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RISK ASSESSMENT OF A CROSS COUNTRY PIPELINE TRANSPORTING HYDROCARBONS
ABSTRACT
A major oil company in India proposes to lay two 600mm dia pipelines for transpo
rting hydrocarbon products like naphtha, motor spirit, high speed diesel and sup
erior kerosene from a South Indian port to their storage terminal about 15 kms a
way. There are five major river crossings, three railway crossings and one NH c
rossing along the proposed route. It is proposed to transfer about 3000 m3/hr o
f hydrocarbon product through each pipeline. A booster pumping station is provi
ded at an intermediate location to overcome the pressure drop and to provide suf
ficient pressure at the storage terminal end.
National and international codes and practices are usually followed while laying
hydrocarbon pipelines. The welded joints would be radiographically tested and
cathodic protection would be given to the pipeline to minimize the effects of co
rrosion. The pipeline will be mostly laid underground except at the booster pum
ping station. It is proposed to incorporate advanced instrumentation and commun
ication system based on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA).
Inspite of all the safety standards and practices, failure of pipeline resulting
in release of hydrocarbons cannot be ruled out. The present paper discusses th
e result of a risk assessment study carried out for the pipeline system. As par
t of the study, the probable failure modes associated with different operational
areas for the proposed facility were identified. The predominant causes of hyd
rocarbon release from the pipeline have been identified as failure due to extern
al factors, corrosion, construction defects and human error.
Consequence analysis was carried out for the identified failure scenarios using
empirical models. The impact distances for pool fires and explosion were estima
ted. The catastrophic failure of the pipeline at booster pumping station result
s in the maximum impact distances. An attempt has also been made in the study t
o assess the probability of failure of the pipeline. Based on the risk assessme
nt study a few recommendations have been made for the safe operation of the pipi
ng system.
Key words : Risk assessment, Hydrocarbons, Pipelines, Failure modes, Consequ
ence analysis, Probability of failure.
â ¢ Formerly with the Process Engineering Department of FACT Engineering and Design
Organisation, Udyogamandal, Cochin, India
Introduction
Chemical process industries handle, store and process large quantities of hazard
ous chemicals and intermediates. These activities involve many different types
of material, some of which can be potentially harmful if released into the envi
ronment , because of their toxic, flammable or explosive properties. The rapid
growth in the use of hazardous chemicals in industry and trade has increased the
risk to employees as well as the neighbouring community.
Under these circumstances, it is essential to apply modern approaches to safety
based on good design, management and operational control (Wells, 1980). The ma
jor hazard units should try to achieve and maintain high standards of plant inte
grity with due regards to the probabilities of undesirable events. While assess
ing design and development proposals for plants which handle hazardous materials
, it is essential to identify potential hazards. Risk assessment techniques hav
e been recognized as an important tool for integrating and internalizing safety
in plant operation and production sequencing (Hoffman, 1973). In India risk ass
essment is mandatory for all new projects in chemical process industries dealing
with hazardous chemicals and severe operating conditions.
Risk assessment includes identification of hazard scenarios and consequence anal
ysis. Scenario identification describes how an accident occurs, while consequen
ce analysis describes the anticipated damage to environment, life and equipment.
This paper presents the results of a risk assessment study carried out for a p
ipe line system proposed for the transportation of petroleum products.
Description of the proposed facilities
The proposed project involves laying of two 600 NB diameter pipelines for the
transport of petroleum products from the tanker berth at a south Indian port to
the marketing terminal of a major oil company which is located about 15 Km away
from the port. One of these lines will be used for the transport for superior
kerosene oil (SKO) / high speed diesel (HSD) and the other for naphtha / motor s
pirit (MS). About 3000 m3 / hr of each product available at the ship end at 1
0 kg/cm2g pressure will be transferred through the pipelines. The pipeline wi
ll be laid as per the guide lines of Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD 141).
There are five river crossings, three railway crossings and one national highw
ay crossing along the proposed route. The pipes will be designed for an operati
ng pressure of 15 kg/cm2 as per ASME B31.4. The entire line will be hydrost
atically tested at 1.5 times the operating pressure before commissioning.
(i) Facilities at the port
At present, there are two tanker berths at the port ; berths I and II. It is p
roposed to install two new 300 NB unloading arms in berth I which will be connec
ted to the 600 NB headers ( existing ) through one of the 250 NB branches provid
ed on the header . An interconnection will be provided between the arm connecte
d to a 250 NB nozzle on a 600 NB header and a second 250 NB nozzle on the other
600 NB header. The interconnection will facilitate use of both the arms simulta
neously for transferring either of the fluid. The interconnection will be made
in such a way that the chances of mixing of the fluids are eliminated. It is pr
oposed to use only one of the two 600 NB headers each from the berth upto the ex
isting exchange pit. A tapping of 600 NB each is taken from these 600 NB lines
at the existing exchange pit area and they join the new 600 NB lines from berth
II at the new exchange pit, and is led to the marketing terminal via the booste
r pumping station located in between. Motor operated valves will be provided to
isolate the other 600 NB lines during the operation of the new facility.
(ii) Booster Pumping Station
A booster pumping station is envisaged as part of the system to overcome the pre
ssure drop in the long line and to provide sufficient pressure required at the t
erminal end. At the booster pumping station one pump with a standby is planned
for each fluid.
4. River crossings shall be below the scour bed with a minimum cover of 4 m
. Isolation valves with valve chamber shall be provided at upstream and downstr
eam of major water crossings. Anti-buoyancy concrete weight coating will be pro
vided on the pipelines in the water logged areas and river crossings to prevent
lifting up of pipes due to buoyancy.
5. The buried lines will be protected with anticorrosive coal tar based co
ating and the entire section of the pipelines would be provided with cathodic pr
otection.
6. All butt weld joints will be 100 % radiographically examined and fillet
weld will be subjected to dye penetration test and ultrasonic inspection.
7. The entire lines will be tested hydrostatically at 1.25 times the design
pressure. The sections for crossing road, rail and river shall be pre-tested b
efore erection.
8. In all 16 numbers motor operated valves (MOV) shall be provided at criti
cal locations along the pipeline some of which are connected to the interlock sy
stem. These valves can also be operated from remote location. This will ensure
quick isolation of the pipeline during emergency.
9. The computerized SCADA to be incorporated in the system will ensure its
safe operation. Any leakage in the pipeline will be immediately detected by the
computer system and pumping of the fluid will be immediately cut off.
10. Communication between tanker berth, booster pumping station, and the mar
keting terminal is also achieved through SCADA. This will be in addition to tel
ephones.
Identification of Failure Scenarios
A hazardous material either flammable or toxic is safe till it is fully containe
d and maintained at desired parameters during storage, operation and transportat
ion. In the case of the proposed pipeline, the major causes of hydrocarbons fro
m the pipe lines can be attributed to external factors like mechanical interfere
nce, material failure (corrosion) and other causes like construction defects, pi
pe material defects and human error.
The failure due to external factors generally caused by third party mechanical
interference is a puncture or a gouge severely reducing the wall thickness of th
e pipeline or guillotine failure of the pipeline. The failure can be immediate
or may occur sometime later by fatigue.
Pipeline failures by corrosion can be due to internal corrosion or external corr
osion. External corrosion failures are due to moisture in the ground and salini
ty of the soil and can take two forms â small pin hole failures caused by pitting an
d more generalized corrosion leading to a reduction in pipe wall thickness over
a plane area.
Pipe line can also fail for a variety of other causes like construction defects,
pipe material defects and human error.
The following failure cases are identified as probable in the pipe line system u
nder study by carrying out a preliminary hazard analysis and HAZOP study.
1. Unloading arm failure in HSD / SKO pipeline ( port area.)
2. Unloading arm failure in Naphtha / MS pipeline (port area)
3. Failure of 300 NB flange in each pipeline (port area)
4. Partial failure of booster pump discharge on each pipeline
5. Catastrophic failure of pipelines at booster pump discharge
6. Partial failure of 600 NB flange at the terminal on pipeline.
Consequence Analysis
Despite the universal acceptance of excellent codes of practice for design and o
peration of storage facility there have been instances of losses due to major ac
cidents of varying degree of severity. The failure cases generally depend upon
the availability of safety systems, instrumentation and their response time and
the probability of human error. Thus, prior to identifying the failure scenario
s for estimating the affected areas, the above mentioned safety systems have bee
n studied in detail. Other parameters like material of construction and protec
tion systems proposed to be provided at the facility have also been given adequa
te consideration.
In the present study, models for flash fire, pool fire and unconfined vapour cl
oud explosion (UVCE) and dispersion have been used for consequence analysis ( W
orld Bank, 1985). Source models have been used to quantify the release scenario
s by estimating the discharge rate and extent of flash and evaporation from a li
quid pool.
UVCE and flash fires occur when a large amount of volatile flammable material is
rapidly dispersed to the atmosphere, forms a vapour cloud which disperses and m
eets a source of ignition before the cloud is diluted to below lower flammabilit
y limit (LFL). The main concern for a UVCE is the shock wave that causes damag
e whereas for a flash fire the main concerns are the thermal radiation effects (
Gugan K, 1979). It is believed that the transition from flash fire to UVCE clo
ud be a function of the flammable mass, presence of confinement obstacles, burni
ng velocity of the material and other factors.
Pool / jet fires generally tend to be localized in effect and are of concern mai
nly in establishing the potential for domino effects and employee safety zones.
Issues relating to spacing of critical equipments can be addressed on the basi
s of specific consequence analysis for a range of possible pool / jet fires. T
he effects of a pool / jet fire depends upon factors such as flammability, combu
stibility, amount of material released, temperature, humidity and flame length (
Lees, 1996).
Dispersion modeling aims at estimating the distances likely to be affected due t
o release of certain quantity of flammable gas. Depending upon the properties o
f the material released and the release conditions, a dense gas dispersion or a
buoyant gas release model is used for estimating the affected areas.
The following assumptions are made for estimating the impact distances for cloud
dispersion, vapour cloud explosion and flash fires.
1. Simultaneous failure leading to more than one scenario is not considere
d.
2. Catastrophic failure of the pipelines is not generally considered in vie
w of the high integrity of construction and safety measures that are proposed.
3. It is assumed that the ground surface is level and the roughness for a g
iven surface is uniform.
4. It is assumed that the atmospheric conditions are constant for at least
the time taken for the cloud to develop as a plume, to the lowest concentration
of interest.
5. Concentration fluctuations within the cloud are ignored.
6. The flame speed through the cloud is constant.
7. Stoichiometric concentration of the cloud is uniform.
Damage Criteria
a) Thermal radiation
The flammable material released accidentally, from an orifice would form a vapou
r cloud. The cloud if encounters an ignition source would result in a jet fire.
The cloud formed due to any failure, if finds an ignition source before reachi
ng a concentration below lower flammable limit and the flammable mass in the clo
ud is less than 5 tonnes, a flash fire is likely to occur (Craven, 1976). The f
lame could also travel back to the source of leak. Any person caught in the fl
ash fire is likely to suffer burns of varying degrees and at times could be fata
l. Therefore, in consequence analysis, the estimated distance upto LFL value is
usually taken to indicate the area which may be affected by the flash fire.
The damage effects of thermal radiation of varying intensity are shown in Table
1.
b) Explosion overpressure
Distances are estimated for unconfined vapour cloud explosion for overpressures
of 14, 28 and 70 kg/cm2. These overpressures are the peak pressures formed in
excess of normal atmospheric pressure by blast and shock waves.
Table 2 gives damage levels at various overpressures for both property damage an
d human injury.
Table 2
Damage Effects of Blast Overpressures
Table 3 Consequence Analysis for the Pipeline carrying High speed Diesel / Ker
osene
Scenario Weather Class LFL distance
(m) Flash Fire Distance (m) Impact distances for pool fires in meters
Impact distances for explosion in meters
4
kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 4.3 kg/cm2 28.5 kg/cm2 70 kg/cm
2
Failure of unloading arm at port F 2 3 6 4
3 Not likely Not likely Not likely
D 4 6 6 4 3 Not likely Not like
ly Not likely
Failure of 300 NB flange at port F 20 42 50 33
- 73 40 38
D 31 27 65 40 - 50 29 26
Partial failure of booster pump discharge F 40 35 53
35 - 76 40 37
D 32 34 80 44 - 75 42 38
Catastrophic failure of booster pump discharge F 55 315 362
220 - 240 108 100
D 58 235 422 225 - 229 105 98
Partial failure of 600 NB pipeline at terminal F 30 35 62
40 - 75 40 37
D 29 32 70 38 - 70 40 38