Sometimes More is Not More: The Need for the Reform of Aid in Afghanistan

KSP Seminar
Janneke deBoer
American attitude towards crisis can often be summed up by a simple question: how much will it

cost to fix it? A pervasive notion, and one of no surprise considering our capitalist western worldview, is

that with enough money just about anything can be fixed. This can be seen in the fundraisers that

inevitably pop up in response to disasters on any level, whether it be a destructive hurricane. or the

sickness of a child. or the plight of a homeless person. However, what is often left out of this mix of good

intentions and acting on principle is accountable application of the funds generated and a consideration

for the complexities of the people being aided, especially when communities are involved. Nowhere else

can this be seen so clearly as in the current nature of American aid to Afghanistan, where both

governmental aid and NGOs have poured billions of dollars into the country in the name of

development and rebuilding. However, the continuous state of turmoil in the nation, the dominance of

corruption, and the growing dependence by local Afghans on aid are evidences of a greater lack of any

improvement, which requires the American people to investigate the heart of our aid intentions and how

to reform our means of assistance if we truly want to good for the country rather than just doing

enough to clear our guilty conscience.

In order to understand the background of this aid and the greater history that shapes the nation

receiving it, some history must be given. The concept of Afghan people being caught in the crossfires of

international conflicts is nothing new: as a land sitting between historically strong regional powers of

Persia, India, and Mongolia, the history of foreign influence in the country is largely a recurring tale of

different conquests and attempts by these nations to add to their territory by land grabbing. With the

rise of colonialism and nationalistic ambitions, western powers (especially Russia and Britain), added to

the complexity of these conquests by wishing to control Afghanistan not for the value of the region

itself, but for the influence that holding a position near the strategically important nations of India and

Iran would have towards their ambitions of mass dominance, and towards the purpose of thwarting the

potential use of the land by their Europeans rivals who would also wish for this lucrative position of
trade. More recently, the theme of the past fifty or so years has been that of the rise of nationalist

insurgency groups as a response to Western influence, and the Western response of sending anti-

insurgency forces with the effect of yet further increasing Western influence, and Western destruction.

The heart of this story, and the reason for current relationship of both dependence and suspicion

between American and Afghan peoples, begins with the war on Afghanistan that was declared by

America following September 11, 2001. For the last 17 years, America has had feet (and guns) on

Afghan soil in efforts to rebut the Taliban. Sadly, the people who have suffered in the midst of this tug-

and-pull of power are not the people with the guns, but the people who call the land Afghanistan their

home: the humble civilian. It was estimated in October 2017 that 31,419 civilians and 30,470 Afghan

military and police have been killed, compared to the 2,371 and 1,136 casualties by American and Allied

soldiers, respectively (Afghanistan War). The American response to the guilt for this loss of life, as well

as the loss of infrastructure and community caused by the destruction and unrest of constant war, has

been to send aid—and lots of it.

Since the start of the war, America has sent billions of dollars in aid to fund everything from

government development contracts, to infrastructure development, to school construction, to

empowerment programs. According to the website ForeignAssistance.gov, the year 2016 marked a

record high spending year in which $7.24 billion were spent in aid by the American government alone

(Foreign Assistance). Let that sink in a bit. In a country that has, according to World Bank data from

2017, a total GPD of $20.815 billion, sums of money equaling 34.7% of the country’s own earnings

flowing into the country cannot be healthy for the sustainable development of the country (World

Bank). And it is not, as audits on much of the Afghan aid projects have revealed repeatedly. Corruption

among officials and contractors is rife, and even where projects are executed according to plan, lack of

foresight and planning for upkeep usually mean that maintenance and repairs are neglected, resulting in

dereliction and premature disuse of the project (whatever it may be). Many of these abuses are made

possible by lack of clearly stated objectives, and the lack of development of any means of quantifiable

tracking or accountability system for money management and project execution. A recent SIGAR
(Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) audit, for example, revealed that while the

Pentagon had been noted to have spent almost $460 million on projects aimed at building the

intelligence of the Afghan army, they had no way of tracking their projects’ progress because “of a lack

of performance metrics” (Task and Purpose). How does one spend millions of dollars in investment

money without instituting even basic measures of return or efficacy? The whole aid process wreaks of a

churlish attitude of “throw some money at it and call it good.”

American aid has also been directed towards humanitarian efforts, such as women’s aid and

infrastructure, where failed goals signify money squandered and corruption vitalized that is being

fueled—not even in the name of military—but by through the name and emotional appeal of Afghan

needs. This carelessness and extortion of real people’s situations that American military had no small

part in creating is especially brazen. A women’s program called Promoting Gender Equity in National

Priority Programs (Promote) stands as an example. The 5-year, $216 million with a goal to bring

75,000 Afghan women into the workplace was announced in July 2013. A SIGAR audit released in

September 2018, however, opens with the less-than-optimistic statement, “after 3 years and $89.7

million spent, USAID/Afghanistan has not fully assessed the extent to which Promote is meeting its

overarching goal”, and later stated that the estimated numbers of women being assisted in joining the

workplace is only a fraction of their initial goal (SIGAR). In this statement, the audit affirms that this

humanitarian effort is subject to the same faults that have characterized much of the reports of aid

efforts in Afghanistan: poor accountability and negligence.

SIGAR, an independent agency which was established by Congress in 2008 to provide objective

oversight on the progress of redevelopment in Afghanistan, has not held back their concerns about the

progress of the humanitarian program (SIGAR About). In the report, its stated three main concerns: (1)

USAID made extensive changes and omissions to the stated goals and objectives of the project in since

its beginning, limiting the ability to assess the components’ performance over time, (2) the USAID did

not perform a baseline report from which to compare progress until two years into the project, thus

compromising the project by limiting the source for original comparison, (3) USAID deviated from the
original intent of the program by increasing the number of projected participants, without having

results to warrant this increase in projections (SIGAR). All three of these major concerns express the

lack of accountability and a sense of timely responsibility.

More concerning than this lack of official accountability is the fact that very few Afghan women

are actually feeling the benefits of all of this money, confirming the inefficacy of Promote’s huge

investment. In speaking about Promote, the inspector general said, "An end-of-program performance

indicator target for one component is for 2,100 women to find new or better employment with the

Afghan government—as of September 2017, USAID said 55 women did" (Free Beacon). Of the $89.7

million spent on the project so far, 18% of the total cost so far has gone towards official overhead and

security fees, and much more than that has gone towards ineffective meetings and empowerment

workshops that have not provided women with long-term skills (NY Times). Rula Ghani, Afghanistan’s

first lady, made a statement apparently critiquing this program, saying in Washington D.C. , “Women

don’t need workshops and certificates. They need real, hard skills” (WSJ). Unfortunately, a stack of

hundred dollar bills and a strict timeline is not going to stand at the front of a classroom, or work over a

period of time with apprentices to teach skills.

This leaves the problem of what to do. Should all aid efforts be halted? Should they be relegated

to NGOs? Or is there perhaps a deeper underlying problem that besets not only the government

mindset, but also the mindset of Western culture as a whole which prevents their “valiant” efforts from

being effective? While some might like the idea of halting aid immediately, the disruption by abruptness

would leave a great danger of a power vacuum and further instability. Leaving the responsibility of aid

to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would also do little to relieve misspending and failure to

accomplish effective measures. Because most NGOs are based and funded in the West, they rely on

funds from the West, which means that ultimately their work will be whatever tugs on the heartstrings

of donors, without considering the wants or actual needs of the Afghan communities they are proposing

to help. First Lady Rula Ghani said in an interview in June 2018, “[NGOs] They’re also not really

trying to work with us as partners… they always come in with the idea that they know better, that
they’ll tell Afghans what to do. It doesn’t work like that in Afghanistan… There is maybe two-thirds of

[aid-workers and NGOs] that think they know everything, and they're here to help, to teach, and to tell

[Afghans] what to do. And so they really create more harm than good” (BRIGHT). This aloofness and

lack of consideration that she speaks of plagues the work of NGOs—with acts such as going into

villages who have met and developed village development plans and “helping” by building the items that

the NGO feels like building rather than consulting the locals who live in the village—which further

tarnishes relations between Westerners and Afghani people (Devex). In summary, she said, “It's

basically a question of attitude. You cannot see a problem and tell people, “well, you know, you're doing

all this wrong” (Devex). Ultimately, the problem with both governmental and NGO aid, is this attitude

of aloofness and lack of consideration or real relationships with the people purportedly being helped.

How then can we change our attitude of giving towards Afghan people (and any people that

have suffered from the effects of disaster or war)? First of all, we should recognize their society’s core

values. Ghani responded to this question by naming a core aspect of Afghan culture:

“The Afghan culture is very much about deliberation in groups — the “shuras,” the “jirgas.” It's

creating a sense of community, but you don't see the internationals promoting that… We're

coming out of three decades of war, we are in a post-conflict situation, where society has been

totally broken. What you need to do is try and bring society back together.” (Devex)

In other words, what needs to be focused on is building relationships with them, listening to them, and

working WITH them. Of course, this human-human oriented approach is much more difficult than

simply writing a check, following our preconceived notions of what a society “needs” in order to

improve; in no part because the change is not going to be immediate. For real development to occur,

time and relationships with individuals will be required. No five-year plan or elaborate data projection

will ultimately have an effective human impact. What is necessary is to listen to Ghani’s exhortation to

the Western world when she says the attitude we should take is more akin to saying “OK, technology's

good. It's not bad, but please let's not forget the human being. It's the human touch that's really very

important” (Devex).
 As Christians especially, this exhortation should ring true to us. Jesus did not go around writing

checks or telling people to fix their lives STAT. Instead, he built relationships with the tax collectors

and the untouchables as they were. He talked to the woman at the well. He went out to the needy and

the sick. Take even the development of the Church. The Church grew, not because of growth

projections by the apostles or by detailed project analyses and funding campaigns, but because of faithful

believers who walked the miles to and with different peoples, and listened to their cultural

understandings, their strengths, and their weaknesses—and then worked on building them up from

their own level. As Christians, we should recognize the value of recognizing the validity of other human

beings when working with them. How can we not, if we affirm that we are all men and women created

in the Image of God?

One last practical bit of advice that First Lady Ghani provided that would serve to answer the

question of what Westerners should be doing in Afghanistan is this: “Local NGOs should become local

institutions. International aid [groups] have to work with the government and instead of saying, “we

have a strategy and this is what you're going to do,” they should see that this is a government with its

own strategy. So, they should be saying, “where can we help you? Let's partner”” (Devex). While she

obviously has a pro-government take on aid as well, her point that aid efforts should be in conjunction

with the different levels of Afghan society in order to work with them to shape efforts around where

they see holes that need to be filled is extremely apt. For a growing society to establish a stable footing

it is essential that they have the confidence to steer their own ship so to speak, or guide their own nation

in its various aspects. This confidence must be, in a large part, developed by affirming their ability to

make effective decisions as they see fit, and to allow them to develop a society that accounts for and

facilitates the unique features of their culture.

Therefore, if aid is to be effective going forward in the redevelopment of Afghanistan, it is

imperative that Western sources of aid begin to recognize themselves not as donors, but as partners.

They must abandon the conventional means of big-money projects and NGO-imposed solutions, which

only serve as short-term solutions and often introduce long-term problems. They must understand most
importantly of all that in redeveloping the country of Afghanistan, they are partners with the Afghani

men and women, with the village councils, and with the national government—all of these different

levels of society that are being brought back together—in order for aid efforts to make any valuable

lasting impact towards peace in a country that has seen its fair share of war and destruction.

References
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“Overview.” World Bank - Afghanistan, www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview.
Keller, Jared. “Here's Exactly How Much The US Has Spent On The War In Afghanistan - So Far.”
Task & Purpose, Task & Purpose, 1 Aug. 2017, taskandpurpose.com/war-afghanistan-us-
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About SIGAR, www.sigar.mil/about/index.aspx?SSR=1.
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