Contents

Franco v People, G.R. No. 191185, February 1, 2016.........................1

Suerte-Felipe v People, G.R. No. 170974, March 3, 2008................10
Malayan Insurance v Philippine Nails and Wires Corp., G.R. No. 138084, April 10, 2002 35
Heirs of Demetria Lacsa v CA, G.R. Nos. 79597-98, May 20, 1991...38
Sanson v CA, G.R. No. 127745, April 22, 2003.................................44
People v Pagpaguitan, G.R. No. 116599, September 27, 1999.........51
Lazaro v Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010...........................64
Pan Pacific Industrial Sales v CA, G.R. No. 125283, February 10, 200672
Delfin v Billones, G.R. No. 146550, March 17, 2006.........................79
Patula v People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012............................87

Franco v People, G.R. No. 191185, February 1,

2016
REYES, J.:
The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the defense's evidence for it
has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused - ei
incumbit probatio qui dicit, non que negat - he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove.1
Nature of the Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on CertiorarP. under Rule
Authentication and Proof of Documents 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner Guilberner Franco (Franco)

EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 1

assails the Decision3 dated September 16, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31706, affirming the Decision4
dated February 27, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 05-238613. The RTC convicted
Franco of the crime of Theft under an Information, which reads as
follows:
That on or about November 3, 2004, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and
consent or the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away one (1)
Nokia 3660 Model cellular phone worth Php 18,500.00 belonging to
BENJAMIN JOSEPH NAKAMOTO Y ERGUIZA to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of Php
18,500.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.5
On September 5, 2005, Franco, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged.6
The Facts
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
On November 3, 2004 at around 11 :00 a.m., Benjamin Joseph
Nakamoto (Nakamoto) went to work out at the Body Shape Gym
located at Malong Street, Tondo, Manila. After he finished working
out, he placed his Nokia 3660 cell phone worth 'Pl 8,500.00 on the
altar where gym users usually put their valuables and proceeded to
the comfort room to change his clothes. After ten minutes, he
returned to get his cell phone, but it was already missing. Arnie
Rosario (Rosario), who was also working out, informed him that he
saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. Nakamoto
requested everyone not to leave the gym, but upon verification from
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 2
the logbook, he found out that Franco had left within the time that
he was in the shower.7
The gym's caretaker, Virgilio Ramos (Ramos), testified that he saw
Franco in the gym but he was not working out and was just going
around the area. Tn fact, it was just Franco's second time at the gym.
Ramos even met him near the door and as Franco did not log out,
he was the one who indicated it in their logbook. When Nakamoto
mmounced that his cell phone was missing and asked that nobody
leaves the place, he put an asterisk opposite the name of Franco in
the logbook to indicate that he was the only one who left the gym
after the cell phone was declared lost.
Nakamoto, together with Jeoffrey Masangkay, a police officer who
was also working out at the gym, tried to locate Franco within the
gym's vicinity but they failed to find him. They proceeded to the
police station and while there, a report was received from another
police officer that somebody saw Franco along Coral Street, which is
near the gym and that he was holding a cell phone. They went to
Coral Street but he was already gone. A vendor told them that he
saw a person who was holding a cell phone, which was then ringing
and that the person was trying to shut it off. When they went to
Franco's house, they were initially not allowed to come in but were
eventually let in by Franco's mother. They talked to Franco who
denied having taken the cell phone.9
Nakamoto then filed a complaint with the barangay but no
settlement was arrived thereat; hence, a criminal complaint for theft
was filed against Franco before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Manila, docketed as LS. No. 04K-25849.10
In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto
had indeed lost his cell phone at around 1 :00 p.m., he and his
witnesses could have confronted him as at that time, he was still at
the gym, having left only at around 2:45 p.m.11 He also admitted to
have taken a cap and cell phone from the altar but claimed these to
be his.12
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision elated February 27, 2008, the RTC convicted Franco of
theft, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds [Franco], GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft penalized in
paragraph 1 of Article 309 in relation to Article 308 of the Revised
Penal
Code and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment of
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to seven
(7) years and four (4) months as maximum and to pay the
complainant Php 18,500.00.
SO ORDERED.13
The RTC did not find Franco's defense credible and ruled that his
denial cannot be given evidentiary value over the positive testimony
of Rosario.14
Franco then appealed to the CA. 15
Ruling of the CA
In affirming the RTC decision, the CA found the elements of theft to
have been duly established. It relied heavily on the "positive
testimony" of Rosario who declared to have seen Franco take a cap
and a cell phone from the altar. The CA likewise gave credence to
the testimony of Ramos who confirmed that it was only Franco who
left the gym immediately before Nakamoto announced that his cell
phone was missing. Ramos also presented the logbook and affirmed
having put an asterisk opposite the name "ELMER," which was
entered by the accused upon logging in. The CA stated that taken
together, the foregoing circumstances are sufficient to support a
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 3
moral conviction that Franco is guilty, and at the same time,
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. 16 The CA
further ruled that the RTC cannot be faulted for giving more weight
to the testimony of Nakamoto17 and Rosario,18 considering that
Franco foiled to show that they were impelled by an ill or improper
motive to falsely testify against him.19
In his petition for review, Franco presented the following issues for
resolution, to wit:
I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTI0N WITNESSES' INCONSISTENT AND
IRRECONCILABLE TESTIMONIES.
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] AFFIRMING [FRANCO'S]
CONVICTION FACT THAT THE SAME WAS FABRICATIONS AND
PRESUMPTIONS.1âwphi1
III.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE VALUE
OF THE ALLEGEDLY STOLEN CELLULAR PHONE WITHOUT
SUBSTANTIATING EVIDENCE.20
Ruling of the Court
Preliminarily, the Court restates the n1le that only errors of law and
not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. This rule
applies with greater force when the factual findings of the CA are in
full agreement with that of the RTC.21
The rule, however, is not ironclad. A departure therefrom may be
warranted when it is established that the RTC ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances,
which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case.
Considering that what is at stake here is liberty, the Court has
carefully reviewed the records of the case22 and finds that Franco
should be acquitted.
Failure of the prosecution to prove
JCranco's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt
The burden of such proof rests with the prosecution, which must
rely on the strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the
case for the defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.23
In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove
two things beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the
commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the
elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was
the perpetrator of the crime.24 Under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of theft are: (1) the
taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3)
the taking away was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking away
was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away
is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or
force upon things.25
The corpus delicti in theft has two elements, to wit: (I) that the
property was lost by the owner; and (2) that it was lost by felonious
taking. 26
In this case, the crucial issue is whether the prosecution has
presented proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish the corpus
delicti of the crime. In affirming Franco's conviction, the CA ruled
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 4
that the elements were established. Moreover, the RTC and the CA
apparently relied heavily on circumstantial evidence.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that the following requisites
must concur: (l) there must be more than one circumstance to
convict; (2) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be
proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to
the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads one to a
fair nnd reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of others, as the guilty person.27
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses - Nakamoto, the
complainant; Ramos, the gym's caretaker; and Rosario, nnother gym
user.
Their testimonies established the following circumstances: (l)
Nakamoto placed his cell phone on the altar, 28 left and went to
change his clothes, and after ten minutes, returned to get his cell
phone but the same was already missing;29 (2) Rosario saw Franco
get a cap and a cell phone from the same place;30 and (3) Ramos
saw Franco leave the gym at 1 : 15 p.m. and the latter failed to log
out in the logbook.31 The RTC and the CA wove these circumstances
in order to arrive at the "positive identification" of
Franco as the perpetrator. 32
A perusal of their testimonies, however, shows that certain facts
have been overlooked by both courts.
For one, it was only Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a cell
phone from the altar. His lone testimony, however, cannot be
considered a positive identification of Franco as the perpetrator:
In People v. Pondivida,34 the Court held:
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and
not perse to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of
commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a
criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the
very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct
evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a
witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a
crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused
as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the
person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other
pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair
and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author
of the crime to the exclusion of all others. x x x.35 (Emphasis
omitted and underscoring ours)
Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of
positive identification. While it may support the conclusion that
Franco took a cell phone from the altar, it does not establish with
certainty that what Franco feloniously took, assuming that he did,
was Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified that Franco
took "a cell phone." He stated:
Q: How did you know that the said cell phone was taken by the
accused?
A: [W]e were then in a conversation when I asked him to spot or
assist me with the weights that I intended to carry. We were then
situated in an area very near the altar where his cap and cell phone
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 5
were placed. After assisting me, he went to the area and took the
cell phone and the cap at the same time.
Q: [W]ho were you talking [sic] at that time?
A: Guilbemer Franco.
Q: 1t was also [G]uilbemer Franco who helped or spot you in the
work out?
A: Yes, sir
Q: And after assisting you, what did Franco do?
A: He took the cell phone of Mr. Nakamoto and his cap at the same
time and covered the cell phone by his cap and left the place.
Q: Where was that cell phone of the private complainant placed at
that time?
A: At the top of the altar where is [sic] cap is also located.
Q: How far was that altar from where you were working?
A: Only inches.
Q: It was directly in front of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do when the accused took the cap as well as the
cell phone of the private complainant?
A: None, sir. I thought the cap and cell phone was his.
Q: How did you know that the cell phone belongs to the private
complainant?
A: After Mr. Nakamoto came out from the shower, he went directly
to the altar to get his cell phone which was not there anymore and
asked us where his cell phone and I told him that I saw Mr. Franco
get a cell phone from that area.36 (Emphasis ours)
On cross-examination, Rosario also stated that he did not actually
see Franco take Nakamoto's cell phone37 but on re-direct, he
clarified that he did not see the cell phone of Nakamoto because he
thought that the cell phone was owned by Franco.38
What was firmly established by Rosario's testimony is that Franco
took a cell phone from the altar. But Franco even admitted such
fact.39
What stands out from Rosario's testimony is that he was unable to
particularly describe at first instance what or whose cell phone
Franco took from the altar. He only assumed that it was Nakamoto's
at the time the latter announced that his cell phone was missing.
This was, in fact, observed by the RTC in the course of Rosario's
testimony, thus:
COURT: What you actually saw was, [G]uilbemer Franco was taking
his cap together with the cell phone placed beside the cap but you
do not know that [the] cell phone was Bj's or Nakamoto 's?
A: [Y]es, Your Honor.
COURT: You just presumed that the cell phone taken by Guilhemer
Franco was his?
A: Yes, Ma'am.40 (Emphasis ours)
Moreover, it must be noted that save for Nakamoto's statement that
he placed his cell phone at the altar, no one saw him actually place
his cell phone there. This was confirmed by Rosario -
COURT:
Q: And on that day, you were able to see that Nakamoto on four
incidents, when he logged-in, during work-out and when he went
inside the C.[R].?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Therefore, you did not sec Nakamoto place his cell phone at the
Altar·?
A: Yes, sir.41 (Emphasis ours)
Ramos, the gym caretaker, also testified that he did not see Franco
take Nakamoto 's cell phone and only assumed that the cell phone
on the altar was Nakamoto's, thus -
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 6
Q: And do you know who owns that cell phone put [sic] over the
altar?
A: Benjamin Nakamoto.
Q: How do you know that it belongs to Benjamin Nakamoto?
A: He is the only one who brings a cell phone to the gym.
xxxx
Q: [D]id you actually see him take the cell phone of Nakamoto?
A: l did not see him take the [cell] phone but as soon as the cell
phone was lost, he was the only one who left the gym.42
Neither can the prosecution's testimonial evidence fall under the
second category of positive identification, that is, Franco having
been identified as the person or one of the persons last seen
immediately before and right after the commission of the theft.
Records show that there were other people in the gym before and
after Nakamoto lost his cell phone. In fact, Nakamoto himself
suspected Rosario of having taken his cell phone, thus:
ATTY. SANCHEZ:
Q: You said that you s1ayed inside the rest room for more or less 10
minutes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After 10 minutes, you don't know whether aside from Franco
somebody went out from the gym because you were inside the c.r.?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: As a matter of fact, one of your witness[es] who went near the
place where your cell phone was placed was this Arnie Rosario?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it was only the accused and [Rosario] who were near the
place
where you said you placed the cell phone?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not suspect [Rosario] have taken the cell phone'!
A: I also suspected, sir:43 - (Emphasis ours)
Moreover, the prosecution witnesses confirmed that the altar is the
usual spot where the gym users place their valuables. According to
Rosario:
ATTY. SANCHEZ:
Q: And in that place, you said there was a Sto. Niño
A: At the Altar
Q: Those who work-out in that gym usually place their things jon
top ofl the altar.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Therefore, there were people who place their ('.ell phones on top
(of] the Altar?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Aside from Nakamoto, other people place their things on top
[of! the Altar?
A: Yes, sir.44 (Emphasis ours)
The prosecution's evidence does not rule out the following
possibilities: one, that what Franco took was his own cell phone;
two, even on the assumption that Franco stole a cell phone from the
altar, that what he foloniously took was Nakamoto's cell phone,
considering the fact that at the time Nakamoto was inside the
changing room, other people may have placed their cell phone on
the same spot; and three, that some other person may have taken
Nakamoto's cell phone.
It must be emphasized that "[c]ourts must judge the guilt or
innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere
conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions."45 It is iniquitous to base
Franco's guilt on the presumptions of the prosecution's witnesses
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 7
for the Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations,
one of which being consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other or others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence has not
fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support
a conviction.46
Franco also asserts that the logbook from which his time in and time
out at the gym was based was not identified during the trial and was
only produced after Ramos testified.47 Ramos testified that when
Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was missing and asked
that nobody leaves the place, he put an asterisk opposite the name
of Franco in the logbook to indicate that he was the only one who
left the gym after the cell phone was declared lost.48
Under the Rules on Evidence, documents are either public or
private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any of
the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.49
Section 20 of the same Rule, in turn, provides that before any
private document is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of
the signature of handwriting or the maker.50
In this case, the foregoing rule was not followed. The testimony of
Ramos shows that the logbook, indeed, was not identified and
authenticated during the course of Ramos' testimony. At the time
when Ramos was testifying, he merely referred to the log in and log
out time and the name of the person at page 104 of the logbook
that appears on line 22 of the entries for November 3, 2004. This
was photocopied and marked as Exhibit "C-1."51 Meanwhile, when
Nakamoto was presented as rebuttal witness, a page from the
logbook was again marked as Exhibit "D."52 The logbook or the
particular page referred to by Ramos was neither identified nor
confirmed by him as the same logbook which he used to log the ins
and outs of the gym users, or that the writing and notations on said
logbook was his. The prosecution contends, meanwhile, that the
RTC's evaluation of the witnesses' credibility may no longer be
questioned at this stage.53 The Court is not unmindful of the rule
that the assignment of value and weight to the testimony of a
witness is best left to the discretion of the RTC. But an exception to
that rule shall be applied in this case where certain facts of
substance and value, if considered, may affect the result.54 In
Lejano v. People,55 the Court stated:
A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping
into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the
job or deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he
saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel
out the accused's claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can
make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying
witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!"
without blinking an eye.56
The facts and circumstances proven by the prosecution, taken
together, are not sufficient to justify the unequivocal conclusion that
Franco feloniously took Nakamoto's cell phone. No other convincing
evidence was presented by the prosecution that would link him to
the theft.57 The fact Franco took a cell phone from· the altar does
not necessarily point to the conclusion that it was Nakamoto's cell
phone that he took. In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence,
the rule is that the circumstances must be proved, and not
themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence must exclude
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 8
the possibility that some other person has committed the offense
charged.58
Franco, therefore, cannot be convicted of the crime charged in this
case. There is not enough evidence to do so. As a rule, in order to
support a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, all the
circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty. In this case, not all the facts on which the inference
of guilt is based were proved. The matter of what and whose cell
phone Franco took from the altar still remains uncertain.
Franco's defense of denial
The evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own weight and
not rely on the weakness of the defense.59 In this case, Franco did
not deny that he was at the Body Shape Gym on November 3, 2004,
at around l :00 p.m. and left the place at around 2:45 p.m. 60 He did
not even deny that he took a cell phone from the altar together with
his cap. What he denied is that he took Nakamoto's cell phone and
instead, claimed that what he took is his own cell phone.61 Denial
may be weak but courts should not at once look at them with
disfavor. There are situations where an accused may really have no
other defenses but denial, which, if established to be the truth, may
tilt the scales of justice in his favor, especially when the prosecution
evidence itself. is weak.62
While it is true that denial partakes of the nature of negative and
self-serving evidence and is seldom given weight in law,63 the Court
admits an exception established by jurisprudence that the defense
of denial assumes significance when the prosecution's evidence is
such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 64 The
exception applies in the case at hand. The prosecution failed to
produce sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional guarantee
that Franco is presumed to be innocent.
Value of the cell phone
It is also argued by Franco that the value of the cell phone must be
duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty. On the other hand,
the people contended that there has been a judicial admission of
the same.65 This issue, however, is now moot and academic
considering Franco's acquittal.
Conclusion
The circumstantial evidence proven by the prosecution in this case
failed to pass the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant
Franco's conviction.1avvphi1 Accusation is not synonymous with
guilt.66 Not only that,
where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral
certainty required for conviction.67
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Comi of
Appeals dated September 16, 2009 in CA-GR. CR No. 31706 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Guilbemer Franco is
ACQUITTED of the crime of Theft charged in Criminal Case No. 05-
238613 because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Suerte-Felipe v People, G.R. No. 170974, March
3, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari praying for the reversal of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26162 dated
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 9
29 December 2005 affirming with modification the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, in Criminal Case No.
00-0182, convicting petitioner Romeo I. Suerte-Felipe of the crime
of homicide for the death of one Godofredo Ariate.
The Information filed against petitioner dated 15 November 1999
charged him with homicide:
The undersigned Asst. City Prosecutor accuses ROMEO
SUERTE I. FELIPE of the crime of HOMICIDE committed as
follows:
That on or about July 11, 1999, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, with intent to kill, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot by
means of a firearm one GODOFREDO ARIATE, thereby,
inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds which caused his
death.3
The prosecution’s version of the 11 July 1999 incident is as follows:
Prosecution witness Rodolfo Alumbres testified that he was in Bgy.
180, Maricaban, Pasay City at around 7:30 that night. Around four-
arms length from him were petitioner Suerte-Felipe and the
deceased Godofredo Ariate, who were arguing over something.
Petitioner was accompanied by PO3 Edison Madriago and PO3
Eduardo Jimeno.4 Petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber firearm,
while Madriago and Jimeno were each armed with a 9mm firearm.
All of a sudden, petitioner fired around four shots at Godofredo.
Seeing Godofredo fall down, Alumbres rushed to his aid and
attempted to bring the latter to the hospital, but petitioner shot him
twice and hit him once on the right leg. Fearing that he might be
shot again, Alumbres pretended to be dead.
Godofredo’s son, William Ariate, and Barangay Chairman Pio Arce
witnessed the incident. Arce, upon arriving at the scene of the
crime, attempted to appease petitioner by shouting, "Romy, ayusin
na lang natin ‘to." Petitioner did not heed Arce’s appeal and instead
fired at Arce. Arce used his .38 caliber revolver to defend himself
against petitioner who was then more than six meters from him.
Arce took cover and exchanged fire with petitioner. Petitioner’s
companions, Madriago and Jimeno, also fired at Arce.
Godofredo was declared dead on arrival at the Pasay City General
Hospital. Edgardo Ariate, another son of Godofredo, identified the
body and requested an autopsy examination. Dr. Ludovino J. Lagat,
Jr. conducted the autopsy, which showed that Godofredo sustained
three gunshot wounds which caused his death. The first wound was
located at the outer portion of his right arm. The second wound was
at the right flank and the third wound was at the epigastric area,
both affecting the intestines and the liver. Armando Mancera,
photographer of the Medico-Legal Division of the NBI, took pictures
of the body.
Ballistics examination of the slug revealed that the slug was fired
from a .45 caliber pistol. Bonifacia Casiñas Ariate presented a
marriage contract to prove that she was Godofredo’s lawful wife.
She also presented receipts amounting to P21,800.00 representing
the expenses during Godofredo’s funeral.
Petitioner had a different version of the events of that night.
Petitioner testified that it was the deceased, Godofredo Ariate, and
his six to seven companions, which included Pio Arce and William
Ariate, who were the unlawful aggressors that night. Godofredo was
irked when petitioner chided him for cursing and slapping a retarded
boy in the streets. Godofredo and his companions attacked and
repeatedly stabbed petitioner. Madriago and Jimeno were also
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 10
attacked by Godofredo’s group. Arce fired at petitioner, Jimeno and
Madriago using a .38 caliber revolver. At this point, petitioner drew
his .45 caliber firearm in self-defense and accidentally fired it in an
upward direction.
Danilo Villa, a street vendor, came out for the first time to narrate
what he allegedly witnessed on the night of the incident. Villa
practically backed up petitioner’s testimony. He said that he did not
report what he saw to the police, nor did he tell his wife or any of
his relatives about it.
The defense would have also presented as witness Dr. Roger
Archangel, the doctor who performed surgeries on petitioner, but
his testimony was dispensed with as explained in the trial court’s 20
September 2001 Order:
(T)he formal taking of the testimony of Dr. Archanghel was
dispensed with after the prosecution agreed that: (1) Dr.
Arcanghel was the one who attended and treated the
accused for the injuries he sustained as reflected in the
Medical Records as marked in Exhibits "1", "1-a". "1-b", "1-
c", "1-d", "1-e", "1-f", "1-g" and "1-h". By reason of this
stipulation, the testimony of Arcanghel is dispensed with
and the fact, among others, that the accused sustained
injuries as shown in the aforesaid exhibits, now form part of
the record of this case as evidence for the accused. 5
On 8 November 2001, the Regional Trial Court found petitioner
guilty as charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, accused ROMEO I. SUERTE FELIPE is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
 of prision mayor as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Moreover, said accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of
Godofredo Ariate the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
the death of Godofredo Ariate, P21,800.00 as actual
damages, and to pay the costs.6
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following
as errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT WAS
GODOFREDO ARIATE’S BODY THAT WAS AUTOPSIED BY DR.
LUDOVINO LAGAT;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SLUG
RECOVERED BY DR. LUDOVINO LAGAT CAME FROM THE
FATAL WOUND THAT KILLED GODOFREDO ARIATE;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
SLUG RECOVERED BY DR. LUDOVINO LAGAT CAME FROM
THE .45 FIREARM OF THE APPELLANT;
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE TESTIMONY
OF APPELLANT AS CONFUSED AND UNBELIEVABLE, AND
THAT OF DANILO VILLA AS THAT OF A PLANTED WITNESS;
AND
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE
TESTIMONIES OF RODOLFO ALUMBRES AND PIO ARCE
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR LACK OF CREDIBILITY.7
On 29 December 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision, disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay city, Branch 117, in Criminal Case No. 00-
0182, convicting appellant Romeo I. Suerte-Felipe of
homicide is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 11
an additional amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
is awarded to the heirs of the victim Godofredo Ariate as
moral damages. No pronouncement as to costs. 8
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising
the following arguments:
I. THERE IS REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE GUILT OF
PETITIONER THERE BEING NO CLEAR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS GODOFREDO ARIATE’S BODY
THAT WAS AUTOPSIED BY DR. LUDOVINO LAGAT.
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AUTOPSIED BODY WAS
THAT OF GODOFREDO ARIATE, STILL THERE IS REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY THERE BEING NO CLEAR
EVIDENCE THAT THE SLUG IN QUESTION WAS RECOVERED
FROM ANY FATAL WOUND THAT CAUSED HIS DEATH.
III. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE SLUG IN QUESTION
WAS RECOVERED IN ANY FATAL WOUND, STILL THERE IS
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO PETITIONER’S GUILT THERE
BEING NO CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE SAME SLUG CAME
FROM THE .45 FIREARM OF PETITIONER
IV. THERE IS REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER IS
GUILTY SINCE THE CONCLUSION THAT HIS TESTIMONY IS AS
"CONFUSED AS IT IS UNBELIEVABLE", AND THAT OF HIS
WITNESS DANILO VILLA AS THAT OF A "PLANTED WITNESS"
IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED FACTS AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
V. THERE IS REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO PETITIONER’S GUILT,
HIS CONVICTION BEING BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF
RODOLFO ALUMBRES AND PIO ARCE NOTWITHSTANDING
THEIR LACK OF CREDIBILITY AS THE TRIAL COURT ITSELF
EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGED9
The arguments presented by both sides concerning the guilt or
innocence of petitioner can be divided into two sets: those
concerning physical evidence, and those concerning testimonial
evidence. We are going to tackle these sets of evidence seriatim.
Physical Evidence
Petitioner unleashed a three-pronged attack against the physical
evidence presented by respondent. Firstly, petitioner claims that
there is no clear evidence to support the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that it was Godofredo Ariate’s body that was autopsied by
Dr. Ludovino Lagat. Secondly, petitioner claims that assuming
arguendo that the autopsied body was that of Godofredo Ariate,
there is no clear evidence that the slug in question was recovered
from a fatal wound that caused Godofredo Ariate’s death. Lastly,
petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the slug in question
was recovered from a fatal wound, there is no clear evidence that
the same slug came from the .45 firearm of petitioner.
At the outset, we must stress that while physical evidence ranks very
high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence and can be relied upon
principally to ascertain the truth,10 presentation thereof is not
absolutely indispensable to sustain a conviction. Petitioner’s stance
that the insufficiency of physical evidence inevitably leads to
acquittal is flawed, as we have, on several occasions, sustained
convictions based on purely testimonial evidence. In the same
manner, guilt beyond reasonable doubt may be produced by the
amalgamation of certain physical and testimonial evidence which,
when taken separately, would have been insufficient to sustain a
conviction.
Whether the autopsied body was that of Godofredo Ariate
Petitioner claims that a most sedulous reading of Dr. Lagat’s
testimony engenders reasonable doubt since it shows that he
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 12
himself was uncertain and incompetent to prove that the body he
autopsied was that of Godofredo Ariate. He allegedly admitted that
he had no personal knowledge of who signed the Request for
Autopsy11 and the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body, 12 and
that no relative of Godofredo was around to identify the body
during autopsy.
Petitioner further argues that the following facts on record
engender reasonable doubt that it was Godofredo Ariate’s body that
was autopsied:
1. Dr. Lagat testified that apart from him, only the embalmer
was around during the autopsy. But there was no showing
whatsoever that the said embalmer knew Godofredo Ariate
personally;
2. The prosecution rested its case without presenting any
representative of the funeral parlor and/or any friend or
relative of Godofredo Ariate, including Godofredo’s son,
William Ariate, to properly identify on the said Request for
Autopsy and Certificate of Identification of Dead Body.
The pertinent portions of Dr. Lagat’s testimony, cited by petitioner,
are as follows:
Q When you do conducted medico legal examinations they
are always predicated on written request either by the
police agency or any particular person interested, isn’t it?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that request is always in writing?
A Yes, sir.
Q Among that, precisely, is your Exhibit "A" where it appears
that a certain Eduardo Ariate signed. I’m showing to you.
A This is the request I received.
xxxx
 Q And of course, since you did not prepare this it was only
referred to you, you do not know actually the signature
appearing there?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You did not see him signed (sic)?
A Yes, sir.
Q And of course, too, the specimen submitted, since you did
not prepare it, you merely rely [on] what appears here?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, even the date and place of the alleged incident
you don’t have personal knowledge, of course?
A Yes, sir.
Q With respect to Certificate of Identification of Dead Body,
do counsel understand that this is also prepared by Veronica
Funeral Parlor?
A Yes, sir.
Q So like Exhibit "B", this could properly be testified to and
authenticated by the personnel of Veronica Funeral Parlor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Again, there’s nothing here which indicate that this is
officially numbered or marked by your office?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Is it not a fact that documents of this, I’m sure have serial
number?
A For the request and the Certificate of Identification of
Dead Body that was prepared by the funeral parlor
accredited by the NBI, we don’t usually put any identified
number.
Q You again rely on everything stated here, in fact, you
cannot tell whose signature appears here?
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 13
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not, like Exhibits "A" and "B", authenticate these
after your examination, in other words, you did not initialed
(sic)?
A Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q And of course, at the time you initially conducted
whatever examination you are required under the law,
nobody, not even the person who allegedly identified the
body was there, to identify it to you?
A I was not aware if the person identified is another one.
Q And you did not required who identified?
A It was relayed to me that it was the son.
Q According to whom?
A The agent of the funeral parlor. That is according to the
request and Certificate of Dead Body.
Q And that agent of the funeral parlor, may we know, if you
come to know the name?
A I cannot remember the funeral agent during that time.
Q Even up to now you did not try to verify?
A Yes, sir.13
According to the Court of Appeals, the records clearly show
that the body autopsied and referred to in the autopsy
report of Dr. Ludovino Lagat of the NBI was no other than
that of Godofredo Ariate. The body submitted for autopsy
was identified by Godofredo’s son, Edgardo. 14 Pictures of
Godofredo’s body, taken by Armando Mancera during the
autopsy, likewise establish the identity of the victim.
Moreover, the entries found in the assailed Autopsy Report
should be deemed prima facie evidence of the facts stated
 therein, as there had been no proof of any intent on the
part of Dr. Lagat to falsely testify on the identity of the
victim’s body.15
We do not find any convincing reason to depart from the
findings of the Court of Appeals. The presentation in
evidence of the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body,16
the latter being a public record made in the performance of
a duty of officers in the Medico-Legal Office of the National
Bureau of Investigation, is governed by Rule 132, Sections 19
and 23 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of
their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a
notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of
private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
All other writings are private.
xxxx
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.—Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 14
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third
person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter.
Thus, entries in the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body are
deemed prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, i.e., that a
body has been properly identified as that of Godofredo Ariate. This
prima facie evidence of identification cannot be rebutted by an
extremely meticulous fault-finding inquiry into the chain of custody
of the body of the victim, as such body cannot be easily replaced or
substituted by ill-minded persons. What petitioner is asking of us is
not to be sedulous anymore, but to be paranoid and unreasonably
mistrustful of the persons whom our very rules require us to trust.
Petitioner’s criticism of the identification of the body of the victim
miserably fails to inject any reasonable doubt in our minds, not
when petitioner is even loath to say that the body autopsied was
not that of Godofredo Ariate but that of some other person.
We must stress at this point that there was no indication of any
impropriety or irregularity committed by the medico-legal officer in
this case with respect to the autopsy on the body of the late
Godofredo Ariate. Dr. Lagat’s duty was to perform the autopsy and
not to obsessively investigate the authenticity of the signature
appearing on all requests presented to him. Thus, Dr. Lagat, as a
medico-legal officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties.
Whether petitioner fired the bullet that caused the death of
Godofredo Ariate
On petitioner’s argument that the slug recovered from the victim’s
body did not come from the second but from the third wound of
Godofredo, the Court of Appeals presented its observation that both
the second and the third wounds sustained by Godofredo were
fatal, as both involved vital organs such as the intestines and the
liver.17 Either wound, thus, could have caused the death of the
victim.
Petitioner argues that this is "pure and simple speculation," for
"there is nothing on record that wound number three, despite
affecting the intestines and liver, could have caused death." 18
Petitioner also presented the following related testimonies:
(1) Dr. Lagat admitted uncertainty on the following:
a. Which of the 3 wounds was inflicted first and
which caused [the] death;
b. Whether said wounds were caused by 3 weapons,
or just by the same gun; and
c. The caliber of the gun[s] that may have been
used; these cannot be determined based solely on
the appearance or nature of said wounds;
(2) SPO3 Danico Unico’s testimony that the Scene of the
Crime Operatives (SOCO) also recovered another slug at the
scene of the crime, which was brought to the SPD
headquarters for ballistic examination, but he was never
informed of the test result;
(3) Rodolfo Alumbres’ written statement that he saw not
only petitioner, but also Eduardo Jimeno and Edison
Madriago, shooting at Godofredo; and
(4) The following testimony of NBI Ballistician Rodolfo
Bilgera, to wit:
a. The [ballisticians] could not determine what
particular .45 gun the slug in question came from
until said gun is examined and compared with the
slug.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 15
b. Whether they were caused by three weapons, or
by the same gun;
c. The caliber of the guns used, which cannot be
determined based solely on the appearance or
nature of the wounds.19
On the issue of whether the slug that was recovered from the
victim’s body came from the .45 caliber firearm of petitioner, the
Court of Appeals reiterated the observation of the RTC that the
ballistics examination of the subject slug revealed a diameter and a
set of riflings which were peculiar to a .45 caliber pistol. 20 Petitioner
was admittedly the only one holding a .45 caliber gun at the time of
the incident. His two companions, Madriago and Jimeno, were each
armed with a 9mm firearm, while Arce was holding a .38 caliber
revolver. Furthermore, Godofredo had a heated argument before
Godofredo was shot. Thus, it was petitioner who had the motive to
kill Godofredo.
Petitioner notes that Dr. Lagat himself refused to confirm that the
slug he recovered was the same slug submitted for examination. His
testimony reads:
Atty. Ferancullo
Q You stated doctor, that you referred the slug to the
Ballistics Division of the NBI and you handed and identified
Exhibit "G," (later changed to Exh. "Y"), my question Doctor
is that, do you know whose signature above the name
Ludovino Lagat?
A It was signed for, by Mr. Mansera, in my behalf.
Q Can you explain to us why it was signed for and in your
behalf by Mr. Mancera?
A Because I instructed him to submit the slug to the
ballistician.
 Q Since you were not the one who signed the request, do
you affirm and confirm the veracity of the contents of the
letter, now you handed to this representation?
Atty. Llamas:
He will be incompetent, Your Honor, because he was
not the one who even signed the indorsement.
Court:
What’s the question again?
Sten:
(Reading back question)
Court:
Witness may answer.
Witness:
I cannot tell whether this slug submitted was taken
from the cadaver, Mr. Mansera can testify more on
that.
xxxx
Atty. Llamas to the witness:
Q You sated very categorically that this transmittal of the
slug was made by Man[c]era and that you cannot be sure
whether the slug referred to herein is the same slug taken
from the cadaver, do you re-affirm that answer of yours?
A Yes, Sir.21
According to petitioner, Mansera expressed similar incompetence
and uncertainty in the following testimony:
Q This letter, Mr. witness, refers to one (1) slug, extracted
from the body of one, Godofredo Ariate, what did you do to
that slug?
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 16
A What I did Sir, was I put the slug in the plastic bag and
then put the number in the plastic bag and then brought it
to the Firearm Division, Sir.
Q If that plastic bag containing the case number that you
placed will be shown to you, will you be able to recognize it
Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How about the bullet you placed inside the plastic bag,
will you be able to recognize the same?
A No sir, only if it still contained in the plastic bag, Sir. 22
Petitioner argues that the private prosecutor negligently ended his
examination of Mansera without even trying to show and ask him to
identify the slug inside or outside the plastic bag referred to. As a
result, there was no testimonial confirmation that the slug
recovered during the autopsy was the same slug that was examined
and determined to be the .45 bullet. Without such confirmation
under oath, it was utterly baseless to conclude that the slug in
question came from petitioner’s gun, since it was that of a .45
caliber firearm, which only the accused has.
Petitioner also argues that the attribution solely to petitioner of the
motive to kill was uncalled for. Even though Eduardo Jimeno and
Edison Madriago had no previous quarrel with Godofredo Ariate,
prosecution witness Alumbres himself allegedly stated in his written
statement that he had seen not only petitioner, but also Jimeno and
Madriago, firing at Godofredo Ariate. The probability that Jimeno
and Madriago were the actual killers could not be diminished by the
fact that their guns were 9mm Berretas, since no slug was recovered
from the fatal wound number two.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the family of the victim, William
Ariate in particular who witnessed the shooting, could not have
allowed a situation where the wrong man was being made to
answer for the death of his father. Petitioner counters that
prosecution witness Pio Arce testified that William, after the
shooting, attacked and stabbed, not petitioner, but one of the
policemen who was with petitioner at that time, notwithstanding
that said policemen had no quarrel with his father. 23
In determining the sufficiency of the physical evidence to prove that
petitioner fired a fatal bullet which killed Godofredo Ariate, an
examination of the following findings of Dr. Lagat in Autopsy Report
No. N-99-832 is in order:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Postmortem rigidity, complete, generalized.
Pallor, generalized.
Gunshot Wounds.
1.) ENTRANCE 2.0 x 1.4 cm; oval; inverted edges; abrasions
collar widest at the inferior border; located at the outer
portion of the right arm; 16.0 cm. below the elbow; directed
upward medially; involving the skin and underlying soft
tissues; fracturing the ulna and radius; then making an EXIT
2.0 x 1.5 cm.; irregular in shape; everted edges; located at
the inner aspect of the same arm; 7.0 cm. below the elbow.
2.) ENTRANCE 1.0 x 1.1 cm.; oval; inverted edges; abrasion
collar widest at the inferior border; inverted edges; located
at the right flank (posterior axillary line); 25.0 cm. of the
anterior median line and 108.0 cm. from the right heel;
directed forward, upward and medially; involving the skin
and underlying soft tissues; entering the peritoneal cavity;
involving the intestines and liver; then making an EXIT 2.0 x
2.0 cm.; irregular in shape; everted edges; located at the left
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 17
upper quadrant of the abdomen; 15.0 cm. from the anterior
median line and 117.0 cm. above the left heel.
3.) 0.9 x 1.1 cm.; oval inverted edges; abrasion collar at the
upper portion, located at the epigastric area, 105.50 cm.
from the right heel; directed backward, downward and to
the right; involving the skin and soft tissues; involving the
stomach, liver and intestines, then the slug lodged at the
right gluteal region; 85.0 cm. from the right heel.
Visceral organs – pale.
Hemoperitoneum – 1,200 c.c.
Stomach ½ full of partially digested food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUNSHOT WOUNDS, BODY.
REMARKS: One (1) slug recovered and submitted to
Firearms and Investigation Division for Ballistics
examination.24
Indeed, Dr. Lagat testified that he recovered a slug in wound number
three25 and not in wound number two as stated in the RTC Decision.
However, despite the error committed by the trial court in
describing the location where the slug was recovered, there is no
factual basis for petitioner’s contention that wound number three is
not a fatal wound. As shown above, wound number three involves
the stomach, liver and intestines. 26 While Dr. Lagat did not testify
that wound number three (or wounds number one and two for that
matter) was fatal, we believe that it is safe to conclude that wounds
number two and three were probably fatal, involving as they did
vital parts of the body. This is an example of a circumstantial
evidence, which is distinguished from direct evidence as follows:
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute
without the aid of any inference or presumption; (Lack
 County vs. Neilon, 44 Or. 14, 21, 74 P. 212) while
circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from
which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of a
particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or
probable consequence (State vs. Avery, 113 Mo. 475, 494,
21 S.W. 193; Reynolds Trial Ev., Sec. 4, p. 8)27
While we therefore agree with petitioner that the above physical
evidence does not conclusively prove that petitioner fired the bullet
which killed Godofredo Ariate, we should find out whether the
above circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution can
prove the controverted fact beyond reasonable doubt if considered
together with other evidence presented. Thus, Section 4, Rule 133
of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.—
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While we shall deal with the credibility of the witnesses later, it is
important to note at this point that Alumbres testified that it was
petitioner who fired first. According to Alumbres, he was four-arms
length away from Godofredo Ariate who was then face to face with
petitioner. Alumbres saw Godofredo Ariate arguing with petitioner,
when suddenly, petitioner cocked his gun and shot Godofredo at
pointblank range.28
Connecting this testimony to the autopsy report, we observe that it
was wound number three that was inflicted frontally. The entry
point of gunshot wound number three is the area midway along the
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 18
lower portion of the chest and the upper area of the stomach
directed downwards. On the other hand, wound number two
entered into the right flank (posterior auxiliary line) and exited at
the left upper quadrant of the abdomen. The prosecution posits that
this may have been the next shot that hit Godofredo, and the
impact must have occurred while body twisted toward the left after
receiving wound number three. The prosecution thinks that wound
number one may have been the third gunshot wound. It is the one
located at the outer portion of the right arm below the elbow and
may have been inflicted while Godofredo was falling face down
because the entry wound was 16 centimeters below the elbow and
it exited higher at only seven centimeters below the elbow. While
the trajectory of the bullet was upward from the lower portion of
the arm below the elbow, it could have been fired downward while
the arm below the elbow was raised in a defensive position.
While there is some doubt as to which between wounds number
one and two was the second wound inflicted and which of them was
the third, the position (the area midway along the lower portion of
the chest and the upper area of the stomach directed downwards)
of wound number three (where the .45 bullet was found) is
perfectly compatible with Alumbres’ testimony on petitioner’s first
shot against Godofredo Ariate, which first shot was fired at
pointblank range. It also makes the version of petitioner (that he
accidentally fired the gun upwards) very unlikely.
The uncertainty of Dr. Lagat as to whether the above wounds were
caused by three weapons or by just one weapon and as to the
caliber of the firearms used does not in any way make us doubt his
statements. Dr. Lagat is not competent to answer questions on such
area, as his expertise is in the field of medical ballistics which Dr.
Lagat stated "pertains to the injury sustained by the victim." 29 Dr.
Lagat further explained that it is the job of the ballistician to
determine the nature and caliber of the firearm and ammunition
used in the shooting.30
Likewise unavailing is petitioner’s anticipation that reasonable doubt
would come from the statement of SPO3 Danilo Unico (that there
was another slug recovered at the crime scene which was brought
to the Southern Police District Headquarters for ballistic
examination, the results of which was allegedly never revealed to
him). SPO3 Unico is to be blamed for the fact that the results were
never revealed to him. This is shown by the following lapses that
SPO3 Unico committed: (1) the investigation report dated 12 August
1999 that he prepared, signed and thereafter submitted to the Chief
of Police of the Pasay City Police Office31 never mentioned the fact
that he had allegedly recovered evidence at the crime scene and
submitted the same for ballistic examination; (2) SPO3 Unico never
showed in court any document purporting that he recovered any
bullet slug; (3) SPO3 Unico did not present in court any written
request for ballistic examination; (4) despite being a seasoned
investigator, SPO3 Unico did not even bother to follow up the results
of the alleged ballistic examination:
Q Was a ballistic examination conducted?
A Yes, your honor.
Q What was the result?
A It is not yet –
Q You did not bother to get a result before turning over your
case to the prosecution? Or filing a referral letter to the
prosecutor’s office? You think you have completely turn over
your case to the prosecutor’s office?
A: Since nobody told me to prepare a report. Anyway, I can
get a result, your Honor.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 19
Q: You should have done that before filing a letter of referral
to the prosecutor’s office. Because the prosecutor can only
be as good as the possessors of evidence turned over to
him. He cannot more foolish than the – he cannot add more
ingredients of what was turned over to him. The prosecutor
is only make good of what is turned over to him. If the
police submit to him a handwash then he have a handwash
to a case x x x.32
Petitioner stresses that Alumbres had testified that he saw
petitioner, PO3 Jimeno and PO3 Madriaga shooting at the victim.
However, during the same cross-examination, Alumbres
categorically stated that the first shot came from petitioner as he
fired at Godofredo Ariate at pointblank range. Hence, he testified:
Q And since the firing was so sudden, you cannot tell whose
gun or whose shot fired first at Ariate?
A The first shot came from Romeo Suerte’s gun.
Q That is how you surmised it?
A That’s what I know, sir.33
Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in holding that the slug
came from petitioner’s gun in light of the purported testimony of
Rodolfo Bilgera that he cannot determine that the particular .45 slug
came from petitioner’s gun. However, the records are clear that the
reason why Bilgera was never able to compare the slug in question is
that petitioner never turned over his gun to the NBI’s Firearms and
Investigation Division (FID). Thus, Rodolfo Bilgera testified that the
gun was never submitted to the FID for ballistic examination. Bilgera
had to compare the rifling of the .45 caliber slug recovered from the
body of Godofredo Ariate with the rifling that petitioner’s .45 caliber
handgun makes.34 Without petitioner’s gun, the ballistician cannot
make such a comparison. The ballistician can only determine the
caliber of the firearm used based on rifling of the recovered bullet
slug.35 Bilgera cannot determine that the slug recovered came from
appellant’s handgun.
Petitioner claims that his failure to produce the gun was not an
excuse, as Bilgera could have looked into the FID’s records for
comparison purposes, but did not did not make any effort to look
into their office records for any .45 caliber slug that would match the
.45 caliber slug recovered from Godofredo Ariate’s body. However,
Bilgera testified that he cannot definitely rely on such records. A
ballistician can make a definite conclusion only after the firearm is
submitted for the ballistic examinations.36
As regards the loss of the petitioner’s gun, petitioner explains the
same in the part of the testimony where he also admits that his gun
was a .45 caliber pistol:
ATTY. FERANCULLO
Q: For clarification, the gun that you had at that time when
the incident occur is a .45 caliber pistol, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: This .45 caliber handgun of yours, if this license to your
name, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The Serial Number of this .45 caliber is 91139 and this is a
.45 caliber Nurinco?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you bring it with you now that .45 caliber, Mr.
Witness?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why did you not bring it now, Mr. Witness?
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 20
A: The gun was missing when I fell down and lost my
consciousness.
Q: Are you certain, Mr. Witness, with your answer that the
firearm, that the .45 caliber gun of yours is missing and that
you did not sell it?
A: I cannot recall anything when I fell down I do not know
what happened so, I do not know whether it was missing or
it was sold.
Q: You did not sell it?
A: No sir, I did not sell it because it was missing.
Q: Did you execute an Affidavit of Loss to the effect that
your gun was missing?
A: No, sir, because I was in the hospital that’s why I have no
time to declare the loss of my firearm, what I know is that
its missing.
Q: So up to now, you have not executed an Affidavit of Loss,
have it forwarded to the Firearms and Explosives Division of
the PNP?
A: No, not yet.37
While Bilgera could not determine that the particular .45 slug came
from petitioner’s gun, Bilgera was certain that the slug recovered
and examined was a slug coming from a .45 caliber gun. This is
shown in Bilgera’s testimony:
ATTY. FERANCULLO
Q: Mr. Witness, Mr. Flores stated in this report, marked as
Exhibit "W", Findings/Conclusion which I quote:
"Examination made on the bullet marked as "GA", revealed
that it is a caliber .45 copper coated with bullet and was
fired through the barrel of a caliber .45 firearm which rifling
inclining to the left." How did your group, five ballisticians of
 the NBI, arrived at the conclusion that the bullet referred to
FID for examination by Dr. Lagat was fired from a caliber .45
firearm?
A: Because this bullet was designed from a .45 caliber
firearm.38
Petitioner himself admitted owning a .45 caliber pistol that was
allegedly lost at the time of the shooting. At the time of the
shooting, only petitioner was observed carrying a loaded .45 caliber
pistol.
Finally, just as petitioner questioned the chain of custody of the
body of Godofredo Ariate, petitioner also claims that there is no
convincing evidence that shows that the slug recovered from wound
number three by Dr. Lagat and thereafter submitted for ballistic test
was the same slug submitted to and examined by Bilgera.
As stated above, it is not the task of the medico-legal officer to
determine the caliber of the weapon used in the shooting; it is the
job of the ballistician based on the slug that was recovered from the
body of the victim. After Dr. Lagat recovered the slug while
performing the autopsy of the late Godofredo Ariate, he instructed
Armando Mancera to place the recovered slug inside a plastic sachet
and to mark the sachet. Armando Mancera followed Dr. Lagat’s
instructions by placing the slug inside the sachet and marking said
plastic sachet with the initials N-99-832. 39 Mancera and Dr. Lagat
thereafter prepared the letter-request dated 12 July 1999 for the
recovered slug to be submitted to the FID of the NBI to undergo a
ballistic examination.40 The contents of said letter are as follows:
TO: F.I.D.
Respectfully submitted the ff: (1) one slug extracted
from the body of one GODOFREDO ARIARTE y de
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 21
Ocampo, 57 yrs., married, carpenter, Res. # 39 Bo.
Bayanihan Onex St., Maricaban, Pasay City.
CASE NO: N-99-832
Alleged Case: Shooting
For analysis and/or test as follows:
For ballistic examination.
Mancera later on testified regarding the circumstances surrounding
the recovery and marking of the recovered slug:
ATTY. FERRANCULO
Q: Mr. Witness, when Dr. Ludovino Lagat testified before this
Honorable Court, he identified [a] letter dated July 12, 1999,
addressed to the FID of the NBI and inform the Court that
the signature appearing above his name Ludovino Lagat is
your initial. Will you please examine the document and tell
the Honorable Court whether you will be able to identify the
initial atop the name Ludovino Lagat?
A: My signature, Sir.
Q: And how about the signature beside the name Ludovino
Lagat and atop the name Armando Mancera, do you know
whose signature is that?
A: My signature, Sir.
Q: Mr. Witness, please explain to the Honorable Court the
reason why instead of Dr. Lagat affixing his signature atop
his name, your initial is the one now appearing atop his
name?
A: Because after the conducted autopsy Sir, Dr. Lagat left Sir,
so I was the one who initialed them sir.
Q: And who prepared this letter, Mr. Witness?
A: Me, Sir.
Q: And who instructed you to prepare this letter?
 A: Dr. Lagat, Sir.
xxxx
Q: This letter, Mr. Witness, refers to one (1) slug, extracted
from the body of one, Godofredo Ariate, what did you do to
that slug?
A: What I did sir, was I put the slug in the plastic bag and
then put the number in the plastic bag and then brought it
to the Firearm Division, Sir.
Q: If that plastic bag containing the case number that you
placed will be shown to you, will you be able to recognize it,
Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the bullet you placed inside the plastic bag,
will you be able to recognize the same again?
A: No sir, only if it still contained in the plastic bag, Sir.
Q: Mr. Witness, I’m showing to you a plastic bag containing
markings N-99-832 previously marked in evidence as Exhibit
"X-1", will you please examine this plastic bag and tell the
Honorable Court the relationship of this plastic bag you said
you placed the markings, the case number?
A: This is the one, Sir.
xxxx
Q: Mr. Witness, this letter you typed is addressed to FID,
what is your proof that this letter was received by the FID?
A: There is a stamp received, Sir.41
The above clearly shows that per instruction of Dr. Lagat, Armando
Mancera placed an identifying mark (N-99-832) on the sachet where
the slug was placed before he sent the slug to the FID of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for ballistic examination.
Through said marking, Mancera positively identified during the trial
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 22
that the slug he had brought to the NBI for ballistic examination was
the same slug that was recovered by Dr. Lagat from the body of
Godofredo Ariarte.
Testimonial Evidence
The Court of Appeals observed that the remaining assigned errors
boiled down to the issue of credibility of the witnesses presented in
court. The Court of Appeals applied the settled rule that factual
findings of the trial court especially on the credibility of witnesses
are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal inasmuch as the matter of assigning values to the
testimonies of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial
court, which can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness’
demeanor, conduct and attitude during the trial.
Petitioner challenges said ruling by claiming that this case falls under
at least one of the exceptions where a review of the factual findings
of the trial court is warranted.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of the defense
witnesses is as follows:
For his defense, the accused cannot seem to make up
whether to interpose self-defense, or to altogether deny any
participation in the shooting to death of Godofredo Ariate.
He is loath to say that he shot Ariate accidentally, yet, his
testimony is also abundant with overtures that if he did shot
Ariate, it was purely accidental. Consequently, the testimony
of the accused is as confused as it is unbelievable.
Accused alleges that Godofredo Ariate and Rodolfo
Alumbres together with about eight people walked up to
him and repeatedly stabbed him on his back; Pio Arce
followed by shooting him. Armed with a 45 cal. pistol as he
was, accused admitted having drawn it from his waistline.
 Having thus drawn the gun, one reasonably expects that
accused will fire his gun at his supposed attackers in
legitimate retaliation and self-preservation. But that is not
so. After being stabbed and shot, he would have this court
believe that he drew his gun and fired it – not at anybody –
but only as a warning shot.
For this court, that act of the accused is unbelievable. But
the accused has an altogether different concern. He thought
the act of deliberately firing his gun under this life-and-
death situation that he has conjured would place him in bad
light. So, he made an abrupt turn-around and say things that
he hoped would place him in good light. Thus, he alleges
that he merely "accidentally pulled the trigger and fired his
gun upwards"; he had "no intention of firing it", "there was
no instance that he pointed his gun at any of his attackers".
Yet, in no time at all, accused negated his own protestation
as a passive prey when he asseverated that "he drew his gun
for self-defense". The court wonders how he could draw the
gun and use it in self-defense if he intends to fire only a
warning shot, or, maybe, a shot in the air. How could he
prevent his attackers from further attacking him if he simply
draws his gun and but not aim it at any of them, or if he was
content with merely drawing his gun without intention of
firing it or pulling its trigger? The court is not persuaded by
such an unnatural and abnormal human conduct. The court
is inclined to believe what is natural, normal and consistent
with the common experience of humankind. The accused
did not only draw his gun, nor did he accidentally pull its
trigger and fire it upwards. While Alumbres and Arce cannot
be believed in other aspects of their testimony, the court is
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 23
fully convinced with their positive identification of the
accused as the killer of Godofredo Ariate.
Danilo Villa, the lone witness accused called to corroborate
his mongrelized defense theory of denial/self-
defense/accident, carries the earmarks of a planted witness.
He said he witnessed the incident when the accused – his
"Pareng Romy" – was repeatedly stabbed and shot on July
11, 1999. After July 11, 1999, he always sees the accused in
the afternoons and evenings and engages in a conversation
with him. Strangely, never did he mention to his "Pareng
Romy" what he witnessed nor did the accused ask him if he
witnessed the incident. Stranger even is the fact that of the
many meetings he had with the accused, never did they
discuss about the bloody incident of July 11.
Then, all of a sudden, a week before he testified in court on
October 4, 2001 – and for the first time – accused requested
him to testify in the accused’s defense. And that, too, was
the first time he learned that the accused was charged for
the death of Godofredo Ariate.
If the accused is a friend to Villa as the latter would like to
impress upon this court, it is normal human conduct for Villa
to share with the accused in the many conversations they
had what he witnessed. The accused for his part, will just be
too happy to find in Villa not just a friend, but someone who
sees the July 11 incident the way he wants this court to see
it: that he is either completely innocent, or that he shot
Ariate in legitimate self-defense, or that his shooting of
Ariate was pure accident. Then he could have, with anxious
anticipation of justice being done, preserved the testimony
 of Villa, and utilize it as early as the preliminary investigation
stage of this case. But the accused did not.
That Villa didn’t say a word to the accused about the July 11
incident and the accused never cared to illicit from Villa any
knowledge he may have about said incident, only shows
that Villa knows nothing of his own personal knowledge
about it.42
Petitioner claims that his testimony was not at all "confused" or
"unbelievable," but was simply either misunderstood or taken out of
context. He claims that "far from being ‘mongrelized’ (his) claim of
self-defense, accident and lack of participation is a factual
admixture, the components of which, taken singly or jointly, are
clear and credible."
According to petitioner, when he said he drew his gun for self-
defense, he never claimed that he was able to effectively proceed to
defend himself with his gun. Quoting his testimony, petitioner
clarified that what he stated was that he was "not able to fire a
warning shot" and had "no chance to aim (his) gun" because after
drawing his gun and trying to aim it, he "accidentally pulled the
trigger and fired upwards," not only because he was "so weak and
about to faint" but also because "somebody suddenly stabbed (him)
at (his) back." Petitioner argues that his testimony cannot be
doubted, for it is undisputed that he suffered wounds at the front,
side and back of his body, including his legs and the lower part of his
stomach.
Petitioner claims that contrary to the trial court’s observation, he
intended to aim and shoot the gun directly at his attackers. He was,
however, not able to have a decent shot because of the frenzy of the
moment and the numerous wounds he sustained. Thus, petitioner
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 24
claims it was baseless and irresponsible for the trial court to say that
he had no intention of firing his gun.
Petitioner also claims that the judge was biased, based on the fact
that out of the 256 questions asked of the petitioner, the trial judge
propounded 84 questions or around one-third of the total; while of
the 188 questions thrown to defense eyewitness Danilo Villa, 107
questions or almost three-fifths of the total came from the trial
judge.
As regards the testimony of Danilo Villa, petitioner claims that the
trial court’s rejection of his testimony "just because Villa failed to
report what he saw to the authorities until the week he testified in
court" is capricious and injudicious. Petitioner claims that Villa had
sufficiently explained his silence in testifying that (1) fear had
prevented him from reporting to the authorities, and that (2) lack of
knowledge of the ongoing prosecution prevented him from telling
petitioner what he knows.
As regards the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, petitioner
found the trial court’s giving credence to the same as "anomalous,"
since, according to petitioner, "the trial court itself lambasted
Alumbres and Arce and their respective testimonies." Petitioner
quoted several parts of the trial court’s Decision on its criticisms of
these testimonies:
(1) "there are loose ends in the(ir) testimony";
(2) "as dramatis personae of this bloody human drama, they
will try mighty hard to free themselves from any blame and
portray themselves in the best possible light they can
conjure"; and
(3) "they leave something to be desired in their effort to
project themselves as innocent babes and level-headed
guardians of peace"43
Petitioner claims that the testimonies of Alumbres and Arce are full
of exaggerations, falsehoods and inconsistencies. On the part of
Alumbres, petitioner alleges that:
(1) When asked about his work, he claimed he is a "laborer."
But to justify his presence at the scene of the incident that
night of 11 July 1999, he hastened to add that he is a
"tanod" of Brgy. 180. However, the incident happened in
Brgy. 185, where petitioner resides, and not Brgy. 180,
where he and Arce had jurisdiction;
(2) Alumbres claimed that he was standing beside an alley in
Brgy. 180 when he "saw" his "friend" Godofredo talking with
petitioner who was with policemen Jimeno and Madriago,
and that as he looked again, he "saw" petitioner and even
Jimeno and Madriago firing at Godofredo. On cross-
examination, however, he admitted not seeing the alleged
shooting, but merely hearing gunshots (putukan), so
"inalam niya", that is, he "came near to check who was the
gun holder." With this admission, he belied his earlier claim
that he saw Godofredo talking with petitioner and the
petitioner shooting at Godofredo;
(3) Alumbres claimed that he saw Godofredo and petitioner
talking, but did not hear their conversation. He later claimed
that he heard their conversation, but did not know if they
were quarreling. Then in the end of his examination, he
admitted having heard the conversation between
Godofredo and petitioner before the shooting and it was
about Raymond, a mentally retarded boy whom petitioner
earlier protected by stopping Godofredo’s maltreatment of
him;
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 25
(4) Alumbres at first said that he saw only the petitioner
shooting at Godofredo, then he changed his mind and said
that he saw not only petitioner, but also Jimeno and
Madriago firing at Godofredo;
(5) Alumbres described appellant as his "long time
acquaintance", but he later contradicted himself by saying
that petitioner may not know him, and that after the
shooting, he had to ask around about petitioner’s work;
(6) Alumbres called Jimeno and Madriago as petitioner’s
policemen "alalay," but it turned out that Jimeno and
Madriago were not petitioner’s "alalay" but co-employees at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and that Alumbres
did not even know their names at the time of the incident;
(7) When shown a sketch of the scene of the accident, he
immediately claimed inability to see because "malabo and
mata ko", but he in no time proceeded to recognize,
described and even helped mark certain places indicated in
the sketch;
(8) He belied his claim of weak eyesight when he boldly
claimed having seen the bullets of the policemen that were
meant for him hit the wall of a house.
(9) Alumbres also stressed that three (3) shots were fired at
him: the first shot came from petitioner and (h)it him, while
the second and third shots, which came from Jimeno and
Madriago, hit the wall of a house. Later, he stated that four
(4) shots were fired at him: "Romeo (petitioner) fired his gun
twice, the two policemen, one each", and petitioner’s first
shot missed him, but his second shot hit his right leg. 44
Petitioner claims that Pio Arce’s contradictions are as follows:
 (1) When asked if he remembered anything unusual that
happened that night of 11 July 1999, he readily said that
there was none. Then he changed his mind by saying that
William Ariate told him that his father Godofredo was
having a quarrel, but petitioner triggered an exchange of
fire, wherein he saw petitioner shooting Godofredo and
Alumbres.
(2) Arce denied any knowledge of petitioner being attacked
and wounded.45
Petitioner also claims that Arce’s and Alumbres’ testimonies
contradict each other:
(1) According to Alumbres, petitioner had already shot him
and Godofredo when Arce arrived. But Arce contradicted
Alumbres, saying that when he arrived at the scene he saw
petitioner loudly quarreling yet with Godofredo, and so he
talked to petitioner but petitioner fired at him, and then he
saw petitioner firing at Godofredo and later at Alumbres;
(2) Alumbres claimed that when Arce arrived, the latter
shouted "Romy, tama na yan, bagsak na yang dalawa". On
the other hand, Arce claimed to have shouted only the
following "Romy, ayusin na lang natin ito.";
(3) Alumbres claimed that when Arce arrives, the latter fired
a warning shot. But Arce never claimed he fired any warning
shot;
(4) Alumbres claimed that Arce brought him and Godofredo
to the hospital. But Arce claimed that he merely shouted for
people to bring Godofredo and Alumbres to the hospital
then he left the scene immediately; and
(5) Alumbres claimed (though he later made a modification)
that before the shooting, he saw/heard appellant and
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 26
Godofredo merely talking, but he did not know if they were
quarreling as he was about three full arms length away. On
the other hand, Arce claimed that as soon as he arrived he
saw petitioner loudly arguing with Godofredo. 46
Petitioner finally decries the "deafening silence" of Alumbres and
Arce on the established fact that it was petitioner who was attacked
and, hence, had many wounds. Alumbres never mentioned any
stabbing; he knew only the gunshot wound petitioner sustained. In
the case of Arce, he never saw any stabbing attack on petitioner.
The credibility of the witnesses of the defense and the prosecution
We have held that the trial judge is the best and the most
competent person who can weigh and evaluate the testimonies of
witnesses.47 Likewise, the trial court is in the best position to assess
the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanor,
conduct and attitude on the witness stand. 48
Hence, other than the reasons expressly stated by the trial court in
its Decision, the witnesses’ demeanor, conduct and attitude on the
witness stand were also taken in account by the court. This is
particularly relevant in cases such as this, where different
interpretations can be had of the same set of testimonies. Indeed, if
petitioner’s testimony is interpreted the way he explains it now
before us, his story can be adjudged consistent.
But whether the trial court believes what petitioner says is another
thing. For example, it is indeed possible that petitioner just
happened to meet and greet Jimeno (who denied 49 knowing
petitioner) and Madriago, who were both armed, while going home,
and just as they were about to be accosted by the group of
Godofredo. It is possible that petitioner indeed lost his gun at the
time of the incident and merely refrained from reporting its loss
even after he was discharged from the hospital. For Villa’s part, its is
also possible that he only informed petitioner of what he knew in
the week of his testimony, because he only came to know of the
homicide charge in the same week. But it is not enough for
petitioner to show that these were all possible; he must likewise
convince the Court that these were what indeed happened,
particularly in this case where testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were found credible. Petitioner’s claims that he and Villa
"adequately explained" certain lapses, or that their testimonies
were "believable" are but a self-serving evaluation of the
testimonies of his own witnesses.
In the same way, the physical evidence consisting of the injuries
suffered by petitioner does not necessarily convert the "mongrelized
claim of self-defense, accident and lack of participation" into one of
a "factual admixture" brought about by petitioner’s state of mind
when he drew and fired his gun. The wounds could have been
inflicted after petitioner shot Godofredo, a factual scenario
rendered probable by the physical evidence consisting of the
position of Godofredo’s wound number three. As discussed earlier,
the entry point of Godofredo’s wound number three, which was
probably the first wound inflicted, was the area midway along the
lower portion of the chest and the upper area of the stomach
directed downwards. It is likely that this was inflicted at pointblank
range by someone not "so weak and about to faint."
We are not naïve to feign ignorance that both sets of witnesses –
those of the prosecution and the defense – have something to hide.
There was something more to the incident than either group is
letting us on. That was why the trial court stated that there were
loose ends in the prosecution’s testimony, and that they "will try
mightily hard to free themselves from any blame and portray
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 27
themselves in the best possible light they can conjure." Thus, a lot of
unanswered questions remain, including the number of wounds
inflicted on petitioner and Godofredo, and the injury of Alumbres.
Just as Alumbres and Arce were silent on the wounds sustained by
petitioner, defense witnesses likewise had nothing to say on the
wounds of Godofredo and Alumbres. However, despite these
unanswered questions, we agree with the trial court that the
prosecution had been "forthright and consistently credible in
positively identifying the accused as the one who shot Godofredo
Ariate to death."
As regards the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of
Alumbres and Arce, we find these "inconsistencies" either trivial or
readily explainable. Those alleged inconsistencies that can easily be
explained are the following:
(1) There is clearly no inconsistency in Alumbres’ claims that
he was a laborer and that, at the same time, he is a tanod.
Petitioner did not pursue the subject or offer any evidence
that would show that Alumbres was lying. As a tanod, it is
not incredible for Alumbres to be within an area adjacent to
his jurisdiction;
(2) On the observation that Alumbres earlier claimed that he
saw petitioner shoot Godofredo, but later claimed that he
heard a gunshot that made him look to determine who fired
the same, it is quite possible that it was the first shot that
made him look back at petitioner and Godofredo just in
time to see the rest of the first shots fired by petitioner at
Godofredo. Being merely three arms away from the firing, it
is not unlikely that, after his eyes wandered for a brief
moment, he does not even have to twist his head to another
 direction to be able to look back at petitioner and
Godofredo, thus seeing even the very first shot fired;
(3) On the claim that Alumbres at first said that he saw only
the petitioner shooting at Godofredo, then changed his
mind and said that he also saw Jimeno and Madriago firing
at Godofredo, Alumbres had clarified that it was Godofredo
who fired the first shot. This was what he was referring to
the first time it was asked;
(4) Alumbres’ asking around about petitioner’s work is not
at all incompatible with considering petitioner an
acquaintance. It is not unlikely for persons to have
acquaintances whose work they do not know;
(5) On calling Jimeno and Madriago as petitioner’s "alalay,"
Alumbres was merely describing how Jimeno and Mardriago
appeared to be at that time. Not knowing the names of
Jimeno and Madriago at the time of the incident is not
inconsistent with any of Alumbres’ statements.
(6) When Alumbres said "malabo and mata ko," Alumbres
was clearly referring to a problem concerning reading near
objects, as shown in the second day of cross-examinations
when he failed to read small letters on the map presented
to him, saying it is blurred. 50 When Alumbres said "malabo
ang mata ko" during the first day of cross-examination,51
Alumbres did not refrain from answering the question
regarding the exhibit and even helped mark certain places
indicated in the sketch, probably after adjusting his view.
This shows that his statement "Malabo ang mata ko" was
not intended to let him escape a line of questioning, as
petitioner implies. This thus likewise debunks petitioner’s
claim that Alumbres belied his claim of weak eyesight when
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 28
he boldly claimed having seen the bullets of the policemen
that were meant for him hit the wall of a house.
(7) The differing accounts on how much Alumbres heard of
the exchange between Godofredo and petitioner before the
shooting, as opposed to what he found out later; what Pio
Arce said when he arrived, and how many shots were fired,
are trivial and can easily be forgotten.
(8) When Pio Arce said that he did not remember anything
unusual on the night of 11 July 1999, he was clearly
referring to the time before the incident. Otherwise, he
would not have been testifying at all!
(9) The failure of Alumbres to notice when Arce arrived at
the scene of the crime is quite understandable, considering
the events that were already transpiring.
We have held that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on
minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the
substance of their declarations, their veracity, or the weight of their
testimonies; slight contradictions in fact serve to strengthen the
sincerity of a witness and prove that his testimony is not
rehearsed.52 It is settled that so long as the witnesses’ testimonies
concur on substantial matters, the inconsistencies and
contradictions do not affect the witnesses’ credibility or the verity of
their testimonies.53
All things considered, there is nothing to indicate that both
Alumbres and Arce deviated from the gist of their testimonies, i.e.,
that both of them saw petitioner gun down Godofredo Ariate. The
aforesaid alleged contradictory statements are but minor
inconsistencies when a witness is testifying in court, which only
shows that both men witnessed the unfolding of the shooting
incident from different vantage points. The slight divergence in their
testimonies also goes to show that both men were not rehearsed
before they testified at the trial, but testified based on their own
perceptions.
Damages
The trial court ordered petitioner to pay actual damages of
P21,800.00 and indemnity for death in the amount of P50,000.00.
The Court of Appeals affirmed these awards and ordered petitioner
to pay an additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. We
sustain these awards of damages to the heirs of Godofredo Ariate.
The amount of actual damages had been duly proven by receipts. 54
No proof is necessary for the award of civil indemnity for death
other than the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of the
assailant.55 The award of moral damages in cases of violent death is
indeed fixed at P50,000.00 under current case law.56
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 26162 dated 29 December 2005
affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, Branch 117, in Criminal Case No. 00-0182, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Malayan Insurance v Philippine Nails and Wires
Corp., G.R. No. 138084, April 10, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated
September 30, 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
45547, affirming the decision dated December 10, 1993, of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 163, and the
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 29
resolution dated March 25, 1999, of the Court of Appeals denying
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.1
Respondent Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation insured against
all risks its shipment of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued
at P67,156,300 with petitioner Malayan Insurance Company Inc. The
shipment delivered was short by 377.168 metric tons. For this
shortage, respondent claimed insurance for P2,698,637.04,
representing the value of undelivered steel billets, plus customs
duties, taxes and other charges paid by respondent. Petitioner
refused to pay.
On July 28, 1993, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for
sum of money with the RTC of Pasig representing said lost and/or
undelivered cargo. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that it failed to state a cause of action, and that it was filed
in the wrong venue. The motion was denied. It thus filed a petition
for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. This was also denied.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated.
However, it was eventually dismissed by the Court of Appeals, and
its dismissal became final and executory.
On September 8, 1993, respondent filed a motion to admit an
amended complaint which the trial court granted. It sent petitioner
summons and a copy of the complaint on October 13, 1993 and also
gave petitioner until October 31, 1993 to file its answer.
On November 4, 1993, respondent moved to declare petitioner in
default. The trial court granted and allowed the presentation of
evidence ex parte before the branch clerk of court. Respondent
presented its lone witness, Jeanne King.
On November 11, 1993, petitioner filed its answer with compulsory
counterclaim. Upon motion by the respondent, the trial court
expunged from the records the answer for late filing.
On December 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a judgment by
default which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant,
ordering the latter to pay the following:
1. P2,532,926.53 representing the insured value of the lost
and/or not delivered 377.168 metric tons of steel billets plus
legal rate of interest from date of filing of this complaint
until fully paid;
2. Fifteen (15) percent of the amount awarded to plaintiff as
attorney's fees; and
3. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
Respondent moved to execute judgment pending appeal. The trial
court granted the motion. Meanwhile, petitioner filed its notice of
appeal which was given due course.
Pursuant to the grant of the motion for execution, the trial court
issued the corresponding writ. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
implementation of the writ. The Court of Appeals granted the prayer
for the temporary restraining order. The writ of execution was
likewise stayed by the trial court which favorably considered
petitioner's urgent motion to stay execution pending appeal and to
approve the supersedeas bond.
Pursuant to the notice of appeal, the entire records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, where petitioner argued that the
trial court erred in rendering judgment by default notwithstanding
that issues were joined by petitioner's filing of an answer; in
awarding damages to respondent based on unauthenticated
documentary evidence and hearsay; and in admitting documentary
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 30
evidence which is irregular in nature and not in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court and disposed
the case thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no
reversible error committed by the lower court, the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.3
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion nor err when it expunged the answer from the records
because petitioner answered way beyond the prescribed period. It
further held that respondent's witness, Jeanne King, was a
competent witness because she personally prepared the
documentary evidence and had personal knowledge of the
allegations in the complaint. In addition, the appellate court said
that conclusions and findings of fact of the trial courts were entitled
to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for
strong and cogent reasons, which were not present in this case.
Lastly, the absence of a written report by the branch clerk of court
on the ex parte proceedings did not necessarily deny petitioner due
process. Nothing in the Rules of Court stated that the absence of the
commissioner's written report nullified a judgment by default. The
appellate court observed that if there was a defect, such was only
procedural that can be waived. Besides, petitioner was declared in
default because of its own failure to answer within the prescribed
period. It cannot claim denial of due process because it was given
the opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this
petition alleging that the Court of Appeals erred and acted contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence in:
 I. …GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE PURELY HEARSAY
TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT'S SOLE WITNESS.
II. …AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH
WAS BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ADMITTED
WITHOUT BEING PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED.4
For resolution now are the following issues: Was Jeanne King's
testimony hearsay, thus without any probative value? Should
respondent authenticate the documentary evidence it submitted at
the trial?
On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends
that Jeanne King's testimony was hearsay because she had no
personal knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting
respondent's cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice,
packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy.
Petitioner avers that even though King was personally assigned to
handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and Wires
Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated with
personal knowledge of the facts which gave rise to respondent's
cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though she
personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets received
by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the weight
of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that respondent's cause of action is
founded on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting
of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to
prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets
valued at P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets
delivered to and received by the importer, namely the respondent.
Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondent's
importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 31
knowledge of the volume of steel billets being imported, and
therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not
hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.5
However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the
delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not have personal
knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she
prepared the summary of the received steel billets, she based the
summary only on the receipts prepared by other persons. Her
testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no probative
value even if not objected to at the trial.6
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly
authenticate respondent's documentary evidence. Under Section
20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,7 before a private document is admitted
in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who
executed it, the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or
who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the
person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously
confessed execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that
King was none of the aforementioned persons. She merely made the
summary of the weight of steel billets based on the unauthenticated
bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel billets
actually received had no proven real basis, and King's testimony on
this point could not be taken at face value.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in giving
imprimatur to the trial court's ruling with regard to the admission of
documentary evidence submitted by respondent. On this score, we
find petitioner's contention meritorious. Under the rules on
evidence, documents are either public or private. Private documents
are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section
19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.8 Section 209 of the same law, in
turn, provides that before any private document is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either
by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker. Here, respondent's documentary exhibits are private
documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19,
thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before
they can be admitted in evidence. With the exception concerning
the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent
presented no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity.10
Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured
cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum,
we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioner's
liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated September 30, 1998 and its resolution on March 25,
1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, Civil Case No. 63445 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Heirs of Demetria Lacsa v CA, G.R. Nos. 79597-
98, May 20, 1991
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 08397-08398 dated
16 July 1987 affirming with modification the decision of the Regional
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 32
Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, in favor of private respondents,
and its resolution dated 14 August 1987 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
This petition which originated with the Regional Trial Court of
Guagua, Pampanga involves two (2) cases, namely: Civil Case No. G-
1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332.1
Civil Case No. G-1190 is an action for recovery of possession with
damages and preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioners, the
heirs of Demetria Lacsa, against Aurelio Songco and John Doe based
on the principal allegations that petitioners are heirs of deceased
Demetria Lacsa who, during her lifetime, was the owner of a certain
parcel of land consisting partly of a fishpond and partly of
uncultivated open space, located in Bancal, Guagua, Pampanga,
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1038 (11725); that
the principal respondent and his predecessor-in-interest who are
neither co-owners of the land nor tenants thereof, thru stealth,
fraud and other forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or
possessing the fishpond of said parcel of land and caused the open
space therein to be cleared for expanded occupancy thereof, and
refused to vacate the same despite petitioner's demands on them to
vacate.2
Civil Case No. G-1332 is an action also by herein petitioners against
private respondents before the same lower court for cancellation of
title, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction, based on
the allegations that they are the heirs of Demetria Lacsa who was
the owner of the land also involved in Civil Case No. G-1190; that
the herein private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest,
thru stealth, fraud and other forms of machination, succeeded in
occupying or possessing the fishpond of the said parcel of land, and
later abandoned the same but only after the case was filed and after
all the fish were transferred to the adjoining fishpond owned by the
private respondents; that on 31 October 1923 and 15 March 1924,
by presenting to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga certain forged
and absolutely simulated documents, namely: "TRADUCCION AL
CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and
"ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA", respectively, and by means of
false pretenses and misrepresentation, Inocencio Songco, the
private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, succeeded in
transferring the title to said property in his name, to the damage
and prejudice of the petitioners; and that a preliminary injunction
was necessary to prevent the private respondents from disposing of
said property.3
Private respondents denied the material allegations of both
complaints and alleged as special and affirmative defenses,
petitioners' lack of cause of action, for the reason that Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-1038 (11725) was merely a reconstituted
copy issued in April 1983 upon petitioners' expedient claim that the
owner's duplicate copy thereof had been missing when the truth of
the matter was that OCT No. RO-1038 (11725) in the name of
Demetria Lacsa, had long been cancelled and superseded by TCT No.
794 in the name of Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin by virtue of
the document entitled "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA
ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRA-JUDICIAL" entered into by the heirs
of Demetria Lacsa; that the latter TCT was in turn superseded by TCT
No. 929 issued in the name of Inocencio Songco (father of private
respondents) by virtue of a document entitled "ESCRITURA DE
VENTA ABSOLUTA" executed by spouses Juan Limpin and Alberta
Guevarra in favor of said Inocencio Songo.4
Private respondents, in their answer, pleaded a counterclaim against
petitioners based on allegations that the latter headed by Carlito
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 33
Magpayo, by force and intimidation, took possession of a portion of
the fishpond in the land and occupied a hut therein, that at that
time, private respondents had 3,000 bangus fingerlings left in the
fishpond which upon petitioners' harvest thereof left private
respondents deprived and damaged in the amount of P50,000.00
more or less; that such illegal occupancy caused private respondents
to suffer unrealized income and profits, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and serious anxiety which entitled them to actual, moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and P500.00
appearance fee for every hearing.5
On 20 January 1985, the parties assisted by their respective counsel
filed in Civil Case No. G-1332 a joint stipulation of facts, alleging:
1. That on June 9, 1982, the plaintiffs, being heirs of
Demetria Lacsa, filed Civil Case No. 1190;
2. That after the defendants filed their Answer in the said
Civil Case No. G-1190, and learning the land subject of the
two (2) abovementioned cases (sic), said plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended and/or Supplemental
Complaint.
3. That the said motion was denied by the Honorable Court,
hence, said plaintiffs filed Civil Case No. G-1332, the above-
entitled case, with the same cause of action as that of the
proposed Amended and/or Supplemental Complaint;
4. That the evidences of both parties in Civil Case No. G-
1190 and in the above-entitled case are practically and
literally the same;
5. That in view of the foregoing, and in order to avoid
duplicity of action by repeatedly presenting the same act of
evidences and same set of witnesses, the parties mutually
agreed as they hereby agree and stipulate that any and all
 evidences presented under Civil Case No. 1190 shall be
adopted as evidences for both parties in the above-entitled
case, and upon submission for resolution of Civil Case No. G-
1190, the above-entitled case shall likewise be deemed
submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence
presented in the same Civil Case No. G-1190.6
On the basis of this joint stipulation of facts, the lower court held
that:
. . . the fishpond in question was originally owned by
Demetria Lacsa under Original Certificate of Title No. 11725.
After Demetria Lacsa died her two daughters Alberta
Guevarra and Ambrocia Guevarra with their respective
husbands Juan Limpin and Damaso Cabais entered into an
extrajudicial partition of the properties left by Demetria
Lacsa under the document "Traduccion Al Castellano de la
Escritura de Partition Extra-judicial" dated April 7, 1923
(Exhibits "3","3-A" and "3-B") wherein the fishpond in
question was adjudicated to Alberta Guevarra and which
deed was duly registered in the Office of the Registry of
Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the certification of the
Deputy Register of Deeds marked as Exhibit "3-C". Aside
from the "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de
Particion Extrajudicial" written in the Spanish language, the
spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin and the spouses
Ambrosia Guevarra and Damaso Cabais executed on April 7,
1923, another deed of partition in the Pampango dialect
marked as Exhibit "3-D" "wherein the fishpond in question
was adjudicated to Alberta Guevarra. As a consequence,
Original Certificate of Title No. 794 (Exhibit "4") was issued
to spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin. On January
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 34
20, 1924, the spouses Juan Limpin and Alberta Guevarra
sold the fishpond in question to Inocencio Songco under the
deed entitled "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" (Exhibits "7"
and "7-A") which was duly registered in the Office of the
Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the
certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds marked Exhibit
"7-B". As a result of the sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
794 (Exhibit "4") in the name of the spouses Alberta
Guevarra and Juan Limpin was cancelled by the Office of the
Registry of Deeds of Pampanga and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 929 was issued to Inocencio
Songco."7
The lower court thus held that the fishpond in question belongs to
the private respondents, having been inherited by them from their
deceased father Inocencio Songco.8
The dispositive portion of the judgment in favor of private
respondents reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
In Civil Case No. G - 1190
(A) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No.
G-1190;
In Civil Case No. G-1332
(B) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No.
G-1332;
In Both Civil Case No. G-1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332
(C) Ordering the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title
No. RO-1038 (11725) in the name of Demetria Lacsa;
(D) Ordering the plaintiffs to restore possession of the
fishpond in question located in Bancal, Guagua, Pampanga,
to the defendants (sic);
 (E) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the
defendants the sum of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for moral damages;
(F) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the
defendants the sum of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for exemplary damages;
(G) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the
defendants the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees;
(H) Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioners appealed the above-mentioned decision to the
respondent Court of Appeals assigning the following errors allegedly
committed by the lower court:
I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS THAT
THE TWO DOCUMENTS (EXHS. 3 & 7 AND THEIR SUB-
MARKINGS) WERE FORGED AND ABSOLUTELY SIMULATED
DOCUMENTS. HENCE, NULL AND VOID;
II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE
SIGNATURE OF JUAN LIMPIN AND THUMBMARK OF
ALBERTA GUEVARRA APPEARING ON THE EXCRITUA DE
VENTA ABSOLUTA (EXHS. 7 & 7-A) WERE FORGED;
III. IN APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES THE
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY WITNESS JESUS CRUZ WHEN
THEIR SOURCES COULD NOT BE ACCOUNTED FOR AND
THEIR AUTHENTICITY IS IN QUESTION;
IV. IN HOLDING THAT INOCENCIO SONGCO, THE
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF THE APPELLEES WAS AN
INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE;
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 35
V. IN HOLDING THAT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO.
929 WAS ISSUED TO INOCENCIO SONGCO BY THE
REGISTERED TRY OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA;
VI. IN HOLDING THAT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO.
RO-1038 (11725) WAS ISSUED BY THE COURT (CFI-III
PAMPANGA) IN EXCESS OF OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND
THEREFORE NULL AND VOID;
VII. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT THE VOLUNTARY
ABANDONMENT OF THE FISHPOND IN QUESTION BY THE
APPELLEES WAS A RECOGNITION OF APPELLANTS' TITLE TO
IT;
VIII. IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE APPELLEES.10
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in the appealed case, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification that appellants are not
liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners flied a motion for reconsideration with the Court of
Appeals but the same was denied in its resolution dated 14 August
1987.12 Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following alleged errors to the Court of
Appeals:
I. IN APPLYING THE "ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE" ON THE
QUESTIONED DOCUMENT ENTITLED "ESCRITURA DE
PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" AND "ESCRITURA DE VENTA
ABSOLUTA; AND MARKED DURING THE TRIAL AS EXHIBITS
"3" AND "7", RESPECTIVELY, FOR THE RESPONDENT HEREIN;
 II. IN DISREGARDING THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF
THE NOTARIAL LAW WHICH TOOK EFFECT AS EARLY AS
FEBRUARY 1, 1903;
III. IN DISREGARDING THE RULE ON PROOF OF PUBLIC OR
OFFICIAL RECORD, (SEC. 25, RULE 132, RULES OF COURT)13
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals wrongfully applied the
"ancient document rule" provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court.14 The rule states that:
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary.— Were a
private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced
from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
execution and authenticity need be given.
It is submitted by petitioners that under this rule, for a document to
be classified as an "ancient document", it must not only be at least
thirty (30) years old but it must also be found in the proper custody
and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from
suspicion.15 Thus, according to petitioners, exhibits "3" and "7",
entitled "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" and "Escritura de Venta Absoluta", respectively, can
not qualify under the foregoing rule, for the reason that since the
"first pages" of said documents do not bear the signatures of the
alleged parties thereto, this constitutes an indelible blemish that can
beget unlimited alterations.16
We are not persuaded by the contention. Under the "ancient
document rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from
proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be
more than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the following
requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a custody in
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 36
which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is
unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.17
The first document, Exhibit "3", entitled 'Traduccion Al Castellano de
la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923
whereas the second document, exhibit "7", entitled "Escritura de
Venta Absoluta" was executed on 20 January 1924. These
documents are, therefore, more than thirty (30) years old. Both
copies of the aforementioned documents were certified as exact
copies of the original on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Pampanga, by the Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further
certification with regard to the Pampango translation of the
document of extrajudicial partition which was issued by the Archives
division, Bureau of Records Management of the Department of
General Services.18
Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind
third parties, must be recorded with the appropriate Register of
Deeds. The documents in question, being certified as copies of
originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said
to be found in the proper custody. Clearly, therefore, the first two (2)
requirements of the "ancient document rule" were met.
As to the last requirement that the document must on its face
appear to be genuine, petitioners did not present any conclusive
evidence to support their allegation of falsification of the said
documents. They merely alluded to the fact that the lack of
signatures on the first two (2) pages could have easily led to their
substitution. We cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof
whatsoever. As held in one case, a contract apparently honest and
lawful on its face must be treated as such and one who assails the
genuineness of such contract must present conclusive evidence of
falsification.19
Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that
a document must be unblemished by any alteration or
circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the
document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages, therefore,
absent any alterations or circumstances of suspicion cannot be held
to detract from the fact that the documents in question, which were
certified as copied of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds
of Pampanga, are genuine and free from any blemish or
circumstances of suspicion.
The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned
in Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.1âwphi1 Further proof of
their due execution and authenticity is no longer required. Having
held that the documents in question are private writings which are
more than thirty (30) years old, come from the proper repository
thereof, and are unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of
suspicion, there is no further need for these documents to fulfill the
requirements of the 1903 Notarial Law. Hence, the other
contentions of the petitioners that the documents do not fulfill the
mandatory requirements of the Notarial Law20 and that the proper
person or public official was not presented to testify on his
certification of the documents in question,21 need not be resolved
as they would no longer serve any purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Sanson v CA, G.R. No. 127745, April 22, 2003
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 37
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision of May
31, 1996 and Resolution of December 9, 1996.
On February 7, 1990, herein petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson
(Sanson), in his capacity as creditor, filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 4497, for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the
deceased) who died on January 10, 1990. Sanson claimed that the
deceased was indebted to him in the amount of P603,000.00 and to
his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of
P360,000.00.1
Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother
Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later filed separate claims against the
estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and
P150,000.00, respectively.2
By Order of February 12, 1991, Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC to which
the petition was raffled, appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of
the deceased, as administratrix of his estate, following which she
was issued letters of administration.3
During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson,
Celedonia, and Jade Montinola, wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola,
Jr., testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over the
objection of the administratrix who invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court otherwise known as the Dead Man’s
Statute which reads:
SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of
adverse party.—Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
 upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind. (Emphasis supplied)
Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that
she had a transaction with the deceased which is evidenced by six
checks4 issued by him before his death; before the deceased died,
Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the checks from his (the
deceased’s) son Jerry who told her that his father would settle them
once he got well but he never did; and after the death of the
deceased, Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment
but were dishonored5 due to the closure of his account.6
Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified
that she knew that the deceased issued five checks 7 to Sanson in
settlement of a debt; and after the death of the deceased, Sanson
presented the checks to the bank for payment but were returned
due to the closure of his account.8
Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr.
and mother-in-law Angeles, testified that on separate occasions, the
deceased borrowed P50,000 and P150,000 from her husband and
mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the
deceased,9 two to Angeles and the other 10 to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.;
before the deceased died or sometime in August 1989, they advised
him that they would be depositing the checks, but he told them not
to as he would pay them cash, but he never did; and after the
deceased died on January 10, 1990, they deposited the checks but
were dishonored as the account against which they were drawn was
closed,11 hence, their legal counsel sent a demand letter 12 dated
February 6, 1990 addressed to the deceased’s heirs Melicia, James,
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 38
Mini and Jerry Sy, and Symmels I & II but the checks have remained
unsettled.13
The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the claims, nevertheless
alleged that if they ever existed, they had been paid and
extinguished, are usurious and illegal and are, in any event, barred
by prescription.14 And she objected to the admission of the checks
and check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by the claimants
upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are
disqualified under the Dead Man’s Statute.
Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade,
the administratrix asserted that they are inadmissible because Jade
is the daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and wife of claimant
Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the above-said rule
on disqualification.
At all events, the administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were
issued by the deceased and that the return slips were issued by the
depository/clearing bank.15
After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four
separate manifestations informing the trial court that she was
dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their claims.16
Finding that the Dead Man’s Statute does not apply to the witnesses
who testified in support of the subject claims against the estate, the
trial court issued an Order of December 8, 1993, 17 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judicial Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, is hereby
ordered, to pay, in due course of administration, creditors-
claimants Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00;
Celedonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00; 18
Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00 and
 Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00, from
the assets and/or properties of the above-entitled intestate
estate.
On appeal by the administratrix upon the following assignment of
errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE
CLAIM[S] FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE FILING FEES THEREON
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE
CLAIM[S] BECAUSE [THEY ARE] ALREADY BARRED BY THE
LAW OF LIMITATIONS OR STATUTE OF NON-CLAIMS
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
CLAIMANT[S’] EVIDENCE OF THE CLAIM IS INCOMPETENT
UNDER THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE, AND INADMISSIBLE
IV.
THE ALLEGED CHECKS ARE INADMISSIBLE AS PRIVATE
DOCUMENTS,19
the Court of Appeals set aside the December 8, 1993 Order of the
trial court, by Decision of May 31, 1996, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside
and another order is entered dismissing the claims of:
1. Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00;
2. Celdonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00; 20
3. Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00; and
4. Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00
against the estate of the deceased JUAN BON FING SY.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Italics supplied)
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 39
The claimants’ Motion for Reconsideration21 of the Court of Appeals
decision having been denied by Resolution of December 9, 1996, 22
they filed the present petition anchored on the following assigned
errors:
FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF JADE MONTINOLA IS
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CLAIMS OF CLAIMANTS
ANGELES A. MONTINOLA AND EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA,
JR..
SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN
FINDING THAT CLAIMANT FELICITO G. SANSON IS
DISQUALIFIED TO TESTIFY [ON] THE CLAIM OF CELEDONIA
SANSON-SA[Q]UIN AND VI[C]E VERSA. (Underscoring in the
original)23
With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners argue that since
the administratrix did not deny the testimony of Jade nor present
any evidence to controvert it, and neither did she deny the
execution and genuineness of the checks issued by the deceased (as
well as the check return slips issued by the clearing bank), it was
error for the Court of Appeals to find the evidence of the Montinolas
insufficient to prove their claims.
The administratrix counters that the due execution and authenticity
of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas were not duly proven since
Jade did not categorically state that she saw the filling up and
signing of the checks by the deceased, hence, her testimony is self-
serving; besides, as Jade had identical and unitary interest with her
husband and mother-in-law, her testimony was a circumvention of
the Dead Man’s Statute.24
The administratrix’s counter-argument does not lie. Relationship to a
party has never been recognized as an adverse factor in determining
either the credibility of the witness or—subject only to well
recognized exceptions none of which is here present—the
admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship to a
party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the
assessment of a witness’ testimony but is not necessarily a negative
element which should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise
accorded to it.25
Jade’s testimony on the genuineness of the deceased’s signature on
the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas is clear:
xxx
Q: Showing to you this check dated July 16, 1989, Far
East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 84262, in the
amount of P100,000.00, is this the check you are referring
to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There appears a signature in the face of the check.
Whose signature is this?
A: That is the signature of Mr. Sy.
Q: Why do you know that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?
A: Because he signed this check I was . . . I was present
when he signed this check.
xxx
Q: Showing to you this check dated September 8, 1989,
is this the check you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know that this is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
xxx
Q: Showing to you this Far East Bank and Trust
Company Check No. 84262 dated July 6, 1989, in the
amount of P50,000.00, in the name of Eduardo Montinola,
are you referring to this check?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Whose signature is this appearing on the face of this
check?
A: Mr. Sy’s signature.
Q: Why do you know that it is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
x x x26 (Emphasis supplied)
The genuineness of the deceased’s signature having been shown, he
is prima facie presumed to have become a party to the check for
value, following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which
reads:
Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. – Every
negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been
issued for a valuable consideration; and every person
whose signature appears thereon to have become a party
thereto for value. (Underscoring and italics in the original;
emphasis supplied),
Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the
prima facie presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the
administratrix who expressly manifested that she was dispensing
with the presentation of evidence against their claims, it has
become conclusive.
As for the administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s Statute, the
same does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties
to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.

EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 40

 xxx
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its
scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not
mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in
the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as
to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and
a third person, if he took no active part therein.
x x x27 (Italics supplied)
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a
person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as
a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved
in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or
relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to
their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties,
there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In
any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony
of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis
of their documentary evidence—the checks.
As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the
testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other’s
claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man’s
Statute;28 besides, the administratrix waived the application of the
law when she cross-examined them.
The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court
of Appeals in its decision on review, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a
case, with like interest, from testifying in each other’s favor
as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 41
Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a
case without distinguishing between testimony in his own
behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified
from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of "parties
or assignors of parties to a case." Apparently, the
testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each other’s behalf, as
co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition.
(Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis
supplied)
But Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose
from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to
Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to
Sanson’s claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other’s
transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the
admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before
the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the
giving of testimony.29 Since the separate claims of Sanson and
Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their
claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the
signature of the deceased appearing on the checks issued to Sanson
and Celedonia. By Celedonia’s account, she "knows" the signature of
the deceased.
xxx
Q: Showing to you these checks already marked as
Exhibit "A" to "E", please go over these checks if you know
the signatures of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy? on these
checks?
A: Yes, sir.
 Q: Insofar as the amount that he borrowed from you, not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a
he also issued checks? comparison32 with the naked eye of the deceased’s signature
A: Yes, sir. appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with
Q: And therefore, you know his signature? that of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which checks
A: Yes, sir. were drawn from the same account, they appear to have been
x x x30 affixed by one and the same hand.
Sanson testified too that he "knows" the signature of the deceased: In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence,
xxx substantiated their claims against the estate of the deceased, the
Q: I show you now checks which were already marked burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix who, however,
as Exhibit "A" to "G-1" – Saquin, please go over this if these expressly opted not to discharge the same when she manifested
are the checks that you said was issued by the late Juan Bon that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against
Fing Sy in favor of your sister? the claims.
A: Yes, these are the same che[c]ks. WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of the Court of
Q: Do you know the signature of the late Juan Bon Fing Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered ordering the
Sy? intestate estate of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy, through Administratrix
A: Yes, sir. Melecia T. Sy, to pay:
Q: And these signatures are the same signatures that 1) Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of P603,500.00;
you know? 2) Celedonia S. Saquin, the amount of P315.000.00;33
A: Yes, sir. 3) Angeles Montinola, the amount of P150,000.00; and
x x x31 4) Eduardo Montinola, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00.
While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not representing unsettled checks issued by the deceased.
faithfully discharged the quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule SO ORDERED.
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who People v Pagpaguitan, G.R. No. 116599,
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he September 27, 1999
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to QUISUMBING, J.:
be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged On appeal is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such Branch I, finding appellants Domingo Pagpaguitan and Roberto
person. x x x, Salazar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and

EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 42

sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay private complainant Evelyn Nalam, jointly and severally, the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages.
Assisted by her father, Federico Nalam, complainant on March 24,
1992, filed before the Butuan City Prosecutor a complaint stating
that:
The undersigned complainant accuses DOMINGO
PAGPAGUITAN alias Pingkong and ROBERTO
SALAZAR alias Opaw of the crime of Rape
committed as follows.
That on or about January 31, 1992 at Barangay
Bitan-agan, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with the use of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse
with the undersigned complainant, who is 14 years
old, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code). 1
The pertinent facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
Roberto Salazar is Evelyn's neighbor at barangay
Bitan-agan, Butuan City and Domingo Pagpaguitan is
his gang mate. In the evening of January 30, 1992,
both of them went to see Evelyn at her employer's
house at Montilla Boulevard, Butuan City, and told
her that they met her father who was very angry
with her and swore to come and get her, if not kill
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 43
her, if she will not go home to Bitan-agan. Although
Evelyn wondered why her father should feel that
way as she asked permission before she left home,
she nevertheless went with the two accused
boarding a jeep for San Vicente where the two
accused left her things, then proceeded towards
Bitan-agan. The accused told her that they would
seek the assistance of Commander Coz to help
pacify her father's anger. But instead of going to the
residence of Commander Coz, the accused brought
her to the uninhabited farmhouse of Roberto
Salazar's grandfather. With knives it their hands,
they threatened to kill her if she would not go with
them up the mountain; they held her by her
hands.1âwphi1.nêt
Upon entering the house, Roberto stayed by the
door and Domingo started embracing and kissing
her several times; she pleaded with him but he
answered that if she could not be taken
"harmlessly", then it would have to be by force; she
kicked Domingo and continued to plead with him,
but the latter boxed him (sic) on her chest and
thighs many times as she fought back, until she fell
to the floor, whereupon Domingo removed his pants
and her panties as she continued pleading and
weeping telling Domingo not to do it as she
considered him a brother; Domingo placed himself
on top of her, spread her legs and inserted his penis
into her vagina and she felt great pain for this was
her first intercourse; he made the motions of
 pushing and pulling his penis within her vagina . . . .
Her body was in pain and her vagina was bleeding.
While Pagpaguitan was doing this to her, Salazar
was watching them.
The following morning the accused brought her to
the house of Domingo in the mountain where his
mother was. As Domingo and Roberto agreed that
evening to bring her to Leyte, Domingo's mother left
to sell a carabao to earn money for their fare to
Leyte. In the absence of Domingo's mother and in
the presence of Roberto Salazar, Domingo again
forced himself upon her. 2
The complainant's relatives, meantime, had gone out looking for
her. They found her with Pagpaguitan. A meeting was then held on
February 2, 1992 before the purok president and the barangay
captain between the parents of Pagpaguitan and the parents of the
private complainant. Pagpaguitan and the complainant were both
present. At the meeting, Pagpaguitan proposed marriage to the
complainant, but the latter rejected the proposal.
On February 10, 1992, complainant went to a doctor for a physical
examination. The examination was conducted by Dr. Rowena T.
Catipay, Medical Officer III of the Butuan City General Hospital and
Medical Center. Her findings were as follows:
Examined a patient who was conscious, coherent,
ambulatory.
SKIN: Fair,
Hematoma noted
on both thighs, left
lateral and right
lateral portions.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 44
xxx xxx xxx
Genetalia (sic): — No vaginal laceration noted on
the mucosa
HYMEN: — Not intact; Caruncula in appearance.
xxx xxx xxx
Vaginal Smear taken for spermatozia — — Negative.
3
On February 19, 1992, complainant and her father executed
affidavits at the police station, and later filed the complaint for rape
with the Butuan City Prosecutor.
Pagpaguitan and Salazar were arrested on August 16, 1992. 4 They
were arraigned on October 2, 1992. Both pleaded "Not Guilty."
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Pagpaguitan admitted having sex with complainant, but insisted that
it was consensual. He claimed they had eloped and that truly they
were actually sweethearts.
As narrated by the trial court, his version of the facts follows:
[O]n January 3, 1992, [Evelyn] went to his and
Roberto's place of work at RGS Bakery, Obrero,
Butuan City, to tell him that his (sic) father was
angry with her as somebody reported to him that
she and Domingo often met at the plaza; he told
Evelyn that her father would be angrier if he knew
she came to his place of work, to which Evelyn
charged that he did not love her; his pride was
pricked so he invited her to his house at Bitan-agan;
Roberto Salazar went with them; he and Evelyn
lived together in his parent's house as husband and
wife; on January 5, 1992, he told Evelyn to go home
and he and his parents would follow to ask for her
 hand, but her parents did not entertain them; in the
dawn of January 6, 1992, Evelyn went to his house
which was one kilometer away from her house and
from then on lived with him until March 15, 1992
when her parents went to his house and pulled their
daughter and maltreated her in front of him and his
parents; . . . they met again on March 16, 1992
before the purok president of
Purok 2; from there they proceeded to the barangay
captain of Bitan-agan; when they went out of the
office of the barangay captain, Evelyn told him to
bring her personal belongings because she would
look for a way to follow him wherever he would go;
Evelyn admonished him to leave Bitan-agan as her
parents are looking for a way to kill him and his
parents so he left for Leyte; while in Leyte, he and
Evelyn exchanged letters (Exh. 2); he received three
letters from Evelyn; he is willing to marry Evelyn
because he loves her; . . . [F]rom January 3 to 5, he
and Evelyn had sexual intercourse 4 times; from
January 6 to March 15, 1992, he could no longer
remember how many times he had sex with Evelyn .
..5
The trial court, however, disbelieved Pagpaguitan's version. Finding
the prosecution's evidence convincing, the court convicted
Pagpaguitan and Salazar and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.
Both appealed.
Before us they raise the following errors:
I any when you arrived there
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 45
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE
DESPITE UNTRUSTWORTHY AND FLIP-FLOPPING
UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT/VICITIM.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PUROK PRESIDENT AND THE
BARANGAY CAPTAIN THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE
INSTANT COMPLAINT WAS INITIALLY ELOPEMENT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ARROGATING UNTO
ITSELF THE SPECIAL TASK OF DETERMINING THE
GENUINESS OF THE HANDWRITING OF THE
COMPLAINANT WHICH RESULT IT HEAVILY RELIED
UPON IN ITS VERDICT AGAINST THE
6
ACCUSED.
We find the appeal without merit.
Regarding the first error, it must be pointed out that in a prosecution
for rape, the evaluation of the evidence presented during trial
ultimately revolves around the credibility of the complaining
witness. 7 If found positive and credible by the trial court, her
testimony suffices to support a conviction. 8
Complainant's testimony in the present case never "flip-flopped",
contrary to the appellant's claim. On direct testimony, complainant
categorically stated that she was boxed, mauled, and forced to
submit to accused's carnal desire. She testified, thus:
Q: In that house; what happened if
together with the two accused?
 A: Upon arriving there, they took
me to the room while Roberto
Salazar stayed at the door.
Q: What happened, if any?
A: Domingo Pagpaguitan embraced
me and kissed me several times.
Q: What did you do when you were
embraced and kissed by Domingo
Pagpaguitan?
A: I pleaded with him not to do that
because I considered him as my
brother.
Q: What was his reply, if any?
A: He said that since I could not be
taken harmlessly; he will get me by
force.
Q: What happened after that?
A: When he tried to get near me
and embrace me and kiss me, I tried
to resist and kicked Domingo
Pagpaguitan and pleaded (with him)
not do that to me I considered them
as my brothers.
Q: When you said you kicked him
did you hit him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was his reaction when you
kicked him?
A: Domingo Pagpaguitan again
embraced me and kissed me.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 46
Q: And what was your reaction
again?
A: I resisted him but I could not
overpower him because he mauled
me.
Q: When you said Domingo
Pagpaguitan mauled you, where in
particular, in relation to your body
did he maul you.
A: I was boxed here (witness
indicating her chest) and also my
thighs.
Q: How many times were you
boxed?
A: Many times because I fought
back.
Q: What happened to you, if any,
when you were boxed on the thighs
by Domingo Pagpaguitan?
A: I fell to (sic) a lying down
position.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you fell down upon being
boxed at the thigh and chest by
Domingo Pagpaguitan, what else
did he do to you, if any?
A: He removed my pants and also
removed my panties.
Q: When he was removing your
panties, what did you do, if any?
 A: I continued pleading and
weeping.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After removing your panty, what
else, if any, did Domingo
Pagpaguitan do to you?
A: He placed himself on top of me.
Q: After that, what did he do when
he was on top of you?
A: He spread my legs.
Q: Then what else happened if any?
A: He inserted his penis into my
vagina.
Q: What did you feel when he
inserted his penis into your vagina?
A: Very painful.
Q: You said it was very painful, did
you have any experience before
about sex?
A: None, sir.
Q: When he was on top of you and
you said he inserted his penis into
your vagina and you felt pain, what
was he doing?
Atty. Jalad:
There is no answer, your honor, it is
a very simple question.
Court:
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 47
If it is true that she has no experience, it will not be
easy to answer that. The Court understands that.
Answer.
Witness:
He made push and pull movements
on top of me. 9
Her testimony under cross-examination remained firm. She was
mauled and boxed on her thighs and stomach, and "deflowered by
Domingo Pagpaguitan" against her will. 10 The only difference in her
account concerns where she was hit. On direct examination, she
said in the chest; on cross-examination, she said in the stomach. We
have ruled that the credibility of a rape victim is not destroyed by
the few minor inconsistencies in her
testimony. 11 After all, a victim of violent sexual abuse cannot and is
not expected to keep an accurate account of her traumatic
experience. 12 Here, complainant's account was straightforward and
candid. It is settled doctrine that a victim who says she has been
raped almost always says all there is to be
13
said. Given the candor of complainant's testimony and her lack of
motive to testify falsely against the accused, the trial court could not
be said to err in finding the Pagpaguitan guilty as charged.
Moreover, we have ruled that the findings of the trial court are
entitled to the highest respect by the appellate courts, particularly
where the prosecution and the defense have contradictory versions
of the facts. 14
On the second error, during the proceedings before the purok
president and the barangay captain, elopement was indeed
mentioned. However, Pagpaguitan's tale of elopement rang with far
too many inconsistencies to be credible. If he and complainant had
eloped and were never apart from January 6, 1992 to March 15,
1992, how would he explain the proceedings before the purok A: I told him "Why did you do this to
president and the barangay captain on February 2, 1992? 15 It is me when I have not committed any
established that he and complainant, with their respective parents, wrong against you?"
appeared before their purok and barangay officials on February 2, Q: What else, if any?
1992, and not, as he claimed, on March 16, 1992. If they were A: When I said that, Domingo said
indeed living together and never separated for over two months, that he would marry me.
how would he explain the fact that complainant underwent medical Q: What was your reply if any?
examination on February 10, 1992, 16 and executed an affidavit A: I said, "If you were going to
before the police authorities of Butuan City on February 19, 1992, 17 marry me would you do an evil act
without his knowledge? Pagpaguitan suggests that the hematoma first?"
on the complainant's thighs could have been due to the Q: What did he say if any?
maltreatment inflicted by complainant's father upon her when she A: He asked me why I won't accept
returned home on March 16, 1992. But where did complainant get him and I answered. "How could I
the hematoma found by the doctor on her thighs when she was accept you when I saw that a pig
examined on February 10, 1992? Mere assertion of a "love was taken from you and if I marry
relationship" would not necessarily rule out the use of force to you, what will you feed me?" 20
consummate it. 18 Much more so where such relationship was Pagpaguitan claimed the above dialogue clearly showed their
denied by the victim, who resisted the brutal suitor.1âwphi1.nêt "sweet" relationship with each other and revealed intimacy in their
In rape the prosecution must rule out the victim's consent to the relationship even before the sexual act. 21 However, as correctly
sexual act. 19 Here, the testimony of private complainant was clear pointed out by the Solicitor General, the cited dialogue merely
and convincing: she did not consent to penile invasion. revealed familiarity rather than intimacy. 22 Even assuming for
Again appellant Pagpaguitan sought to prove he and complainant argument's sake, that they were sweethearts, nevertheless, rape
were lovers by citing her testimony which ran as follows: was committed because by force, appellant had sex with the victim
Q: After Domingo Pagpaguitan was against her will. 23 The claim that they were sweethearts could not
through with you, did you say prove complainant's consent 24 nor undermine her complaint.
anything to him? The findings of the examining physician, Dr. Rowena T. Catipay,
A: Yes. support the accusation for rape. The medical certificate issued on
Q: What did you say? February 10, 1992 noted hematoma on complainant's thighs. Her
hymen was no longer intact and caruncula were noted. Both
phenomena — the cause of the hematoma and the caruncula

EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 48

appearance of complainant's hymen — were explained by the
examining physician, as follows:
Q: As a doctor, will you please
explain to this Honorable Court
what could have caused the
hematoma on both thighs of Evelyn
Nalam?
A: It may have been caused by the
application of a blunt instrument.
Q: How about a hard blow like a
hard fist, can it cause hematoma?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What else is (sic) you findings,
Doctor?
A: I examined the genitalia, the
hymen was not intact; the hymen is
no longer intact and the caruncula
was noted. Caruncula means
remnants of an intact hymen.
Q: When you said that the hymen is
no longer intact, what do you mean
by that, Doctor?
A: It means that there was penile
entry to (sic) the vagina. It means
there was an (sic) intercourse. 25
In response to clarificatory questions from the trial court, Dr. Catipay
further explained that from the appearance of complainant's
hymen, the only possible explanation for her non-virgin state was
sexual intercourse and nothing else:
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 49
Q: And in this particular victim, how
would you describe her hymen?
A: Fimbriated hymen.
Q: And in fimbriated hymen, if the
remnants of a hymen which you call
caruncula, upon examination, would
that give you a sure conclusion that
the cause of the breaking of the
hymen was due to intercourse?
A: Yes, Sir, because if the hymen
was only broken by let us say
jumping or bicycle riding, I don't
think that the hymen would appear
that loose.
Q: So, in other words, by just
examining the remnants of a broken
hymen, the doctor can determine
whether it was caused other than
by intercourse or some other
causes?
A: Yes, Your Honor. 26
It has been ruled that a medical examination is not an essential
prerequisite to a prosecution for rape. 27 However, when the
physician's finding of penile penetration is corroborated by the
testimony of the victim that the accused's genitals touched her
vagina, it is sufficient to establish the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge. 28 Pagpaguitan tried to debunk the charge of
complainant that he raped her on January 31, 1992, by claiming the
examining physician had said that complainant told her the rape
took place on another date, February 6, 1992. 29 It is settled,
however, that the exact date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime. 30 The fact remains that the act took
place on or about the date averred in the charge.
Regarding the third error, Pagpaguitan faults the judge for arrogating
unto himself the task of determining the genuineness of the
handwriting at the back of the picture of the accused and the
complainant together (Exhibit "1") 31 and the alleged letter of
complainant to him (Exhibit "2") 32 submitted by the defense to
prove that he and the victim were sweethearts. During the trial, the
judge had ordered complainant to write a letter under his dictation
which was subsequently marked as Exhibit "X" for the court. 33 The
judge found this necessary in the interest of justice as the victim had
denied having written either the letter or the dedication at the back
of the picture. 34 It is of record that the handwriting at the back of
the picture and in the letter were very different. 35 The trial court
made the following findings after comparing Exhibit "X" with
Exhibits "1" and "2", thus:
. . . In a letter by letter comparison, the court found
that the alphabets (sic) "g"; "k"; "p" and "y" in
Exhibit 2 and Exhibit X have different writing
characteristics which led the court to believe that
Exhibit 2 was not written by the complainant. 36
Pagpaguitan now asks whether or not it is permissible or proper for
the trial judge to receive and examine a specimen writing, written at
his order by a party who alleged that she was not the writer of other
documents submitted in evidence? He argues that the task of
comparing the handwriting on the documents in question was one
for experts and not the judge. On this point, we find the judge's
comparison proper and permissible.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 50
When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon
the other to be the writing of a particular person, any other writing
of that person may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of
comparison with the writing in dispute. 37 It is also recognized that a
comparison of writing is a rational method of investigation;
similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value in
the search for truth. 38 Thus, it has been held that, where a
comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or
without the aid of expert witnesses. 39 The court may, in the exercise
of its sound discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as
a basis for comparison. 40 For, the handwriting of a person is
characteristic of the person himself. 41 Once admitted, the
genuineness of other offered writings alleged to be the work of the
same writer becomes a question for the trier of fact who may, but
need not, be assisted in this task by experts. 42 Our rules on evidence
having been drawn mainly from American sources, 43 decisions of
American courts have persuasive effect. The general rule is local rule
is patterned or copied from that of another country, then the
decisions of the courts in such country construing the rule are
entitled to great weight in interpreting the local rule. 44 Following
cited precedents, we find no reversible error on this score.
Coming now to appellant Salazar, his defense claimed the trial court
erred in convicting him since the private complainant's own
testimony showed that he was a mere on-looker during the sexual
attack. His defense averred he never lent a lending hand to
Pagpaguitan to ensure the success of the latter's lewd designs on
complainant. 45 But can we conclude that Salazar had no role in the
rape of complainant? Note the trial court's findings regarding
Salazar:
 And what about Roberto Salazar who is accused as
co-conspirator? Evelyn said that he went with
Domingo in fetching her and when the ravishment
was done, he was watching. The farmhouse they
brought her to is owned by Salazar's grandfather,
and upon arrival at the foot of the mountain, the
two accused threatened her with their knives and
held her hands bringing her to the farmhouse. From
the choice of the farmhouse of Salazar's grandfather
as the place Evelyn will be brought to, a farmhouse
in the mountain with no neighbor, is evidence that
Salazar knew and agreed with Pagpaguitan
beforehand concerning the latter's intent to rape
the complainant. But because of the theory of the
case formulated by the defense — that an
elopement occurred on January 3, 1992, and not a
rape on January 31 — Salazar's counsel saw no need
for him to take the stand to pledge his innocence.
Throughout the trial, the defense never attempted
to extricate Salazar from the muddle his friend
brought him into, who, surely, must be the
proponent of the crime. In fact, the defense seemed
to have forgotten that Salazar is accused as co-
conspirator. He just sat smugly at the audience's
bench passively watching the trial the same way he
watched the rape with perverse passivity. 46
It must be pointed out that direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found,
for criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots. 47
Conspiracy may, nevertheless, be proven to exist where at the time
of the commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 51
and was united with his co-accused in its execution. 48 Complainant's
testimony showed that Salazar was instrumental in helping to bring
her to the isolated and uninhabited farmhouse of his grandparents
where the rape occurred and in preventing her escape from the
clutches of the accused. Neither did he act to prevent his co-accused
Pagpaguitan from boxing complainant and ravishing her. In fact, he
was a spectator during the rape scene. 49 Complainant's testimony as
to Salazar's role does not exculpate but clearly implicates him, thus:
Q: Where did they bring you to
Malihao?
A: They brought me to the house of
the grandparents of Roberto
Salazar.
Q: Is that house of the grandparents
of Roberto Salazar inhabited?
A: Uninhabited.
Q: You mean to tell this Honorable
Court that when you arrived there
was nobody there?
A: There was nobody living in that
house.
Q: In that house, what happened if
any when you arrived in there
together with with (sic) the two
accused?
A: Upon arriving there, they took
me to the room while Roberto
Salazar stayed at the door. 50
xxx xxx xxx
 Q: What happened to you, if any,
when you were boxed on the thighs
by Domingo Pagpaguitan?
A: I fell to (sic) a lying down
position.
Q: When you were lying down did
you notice where Roberto Salazar
was?
A: Roberto Salazar remained at the
door.
Q: You mean he was just there
watching the two of you?
A: Yes, sir. 51
xxx xxx xxx
Pros. Macalawi:
Q: Can you recall how many
seconds or minutes did it take
Domingo Pagpaguitan to do push
and pull movements?
Court:
Let us correct that push and pull movement. Let us
make it clear. When he was on top of me, he made
motions of pushing it in and pulling it out.
Pros. Macalawi:
Q: Do you remember how many
minutes or seconds did it take
Domingo Pagpaguitan to do that
movement?
A: I do not recall how long.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 52
Q: When he was doing that have
you noticed where was Roberto
Salazar?
A: He was watching us. 52
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there was nothing
unnatural regarding complainant's testimony that Salazar only stood
by the door and watched them. It was precisely Salazar's role in the
rape of complainant to stop the latter in the event that she tried to
run away. 53 Thus, there was no error committed by the trial court in
convicting Salazar as a co-conspirator of Pagpaguitan. It is now firmly
settled that in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. 54 One
who joins in a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the
criminal designs of his co-conspirators and he can no longer
repudiate the conspiracy after it had already materialized. 55
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 7659 and Republic Act No. 8353, provided that:
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and,
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or
demented.
xxx xxx xxx
After a thorough scrutiny of the records of this case, we find that the
prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proved the pertinent
indispensable elements of the crime of rape defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: that the
appellant Domingo Pagpaguitan had carnal knowledge of
complainant and that the act was accomplished against her will and
through the use of force. The prosecution has also proved beyond a
doubt that Salazar was Pagpaguitan's confederate who ensured the
success of Pagpaguitan's carnal plot. The trial court did not err at all
in convicting both appellants for the outrage committed on
complainant. We find no reason now to overturn their conviction.
We take note, however, that the award by the trial court of
P30,000.00 in moral damages is now inadequate. In accordance with
prevailing
jurisprudence, 56 such award ought to be increased to P50,000.00.
Further, without need of additional proof, the victim should also be
awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The award of
the trial court is therefore modified accordingly in this respect.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the trial court finding
appellants Domingo Pagpaguitan and Roberto Salazar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that CIVIL INDEMNITY in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and MORAL DAMAGES also in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) should be paid
jointly and severally, by said appellants to private complainant,
Evelyn Nalam.
Costs against appellants.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Lazaro v Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, April 15,
2010
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the
Decision1 dated February 21, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 53
CA-G.R. SP No. 63321. The CA had affirmed, with modification, the
Decision2 dated February 6, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laoag City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 11951-13, which also
affirmed, with modification, the Decision 3 dated January 6, 2000 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Laoag City, Branch 1, in
Civil Case No. 2834.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On November 4, 1998, herein petitioners filed against herein
respondents a Complaint4 for partition with the MTCC of Laoag City,
alleging as follows:
xxxx
II
That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the descendants
of the late Simeon C. Santos, married to Trinidad Duldulao,
who died intestate leaving a parcel of land situated in the
Barrio of Natividad Nstra. Sra., Municipality of Laoag,
designated as Lot No. 10675 of the Cadastral Survey of
Laoag;
III
That Simeon C. Santos during his lifetime, married to
Trinidad Duldulao, begot four (4) legitimate children,
namely: Basilisa D. Santos, Alberto D. Santos, Leoncio D.
Santos and Alejandra D. Santos. Basilisa D. Santos, [who]
was married to Petronilo Agustin, is now deceased; Alberto
Santos, married to Rizalina Guerrero, is now deceased, while
Leoncio D. Santos, married to Dictinia Tabeta, and Alejandra
D. Santos married to Isauro M. Lazaro, are still living;
IV
That in the desire of the children of Simeon C. Santos from
whom the parcel of land originated as owner, his children,
 namely[:] Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed
Santos, consented that the parcel of land mentioned in
paragraph II of this complaint be titled in the name of
Basilisa, the latter being the eldest and so Original
Certificate of Title No. 20742 in the name of Basilisa Santos
was obtained although it was agreed among them that it did
not and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is
the sole and exclusive owner of this parcel of land, and as
embodied in the Title obtained in the name of Basilisa
Santos, the parcel of land is particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 10676 of the Cadastral survey of
Laoag), with the improvements thereon, situated in the
Barrio of Natividad Nstra. Sra., Municipality of Laoag.
Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 10677; on the SE. by
Panganiban Street; on the SW. by Lot No. 10672; and on
NW. by Lot No. 1065, containing an area of three hundred
and one (301) square meters, more or less, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 010-00224 for the year 1994 in the names
of Modesta Agustin, et al. with a market value of ₱96,320.00
and an assessed value of ₱14,450.00.
V That during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, plaintiff
That there is a residential house constructed on the lot
described in paragraph IV of this complaint and in the
construction of which plaintiff Alejandra Santos, then still
single, spent the amount of ₱68,308.60, while Basilisa
Santos and her children spent the amount of ₱3,495.00.
Afterwards, Alejandra Santos got married to Isauro M.
Lazaro who was employed in a private company and when
he retired from the service, some additional constructions
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 54
were made on the residential house and lot such as a
bedroom, azotea, two (2) toilets, two (2) kitchens, a car
garage, the money spent for these additional constructions
came from the earnings of the spouses Alejandra Santos-
Lazaro and Isauro M. Lazaro. The said residential house is
now covered by Tax Declaration No. 010-00225 in the names
of Basilio Agustin (should be Basilisa Agustin) and Alejandra
Santos for the year 1994 with a market value of ₱93,920.00
and an assessed value of zero;
VI
That without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs,
the title of the lot described in paragraph IV of the
complaint was transferred into another title which is now
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20695 in the names of
Modesta Agustin, Filemon Agustin, Venancia Agustin,
Marcelina Agustin, Monica Agustin, Gregorio Agustin and
Bienvenido Agustin who are the children of the late Basilisa
Santos-Agustin who are herein named as defendants with
Monica Agustin now deceased represented by her children
Paul A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo as defendants;
VII
Alejandra Santos-Lazaro informed the former, who are
sisters, that the transfer of the title covering the lot
described in paragraph IV of this complaint in the name of
Basilisa Santos into the names of her children would
erroneously imply that the lot is solely and exclusively
owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin's children, but Basilisa
Santos-Agustin replied [to] plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro
not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by
 her recognizing and specifying that her brothers Alberto
Santos and Leoncio Santos, and her sister Alejandra Santos-
Lazaro would each get one fourth (¼) share of the lot;
VIII
That in a move to determine if the children and the heirs of
Basilisa Santos-Agustin, namely: Modesta Agustin, Filemon
Agustin, Venancia Agustin, Marcelina Agustin, Paul Dalalo
and Noel Dalalo who are the successors of their mother the
late Monica Agustin, Gregorio Agustin and Bienvenido
Agustin would follow the line of thinking of their mother
and grandmother of Paul A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo on the
shares of the lot and residential house erected on it, the
plaintiffs initiated a partition in the barangay court where
the lot is situated described in paragraph IV of this
complaint, but that the children of Basilisa Santos-Agustin
and her grandchildren Paul A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo
refused and opposed the partition claiming that they are the
sole and exclusive owners of the lot being that the lot is now
titled in their names, and hence there was no settlement as
shown by the certification of the barangay court hereto
attached as annex "A";
IX
That plaintiffs now invoke the intervention of the court to
partition the lot in accordance with the law on intestate
succession and to partition the residential house as
specified below. x x x
x x x x5
Petitioners also prayed for the grant of attorney's fees, moral and
exemplary damages, and costs of suit.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 55
Herein respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim, 6 raising
the following as their Special/Affirmative Defenses:
1. The subject parcel of land is owned exclusively by the
defendants as heirs of the late Basilisa Santos, wife of
Petronilo Agustin, who was the original registered owner of
the property evidenced by OCT No. 20742; the plaintiffs
never became owners of said land. There was never any
agreement between the ascendants of the plaintiffs and
defendants, neither is there any agreement between the
plaintiffs and defendants themselves that in the ownership,
the plaintiffs have a share over the lot;
2. The defendants are the ones paying for the real estate
taxes of said land;
3. Some of the plaintiffs were able to stay on the subject
house because defendants' mother Basilisa Santos was the
eldest sibling and she had to take care of her brother
Leoncio and sister Alejandra when these siblings were not
yet employed and Basilisa allowed them to reside in the
house constructed within the lot; Alejandra Santos stayed in
the house up to the present with the agreement that she
will spend for the renovation of the house in lieu of monthly
rentals that she has to pay when she already became
financially able;
4. Prior to 1962, subject property was mortgaged by Basilisa
Santos Agustin to the Philippine National Bank and the
property was foreclosed by PNB when the loan was not
paid, hence, TCT No. (T-9522)-4495, under the name of the
Philippine National Bank was issued (Annex "A"). Thereafter,
Basilisa Santos-Agustin, purchased it from the PNB and TCT
No. T-5662 was issued under her name (Annex "B"); the
 property was later on transferred to her direct descendants,
the defendants herein as evidenced by TCT No. T-20695
(Annex "C");
x x x x7
Respondents then prayed that petitioners' complaint be dismissed.
In their Counterclaim, respondents asked the court to direct
petitioners to pay reasonable compensation for the latter's use of
the disputed property, exemplary and moral damages, attorney's
fees, and costs of suit.
After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial
on the merits ensued.
On January 6, 2000, the MTCC rendered its Decision 8 dismissing the
complaint and denying petitioners' prayer for partition.
The MTCC ruled, among others, that no evidentiary value could be
given to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she
purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property
with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant
was not presented on the witness stand, such that all the
statements made in her affidavit were hearsay. Moreover, the MTCC
held that two credible witnesses testified in plain, simple and
straightforward manner that at the time the affidavit was supposed
to have been signed and sworn to before the notary public, Basilisa
was already bedridden and an invalid who could not even raise her
hand to feed herself. In addition, the MTCC also gave credence to
the testimony of the notary public, before whom the document was
supposedly signed and sworn to, that the said affidavit was already
complete and thumbmarked when the same was presented to him
by a person who claimed to be Basilisa.
Petitioners filed an appeal with the RTC of Laoag City.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 56
On February 6, 2001 the RTC issued a Decision 9 affirming, with
modification, the judgment of the MTCC. The RTC found that the
house erected on the disputed lot was built and renovated by
petitioners in good faith. As a consequence, the RTC held that
petitioners were entitled to indemnity representing the costs of the
construction and renovation of the said house. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed with
the modification directing the appellees [herein respondents] to
indemnify the appellants [herein petitioners] in the amount of
₱68,308.60 as proved by them.
Considering the apparent error of the lower court in quoting the
questioned lot as Lot No. 10675, the same is hereby corrected so as
to reflect the correct lot number as Lot No. 10676 to conform to the
evidence presented.
SO ORDERED.10
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, petitioners filed a petition for review
with the CA.
On February 21, 2002, the CA issued its presently assailed Decision
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 6, 2001 rendered in Civil
Case No. 11951-13 is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
MODIFICATION that appellees [herein respondents] pay the amount
of ₱68,308.60 in indemnity solely to appellant Alejandra Santos-
Lazaro.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I. THE SWORN STATEMENT OF BASILISA S. AGUSTIN IS A
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST WHICH ESTABLISHES THE CO-
OWNERSHIP OF LOT NO. 10676 BY AND AMONG THE PETITIONERS
AND RESPONDENTS AS HEIRS OF THE LATE SIMEON C. SANTOS. 12
II. THE CO-OWNERSHIP OF LOT NO. 10676 BY AND AMONG BASILISA
S. AGUSTIN, ALBERTO D. SANTOS, ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO AND
LEONCIO D. SANTOS DID NOT TERMINATE AS A RESULT OF THE
TRANSFER OF THE LOT'S OWNERSHIP PRECIPITATED BY ACTS OF
BASILISA S. AGUSTIN WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 13
III. PETITIONER ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO IS A CO-OWNER OF THE
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE ON LOT NO. 10676 NOT MERELY A BUILDER IN
GOOD FAITH WITH RESPECT THERETO AND AS SUCH, IS ENTITLED TO
A PARTITION OF THE SUBJECT HOUSE.14
In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that Basilisa's sworn
statement which recognizes her siblings' share in the disputed
property is a declaration against interest which is one of the
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Petitioners argue that
since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted
in court without further proof of its due execution and authenticity;
that the testimonies of Basilisa's nurse and physician cannot qualify
as clear and convincing evidence which could overthrow such
notarized document; that the notary public cannot impugn the same
document which he notarized for to do so would render notarized
documents worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the
public.
As to the second assigned error, petitioners aver that their co-
ownership of the questioned property with Basilisa did not cease to
exist when the Philippine National Bank (PNB) consolidated its
ownership over the said parcel of land. Petitioners assert that they
did not lose their share in the property co-owned when their share
was mortgaged by Basilisa without their knowledge and consent;
that the mortgage was limited only to the portion that may be
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 57
allotted to Basilisa upon termination of their co-ownership; that PNB
acquired ownership only of the share pertaining to Basilisa; that
when Basilisa bought back the property from PNB, she simply re-
acquired the portion pertaining to her and simply resumed co-
ownership of the property with her siblings. Petitioners also contend
that Basilisa's children did not acquire ownership of the subject lot
by prescription, and that neither Basilisa nor respondents
repudiated their co-ownership.
Anent the third assignment of error, petitioners argue that Alejandra
Lazaro, being a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land and not
simply a builder in good faith, is entitled to a partition of the subject
residential house.
At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to
argue that Basilisa's alleged sworn statement is a declaration against
interest. It is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an
admission against interest.1avvphi1
Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against
interest and declarations against interest. Admissions against
interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity
with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are
admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. 15
Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is
neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary
evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are
admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 16 In
the present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-
interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter's legal interest, the
former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly executed,
should be considered as an admission against interest.
A cursory reading of the subject sworn statement also reveals that it
refers to a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 10678 while the
property being disputed is Lot No. 10676. 17 On this basis, it cannot
be concluded with certainty that the property being referred to in
the sworn statement is the same property claimed by petitioners.
Having made the foregoing observations and discussions, the
question that arises is whether the subject sworn statement,
granting that it refers to the property being disputed in the present
case, can be given full faith and credence in view of the issues raised
regarding its genuineness and due execution.
The Court rules in the negative.
Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public
have in their favor the presumption of regularity. 18 However, this
presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.19
Moreover, not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule
on authentication.20 Thus, an affidavit does not automatically
become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. 21
The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be
affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization
was regular.22
However, a question involving the regularity of notarization as well
as the due execution of the subject sworn statement of Basilisa
would require an inquiry into the appreciation of evidence by the
trial court. It is not the function of this Court to review, examine and
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. A
question of fact would arise in such event. Settled is the rule that
questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 58
the Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration. 23 The
rationale behind this doctrine is that a review of the findings of fact
of the trial courts and the appellate tribunal is not a function this
Court normally undertakes.24 The Court will not weigh the evidence
all over again unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower
courts are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion. 25 Although there are
recognized exceptions26 to this rule, none exists in the present case
to justify a departure therefrom.
Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded by
law to notarized documents. While indeed, a notarized document
enjoys this presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a
guarantee of the validity of its contents. 27 As earlier discussed, the
presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 The presumption cannot be
made to apply to the present case because the regularity in the
execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings
below where its prima facie validity was overthrown by the highly
questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly
executed, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on
the improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as well as on
the physical condition of the signatory, at the time the questioned
document was supposedly executed. The trial and appellate courts
were unanimous in giving credence to the testimonies of these
witnesses. The Court has repeatedly held that it will not interfere
with the trial court's determination of the credibility of witnesses,
unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted.29 The reason for this is that the trial
court was in a better position to do so, because it heard the
witnesses testify before it and had every opportunity to observe
their demeanor and deportment on the witness stand. 30
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to reverse the
rulings of the MTCC, the RTC and the CA. Although the questioned
sworn statement is a public document having in its favor the
presumption of regularity, such presumption was adequately
refuted by competent witnesses.
The Court further agrees with the ruling of the RTC that:
The testimony of [the notary public] Atty. Angel Respicio did not
suffice to rebut the evidence of the appellees considering his
admission that the affidavit was already thumbmarked when
presented to him by one who claimed to be Basilisa Santos and
whom, the witness said he did not know personally. Further, what
makes the documents suspect is the fact that it was subscribed on
the same date as the financial statement of Alejandra Santos.
It may not be amiss to point out, at this juncture, that the principal
function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. 31 When a
notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a
document under his hand and seal, he gives the document the force
of evidence.32 Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents
to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the
solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of
documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without
further proof of their execution and delivery. 33 A notarial document
is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed before a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. 34 Hence, a notary public must
discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity. 35 A notary public should not
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 59
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.36
In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost
diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person executing
the said sworn statement. However, the notary public did not
comply with this requirement. He simply relied on the affirmative
answers of the person appearing before him attesting that she was
Basilisa Santos; that the contents of the sworn statement are true;
and that the thumbmark appearing on the said document was hers.
However, this would not suffice. He could have further asked the
person who appeared before him to produce any identification to
prove that she was indeed Basilisa Santos, considering that the said
person was not personally known to him, and that the thumbmark
appearing on the document sought to be notarized was not affixed
in his presence. But he did not. Thus, the lower courts did not
commit any error in not giving evidentiary weight to the subject
sworn statement.
The second and third assigned errors proceed on the presumption
that petitioners are co-owners of the disputed property. Since the
Court has already ruled that the lower courts did not err in finding
that petitioners failed to prove their claim that they were co-owners
of the said property, there is no longer any need to discuss the other
assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 21, 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63321 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Pan Pacific Industrial Sales v CA, G.R. No. Associated Bank (the Bank) as security for the latter’s loan
accommodation.11
125283, February 10, 2006
Shortly, by virtue of the Special Power of Attorney, Cruz obtained a
TINGA, J.:
loan in the amount of ₱500,000.00 from the Bank. Thus, he
Petitioner Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. (Pan Pacific) filed the
executed a Real Estate Mortgage12 over the subject lot in favor of the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2
Bank.13
dated 4 June 1996 of the Court of Appeals Fourteenth Division in
Capistrano and Cruz then executed a letter-agreement dated 23
C.A. G.R. No. CV-41112. The challenged Decision affirmed in toto the
September 1982 whereby Cruz agreed to buy the subject lot for the
Decision3 dated 24 April 1992 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
price of ₱350,000.00, of which ₱200,000.00 would be paid out of
Manila, Branch 18 in Civil Case No. 88-46720.
the loan secured by Cruz, and the balance of ₱150,000.00 in eight
The case arose when on 22 December 1988, private respondent
(8) quarterly payments of ₱18,750.00 within two (2) years from 30
Nicolas Capistrano (Capistrano) filed an Amended Complaint 4 before
October 1982, without need of demand and with interest at 18% in
the RTC of Manila against Severo C. Cruz III (Cruz), his spouse
case of default.14
Lourdes Yap Miranda, and Atty. Alicia Guanzon, 5 pleading two causes
On 15 March 1983, Capistrano executed the Deed of Absolute Sale 15
of action.6
over the subject lot in favor of Cruz. Two (2) days later, on 17 March
The first cause of action is for the nullification, or alternatively, for
1983, Notary Public Vicente J. Benedicto (Benedicto) notarized the
the "rescission," of a Deed of Absolute Sale 7 covering a parcel of
deed. However, it was earlier or on 9 March 1983 that Capistrano’s
land that Capistrano owned, located at 1821 (Int.), Otis Street (now
wife, Josefa Borromeo Capistrano, signed the Marital Consent 16
Paz Guanzon Street), Paco, Manila, and covered by Transfer
evidencing her conformity in advance to the sale. The Marital
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 143599 to Cruz. 8 This is the subject lot.
Consent was also sworn to before Benedicto.
Capistrano denied having executed the deed.
Following the execution of the deed of sale, Cruz continued
The second cause of action is for the rescission of another
payments to Capistrano for the subject lot. Sometime in October
agreement with an alternative prayer for specific performance.
1985, Capistrano delivered to Cruz a Statement of Account 17 signed
Capistrano alleged that he agreed to sell another parcel of land in
by Capistrano, showing that as of 30 October 1985, Cruz’s balance
the same vicinity to Cruz. According to Capistrano, Cruz only paid
stood at ₱19,561.00 as principal, and ₱3,520.98 as interest, or a
₱100,000.00 of the stipulated purchase price, thereby leaving
total of ₱23,081.98.
₱250,000.00 still unpaid.9
Thus, in May 1987, with the mortgage on the subject lot then being
The operative facts follow.
in danger of foreclosure by the Bank, Cruz filed a case with the RTC
On 10 September 1982, Capistrano executed a Special Power of
of Manila, Branch 11, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-40647, to enjoin
Attorney10 authorizing Cruz to mortgage the subject lot in favor of
the foreclosure. Cruz impleaded Capistrano and his spouse Josefa

EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 60

Borromeo Capistrano as defendants, the title to the subject lot not
having been transferred yet to his name. 18
Cruz also devised a way to save the subject lot from foreclosure by
seeking a buyer for it and eventually arranging for the buyer to pay
the mortgage debt. Towards this end, Cruz succeeded in engaging
Pan Pacific. Thus, on 22 September 1988, Pan Pacific paid off Cruz’s
debt in the amount of ₱1,180,000.00. 19 Consequently, on 23
September
1988, the Bank executed a Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage. 20
On even date, Cruz executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 21 over the
subject lot in favor of Pan Pacific, attaching thereto the previous
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Capistrano in favor of Cruz.
Surprisingly, on 20 October 1988, Capistrano filed a Revocation of
Special Power of Attorney22 with the Register of Deeds of Manila.
Less than a week later, Capistrano sent the Register of Deeds
another letter informing said officer of his having come to know of
the sale of the subject lot by Cruz to Pan Pacific and requesting the
officer to withhold any action on the transaction. 23
Before long, in November 1988, Capistrano filed the precursory
complaint before the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. 88-46720.
Pan Pacific, which bought the subject lot from the Cruz spouses, was
allowed to intervene in the proceedings and joined Cruz, et al. in
resisting the complaint insofar as the first cause of action on the
subject lot is concerned.24
Then on 24 April 1992, a Decision was rendered by the trial court in
favor of Capistrano on both causes of action, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, Severo E. (sic) Cruz III, his spouse,
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 61
Lourdes Miranda Cruz, and the intervenor, Pan Pacific Industrial
Sales Co., Inc., as follows:
1. Declaring the Letter-Agreement, dated September 23,
1982, Exhibit "C", as resolved and/or rescinded;
2. Declaring both the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "H", and
the document entitled, "Marital Consent", Exhibit "K", null
and void;
3. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the
spouses Severo C. Cruz, III and Lourdes Miranda Cruz in
favor of the intervenor, Pan Pacific Industrial Sales, Co., Inc.,
Exhibit "8", null and void;
4. Making the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on November 23, 1988, permanent;
5. Ordering the intervenor, thru its legal counsel and
corporate secretary, Atty. Senen S. Burgos, who has
possession of the owner’s copy of TCT No. 143599 of the
Register of Deeds of Manila, in the name of the plaintiff, to
surrender the same to this Court within ten days from
finality of the decision for turn over to the plaintiff;
6. Ordering Defendant Register of Deeds of Manila to reject
and not give due course to the documents submitted to it,
which have for their purpose the transfer of the real estate
property covered by TCT No. 143599 from the name of the
plaintiff to Defendant Cruz and/or to the intervenor; and
7. Ordering the spouses Severo C. Cruz, III and Lourdes
Miranda Cruz to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱69,561.00 as
net amount due to the latter as per the computation in the
end-part of this decision.
The counterclaims of both Severo C. Cruz, III and spouse, and of the
intervenor, Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc., are both dismissed,
for lack of merit.
Double costs against the defendants-Cruz spouses.
SO ORDERED.25
To arrive at the conclusion that the first Deed of Absolute Sale and
the Marital Consent are spurious, the trial court mainly relied on
Capistrano’s disavowal of his signature and that of his wife’s,
together with extrinsic factors which in its opinion evinced the
spuriousness.
Pan Pacific and the Cruz spouses interposed separate appeals to the
Court of Appeals, their common concern being the trial court’s
finding that the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Marital Consent were
spurious.26
In assailing this finding, Pan Pacific and the Cruz spouses contended
that Capistrano failed to present clear and convincing evidence to
overturn the presumption of regularity of public documents like the
documents in question.27
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. Concerning the
subject lot, it held that while a notarial document cannot be
disproved by the mere denial of the signer, the denial in this case
should be taken together with the other circumstances of the case
which in sum constitute clear and convincing evidence sufficient to
overcome the presumption of regularity of the documents. 28
The Cruz spouses did not elevate the Court of Appeals’ Decision to
this Court. Thus, the RTC Decision became final as to them.
Pan Pacific, however, filed the instant Petition solely concerning the
first cause of action in the Amended Complaint. Pan Pacific contends
that the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale and Marital Consent cannot be overridden by the self-serving
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 62
testimony of Capistrano. It stresses that the trial court cannot rely
on irrelevant extrinsic factors to rule against the genuineness of the
deed.29 Finally, it points out that Capistrano cannot contest the sale
of the subject lot to Cruz, as the sale had already been
consummated.30
For his part, Capistrano posits in his Memorandum 31 that Pan Pacific
is not an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith as Cruz was
never the registered owner of the subject lot. Pan Pacific was bound
at its peril to investigate the right of Cruz to transfer the property to
it. Moreover, Capistrano asserts that the legal presumption of
regularity of public documents does not obtain in this case as the
documents in question were not properly notarized. He adds that
the parties never appeared before the notary public as in fact the
deed had only been delivered by Capistrano to the house of Cruz’s
mother.
Furthermore, Capistrano maintains that his spouse’s signature on
the Marital Consent is a forgery as it was virtually impossible for her
to have signed the same. Lastly, Capistrano disputes Cruz’s assertion
that the sale had been consummated, pointing out that the
Amended Complaint consisted of two (2) causes of action pertaining
to two (2) separate lots, and Cruz had only paid ₱100,000.00 of the
total price of the lot subject of the second cause of
action.1avvphil.net
The petition is imbued with merit.
Pan Pacific disputes the common conclusion reached by the courts
below that the presumption of regularity of the Deed of Absolute
Sale and the Marital Consent, which in its estimation are both public
documents, has been rebutted by Capistrano’s countervailing
evidence. The correctness of the conclusions on the alleged
spuriousness of the documents in question drawn by the courts
below from the facts on record is before this Court. The issue is a
question of law cognizable by the Court.32
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that notarial
documents celebrated with all the legal requisites under the
safeguard of a notarial certificate is evidence of a high character and
to overcome its recitals, it is incumbent upon the party challenging it
to prove his claim with clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant evidence.33
A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon
it with respect to its due execution, and it has in its favor the
presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence
so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the
falsity of the certificate. Absent such, the presumption must be
upheld. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due
execution of a notarial document lies on the one contesting the
same. Furthermore, an allegation of forgery must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of
proving the same.34
Evidently, as he impugns the genuineness of the documents,
Capistrano has the burden of making out a clear-cut case that the
documents are bogus. The courts below both concluded that
Capistrano had discharged this burden. However, this Court does not
share the conclusion. Indeed, Capistrano failed to present evidence
of the forgery that is enough to overcome the presumption of
authenticity.
To support the allegation of the spuriousness of his signature on the
Deed of Absolute Sale and that of his wife on the Marital Consent,
Capistrano relied heavily on his bare denial, at the same time taking
sanctuary behind other circumstances which supposedly cast doubt
on the authenticity of the documents. Capistrano did not bother to
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 63
present corroborating witnesses much less an independent expert
witness who could declare with authority and objectivity that the
challenged signatures are forged. It befuddles the Court why both
the courts below did not find this irregular considering that the
Court has previously declared in Sy Tiangco v. Pablo and Apao,,35
"that the execution of a document that has been ratified before a
notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged
signer."
The case of Chilianchin v. Coquinco36 also finds application in this
regard wherein we stated that:
As the lower court correctly said, the plaintiff did not even present a
sample of his authentic signature to support his contention that it is
not his the (sic) signature appearing in said document. He did not
call a handwriting expert to prove his assertion. His attorney, at the
beginning of the trial, made it of record that if the defendant
present an expert in hand-writing to show that the signature in
question is genuine, the plaintiff will also present an expert to the
contrary, as if it were incumbent upon the defendant to show that
the signature of the plaintiff in Exhibit A is genuine . . . . 37
Corollarily, he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a
public document bears the responsibility to present evidence to that
effect. Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. At the very least, he should
present corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he
should present an expert witness.
On the other hand, the Court cannot understand why an
unfavorable inference arose not from Capistrano’s but from Cruz’s
failure to have the documents examined by an expert witness of the
National Bureau Investigation (NBI) and to present the notary public
as witness. Specifically, the courts below took Cruz’s inability to
obtain the NBI examination of the documents as he had somehow
undertaken as an indication that the documents are counterfeit. 38
The courts below may have forgotten that on Capistrano lies the
burden to prove with clear and convincing evidence that the
notarized documents are spurious. Nothing in law or jurisprudence
reposes on Cruz the obligation to prove that the documents are
genuine and duly executed. Hence it is not incumbent upon Cruz to
call the notary public or an expert witness. In contrast, Capistrano
should have called the expert witness, the notary public himself or
the witnesses to the document to prove his contention that he
never signed the deed of sale, that its subscribing witnesses never
saw him sign the same, and that he never appeared before the
notary public before whom the acknowledgment was made.
In fact, there is no evidence that the notarization of the documents
did not take place. All that Capistrano could say on this matter was
that he had not seen Benedicto, the notary public. 39 The assertion
that the parties to the deed never appeared before the notary
public is not supported by evidence either. The courts below drew
an inference to that effect from Cruz’s testimony that the deed of
sale was dropped or delivered to his mother’s house. 40 That is not a
reasonable deduction to make as it is plainly conjectural. No
conclusion can be derived therefrom which could destroy the
genuineness of the deed. The testimony means what it declares:
that the copy of the deed was dropped at the house of Cruz’s
mother. That is all.
Nor can the Court lend credence to the thinking of the courts below
that since Cruz had a balance of ₱132,061.00 owing to Capistrano as
of the date of the deed of sale, the latter could not have possibly
executed the deed. This is plain guesswork. From the existence of
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 64
Cruz’s outstanding balance, the non-existence of the deed of sale
does not necessarily follow.
Indeed, a vendor may agree to a deed of absolute sale even before
full payment of the purchase price. Article 1478 of the Civil Code
states that "the parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing
shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price." A
sensu contrario, the parties may likewise stipulate that the
ownership of the property may pass even if the purchaser has not
fully paid the price.
The courts below also assigned an adverse connotation to Cruz’s
impleading of the Capistrano spouses as party-defendants in the
action against the Bank to enjoin the foreclosure of the mortgage on
the subject lot. Cruz’s move is congruent with both his strong desire
to protect his interest in the subject lot and the reality that there
was an existing deed of sale in his favor. Precisely, his interest in the
lot is borne out and had arisen from the deed of sale. As purchaser
of the lot, he had to avert the foreclosure of the mortgage thereon.
And to ensure against the dismissal of the action for failure to join a
real party-in-interest, he had to implead Capistrano in whose name
the title to the subject lot was registered still.
Apart from Capistrano’s abject failure to overcome the presumption
of regularity and genuineness with which the Deed of Absolute Sale
is impressed as a public document, Capistrano’s cause is eviscerated
by his own acts in writing before and after the execution of the
deed. Said written acts constitute indelible recognition of the
existence and genuineness of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
First is the letter-agreement 41 dated 23 September 1982 made and
signed by Capistrano in favor of Cruz, which the latter also signed
subsequently, stating that Cruz will, as he did, purchase the subject
lot for ₱350,000.00 to be paid according to the terms provided
therein.
Second is the Statement of Account 42 signed by Capistrano, which he
delivered to Cruz, showing that as of 30 October 1985, Cruz’s
balance of the stipulated purchase price consisted of ₱19,561.00 as
principal and ₱3,520.98 as interest, or a total of ₱23,081.98.
Third is Capistrano’s Amended Complaint itself which illustrates his
own manifest uncertainty as to the relief he was seeking in court. He
demanded that the Deed of Absolute Sale be nullified yet he prayed
in the same breath for the "rescission" of the same 43 —evidently, a
self-defeating recognition of the contract. In asking for "rescission,"
Capistrano obviously was invoking Article 1191 of the Civil Code
which provides that the "power to rescind," which really means to
resolve or cancel, is implied in reciprocal obligations "in case one of
the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him."
When a party asks for the resolution or cancellation of a contract it
is implied that he recognizes its existence. A non-existent contract
need not be cancelled.
These are unmistakable written admissions of Capistrano that he
really intended to sell the subject lot to Cruz and that he received
payments for it from the latter as late as the year 1985. It is thus a
little baffling why in 1988, he decided to disown the Deed of
Absolute Sale. The most plausible explanation for his sudden change
of mind would be his belated realization that he parted with the
subject lot for too small an amount (₱350,000.00), compared to the
price pegged by Cruz (₱1,800,000.00) in the sale to Pan Pacific.
Now, to the Marital Consent. The fact that the document contains a
jurat, not an acknowledgment, should not affect its genuineness or
that of the related document of conveyance itself, the Deed of
Absolute Sale. In this instance, a jurat suffices as the document only
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 65
embodies the manifestation of the spouse’s consent, 44 a mere
appendage to the main document.
The use of a jurat, instead of an acknowledgement does not elevate
the Marital Consent to the level of a public document but instead
consigns it to the status of a private writing. 45 The lack of
acknowledgment, however, does not render a deed invalid. The
necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or
extinguish real rights over immovable property, as mandated by
Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is only for convenience; it is not
essential for validity or enforceability.46
From the perspective of the law on evidence, however, the
presumption of regularity does not hold true with respect to the
Marital Consent which is a private writing. It is subject to the
requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court which states:
Section 20. Proof of private document.- Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which is
claimed to be.
The requirement of proof of the authenticity of the Marital Consent
was adequately met, in this case, through the testimony of Cruz to
the effect that, together with the other witnesses to the document,
he was present when Capistrano’s wife affixed her signature thereon
before notary public Benedicto. 47 Viewed against this positive
declaration, Capistrano’s negative and self-serving assertions that his
wife’s signature on the document was forged because "(i)t is too Delfin v Billones, G.R. No. 146550, March 17,
beautiful" and that his wife could not have executed the Marital
2006
Consent because it was executed on her natal day and she was
TINGA, J.:
somewhere else, crumble and become unworthy of belief.
This treats of the petition for review on certiorari assailing the
That the Marital Consent was executed prior to the Deed of
Decision1 and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
Absolute Sale also does not indicate that it is phoney. A fair
54035 entitled Presentacion D. Billones, et al. v. Felipa Delfin, et al.,
assumption is that it was executed in anticipation of the Deed of
promulgated on 13 October 2000 and 26 December 2000,
Absolute Sale which was accomplished a scant six (6) days later.
respectively, which reversed the 27 May 1996 Decision of the
With respect to whatever balance Cruz may still owe to Capistrano,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 of Roxas City.
the Court believes that this is not a concern of Pan Pacific as the
The antecedents are as follows:
latter is not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale between
On 29 July 1960, a Deed of Absolute Sale 2 over Lot No. 213, covered
Capistrano and Cruz. But of course, Pan Pacific should enjoy full
by RO-5563 (14516) of the Cadastral Survey of Panitan, Capiz, was
entitlement to the subject lot as it was sold to him by Cruz who
executed by Teresa Daños, Esperanza Daradar, Estrella Daradar and
earlier had acquired title thereto absolutely and unconditionally by
Maria Daradar, with the marital consent of Cipriano Degala, husband
virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Otherwise laid down, Cruz had
of Teresa Daños, in favor of the spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa
the right to sell the subject lot to Pan Pacific in 1988, as he in fact
Belo (spouses Delfin). The document, so it appears, bore the
did. Thus, the question of whether or not Pan Pacific is a purchaser
signatures of Esperanza and Estrella, as well as the thumb marks of
in good faith should be deemed irrelevant.1avvphil.net
Teresa, Maria, and Cipriano, and was acknowledged before a notary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 4 June
public. On 18 November 1980, the spouses Delfin registered the
1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41112 is REVERSED
Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds of the Province of
and SET ASIDE. Respondent Nicolas Capistrano is ordered to
Capiz. Thereupon, a new title, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
surrender the owner’s duplicate certificate of Transfer of Certificate
T-17071, was issued in the name of the spouses Delfin. 3
of Title No. 143599 to the Register of Deeds of Manila to enable the
Meanwhile, on 26 March 1965, an Extra-Judicial Partition and
issuance of a new title over the subject lot in the name of petitioner
Absolute Deed of Sale4 involving Lot No. 3414 then covered by TCT
Pan Pacific Industrial Sales, Inc. Costs against respondent Nicolas
No. T-16804 was made between Teresa Daños, Trinidad Degala,
Capistrano.
Leopoldo Degala, Presentacion Degala, Rosario Degala and Pedro
SO ORDERED.
Degala, on one part, and the spouses Delfin, on the other. The deed,
bearing either the thumb marks or the signatures of the sellers, was
likewise notarized. Said document was registered by the spouses

EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 66

Delfin on 24 June 1980. Thus, TCT No. T-16804 covering Lot No.
3414 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16805, was issued in
the names of the spouses Delfin on 24 June 1980. 5
The spouses Delfin then consolidated Lots No. 213 and No. 3414 and
subdivided the resulting lot into six (6) smaller lots. 6 Lot No. 1,
covered by TCT No. T-19618, was sold to Roberto Delfin on 21
October 1989; Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-19619 to Recio Daños
on 25 April 1985; Lot No. 3 covered by TCT No. T-19620 to Gina
Maalat on 14 June 1989, and; Lot No. 4 covered by TCT No. T-19621
to Shirley Tamayo on 11 August 1989. Lot No. 5 remained with the
spouses Delfin, while Lot No. 6 was used as an access road. 7
On 12 April 1994, herein respondents, claiming to be the heirs of the
former owners of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414, filed an action for
annulment, reconveyance, recovery of ownership and possession
and damages.8 According to them, it was only in 1989 9 when they
discovered that Teresa Daños, sick and in dire need of money, was
constrained to mortgage the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 3414
to the spouses Delfin for P300.00 sometime in 1965.10 Taking
advantage of her condition, the spouses Delfin made her sign a
document purporting to be a mortgage, but which turned out to be
an extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale. As to Lot No.
213, respondents averred that the Deed of Sale covering the
property was fictitious and the signatures and thumb marks
contained therein were all forged because three (3) of the
signatories therein died before the alleged sale in 1960, namely:
Estrella Daradar, who died in 1934, and Esperanza Daradar and
Cipriano Degala, who both died in 1946. 11 As proof thereof,
respondents presented certifications12 on the deaths of Esperanza
Daradar and Cipriano Degala by the Local Civil Registrar of Panitan,
Capiz.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 67
To counter respondents’ arguments, petitioners alleged that
respondents’ action was already barred by prescription and laches.
Further, they argued that the spouses Delfin, as well as the
subsequent owners of the subject properties, are innocent
purchasers for value and in good faith, whose titles to the lots at the
time of the purchase were all clean and free from liens and
encumbrances.13 The documents
evidencing the conveyance of the properties were personally and
unilaterally executed by the vendors-signatories therein without any
intervention from the spouses Delfin, and duly acknowledged before
a notary public, petitioners averred.14
Giving credence to the claims of petitioners, the trial court ruled
that respondents’ claim of ownership over the subject properties
was not established by a preponderance of evidence. Compared to
respondents’ verbal claims of ownership, the spouses Delfin were
able to prove that they bought the properties from the original
owners, the trial court added. The trial court held that the deeds of
sale being duly executed notarial and public documents, they enjoy
the presumption of regularity which can only be contradicted by
clear and convincing evidence. In addition, respondents’ claims
based on fraud were barred by prescription, having been filed more
than four (4) years from the time the instruments were registered
with the Register of Deeds, and they are estopped from annulling
the documents by reason of laches, the action having been filed 15
years after the deeds were registered. The trial court also denied
respondents’ claims for damages.15
Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the ruling of the trial court. In its Decision, 16 the Court of
Appeals ruled that while an action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, such
prescriptive period does not apply if the person claiming to be the
owner of the property is in possession thereof, such as respondents
in this case.17 Moreover, considering that a similar action for
reconveyance was filed by respondents as early as 1989 which was
eventually dismissed without prejudice, respondents’ action to
annul the two (2) deeds on the ground of fraud has not yet
prescribed, according to the Court of Appeals. 18
The appellate court annulled the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of
Sale covering Lot No. 3414. The appellate court noted that: (i) Teresa
Daños was a very old and sickly woman; (ii) she and her children
lacked formal education to fully comprehend the document to
which they affixed their signatures and/or thumb marks; (iii)
P300.00 was inadequate consideration for a lot consisting of 1,565
square meters even in 1965; (iv) respondents were allowed to
remain in the subject properties; and (v) the questioned document
was registered in the name of the spouses Delfin 15 years after the
alleged date of its execution, when most of the alleged vendors have
already died. These circumstances surrounding the execution of the
said document show that the real intention was merely to secure
the loan of P300.00. Thus, what took place was in fact, an equitable
mortgage and not a sale.19
As for Lot No. 213, the Court of Appeals held that the Deed of
Absolute Sale could not have been executed on 9 July 1960. Relying
on the certifications of death presented by respondents, the Court
of Appeals ruled that the defense of due execution cannot prevail
over the fact that two (2) of the signatories therein have already
died prior to said date.20 Roberto Delfin, Recio Daños, Gina Maalat,
and Shirley Tamayo, buyers of the subdivided lot, could not be
considered as purchasers in good faith nor entitled to be protected
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 68
in their rights because they were informed by respondents prior to
the purchase that they, and not the spouses Delfin, are the real
owners of the lots, the appellate court added. 21
The Court of Appeals thus ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court of Roxas City, Capiz, Branch 15 presided over by Judge Roger
B. Patricio is hereby REVERSED and SET SIDE and a new one entered:
(1) Annulling the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 26, 1965 and Deed of Absolute
Sale dated July 9, 1960;
(2) Reinstating OCT No. RO-5563 (14516) referring to Lot
213 registered in the names of Teresa Daños (1/2 portion),
and the children of Lucia Daños, namely: Esperanza Daradar,
Estrella Daradar and Maria Daradar (1/2 pro-indiviso) and
OCT No. (4650) RO-5529 referring to Lot 3414 registered in
the names of the late spouses Cipriano Degala and Teresa
Daños, and canceling the TCTs issued thereafter;
(3) Ordering plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, to
pay defendant Felipa Belo Delfin the amount of P300.00
within thirty (30) days from the date of finality of this
decision;
(4) Ordering defendants-appellees to free Lots 3414 and 213
from any and all obligations and encumbrances that may
have been attached to both lots and thereafter to deliver
possession of the same to plaintiffs-appellants; and
(5) Ordering defendants-appellees, jointly and severally, to
pay plaintiffs-appellants P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and [sic] for attorney’s fees and P10,000.00 as litigation
expenses.
Costs against defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.22
In the present petition for review under Rule 45, petitioners claim
that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondents retained
possession of the subject properties. Moreover, petitioners posit
that respondent’s allegations of fraud and forgery confine their
action to a four (4)-year prescriptive period which has long expired.
Additionally, they argue that respondents failed to: (i) prove the
inadequacy of the selling price of Lot No. 3414; (ii) prove the frail
condition of Teresa Daños; (iii) show that fraud attended the sale of
Lot No. 213; (iv) show that Roberto Delfin, Recio Daños, Gina Maalat
and Shirley Tamayo are not purchasers in good faith; and (v)
overcome the presumption of regularity enjoyed by the notarized
deeds of sale. Petitioners also question the award of exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees in favor of respondents. 23 On the other
hand, respondents for the most part merely reiterated the ruling of
the Court of Appeals.24
The complete resolution of the issues presented before the Court
requires a determination of facts, which this Court, not being a trier
of facts, does not normally exercise in an appeal by certiorari. 25 This
rule, however, is subject to exceptions, such as where the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are conflicting or
contradictory,26 as in the instant case.
When one’s property is registered in another’s name without the
former’s consent, an implied trust is created by law in favor of the
true owner.27 Implied trusts are those which, without being
expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction by
operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties. Meanwhile, constructive trusts
are created in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 69
unjust enrichment. They arise against one who, by fraud, duress or
abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property
which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. 28 An
action for reconveyance based upon an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten (10) years from the registration of the deed or from
the issuance of the title, registration being constructive notice to all
persons.29 However, an action for reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property
subject of the acts.30
In essence, petitioners insist that respondents failed to prove that
fraud attended the sale of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414. The Court
agrees.
A contract or conduct apparently honest and lawful must be treated
as such until it is shown to be otherwise by either positive or
circumstantial evidence.31 A duly executed contract carries with it
the presumption of validity. The party who impugns its regularity
has the burden of proving its simulation. 32 A notarized document is
executed to lend truth to the statements contained therein and to
the authenticity of the signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the
presumption of regularity which can be overturned only by clear and
convincing evidence.33
As plaintiffs in the action before the trial court, respondents have
the burden to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence,
or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that
which is offered in opposition to it. Hence, parties who have the
burden of proof must produce such quantum of evidence, with
plaintiffs having to rely on the strength of their own evidence, not
on the weakness of the defendant’s. 34
As regards Lot No. 3414, respondents specifically alleged that the
spouses Delfin "tricked the plaintiffs and their late mother into
signing a fictitious and simulated document," and that "TCT No. T-
16805 was the product of a fictitious and simulated transaction
[that] was obtained through fraud, the same should be declared null
and void".35 They claimed that the original owners of Lot No. 3414
did not intend to execute a deed of extra-judicial partition and
absolute sale but only a mortgage instrument. However, all that
respondents came out with were bare allegations that the said
owners were either old and sickly or illiterate; that the purported
selling price of P300.00 was unconscionable; and that petitioners
failed to eject respondents from the subject land, as respondents
were unable to present any evidence to substantiate their claims,
much less the charge of fraud.
Respondents did not present any witness to testify on the execution
of the deed, nor on the condition of the signatories thereto. At best,
their witnesses merely testified as to the identity of the previous
owners of the property. Worse, petitioners Presentacion Degala
Billones and Rosario Degala Demonarca, both signatories to the
subject deed, were not presented to testify on the real
circumstances surrounding the assailed transaction. As for the
selling price of P300.00, suffice it to say that respondents did not
even present a witness to testify as to its alleged unconscionability
vis-a-vis the prevailing market value of the property at the time of
the sale. Meanwhile, the belated registration of the document with
the Register of Deeds can be explained by the fact that the original
of OCT No. 4650 covering Lot No. 3414 was either lost or destroyed
and was reconstituted only in 1971, while the original copy of the
deed of sale was lost by Felipa Delfin. 36
Even respondents’ claim of possession of the subject properties has
not been sufficiently proved. This Court has uniformly held that "the
one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 70
owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title
is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of
a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be
claimed only by one who is in possession." 37 Actual possession of
land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such
a nature as those a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.38
Contrary to the appellate court’s illation, respondents have not
established possession of the subject properties. Save for the lone
testimony of Orlando Buday, a neighbor, that Rosario Degala
Daradar was the only one still residing in the properties in dispute,
no other evidence was presented to show that respondents are in
actual occupation and possession thereof. Not even Rosario herself
testified. Doubts also arise as to the veracity of respondents’ claim
of possession since respondents themselves averred in their
complaint that the spouses Delfin had immediately taken possession
of the subject properties in the same year that the sale was made,
and appropriated the produce found in the subject lots from then
on.39 Admissions made in the complaint are judicial admissions
which are binding on the party who made them and cannot be
contradicted40 absent any showing that it was made through
palpable mistake. No amount of rationalization can offset such
admission.41 By their very own admissions, it can be inferred that
respondents or their predecessors-in-interest did not exercise actual
occupancy, as they had ceased to perform acts of dominion over the
property upon the sale thereof.
Fraud may be, and often is, proved by or inferred from
circumstances, and the circumstances proved may in some cases
raise a presumption of its existence. However, while fraud may be
proved by circumstances or presumed from them, it cannot be
demonstrated by mere construction, but must be proven in all
cases.42 Respondents indeed failed to prove that fraud attended the
execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale.
Their bare and unsupported allegations are not enough to
overthrow the presumption of the validity of said agreement or to
raise the presumption of fraud.
Considering that respondents failed to establish the existence of
fraud in the spouses Delfin’s acquisition of Lot No. 3414, it cannot be
said that implied or constructive trust was created between
respondents and the spouses Delfin. The action for reconveyance of
Lot No. 3414 must fail. Further, in view of respondents’ failure to
show their valid title to Lot No. 3414 or even their occupation
thereof, the case cannot prosper even when it is viewed as one for
quieting of title.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals annulled the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 9 July 1960 covering Lot No. 213 because "one
of the vendors therein was already dead," 43 relying on the
certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar. In assailing this
declaration, petitioners once more point out that the Deed of Sale,
being a duly notarized document, should be given full faith and
credit. Also, they argue that the appellate court’s conclusion is based
on the disputable presumption that identity of names means
identity of persons.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.44 Public documents are (i) the written
official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 71
Philippines, or of a foreign country; (ii) documents acknowledged
before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (iii)
public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein. 45 Public documents may be
proved by the original copy, an official publication thereof, or a
certified true copy thereof;46 and when a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation by the
officer having legal custody of the record must state that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be.47 A duly-registered death certificate is considered a public
document and the entries found therein are presumed correct,
unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce positive
evidence establishing otherwise. 48 Nevertheless, this presumption is
disputable and is satisfactory only if uncontradicted, and may be
overcome by other evidence to the contrary.
The documents presented by respondents were mere certifications
and not the certified copies or duly authenticated reproductions of
the purported death certificates of Esperanza Daradar
and Cipriano Degala. They are not the public documents referred to
by the Rules of Court, nor even records of public documents; thus,
they do not enjoy the presumption granted by the Rules.
Respondents did not even present the local civil registrar who
supposedly issued the certifications to authenticate and identify the
same. Likewise, respondent Jolly Datar who adverted to the
certifications did not testify on how the certifications were obtained,
much less his role therein.49 As a consequence, the trial court did
not admit the certifications as independent pieces of evidence but
merely as part of the testimony of respondent Jolly Datar. 50 A
document or writing which is admitted not as an independent
evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a witness does not
constitute proof of the facts related therein. 51 Clearly then, the
certifications cannot be given probative value, and their contents
cannot be deemed to constitute proof of the facts therein stated.
More importantly, the very exhibits of respondents dispel the
presumption of regularity of the issuance of the certifications of
death relied upon by the Court of Appeals. The certifications state
that both Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala died in 1946 at
ages 24 and 63, respectively. However, a careful study of the records
of the case shows that in OCT No. RO 5563 (14516), 52 Esperanza
Daradar was already 20 years old in 1929, making her date of birth
to be sometime in 1909. This is totally incongruous with her
supposed age of 24 years in 1946, which places the year of her birth
in 1922. Likewise, the Court takes note of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31739, 53 wherein the appellate court in
its statement of facts found that Esperanza Daradar died on 10
August 1940, while Estrella Daradar died on 15 June 1943, contrary
to the claim of respondents in this case. 54 The Esperanza Daradar
named in the OCT and the one referred to in the aforesaid Decision
could not have been the same Esperanza Daradar in the Local Civil
Registrar’s certification.
As for the Cipriano’s thumb mark on the deed, suffice it to say that
his consent was not in fact needed to perfect the sale. Teresa Daños
Degala’s share in Lot 213 was paraphernal property and, under the
provisions of the Civil Code applicable at the time of the sale, she
could alienate or dispose of the said property without the
permission or consent of her husband. 55 Thus, with or without such
thumb mark, whether it was forged or not, the Deed of Absolute
Sale remains valid and effectual.
Under the circumstances, therefore, respondents were unable to
overthrow the presumption of validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 72
Said deed, as well as the titles derived as a result thereof must be
accorded respect and must remain undisturbed.
Anent the charge of bad faith on the part of petitioners, the Court
takes note of respondents’ statement in their Plaintiff-Appellants’
Brief,56 to wit:
From the facts and circumstances of this case, Lot 213 and 3414
both of Panitan Cadastre which were consolidated, into one single
lot, per consolidated plan as appearing at the back of TCT No. T-
17071, and after the two lots were consolidated, and the same was
subdivided, into six smaller lots, Lots 1, 4 and 5 thereof still
remained in the names of appellees spouses Rodolfo Delfin and
Felipa Belo, while Lots 2 and 3 thereof were transferred by the said
spouses’ appellees to Recio Daños and Gina Maalat, respectively.
These two transferees are innocent purchasers for value which
appellants admit, and this appeal is only an appeal by appellants
against defendant-appellees spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa Belo,
and not against Recio Daños and Gina Maalat. 57 (Emphasis supplied.)
In effect, contrary to the testimony of respondents’ witness Myrna
Degala-Distura that her mother warned petitioners against buying
the subject lots,58 respondents admitted that the only persons they
consider to be not innocent purchasers are the spouses Delfin.
However, in view of respondents’ failure to prove the fraud
attributed to the spouses Delfin, the Court has no choice but to
declare all petitioners to be purchasers for value and in good faith.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 13 October 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 27 May 1996 is
REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Patula v People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the State’s
evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidenceadheres to
the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty
of the crime charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded
of the judge; otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is
nullified.The accused need notadduceanythingto rebut evidence
that is discredited for failing the test.Acquittal should then follow.
Antecedents
Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in DumagueteCitythat averred:
That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997
and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Dumaguete,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then a saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain of
Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total
sum of ₱131,286.97 from several customers of said company under
the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and
deliver the collection to the said company, but far from complying
with her obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite
repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the said
company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail
to deliver the said collection to the said company but instead, did,
then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company in the
aforesaid amount of ₱131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.1
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 73
Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the information.
At pre-trial, no stipulation of factswas had, and petitioner did not
avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
The Prosecution’s first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that
he was the branch manager of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc.
(Footlucker’s) in Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994; that
petitioner was an employee of Footlucker’s, starting as a saleslady in
1996 until she became a sales representative; that as a sales
representative she was authorized to take orders from wholesale
customers coming from different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita,
Valencia, Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor),
and to collect payments from them; that she could issue and sign
official receipts of Footlucker’s for the payments, which she would
then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the
payments for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of
sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading him to confront
her; that she responded that business was slow; that he summoned
the accounting clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk discovered
erasures on some collection receipts; that he decided to subject her
to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned
from a customer of petitioner’s that the customer’s outstanding
balance had already been fully paid although that balance appeared
unpaid in Footlucker’s records; and that one night later on,
petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny having
misappropriated any money of Footlucker’s and to plead for him not
to push through with a case against her, promising to settle her
account on a monthly basis; and that she did not settle after that,
but stopped reporting to work.2
On March 7, 2002, Go’s cross examination, re-direct examination
and re-crossexamination were completed.
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan,
whomFootlucker’s employed as its store auditor since November 16,
1995 until her resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go
had requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told
him that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger
had still reflected outstandingbalances for them; that she first
conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from
Mabinay to Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor;
thatshe discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts
appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of
around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the
duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office;
that upon completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report
denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA
PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March
16-20, 1997" marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report,
petitioner had misappropriated the total amount of₱131,286.92.3
During Guivencan’s stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the
ledgers of petitioner’s various customers allegedly with
discrepancies as Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive. Each
of the ledgers had a first column that contained the dates of the
entries, a second that identified the invoices by the number, a third
that statedthe debit, a fourth that noted the credit (or the amounts
paid), and a fifth that summed the balances (debit minus
credit).Only 49 of theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by
the RTC because the 50thledger could no longer be found.
In the course of Guivencan’sdirect-examination,petitioner’s counsel
interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 74
figuresentered in Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive,
were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were
not themselves presented in court.4 With that, petitioner’s counsel
did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her
testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove
falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.
TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits,
including Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives (like the originals and
duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and issued by
petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in
auditing the accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencan’s so-
called Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies.5
After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file
a demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention to
do so, and instead rested itscase.The Prosecution and Defense
submitted their respective memoranda, and submitted the case for
decision.6
On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner
had opted "not to present evidence for her defense" the
Prosecution’s evidence remained "unrefuted and uncontroverted,"7
rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the
Court finds ANNA LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal
Code and accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an
INDETERMINATE PENALTY of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum to 18 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by
law and to indemnify private complainant the amount of
₱131,286.92 with interest at 12% per annum until fully paid and to
pay the costs.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the cash bail put up by the accused shall be effective
only until the promulgation of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied the
motion on May 7, 2004.9
Issues
Insisting that the RTC’s judgment "grossly violated [her]
Constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her because, while the charge
against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, the evidence presented against her and upon which her
conviction was based, was falsification, an offense not alleged or
included in the Information under which she was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty," and that said judgment likewise "blatantly
ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on admission of
evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial
court were all private documents, the due execution and
authenticity of which were not proved in accordance with Sec. 20 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence," petitioner has directly
appealed to the Court via petition for review on certiorari, positing
the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT
MATTER , CHARGED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B)
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE CONVICTED UPON OR
BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 75
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED
WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF
FALSIFICATION CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST
HER IS ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART.
315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS "B" TO "YY"-"YY-2", ALL
PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, THE DUE EXECUTION AND
AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH WERE NOT PROVED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20, RULE 132 OF THE SAID
REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT
SAID EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY THE
ACCUSED, A CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR ALLEGED IN
THE INFORMATION.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF KAREN GUIVENCAN
DESPITE THE OBJECTION THAT SAID TESTIMONY WHICH
TRIED TO PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED FALSIFIED EXHIBITS "B"
TO "YY"-"YY-2"INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSED’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER, FOR BEING
IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST
THE ACCUSED IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
"REMAINS UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED" DESPITE
 ACCUSED’S OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS IMMATERIAL
AND IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSE’S NOT CROSS-
EXAMINING KAREN GUIVENCAN FOR THE REASON THAT
HER TESTIMONY IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AS IT
TENDED TO PROVE AN OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN
INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE ADMISSION OF SAID
TESTIMONY AS BEING "UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED", AND WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEFENSE’S OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
WAIVED IF THE DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT EXHIBIT "A", WHICH IS THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS
COVERED BY SALESWOMAN LERIMA PATULA WITH
DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT HEARSAY AND SELF-
SERVING.10
The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:
1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to
allege the falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by
petitioner to her customersviolated petitioner’s right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting
evidence of the falsification of the duplicate receiptsdespite
the information not alleging the falsification;
3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY,
and their derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence
of petitioner’s guilt for estafaas charged despite their not
being duly authenticated;and
4. Whether or not Guivencan’stestimony onthe ledgers and
receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 76
prove petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion
wasinadmissible for being hearsay.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Failure of information to allege falsification
did not violate petitioner’s right to be informed
of thenatureand cause of the accusation
Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her Constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
when: (a) it held that the information did not have to allege her
falsification of the duplicate receipts, and (b) when it convicted her
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Codeby relying on the evidence on falsification.
The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every person accused of a
crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation, viz:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
 provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when
the information was filed in the RTC, contained the following
provisions on the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of
the accusation in the information, to wit:
Section 8.Designation of the offense.– Whenever possible, a
complaint or information should state the designation given to the
offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts or
omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such designation,
reference should be made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it. (7)
Section 9.Cause of accusation. – The acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the
statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. (8)
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and
cause of the accusation in the informationshould never be taken for
granted by the State. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense
that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To
convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint
or information would be violative of the Constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.11 Indeed, the
accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless
the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed
against him.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 77
The crime of estafacharged against petitioner was defined and
penalized by Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000
pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period if such amount is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such
amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the
four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the
following means:
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.
xxx
The elements of the offense charged were as follows:
(a) That the offender received money, goods or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such
money, goods or other personal property, or denied his part
in its receipt;
(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to
the prejudice of another; and
(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender
for the delivery or return of such money, goods or other
personal property.12
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner
misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and
later falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such
duplicates to her employer to show that the customers had paid less
than the amounts actually reflected on the original receipts.
Obviously, she committed the falsification in order to conceal her
misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the
falsificationwas not an offense separate and distinct from the
estafacharged against her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 78
her acts of falsification as its means of establishing her
misappropriation or conversion as an essential ingredient of the
crime duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was
not infringed or denied to her.
We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein
completely pleaded the estafa defined and penalized under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Codewithin the context of the
substantive lawand the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the
information to allege the acts of falsification by petitioner because
falsification was not an element of the estafacharged.
Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with
petitioner’s concern thuswise:
In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that [the]
prosecution’s evidence utterly fails to prove the crime charged.
According to the defense, the essence of Karen Guivencan’s
testimony is that the accused falsified the receipts issued to the
customers served by her by changing or altering the amounts in the
duplicates of the receipts and therefore, her testimony is immaterial
and irrelevant as the charge is misappropriation under Art. 315,
paragraph (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation
whatsoever of any falsification or alteration of amounts in the
[i]nformation under which the accused was arraigned and pleaded
NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that the testimony of Karen
Guivencan should therefore not be considered at all as it tended to
prove an offense not charged or included in the [i]nformation and
would violate [the] accused’s constitutional and statutory right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. The
Court is not in accord with such posture of the accused.
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the crime
charged in the [i]nformation is merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru
[f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could not prove
falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since the
information charges accused only of misappropriation pursuant to
Art. 315, par. (1b) of the Revised [P]enal Code, the Court holds that
there is no necessity of alleging the falsification in the Information as
it is not an element of the crime charged.
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and
Falsification will constitute as one complex crime and when they are
considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime of Estafa
Through Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to
falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from
another person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary
means of committing estafa. However, if the falsification is
committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses
of estafa and falsification are committed. In the instant case, when
accused collected payments from the customers, said collection
which was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or
erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate copies of the
receipts were contrived to conceal some amount of her collection
which she did not remit to the company xxx.13
II
Testimonial and documentary evidence,being hearsay,
did not prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the
burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to prove
each and every element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 79
necessarily included therein.14 The Prosecution must further prove
the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense.15
In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the
evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the
Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed.16
Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of
proof,17 that he must then be acquitted and set free should the
Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his
favor.In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the
accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the
Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing
the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused
as the malefactor responsible for it.
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the
information?
To establish the elements of estafaearlier mentioned, the
Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and
various documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by
petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the
ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the
corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the
payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by
Guivencan herself.18 The ledgers and receipts were marked and
formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various
duties of petitioner as Footlucker’s sales representative. On her part,
Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts
actually received by petitioner from the customersor remitted by
petitioner to Footlucker’s.This means that persons other than
Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives,
inclusive,and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries
found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the
ledgers held by Footlucker’s corresponding to each customer, as well
as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to
validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as
evidence of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion through
cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity
rendered theentire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay,
and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable
and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is
made toSection 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that
a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The
personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft ofpersonal knowledge of the
disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her
testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a
witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency
of the extrajudicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard
another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 80
whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is
not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined.
The weight of such testimony thendepends not upon theveracity of
the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the
information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be
tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness
andcannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged
to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any
difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any
obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches
herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the
burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.19 Thus, the rule
against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was
no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.20 The testimony
may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if
it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.21
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human
utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the
credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and,
therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when
made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination.
However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion
to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of
the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example,
in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the
accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is
admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but
merely to show that the accused uttered those words.22 This kind of
utterance ishearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.23 The
distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was
made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of
the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule
applies.24
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the
only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be
excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to
preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the
originaldeclarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the
transaction or occurrence.25 If hearsay is allowed, the right stands
to be denied because the declarant is not in court.26 It is then to be
stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as
evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguardinga
party’s right to cross-examine her adversary’s witness,the Rules of
Court offers two solutions. The firstsolution is to require that allthe
witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in
courtunder oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court formalizes this solution,viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination
of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open
court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of
answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a)
The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the
cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Courtensuresthis solutionthusly:
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 81
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. – Upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-
examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts
bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional
precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of
the 1987 Constitution,which guarantees that: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the
witnesses face to face xxx," the rule requiring the cross-examination
by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based
upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of
hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn
affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination
by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity
and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon
whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement
depends.27
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan’s testimony as
well as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be
entirely rejected as proof of petitioner’s misappropriation or
conversion.
III
Lack of their proper authentication rendered
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as
evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite
their being private documents that were not duly authenticated as
required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a
public document and a private document for the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, viz:
Section 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except
last wills and testaments, and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how
the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public
document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because
it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial
will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by
law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by
law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in
order to be presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private
document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a
private person without the intervention of a notary or other person
legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 82
or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public
document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document
requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules
of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement
of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one
within the context of Section 21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court;
(b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable
document have not been specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party;29 (c) when thegenuineness and authenticity of the
document
have been admitted;30 or (d) when the document is not being
offered as genuine.31
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were
private documents because private individuals executed or
generated them for private or business purposes or uses.
Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four
exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence
against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their
authentication in the manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court,viz:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. – Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it
is claimed to be.
The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the signature of
petitioner in various receipts, to wit:
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with
the original receipts, do you have copies of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but it’s not now in my
possession.
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable
Court, can you assure this
(Next Page)
ATTY ABIERA (continuing):
Honorable Court that you will be able to present those receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in this
case, Anna Lerima Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this
case?
A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts
also.
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would
present this,or offer the same as soon as the original receipts can be
presented, but for purposes only of your testimony, I’m going to
point to you a certain signature over this receipt number FLDT96
20441, a receipt from Cirila Askin, kindly go over the signature and
tell the Honorable Court whether you are familiar with the
signature?
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER:
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 83
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word
"collector".
(Next Page)
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature rather,
of the accused in this case appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the
original receipts Your Honor, because it’s quite voluminous, so we
will just forego with the testimony of the witness but we will just
present the same using the testimony of another witness, for
purposes of identifying the signature of the accused. We will
request that this signature which has been identified to by the
witness in this case be marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to
present the original copy and present the same to offer as our
exhibits but for the meantime, this is only for the purposes of
recording, Your Honor, which we request the same, the receipt
which has just been identified awhile ago be marked as our Exhibit
"A" You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit "A".
ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "A-1".
(Next Page)
COURT:
Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. "A-1". What is the number of
that receipt?
ATTY. ABIERA:
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that:
received from Cirila Askin.32
xxx
As the excerpts indicate, Go’s attempt at authentication of the
signature of petitioner on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No.
20441 (a document that was marked as Exhibit A, while the
purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-
1) immediately fizzled out after the Prosecution admitted that the
document was a meremachinecopy, not the original. Thereafter, as if
to soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution expressly promised to
produce at a later date the originalsof the receipt with serial number
FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that promise was not
even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution
offered to authenticate the signature of petitioner on the
receiptsthrougha different witness (though then still unnamed). As
matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate
both themachinecopy of the receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No.
20441 and the signature of petitioner on that receipt was wasteful
because the machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and was no
longer evenincluded in the Prosecution’s Offer of Documentary
Evidence.
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number
FLDT96 No. 20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough
Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not establishthat the
signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go
had earliersought to identify to be the signature of petitioner
(Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A). This is borne out by
the fact that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the marking
nomenclature for the machine copyof the receipt bearing serial
number FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and purposes of this case,
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 84
and used the same nomenclature to referinstead toan entirely
differentdocument entitled "List of Customers covered by ANA
LERIMA PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified
March 16-20, 1997."
In her case, Guivencan’s identification of petitioner’s signature on
two receipts based alone on the fact that the signatures contained
the legible family name of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet
another deep flaw infecting the documentary evidence against
petitioner. Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify
petitioner’s signature on the receipts either because she lacked
familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen
petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as the following
excerpts from her testimony bear out:
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation
sheet, will you go over these Miss witness?
A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the customer. The
other receipt is the one showing her payment prior to the last
payment.
COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as
Exhibit "B-3", receipt number 20441.
(Next Page)
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA: Q.How do you know that this is her signature?
The signature of the collector be marked as – A.Because we can read the Patula.34
Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the collector, We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as
are your familiar with that signature? (shown to witness) to the ledgers the Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies
A. Yes. between the amountspetitioner hadallegedly received from the
Q. Whose signature is that? customers and the amounts she had actually remitted to
A. Miss Patula. Footlucker’s. Guivencanexclusively relied on the entries of the
Q. How do you know? unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit report on petitioner’s
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula. supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of
Q. Are you familiar with her signature? independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the
A. Yes. following excerpts of her testimony show:
ATTY. ZERNA: ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "B-3- Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed
a" that this Cecilia Askin has an account of ₱10,791.75?
COURT: ATTY. DIEZ:
Mark it. The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office
ATTY. ZERNA: record.
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit "B-4" and the COURT:
signature as Exhibit "B-4-a". Let the witness answer.
COURT: WITNESS:
Mark it.33 A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and
xxx showed it to the customers for confirmation.
ATTY. ZERNA: ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 Q. What about the receipts?
issued to one Divina Cadilig. Will you please identify this receipt if COURT:
this is the receipt of your office? Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you
A.Yes. copied that amount in the ledger and you had it confirmed by the
Q.There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose customers, what was the result when you had it confirmed by the
signature is this? customers?
A.Ms. Patula. WITNESS:

EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 85

A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original
of ₱10,971.75. receipt she has still a balance.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: xxx
Q. Do you have a-what’s the basis of saying that the balance of this ATTY. ZERNA:
customer is still ₱10,971.75 The confirmation sheet ---
(Next Page) COURT:
ATTY. ZERNA (continuing): The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt in
[i]n your office? your earlier testimony? Is that what you referred to as the receipts,
COURT: the original receipts?
That was already answered pañero, the office has a ledger. A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you? Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed
A. No, Ma’am.35 that that particular customer still has a balance of Ten Thousand
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of something?
Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002) A. The receipt is no longer here.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the
Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and ledger?
the duplicate, will you please enlighten the Honorable Court on A. Yes.36
that discrepancy which you said? In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecution’s
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her evidence, it should come as no surprise that petitioner’s counsel
ledger shows a zero balance she has fully paid while in the original interposed timely objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously overruled
(Next page) the objections and allowedthe Prosecutionto present the
WITNESS (continuing): unauthenticated ledgers, as follows:
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred Ninety- (Continuation of the Direct Examination of
one Pesos and Seventy-five Centavos (10,791.75). Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)
COURT: ATTY. ZERNA:
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated there? CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already Q – Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several
forwarded to the Manila Office. ledgers. Where is it now?
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that A – It is here.
it has already a zero balance?

EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 86

Q – Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how
much is her account in your office?
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer the
question, let me interpose our objection on the ground that this
ledger has not been duly identified to by the person who made the
same. This witness will be testifying on hearsay matters because
the supposed ledger was not identified to by the person who made
the same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think
they were already duly identified by this witness. As a matter of fact,
it was she who brought them to court
(Next Page)
COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the entries is
not this witness, Your Honor. How do we know that the entries
there is (sic) correct on the receipts submitted to their office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let
the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A – It’s the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the
auditor of Footluckers.
COURT:
I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those
entries were taken. So, you answer the query of counsel.
xxx
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a continuing
objection to the questions profounded(sic) on those ledgers on the
ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.
COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.
Q – (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who prepared
the entries on those ledgers, is she still connected with Footluckers?
A – She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,
COURT:
Alright proceed.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of business. So,
exempt from the hearsay rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.37
The mystery shrouding the RTC’s soft treatment of the Prosecution’s
flawed presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to
the instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how
to prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding,
as follows:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes
it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the

EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 87

person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which
the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting
the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine
by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen
the execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely
did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and
their derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative
value as evidence. That was the onlyfair and just result, as the Court
held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires
Corporation:38
On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends
that Jeanne King’s testimony was hearsay because she had no
personal knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting
respondent’s cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice,
packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy.
Petitioner avers that even though King was personally assigned to
handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and Wires
Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated with
personal knowledge of the facts which gave rise to respondent’s
cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though she
personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets received
by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the weight
of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that respondent’s cause of action is
founded on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 88
of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to
prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets
valued at ₱67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets
delivered to and received by the importer, namely the respondent.
Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondent’s
importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal
knowledge of the volume of steel billets being imported, and
therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not
hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the
shortage in the delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not
have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even
though she prepared the summary of the received steel billets, she
based the summary only on the receipts prepared by other
persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has
no probative value even if not objected to at the trial.
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly
authenticate respondent’s documentary evidence. Under Section
20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted
in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who
executed it, the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed,
or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or
the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously
confessed execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that
King was none of the aforementioned persons. She merely made
the summary of the weight of steel billets based on the
unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the
summary of steel billets actually received had no proven real basis,
and King’s testimony on this point could not be taken at face value.
xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or
private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any of
the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.Section 20of the same law, in turn, provides that before any
private document is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondent’s
documentary exhibits are private documents. They are not among
those enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due execution and
authenticity need to be proved before they can be admitted in
evidence.With the exception concerning the summary of the
weight of the steel billets imported, respondent presented no
supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently,
they cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or
the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no
sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioner’s liability.
That the Prosecution’s evidence was left uncontested because
petitioner decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination,
and did not tender her contrary evidencewas inconsequential.
Although the trial court had overruled the seasonable objections to
Guivencan’s testimony bypetitioner’s counsel due to the hearsay
character, it could not be denied thathearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, had no probative value.39 Verily, the flaws of the
Prosecution’s evidence were fundamental and substantive, not
merely technical and procedural, and were defects that the adverse
party’s waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould not
set right or cure. Nor did the trial court’s overruling of petitioner’s
objections imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and value.
EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 89
Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the
application of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers
"were prepared in the regular course of business."40 Seemingly, the
RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or
near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the
facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping
mannerof justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable
due to the need to show the concurrence of the several requisites
before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the
hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows:
(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable
to testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in
the entries;
(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in
the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual,
moral, or religious;
(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course
of business or duty.41
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the
trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the State’s
evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to
the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty
of the crime charged upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to
do so herein nullified the guarantee of due of process of law in favor
of the accused, who had no obligation to prove her innocence.
Heracquittal should follow.
IV
No reliable evidence on damage
Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the Court
declares that the disposition by the RTC ordering petitioner to
indemnify Footlucker’s in the amount of ₱131,286.92 with interest
of 12% per annum until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually
founded. Yet, she cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that
basis. Heracquittal has to bedeclared as without prejudice to the
filing of a civil action against her for the recovery of any amount that
she may still owe to Footlucker’s.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe decision
convicting ANNA LERIMA PATULAof estafa as charged, and ACQUITS
her for failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action brought against
her for
the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of Footlucker’s Chain
of Stores, Inc.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

EVIDENCE (Rule 132 Cases) Page 90