PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.

172873
Appellee,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

ROLDAN MORALES y MIDARASA, Promulgated:

Appellant. March 19, 2010

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our
criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at
stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his
liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every
individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is
reasonable doubt about his guilt.1[1] Due process commands that no man shall lose his

1[1] In the Matter of Samuel Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970).
liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the factfinder of his
guilt. To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it impresses on the
trier of fact the necessity of reaching certitude of the facts in issue.2[2]

Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the

respect and confidence of the community in applications of criminal law. It is critical that
the moral force of criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society
that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government
cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of
his guilt with utmost certainty.3[3]

Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.4[4]

On appeal is the Decision5[5] of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on April 24, 2006 affirming in
toto the Decision6[6] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103 finding appellant
Roldan Morales y Midarasa guilty of the crimes of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.

2[2] Id.

3[3] Id.

4[4] Id.

5[5] Rollo, pp. 3-11; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by
Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Rosanlinda Asuncion-Vicente.

6[6] Records, pp. 63-66; penned by Presiding Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
Factual Antecedents

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession and sale of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), to wit:

Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256

That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not
being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in her/his/their possession and control, zero point zero three (0.03) grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7[7]

Criminal Case No. Q-03-114257

That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not
being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and
there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said
transaction, zero point zero three (0.03) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8[8]

7[7] Id at 2-3.

8[8] Id at 4-5.
 Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to both
charges read in Filipino, a language known and understood by him.9[9] On motion
of the City Prosecutor, the cases were consolidated for joint trial.10[10] Trial on
the merits ensued thereafter.

The testimonies of PO1 Eduardo Roy (PO1 Roy) and PO3 Armando Rivera (PO3 Rivera) were
presented by the prosecution:

PO1 Roy testified that on January 2, 2003, at about 2:00 p.m., he was on duty at Police Station 9 where he
made a pre-operation report on the buy-bust operation to be conducted on the herein appellant that same
afternoon.11[11] He then proceeded to Brgy. San Vicente, Quezon City with PO3 Rivera for the
operation.12[12] At a point near Jollibee, they met the informant who, upon seeing the subject appellant,
went with him to meet PO1 Roy.13[13] After being introduced to the appellant as a buyer of piso worth
of shabu, appellant immediately produced a sachet containing the alleged drug. When appellant received
the marked money amounting to P100.00,14[14] PO1 Roy raised his left hand, at which point his back-
up officer, PO3 Rivera appeared and immediately arrested the appellant.15[15] The appellant was
immediately brought to the Police Station for investigation, while the two sachets of shabu and aluminum
foil discovered on the said appellant were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination.16[16]

9[9] Id. at 15.

10[10] Id. at 16.

11[11] TSN, March 20, 2003, pp. 3-4.

12[12] Id. at 4.

13[13] Id.

14[14] Id. at 5.

15[15] Id. at 5-6.

16[16] Id at 6.
PO3 Rivera testified that he was the back-up officer of PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust
operation conducted against the appellant in the afternoon of January 2, 2003.17[17] In preparation for
the said operation, he conducted a short briefing and recorded the particulars of the operation they were
about to carry out: the place of the operation which is at the parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa; the
identification of the suspect as the appellant; and the preparation of the buy-bust money to be
used.18[18] With respect to the buy-bust money, he prepared one P50.00 bill, two P20.00 bills and one
P10.00 bill, by making the appropriate marking on the top portion of each bill and recording their
respective serial numbers.19[19] Later that afternoon, police officers proceeded to the meeting place.
PO3 Rivera positioned himself in a parked vehicle20[20] about 20 meters from the situs of the
transaction.21[21] He thus had a clear view of the appellant with the informant and PO1 Roy.22[22]
Shortly thereafter, he saw PO1 Roy make the pre-arranged signal at which point he approached the
appellant to arrest him.23[23] He recovered the marked money from the appellant and proceeded to frisk
the latter.24[24] Upon conducting the body search, he found another sachet which he suspected to be
shabu and two aluminum foils. Appellant was brought to the Police Station for detention, while the items
seized from him were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination.25[25] The two sachets tested
positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) while the aluminum foil sheets tested negative of
the aforementioned substance.26[26]

Both PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera identified a Joint Affidavit dated January 3, 2003 during their respective
testimonies, which they acknowledged to have executed subsequent to the buy-bust operation.27[27]

17[17] Id at 12-13.

18[18] Id.

19[19] Id.

20[20] Id at 13.

21[21] Id at 16.

22[22] Id at 13.

23[23] Id at 13-14.

24[24] Id at 14.

25[25] Id.

26[26] Id at 14-15.

27[27] Id. at 8 and 15, respectively.

The defense presented the testimonies of Joaquin Artemio Marfori, Arsenia Morales and the appellant:

Appellant denied the charges against him.28[28] He testified that he is a resident of Dolores, Quezon
where he worked in a fertilizer store.29[29] He was in Manila at that time to bring money for his parents
who live at Cruz na Ligas.30[30] As his mother did not give him enough money for his fare back to
Quezon, he sidelined as a parking attendant at Philcoa in order to earn the balance of his bus fare.31[31]
However, sometime that afternoon, two male persons in civilian clothes suddenly approached him and his
co-attendant, identified themselves as policemen and poked their guns at them.32[32] The said
policemen handcuffed them and proceeded to frisk them.33[33] He averred that nothing was found on
him and yet the policemen still brought him to the police station.34[34] He denied the allegation made
against him that he sold, much less possessed, the shabu subject of this action.35[35] He further testified
that in the tricycle on the way to the police station, PO1 Roy took out a plastic of shabu from his (PO1
Roys) pocket and once at the station, the said policeman showed it to the desk officer and claimed that the
plastic sachet was found on the appellant.36[36]

He likewise denied having received the buy-bust money and claimed that the P50.00 bill and the two
P20.00 bills, totaling P90.00, were given to him by his mother for his bus fare to Quezon.37[37] He
disclaimed any knowledge of the P10.00 bill.38[38] He further testified that he personally knew PO3

28[28] TSN, June 19, 2003, pp. 3-5.

29[29] Id. at 3 and 8.

30[30] Id. at 9.

31[31] Id. at 3 and 8.

32[32] Id.

33[33] Id.

34[34] Id. at 4.

35[35] Id.

36[36] Id. at 4-5.

37[37] Id. at 5.

38[38] Id.
Rivera prior to the arrest, since his first cousin and PO3 Rivera had a quarrel which he had no
involvement whatsoever.39[39] He noted the fact that it was PO3 Rivera who arrested him.40[40]

Witness Joaquin Artemio Marfori testified that he is the employer of the appellant in his agricultural and
poultry supply store in Babayan, Calamba, Laguna.41[41] He further stated that he allowed the appellant
to go on vacation on December 12, 2003 to celebrate the New Year with his family in Manila.42[42]
However, the appellant failed to report back for work at the start of the New Year.43[43]

Finally, witness Arsenia Morales (Arsenia) corroborated the testimony of her son that she gave him
P90.00, consisting of one P50.00 bill and two P20.00 bills as bus fare back to Laguna where he
worked.44[44] Thinking that her son was already on his way home, she was surprised to receive a call
from her daughter informing her that her son, the appellant, was arrested for possession and sale of
shabu.45[45]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 29, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q-

39[39] Id. at 6-7.

40[40] Id.

41[41] TSN, August 5, 2003, pp. 3-4.

42[42] Id. at 4.

43[43] Id. at 5.

44[44] TSN, November 6, 2003, pp. 3-4.

45[45] Id.
03-114257 for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. [No.] 9165 for drug pushing [of] zero point zero
three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is
hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
pesos.

The Court likewise finds the accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256 for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. [No.]
9165 for drug possession x x x of zero point zero three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance
containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of
Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Month to Thirteen (13) Years and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos.

The sachets of shabu subject of these cases are ordered transmitted to the PDEA thru Dangerous
Drugs Board for proper disposition after this decision becomes final.

SO ORDERED.46[46]

The trial court held that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the
appellant as the person who possessed and sold to the poseur-buyer the shabu
subject of this case, during the buy-bust operation conducted in the afternoon of
January 2, 2003.47[47] The trial court found that from the evidence presented, the
prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the following: (1) the fact of the buy-
bust operation conducted in the afternoon of January 2, 2003 at the parking lot of
Jollibee Philcoa which led to the arrest of the appellant; and (2) the corpus delicti,
through the presentation in court of the two sachets of white substance which was

46[46] Records, p. 66.

47[47] Id. at 65.

confirmed by the Chemistry Report to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), found in the possession of and sold by the appellant.48[48]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court in toto. It found that contrary to the allegations of the
appellant, there was no instigation that took place.49[49] Rather, a buy-bust operation was employed by
the police officers to apprehend the appellant while in the act of unlawfully selling drugs.50[50] The
appellate court further held that what is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.51[51] Stripped of non-essentials, the CA summarized the antecedent facts of the case as follows:

PO1 Eduardo Roy prepared a pre-arranged report on the buy-bust operation to be conducted
against appellant at Barangay San Vicente, Quezon City upon an informants tip that appellant was selling
shabu in the said area. On the other hand, PO3 Armando Ragundiaz Rivera recorded the briefing,
summary, identification of appellant and the buy-bust money to be used in the operation consisting of one
(1) fifty peso bill, two (2) twenty peso bill[s] and one (1) ten peso bill. PO1 Roy who acted as the poseur-
buyer and PO3 Rivera as his back-up proceeded to University Avenue corner Commonwealth Avenue,
Barangay San Vicente, Quezon City together with the informant.

PO1 Roy and the informant met appellant at the parking lot of Jollibee restaurant while PO3
Rivera positioned himself at the side of a parked car where he can easily have a clear view of the three.
After PO1 Roy was introduced by the informant to the appellant as a buyer of shabu, the latter
immediately produced a sachet containing the said prohibited drugs and handed the same to him. PO1
Roy raised his left hand as the pre-arranged signal that the transaction was consummated. Thereafter, PO3
Rivera went to the area, introduced himself as a police officer and frisked appellant from whom he

48[48] Id.

49[49] CA rollo, pp. 92-93.

50[50] Id. at 93.

51[51] Id. at 95.

recovered the marked money and a matchbox, where the suspected shabu was placed, and two (2)
aluminum foils. They informed appellant of his constitutional rights and brought him to the police station
while the two (2) small transparent heat sealed sachets containing the suspected prohibited drugs and
paraphernalia were turned over to the crime laboratory for examination, and which [was] later, found to
be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (commonly known as shabu).52[52]

Thence, the CA rendered judgment to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.53[53]

Appellant elevated the case to this Court via Notice of Appeal.54[54] In our Resolution dated July 12,
2006, we resolved to accept the case and required the parties to submit their respective supplemental
briefs simultaneously, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice.55[55] Both parties adopted their
respective appellants and appellees briefs, instead of filing supplemental briefs.56[56]

Our Ruling

52[52] Id. at 88-89.

53[53] Id. at 95.

54[54] Id. at 101.

55[55] Rollo, p. 12.

56[56] Id. at 22-23; 25-26.

Appellant claims that he should not be convicted of the offenses charged since his guilt has not been
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.57[57] In support of his contention, appellant alleges
that the arresting officers did not even place the proper markings on the alleged shabu and paraphernalia
at the time and place of the alleged buy-bust operation.58[58] Appellant hence posits that this created
serious doubt as to the items and actual quantity of shabu recovered, if at all.59[59]

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, insists that the direct testimony of the two arresting
officers sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu.60[60]

At the outset, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case: the appeal throws the
whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.61[61] On the basis of such review, we
find the present appeal meritorious.

Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact, especially when affirmed by
the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal.62[62]
However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with
direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied.63[63] After due consideration of the records of this case, evidence presented and relevant
law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.

57[57] CA rollo, pp. 40, 45.

58[58] Id. at 48.

59[59] Id. at 49.

60[60] Id. at 63, 76-78.

61[61] People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, citing People v. Balagat, G.R. No.
177163, April 24, 2009.

62[62] People v. Milan, 370 Phil. 493, 499 (1999).

63[63] People v. Robles, G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009.

In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the
illicit drug as evidence.64[64]

On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1)
the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2)
such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being
in possession of the drug.65[65] Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.66[66]

With respect to corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

64[64] People v. Darisan, G.R. No. 176151, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 486, 490.

65[65] Id.

66[66] People v. Partoza, G.R. No. 182418, May 8, 2009.

In People v. Partoza,67[67] we held that the identity of the corpus delicti was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. In the said case, the apprehending policeman did not mark the seized drugs after he
arrested the appellant in the latters presence. Neither did he make an inventory and take a photograph of
the confiscated items in the presence of the appellant. There was no representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were
supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. Hence, we held in the afore-
cited case that there was no compliance with the statutory safeguards. In addition, while the apprehending
policeman admitted to have in his possession the shabu from the time the appellant was apprehended at
the crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of proof on how the seized items were handled
from the time they left the hands of the said police officer.

We declared in People v. Orteza,68[68] that the failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 implied a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the
corpus delicti:

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately
after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in
anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court
concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to
place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure
and take custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard
to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs
created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due
to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.

Likewise, in People v. Obmiranis,69[69] we acquitted the appellant due to flaws in the conduct of the
post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from the appellant, together with the

67[67] Id.

68[68] G.R. No. 173051, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 750, 758-759.
failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibit before it was
offered in evidence in court.

In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated
dangerous drugs, as mandated in Section 21 of RA 9165, were not observed. The records utterly failed to
show that the buy-bust team complied with these procedures despite their mandatory nature as indicated
by the use of shall in the directives of the law. The procedural lapse is plainly evident from the testimonies
of the two police officers presented by the prosecution, namely: PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera.

PO1 Roy, in his testimony, failed to concretely identify the items seized from the appellant. Moreover, he
confirmed that they did not make a list of the items seized. The patent lack of adherence to the procedural
mandate of RA 9165 is manifest in his testimony, to wit:

FISCAL JURADO

x x x You mentioned that you gave the pre-arranged signal, what is that?

WITNESS

A- Raising my left hand.

Q- And what happened next?

A- My back up PO3 Rivera came.

Q- What [did] your back up do when you raised your hand?

A- He arrested Morales.

69[69] G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 140, 158.
Q- What were you doing when he arrested Morales?

A- I put the informant away from the scene.

Q- And what happened next after that?

A- We brought him to the police station.

Q- How about the shabu, what did you do with it?

A- We brought it to the crime lab.

Q- How did you send it to crime lab?

A- Shabu and paraphernalia recovered by my companion from the suspect.

Q- How many items were sent to the crime lab?

A- 2 shabu and paraphernalia.

Q- What are the paraphernalia?

A- Foil, sir.

Q- How many foil?

A- I cannot recall.

Q- What happened to the accused in the police station?

A- He was investigated.
Q- Do you know the accused?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- What is his name?

A- Roldan Morales.

xxxx

FISCAL JURADO

Q- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how

would you be able to identify the said items?

WITNESS

A- I could not recall pare-pareho yung shabu

ATTY. MOSING

I will object because that would be leading on the part of the prosecution
because he could not identify on what shabu.

COURT

That question is overruled.

FISCAL JURADO

I am showing to you an item, would you be able to identify?

COURT

Fiscal showing several shabu.

WITNESS

A- This one.

FISCAL JURADO

Q- There is another plastic sachet?

WITNESS

A- Recovered.

Q- How about these two?

A- I was not the one who confiscated that.

Q- What happened to the said item submitted to the crime lab?

A- Positive, sir.

xxxx

FISCAL JURADO

xxxx
 Q- How about the specimen forwarded to the crime lab?

WITNESS

A- My companion brought that.

Q- What was your participation in the case?

A- Poseur buyer.

xxxx

ATTY. MOSING

xxxx

Q- After the arrest you brought the suspect and the items to the station?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Did you not make a list of items you have confiscated in this case?

A- No, we turned it over to the investigator.

Q- You have presented the buy bust money a while ago, was that buy bust
money suppose to be turned over to the investigator?
 A- No, inquest. Upon request, I was the one who received it.70[70]
(Emphasis supplied)

The testimony of the other arresting officer, PO3 Rivera further confirms the failure of the buy-bust team
to observe the procedure mandated under Section 21 of RA 9165:

COURT

Q- Where did you position yourself?

WITNESS

A- Parked vehicle.

FISCAL JURADO

Q- What did you notice?

WITNESS

A- The confidential informant introduced our poseur buyer to the suspect

and after a few conversation I waited and I saw the pre-arranged signal.
And when he raised his left hand that is the signal that the transaction is
consummated.

Q- After he made that signal, what did you do?

A- I rushed to the area and arrest[ed] the suspect.

70[70] TSN, March 20, 2003, pp. 5-11.

Q- Who was the person you took x x x custody [of]?

A- Roldan Morales

Q- And what did you do with him?

A- Because he ha[d] a marked money I got hold of it and arrest[ed] him.

Q- And what did you do with him?

A- I frisked him.

Q- And what was the result of your frisking?

A- A box of match which I was able to recover [containing] another

suspected shabu.

Q- Where did you find that on his body?

A- Front [pocket of] pants.

Q- How about the match?

A- The same.

Q- What else did you find?

A- Aluminum foil.

Q- And after you recovered that evidence, what did you do with the
accused?
 A- We informed him of his constitutional rights and brought him to the
station.

Q- How about the items you recovered?

A- Delivered it to the crime lab for examination.

Q- What else did you deliver [to] the crime lab?

A- Request, sir.71[71] (Emphasis supplied)

Other than PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera, the prosecution did not present any other witnesses. Hence, the
investigator, referred to by PO1 Roy in his testimony as the one who took delivery of the seized items,
was not identified nor was he presented in court. More importantly, the testifying police officers did not
state that they marked the seized drugs immediately after they arrested the appellant and in the latters
presence. Neither did they make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the
presence of the appellant. There was likewise no mention of any representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were
supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None of these statutory
safeguards were observed.

Even PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer, was not certain as to the identity of the confiscated shabu, to wit:

FISCAL JURADO:

Q- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how would
you be able to identify the said items?

WITNESS

71[71] Id. at 13-14.

 A- I could not recall pare-pareho yung shabu.72[72]

The procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized items

collectively raise doubts as to whether the items presented in court were the exact same items that were
confiscated from appellant when he was apprehended.

While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not
fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, for and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the siezed items are properly preserved by the apprehending team,73[73] these conditions were
not met in the case at bar. No explanation was offered by the testifying police officers for their failure to
observe the rule. In this respect, we cannot fault the apprehending policemen either, as PO1 Roy admitted
that he was not a PDEA operative74[74] and the other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified that he was not

72[72] Id. at 7.

73[73] Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 provides:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

74[74] TSN, March 20 2003 pp. 8-9.

aware of the procedure involved in the conduct of anti-drug operations by the PNP.75[75] In fine, there
is serious doubt whether the drug presented in court was the same drug recovered from the appellant.
Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the corpus delicti.

Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the person who had
custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. Thus, the
prosecution likewise failed to establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause.

In fine, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. There was
likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecutions case. Thus, since the
prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof
required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to
ACQUIT Roldan Morales y Midarasa.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00037 affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
Roldan Morales y Midarasa is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt, and is ordered to be
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report
to this Court the action taken hereon within five days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.

75[75] Id. at 16.

 November 22, 2017

G.R. No. 205787

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
PABLO ARPOSEPLE y SANCHEZ and JHUNREL SULOGAOL y DATU, Accused-
Appellants

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This resolves the appeal of Pablo Arposeple y Sanchez (Arposeple) and Jhunrel Sulogaol y
Datu1 (Sulogaol) from the 3 October 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R.
CR-HC No. 00865 which affirmed, but with modification as to the fine imposed in Criminal
Case No. 12853, the 20 November 2007 Omnibus Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Criminal Case Nos. 12852 to 12854.

THE FACTS

Arposeple and Sulogaol were both charged with three counts of violation of certain provisions of
R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, viz:

CRIM. CASE NO. 12852

(Viol. of Sec. 5, Art. II, R.A. 9165)

G.R. No. 205787

That on or about the 21st day of September 2005, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together, and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly, without any legal purpose, sell, transfer, deliver and
give away One (1) transparent cellophane sachet containing small amount of white powdered
substance commonly known as shabu powder which could no longer be measured in terms of
weight, but could not be more than 0.01 gram, for and in consideration of the amount of Five
Hundred Pesos (₱500.00) Philippine currency, the accused knowing fully well that the above-
mentioned substance which contains METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE is a
dangerous drug and that they did not have any lawful authority, permit or license to sell the
same, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing R.A. 6425, as amended.4

CRIM. CASE N0.12853

(Viol. of Sec. 11, Art. II, R.A. 9165)
That on or about the 21st day of September 2005, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together, and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly have in their possession, custody, and control two (2)
pcs. empty transparent cellophane sachets containing suspected shabu leftover which could no
longer be measured in terms of weight, but could not be more than 0.01 gram, the accused
knowing fully well that the above-mentioned substance which contains Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride is a dangerous drug and that they did not have any lawful authority, permit or
license to possess the same, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing R.A. 6425, as amended.5

CRIM. CASE NO. 12854

(Viol. of Sec. 12, Art. II, R.A. 9165)

That on or about the 21st day of September 2005, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together, and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in their possession, custody and control to wit: two
(2) pcs. rolled aluminum foil used as tooter; two (2) pcs. folded aluminum foil; two (2) pcs.
disposable lighters; one (1) pc. bamboo clip; and one (1) pc. half blade, the accused knowing
fully well that the above- mentioned items are the instruments, apparatus or paraphernalia fit or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting or introducing dangerous
drug into the body, and that he did not have any lawful authority, permit or license to possess the
same, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing R.A. No. 6425, as amended.6

When arraigned, both appellants pleaded not guilty; thus, the consolidated trial of these cases
took place.

The Version of the Prosecution

To prove its cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following: Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Victoria C. de Guzman (De Guzman), Police Officer 2 (PO2) Jay E.
Ramos (Ramos), Police Officer I (PO1) Earl U. Tabuelog (Tabuelog), Police Inspector (P/Insp.)
Miguel Jimenez (Jimenez), and Barangay Kagawad Mary Jane Ruiz (Ruiz).

At around 3:00 a.m. on 21 September 2005, Jimenez, who was the Assistant City Drug
Enforcement Officer, held a briefing at his office on a buy-bust operation to be carried out at
Ubujan District, Tagbilaran City. The briefing, with the appellants as the subjects of the buy-bust
operation, was attended by the buy-bust team (team) composed of PO3 Rolando Bagotchay
(Bagotchay), PO3 Jonathan Bafiocia, PO3 Rodante Sanchez, PO3 Norman Brunidor (Brunidor),
PO2 Jay Tizon, Ramos, Tabuelog, PO2 Ruben Baculi, who was the representative of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, and the informant. Jimenez gave ₱500.007 to
Ramos, the poseurbuyer, while Bagotchay would be the recorder and property custodian.
Jimenez instructed Ramos to take off his cap as the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had
been consummated.8

After the briefing, the team proceeded to their designated area, i.e., the Monastery of the Holy
Spirit (monastery) located at CPG North Avenue, Ubujan District, Tagbilaran City. Ramos and
the informant proceeded in front of the monastery while the rest of the team positioned
themselves at the nearby GH Motors.9

Ramos instructed the asset to inform the appellants that he had a friend who wanted to buy
shabu. After the asset returned from a house in front of the monastery, the appellants arrived.
The asset introduced Ramos to the appellants who at first were hesitant to sell him shabu.
Sulogaol told Arposeple, "Ato lang ni hatagan bay,"10 to which the latter replied "sige hatagan
na lang nato."11 With the agreement to sell shabu, Ramos gave the ₱500.00 marked money to
Arposeple, while Sulogaol took one transparent sachet from his pocket and handed this to
Arposeple who in turn gave it to Ramos. With the sale consummated, Ramos took off his cap
but, as the team approached, the appellants ran in opposite directions.12

Ramos chased Arposeple until they reached a house fronting the monastery. Ramos got hold of
Arposeple's shirt but as they grappled they found themselves inside the house. With the aid of
Brunidor and Bagotchay, Ramos was able to handcuff Arposeple. A body search on Arposeple
yielded a playing card case13 containing the following: one piece sachet with suspected shabu
leftover;14 a hundred peso bill;15 two pieces empty transparent cellophane sachets containing
suspected shabu leftover;16 two pieces of aluminum foil used as tooters;17 two pieces folded
aluminum foil18 two pieces disposable 1ighters;19 one piece bamboo c1ip;20 an d one piece
half-blade.21 The marked five-hundred-peso22 bill was found in Arposeple's left pocket. Ramos
informed Arposeple of his constitutional rights.23

Tabuelog caught Sulogaol after a brief chase. The body search on Sulogaol yielded negative.
Tabuelog likewise informed Sulogaol of his constitutional rights.24

Ramos turned over the seized items to Bagotchay who filled out the certificate of inventory.25
The inventory was witnessed by the appellants and by Barangay Kagawads Ruiz and Felixia
Ligue, and Zacarias Castro and Willy Maestrado, who acted as representatives of the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and the media, respectively.26 Except for the appellants who refused to sign the
certificate of inventory, the other witnesses did.27

The appellants were brought to the Tagbilaran Police Station for proper disposition28 while
Ramos and Tabuelog executed their respective affidavits29 in relation to what had happened
during the buy-bust operation.30

At 3:05 p.m. on the same day, the Philippine Provincial Crime Laboratory Office of Camp
Francisco Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City (laboratory), received a request31 for the laboratory
examination of the following: one piece transparent cellophane sachet (labelled PA/JS-09-21-01
YB); two pieces empty transparent cellophane sachets (labelled PA/JS-09- 21-05-02 YB and
PNJS-09-21-05-03 YB); two pieces aluminum foil used as tooters (labelled PA/JS-09-21-05-04
YB and PA/JS-09-21-05-05); and two pieces aluminum foil (labelled PA/JS-09-21-05-06 YB
and PA/JS 09- 21-05-07 YB). These were marked by De Guzman, the forensic chemical officer
of the laboratory as specimens "A" "B" and "B-1 "· "C" and "C-1" "D" and "E," respectively. On
22 September 2005, after the laboratory examination, De Guzman came up with Chemistry
Report No. D-117-200532 stating that, except for specimen "E" labelled as PA/JS 09-21-05-06
YB, all the specimens were positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.33

It was also on 21 September 2005 that the laboratory received the request34 for drug/urine test
on the appellants to determine whether they had used any prohibited drugs. The screening
laboratory test and the confirmatory examination conducted the following day were done in the
presence of the appellants. The screening tests on both appellants yielded positive results for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride and negative for marijuana. De Guzman's findings
were contained in Chemistry Report Nos. DT-242-200535 and DT-243-200536 for Arposeple
and Sulogaol, respectively. The confirmatory tests on the urine samples of the appellants
likewise gave positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride as evinced in
Chemistry Report Nos. DT-242A-200537 and DT-243A-200538 for Arposeple and Sulogaol,
respectively.39

The Version of the Defense

The defense presented their version of what happened in the morning of 21 September 2005
through Myra Tara (Tara), Joan Cortes Bohol (Bohol), Arposeple and Sulogaol.

Tara testified that at about 4:30 a.m. on 21 September 2005, while she was sleeping at the house
she was renting with Cory Jane Rama (Rama), she was awakened by the appellants who wanted
to borrow ₱200.00 to pay for the van that they hired to come back from Tubigon, Bohol. She
handed the ₱200.00 to Sulogaol, and while peeping from the window, she saw Sulogaol hand the
₱200.00 to the driver of the van parked in front of the house.40

Arposeple and Sulogaol proceeded to the room the former used to rent but since its present
occupant, Ondoy, had a visitor, Arposeple and Sulogaol went back to Tara's place and requested
that she allow them to play tong-its inside her house while waiting for daylight. She acceded and
allowed them to use her playing cards.41

While Tara, together with Rama, Jessa, and Susan, was sleeping inside the room, she was
awakened by the sound of a strong kick to the door of the house. Two persons barged in saying,
"We are policemen! Do not move!" while pointing their guns at Arposeple and Sulogaol. The
two men grabbed Arposeple and Sulogaol, dragged them out of the house, and handcuffed them.
Arposeple and Sulogaol protested while they were being frisked but to no avail. Two other
policemen outside the house boarded Arposeple and Sulogaol into a parked police vehicle.42

Bohol, Tara's landlady, testified that she knew Arposeple, he being her former boarder. Before
Arposeple's stay at her house, he stayed at an adjacent room which was occupied thereafter by
Ondoy Belly. At about 2:00 a.m. on 21 September 2005, she observed a passenger van parked
outside the house and saw Sulogaol hand money to its driver. At about 3:00 a.m., she heard
banging on the door of the other house. Thinking nothing of the commotion, she went back to
sleep.43

When Bohol woke up at about 6:00 a.m., she saw a vehicle and four uniformed policemen
outside. She saw Arposeple and Sulogaol who, while resisting the policemen's arrest, claimed
that they did not commit any crime. The policemen told Arposeple and Sulogaol to explain
themselves at the police station. Arposeple, who was in handcuffs, and Sulogaol were made to
board a vehicle.44

After the vehicle had gone, Bohol went to Tara's house and saw Tara, Jessa, Mylene Amora, and
Tara's visitor seated on the bed and trembling. The house was in disarray and Tara's playing
cards were scattered on the floor and on the bed. They told her that Arposeple and Sulogaol were
playing cards with them when the policemen came; that Arposeple had refused to go with the
policemen claiming he did not commit any crime.45

In his defense, Arposeple testified that in the early dawn of 21 September 2005, he went to Tara's
house to borrow money to pay for the car rental. He and Sulogaol had come from Cebu and were
on their way to Tubigon-Tagbilaran, Bohol, when they rented the van. He chose to pass by Tara
to borrow ₱l00.00 because she was his friend. After paying for the rental, he and Sulogaol stayed
at Tara's place and played with her cards. Tara took care of her child while Susan, Jessa, and
Cory were sleeping.46

At about 3:00 a.m., three men kicked the door, entered the house, and pointed their guns at him
and Sulogaol. He asked what crime they had committed but Ramos told him to produce the
shabu. He told PO2 Ramos he had nothing to show because he had no shabu. Ramos frisked him
and Sulogaol while Ramos' companions searched around. Ramos found nothing on him and on
Sulogaol.47

After a while, other policemen arrived and, together with Ramos, frisked him and Sulogaol.
While he was in handcuffs, Ramos frisked him again.48

Ramos and his two companions then left and soon after returned with Jimenez. He and Sulogaol
were again frisked and ordered to remove their clothes and to lower their underwear to their
knees. Nothing was found in their person. Ramos got shabu, money, tin foil, and a lighter from
his pocket and placed these on the table. Arposeple protested Ramos' act of planting evidence but
Ramos told him to explain himself at the police station. He was made to board a police car while
Sulogaol was being investigated by the policemen. He told Tara that she and Sulogaol would be
his witnesses as they had seen the policemen plant evidence.49

Arposeple was brought to the police station with Sulogaol where he complained that the
policemen had planted evidence against him. Ramos told him that the items were not his
(Ramos) but belonged to the CIDG. Arposeple did not request a lawyer when he was jailed
because he has no relatives in Bohol. He was investigated by the chief of police and other
policemen. He did not sign the inventory of the items allegedly taken from him because there
was actually nothing found on him. Because he and Sulogaol were not willing to have their
pictures taken at the police station, he was hit at the back of his head and slapped by a policeman
while Sulogaol was hit on the stomach by Ramos.50

Sulogaol testified that in the early dawn of 21 September 2005, he and Arposeple were at Ubujan
District, Tagbilaran City, to borrow ₱l00.00 from Tara, Arposeple's friend, to pay for their v-hire
fare. After paying for the fare, Arposeple and Sulogaol decided to stay at Tara's place to play
cards unti1 morning.51

While he and Arposeple were playing cards, two policemen in civilian clothes kicked the door
and said they were conducting a raid. The policemen handcuffed Arposeple while he was picking
up the scattered cards. The policemen pointed their guns at them. When Tara asked the
policemen why Arposeple was handcuffed, they said that Arposeple sold shabu. Sulogaol and
Arposeple were frisked twice by the policemen but nothing was found on them. Sulogaol saw
Ramos put a plastic sachet containing shabu on the table. He told Ramos not to plant evidence
against them since nothing was found on them. Two of the policemen left the room while the
other two stayed behind to watch over him and Arposeple.52

After two hours, the two policemen who had earlier left returned with two barangay kagawads
and a representative from the media. He and Arposeple were frisked again. While Arposeple was
being boarded into the car, Jimenez told Sulogaol he would not be charged as long as he would
testify against Arposeple. When he declined the offer, he was also made to board the vehicle. At
the police station, he and Arposeple were made to sign a paper but when they refused, they were
told to admit owning the shabu and the piece of the foil. When they refused to be photographed
with the items that were allegedly seized, Arposeple was hit on the face while he was hit on the
chest and struck with a placard on his right leg.53

The Ruling of the RTC

On 20 November 2007, the RTC rendered its decision54 in these cases, viz:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 12852, the court finds accused Pablo Arposeple y Sanchez
and Jhunrel Sulogaol y Datu, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of
Section 5, Article II, of R.A. 9165, embraced in the afore-quoted information. There being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance adduced and proven at the trial, the said accused are
each hereby sentenced to the indivisible penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱300,000.00 Pesos, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs.

In Criminal Case No. 12853, the court finds accused Pablo Arposeple y Sanchez, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II, of R.A. 9165, embraced in
the aforequoted information. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance adduced
and proven at the trial, the said accused is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 Pesos, with the accessory penalties of
the law, and to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 12854, the court finds accused Pablo Arposeple y Sanchez, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 12, Article II, of R.A. 9165, embraced in
the aforequoted information. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance adduced
and proven at the trial, the said accused is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to FOUR (4) years,
as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱25,000.00 Pesos, with the accessory penalties of the law, and
to pay the costs.

The charges against accused Jhunrel Sulogaol, under Criminal Case Nos. 12853 and 12854 are
hereby ordered dismissed and the said accused acquitted, for insufficiency of evidence.

Accused, being detention prisoners are hereby credited in full of the period of their preventive
imprisonment.

In compliance with Par. 4, Section 21 of R.A. 9165, the evidence in these cases consisting of one
(1) sachet of shabu, with an aggregate weight of 0.01 gram, and paraphernalia with Shabu
leftovers are hereby ordered confiscated, destroyed and/or burned, subject to the implementing
guidelines of the Dangerous Drugs Board as to the proper disposition and destruction of such
item.

SO ORDERED.55

The Ruling of the CA

Arguing that the essential elements of the crimes had not been established by the prosecution
with moral certainty, the appellants appealed before the CA, Cebu City. The CA, through its
Nineteenth Division,56 however did not agree with the appellants and ruled that the trial court
had the unique opportunity, denied of appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under direct and cross-examination.57 The CA held that the
prosecution witnesses categorically testified in court and positively identified the appellants, and
that the buy-bust operation was regularly conducted by the police.58 Moreover, it declared that
although the team have not strictly complied with the requirements of the chain of custody, they
had substantially complied therewith, viz: Ramos turned over the seized items to Bagotchay; on
the same day, the items, which had been properly marked were turned over to the laboratory and
received by PO2 Casagan; de Guzman made her own markings on the items; and the items were
presented in court by Ramos and de Guzman, who identified that the items were those seized
from the buy-bust operation where the appellants were arrested.59

The CA held that the failure of the buy-bust team in complying with Section (Sec.) 21, R.A. No.
9165 did not render the items as inadmissible in evidence considering that what were essential
and necessary in drug cases were preserved by the arresting officers in compliance with the
requirements of the law. On the one hand, the non-presentation of the informant was ruled by the
CA as dispensable for the successful prosecution of the cases because his testimony will only be
corroborative and cumulative.60
In compliance with Sec. 11(3), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the CA found the need to modify in
Crim. Case No. 12853 the fine imposed by the RTC to Arposeple from ₱200,000.00 to
₱300,000.00. Thus, the dispositive portion of the CA's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the
assailed 20 November 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 of Tagbilaran
City, Bohol is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The fine imposed to Pablo Arposeple
y Sanchez in Criminal Case No. 12853 is hereby increased to Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php300,000.00)

No pronouncement as to costs.61

ISSUE

The sole issue raised by the appellants was the following:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OF THE

CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE
THEIR GUILT BEYOND RESONABLE DOUBT.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The appeal is meritorious.

An accused is presumed
innocent until his guilt
is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

In all criminal cases, the presumption of innocence of an accused is a fundamental constitutional

right that should be upheld at all times, viz:

2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided, that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.62

In consonance with this constitutional provision, the burden of proof rests upon the
prosecution63 and the accused must then be acquitted and set free should the prosecution not
overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor.64 Conversely, in convicting the accused all
the elements of the crime charged must be proven beyond reasonable doubt,65 viz:
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - x x x Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.66

Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the
weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is not on the accused
to prove his innocence.67

On the one hand, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, the findings and conclusion of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed
because it has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their deportment and manner
of testifying.68 This rule however is not set in stone as not to admit recognized exceptions
considering that "an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty
of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether
they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the
case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."69 (citations omitted)

With these as our guideposts, we shall proceed to evaluate the records of these cases.

The charges against the

appellants vis-a-vis the
requirement on the
unbroken chain of
custody of the seized
drugs

In Crim. Case No. 12852, Arposeple and Sulogaol were charged and convicted with violation of
Sec. 5, Article (Art.) II of R.A. No. 9165.70

In Crim. Case Nos. 12853 and 12854, although both appellants were charged with violation of
Secs. 1171 and 12,72 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, on

Arposeple was convicted on both counts after the R TC ruled that the sachets of shabu and the
drug paraphernalia were found only in his person after the team undertook a body search. It must
be remembered that a person lawfully arrested may be searched without a warrant for anything
which may have been used or may constitute proof in the commission of an offense.73

Jurisprudence dictates that to secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Sec. 5,
Art. II of R.A. 9165, the prosecution must establish the following: (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object of the sale, and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.74 The essential elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Sec. 11 are as follows: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.75 On the one hand, the elements of
illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs under Sec. 12 are the following: (1) possession or control by the accused of any
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such
possession is not authorized by law.76 The CA ruled that all the elements of the offenses charged
against appellants were established with moral certainty.77

We do not agree.

In People v. Jaafar78 we declared that in all prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 9165, the
corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself, the existence of which is essential to a judgment of
conviction; thus, its identity must be clearly established. The justification for this declaration is
elucidated as follows:

Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To determine their composition and nature, they
must undergo scientific testing and analysis. Narcotic .substances are also highly susceptible to
alteration, tampering, or contamination. It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized
from the accused are the very same objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court as
evidence. The chain of custody, as a method of authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts
involving the identity of seized drugs are removed.79

Equally significant therefore as establishing all the elements of violations of R.A. No. 9165 is
proving that there was no hiatus in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs and
paraphernalia. It would be useless to still proceed to determine the existence of the elements of
the crime if the corpus delicti had not been proven beyond moral certainty. Irrefragably, the
prosecution cannot prove its case for violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 9165 when the
seized items could not be accounted for or when there were significant breaks in their chain of
custody that would cast doubt as to whether those items presented in court were actually those
that were seized. An enlightened precedent provides for the meaning of chain of custody, viz:

Chain of custody is defined as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction." Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.80

The stringent requirement as to the chain of custody of seized drugs and paraphernalia was given
life in the provisions of R.A. No. 9165, viz:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof;

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provides the proper procedure
to be followed in Sec. 2l(a) of the Act, viz:

a. The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.

Even the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) - the policy-making and strategy-formulating body in
the planning and formulation of policies and programs on drug prevention and control tasked to
develop and adopt a comprehensive, integrated, unified and balanced national drug abuse
prevention and control strategy81 - has expressly defined chain of custody involving the
dangerous drugs and other substances in the following terms in Sec. l(b) of DDB Regulation No.
1, Series of 2002,82 to wit:

b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.83

Jurisprudence dictates the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer
of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.84

a. The first link was weak.

On the first link, the importance of marking had been discussed as follows:

The first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items.
Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending
officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be made
in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The importance of the
prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of the dangerous drugs or related
items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the
dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the moment they are confiscated until
they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon confiscation or
recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their
integrity and evidentiary value.85

The prosecution claimed that the body search conducted by Ramos on Arposeple yielded the
seized items. The inventory of the items by Bagotchay outside Tara's house was witnessed by the
appellants, two kagawads, and a representative each from the DOJ and the media. Except for the
appellants, the witnesses to the inventory including Jimenez, as team leader, and Tara, as
representative of the appellants, affixed their respective signatures on the certificate of inventory.
Noteworthy, nothing was mentioned in the certificate of inventory as to the marking of the seized
items considering that the certificate contained a plain enumeration of the items, viz:

One (1) pc. transparent cellophane sachet containing suspected shabu powder

Two (2) pcs. empty transparent cellophane sachets containing suspected shabu leftover

Two (2) pcs. rolled aluminum foil used for tooter

Two (2) pcs. folded aluminum foil

Two (2) pcs. disposable lighters

One (1) pc. bamboo clip

One (1) pc. half blade

One (1) pc. five hundred peso bill - as marked money bearing SN# GY 558660

One (1) pc. one hundred peso (₱100) bill

One (1) pc. playing card plastic case86

Ramos, Tabuelog, and Jimenez failed to explain how and when the seized items were marked.
Ramos stated that after the inventory of the items the appellants were brought to the police
station for proper disposition, i.e., the booking of the appellants, and the team's preparation of
their report.87 Ramos and Tabuelog executed their respective affidavits88 relative to the buy-
bust operation but both failed to mention anything therein as to what had happened to the seized
items after the inventory and when these were probably brought to the police station for marking.

De Guzman admitted that she had no knowledge as to who made the markings on the
evidence.89 Even Ruiz's testimony never made mention of the marking. True, there were already
markings on the seized items when these were submitted to the laboratory for examination but
not one of the prosecution witnesses testified as to who had made the markings, how and when
the items were marked, and the meaning of these markings. Conspicuously, the uncertainty
exceedingly pervades that the items presented as evidence against the appellants were exactly
those seized during the buy-bust operation.

Also glaring was the hiatus from the time the seized items were inventoried by Bagotchay in
front of Tara's house to the time these were delivered to the laboratory.1âwphi1 In his
memorandum90 relative to his request for the laboratory examination of the seized items, P/Supt.
Ernesto Agas (Agas) stated that the evidence were obtained on 21 September 2005 at around
4:00 a.m. Bagotchay delivered the evidence to the laboratory, notably already marked, on the
same day at 3:05 p.m. The lapse of eleven (11) hours for the submission of the seized items to
the laboratory was significant considering that the preservation of the chain of custody vis-a-vis
the contraband ensures the integrity of the evidence incriminating the accused, and relates to the
element of relevancy as one of the requisites for the admissibility of the evidence.91 In contrast,
Agas' memorandum92 pertinent to his request for the drug/urine tests of the appellants were
forwarded to the laboratory on the same day at 9:50 a.m. or a gap of at least six (6) hours only.

Bagotchay, who was assigned by Jimenez as the custodian of the seized items, was never
presented by the prosecution to elucidate on the following important matters: the significant
break from the inventory to the actual marking of the items; how and when these items were
marked; the justification for the long period it took him to submit these to the laboratory; the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of seized items; the date and
time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence; and the final disposition.93

To stress, in order that the seized items may be admissible, the prosecution must show by records
or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the times it came into
the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition up to the time it was offered in evidence.94 In Mallillin v. People95 we were more
definite on qualifying the method of authenticating evidence through marking, viz: "(I)t would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence; in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession; the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain."96 We have scrupulously scanned the records but found
nothing that would support a declaration that the seized items were admissible.
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires that the seized items be photographed in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative each from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official. The records of these cases, however, were bereft of any showing of these
photographs while the testimony of the prosecution witnesses were most notably silent on
whether photographs were actually taken as required by law.

Certainly revealing from these findings was the consistent noncompliance by the team with the
requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. It must be remembered that this provision of the law
was laid down by Congress as a safety precaution against potential abuses by law enforcement
agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those suspected to be
involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal drugs.97 While it may be true that
noncompliance with Sec. 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal to the prosecution's case
provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by the existence of a ground that
justifies departure from the general rule.98 The prosecution, however, miserably failed to prove
that its cases fall within the jurisprudentially recognized exception to the rule.

The first link in the chain of custody was undoubtedly inherently weak which caused the other
links to miserably fail. The first link, it is emphasized, primarily deals on the preservation of the
identity and integrity of the confiscated items, the burden of which lies with the prosecution. The
marking has a twin purpose, viz: first, to give the succeeding handlers of the specimen a
reference, and second, to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the moment of seizure until their disposition at the end of criminal
proceedings, thereby obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.99 Absent
therefore the certainty that the items that were marked, subjected to laboratory examination, and
presented as evidence in court were exactly those that were allegedly seized from Arposeple,
there would be no need to proceed to evaluate the succeeding links or to determine the existence
of the other elements of the charges against the appellants. Clearly, the cases for the prosecution
had been irreversibly lost as a result of the weak first link irretrievably breaking away from the
main chain.

b. The presumption of
regularity in the
performance of duty cannot
prevail in these cases.

Even the presumption as to regularity in the performance by police officers of their official
duties easily disappeared before it could find significance in these cases. Continuing accretions
of case law reiterate that a high premium is accorded the presumption of innocence over the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, viz:

We have usually presumed the regularity of performance of their official duties in favor of the
members of buy-bust teams enforcing our laws against the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Such
presumption is based on three fundamental reasons, namely: first, innocence, and not
wrongdoing, is to be presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated; and, third, a
republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon controversies
and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental department or agent by every
other such department or agent, at least to the extent of such presumption. But the presumption is
rebuttable by affirmative evidence of irregularity or of any failure to perform a duty. Judicial
reliance on the presumption despite any hint of irregularity in the procedures undertaken by the
agents of the law will thus be fundamentally unsound because such hint is itself affirmative proof
of irregularity.

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason exists
in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in
that instance the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the
constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. Trial courts are instructed to apply this
differentiation, and to always bear in mind the following reminder issued in People v. Catalan:

x x x We remind the lower courts that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
could not prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence favoring the accused. Otherwise,
the constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent would be held subordinate
to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of evidence. Where, like here, the proof adduced
against the accused has not even overcome the presumption of innocence, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty could not be a factor to adjudge the accused guilty of the
crime charged.

Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly presumed in
favor of the policemen because the records were replete with indicia of their serious lapses. As a
rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a police officer must be inferred only
from an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say it differently, it is the
established basic fact that triggers the presumed fact of regular performance. Where there is any
hint of irregularity committed by the police officers in arresting the accused and thereafter,
several of which we have earlier noted, there can be no presumption of regularity of performance
in their favor.

It must be noted that the chemistry report100 of De Guzman mentioned that the specimens
submitted for examination contained either small amount101 or traces102 on1y of white
substance which tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The informations in Crim.
Case Nos. 12852 and 12853 respectively refer to a transparent cellophane sachet and two empty
transparent cellophane sachets, each of which contained shabu weighing not more than 0.01
grams. Recent cases103 have highlighted the need to ensure the integrity of seized drugs in the
chain of custody when only a minuscule amount of drugs had been allegedly seized from the
accused. Pertinently, we have held that "[c]ourts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent
with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving minuscule
amounts of drugs ... [as] they can be readily planted and tampered [with]."104

The guilt of the appellants was

not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
This much is clear and needs no debate: the blunders committed by the police officers relative to
the procedure in Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165, especially on the highly irregular manner by which the
seized items were handled, generates serious doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value of the
items. Considering that the seized items constitute the corpus delicti of the offenses charged, the
prosecution should have proven with moral certainty that the items confiscated during the buy-
bust operation were actually those presented before the RTC during the hearing. In other words,
it must be unwaveringly established that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence
against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place.105 Under the principle
that penal laws are strictly construed against the government, stringent compliance with Sec. 21,
R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR is fully justified.106 The breaches in the procedure provided in Sec.
21, R.A. No. 9165 committed by the police officers, and left unacknowledged and unexplained
by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.107

To recapitulate, the records of these cases were bereft of any showing that the prosecution had
discharged its burden to: (1) overcome the presumption of innocence which appellants enjoy; (2)
prove the corpus delicti of the crime; (3) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized
drugs; and (4) offer any explanation why the provisions of Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165 were not
complied with. This Court is thus constrained to acquit the appellants based on reasonable
doubt.108

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the 3 October 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00865. Accused-appellants Pablo
Arposeple y Sanchez and Jhunrel Sulogaol y Datu are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are
ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless they are otherwise legally
confined for another cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City, for immediate implementation. The Director of Corrections is directed to report the action
he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Variably referred as "Jhunrel Sulogaol y Dato" in some parts of the rollo.

2 Rollo, pp. 3-16. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos and concurred in
by Associate Justices Ramon Paul. L. Hernando and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes.

3 Records (Crim. Case No. 12852), pp. 155-164.

4 Records (Crim. Case No. 12852), pp. 1-2.

5 Records (Crim. Case No. 12853), pp. 1-2.

6 Records (Crim. Case No. 12854), pp. 1-2.

7 Exh. "N." (TSN, 6 June 2006), p. 7.

8 TSN, 6 June 2006, pp. 5-8 and 10.

9 Id. at 8-9.

10 Records (Crim. Case No. 12852), p. 158; English translation: "Let us just give him
Bay."
11 Id.; English translation: "Ok, let us just give."

12 TSN, 9 May 2006, pp. 12-15.

13 Exh. "L."

14 Exh. "M."

15 Exh. "O."

16 Exhs. "P" and "P-1."

17 Exhs. "Q" and "Q-1."

18 Exhs. "R" and "R-1."

19 Exh. "S."

20 Exh. "T."

21 Exh. "U."

22 Exh. "N."

23 TSN, 9 May 2006, pp.15-29.

24 TSN, 25 May 2006, pp. 14-16.

25 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 5; Exh. "C."

26 TSN, 9 May 2006, pp. 30-31.

27 TSN, 4 July 2006, p. 16.

28 TSN, 25 May 2006, p. 17.

29 Record of Documentary Evidence, pp. 1-4; Exhs. "A" and "B."

30 TSN, 9 May 2006, p. 32; TSN, 25 May 2006, p. 17.

31 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 6; Exh. "G."

32 Id. at 7; Exh. "H."

33 TSN, 18 April 2006, pp. 6-9.

34 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 8; Exh. "I."

35 Id. at 9; Exh. "J."

36 Id. at 11; Exh. "K."

37 Id. at 9; Exh. "J-1."

38 Id. at 11; Exh. "K-1."

39 TSN, 18 April 2006, pp. 16-26.

40 TSN, 17 October 2006, pp. 4-7.

41 Id. at 7-9.

42 Id. at 9-13.

43 TSN, 10 May 2007, pp. 4-5 and 9-11.

44 Id. at 12-15.

45 Id. at 16-20.

46 TSN, 22 May 2007, pp. 3-10.

47 Id. at 10-14.

48 Id. At l4-17

49 Id. at 17-20.

50 Id. at 21-28.

51 TSN, 28 June 2007, pp. 5-9.

52 Id. at 10-15.

53 Id. at 18-23.

54 Records (Crim. Case No. 12852), pp. 155-164; presided by Judge Baudilio K. Dosdos.

55 Id. at 163-164.
56 Rollo, pp. 3-16. Penned by Associate Justice and Chairperson Edgardo L. Delos
Santos, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Victoria
Isabel A. Paredes.

57 Id. at 11.

58 Id.

59 Id. at 12-13.

60 Id. at 14.

61 Id. At l5.

62 Sec. 14(2), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.

63 People v. Patentes, 726 Phil. 590, 606 (2014).

64 People v. Cruz, 736 Phil. 564, 580 (2014).

65 Ngo v. People, 478 Phil. 676, 680 (2004).

66 Rule 133, Rules of Court.

67 Macayan. Jr. v. People, 756 Phil. 202, 214 (2015).

68 People v. Tamaiio, et al., G.R. No. 208643, 5 December 2016.

69 Gamboa v. People, G.R. No. 220333, 14 November 2016.

70 Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such
transactions.
 If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or
transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners,
couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemical trade, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or

should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical
involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be
imposed.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any
person who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal
activities prescribed in this Section. The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.

71 Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to

death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the
degree of purity thereof:

(1) 10 grams or more of opium;

(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;

(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;

(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;

(5) 50 grams or more ofmethamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";

(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and

(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy",
 paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA),
lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine (GHB),
and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and
promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this
Act.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
penalties shall be graduated as follows:

(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand
pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00), ifthe
quantity ofmethamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams
or more but less than fifty (50) grams;

(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life
imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(₱400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten
(10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or
"ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives without having any therapeutic
value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements;
or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five (hundred) 500)
grams of marijuana; and

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos
(₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA,
TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs
and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than
three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.

72 Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia

for Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (₱10,000.00) to
Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering,
injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body: Provided, That in
the case of medical practitioners and various professionals who are required to carry such
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their
profession, the Board shall prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof.

The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia

fit or intended for any of the purposes enumerated in the preceding paragraph
shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked, consumed,
administered to himself/herself, injected, ingested or used a dangerous drug and
shall be presumed to have violated Section 15 of this Act.

73 People v. Montevirgen, 723 Phil. 534, 543 (2013).

74 People v. Ismael, G.R. No. 208093, 20 February 2017.

75 People v. Minanga, 751 Phil. 240, 248 (2015).

76 People v. Villar, G.R. No. 215937, 9 November 2016.

77 Rollo, p. 11.

78 G.R. No. 219829, 18 January 2017.

79 Id.

80 People v. Ameril, G.R. No. 203293, 14 November 2016.

81 Sec. 77, R.A. No. 9165.

82 Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled

Precursors and Essential Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment pursuant to Section 21,
Article II of the IRR of RA No. 9165 in relation to Section 8l(b), Article IX of RA No.
9165.

83 People v. Gonzales, 708 Phil. 121, 129-130 (2013).

84 People v. Poja, G.R. No. 215937, 9 November 2016.

85 People v. Ismael, supra note 74, citing People v. Gonzales, supra note 83 at 130-131.

86 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 5.

87 TSN, 6 June 2006, pp. 15-18.

88 Record of Documentary Evidence, pp. 1-4; Exhs. "A" and "B."

89 TSN, 18 April 2006, pp. 12-14.

90 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 6: Exh. "G."

91 People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 199271, 19 October 2016, citing People v. Mendoza, 736
Phil. 749, 761 (2014).

92 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 8; Exh. "I."

93 People v. Ameril, supra note 80.

94 People v. Tamano, supra note 68.

95 576 Phil. 576 (2008), cited in People v. Ismael, supra note 74.

96 Id. at 587.

97 Rontos v. People, 710 Phil. 328, 335 (2013).

98 People v. Jaafar, supra note 78.

99 People v. Gaea, G.R. No. 219584, 17 October 2016.

100 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 7; Exh. "H."

101 Id.; Specimen "A."

102 Id.; Specimens "B," "B-1"; "C" and "C-1."

103 People v. Jaafar, supra note 78, citing People v. Holgado, 741 Phil. 78, 81 (2014);
Tuano v. People, G.R. No. 205871, 28 September 2016; and People v.Caiz, G.R. No.
215340, 13 July 2016, 797 SCRA 26, 58.

104 People v. Holgado, 741 Phil. 78, 100 (2014).

105 People v. Tamaha, supra note 68.

106 Rontos v. People, supra note 97 at 335.

107 Gamboa v. People, supra note 69.

108 People v. Ismael, supra note 74.