Ottoman Diplomacy
continued to affect the ideals and aspirations
GÜNEŞ IŞıKSEL
İstanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi, Turkey
The Ottoman emirate emerged in the four-
teenth century from the many small emirates
that formed along the Anatolian frontier with
Byzantium after the demise of the Anatolian
branch of the Seljuk dynasty. In the following
two centuries the emirate became an empire,
expanding into southeastern Europe and the
Middle East while dominating Mecca and
Medina as well as other important centers of
Islamic civilization such as Damascus, Cairo,
and Baghdad. By the seventeenth century,
stretching from North Africa to the Caucasus,
it acquired a viable multi-confessional and
multi-ethnic identity and the human capital
that enabled its sultans to pursue their polit-
ical agendas in Europe, Western Asia, and
Africa. With the subsequent emergence of the
“Eastern Question,” the empire’s territorial
integrity became an international problem.
During the long nineteenth century until its
demise in 1922, the empire tried to preserve
its frontiers by playing one Great Power off
against another. In this process it adopted
the institutions of modern diplomacy, first by
extending its diplomatic and consular net-
work throughout Europe and then to other
important capitals of the world.
From the fourteenth century onward the
Ottomans exhibited a marked reluctance to
sign binding treaties of alliance with Chris-
tian powers until the reversal of their military
power at the beginning of the nineteenth
century. But before 1900 they had engaged
in numerous informal pacts of friendship.
In the context of rational political calcula-
tions, Ottoman reliance on the traditions of
The Encyclopedia of Diplomacy. Edited by Gordon Martel.
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2018 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/9781118885154.dipl0207
Islamic jurisprudence declined, although they
of decision-makers. Ottoman diplomatic
practices were never static and continued to
evolve.
When evaluating the institutions of
Ottoman diplomacy it must be kept in
mind that, until the second quarter of the
nineteenth century, the central administra-
tion had neither a specialized department
of foreign affairs responsible for direct-
ing foreign policy, nor even a minister in
charge – although a strong case can be
made that the reisülküttab (chief scribe)
fulfilled that role during the eighteenth
century in conjunction with the Grand
Vizier. Similarly, no officials undertook the
duties of professional diplomatists. Nev-
ertheless, the sultans and their chanceries
repeatedly defined what they meant by
friendship, good neighborliness, and peace,
which demonstrates that there were cer-
tain recognized standards of diplomatic
conduct between the Ottomans and the
political entities with which they coexisted
and with whom they negotiated. On the
other hand, the gradual Westernization of
Ottoman diplomacy during the nineteenth
century is not simply another instance of
the importation or adoption of European
institutions. The process was multifaceted
and demonstrates how diplomatic princi-
ples were redefined and reoriented by the
Ottomans in their pursuit of a coherent
foreign policy.
The comprehensive periodization which is
necessary in order to trace the evolution in
the principles, institutions, and techniques
of Ottoman diplomacy on the one hand
and the cultural and institutional influ-
ences on the other is difficult inasmuch as
the historiography on the subject is still
2 OT TOM A N DI PLOM AC Y
deficient. The absence of a complete and
critical edition of Ottoman peace treaties
and other major diplomatic acts is a case
in point. The customary chronological divi-
sion occurs at the turn of the nineteenth
century with the establishment of resi-
dent embassies and consulates, which were
decisive developments in the adoption of
European norms and instruments of diplo-
macy within the empire. But previous to
this there were affinities between preexist-
ing Ottoman diplomatic institutions and
their European equivalents, which makes it
possible to reassess Ottoman relations with
the surrounding world and to reframe the
diplomatic history of the empire within a
broader context.
WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE OTTOMAN
STATE
During the formation of the Ottoman emi-
rate, the authority and power of rulers derived
from their success in war. Holy War spirit and
militancy (ghaza) was cultivated by the ruling
class and the mythology constructed around
it became an integral part of the Ottoman
political system – so much so that in the early
stages of state-building, a distinction between
the civil and the military branches of the
administration was rarely made. The main
motive of Ottoman expansion up to the fall
of Constantinople in 1453 was the consoli-
dation of power in Asia Minor (mostly at the
expense of other Turkic emirates) and south-
eastern Europe through the occupation of
major trade routes and centers. After the final
defeat of Byzantium, stabilization of the fron-
tier on the Lower Danube and the removal
of Muslim military rivals in Anatolia, the
Ottoman sultans, as they now were, had both
the ability and need to consider a greater mar-
itime role, especially in the Black Sea and the
eastern Mediterranean. With Constantinople
under their control, they inherited not only a
strategically located position dominating the
straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus
but also a center of sea power. Territorial
forces, which included one of the first stable
armies (the Janissary Corps) and an efficient
navy organization, meant that the Ottoman
state was positioned to become one of the
strongest military powers of the early modern
world.
Still, even in the fourteenth century, diplo-
macy was a constant feature in Ottoman
political culture despite the fact that the
ideology of Holy War or jihad was a constant
feature in political discourse. It is not gen-
erally acknowledged that the few embassies
referred to in the sources represent only
a small fraction of the constant flow of
diplomatic missions that concerned territo-
rial arrangements, commercial treaties, or
matrimonial alliances. Battles with Ottoman
adversaries were rarely fought to the death,
and after a demonstration of resources and
an initial trial of strength, rulers often pre-
ferred to establish a truce and negotiate a
settlement. When expanding their territory
the Ottomans proved ready to negotiate for
the loyalty of local elites if it did not seem
possible to impose full control via conquest.
In this process the practical organizational
devices developed by the Ottomans to main-
tain control over both defeated enemies and
those they sought to win over to their side
were vital. This strategy of accommodation
(istimalet) helped to smooth the transition
from pre-Ottoman regimes to the new rule
and to maintain law and order after the
conquests.
At the turn of the sixteenth century, the
Ottoman state improved its administrative
and fiscal institutions to be able to compete
with major regional powers. The Ottomans
displayed remarkable openness to techno-
logical innovation and transfers, as evident
in their early and effective use of firearms

Figure 1 Nikolai Vasilyevich Repnin (1734–1801), Russian general and diplomat, ambassador to Con-
stantinople, 1775–76. Source: INTERFOTO/Alamy Stock Photo.
and their interest in nautical science. An
effective prebendal land-tenure system was
set up in order to crush the Mamluk cavalry.
Artillery was improved so as to besiege the
state-of-the-art fortifications of the Hungar-
ian kingdom. To face the Venetian Republic
in the eastern Mediterranean, the Ottomans
invested in naval technologies. Against their
formidable enemy in the east, Safavid Iran,
communication and supply systems were
reorganized. At this stage the Ottomans
adopted and reinterpreted some of the for-
eign policy institutions of their neighbors.
Ottoman treaties of peace and commerce,
the ahdnames, were multilayered diplomatic
instruments with many legal and rhetorical
borrowings from medieval Italian, Balkan
and, especially, Byzantine traditions. It goes
without saying that Islamic principles and
conceptions were reinterpreted during this
process.
The “Well-Protected Dominions” (mema-
lik-i mahruse) – the official denomination of
OT TOM A N DI PLOM AC Y 3
the empire that started to take shape during
the second half of the sixteenth century – was
a complex set of political and cultural entities
bounded by seas, other empires, and polities.
Ultimately, it was at the expense of the latter
that the Ottomans built their empire. In one
way or another, administrative provinces had
been, wholly or partly, monarchies before
the conquest. Some other political entities
were not totally incorporated into the empire.
The pattern of relations between the imperial
center and client-principalities – Christian
vassals in the Balkans and Caucasus, Muslim
ones in Kurdistan and in Crimea – was not
simply an interaction between conqueror and
conquered. The Ottoman center provided
clients with military support and protec-
tion, while clients contributed massively to
the manpower and resources upon which
imperial administration could build. In
most circumstances, it was actually in the
Ottomans’ own interest to support them,
not only to preserve their reputation, but
4 OT TOM A N DI PLOM AC Y
also because the removal or subjugation of
a client-principality was likely to result in
pressure from a mightier neighbor.
CONSOLIDATION OF FRONTIERS
AND REDEFINITION OF THE REALM
Notions related to territorial limits seem
to have been ignored both by medieval
Turco-Mongol political entities and Near
Eastern states. Although frontier regions
existed from the beginnings of the Ottoman
emirate – which was, indeed, a frontier polity
initially – these were not perceived as a limit
to expansion. The concept of an imperial
frontier seems to have had little meaning and
“victorious sultans” were not accustomed to
thinking about frontiers as physical and static
boundaries. The limits of the empire, if at all
defined, were expressed in terms of power
and military action. The only clearly demar-
cated boundaries were those between inner
provinces. Although some portions of the
frontier with Venice were fixed in Dalmatia
and in Morea during the 1470s, these were
used mainly as an instrument to bring order
to the vague territory that had been annexed
to the mainland.
However, from the third quarter of the
sixteenth century onwards, the Ottomans
gradually came to see political space in
terms of demarcated territory. This change of
perception was prompted primarily by less
feasible military expeditions. Distances, with
consequent logistical difficulties and chal-
lenging geographical conditions, favored a
pattern of Ottoman military involvement ori-
ented primarily to the eastern and southern
edges of central Europe and along the west-
ern Iranian plateau south of the Caspian Sea.
Moreover, the Ottomans had to operate on a
wide variety of fronts far distant from each
other. They responded to these challenges by
the creation of flexible and interdependent
administrative structures in the borderlands
in order to implement a coherent frontier
policy. Instead of broad margins that were
casual, adventitious, and tactically illogical,
they developed zones that showed a strategic
awareness of natural defenses, communica-
tions, and resources. Most of these consisted
of fortified cities as army bases with roads
between them. Nevertheless, early modern
Ottoman frontiers were not along fixed lines,
but were broad borderlands where expansion
had stopped because of a lack of resources.
Consequently, an important change in
Ottoman relations with its neighbors took
place. While the term “Well-Protected
Dominions” came to designate the entire
polity, the Ottomans started to consolidate
their borders against foreigners. Neverthe-
less, the frontiers of the empire were not
comparable to the Great Wall of China: these
zones were porous, especially in the limits of
the empire in the north and south. There, vast
zones were controlled by remote fortresses,
in some cases hundreds of miles distant from
each other. In other words, early modern
Ottoman frontiers differed from modern
boundaries by virtue of their shifting and
amorphous nature, facilitating cross-cultural
interaction and interpenetration between
different frontier societies. The Ottomans, as
well as their neighbors, willingly supported
and even armed some of the paramilitary
forces making a living along the edges of their
respective territories. To extend their power
and weaken the position of their neighbors,
they authorized predatory attacks by these
forces on the commercial and political inter-
ests of competing political structures. When-
ever one of the neighboring polities com-
plained to the sultan, the latter replied that the
offending parties were acting under their own
initiative and he denied any responsibility.
Stretching from the Danube to the Indian
Ocean, the Ottoman Empire had frontiers
with various political entities. Each neigh-
boring state had its own notions of frontiers

and administrative systems. The resolution of
border issues with the Habsburg Empire had
little to do with similar problems involving
sub-Saharan political entities. At the imperial
center, a bureau with specialized personnel
and specific regional expertise was lacking.
Moreover, the distances between the capital
and remote frontiers posed a major challenge
that prevented the necessary flexibility for
decision-making and implementation. As a
consequence, for reasons of efficiency and
to facilitate negotiations in different border
configurations, the sultans delegated some
of their foreign policy powers to frontier
governors-general who had the necessary
local knowledge and expertise. The frontier
governors regularly sent embassies to their
counterparts in order to discuss multifarious
frontier issues and to gather information.
Frontier diplomacy, which was a constant
feature from the second half of the sixteenth
century on, not only reduced the costs of
diplomatic action but also compensated for
the absence of resident missions in foreign
capitals.
TRUCE AND TRADE
As the Ottoman state became larger and
more complex the establishment and main-
tenance of peaceful relations emerged as a
key concern alongside success in war. The
sultans constantly received embassies and
negotiated truces, bilateral peace treaties,
and other diplomatic agreements with them.
For example, the Ottoman and Habsburg
empires both had a vital interest in the Hun-
garian lands lying between their territories,
which initially brought them into conflict.
But conflict soon gave way to negotiation
and agreement when both accepted that the
disputed region was sufficiently large to allow
each of them some control over resource-rich
areas along the Danube. On the other hand,
a military showdown in central Europe or in
OT TOM A N DI PLOM AC Y 5
Iran would involve an enormous drain on the
state’s finances, with no guarantee of success
and the possibility of stripping the homeland
of its defense forces.
Ottoman treaties with European states,
organized in chapters (Lat. capitulum, from
which the term “Capitulations” is derived)
usually included considerable detail, some
quite specific, concerning subjects such as
procedures for transferring slaves or goods.
By contrast, agreements with Safavid Iran
and other Islamic powers were, mostly, more
generalized in nature – including wishes
expressed metaphorically to emphasize the
binding nature of agreements and the sanctity
of promises. However, in some instances, they
included details such as the fate of particular
frontier regions and castles.
There were also significant material ben-
efits that could flow from peaceful relations,
particularly in the area of trade. If political
and military objectives were not absent in the
granting of Capitulations, strictly commercial
considerations were of primary importance.
As a matter of fact, the Ottomans appreciated
commerce for the valuable, useful, or novel
articles it procured for the wealthy, and for
the substantial fiscal revenues it brought to
the treasury. The Capitulations contained
specific clauses on freedom of trade, levying
duties and taxes, the rules of navigation, the
registration of trade vessels, and provision
of security for merchants. Initially accorded
to France (1569), England (1580), and the
Netherlands (1612), these unilateral grants
were extended in the following centuries to
almost all European countries, thanks to the
“most-favored nation” clause. These agree-
ments not only assured favorable conditions
for commercial exchanges, but also paved
the way to enhance cross-cultural contacts,
which fostered a change in Ottoman percep-
tions of non-Muslim nations and political
entities.
6 OT TOM A N DI PLOM AC Y
PATTERNS OF EVOLUTION
With the end of extensive conquests during
the second half of the sixteenth century, the
Ottoman chancery revised its discourse on
the nature of the empire to new political
realities. The centrality of the sultan was no
longer defined by the boundary between
Ottomans and “others” to be conquered. The
empire’s success and safety depended less on
the force that it could wield than on an image
of force. According to this fiction, what con-
stituted imperial sovereignty was not related
to the possession of supreme military power,
but rather to the occupation of a pivotal
position in a highly complex and dynamic
political realm divided into three regions of
diminishing Ottoman influence: the inner
vassal area (North African governorates,
Kurdish principalities), the outer vassal
area (tribute-payers as well as the Crimean
khanate), and the rest of the world. The
Ottomans did not expect to extend their
authority over states in the last category. The
sultans devised a hierarchy of relations predi-
cated on Ottoman superiority and suzerainty
vis-à-vis the inferiority and submission of
their interlocutors. Respect for this hierarchy
and acknowledgment of Ottoman superiority
were absolute requirements for friendship
with the sultans.
From the moment when diplomacy
worked its way into the relations between
the Ottomans and Christian nations, the
Islamic juridical concept of the “Abode of
War,” that is, lands of enemy infidels, neces-
sarily lost its rigidity and uniformity, whilst
the “infidels” who were previously considered
to be a “united nation” were progressively
differentiated one from another. In principle,
each one of these states, be they small or
great, merited attention and consideration.
In their letters, the sultans addressed them
by such noble formulas as “the paragon of
the glorious seigniors of the Religion of
Jesus.” These flattering words reflected the
recognition of their legitimate rule. What is
more, from the Ottoman chancery’s point
of view, all those Christian seigniors were
distinguishable from each other by virtue
of their respective powers as well as their
relative seniority in their relations with
the sultan. Of course, the latter was placed
at the top of the interstate hierarchy, as
reflected in his title, “the distributor of the
crowns.” The title of “caesar” was reserved
exclusively for him. Habsburg rulers were
simply categorized as “king” (kral) or, at
best, “emperor,” which had no particular
value for the Ottomans. On the contrary,
some other rulers, who were esteemed by
the sultan, such as the king of France or the
sultan of Aceh (Sumatra), were elevated as an
example and honored by the title of padişah
(“ruler”).
The language of friendship was the chief
discursive framework whereby the Ottomans
constructed their relationships with their
neighbors and other international partners.
A recurrent formula consisted in conven-
tional use of dostluk (friendship) together
with similar concepts such as good neighbor-
liness and accord. So long as an interlocutor
was demonstrating firmness and sincer-
ity to peace, friendship, and alliance with
the sultan, the latter promised to do like-
wise on his part. Friendship involved also a
redefinition of other friends and, especially,
common enemies. The typical formula for
organizing a political reality according to the
friend/enemy distinction, “the friend of my
friend and the enemy of my enemy,” demon-
strated the mechanism of assigning the roles
of friends and enemies upon entering a new
relationship. Finally, besides being the most
apparent justification for alliances and pro-
vision of help, friendship turned out to be
an expedient instrument in the arguments
made for launching commercial relations
with collateral legal regimes, as well as for

affirming sovereign power in their respective
territories.
After the redefinition of the frontiers and
the identification of the empire’s essence
through the security of territory, the ultimate
aim was no longer to eliminate enemies but
to coexist with them. There was a substantive
change in Ottoman diplomatic practices
that occurred in tandem with the political
fortunes of the empire. The principal aim of
this diplomacy was to maintain a balance
of power, and the Ottomans came to make
a greater effort to understand European
diplomacy. In fact, the sultans appear as
pragmatic rulers who were capable of adjust-
ing their strategies to changing geopolitical
challenges. They proved able tacticians who
managed to build alliances across religious
and ethnic boundaries. The idea of the bal-
ance of power was seemingly well received in
the fertile soil cultivated and prepared by the
discourse of friendship. For instance, during
the sixteenth century, the Ottomans exploited
the growing political (Habsburg–Valois)
and confessional (Catholic–Protestant)
rivalries in Christian Europe. The sultans
frequently helped the enemies of the Hab-
sburg Empire and received their help in
return.
By the last quarter of the sixteenth cen-
tury power relations on all fronts were more
balanced, which made wars longer and more
exhausting. Of these, the Hungarian War
(1593–1606), the Iranian Wars (1579–91,
1603–11, 1623–39), and the Venetian War
(1645–69) present changing patterns of war-
fare. The second siege of Vienna (1683) was
the high-water mark of Ottoman expansion
in Europe and its failure opened its central
European possessions to reconquest by the
Christian powers. In a ruinous fifteen-year
war, Russia and the Holy League (composed
of the kingdom of Poland, the Habsburg
Empire, and the Republic of Venice) orga-
nized under the aegis of the papacy, drove
OT TOM A N DI PLOM AC Y 7
the Ottomans south of the Danube. Peace
was no longer considered a justified yet
temporary respite, but a necessity. Although
during the eighteenth century the Ottoman
Empire was almost continuously at war
with one or more of its enemies – Austria,
Persia, Poland, Russia, and Venice – a mil-
itary ethos was gradually rejected by the
upper classes. After defeats sealed by the
treaties of Karlowitz (1699), Passarowitz
(1718), and Belgrade (1739), the foreign
policy of the empire came to be based on
the principle that a grand alliance uniting
all its neighbors should be avoided at all
cost. This idea was accompanied by a will-
ingness to make peace even on unfavorable
terms.
DIPLOMATIC CULTURE AND ITS
TRANSFORMATION IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
“My Sublime Porte is not closed and is
always wide open to those who come both
to report their friendship and enmity.” This
common expression suggests not only the
centrality of the sultan in the international
hierarchy but also an important concep-
tion of Ottoman diplomacy: all foreigners
personally invested with political power or
accredited by a political entity may enter into
negotiations with the sultan. The Ottomans,
in theory, assumed material responsibility
for foreign missions as soon as they crossed
into their territory. An ambassador usually
attended two audiences with the sultan: the
first following his arrival, and the second
before his departure. If an ambassador was
not a resident, the time he could spend
depended on the sultan’s goodwill. Entries
of the ambassadors to the Ottoman capital
and then to the imperial palace were staged
in a ceremonial form. Ceremonies were
specifically designed to convey a range of
messages and ideas about the nature of the
8 OT TOM A N DI PLOM AC Y
empire and the sultan’s power. Diplomatic
ceremonial underlined the latter’s role as the
warden of the well-ordered political universe,
and provided an impressive background for
diplomatic negotiations. Gifts and liberties
offered to the ambassadors were indicative of
the support they enjoyed. Submission to the
sultan’s authority was emphasized through
the proskynesis ceremony which suggested
that both ambassadors and those they repre-
sented were, at least symbolically, subjects of
the sultan. On the other hand, mistreatment
of foreign envoys was not uncommon by
Ottoman dignitaries, for whom extrater-
ritoriality of envoys had a limited validity.
They did not respect the immunity of the
diplomatic community and frequently held
representatives accountable for the actions
of their country. Their imprisonment as
part of a declaration of war was a frequent
practice.
Early modern Ottoman envoys were often
mere carriers of letters who had little power of
negotiation. We can find neither in Ottoman
archives nor in other contemporary sources a
reference to their full powers. Rather, officials
were chosen to undertake ad hoc missions
at the sultan’s pleasure, or on the advice
of his divan (central advisory body). The
Ottomans did not respect the gradations
of the European hierarchy in Istanbul, but
expected it for their own envoys in Europe.
As a diplomatic career did not exist in the
Ottoman administration almost any court
functionary could be dispatched. The rank
attached to his post, or to him personally,
could signify the degree of respect being
paid to the recipient; çavuşes (commissars)
were used and indeed demanded in the most
important missions; some were elevated to
higher ranks before their embassies com-
menced. Certain officials were involved in
matters closely associated with communica-
tion with other parties, and so were chosen to
perform embassies as a consequence of their
involvement; this included the dragomans,
whose duties involved the translation of acts
and parleys, as well as the oversight of visiting
diplomats. An individual’s talents in oratory
and/or cultural affinity might particularly
recommend him. Finally, there are a striking
number of emissaries who undertook mul-
tiple embassies, recommended apparently
by their previous experience in other lega-
tions, whether to the same party or another.
The advantages of sending an individual
as an envoy to the same destination were
familiarity with conditions and people, and
a greater preparedness for what he might
encounter.
The treaties of Karlowitz (1699) estab-
lished a number of precedents in Ottoman
diplomacy that accelerated the familiarity
with the European system. It was the first
time that members of civil officialdom,
rather than the military, had negotiated
the terms of peace, and it was also the first
time that there was a willingness on the
part of the Ottomans to accommodate the
diplomatic system of Europe. The bureau-
cracy, and especially the offices involved
with foreign affairs, notably the chief scribe
and his staff, grew in size during the eigh-
teenth century. During the so-called Tulip
Period (1718–30), European delegations
in Istanbul were allowed to circulate more
freely in Ottoman society and diplomatic
relations with Europe were expanded, as an
increasing number of embassies were sent to
major capitals. In 1721, the Ottoman ambas-
sador to France, Yirmisekiz Mehmed Çelebi
(d. 1732) was ordered not only to fulfill
a diplomatic mission, but also to obtain
detailed information about France. In travel
accounts (sefaretname) prepared in this cen-
tury by the Ottoman ambassadors, there
were details not only about administrative,
military, and technological aspects, but also
arts, culture, and education in European
states and societies. It was France, however,

that the regime regarded as a kindred state
and looked to as a model. Without doubt, the
fame of Louis XIV resounded as well in Istan-
bul. The common language of diplomacy was
Latin or Italian, but French began to assume
great importance towards the end of cen-
tury. Due to the long-established relations,
French ambassadors often received a priority
in rank in Istanbul. Other experiments in
diplomacy included the consistent use of
mediation during peace negotiations – as in
the case of the successful French ambassador
Villeneuve at Belgrade (1739) – and char-
acterized thereafter all treaty negotiations.
These new institutions became gradually
reciprocal, continuous, and Westernized.
The Ottomans exported some of the newly
adopted diplomatic concepts and institutions
to their Asian and African neighbors, as was
the case in the delineation of borders with
different dynasties in Iran from the first half
of the eighteenth century onwards.
The Ottomans persisted in the use of diplo-
matic initiatives with Europe in preference to
war between 1739 and 1768, the longest such
period of peace on the western borders of the
empire in its entire span. The long period of
inactivity against western enemies helped to
mask Ottoman military weakness until the
battles of the Russo-Ottoman War (1768–74).
The peace of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) resulted
in the loss not only of Ottoman suzerainty
over the Crimea – a region inhabited mainly
by Muslims – but also of the monopolistic
right to sail the Black Sea. Moreover, Rus-
sia secured the right to protect the sultan’s
Christian Orthodox subjects in the Balkans,
Anatolia, and Syria. The implications of the
perceived decline of Ottoman power as well as
the vulnerability and attractiveness of its vast
holdings became collectively known as “the
Eastern Question” in European diplomatic
circles in the last quarter of the eighteenth
century. The problem from the viewpoint
of the European powers was how to dispose
OT TOM A N DI PLOM AC Y 9
of the empire in such a manner that no
one power would gain an advantage at the
expense of the others and upset the political
balance of power in Europe.
The French Revolution increased the need
to gather first-hand information on Europe
and speed up the establishment of resident
embassies. The first resident ambassadors,
however, proved to be mostly ineffective.
Though they were chosen from among the
ranks of high dignitaries and respected mem-
bers of the Ottoman bureaucracy, they were
not trained as career diplomats. They were
neither experts in conducting negotiations
nor familiar with European protocol. More-
over, most of them did not speak European
languages and were highly dependent on their
dragomans (chosen from Greek Orthodox
secular elites trained in Italy and France). It
took days and months to send information
to, and receive instructions from, Istanbul.
Furthermore, resident embassies added to the
increasing costs of the empire. Consequently,
by the 1820s, the Ottoman state suspended
this system, called back its ambassadors, and
left the dragomans as chargé d’affaires and
consuls.
THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY
Diplomatic alliances, military cooperation,
and trade agreements created a modus vivendi
between the Ottomans and Europe, under
which ideas, goods, and technologies flowed
with greater ease. This flow gained unprece-
dented momentum in the long nineteenth
century, as a result of modernization efforts
which were first undertaken in the military
domain during the last quarter of the eight-
eenth century in an effort to forestall the
perceived decline of the empire. European
administrative practices and political ideas
were infused into the classical Ottoman sys-
tem. Bureaucratic reforms of the Tanzimat
(Reordering) era led to a complete break
10 OT TOM A N DI PLOM AC Y
that encompassed all aspects of Ottoman
institutional, cultural, and societal routines.
The rivalries of the Great Powers for polit-
ical, diplomatic, commercial, and strategic
leverage in Istanbul and other Ottoman
lands had an important impact during this
modernization process. Russia and Austria
clashed in the Balkans, Britain and France
were rivals in North Africa, Egypt, and Syria,
Germany and Britain competed in Ottoman
Mesopotamia, and last, but not least, Britain
and Russia struggled for control of the straits
of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the
major threat to the integrity of the empire
came from France, the Ottomans’ ancient
and esteemed ally, when Napoleon invaded
Egypt in 1798. During the crisis, Selim III
(r. 1789–1807) tried to thwart the French
occupation through the use of diplomacy
and negotiation. Although the French had
undertaken a deliberate act of aggression
and violated international law, Ottoman
statesmen favored a resolution of the conflict
through diplomatic means. In this period,
the Ottomans started to refer regularly to
European legal terminology and arguments
(such as status quo ante bellum) in their
negotiations. In effect, this diplomatic pattern
became regularized during the first half of
the nineteenth century when Ottoman cen-
tral control over peripheral areas decreased
considerably while some were lost altogether,
including western Georgia (1801–4), Serbia
(1804–15), Greece (1821–28), and Algiers
(1830). Henceforth, Ottoman diplomats nev-
ertheless clung to the idea of the territorial
integrity of the empire. Their activity was
related to the struggle to prevent the loss of
territory, or the loss of governing author-
ity over parts of territory, either to nascent
nations within the empire or to the Great
Powers. They determined that existing legal
regimes in the Ottoman lands should be pre-
served and that the principle of nationality,
or of national self-determination, should not
be allowed.
However, unrest in the Balkans was attract-
ing the attention of the Great Powers, none
more so than Russia in view of its geo-
graphical proximity and religious ties to the
Orthodox Ottoman subjects. In prepara-
tion for the expected takeover of the straits
of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, Russia
continued swallowing the Ottoman territory
that circled the Black Sea in both Europe
and Asia. The main endeavor of Ottoman
diplomats was to gain the support of major
opponents of Russia. In the 1830s and the
following decade, their foremost supporter
was Metternich. Vienna had no desire to
see a weak Ottoman neighbor replaced by
a potentially strong Russia. In the following
decades, the Sublime Porte sided with Lord
Palmerston and Benjamin Disraeli. Britain
went to war against Russia in 1853 on behalf
of the Ottomans, in order to block Rus-
sian power. In the 1870s, the sultan turned
towards Otto von Bismarck who, for similar
reasons, defended the Ottomans. Ottoman
statesmen based their actions on the principle
that international law must be observed by
all governments, since that law tended to
support the status quo. In many instances,
Ottoman diplomats appealed to interna-
tional law as a kind of defensive insurance
policy. Consequently, diplomacy became a
defensive weapon for the Sublime Porte in
more than one way: it helped to avoid injury
to the empire and to attract aid from the
Great Powers, on the basis that the empire
deserved support because of the implemen-
tation of substantial administrative and legal
reforms on the one hand and the institu-
tional improvements regarding the status of
non-Muslim Ottomans as well non-Ottoman
residents in the empire, on the other.
Modernization and bureaucratization
attempts gained momentum during the sec-
ond quarter of the nineteenth century. In

1833 and 1836, respectively, the Tercüme
Odası (Bureau of Translations) and the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs were founded. The
office of chief scribe was changed into that
of foreign minister, while its staff and pro-
cedures were increasingly professionalized.
New embassies were established, in addition
to the four existing ones (London, Vienna,
Berlin, and Paris), in Athens, Brussels,
St. Petersburg, Stockholm, Teheran, Turin,
and Washington. Ottoman foreign minis-
ters and ambassadors soon became familiar
with the ways in which European diplomats
operated, and then adopted their methods,
using the formal diplomatic note, the circular
dispatch, the formalities of conference pro-
cedures, protocols, and the other techniques
of modern diplomacy. During the Crimean
War, the telegraph system of Europe was
extended to Istanbul. Ottoman ambassadors
quickly started to use this channel for urgent,
sometimes ciphered, messages.
During this process, the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs played a substantial role. In
this multi-ethnic and multi-confessional
ministry, which included not only Muslim
subjects but also Greek Orthodox, Armenian,
and Jewish Ottomans, professional diplomats
and bureaucrats with European outlooks
and methods were trained. Western-style
procedures gradually came into use for draft-
ing documents and writing summaries of
dispatches as well as registering and filing
incoming and outgoing communications.
Apart from the conduct of foreign affairs,
the ministry was involved in the formulation
and initiation of internal reforms which
were often coordinated with the embassies
in the Ottoman capital. The Islahat Fermanı
(Reform Edict) of 1856, promulgated by
Abdülmecit I (r. 1839–61), reinforced these
trends. There was nearly a symbiosis between
this ministry and the government itself: Reşid
Paşa, Fuad Paşa, Âli Paşa, and Halil Şerif
Paşa were all diplomats and reformers who
OT TOM A N DI PLOM AC Y 11
later became foreign ministers and grand
viziers. The gradual evolution of institutions
does not imply however that a “primacy of
foreign affairs” had been established as a new
rule overnight. The personal interests of the
members of the court, the bureaucracy, and
other forms of vested interests continued
to influence decisions made in the realm of
diplomacy.
Throughout the century, Ottoman diplo-
mats insisted on the premise that the Ottoman
Empire was a member of the Concert of
Europe. Although it had not been repre-
sented at the Congress of Vienna (1814–15),
the Sublime Porte became an active par-
ticipant in the European state system as a
co-signer of the London Convention and
of the Straits Convention, in 1840 and
1841 respectively. The seventh article of the
Treaty of Paris (1856), which concluded the
Crimean War (1853–56), famously extended
to the Sublime Porte the right to partici-
pate in the Concert of Europe. Ottoman
diplomats especially insisted on this article
during the Berlin Conference of 1878. The
premise was that the Ottoman Empire was a
modern state whose subjects were Ottomans
and as such were equal. The empire was
beginning to act in international relations
more like a secular dynastic state, on the
model of the major European powers. Still,
it was not clear whether the empire could
be said to have thereby secured recognition
as a full-fledged “European” state. Even if
it had secured the right to partake in the
European state system’s advantages, at least
nominally, and had begun to comport itself
accordingly, European diplomats and jurists
of the period seldom recognized the Ottoman
Empire as a full member of the “family of
civilized nations” and often treated it as
occupying an intermediate status. During
the second half of the century, the empire
was swiftly relegated from a welcome new
12 OT TOM A N DI PLOM AC Y
member of the Concert to the “Sick Man of
Europe.”
The most salient feature of inequality
was, in fact, the continuance of the Capit-
ulations which, in their transformed state,
assured Western residents in Ottoman
lands considerable extraterritorial privi-
leges. Such processes both engendered and
were engendered by relations of dependence
and debt-accumulation similar in many
respects to those in operation in colonial
and quasi-colonial territories elsewhere that
engendered the unequal treaties. Reforms
were costly, required financial investments
and, ultimately, the permanent indebtedness
of the empire. European enterprises including
banks, railroads, and harbors were immune
from Ottoman laws and taxes, and subject
only to those of their own governments. To
such built-in dominance by Europe over
key developmental aspects of the Ottoman
economy was added guardianship of cer-
tain religious communities. Russia and
France supported educational, religious,
and philanthropic societies acting on behalf
of Balkan, Arab, and Armenian Christians
of the Ottoman Empire. Concerted actions of
the Great Powers, which were often criticized
by the Sublime Porte as interference with its
domestic affairs, were, on the other hand,
among the earliest examples of humanitar-
ian intervention and collective preventive
diplomacy.
The reforms of the Tanzimat period, as well
as the institutions and techniques transferred
from Europe, did not succeed in securing
the territorial integrity of the empire in the
long run. However, they did help to prolong
its life and to make it a more acceptable
participant in the European Concert. After
Austria-Hungary was accorded a mandate
to occupy and govern Bosnia and Herze-
govina at the Congress of Berlin in 1878
and the declaration of independence by
Bulgaria the same year, pan-Islamist poli-
cies were reinvigorated during the reign
of Abdulhamid II (1876–1909), in order
to gain support from Asian and African
polities. Islam started to play a part in a
more modern manner as a way of appeal-
ing to the contemporary concept of public
opinion, which was much used by other
powers of Europe. At the same time, the
Ottoman Empire signed major international
conventions and participated in international
organizations such as the Berlin Conference
(1885). Nevertheless, the Ottoman regime
was more isolated from Europe than it had
been for half a century and could count on
support only from Germany, which served
as military and naval adviser and supplier
to the sultan. In 1902 Germany was granted
a ninety-nine-year concession to build and
operate a rail connection to link Europe
across Anatolia through Mosul, Baghdad,
and Basra to the head of the Persian Gulf.
Still, neither the administrative reforms nor
the pan-Islamist policies were useful for the
territorial integrity of the empire. Both in
the Balkans and Arab regions political power
was no longer effective in maintaining the
integrity of the empire.
The disastrous defeats suffered by the
Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars of
1912–13 were traumatic but the worst was
yet to come. For the first time the Sublime
Porte, which entered World War I in Novem-
ber 1914 as an ally of the Central Powers,
placed itself simultaneously at war with the
three countries that had territorial scores
to settle with the sultan. During the war,
the Ottomans fought on several fronts, both
in the Near East and in the Balkans and
delivered some heavy blows to the Entente
powers. Yet, by 1918, the defeat was total
and led to the empire’s eclipse with tragic
consequences. Still, even after the formal
dissolution of the empire in 1922 and the
abolition of caliphate two years later, the

Ottomans left an important heritage during
the successive phases in the shaping and
reshaping of the modern Middle East and the
Balkans.
SEE ALSO: Alliance Diplomacy; Balkan Wars
(1912–13); Bismarck-Schönhausen, Otto von
(1815–98); Bosnian Crisis (1908–9); Byzantine
Diplomacy; Concert of Europe; Congress of
Vienna (1815); Crimean War (1853–56);
Diplomatic Ceremonial; Eastern Question;
First World War (1914–18); Holy Alliance;
Lausanne Conference (1922–23); Marriage
Diplomacy; Mehmed the Conqueror
(1432–81); Metternich, Clemens von
(1773–1859); Nicholas I (1796–1855);
Ottoman–Persian Treaties; Renaissance
Diplomacy; Suleiman the Magnificent
(1494–1566); Treaty of Karlowitz (1699); Treaty
of San Stefano (1878); Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi
(1833); Unequal Treaties
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