Mills, Inc – were approved,
after which two manager’s checks representing the supposed proceeds of these fictitious loans were issued
but made payable to two different entities – Philippine Recycler’s Inc and Zeta International – without any
documents issed by the supposed borrowers Timmy’s Inc and Asia Textile Mills, Inc assigning the supposed
loan proceeds to the two payees. Thereafter, these two manager’s checks – together with several others
totaling P 120, 819, 475. 00 – were encashed, and then deposited in OCBC Savings Account of Go. Then
several automatic transfer deposits were made from Go’s savings account to his OCBC Current Account
which were then used to fund Go’s previously dishonoured personal checks. PDIC, designated as OCBC
receiver, came to the conclusion that the signatures on Timmy’s Inc and Asia Textile Mills, Inc loan
documents were indeed falsified. Two counts of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed
by PDIC against Go. CA affirmed RTC Order granting Go’s demurrer.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not there’s sufficient evidence not to warrant demurrer to evidence .
HELD: Yes. Trial court effectively failed and /or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against Go,
which it was duty bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of
pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to mention that banking industry is impressed with public interest,
the trial court should have conducted itself with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in
resolving issues. Demand is not an element of the felony. Furthermore, as the beneficiary of the proceeds,
Go is presumed to be the author of the falsification. It is irrelevant that the proceeds of supposed loans
were made payable to entities other than the alleged borrowers. The bottom line is that they are encashed
using bank funds, and the proceeds were deposited in Go’s bank savings and current accounts and used
to fund personal checks.
###
PEOPLE VS. PEPINO 779 SCRA 170
DOCTRINE: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a
witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of
the identification procedure. At any rate, the appellants' respective convictions in this case were based on
an independent in-court identification made by Edward and Jocelyn, and not on the out-of-court
identification during the police lineup.
FACTS: Around two men and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in
Sucat, Paraniaque City, and pretended to be customers. Pepino pulled out a gun. Thinking that it was a
holdup, Edward told Pepino that the money was inside the cashier's box. Pepino and the other man looted
the "'cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him to go with them. Kidnappers called Edward's father
and demanded a P40 million ransom for his release. Edward's father told the kidnappers that he did not
have that amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom.
When Edward removed his blindfold, he found himself inside his own car parked at the UP Diliman Campus.
He drove home and reported his kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a known anti-crime crusader. Edward
was invited to identify some suspects from a lineup consisting of seven persons: five males and two
females. Edward positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo. Jocelyn likewise identified
Pepino. Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. Only Pepino only Gomez were arraigned while
others remained at large. RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty.
RTC held that they were positively identified in police lineup. The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were
deemed to have waived any objection to the illegality of their arrests when they did not move to quash the
information before entering their plea, and when they participated at the trial. Only Gomez appealed.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Edward's identification of her during trial might have been preconditioned by the
"suggestive identification" made during the police lineup
HELD: No. The illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty
when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the
warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had
commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test , there was thus ample opportunity for Edward - before and after
the gun had been pointed at him - to view the faces of the three persons who entered his office. In addition,
Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him "[a]t least once a day" during the four days that he was
detained. Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green Toyota Corolla
vehicle. In addition, the abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes when they arrived at the
apartment, and among those whom he saw there was Gomez. According to Edward, he was able to take a
good look at the occupants of the car when he was about to be released.
On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of Pepino as the person who pointed
a gun at her husband while going down the stairs, and who brought him outside the premises of Kilton
Motors. She maintained that she was very near when Pepino was taking away her husband; and that she
could not forget Pepino's face.
Police lineup conducted at the NBI was not suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup;
Edward was not compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it might have
been ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup instead of only two, or if there had been a
separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone that there were five males and two females in the
lineup did not render the procedure irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or even
suggested to Edward that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators.
Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were among those already
presented to the media as kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a day before the police lineup was made. In
this sense, the appellants were already the focus
of the police and were thus deemed to be already under custodial investigation when the out-of-court
identification was conducted.
Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for having been tainted by an irregular
out-of-court identification in a police lineup. They focused, instead, on the legality of the appellants' arrests.
The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is more favorable to
him.
###
A law without justice is just like a

wound without a cure.
- William Scott Downey

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MATIAS, Michelle Dulce Candelaria Remedial Law Review 1

2014-0659 Atty. Jose Parungo

Remedial Law Review 1

Criminal Procedure Compilation of Case Digest

*On Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

*Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan vis-à-vis of the RTC

HELD: Yes, the case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY T GO

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

*Corrupt practices of public officers, R.A. 3019, Conspiracy

HELD: Yes. The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:

The elements of the above provision are:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004

ISSUE: Whether or not the AFP-RSBS is not a government entity.

HELD: No, the AFP-RSBS is a government entity.

People of the Philippines vs Alfredo Benipayo

G.R. Nos. 154473 & 155573

April 24, 2009

HELD: RTC HAS JURISDICTION.

G.R. No. Nos. 111771-7 November 9, 1993

G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, Petitioner,vs

SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.

*On Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts

ISSUE/S: Which court has jurisdiction over cases covered by RA 10175?

Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses

G.R. No. 178607

*On Sufficiency of Complaint/Information

2. Whether the information is sufficient to justify the conviction of the accused?

*Venue is Jurisdictional in Criminal Cases

Union Bank vs People

Rule 111 Prosecution of Civil Actions

*Suspension of Civil Actions

Lim Vs Kou Co Ping

*Independent Civil Actions

Caterpillar Inc vs Samson

*Effect of Death on the Civil Actions

ISSUE/S: What is the effect of the death of an accused on the case?

Rule 112 Preliminary Investigation

Burgundy Realty Corporation vs Reyes

1. a copy of the Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation, 2. Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the conduct of a preliminary investigation is an executive function.

Heirs of Nestor Tria vs Obias

Rule 113 Arrest

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Arrest of sarum was valid

A – It was partially open Your Honor.

A – Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may…

A – Yes, Your Honor.

A – Yes, Your Honor.

A – Yes, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule 114 Bail

Government of HK Special Adm Region vs Olalia

ISSUE/S: WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

Rule 115 Rights of the Accused

Del Castillo vs People

ISSUE/S: Whether the search made in the nipa hut is valid.

Right Against Self-Incrimination

Rule 116 Arraignment and Plea