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PAPER No.

: M - 19
RISK ASSESSMENT OF A CROSS COUNTRY PIPELINE TRANSPORTING HYDROCARBONS

ABSTRACT
A major oil company in India proposes to lay two 600mm dia pipelines for transpo
rting hydrocarbon products like naphtha, motor spirit, high speed diesel and sup
erior kerosene from a South Indian port to their storage terminal about 15 kms a
way. There are five major river crossings, three railway crossings and one NH c
rossing along the proposed route. It is proposed to transfer about 3000 m3/hr o
f hydrocarbon product through each pipeline. A booster pumping station is provi
ded at an intermediate location to overcome the pressure drop and to provide suf
ficient pressure at the storage terminal end.
National and international codes and practices are usually followed while laying
hydrocarbon pipelines. The welded joints would be radiographically tested and
cathodic protection would be given to the pipeline to minimize the effects of co
rrosion. The pipeline will be mostly laid underground except at the booster pum
ping station. It is proposed to incorporate advanced instrumentation and commun
ication system based on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA).
Inspite of all the safety standards and practices, failure of pipeline resulting
in release of hydrocarbons cannot be ruled out. The present paper discusses th
e result of a risk assessment study carried out for the pipeline system. As par
t of the study, the probable failure modes associated with different operational
areas for the proposed facility were identified. The predominant causes of hyd
rocarbon release from the pipeline have been identified as failure due to extern
al factors, corrosion, construction defects and human error.

Consequence analysis was carried out for the identified failure scenarios using
empirical models. The impact distances for pool fires and explosion were estima
ted. The catastrophic failure of the pipeline at booster pumping station result
s in the maximum impact distances. An attempt has also been made in the study t
o assess the probability of failure of the pipeline. Based on the risk assessme
nt study a few recommendations have been made for the safe operation of the pipi
ng system.
Key words : Risk assessment, Hydrocarbons, Pipelines, Failure modes, Consequ
ence analysis, Probability of failure.

â ¢ Formerly with the Process Engineering Department of FACT Engineering and Design
Organisation, Udyogamandal, Cochin, India

Introduction
Chemical process industries handle, store and process large quantities of hazard
ous chemicals and intermediates. These activities involve many different types
of material, some of which can be potentially harmful if released into the envi
ronment , because of their toxic, flammable or explosive properties. The rapid
growth in the use of hazardous chemicals in industry and trade has increased the
risk to employees as well as the neighbouring community.
Under these circumstances, it is essential to apply modern approaches to safety
based on good design, management and operational control (Wells, 1980). The ma
jor hazard units should try to achieve and maintain high standards of plant inte
grity with due regards to the probabilities of undesirable events. While assess
ing design and development proposals for plants which handle hazardous materials
, it is essential to identify potential hazards. Risk assessment techniques hav
e been recognized as an important tool for integrating and internalizing safety
in plant operation and production sequencing (Hoffman, 1973). In India risk ass
essment is mandatory for all new projects in chemical process industries dealing
with hazardous chemicals and severe operating conditions.
Risk assessment includes identification of hazard scenarios and consequence anal
ysis. Scenario identification describes how an accident occurs, while consequen
ce analysis describes the anticipated damage to environment, life and equipment.
This paper presents the results of a risk assessment study carried out for a p
ipe line system proposed for the transportation of petroleum products.
Description of the proposed facilities
The proposed project involves laying of two 600 NB diameter pipelines for the
transport of petroleum products from the tanker berth at a south Indian port to
the marketing terminal of a major oil company which is located about 15 Km away
from the port. One of these lines will be used for the transport for superior
kerosene oil (SKO) / high speed diesel (HSD) and the other for naphtha / motor s
pirit (MS). About 3000 m3 / hr of each product available at the ship end at 1
0 kg/cm2g pressure will be transferred through the pipelines. The pipeline wi
ll be laid as per the guide lines of Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD 141).
There are five river crossings, three railway crossings and one national highw
ay crossing along the proposed route. The pipes will be designed for an operati
ng pressure of 15 kg/cm2 as per ASME B31.4. The entire line will be hydrost
atically tested at 1.5 times the operating pressure before commissioning.
(i) Facilities at the port
At present, there are two tanker berths at the port ; berths I and II. It is p
roposed to install two new 300 NB unloading arms in berth I which will be connec
ted to the 600 NB headers ( existing ) through one of the 250 NB branches provid
ed on the header . An interconnection will be provided between the arm connecte
d to a 250 NB nozzle on a 600 NB header and a second 250 NB nozzle on the other
600 NB header. The interconnection will facilitate use of both the arms simulta
neously for transferring either of the fluid. The interconnection will be made
in such a way that the chances of mixing of the fluids are eliminated. It is pr
oposed to use only one of the two 600 NB headers each from the berth upto the ex
isting exchange pit. A tapping of 600 NB each is taken from these 600 NB lines
at the existing exchange pit area and they join the new 600 NB lines from berth
II at the new exchange pit, and is led to the marketing terminal via the booste
r pumping station located in between. Motor operated valves will be provided to
isolate the other 600 NB lines during the operation of the new facility.
(ii) Booster Pumping Station
A booster pumping station is envisaged as part of the system to overcome the pre
ssure drop in the long line and to provide sufficient pressure required at the t
erminal end. At the booster pumping station one pump with a standby is planned
for each fluid.

(iii) Marketing Terminal


The petroleum product from the proposed 600 NB lines will join an existing 600 N
B header at the terminal end from where the hydrocarbons can be directed to any
of the respective storage tanks.
(iv) Pigging Facility
A pigging facility to pig the pipe line is also envisaged in the system. A laun
cher at the port end and a pig receiving station at the terminal end will form
part of the facility.
(v) Instrumentation
All valves in the 600 NB lines will be motor operated. All the first block valv
es in the new exchange pit and the main block valves in the main 600 NB line ru
nning to the terminal are motor operated with provision for remote and local ope
ration. These valves can be operated just before starting pumping from the ship
.
The main block valves in the 600 NB lines after the new exchange pit will be int
erlocked with the leak detection system so that the lines can be isolated from t
he control room by closing these valves. The main line at the port end will be
provided with pressure indicators, temperature indicator, turbine type flow mete
r. The flow meter will have indicator, integrator and low and high flow alarms.
The flow meters are provided as part of the leak detection system. Thermal re
lief valves will also be provided at various locations.
Provision to start or stop the booster pumps locally or from the control room wi
ll be made. A panel indicator, a turbine flow meter with indicator, integrator
and low and high flow alarms will be provided in the discharge line of the pumps
.
The storage terminal will also be provided with all the necessary instrumentatio
n. The motor operated valve in the main line is provided with two wire control
system with local and remote operation. The smooth and safe operation of the sy
stems will be ensured by incorporating a computerized Supervisory Control and D
ata Acquisition (SCADA) system.
Safety features of the proposed project
The safety features proposed to be incorporated in the pipeline project are outl
ined below :
1. The entire stretch of the pipelines is proposed to be buried underground
except at the booster pumping station, which will be properly fenced, and the p
umping station would be manned round the clock.
2. The lines are to be buried with a minimum cover of 1.2 m as against 1 m
specified in the standards. At road crossings, the lines will be laid with a m
inimum cover of 1.5 m through hume pipe protection using horizontal boring/trenc
hing technique.

3. At railway crossings, casing pipe protection as per the norms of Indian


Railways will be provided. Minimum cover shall be 1.5 m. The casing pipe shal
l also be protected with anti corrosive coating. Pipeline insulators will be us
ed to support the carrier pipe inside the casing pipe and electrically isolate t
he carrier pipe from the casing pipe.

4. River crossings shall be below the scour bed with a minimum cover of 4 m
. Isolation valves with valve chamber shall be provided at upstream and downstr
eam of major water crossings. Anti-buoyancy concrete weight coating will be pro
vided on the pipelines in the water logged areas and river crossings to prevent
lifting up of pipes due to buoyancy.
5. The buried lines will be protected with anticorrosive coal tar based co
ating and the entire section of the pipelines would be provided with cathodic pr
otection.
6. All butt weld joints will be 100 % radiographically examined and fillet
weld will be subjected to dye penetration test and ultrasonic inspection.
7. The entire lines will be tested hydrostatically at 1.25 times the design
pressure. The sections for crossing road, rail and river shall be pre-tested b
efore erection.
8. In all 16 numbers motor operated valves (MOV) shall be provided at criti
cal locations along the pipeline some of which are connected to the interlock sy
stem. These valves can also be operated from remote location. This will ensure
quick isolation of the pipeline during emergency.
9. The computerized SCADA to be incorporated in the system will ensure its
safe operation. Any leakage in the pipeline will be immediately detected by the
computer system and pumping of the fluid will be immediately cut off.
10. Communication between tanker berth, booster pumping station, and the mar
keting terminal is also achieved through SCADA. This will be in addition to tel
ephones.
Identification of Failure Scenarios
A hazardous material either flammable or toxic is safe till it is fully containe
d and maintained at desired parameters during storage, operation and transportat
ion. In the case of the proposed pipeline, the major causes of hydrocarbons fro
m the pipe lines can be attributed to external factors like mechanical interfere
nce, material failure (corrosion) and other causes like construction defects, pi
pe material defects and human error.
The failure due to external factors generally caused by third party mechanical
interference is a puncture or a gouge severely reducing the wall thickness of th
e pipeline or guillotine failure of the pipeline. The failure can be immediate
or may occur sometime later by fatigue.
Pipeline failures by corrosion can be due to internal corrosion or external corr
osion. External corrosion failures are due to moisture in the ground and salini
ty of the soil and can take two forms â small pin hole failures caused by pitting an
d more generalized corrosion leading to a reduction in pipe wall thickness over
a plane area.
Pipe line can also fail for a variety of other causes like construction defects,
pipe material defects and human error.
The following failure cases are identified as probable in the pipe line system u
nder study by carrying out a preliminary hazard analysis and HAZOP study.
1. Unloading arm failure in HSD / SKO pipeline ( port area.)
2. Unloading arm failure in Naphtha / MS pipeline (port area)
3. Failure of 300 NB flange in each pipeline (port area)
4. Partial failure of booster pump discharge on each pipeline
5. Catastrophic failure of pipelines at booster pump discharge
6. Partial failure of 600 NB flange at the terminal on pipeline.
Consequence Analysis
Despite the universal acceptance of excellent codes of practice for design and o
peration of storage facility there have been instances of losses due to major ac
cidents of varying degree of severity. The failure cases generally depend upon
the availability of safety systems, instrumentation and their response time and
the probability of human error. Thus, prior to identifying the failure scenario
s for estimating the affected areas, the above mentioned safety systems have bee
n studied in detail. Other parameters like material of construction and protec
tion systems proposed to be provided at the facility have also been given adequa
te consideration.
In the present study, models for flash fire, pool fire and unconfined vapour cl
oud explosion (UVCE) and dispersion have been used for consequence analysis ( W
orld Bank, 1985). Source models have been used to quantify the release scenario
s by estimating the discharge rate and extent of flash and evaporation from a li
quid pool.
UVCE and flash fires occur when a large amount of volatile flammable material is
rapidly dispersed to the atmosphere, forms a vapour cloud which disperses and m
eets a source of ignition before the cloud is diluted to below lower flammabilit
y limit (LFL). The main concern for a UVCE is the shock wave that causes damag
e whereas for a flash fire the main concerns are the thermal radiation effects (
Gugan K, 1979). It is believed that the transition from flash fire to UVCE clo
ud be a function of the flammable mass, presence of confinement obstacles, burni
ng velocity of the material and other factors.
Pool / jet fires generally tend to be localized in effect and are of concern mai
nly in establishing the potential for domino effects and employee safety zones.
Issues relating to spacing of critical equipments can be addressed on the basi
s of specific consequence analysis for a range of possible pool / jet fires. T
he effects of a pool / jet fire depends upon factors such as flammability, combu
stibility, amount of material released, temperature, humidity and flame length (
Lees, 1996).
Dispersion modeling aims at estimating the distances likely to be affected due t
o release of certain quantity of flammable gas. Depending upon the properties o
f the material released and the release conditions, a dense gas dispersion or a
buoyant gas release model is used for estimating the affected areas.
The following assumptions are made for estimating the impact distances for cloud
dispersion, vapour cloud explosion and flash fires.
1. Simultaneous failure leading to more than one scenario is not considere
d.
2. Catastrophic failure of the pipelines is not generally considered in vie
w of the high integrity of construction and safety measures that are proposed.
3. It is assumed that the ground surface is level and the roughness for a g
iven surface is uniform.
4. It is assumed that the atmospheric conditions are constant for at least
the time taken for the cloud to develop as a plume, to the lowest concentration
of interest.
5. Concentration fluctuations within the cloud are ignored.
6. The flame speed through the cloud is constant.
7. Stoichiometric concentration of the cloud is uniform.
Damage Criteria
a) Thermal radiation
The flammable material released accidentally, from an orifice would form a vapou
r cloud. The cloud if encounters an ignition source would result in a jet fire.
The cloud formed due to any failure, if finds an ignition source before reachi
ng a concentration below lower flammable limit and the flammable mass in the clo
ud is less than 5 tonnes, a flash fire is likely to occur (Craven, 1976). The f
lame could also travel back to the source of leak. Any person caught in the fl
ash fire is likely to suffer burns of varying degrees and at times could be fata
l. Therefore, in consequence analysis, the estimated distance upto LFL value is
usually taken to indicate the area which may be affected by the flash fire.
The damage effects of thermal radiation of varying intensity are shown in Table
1.
b) Explosion overpressure
Distances are estimated for unconfined vapour cloud explosion for overpressures
of 14, 28 and 70 kg/cm2. These overpressures are the peak pressures formed in
excess of normal atmospheric pressure by blast and shock waves.
Table 2 gives damage levels at various overpressures for both property damage an
d human injury.

Results of consequence analysis


The results of the consequence of the various failure scenarios are given in Tab
les 3 and 4.
Unloading arm failure at port area
The quantity of hydrocarbon released in this failure is very small due to the av
ailability of emergency release system (ERS). ERS will automatically shut off
the transfer when there is breakage of arm due to movement of the tanker. In c
ase of any pool fire, the effects will be very localized and hence will not caus
e much damage. The quantity released is too small to qualify for any vapour cl
oud explosion.
Failure of 300 NB flange on each pipeline
Under this scenario, radiation intensity of 4 kW/m2 will be felt up to a distanc
e of 72 m. The LFL distance is found to be 84 m from the point of leak. Under
worst weather conditions, a late explosion distance of 279 m is observed in case
of naphtha. This may result in wide spread damage in the port area. Therefore
it is recommended to avoid any open flame in the port area during transfer oper
ation. It is also recommended to have fogging arrangements at the jetty to avoi
d any formation of explosive mixture.

Partial failure of pipeline at booster pump discharge


The impact distances for this scenario is comparable with the above scenario. U
nder this scenario, the radiation intensity of 4 kW/m2 will be experienced up to
a distance of 75 m, the LFL distance being 80 m from the point of leak. The la
te ignition explosion distance can extend up to 320 m in case of naphtha under w
orst weather conditions. This may cause wide spread damage in the booster pump
station. Fogging arrangement may be provided at the booster pump station to av
oid the formation of an explosive mixture as there will be many flanges and henc
e probability of failure is high.

Catastrophic failure of pipeline at booster pump discharge


This is the worst possible scenario for the pipelines. However, the probability
of a catastrophic failure of the pipeline is very small. In the unlikely even
t of catastrophic failure of naphtha pipeline, the impact of vapour cloud explos
ion could be felt up to a distance of around 1 Km. During such a failure, the
population living in the down wind direction may have to be notified to minimize
the chances of ignition sources.
Partial failure of 600 NB flange on pipeline at the terminal
The impact distances for this scenario inside the terminal is comparable with th
ose of a partial failure of pipeline at booster pump discharge. However, the m
ain concern will be the protection of large storage tanks in the terminal.
Probability of failure of the pipeline
The duration of pumping from the port to the terminal is estimated as 100 hours.
The number of such pumping operations in a year will be approximately sixty.
The probability of a oil pipeline rupture is reported in literature as 2.16 x
10-3 / year. Assuming that the probability of a source of ignition available is
1, the probability of failure of the pipeline under study is calculated as 1.4
8 x 10-3 per year.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The following are the conclusions and recommendations emerging out of the study.
â ¢ Regular patrolling of the pipelines should be carried out especially when the tr
ansfer operation is in progress. This will help in identifying any activity tha
t have the potential to cause pipeline damage or to identify small leaks whose e
ffects are too small to be detected by instruments.
â ¢ Pipeline failures due to third party activity can be reduced by ensuring that th
e members of the public, surrounding population, and the district administration
are aware of the pipeline.
â ¢ The entire stretch of the underground pipeline is proposed to be cathodically pr
otected. Regular readings of pipe to soil potentials should be taken to ensure
that rapid corrosion is not taking place locally.
â ¢ Prior to the transfer of hydrocarbons from the port to the storage terminal, wat
er draw off should be done to minimize internal corrosion.
â ¢ Positive blinding of the lines may be carried out by using spectacle blinds both
at the port and the terminal.
â ¢ The unloading operation should be continuously manned and monitored.
â ¢ At locations where the pipelines / pipe racks are close to traffic movement, ade
quate crash guards may be provided.
â ¢ All unloading arms may be inspected by non-destructive testing methods annually.
The pipelines should be subjected to hydrotest at least once in 5 years.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank his former colleagues in the Process Engineering Depa
rtment of FACT Engineering and Design Organisation, Udyogamandal, Cochin for the
ir support and constructive suggestions during the course of the work.
References
Craven, A.D. (1976) Fire and Explosion hazards associated with small scale uncon
fined spillages, I.Chem.E. Symposium Series No. 47,39
Gugan, K. (1979) Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosions. Institution of Chemical En
gineers / Godwin.
Hoffman, P.D. (1974) Hazard Analysis and risk control. CEP Loss Prevention, 8, 8
0
Lees, F.P (1996) Loss Prevention in Process Industries. 2nd Ed. Butterworth-Hein
emann.
Wells, G.L. ( 1980 ) Safety in Process Plant Design . New York : John Wiley &
Sons.
World Bank Technical Paper No.55 (1985). Techniques for Industrial Hazards â A Manu
al. Technica Ltd.
Table 1
Damage due to incident radiation intensity

Incident Radiation Intensity (KW/m2)


Type of Damage
37.5 Damage to process equipment. 100% lethality in 1min. 1% lethality in 10
sec.

25.0 Minimum energy to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposure without a fl


ame. 100 % lethality in 1 min. Significant injury in 10sec.
12.5 Minimum energy to ignite wood with a flame; melts plastic tubing. 1% le
thality in 1min. 1st degree burns in 10 sec.
4.5 Causes pain if duration is longer than 20 sec but blistering is unlikely
.
1.6
Causes no discomfort for long exposure.

Table 2
Damage Effects of Blast Overpressures

Blast Overpressure ( kg/cm2)


Damage level
70.0 Major structural damage
43.0 Storage tank failure
35.5 Eardrum damage
28.0 Pressure vessels remain intact, light structures collapse
7.0 â 14.0 Major window glass breakage, possibly causing some injuries
4.3 10% window glass breakage

Table 3 Consequence Analysis for the Pipeline carrying High speed Diesel / Ker
osene
Scenario Weather Class LFL distance
(m) Flash Fire Distance (m) Impact distances for pool fires in meters
Impact distances for explosion in meters
4
kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 4.3 kg/cm2 28.5 kg/cm2 70 kg/cm
2
Failure of unloading arm at port F 2 3 6 4
3 Not likely Not likely Not likely
D 4 6 6 4 3 Not likely Not like
ly Not likely
Failure of 300 NB flange at port F 20 42 50 33
- 73 40 38
D 31 27 65 40 - 50 29 26
Partial failure of booster pump discharge F 40 35 53
35 - 76 40 37
D 32 34 80 44 - 75 42 38
Catastrophic failure of booster pump discharge F 55 315 362
220 - 240 108 100
D 58 235 422 225 - 229 105 98
Partial failure of 600 NB pipeline at terminal F 30 35 62
40 - 75 40 37
D 29 32 70 38 - 70 40 38

Table 4 Consequence Analysis for the Pipeline carrying Naphtha/ Motor Sp


irit
Scenario Weather Class LFL distance
(m) Flash Fire Distance (m) Impact distances for pool fires in meters
Impact distances for explosion in meters
4
kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 4.3 kg/cm2 28.5 kg/cm2 70 kg/cm
2
Failure of unloading arm at port F 3 4 8 5
3 Not likely Not likely Not likely
D 4 6 6 5 4 Not likely Not like
ly Not likely
Failure of 300 NB flange at port F 85 155 50 30
- 282 142 126
D 75 175 75 44 - 278 190 180
Partial failure of booster pump discharge F 75 190 55
35 - 325 230 225
D 80 200 75 40 - 260 150 140
Catastrophic failure of booster pump discharge F 780 775 300
180 - 950 885 875
D 832 825 310 186 - 980 860 840
Partial failure of 600 NB pipeline at terminal F 85 87 52
40 - 280 185 175
D 65 65 68 40 - 250 150 135

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