STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE 36TH DISTRICT COURT

3RD CIRCUIT COURT
CRIMINAL DIVISION

STATE OF MICHIGAN
Plaintiff, Case No. 00-69257
HON JAMES R. CHYLINSKI

MARK JACKSON
Defendant.

_________________________________________________________________/

Mark Alan Jackson, Pro Se

129 North Lowell Road
Windham, NH 03087
313 478 8061
_________________________________________________________________/

DEFENDANT’S AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND

MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE

Pursuant to United States Constitution 2nd, 4th, 5th and 8th Amendments, United States

Constitution Article 1 Section 9, MCR 6.500 and MCL 764.1, et al.

Comes now the Defendant, Mark Alan Jackson, to challenge subject matter jurisdiction and

move this honorable court to withdraw the Defendant’s plea, vacate judgment and dismiss the

indictment.


 i

DEFENDANT’S MOTION INDEX
I. JURISDICTION 1


II. DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1


I. THE INCIDENT 1

II. IN BETWEEN THE INCIDENT AND “ARREST” 4

III. THE “ARREST” 4

IV. INCARCERATION 5

V. HABEAS CORPUS GRANTED, IGNORED AND GRANTED AND IGNORED AGAIN 7

VI. RELEASE AND ARRAIGNMENT AND RELEASE 8

VII. BEFORE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 9

VIII. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 9

IX. BEFORE PRETRIAL 9

X. PRETRIAL 10

XI. SENTENCE 10

XII. DURATION OF PROBATION 10


III. ISSUES 11


IV. LEGAL DISCUSSION 12


I. DUE PROCESS FUNDAMENTAL 30

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION CHALLENGED AT ANY TIME 32

III. TRESPASS AB INITIO 32

IV. COURT RECORD TAMPERED WITH 33

V. BRANDED A CRIMINAL 35

VI. DAMAGES 36

VII. THE LAW OF VOID JUDGMENTS 37


V. CONCLUSION 38


VI. EXHIBITS 41


EXHIBIT A 43

EXHIBIT B 44

EXHIBIT C 45

EXHIBIT D 46

EXHIBIT E – XECTION 1 47

EXHIBIT E – XECTION 2 48

EXHIBIT F 49

EXHIBIT G 50

EXHIBIT H 52

EXHIBIT I 54

EXHIBIT J 56

EXHIBIT K 57

EXHIBIT L 58


VII. VERIFICATION 59


VIII. PROOF OF SERVICE 59



 ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Article I § 9..…………………………………………………………………………………………page 20
Article IV......…………………………………………………………………………………………page 20
Article IV, Section 4..............................................................................................................page 31
3rd Amendment…………………………………………….…..….………………………………….page 15
4th Amendment…………………………………………….…..…….……………….………….pages 14,15
6th Amendment…………………………………………….…..…….…………….....….………….pages 29
8th Amendment…………………………………………….…..….…………..………………….page 22,33
14th Amendment…………………………………………….…..….…………..……………...…….page 38

MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION
Article I § 1…......……………………………………………………………………………………page 31
Article I § 11….…………………………………………...…………………………………………page 16
Article I § 12…………………………………………………………………………………………page 20
Article I § 16…………………………………………………………………………………………page 23
Article XI § 11….……………………………………………………………………………………page 24

STATUTES
Federal
USC, Title 5, Part 2, Subpart B, Chapter 33, Subchapter II § 3331.....................................page 26
USC, Title 5, Part 2, Subpart B, Chapter 33, Subchapter II § 3332.....................................page 26
USC, Title 18, § 241..............................................................................................................page 34
USC, Title 18, § 242..............................................................................................................page 34

Michigan
MCL 45.318......................................................................................................................page 24,25
MCL 600.206.........................................................................................................................page 25
MCL 600.2153.......................................................................................................................page 25
MCL 600.4313.......................................................................................................................page 20
MCL 600.4325.......................................................................................................................page 21
MCL 600.4328.......................................................................................................................page 21


 iii

MCL 600.4331.......................................................................................................................page 21
MCL 600.4334.......................................................................................................................page 22
MCL 750.227(B-A)…………………………………….…….…..…………………..……………….page 8
MCL 750.82………………………………………………….…..…………………..…………….page 8,10
MCL 752.9863……………………………………………….…..…………………..……..……….page 10
MCL 764.1b………………………………………………….…..….……………………………….page 33
MCL 764.1b………………………………………………….…..….……………………………….page 16
MCL 764.13………………………………………………….…..….………………………..….page 17,39
MCL 764.19………………………………………………….……………………………………….page 17
MCL 780.652…………………………….…………….…….…..………………….……………….page 16

COURT RULES
MCR 2.613(C).......................................................................................................................page 39
MCR 6.102(B.........................................................................................................................page 13
MCR 6.102(E).......................................................................................................................page 16
MCR 6.302.....………………………………………………….…………………………………….page 28
MCR 6.302(A)………………………………………………….…………………………………….page 28
MCR 6.500…………………………………………………….…………………………….…………page 1
MCR 9.104…………………………………………………….……………………………..………page 30

CASES
Federal
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 35 (1885)........................................................................page 30
Boykin v. Alabama [395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)...........................page 28
County of Riverside v. Mclaughlin, 989-1817), 500 U.S. 44 (1991.................................page 17,18
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975..............................................................................page 17,18
Hagens v. Lavine 415 U.S. 533.............................................................................................page 37
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985..................................................................................page 16
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)................................................................................page 29
Louisville & N.R.R. v. U.S., 282 U.S. 740,759......................................................................page 39
Marbury v. Madison (1803)..................................................................................................page 32
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 , 55 S.Ct. 340, 342, 98 A.L.R. 406.........................page 29
Nguyen v. United States (01-10873) 540 U.S. 935 (2003) 284 F.3d 1086...........................page 37


 iv

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980..............................................................................page 15
Smith v. McCullough 46 S.CT. 338.......................................................................................page 37
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981.....................................................................page 15
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)....................................................................page 29
U.S. v. Van Dusen, C.C. A. Minn,. 78 F .2d 121,124............................................................page 37
Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 US 560, 568-569 (1971).............page 14

Michigan
Case Nos. 91-245-GA, 91-272-FA (1994)............................................................................page 30
In re Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 113, 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975)..................................page 28
People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 197, 448 N.W.2d 781 (1989).................................page 28
People v. Burrill, 391 Mich 124, 128 (1974).....................................................................…page 13
People v. Cornell, 466 Mich. 335, 363 n. 16, 646 N.W.2d 127 (2002).................................page 28
People v. Kennedy, 9 Mich App 346, 348 (1968...................................................................page 14
People v. Mendoza, 468 Mich. 527, 664 N.W.2d 685 (2003)...............................................page 28
People v. Plumaj, April 23, 2009, Docket #285534..............................................................page 28
People v. Saffold, 465 Mich. 268, 272, 631 N.W.2d 320 (2001)...........................................page 28

Other States
Bernard v. Palo Alto, 699 F. 2d 1023 (CA9 1983)...............................................................page 18
Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000 (DC 1978)..............................................................page 18
McGregor v. County of San Bernardino, 888 F. 2d 1276 (CA9 1989..................................page 18
Prieto Bail Bonds v. The STATE of Texas (1999) 994 S. W. 2d 316....................................page 27
Sanders v. Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694 (SD Tex. 1982)........................................................page 18
Scott v. Gates, Civ. No. 84-8647 (CD Cal. Oct. 3, 1988).....................................................page 18
Stine v. State, 908 S.W. .2d 429, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)..............................................page 32

OTHER
Code of Professional Responsibility.....................................................................................page 30
Michigan Judicial Institute © 2006–April 2009, Monograph 1, Page 23-24..................page 13,14
Michigan Judicial Institute © 2006–April 2009, Monograph 1, Page 25......................page 16-17
Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct.............................................................................page 30


 v

 I. JURISDICTION

It has been and remains the position of the defense that this court surrendered jurisdiction

through due process violations and structural errors. However, in order to seek the intended

adjudication and relief, this court must hear this Motion, at arm’s length and by special

appearance, pursuant to MCR 6.500, et al., by the Defendant. This court stands as the last court

of record where a plea was entered. Furthermore, the Defense does not wave, nor has it ever

waved these violations or errors. The Defense stands fast.

II. DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

i. The incident

1. On November 4, 2000, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Mark Jackson, hereafter known as

“Defendant”, was working upstairs on his residence at 1309 Crawford Street, Detroit,

Michigan [48209], hereafter referred to as the “residence”, where he resided with his wife

and three (3) children.

2. The lights were off and the power was off at the residence.

3. The Defendant heard crashing noises outside and banging on the windows.

4. The Defendant ran over to the window to see where the noises were coming from.

5. The Defendant could not see where the noises were coming from.

6. The Defendant grabbed his shotgun from the closet and ran downstairs into the front

vestibule of the residence.

7. The Defendant witnessed two (2) people on his porch, hereafter referred to as

“perpetrator(s)”, “transgressor(s)” or “trespasser(s)”.


 1

 8. One perpetrator was carrying off construction materials that the Defendant had on the

porch.

9. The second perpetrator was exiting the porch and walking down the steps.

10. The perpetrators grabbed the large trashcans in front of the steps and knocked them over

which caused the contents to spill out onto the ground.

11. The Defendant placed the shotgun down, near the door, and opened the door.

12. The Defendant yelled at the two (2) transgressors to stop what they were doing.

13. The trespassers became belligerent and started cursing at the Defendant.

14. The Defendant approached them and told them to drop the items that they had stolen

from the residence.

15. One of the perpetrators dropped the materials and ran off down the sidewalk.

16. The other perpetrator, whom the Defendant later learned was identified as Larry Mason

II, dropped the items and took a combative stance, stating, “What are you going to do

now, Bitch?” while approaching the Defendant.

17. Larry Mason II, hereafter referred to as “Larry”, made a sudden movement in the

Defendant’s direction.

18. Fearing he was going to be struck, the Defendant moved to block his attacker and struck

him in the lower jaw with an open hand, knocking the attacker back.

19. The attacker “backed off”, stated more threats and ran away.

20. The Defendant collected his items from the ground, walked back to the house, returned

the items to the porch, began picking up the trashcans and replacing the trash, into the

cans.


 2

 21. While the Defendant was cleaning up, five (5) people started running towards his

residence.

22. Larry Mason II was carrying a bat.

23. The Defendant witnessed one of Larry’s accomplices carrying a stick.

24. The Defendant ran back onto his porch and turned to face the group.

25. The group stopped at bottom of the steps, where the steps met the front sidewalk.

26. Larry began approaching with the bat and cursing.

27. It was at this time, that the Defendant saw one member of the mob reaching behind his

back and keeping his hand there.

28. The Defendant backed up to the door, reached inside and grabbed the shotgun that he had

placed inside earlier.

29. Without uttering a word, the Defendant walked back out onto the porch, with the gun at

his side.

30. Larry backed up for a few seconds and then came towards the Defendant, saying, “Shoot

me. I dare you.”

31. At this point, Larry was in front of the Defendant, but slightly to the right.

32. The rest of the group was standing off, further to the right, than Larry’s location.

33. The Defendant raised the shotgun, fired one shot into the lawn, off to the left side of the

porch, far away from the group.

34. The mob immediately scattered.

35. Larry threw down his bat, as he ran off.

36. The Defendant went back into the house, put the gun down, came back out, finished

picking up the trash, picked up the bat and threw it into the trash.


 3

 ii. In between the Incident and “Arrest”

37. The Defendant grabbed the items off the porch and took them into basement storage.

38. The Defendant finished up his work and turned the power back on in the house.

39. On or about 2 hours later, the Defendant called his father, Bruce Jackson, to discuss the

incident that happened between the Defendant and the intruders.

40. The Defendant’s father, drove over to sit with the Defendant to “keep him company”.

41. The father arrived within 30 minutes.

42. The Defendant’s father was at the residence for approximately 2 hours when they heard a

loud banging on the door.

iii. The “Arrest”

43. The Defendant approached the door and tried to look out the door’s window, but a

flashlight shining into the house blinded him.

44. The Defendant opened the door and was immediately shoved back by the door as

someone yelled, “Get down! Hands behind your head!”

45. Employees of the Detroit Police Department, here after referred to as “officer(s)”,

streamed into the house, yelling and cursing, with guns raised.

46. The Defendant kneeled down and placed his hands behind his head.

47. The Defendant witnessed his father also place kneel and put his hands behind his head.

48. One “officer” held a gun to the Defendant’s head and yelled, “tell us where the guns are

at!”

49. Knowing that no one from the outside could see anything going on in the house and

understanding the situation was escalating, still having a gun pointed at his head, the


 4

 Defendant told the “officers” that the shotgun was in the bathroom and that a Ruger

model 10/22 was in the closet of the master bedroom.

50. One “officer” went upstairs and retrieved the weapons.

51. The Defendant witnessed the “officer” coming back down the stairs with both weapons in

hand.

52. The “officers” pulled the Defendant onto the front porch, closed the door slightly, with

the Defendant’s father still in the house.

53. The Defendant could hear the “officers” screaming at his father.

54. The “next door” neighbor was yelling at the “officers”, “They attacked him. What are

you doing?”

55. The “officers” handcuffed the Defendant and placed him in the backseat of a police car,

on the street.

56. The Defendant sat in the vehicle for, approximately, 15 minutes, when an “officer”

entered the vehicle, sat into the driver’s seat and drove to the 4th precinct, located at the

intersection of Fort Street and Green, “running” red lights and ignoring stop signs, along

the way.

57. The Defendant’s father was released at the scene, without charge.

58. At no time did the “officers” show a warrant or give a receipt for items taken.

59. There was no probable cause for arrest.

iv. Incarceration

60. “Officers” escorted the Defendant, inside the precinct, to a large room with a

fingerprinting machine.

61. The “officers” un-cuffed the Defendant, finger printed him and removed his glasses.


 5

 62. The “officers” instructed the Defendant to remove his shoelaces, which he complied with.

63. An “officer” inside the precinct began questioning the Defendant, when the Defendant

asserted his “right to remain silent”.

64. The “officers” escorted the Defendant to a cell and locked the cell door.

65. The Cell “block” was a “hallway” which had a prison cell door on each end.

66. The entrance that the Defendant was brought through also had a large wooden door on

the outside of the Cell door.

67. On the other end of the hall, the cell door lead into a much larger “community cell”.

68. On each side of the “hallway” were, approximately, six (6) cells.

69. On the Southern side of the “cell block”, was one cell that had been retrofitted as a

“bathroom” with one toilet.

70. On the Northern side were two (2) cells with windows, which were the only windows.

71. There was only limited light from the “hallway”, but no lights were in the individual

cells.

72. Phones were installed into some of the cells, which each had their own barred doors.

73. The floor was comprised of very old terrazzo flooring.

74. Toilet paper and gum were stuck to the walls in various places and to the benches and

phones.

75. The Defendant’s cell had one bench, which was missing one brace, so it slanted towards

the cell door.

76. The air was frigid and there were several men already incarcerated.

77. Urine smell permeated the cells.


 6

 78. Throughout the duration of incarceration, the defendant witnessed several of the men

urinating out of their cells into the “hallway” to relieve themselves.

79. The cell doors were locked for most of the day, for many of the days that the Defendant

was incarcerated.

80. One meal was offered daily.

81. An “officer” gave one of the prisoners a loaf of bread and a package of bologna to hand

out to the other prisoners.

82. With poor sanitary conditions, the Defendant declined the meals.

83. Several days passed during the Defendants incarceration.

84. The Defendant used his boots as a place to lay his head.

85. Two (2) times during the incarceration, an “officer”, also known as the “turn-key”, came

in and offered all of the prisoners a cigarette.

86. On or about the third (3rd) day of incarceration, the temperature was changed and the

cellblock went from frigidly cold to intolerably hot.

87. The Defendant was able to call his wife ”collect”, from the phone in his cell, and talk to

her several times during the incarceration, at great expense to his family.

88. On or about day five (5) of incarceration, the Defendant was moved to another location,

by van, and brought back to the 4th precinct, without being allowed to exit the van.

89. Later in the day, the Defendant visited with his attorney, at the precinct.

v. Habeas Corpus Granted, Ignored and Granted and Ignored Again

90. On November 7, 2000, Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant, Bar #20214,

hereafter referred to as “Mr. Semperger”, filed a Complaint for Habeas Corpus [Exhibit


 7

 A] on the Defendant’s behalf, alleging that the Defendant’s incarceration and continued

detention was illegal.

91. A Writ of Habeas was granted on November 8, 2000 by the Honorable John R. Perry,

Bar #18808, to be delivered to the custody of Mr. Semperger (listed as Attorney for the

Plaintiff on the Complaint), Bar # 20214, for the purpose of returning for arraignment or

to bring the Defendant to the arraignment, scheduled for November 9, 2000 at 9:00 a.m.

at 36th District Court, Room 4039 [Exhibit C].

92. Defendant remained in the custody of the Detroit Police Department and the Writ was

ignored.

93. On November 9. 2000, a second Complaint for Habeas was filed by Mr. Semperger

[Exhibit B].

94. The Honorable, John R. Perry, entered an order to deliver the Defendant to the custody

of Mr. Semperger and that arraignment was scheduled for November 13, 2000 [Exhibit

D].

vi. Release and Arraignment and Release

95. On or about November 9, 2000, the Defendant was released to his lawyer’s custody.

96. Contrary to the second Writ of Habeas, which ordered an arraignment on November 13,

2000, before judge Perry, the Defendant was arraigned on November 10, 2000.

97. The Defendant arrived early in the day, was taken into custody, again, when the

arraignment was held.

98. The State of Michigan charged the Defendant with Felonious Assault [750.82] and

Felony Firearm [750.227B-A]

99. Bond was set at $5000.


 8

 100. Bond was posted and the Defendant was released, approximately, six (6) to eight (8)

hours later.

101. Defendant was held for five (5) days at the 4th precinct and roughly thirteen (13) hours

with the Wayne County Jail.

102. A Preliminary Examination was scheduled.

vii. Before Preliminary Examination

103. Between the Arraignment and Preliminary Examination, the Defendant met with his

attorney, Paul Semperger, Bar # 20214, and discussed the preliminary examination.

104. Counsel prepared the Defendant for the exam, stating how excited he was to get “these

liars on the stand”.

viii. Preliminary Examination

105. The morning of the Preliminary Examination, on November 22, 2000, counsel changed

his former position and advised the Defendant to wave the right to a preliminary

examination.

106. The Defendant and his family expressed their concern with this decision, questioned

counsel on his advice, but chose to wave preliminary examination on the advice of

counsel.

107. Pretrial was scheduled.

ix. Before Pretrial

108. The Defendant met, once again, with his counsel at counsel’s office in Plymouth,

Michigan.

109. The Defendant expressed concern over the issue of the weapon used by Larry Mason II.


 9

 110. Because the Defendant had thrown it in the trash, he retrieved it from the trash, upon his

release, and brought it to counsel’s office.

111. Counsel had been advised of this weapon from the very first meeting with the

Defendant, but Counsel advised the Defendant “not to worry about it, right now”.

112. Counsel, once again, expressed excitement over moving the case forward.

x. Pretrial

113. On the morning of Pretrial, the Prosecuting Attorney offered a Settlement.

114. Counsel advised the Defendant that this was a “good deal” stating that it was likely the

“best he could get”.

115. On the advice of counsel, the Defendant accepted the plea deal of the lesser charge of

Reckless Discharge of a Firearm [752.9863] and Felonious Assault [750.82].

116. The agreed upon a sentence was: 3 years of Probation, with last 6 months “reviewable

in the Wayne County Jail”, mandatory psychiatric examination and treatment, as needed,

no contact with the victim and anger management counseling.

xi. Sentence

117. Defendant plead nolo contendere before Judge James R. Chylinski, bar #24293, on

January 24, 2001.

118. Extra costs were disclosed to the Defendant of $60 Crime Victim Assessment Fee and

$165 Costs per year, which were not previously disclosed.

xii. Duration of Probation

119. After Sentencing, the Defendant was sent to the local probation department for

processing, where he completed psychological testing, eleven (11) weeks of anger

management counseling and attended two (2) years of probation at the Lahser office and


 10

 was discharged, without incident, on January 15, 2003, signed by Judge Chylinski, on

January 23, 2003.

III. ISSUES

A. THE ARREST WAS BASED ON THE COMPLAINT AND THE

INVESTIGATORS REPORT, WAS THERE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST?

B. THE ARREST OCCURRED AT THE DEFENDANT’S HOME, WHILE THE

DEFENDANT WAS INSIDE. ALL EVIDENCE WAS SEIZED FROM INSIDE

THE DEFENDANT’S HOME. DID THE “OFFICERS” VIOLATE THE

DEFENDANT’S CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCORDING TO THE 4TH AMENDMENT?

C. THE DEFENDANT WAS HELD FOR SIX (6) DAYS, AT THE 4TH PRECINCT.

WAS THE DEFENDANT TAKEN BEFORE A MAGISTRATE IN A TIMELY

MANNER?

D. TWO (2) COMPLAINTS FOR HABEAS WERE FILED ON BEHALF OF THE

DEFENDANT. THE DEFENDANT REMAINED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT DURING BOTH ORDERED

ARRAIGNMENTS IN THE WRITS OF HABEAS. DID THE “OFFICERS”

IGNORE THE DEFENDANT’S WRITS OF HABEAS AND VIOLATE HIS CIVIL

RIGHTS?

E. THE “OFFICERS” HELD THE DEFENDANT IN DEPLORABLE CONDITIONS

AND STARVED THE DEFENDANT. DID THE “OFFICERS” VIOLATE THE

DEFENDANT’S CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCORDING TO THE 8TH AMENDMENT?


 11

 F. JUDGE CHYLINSKI DID NOT FILE AN OATH WITH THE SECRETARY OF

STATE. DID JUDGE CHYLINSKI HAVE A VALID OATH OF OFFICE? WAS

HE A CONSTITUTIONALLY ELIGIBLE OFFICER OF THE COURT?

G. THE DEFENDANT PLED NOLO CONTENDRE TO TWO (2) CRIMINAL

COUNTS UNDER OATH. WERE THERE STRUCTURAL ERRORS IN THE

DEFENDANT’S PLEA?

H. THE DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL ONLY FILED TWO (2) DOCUMENTS ON

BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT, BUT DID NOT CHALLENEGE ANY ERRORS

IN THE COURT RECORD. COUNSEL MISSED ERROR AFTER ERROR. DID

THE DEFENDANT HAVE SUFFICIENT COUNSEL OR DID COUNSEL SELL

THE DEFENDANT OUT?

IV. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. NO, THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST, THERE WAS NO

STANDING AND THE INVESTIGATOR’S REPORT WAS FAULTY.

1. In the Investigator’s Report [Exhibit E], dated November 6, 2000, in the

circumstances described, it states, “complt was walking down the street when a friend pushed

him into the def’s trash cans knocking them over…” It would not take very much

investigating to realize that the complainant was not credible. At the time of the arrest, the

trashcans were still out in front of the home. They were large “Detroit Issued” trashcans

placed very close together, full of construction debris. The only thing that could have

“accidentally” knocked them over could have been a Mack Truck. The report goes on to

state, “def then ran out of the above loc. and slapped complt in the face, def then ran back

into the loc. [and] came out with a 12 ga shotgun and pointed at complt and fired it.” Yet,


 12

 the complainant had no gun shot wounds and to the Defendant’s knowledge was not taken to

a hospital. The fact is that the investigators report [Exhibit E] is prima facie evidence of

contradictory statements and lack of credible fact witnesses and lazy detective work, which

as become the standard practice of the Detroit Police force.

2. It must be further noted that in 2003, at least, seventeen (17) indictments were

handed down to officers in the fourth precinct. While this may not necessarily implicate

these officers, it casts disparity on the whole precinct and substantiates a lack of credibility.

3. Without a credible fact witness, this court has no probable cause for arrest and no

standing. The prosecuting attorney has a duty to disclose of any knowledge of improprieties

on behalf of the witnesses or officers or his office. The Defendant alleges that not disclosing

this vital information was done in order to avoid civil litigation and surrendering subject

matter jurisdiction.

4. Furthermore, in the Investigator’s report [Exhibit E], there is no clause swearing it as

“accurate and true” as required by the statute, so it cannot be used as a credible document.

i. Any sworn testimony relied on in making the probable cause determination must
be adequately preserved to permit review. MCR 6.102(B). A record of
testimony is critical when there is a review of the validity of the arrest warrant
in connection with the seizure of physical evidence.
ii. In People v Burrill, 391 Mich 124, 128 (1974), the magistrate issued the arrest
warrant, based on a complaint, which contained conclusory statements. At the
time of issuance, the magistrate had no personal knowledge of the officer who
signed the complaint, nor did the magistrate interview any witnesses. The
Supreme Court held that the warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause.
However the invalidity of the warrant evidence did not effect the jurisdiction of
the court because in Michigan a complaint serves a dual purpose: (1)
“[initiation] of the judicial process,” and (2) “providing a basis for the
issuance of an arrest warrant.” Id. Therefore, although the complaint failed as
the basis for issuing the warrant, the Supreme Court held that it did not fail as a
basis for starting judicial proceedings, and thus the court was not divested of
jurisdiction since the officer had “probable cause to arrest Burrill based on his
conversations with the [victim].” Id. at 136. As the United States Supreme
Court has stated, “[t]he sole sanction imposed . . . for the invalidity of an arrest


 13

 warrant has been the suppression of evidence obtained from the person
following his illegal arrest” and not divesting the court of jurisdiction. Id. at
133. In Whiteley v Warden of Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 US 560, 568-569
(1971), a sheriff, acting on an informant’s tip, presented a complaint before the
magistrate that Whiteley and another person had broken into and entered a
locked building. The complaint contained only conclusory statements by the
sheriff, and the sheriff failed to mention that he was relying on an informant’s
tip in the complaint. The sheriff then put out a radio bulletin giving the names
and descriptions of the suspects, the type of car they were probably driving, and
the amount of money taken. An officer, relying on the radio bulletin, arrested
the suspects and seized physical evidence incident to the arrest. The court first
held that the arrest warrant was invalid. Id. at 565. However, the invalidity of
the arrest warrant would not automatically cause the suppression of evidence if
the arresting officer “possessed sufficient factual information to support a
finding of probable cause for arrest without a warrant.” Id. at 565-566. The
court found that the arresting officer could not show sufficient facts that the
people in the car had committed the crime stated in the police bulletin, and not
just evidence of their identity from the police bulletin. Id. at 567. The evidence
obtained was suppressed.
iii. Furthermore, a record of testimony to show a false swearing may be necessary
to support a charge of perjury against a complaining witness who knowingly
makes false statements that form the basis for a person’s arrest. People v
Kennedy, 9 Mich App 346, 348 (1968).1

5. As stated previously, flaws of this nature are fatal and render the charges void or vital

evidence inadmissible.

B. YES, THE “OFFICERS” DID VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT’S CIVIL RIGHTS,

ACCORDING TO THE 4TH AMENDMENT, RENDERING THE ARREST AND

EVIDENCE INVALID.

1. When King George granted his generals the ability to quarter the soldiers in the

Colonist’s homes, this left the colonists bitter. The soldiers were brutal. They would

take what they wanted. They would destroy property. They would displace families.

Even those who were loyal to the crown found themselves very bitter against the

British.

























































1
Michigan Judicial Institute © 2006–April 2009, Monograph 1, Page 23-24


 14

 2. It was for this reason that the 3rd and 4th Amendments were instituted. It was the

intent of the Constitutional Convention to make sure that this would not happen here;

not again.

3. The Bill of Rights in the 4th Amendment guarantees us:

i. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

4. This is reiterated in the Michigan State Constitution:

i. I § 11 Searches and seizures.

Sec. 11. The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be
secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place
or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section
shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any
narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized
by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.2

5. When the Defendant opened his door on November 4, 2000, the police stormed in.

They assaulted the Defendant and his Father, damaged his property, invaded his

privacy and stole items from his house.

6. The Investigator’s Report [Exhibit E] makes mention that the “officers” went to the

residence of the Defendant. The “officers” had no warrant, had not witnessed a crime

and could not lawfully make an arrest, as in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)

(voiding state law authorizing police to enter private residence without a warrant to

make an arrest); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (officers with arrest

warrant for A entered B’s home without a search warrant and discovered


























































2Constitution of Michigan 1963 – Article I § 11


 15

 incriminating evidence; violated Fourth Amendment in absence of warrant to search

the home); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (officers went to suspect’s home

and took him to police station for fingerprinting).

7. The seizure of evidence, immediately following the illegal arrest is inadmissible.

When officers entered the residence during the arrest, even if the arrest would be a

lawful arrest, the officers could only search the immediate area to secure the safety of

the officers. The standard applies to items found “in plain sight”. By the officer’s

admissions in the Investigator’s Report [Exhibit E], they claim that the Defendant

informed them that the weapons were in the “bathroom”, which was upstairs. Since

the Defendant was already in custody, there would be no reason to assume that any

evidence in the residence would be in danger. A search warrant could be obtained,

under MCL 780.652, without worry of the integrity of the evidence. Even if the

Defendant had told the officers the location of the guns, and if the arrest was lawful,

the officers should have realized their limitations and sought a warrant, because the

gun was not in the immediate area, in plain sight. Furthermore, the officers seized a

weapon, a Ruger model 10/22, that was not pertinent to the investigation and was

never mentioned. There was no mention of all the clips and ammunition that was

taken, either. They did not provide a receipt of the items taken, to the Defendant, to

further cover up their crimes.

8. After the warrantless arrest, a Warrant [Exhibit F] was made, pursuant to the law on

warrantless arrests, but a proper return, as required by the statute, was not signed,

rendering the Warrant invalid:

i. MCL 764.1b requires that the arrest warrant: “shall be directed to a peace
officer; shall command the peace officer immediately to arrest the person


 16

 accused and to take that person, without unnecessary delay, before a magistrate
of the judicial district in which the offense is charged to have been committed, to
be dealt with according to law; and shall direct that the warrant, with a proper
return noted on the warrant, be delivered to the magistrate before whom the
arrested person is to be taken…

ii. B. Return on an Arrest Warrant

The return on an arrest warrant is a certificate of the executing officer, which
states the manner in which the warrant was executed. MCR 6.102(E) provides
that “[o]n execution or attempted execution of the warrant, the officer must make
a return on the warrant and deliver it to the court before which the arrested
person is to be taken.”
iii. MCL 764.19 states that “[t]he return of the officer making the arrest, endorsed
upon the warrant upon which the accused shall be subsequently held, affirming
compliance with the provisions herein, shall be prima facie evidence of the fact
in the trial of any criminal cause.”3

C. NO, THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT TAKEN BEFORE A MAGISTRATE IN A

TIMELY MANNER.

1. The duty to be bring a person before a magistrate in a timely manner is paramount in

our system of justice, which has been adjudicated by the courts, many times and is

solidified in statute:

i. 764.13 Arrest without warrant; taking arrested person before magistrate of

judicial district in which offense charged to have been committed; complaint.
Sec. 13.
A peace officer who has arrested a person for an offense without a warrant shall
without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a magistrate of the
judicial district in which the offense is charged to have been committed, and shall
present to the magistrate a complaint stating the charge against the person
arrested.

2. Case law mirrors the statute, including notable cases, such as, Gerstein v. Pugh 420

U.S. 103 (1975) and County of Riverside v. Mclaughlin 989-1817), 500 U.S. 44

(1991). (The Riverside case clarifies rulings in the Gerstein case.)


























































3
Michigan Judicial Institute © 2006–April 2009, Monograph 1, Page 25


 17

 i. “The Court thus established a "practical compromise" between the rights of
individuals and the realities of law enforcement. Id., at 113. Under Gerstein,
warrantless arrests are permitted but persons arrested without a warrant
must promptly be brought before a neutral magistrate for a judicial
determination of probable cause…..
ii. Given that Gerstein permits jurisdictions to incorporate probable cause
determinations into other pretrial procedures, some delays are inevitable. For
example, where, as in Riverside County, the probable cause determination is
combined with arraignment, there will be delays caused by paperwork and
logistical problems. Records will have to be reviewed, charging documents
drafted, appearance of counsel arranged, and appropriate bail determined.
On weekends, when the number of arrests is often higher and available
resources tend to be limited, arraignments may get pushed back even further.
In our view, the Fourth Amendment permits a reasonable postponement of a
probable cause determination while the police cope with the everyday
problems of processing suspects through an overly burdened criminal justice
system.
iii. But flexibility has its limits; Gerstein is not a blank check. A State has no
legitimate interest in detaining for extended periods individuals who have
been arrested without probable cause. The Court recognized in Gerstein that
a person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a fair and reliable
determination of probable cause and that this determination must be made
promptly.
iv. Unfortunately, as lower court decisions applying Gerstein have demonstrated,
it is not enough to say that probable cause determinations must be "prompt."
This vague standard simply has not provided sufficient guidance. Instead, it
has led to a flurry of systemic challenges to city and county practices, putting
federal judges in the role of making legislative judgments and overseeing
local jailhouse operations. See, e. g., McGregor v. County of San Bernardino,
decided with McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F. 2d 1276 (CA9 1989);
Scott v. Gates, Civ. No. 84-8647 (CD Cal. Oct. 3, 1988); see also Bernard v.
Palo Alto, 699 F. 2d 1023 (CA9 1983); Sanders v. Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694
(SD Tex. 1982), affirmance order, 741 F. 2d 1379 (CA5 1984); Lively v.
Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000 (DC 1978).
v. Our task in this case is to articulate more clearly the boundaries of what is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Although we hesitate to announce
that the Constitution compels a specific time limit, it is important to provide
some degree of certainty so that States and counties may establish procedures
with confidence that they fall within constitutional bounds. Taking into
account the competing interests articulated in Gerstein, we believe that a juris
diction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48
hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness
requirement of Gerstein. For this reason, such jurisdictions will be immune
from systemic challenges…
vi. Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination
within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the arrested individual


 18

 does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable delay. Rather, the
burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide
emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. The fact that in a particular
case it may take longer than 48 hours to consolidate pretrial proceedings does
not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance. Nor, for that matter, do
intervening weekends. A jurisdiction that chooses to offer combined
proceedings must do so as soon as is reasonably feasible, but in no event later
than 48 hours after arrest.”

3. In this case, the Defendant was arrested on November 4, 2000 and not brought before

a Magistrate until November 10, 2000. The “officers” failed to bring the Defendant

before a magistrate in the time allotted, by statute and by case law.

4. Furthermore, the Warrant [Exhibit F], dated November 7, 2000, clearly commands

the officers to bring the Defendant before him “immediately”. The officers ignored

the magistrate and continued to hold the Defendant illegally, as their hostage.

D. YES, THE “OFFICERS” DID IGNORE THE DEFENDANT’S WRITS OF

HABEAS AND VIOLATE HIS CIVIL RIGHTS.

1. As stated previously, on November 7, 2000, Paul Semperger, Attorney for the

Defendant, bar # 20214, filed a Complaint for Habeas Corpus on the Defendant’s

behalf alleging that “the Defendant’s incarceration and continued detention was

illegal” [Exhibit A]. It was allowed on November 8, 2000, by the Honorable John R.

Perry, Bar # 18808, to be delivered to the custody of Paul Semperger, Attorney for

the Defendant (listed as Attorney for the Plaintiff), Bar # 20214, for the purpose of

returning for arraignment or to bring the Defendant to arraignment scheduled for

November 9, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. at 36th District Court, Room 4039 [Exhibit C].

Defendant remained in the custody of the Detroit Police Department and the order

was ignored.


 19

 2. On November 9. 2000, a second Habeas was filed [Exhibit B], for the Defendant, and

the Honorable John R. Perry entered an order to deliver the Defendant to the custody

of Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant, Bar # 20214, and that arraignment

was scheduled for November 13, 2000 [Exhibit D]. The Defendant was arraigned on

November 10, 2000, before a different judicial officer, in further violation of the Writ

and denial of due process rights.

3. Twice, the Detroit Police Department and the Prosecuting Attorney chose to suspend

the Michigan Constitution and the United States Constitution. To the Defendant’s

knowledge, no proclamation of rebellion or invasion had been declared as required by

both Constitutions, which read:

i. Constitution of the State of Michigan,

Habeas corpus.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in case of
rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.4

ii. Constitution of the United States:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.5

4. Furthermore, Judge Chylinski did not acknowledge this violation of the Defendant’s

rights, as required by statute, nor did he follow any of the commands issued in those

statutes, further covering up the criminal behavior of the officers and judicial

officials:

i. MCL 600.4313
Habeas corpus; refusal to consider; malfeasance of judge.


























































4
Constitution of Michigan 1963 – Article I § 12
5United States Constitution - Article I § 9


 20

 Any judge, who willfully or corruptly refuses or neglects to consider an
application, action, or motion for habeas corpus, is guilty of malfeasance in
office.6

ii. MCL 600.4325

Habeas corpus; person served; duty to bring body of prisoner.
If a writ of habeas corpus is issued, the person on whom it is served shall bring
the body of the person in his custody according to the command of the writ,
except as provided in section 4328.7

iii. MCL 600.4328

Habeas corpus; sickness or infirmity of prisoner.
If, from the sickness or infirmity of the prisoner directed to be produced by any
writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner cannot, without danger, be brought before
the court or judge, the party having custody of the prisoner may state that fact
in his answer. The court or judge, if satisfied of the truth of the allegation, and if
the answer is otherwise sufficient, shall proceed to dispose of the matter on the
record.8

iv. MCL 600.4331

Habeas corpus; refusal or neglect to obey; arrest; close custody; proceeding
against sheriff; prisoner to be brought before court; power of county.
(1) If the person upon whom the writ of habeas corpus was duly served refuses
or neglects to obey the writ without sufficient excuse, the court or judge before
whom the writ was to be answered, upon due proof of the service thereof, shall
direct the arrest of such person.
(2) The sheriff of any county within this state, or other officer, who is directed
to make the arrest, shall apprehend such person, and bring him before the court
or judge. The person shall be committed to close custody in the jail of the
county in which the court or judge is, without being allowed the liberties
thereof, until the person complies with the writ.
(3) If the person ordered arrested is the sheriff of any county, the order may be
directed to any coroner or other person, to be designated therein, who has
thereby full power to arrest the sheriff. Such sheriff upon being brought up may
be committed to the jail of any county other than his own.
(4) The person directed to make the arrest shall also bring the prisoner named
in the writ of habeas corpus before the court or judge which issued the writ.
(5) In making the arrest the sheriff or other person so directed may call to his
aid the power of the county as in other cases.9


























































6
History: 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963.
7
History: 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963.
8
History: 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963.
9
History: 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963.


 21

 v. MCL 600.4334
Arrest in support of writ.
If any person attempts wrongfully to carry the prisoner out of the county or
state after service of a writ of habeas corpus or order to show cause, the person
serving the writ or order to show cause, or other officer, shall arrest the person
so resisting, and bring him together with the prisoner before the court or judge
issuing the writ or order to show cause.10

5. Again, this amounted to a violation of the Defendant’s rights, guaranteed by both

Constitutions, State and Federal, and is a fatal defect which cannot be remedied. With

this act, the State, again, surrendered subject matter jurisdiction, forever.

Furthermore, the act of changing the date may have been an attempt by the prosecutor

to “judge shop” and was also in violation of the Defendant’s rights and is irreparable.

E. YES, THE “OFFICERS” DID VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT’S CIVIL RIGHTS,

ACCORDING TO THE 8TH AMENDMENT.

1. The Defendant was brought to the 4th precinct, located at 7140 W Fort Street or at the

intersection of Fort Street and Green, where he was held for approximately six (6)

days.

2. Conditions at the precinct were inhumane, at best, but may have reached the level of

torturous. Sanitary conditions were horrid and no bedding or bed was provided for

the six (6) day stay. Regular access the restrooms were not available. Regular meals

were not provided. The climate and temperature were not properly regulated, nor was

adequate clothing. The conditions were a violation the 8th amendment of the US

Constitution, which reads,

i. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.


























































10
History: 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963.


 22

 3. The argument can be made that up until that time, the Defendant had no trial and due

process had already been violated. The Defendant had already been restricted of his

liberty and to impose such conditions on the Defendant amounted to a sentence, a

further violation of due process.

4. Article 1 § 16 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 also states that,

i. I § 16 Bail; fines; punishments; detention of witnesses.

Sec. 16. Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed;
cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; nor shall witnesses be
unreasonably detained.

5. The “Officers” ignored three (3) orders to bring the Defendant to a magistrate,

ignored laws commanding the same and tortured the Defendant. After such cruel

treatment and violation of rights, the Defendant was not mentally capable of making a

decision that may have lead him back into such an environment. When a plea deal

was offered, the Defendant feared similar treatment and abuses in both process and

sentencing, specifically in the event of another incarceration. The very reason why

these laws were enacted, were to defend against such abuses on the innocent. By this

method, the “officers” ensured that the Defendant would take a plea.

F. NO, JUDGE CHYLINSKI DID NOT HAVE A VALID OATH OF OFFICE AND

HE WAS NOT A CONSTITUTIONALLY ELIGIBLE OFFICER OF THE

COURT.

1. On May 24th, 2010, the Defendant requested a copy of Judge Chylinksi’s Oath of

Office, among others, from the Office of the Great Seal, c/o Terri Lynd Land, the

current Secretary of State [Exhibit G]. The Defendant asked for Judge Chylinski’s

Oath of Office, on file, for the years covering 2000 and 2001 and his current Oath on


 23

 file. The Defendant also asked for a copy of Judge Perry’s Oath of Office for the

years covering 2000 and 2001. On May 27th, the Defendant’s request was answered

[Exhibit H].

2. The FOIA coordinator, Michelle Martin, responded by sending a letter of response

[Exhibit H] pursuant to the Defendant’s request and certified copies of Oaths on file

on and certified copies of no Oaths on File. Contained herein were certified copies of

the following:

1st. Judge Chylinski’s current Oath of Office on file [Exhibit I] filed on December

14, 2004.

2nd. Judge Chylinski’s lack of Oath for the years of 2000 through 2001 [Exhibit J].

3rd. Judge Perry’s lack of Oath for the years of 2001 through 2001 [Exhibit K].

3. In the Michigan State Constitution, the requirement for holding public office is clear:

i. Oath of Public Officers

All officers, legislative, executive and judicial, before entering upon the duties of
their respective offices, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United
States and the constitution of this state, and that I will faithfully discharge the
duties of the office of .......... according to the best of my ability. No other oath,
affirmation, or any religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office
or public trust.11 12

4. This is further reiterated and codified in statute, in full effect and force at the time of

this matter:

i. Revised Statutes of 1846 (EXCERPT)

FILING OATHS AND BONDS BY COUNTY OFFICERS.


























































11
Constitution of Michigan 1963 – Article XI § 11

12
 History:Const. 1963, Art. XI, § 1, Eff. Jan. 1, 1964 Former Constitution: See Const. 1908,
Art. XVI, § 2.


 24

 45.318
County officers; oaths of office, deposit, filing.
Each of the officers named in this chapter, except notaries public and prosecuting
attorneys, shall before entering upon the duties of his office, and within 20 days
after receiving official notice of his election, or within 20 days after the
commencement of the term for which he was elected, take and subscribe the oath
of office prescribed by the constitution of this state, before some officer
authorized by law to administer oaths, and deposit the same with the clerk of the
proper county, who shall file and preserve the same in his office.13

5. While reading the statues in Para Materia, we find the full intent of the legislature

and Constitution:

i. REVISED JUDICATURE ACT OF 1961 (EXCERPT)

Act 236 of 1961
600.2153
Public officers; administration of oaths for certain purposes.
Whenever any application is made to any public officer or board of officers to do
any act in an official capacity, and such officer or board requires information or
proof to enable him or them to decide on the propriety of doing such act, such
information or proof may be required to be given by affidavit, and such officer or
any member of such board, may administer all necessary oaths for that purpose.14

6. Furthermore, the statutes lay out the guidelines for the Supreme Court justices:

i. REVISED JUDICATURE ACT OF 1961 (EXCERPT)

Act 236 of 1961
600.206
Justices; oath.
The Supreme Court justices shall take and subscribe the oath required by the
constitution before entering upon the discharge of their duties.15

7. Once again, laid out in the Federal Constitution:


























































13
History:R.S. 1846, Ch. 14 ;-- CL 1857, 466 ;-- CL 1871, 608 ;-- How. 638 ;-- CL 1897, 2641
;-- CL 1915, 2505 ;-- CL 1929, 1417 ;-- CL 1948, 45.318
Compiler's Notes: This section, as originally enacted, was numbered section 119.In this section,
“the constitution of this state” evidently refers to the Constitution of 1835. See now Const. 1963,
Art. XI, § 1.
14
History: 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963

15
History: 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963


 25

 i. Debts, Supremacy, Oaths
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution,
as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the
several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the
United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.16

7. This is codified in:

i. United States Code (USC)

Title 5, Part 2, Subpart B, Chapter 33, Subchapter II § 3331
Oath of Office
An individual, except the President, elected or appointed to an office of honor or
profit in the civil service or uniformed services, shall take the following oath: “I,
AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear
true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully
discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.”
This section does not affect other oaths required by law.

8. Furthermore, the statutes, in the Federal code, are clear on when this oath must be

filed:

i. United States Code (USC)

Title 5, Part 2, Subpart B, Chapter 33, Subchapter II § 3332
Officer affidavit; no consideration paid for appointment
An officer, within 30 days after the effective date of his appointment, shall file
with the oath of office required by section 3331 of this title an affidavit that
neither he nor anyone acting in his behalf has given, transferred, promised, or
paid any consideration for or in the expectation or hope of receiving assistance in
securing the appointment.


























































16
Unites States Constitution – Article IV



 26

 3. The Oath of Office issue is not a minor one; case law stresses that point. New York

and other states have several cases to this effect, but one case in Texas which spells it

out very well,

i. “After criminal defendant failed to appear in court, the 34th District Court, El
Paso County, Jack Ferguson, J., entered judgment forfeiting $40,000 bail bond.
Bail bond surety appealed. The Court of Appeals initially affirmed, 948 S.W.2d
69. The Court of Criminal Appeals vacated and remanded for reconsideration.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals, Larsen, J., held that: (1) senior judge who
signed judgment nisi was required, as appointed official, to take constitutional
oath, and (2) because judgment nisi was invalid, application for bail forfeiture
was unsupported. Reversed and rendered.17”

4. While this issue, at first blush, may appear as a “minor infraction”, it may be

something quite a bit more than that. It is certainly a Constitutional requirement.

While Judge Chylinski may remember taking the Oath, there is only one legal way to

verify that fact: a legally filed oath, within 10 days. A Defendant cannot be assured

that his constitutionally protected rights would be preserved in front of such an

official. The Defense adamantly believes that this is an error and cannot be

overlooked. Therefore, both Judge Chylinski and Judge Perry, acted through color of

law and had no jurisdiction to perform in an official capacity. These acts amount to

malfeasance in office and official oppression. It is a further violation of due process

and is irreparable.

G. YES, THERE WERE STRUCTURAL ERRORS IN THE DEFENDANT’S PLEA.

1. The Defendant pled nolo contendere to two (2) criminal counts, under oath.

However, Judge Chylinski’s oath of office leads to a further problem. He was not

constitutionally eligible to hold office. Therefore, he could not swear the Defendant

























































17
Prieto Bail Bonds v. The STATE of Texas (1999) 994 S. W. 2d 316 (Tx. App. - El Paso)



 27

 in to take a plea. In the PEOPLE v. PLUMAJ, April 23, 2009, docket #285534,

before the Court of Appeals of Michigan:

i. Constitutional errors that are structural in nature are subject to automatic

reversal. If a case involves nonstructural, preserved constitutional error, an
appellate court should reverse unless the prosecution can show that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. If the constitutional error is not
preserved, it is reviewed for plain error. In cases involving preserved,
nonconstitutional errors, the defendant must establish that it is more probable
than not that the error undermined reliability in the verdict. Unpreserved,
nonconstitutional errors are reviewed for plain error. [People v. Cornell, 466
Mich. 335, 363 n. 16, 646 N.W.2d 127 (2002) overruled in part on other
grounds People v. Mendoza, 468 Mich. 527, 664 N.W.2d 685 (2003) (internal
citations omitted.) ]….
ii. “The procedures governing the acceptance of a guilty plea were first adopted
by [our Supreme Court] in 1973 and are currently set forth in MCR 6.302.
MCR 6.302(A) provides that: ‘the court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere unless it is convinced that the plea is understanding, voluntary, and
accurate. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must
place the defendant or defendants under oath and personally carry out sub
rules (B)-(E).’ “2 People v. Saffold, 465 Mich. 268, 272, 631 N.W.2d 320
(2001) (internal footnote omitted).
iii. Strict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not essential, but rather, our Supreme
Court has “adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance, holding that ‘whether
a particular departure from Rule 785.7 [now MCR 6.302] justifies or requires
reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the
noncompliance.’ “ Saffold, supra at 273, 631 N.W.2d 320, quoting In re Guilty
Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 113, 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975). Automatic reversal is
required only when the trial court fails to procure “an enumeration and a
waiver on the record of the three federal constitutional rights as set forth in
Boykin v. Alabama [395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) ]: the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and
the right to confront one's accusers.” Id. at 281. This Court may consider “the
record as a whole” to determine whether the Boykin requirements were
satisfied and whether a guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. People
v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 197, 448 N.W.2d 781 (1989).

2. This fact, added up with the other Constitutional violations, makes this case “rock

solid” for automatic reversal and a ruling of void judgment.

H. NO, THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL.


 28

 1. The Defendant was a young man when this incident took place. He was a pillar in the

community, working for the Detroit Rescue Mission and other organizations as an

Assistant Director of a Christian camp for many seasons. The Defendant believed in

the advice of counsel and the authority of his elders. The Defendant had no idea how

much that trust would be abused.

2. The Defendant was lead to believe that counsel was a powerful advocate and would

fight diligently on his behalf. From the very beginning, it appeared that this was the

case.

3. Defendant’s Counsel did not challenge any of the issues listed in this Motion.

Counsel, who the Defendant trusted to be learned in these matters, did not admit

evidence in the Defendant’s favor, did not confront witnesses. Counsel did not file

discovery. In the end, Counsel did not put up a defense. The Defendant was robbed

of his 6th Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Counsel set up the

Defendant for a plea and steered the Defendant towards a plea, despite the Defendants

objections and protests of innocence.

i. Of the contention that the law provides no effective remedy for such a
deprivation of rights affecting life and liberty it may well be said-as in Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 , 55 S.Ct. 340, 342, 98 A.L.R. 406- that it 'falls
with the premise.' To deprive a citizen of his only effective remedy would not
only be contrary to the 'rudimentary demands of justice’ but destructive of a
constitutional guaranty specifically designed to prevent injustice.18
4. The Defendant’s Counsel did not inform him of the fines agreed to, in the plea deal.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), lays out ineffective assistance of


























































18
JOHNSON v. ZERBST, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)


 29

 counsel clearly. The Court determined that counsel is ineffective if the outcome of

the case would have been different if counsel had not made errors. In this case, the

issue is clear. Counsel’s ineffectiveness sealed the Defendant’s fate.

5. While it may not be paramount to this case, it must also be noted that Paul

Semperger, Bar #20214, had been reprimanded in Case Nos. 91-245-GA; 91-272-FA,

in 1994, by the Attorney Discipline Board Tri-County Hearing Panel #31 for conduct

was found to be in violation of MCR 9.104 (1-4,7); Canons 1, 6 and 7 of the then-

applicable Code of Professional Responsibility; and the Michigan Rules of

Professional Conduct, 1.1(c); 1.2(a); 1.3; 3.2; 8.1(b); 8.4(a,c). This fact was never

disclosed to the Defendant.

i. Due Process Fundamental

1. The founding fathers understood the importance of due process. They understood how

critical it was to allow for fair dealings in the courts and that the rules were followed. They

jealously protected the liberty of each man and understood that the only way to ensure that an

innocent man not be violated in his own home is for due process to be vigilantly guarded.

i. "The Fourteenth Amendment, in declaring that no State 'shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' undoubtedly intended . . . that equal
protection and security should be given to all [and] they should have like access to the
courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention
and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts...."19

2. It was understood, the only way the innocent could stand a chance and to avoid injustice

was to put restraints on the government and create a government “by the people and for the

people” in a Republican form of government. This is demonstrated in the words, “Congress


























































19
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Steven Field, Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 35 (1885),


 30

shall make no law…” that are repeated over and over again or as Michigan put it,

i. Political power.
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal
benefit, security and protection.20

3. The idea of having a Democratic form of government was not popular until the 20th

century. Until that time, our legislators, members of the judicial branch and members of the

executive branch understood the importance of having a Republican form of government, based

on property rights, including the most valuable property of all, our very selves, guaranteed by an

excerpt from Article IV, Section 4:

i. “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion;…”

4. The founding fathers called Democracy, a “Tyranny of the Majority21”, where 51% of the

people can vote away the rights of 49% of the people. It is fundamental, it is imperative, it is

crucial that the rights of all men are diligently protected, no matter if they should be in the

minority or majority.

5. It is important to distinguish between the idea that “this is the way that we have always

done it” and “this is the law, therefore we are commanded to obey.” This has been lost in our

country. This has been lost in our court system.


























































20
Constitution of Michigan 1963 – Article I § 1

21
Quote by Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America



 31

 ii. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Challenged at Any Time

1. This case started and concluded in late 2000 and early 2001. The Sentence was

discharged in 2003. It has not been appealed and the time for most appeals has passed. The

Court must be satisfied why this matter should be brought before it, at this time.

2. The Courts have rules that state that any judgments made without subject matter

jurisdiction are null and void. They have no force and effect in law. This is an error that must be

addressed and must be corrected, once the issue has been raised.

3. Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Texas says of this

right in Stine v. State, 908 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (Meyers, J., concurring):

"The writ of habeas corpus, for example, is available to set aside a criminal conviction on the

basis of any jurisdictional defect in the proceedings which led to it, no matter how remote in

time."

4. An 1803 case, Marbury v. Madison, tells us “anything repugnant to the Constitution is

null and void”.

5. The other issue that the Court needs to address is why these issues were not previously

raised.

iii. Trespass Ab Initio

1. The Doctrine of Trespass Ab Initio is the doctrine that states that an officer that acts under

color of law is wrong from the very beginning and all his acts are defeated. The very moment he

chooses to step out of the mandates of his authority and act is the moment that he becomes a

trespasser ab initio.

2. Thus, in this case, when the officers chose to violate any of the Defendant’s rights, he

invalidated the arrest and had a duty to release the Defendant. There were many opportunities to


 32

correct their actions along the way, beginning with the initial interaction with the Defendant,

when the officers ignored his fourth amendment rights, ignored the due process requirements in

MCL 764.1, ignored his 8th amendment rights, ignored orders granted by the Court to bring him

before a Magistrate and perjured themselves on government documents, among many other

violations.

3. Any one (1) of these violations would have violated due process and been enough to

surrender subject matter jurisdiction, but in this case, the violations are vast.

iv. Court Record Tampered With

1. On November 9. 2000, a second Habeas was filed with the court clerk by Paul

Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant, Bar #20214, [Exhibit B]. Further examination of this

document shows that the date has been tampered with.

2. On March 15, 2010, the Defendant received from the Court Clerk [see receipt, Exhibit L]

20 different documents in the case file #00-69257. The Defendant asked for all of the documents

in the file, but the clerk of the court withheld four (4) documents for reasons unknown to the

Defendant. The Defendant questioned the Clerk, but the clerk stated that she could not copy

them, according to the law. The Habeas [Exhibit B] was one of those documents, but the

Investigator’s Report, if it was in the case file, was not given to the Defendant. The Defendant

subsequently learned that the Clerk had a duty to redact the “victim’s” information and release

the document. It is not known if this was in the case file.

3. Furthermore, the exhibits listed as C and D, were not given to the Defendant by the clerk.

It is not known if those documents were in the case file. If these documents were in the case file,


 33

there would be primae facie evidence of the corruption and cover-up that occurred in this case

and the hiding of exculpatory evidence.

i. United States Federal Code states:

If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in
any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or because of his having so exercised the same;... They shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from
the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an
attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual
abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term
of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.22

And
ii. United States Federal Code states:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in
violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation
of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated
sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill,
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or
may be sentenced to death.23
4. The Defense alleges serious charges against the Detroit Police Officers, the Prosecution,

the Judge and the State of Michigan. The facts back up the Defendant’s statements and it

appears that the Clerk of the Court has made an effort to do the same, further violating the due

process rights of the Defendant, under color of law.


























































22
TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTION 241
23
TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTION 242



 34

 v. Branded a Criminal

1. When police officers chose to violate the law, who is there to stand in the gap? For most

citizens, the burden is far too great. It’s insurmountable. If a citizen’s rights have been violated,

it can be devastating. Citizens are taught, “the police are there to protect you.” When the reality

becomes one that the police are the violators, the whole weight of the judicial system bears down

on the citizen, in this case, the Defendant, and justice is elusive, at best. At worst, justice is not

within reach of an innocent man.

2. In 2003, when 17 or more officers were indicted, the Detroit reported how those

complainants were not believed because they were “convicts”. The truth is, “innocent until

proven guilty” is not a reality in a system where rights are not protected. If an officer chooses to

charge an individual with a crime, “who will believe you over me?”

3. In this case, the Defendant believed in moral excellence. The Defendant believed in his

2nd amendment rights and his ability to protect his house, his family and his property. If the

officers had taken just one moment to truly look at the facts on November 4, 2000, then all of

this could have been avoided and the arrest would have never happened. The Defendant has

taken the position, despite police reports claiming the contrary, from the very beginning, that he

was right to defend himself and had he not done so, he probably would not be here.

4. Logic dictates that it simply does not make sense that the Defendant would “attack”

someone for simply knocking over his trashcans and jeopardize his liberty and all that he had

worked for. It also does not follow a logical conclusion that the Defendant would jeopardize his

family, by way of retribution, over such a menial issue.

5. However, in a Court of Law, logic is not the standard. Due process is. The hope is that if

due process were followed, the logical outcome would be what happens. Due process is there to


 35

weed out corruption, to weed out the innocent from the guilty and to make sure that justice

happens.

6. Justice just did not happen in this case and the Defendant has lived under this cloud for

10 years. It is imperative that the court sees this and follows the standards, as prescribed by law.

vi. Damages

1. While this is not a Civil Proceeding, the Defendant reminds the Court that he has suffered

damages. The Defendant does not believe the Court or any of its Judicial Officers were party to

the larger conspiracy, at this time, but was rather an unwilling participant in the corruption of

both, the Prosecutor and the Detroit Police Department. However, the Defendant acknowledges

that the Court was participant, nonetheless, and that the Court had a duty to obey the laws.

2. The Defendant also believes that the facts are overwhelming that the Attorney, Paul

Semperger, Bar # 20214, was inept and apathetic in his representation of the Defendant.

3. Regardless of who might be to blame for inept or conspiratorial practices and procedures,

or what reasons they might have had to do so, the Defense reminds the Court that it stands to

gain very little by revisiting this matter. The Defendant is not incarcerated. The Defendant is no

longer under any Sentence Restrictions or Supervision by any Probation offices. Nonetheless,

the Defendant has suffered and is still suffering damages to this very day because he the

Defendant remains constrained at his liberties.

4. The Defendant has suffered invasion of privacy, invasion of property, theft of property,

including, but not limited to one (1) shotgun and one (1) Ruger 10/22 Rifle and equipment. The

Defendant was falsely imprisoned and falsely charged. The Defendant has had his due process

rights violated on multiple occasions and continues to live under a cloud of impropriety. The


 36

Defendant has had his 2nd Amendment rights stripped. The Defendant has found it difficult to

find employment with a criminal history. The Defendant was forced to pay fees and penalties to

the Probation Supervision office and attorney’s fees.

5. It is also important to note that the Defendant was victimized many times. It began with

destruction of property and attempted theft by Larry Mason II and his friends and continued on

throughout the legal proceedings into sentencing where everyone got “their pound of flesh.”

vii. The Law of Void Judgments

1. The Defense holds that this judgment is void and subject matter jurisdiction was

surrendered, ab intio. While the human element is important to keep in mind, it is far more

pressing to realize that due process was violated at key stages throughout this case, which

severely prejudiced the Defendant’s position.

2. Case Law supports this principle. In Smith v. McCullough 46 S.Ct. 338, dealing with in

personam jurisdiction, it states that jurisdiction cannot be assumed and until proven, “he/she is

without jurisdiction and case should be dismissed, jurisdiction cannot be presumed”; reiterated in

Smith v. McCullough 46 S. Ct. 338, “once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven.” Hagens

v. Lavine 415 U.S. 533, tells us that, “No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction.”

3. In NGUYEN V. UNITED STATES (01-10873) 540 U.S. 935 (2003) 284 F.3d 1086, the

Supreme Court held that any judgment entered without a qualified judge must be vacated.

“Void Process”. (Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition)

One which fails in some material respect to comply with the requisite form of Legal process.
United States vs. Van Dusen, C.C.A.Minn,. 78 F.2d 121,124.


 37

4. No argument is subjective in this case. The documentation is conclusive and self-

authenticating. The prosecution and, thus, the State of Michigan, has lost all subject matter

jurisdiction by ignoring law and violating Michigan Court Rules, making the burden too great on

the defendant to properly prepare and uphold a fair defense.

5. Most importantly, due process has been ignored, which has been guaranteed by the 14TH

Amendment of the Constitution of the united states of America: “…nor shall any state deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws…”

V. CONCLUSION

The Defendant has lawfully brought this Motion forward, showed jurisdiction to hear this

Motion based on the court rules, showed due process violations, violations of law, civil rights

violations and the damage caused expose a larger cancer that operates in the court and the local

police forces. The Defendant has shown:

1) There was no probable cause for arrest, no credible fact witness and no proper

charging documents.

2) The Defendant was arrested in his home, illegally, in violation of law, in accordance

with a warrantless arrest.

3) All evidence obtained was obtained illegally and unlawfully.

4) The “officers” engaged in criminal behavior.

5) The Defendant was held in excess of the time allotted by law before arraignment.

6) The Detroit Police Department did violate the Defendant’s rights by ignoring two (2)

Writs of Habeas Corpus, an order from the magistrate on the warrant and what law,


 38

 according to MCR 764.13, commands.

7) The Detroit Police Department did abuse and starve the Defendant in violation of law.

8) Judge Chylinski did impersonate a judicial officer and was not Constitutionally

eligible to take the bench without a valid oath of office, as required by law.

9) The Defendant plead nolo contendere without being sworn in by a constitutionally

eligible officer.

10) The Defendant’s Counsel was inept and inebriated and did not provide a competent

defense.

For these reasons, the court should grant this Motion, without delay.

With that, the Defendant thanks the Court.

Failure to enforce the law does not change it. Louisville & N.R.R. v U.S., 282 U.S. 740, 759.

WHEREFORE, the defendant moves the Court to withdraw the Defendant’s plea, void the

judgment and dismiss the charges with prejudice, for the reasons stated herein and because it is

the right thing to do, the law commands it and justice demands it. The defendant further moves

the court to return all property, fines and fees, or in the alternative, make him whole again and

any other relief that the court sees fit to grant. If the Court denies this motion, the defendant

moves the court to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law why this motion should be

denied in accordance with MCR 2.613(C).


 39

Respectfully Submitted,

______________________ Notary Stamp Here

Mark Alan Jackson

129 North Lowell Road

Windham, NH 03087

313-478-8061

marcosagostos@gmail.com


 40

 VI. EXHIBITS

All exhibits have been attached to the end of this document and labeled. Some are part of

the original Court Record and some are unclear, but should have been entered into the Court

Record.

A. Complaint for Habeas Corpus, filed by defendant’s Attorney (listed as Attorney for

the Plaintiff, Bar #20214, on November 7, 2000 against Benny Napoleon, Detroit

Chief of Police.

B. Complaint for Habeas Corpus, filed by defendant’s Attorney (listed as Attorney for

the Plaintiff, Bar #20214, on November 8, 2000 against Benny Napoleon, Detroit

Chief of Police.

C. Writ of Habeas Corpus, granted on November 8, 2000, by the Honorable John R.

Perry, Bar # 18808, to be delivered to the custody of Paul Semperger, Attorney for

the Defendant (listed as Attorney for the Plaintiff), Bar # 20214, for the purpose of

returning for arraignment or to bring the Defendant to arraignment scheduled for

November 9, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. at 36th District Court, Room 4039.

D. Writ of Habeas Corpus, granted on November 9, 2000, by the Honorable John R.

Perry, Bar # 18808, to be delivered to the custody of Paul Semperger, Attorney for

the Defendant (listed as Attorney for the Plaintiff), Bar # 20214, for the purpose of

returning for arraignment on November 13, 2000.

E. 2 Sections. The Investigator’s Report [04-583476], dated November 6, 2000, filed

by the 4th precinct.

F. The Felony Warrant, dated November 7, 2000, signed by Magistrate Charles W.

Anderson III.


 41

 G. Defendant’s FOIA request to the Office of the Great Seal c/o the Secretary of State,

written on May 24th 2010, requesting Oaths of Office.

H. Michelle Martin’s response, pursuant to the Defendant’s May 24th, 2010 FOIA

request, answered on May 27th, 2010.

I. Judge Chylinski’s current Oath of Office on file with the Secretary of State, filed on

December 14th, 2004.

J. Certified copy of response that Judge Chylinski had no Oath of Office on file for the

years of 2000 through 2001, by Terri Lynn Land, the current Secretary of State.

K. Certified copy of response that Judge Perry had no Oath of Office on file for the

years of 2000 through 2001 by Terri Lynn Land, the current Secretary of State.

L. Felony Complaint, dated on November 6, 2000, signed by Magistrate Charles W.

Anderson III, charging the Defendant with 2 counts.

M. Receipt from Cathy M. Garett, Wayne County Clerk, dated March 15, 2010, for 20

documents, for a total of $20.00.


 42

 Exhibit A

 43

 Exhibit B

 44

 Exhibit C

 45

 Exhibit D

 46

 Exhibit E – Section 1


 47

 Exhibit E – Section 2


 48

 il

)oov?Rl45
STATE OF MICHIGAN CASENO: 2000228145
PA
WARRANT
36TH DISTRICT COURT FELONY 3G-OO 69?57
3rd CIRCIIIT (-f|IIRT

The Peopleof the Stateof Michigan Offense Information

Date of Offense Police Agency Report No.
vs 1110412000 jaw 82DP4-s83476
MARK ALAN JACKSON 82-002281,45-0I Place of Offense
1309CrawfordStreet,DETROIT
Complainantor Victim
LARRY RICHARD MASON II
ComplaininqWitness
TNFO& BE:LIEF

Stateof Michiean.Countv of Wavne

To anyPeace-Officei'or
Cou'rtOfficerauthorized
to makearrest:Thecomplaining
witness
hasfileda swomcomplaint
in this
Court stating that on the date and location statedabove, the Defendant(s), contriry to liw,

couNT I DEFENDANT(S)0l ASSAULT WrTH A DANGEROUSWEAPON (FELONIOUSASSAULT)

did makean assaultuponLarry Mason II with a dangerous weapon,to-wit: Shotgun,but without intendingto commit
thecrimeof murderor to inflict greatbodilyharmlessthanthecrimeof murder;contraryto MCL 750.82;MS.A28.277.
[7s0.82]
FELONY: 4 Yearsand/or$2.000.00

couNT 2 DEFENDANT(S)01 WEAPONS - FELONY FTREARM

did carryor havein his/herpossession
a firearm,to-wit: Shotgun,at the time he/shecommittedor attemptedto commita
felony,to-wit:FeloniousAssault;contraryto MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).1750.2278-Al
FELONY: 2 Yearsconsecutivelywith andprecedinganytermof imprisonmentimposedfor the felonyor attempted
felonv conviction

Upon examinationof the complainingwitness,thereis probablecauseto believethat

Defendant committed the offense. Therefore, in the name of the People of the S and bring
theDefendantbefore the Court immediatelv.

oate-------'-7--
/t- ?-A? (seal)
Atov
a6UA
Byvirnreorthiswarrant,
theDefendant
hasbeen CHARIESW.ANDERSON
intoc,lfJyHo-rnuna&IAGISTRATE
taken ltl
Date: PeaceOfficer:

Exhibit F


 49


PageI of I
 Exhibit G







































 50













































 51

 Exhibit H

















































































 52





 53






 Exhibit I
























































































 54































































































 55






 Exhibit J











































































 56




 Exhibit K























































 57

 Exhibit L


 58

 VII. VERIFICATION

I, Mark Alan Jackson, do swear and affirm that all statements made herein are true and

accurate to the best of my knowledge, in all respects.

Jurat

Signed
and
sworn
before
me
________________________________,
on
this
day,
the
_____
day
of

_________,
2010.

Notary
Signature:



____________________________________



VIII. PROOF OF SERVICE

To be completed by the court.

I certify on this date a copy of this motion was served upon the prosecutor by

Personal Service: Mail:


 59