G.R. No.

97906 May 21, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO

WONG, respondents.

Petitioner seeks to set aside the judgment of respondent Court of

Appeals 1 in affirmance of the decision of the court a quo 2 granting the petition filed by
herein private respondent Maximo Wong for the change of his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.
which was his name prior to his adoption by Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong.

The facts are undisputed. Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of
Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and
then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old,
they were, with the consent of their natural parents 3 and by order of the court in Special
Case No. 593 4 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an
insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher. They decided to
adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen years of marriage. The couples
showered their adopted children with parental love and reared them as their own children.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and a
junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to
change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong
embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a
Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he
is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social
life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former
surname.

As earlier stated, on July 2, 1986, the matter was resolved in favor of private respondent,
the trial court decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied
with, petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was
granted. 5 On appeal to respondent court, and over the opposition of petitioner Republic
through the Solicitor General, the decision of the court below was affirmed in full, hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.

The lone issue to be settled is whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in
his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of
said petition.

The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or
isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for
change of name. He claims that for private respondent to cast aside the name of his
adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother
who is still alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further, the

1
Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates Articles
341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to use the surname of the
adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that
he has severed his relationship with his adoptive parents. 6

In refutation, private respondent argues that he did as the law required, that is, upon
adoption he used the surname of the adopter. However, being already emancipated, he can
now decide what is best for and by himself. It is at this time that he realized that the
Chinese name he carries causes him undue ridicule and embarrassment and affects his
business and social life. In fact, his adoptive mother, being aware of his predicament, gave
her consent to the petition for change of name, albeit making it clear that the same shall in
no way affect the legal adoption, and even underwent the rigors of trial to substantiate her
sworn statement. If his adoptive mother does not take offense nor feel any resentment,
abhorrence or insecurity about his desire to change his name, private respondent avers
that there can be no possible prejudice on her, much less the State. 7

We feel that we should preface our review of this case with a clear comprehension of the
legal significance of a person's name. For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is
the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which be lives and is
best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears
for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, of in speaking of or dealing with
him. 8 Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are
descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has
frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the
name is immaterial. 9

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual
at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is
that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child.
The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 10

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect
the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for
nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the
start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside
the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter
vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible. 11

Title XIII, Book I of the Civil Code, in Articles 364 to 380, provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surnames. Considering the subject and personalities involved in
this present review, particular attention must be called to Article 365 which mandates that
"(a)n adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter," in correlation with Article 341
on the effects of adoption, among which is to"(e)ntitle the adopted person to use the

2
adopter's surname." This same entitlement of an adopted child is maintained in Article
39(3), Title II of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code. More recently, Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No.
227, or the Family Code, echoes the same statutory right of an adopted child to use the
surname of the adopter. 12 Clearly, from the very wordings of the law, it may be inferred
that this use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a
right.

Under Article 376 by the Civil Code, "(n)o person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority." The application for change of name thereunder involves a special
proceeding governed by and conducted under the strictures of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court and one which involves substantial changes, with the declared objective of such
judicial proceedings being the prevention of fraud. The purpose of the statutory procedure
authorizing a change of personal name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the
change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, court to which application is made
should normally make its decree recording such change of name. 13

A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person involving his
relation with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the
community. It is a proceeding in rem 14 and, as such, strict compliance with all jurisdictional
requirements, particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction thereover. 15 For this purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true or
official name recorded in the civil register. 16

To digress a little for purposes of clarification, the change of name contemplated under
Article 376 and reglementarily implemented by Rule 103 must not be confused with and
cannot be effected through the summary proceeding proposed in Article 412 of the some
Code, as procedurally regulated by Rule 108 of the Rules, which refers only to correction of
clerical errors, such as those which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding,
or an error made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying or writing, or some
harmless or innocuous change, 17 and not those which will involve substantial changes. 18

Turning now to the case at bar, we are guided by the jurisprudential dictum that the State
has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of
identification, and a change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion,
to be exercised in the light of reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely
follow; 19 it is a privilege which may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or
reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor. 20

We find unacceptable the assertion of the Solicitor General that private respondent's
allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to the use of his present surname is
unsubstantiated.

The testimony of private respondent in the lower court bears out the existence of valid
cause in his bid for change of name:

ATTY. DUMAMBA:
3
Q Now, after adoption, when you went to school, what did you
use as your surname?

A "Wong," sir.

Q Now, after you adopted the surname "Wong?" in your

studies, what did you observe?

A I observed that "Wong" as a surname embarrassed me to my

friends and when I go with Chinese friends I cannot talk
Chinese. I am living in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but
no one can believe that I am Muslim. I have a little business of
Furniture but I have little (sic) customer because no one
believes me that I am Muslim.

Q You want to inform this Honorable Court that this family

name you are using which is "Wong" embarrassed you from
(sic) your friends and relatives and also cause(d) damage to
your business?

A Yes sir.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. DUMAMBA:

Q Now, considering that according to you, you are embarrassed

because of the family name you are using, your friends shy
away from you and it is a handicap in your business, what is
your desire for the Court to do in order to help you?

A Change my family name.

Q From "Wong" to what do you want your surname changed?

A "Alcala, Jr.", sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q What is your purpose in changing your family name from

Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr.?

A I feel embarrassed to my friends and also to my relatives and

as I said I have a little business of furniture and only a few
customers buying for the fact that they don't believe I am
Muslim.

4
 Cross.
ATTY. SERO:

With the permission of the Honorable Court.

Q Your father's name is Maximo Alcala, Sr., is he still alive?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what does your father say to this proposed changed (sic)
of your name, your family name to your real family name given
to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q They have no objection to it?

A No, sir.

Q Stated before this Honorable Court, the purpose why you

wanted to change your name from "Wong" to "Alcala" is so that
to avoid embarrassment because you are a Muslim and your
Muslim relatives think that you are Chinese.

A Yes, sir.

Q Not for the purpose to hide anything or what not?

A No, sir. 21

The foregoing testimony of private respondent is materially corroborated by the testimony

of private respondent's adoptive mother:

Q Now, what did you observe to (sic) your son Maximo Wong
after you and your husband adopted him?

A When I adopted him and he used the surname "Wong" I

observed that some of his relatives, cousins and friends seem
to shy away from him and despise him in school that is why I
agreed to change his name. 22

We uphold these observations in the decision of respondent appellate court:

The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as contemplated by the

provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an
opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his best interest.
(Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In granting or denying the petition for
change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the

5
 discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to
the court and not all the best evidence available is required. (Uy vs. Republic,
L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965; Nacionales vs. Republic,
L-18067, April 29, 1966; both cases cited in 1 SCRA 843). In the present case,
We believe that the court a quo had exercised its discretion judiciously when
it granted the petition.

From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother

Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that said appellee was prompted to file the
petition for change of name because of the embarrassment and ridicule his
family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he
being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another cause is
his desire to improve his social and business life. It has been held that in the
absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only
hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for
change of name (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965, Que Liong Sian vs.
Republic, L-23167, Aug. 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1074). Justice dictates that a
person should be allowed to improve his social standing as long as in doing
so, he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or other
persons (Calderon vs. Republic, supra). Nothing whatsoever is shown in the
record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or
of other persons would result in the change of petitioner's name. 23

It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of name, petitioner must
show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 24Among the grounds for change of
name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; 25 (d) Having
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her
alien parentage; 26 (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; 27 and (f) When the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. 28

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable
cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. 29 Summarizing, in special
proceedings for change of name, what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of
the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the
event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being
lodged in the courts.

6
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that
an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in
mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the
object of adoption proceedings. 30 The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and
child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are
recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. It has been defined
as the taking into one's family of the child of another as son or daughter and heir and
conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption
proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive
parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an
incident than the object of the proceeding. 31 The welfare of the child is the primary
consideration in the determination of an application for adoption. On this point, there is
unanimous agreement. 32

It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to the
adoptive parents the custody of the child's person, the duty of obedience owing by the
child, and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation, in the same
manner as if the child had been born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock, subject,
however, to such limitations and restrictions as may be by statute imposed. 33 More
specifically under the present state of our law, the Family Code, superseding the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code and of the Child and Youth Welfare Code on the
matter, 34 relevantly provides in this wise with regard to the issue involved in this case:

Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be the legitimate child
of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters; (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

The Solicitor General maintains the position that to sustain the change of name would run
counter to the behest of Article 365 of the Civil Code and the ruling in Manuel
vs. Republic 35 that "one should not be allowed to use a surname which otherwise he is not
permitted to employ under the law," and would set a bad example to other persons who
might also seek a change of their surnames on lame excuses. 36

While we appreciate the Solicitor General's apprehensions and concern, we find the same
to be unfounded. We do not believe that by reverting to his old name, private respondent
would then be using a name which he is prohibited by law from using. True, the law
prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but the law does not go so far as to
unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and only subjects such recourse to the
obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it permits.

If we were to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to its conclusion, then there will
never be any possibility or occasion for any person, regardless of status, to change his
7
name, in view of the supposed subsequent violation of the legal imperative on the use of
surnames in the event that the petition is granted. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court would
then be rendered inutile. This could hardly have been the intendment of the law.

A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by way of exception
to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. The law fixes the
surname that may be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may be changed only
upon judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103,
in specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term "persons" to
signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may, under certain
judicially accepted exceptional circumstances, petition the court for a change of name, we
do not see any legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy
by an adopted child. In other words, Article 365 is not an exception, much less can it bar
resort, to Rule 103.

We are of the view that the circumstances herein obtaining are within the ambit of the
established exceptions and find merit in private respondent's submission:

Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its primordial purpose which (State) is to
give a person in opportunity to improve his personality and provide his best
interest (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In the instant case, the court a
quo found the petition of Maximo Wong for change of name justifiable after
due hearing, thus its factual findings and appreciation of testimonies count
heavily and need not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons
because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence as well
as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case
(Baliwag Transit, Inc. vs. CA, 147 SCRA 82). Moreover, the trial court could
take judicial notice of other existing factors in the community where herein
respondent lives which it considers material in its judicious determination of
the case. . . .

Additionally, herein respondent is already of age and as such he can decide

what is best for him. His experience with regards (sic) his social and business
dealings is personal and it is only him (sic) who can attest to the same.
Finding his predicament's proper remedy is solely through legal process,
herein respondent accordingly filed a petition pursuant to Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court which was granted by the Court a quo. 37

Besides, we have faith in the circumspection of our lower courts and that, in the exercise of
their discretion, said courts shall consider petitions for change of name only on cogent and
meritorious grounds as would justify the granting of such applications. We do not expect
our trial courts to cater or give in to the whim or caprice of an applicant, aside from the fact
that there is always the safeguard and corrective interdiction of appellate review.

It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private respondent to the use of the name
of his parents by nature as cross ingratitude. To go by the Solicitor General's suggestion

8
that private respondent should have his adoption revoked if he wants to use the surname
of his natural father would be to exact too clear a toll for making use of an appropriate and
valid remedy available under the law.

Herein private respondent, before he filed the petition for change of name, asked for his
adoptive mother's permission to do so:

Q Now, in filing this petition for change of surname, you had

talked with your adopted mother?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you ask permission from her whether she wants you to
change the surname?

A Yes, sir. 38

True enough, the above testimony of private respondent was confirmed by his adoptive
mother in this manner:

Q How are you related to Maximo Wong?

A My adopted son.

Q He is your adopted son, did your son talk to you when he

filed this petition for change of his surname?

A Yes, he even tried to ask me and I said, alright if you want to

change.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, when you agreed to the filing of this petition for change
of name, did you reduce your consent in writing?

A Yes, sir, I agreed also so that his business will prosper

because
he is already Alcila and not Wong because Wong they said is
Chinese. 39

As proof of her assent to the filing of said petition (her husband having already passed
away), Concepcion Ty Vda. de Wong executed an affidavit in Cotabato City on May 27, 1985,
with these textual declarations:

That I am the same and identical person, who is the surviving adapted (sic)
parent of Maximo Wong.

9
 That I personally discovered it myself from the time my adapted (sic) son
Maximo used the surname of my late husband Wong, his relatives and
childhood friends shy away from him because he is branded as a son of a
chinese which is different from them whose parents are muslim Filipinos;

That I pity my son who is often rediculed (sic) by his friends and relatives
because of his family name Wong, hence, in order not to humper (sic) his
social and business life in the future, I am voluntarily and of my own free will
without being forced, coerced, or intimidated give (sic) my consent to his
desire to change his desire to change his surname without affecting however
the legal adoption granted by the Court on September 9, 1967, making him as
one of my legal and compulsory heir (sic).

That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the above
mentioned facts and for all legal intent (sic) and purposes. 40

There could be no other plausible reason for private respondent to first secure has
adoptive mother's consent before resorting to the questioned legal recourse other than the
parental respect and reverence which is owed by and to be expected of a dutiful child. If
private respondent was such an ingrate, as the Solicitor General would have us believe, he
would not have bothered to seek his adoptive mother's counsel. In the same breath, had his
adoptive mother regarded him as an ungrateful adoptee, she would not have executed the
affidavit above quoted, much less testify in his behalf at the hearing of his petition.

Moreover, worthy of note is the fact that private respondent's adoptive mother emphasized
that she executed the above affidavit "without affecting the legal adoption granted by the
Court on September 9, 1967, making him as one of my legal and compulsory heir(s)." This
is incontrovertible proof that she never entertained any misgivings or reservations with
respect to her consent to his petition. This likewise dispels any possible confusion as to
private respondent's legal status or adoptive paternity and his successional rights.
Concordantly, we have heretofore held that a change of name does not define or effect a
change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It
does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is altered is only the
name. 41

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

10
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on February 20,
1990 1 which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi
City 2 granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat,
petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.

On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then
six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old,
before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, docketed therein as Special Proceeding No.
1386. 3

The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order
dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. 4 The order
was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor General;
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and
the social worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin
board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody
appeared to oppose the petition. 5

Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the
testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of her husband, Dioscoro
Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
were taken and admitted in the proceedings.

On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor child, JASON

CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance
with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the
child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the
child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.

11
 Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V, Legaspi City, and the
Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this decision. 6

Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated, affirmed the
aforesaid decision of the court below. Hence, this present petition with the following
assignment of errors:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code
cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida
C. Bobiles; and

2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision
which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses
Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles. 7

The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2,
1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth
Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses
or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case
was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code,
took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife
is mandatory.

On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should
be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her
husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the
spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed
by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the
mere filing of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.

Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-inclusion of

Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an outright
dismissal on that score. It could not be taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder
since petitioner must be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action or a special proceeding. 8 We further apprehend that this objection has been raised
for the first time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shall clarify petitioner's
misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment of errors.

Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant
provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application
will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events
foreign to the will of the holder. 9 The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action,

12
or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to
inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. 10 Vested rights include not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations created after the right has vested. 11

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition
for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her
petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her
filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot
be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a
matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.12 We do
not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.

The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and foreign
jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article 185 of the Family
Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective
construction in the sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as
well as to future actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps
completed before their enactment. 13

Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and procedural
statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending proceedings and are not
confined to those begun after their enactment although, with respect to such pending
proceedings, they affect only procedural steps taken after their enactment. 14

The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and
proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so
extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into
effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises.15

The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is

substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed
by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time.
As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance
with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and
retains it until it fully disposes of the case. 16 To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such
jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted
by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. 17

13
On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not
apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by
granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband
not being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject
the same.

Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for
adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and
expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in
adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire to

adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor being six (6)
years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also
in the Philippines;

3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said minor
child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations court, now
the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;

4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving my lawful

consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT;

5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I have

continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON CONDAT since
birth;

6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of maternal

and paternal love for the boy as our very own, exercising therein the care,
concern and diligence of a good father toward him;

7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for

whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter of adoption of this
minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and
by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice; (Emphasis supplied.) 18

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are
sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by
reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of
consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the
text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements
should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The

14
future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid
adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.

We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this
case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption
statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect
the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. 19 The
modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a substantial
compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse
would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat
its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every material
requirement of the statute was complied with.

In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the judicial
microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may be enlarged and
magnified so that a reason may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years
before, but rather to approach the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found
that there was a substantial compliance with the statute. 20 The technical rules of pleading
should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more
important that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which
may give information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a
pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it
substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the
court jurisdiction. 21

In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare
of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. 22 The welfare of a child is of
paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its
adoption by another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is
charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests
fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish that end. 23 Ordinarily, the
approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should
be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights
of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of grave
abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed. 24

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be
for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural
parents. 25 The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial court
dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the
child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy. 27 Further, the said petition
was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.

15
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption
and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated by respondent court:
"Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing
doctrine, 28 We are of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the
court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life." 29

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to
be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law. 30

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue
raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies
middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
granting the adoption, thus:

16
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the
absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an
adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the
child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest
and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds
that the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present
constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.

Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes,
shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article
189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE
NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar
concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or

reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate
child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a
middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only
one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle
name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the

17
adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated;
(5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers
surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of
Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees
with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name,
the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to
be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not
prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the
Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the

18
family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his
status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted
child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:

Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

xxx

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such
as Mrs.

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume
her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her
former husband's surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still
living, in accordance with Article 370.

19
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be
obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct
male descendants shall either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

xxx

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of
a middle name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee
may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child
shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;

xxx

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized
the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his
middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the
20
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father, thus

Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of
the surname and that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family
to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers
surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname
of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother,
how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his
point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father
and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article
364, which reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person
himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following
example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname
is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family
name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice
David.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect
that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he
may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof.
Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of
Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of
legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.

xxx

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice
Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so
many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given
name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even
include the Clan name.

xxx

21
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the
Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really
the Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall
bear the surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a
middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or
not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the
Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the
principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the
adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998,[19] secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father.

22
 Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of
her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains
an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert
or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together
in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached
to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they
are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers
surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of
the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the

lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it

may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or
obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.[28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by
her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly
MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers
surname GARCIA as her middle name.

23
 Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered
in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY
OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN
WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN
LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA
WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly
represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.

I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.

Revelation 3:5

On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor,

represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19
September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in
the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his
middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB
and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other.
When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a
deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei
Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether
they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny
in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is,

24
they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.[1]

On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. [2] The
trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the
petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when
studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is
merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the
name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the
bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no
reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering
that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian
reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his
name by dropping his middle name.[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was
denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.[4] The trial court maintained that the
Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the
dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study
there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due
recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law
which is controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice public
interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the
petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.[5]
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule
45) arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not
[6]

theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the
middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174[7] of the Family Code.
Petitioner contends that [W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a
need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name
for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony
among siblings, taking into consideration the best interest of the child. [8] It is
argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name
as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that
the middle name Carulasan will cause him undue embarrassment and the
difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social
acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also
alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change
of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name

25
to use, contrary to previous cases[9] decided by this Court that allowed a minor
to petition for change of name.[10]
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment
on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment[11] positing that the trial court
correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under
Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the
mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no
showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is in the best interest
of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for
change of name and/or cancellation of entry.[12] The OSG also adds that the
petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name
or the dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioners allegation that
the continued use of the middle name may result in confusion and difficulty is
allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised
before the trial court that the dropping of the childs middle name could only
trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner.
Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is
no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even
assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has
also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed
by Singaporean law.[13]
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that
before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his
certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause,
or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the
request should be denied.[14]
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper
and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.[15] To justify a request
for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held
valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence,
as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and

26
was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name
to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest.[16]
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper
and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence
available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in
the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.[17]
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it
does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt
another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases
in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually deal with
requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving
requests for change of the given name[18] and none on requests for changing
or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the middle
name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this
point. We quote, thus:

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined
as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of
the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are
used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive
of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has
frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the
name is immaterial.

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the
child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.

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A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to
protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain
respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable
and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.[19]

This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does
not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle
names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and
surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father.[20] The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother,[21] while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother,
unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
fathers surname.[22]
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized
by the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not
have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears
both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such
individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The
registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child
thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle
name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into
Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic[23] and Calderon
v. Republic,[24] which, however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother,
Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to
change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court
granted her petition based on the following considerations: she had elected

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Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings
who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mothers
surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still being
ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no
showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or
that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an
illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her
behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the
surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The
Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted
where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into
consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the
stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the
surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates
that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social
standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the
interests of the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,[25] in arguing that although Article 174 of
the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the
father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only
one family name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner
therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought
to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name
as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she
had been using since childhood, in her school records and in her voters
registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court overturned the
denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a
legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her father, there is no
legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to which
she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to
grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name
against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would
show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not
warrant favorable action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are
not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly
distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were

29
already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name. Being of
age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully
knowing the effects of their decision to change their surnames. It can also be
unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the petitions for change
of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or compelling
grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity
most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a result of World
War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of Philippine
citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had
been known since childhood by a name different from her registered name
and she had not used her registered name in her school records and voters
registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed
by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case
to buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to
petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the
Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount
consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would
make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not
clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches
the age of majority.[26] As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at
this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

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