US VS.

BUSTOS
Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous
citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled,
and prepared and signed a petition to the
Executive Secretary (privileged communication)
through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien,
and five individuals signed affidavits, charging
Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe
and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in
office and asking for his removal. The specific
charges against the justice of the peace include
the solicitation of money from persons who have
pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan
alleged that accused published a writing which was
false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and
libelous against him.

Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to

constitutional protection by virtue of his right
to free speech and free press.

Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and

a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is
wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject
for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize
a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any
other public officer, public opinion will
be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which
everyone owes to society or to the State to assist
in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It
is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the
wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts
to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire
into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary

consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly
means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for
a redress of grievances. The persons assembling
and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made. All persons
have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the

orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion. The
inevitable and incontestable result has been
the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure
and efficient administration of justice and of public
affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged
is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and
this person in good faith believes he is acting in
pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken.
Although the charges are probably not true as to
the justice of the peace, they were believed to be
true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded
their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
apparent. The ends and the motives of these
citizens— to secure the removal from office of a
person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In
no way did they abuse the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from
defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. A privileged communication should
not be subjected to microscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice or falsity.

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia

Facts of the case

George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the

Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on
obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines.
A local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported
on the arrest, but failed to use the words “allegedly” or
“reportedly” in during one broadcast. In subsequent
broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and other
similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and “smut
distributors”. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on
the obscenity charges.

Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district

court held that the First Amendment standard, which
allowed recovery of damages only for knowingly and
recklessly false statements, did not apply because
Rosenbloom was not a public official or figure. The court
instead instructed the jury to award damages where
Metromedia did not use reasonable care to discern the
truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom
general and punitive damages, although the district court
reduced the punitive damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly
and recklessly false standard applied.

Question

(1) Should the knowingly and recklessly false standard for

defamatory statements apply to private individuals?

(2) If so, is the evidence presented at trial enough to

support the damages originally awarded to Rosenbloom?

Conclusion

1. Yes. The court affirmed the Third Circuit decision. The

Supreme Court held that the knowingly and recklessly
false standard applied because the story was a matter of
public concern. It did not matter that Rosenbloom was a
private citizen.

2. No. The Court held that the evidence in the case did
not support the damages award under the proper
constitutional standard.

LAGUNZAD vs.VDA. DE GONZALES & CA

FACTS

Lagunzad and de Gonzales entered into a licensing

agreement for the former was filming “The Moises Padilla
Story.” Manuel Lagunzad was a newspaperman and,
through his MML Productions, began the production of the
movie. The movie was based on the book of Atty. Ernesto
Rodriguez, Jr.s “The Long Dark Night in Negros.”

Although the focus of the film was on Moises’ life, there

were portions which dealt with his private and family life
including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother,
Maria Sotto Vda. De Gonzales.

Thirteen days prior to its premiere showing, Moises’ half-

sister, Mrs. Nelly Amante, objected to the movie as it
exploited Moises’ life.
ISSUES

1. Whether or not the fictionalized representation of

Moises Padilla is an intrusion upon his right to
privacy notwithstanding that he was a public
figure.
2. Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother,
has any property right over the life of Moises
Padilla considering that the latter was a public
figure.
3. Whether or not the Licensing Agreement
constitutes an infringement on the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and of the press.

HELD

1. YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not

automatically destroy in toto a person's right to
privacy. The right to invade as person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend to
a fictional or novelized representation of a
person, no matter how public a figure he or she
may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that
petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life
 story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he
included a little romance in the film because
without it, it would be a drab story of torture and
brutality.
2. YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need
for prior consent and authority from the deceased
heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the
members of his family. As held in Schuyler v.
Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving
relatives of a deceased person to protect his
memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of
the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent
a violation of their own rights in the character and
memory of the deceased."
3. NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a
newspaperman, he had the right to express his
thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla
without prior restraint. The right of freedom of
expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position
in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not,
however, without limitations. One criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and
of the press is the "balancing-of-interests test."
 The principle requires a court to take conscious
and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation." In the case at bar, the interest’s
observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of -freedom of
expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into
account the interplay of those interests, and
considering the obligations assumed in the
Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner,
the validity of such agreement will have to be
upheld particularly because the limits of freedom
of expression are reached when expression
touches upon matters of essentially private
concern.

AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG

Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and

his movie production company, Ayer Productions,
envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing
and for Philippine and international release, the historic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed
motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was
endorsed by the MTRCB and other government agencies
consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the
intended film production.

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series

television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style,
creating four fictional characters interwoven with real
events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
background. David Williamson is Australia's leading
playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South
Wales) is an American historian have developed a script.

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use,

appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name,
or picture, or that of any member of his family in any
cinema or television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation. Petitioners
acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was
deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded
to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint
was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC
ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from
creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked
resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was

violated.

Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes

the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and
exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them
through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the
production of motion picture films is a commercial activity
expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification
for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.

The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and

hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private
respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the
completed film would precisely look like. There was, in
other words, no "clear and present danger" of any
violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of
public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a
highly critical stage in the history of the country.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events,

clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film
were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such
public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at
least, their right to privacy.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant

case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of
expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in
terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture
must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of
events.

BRIDGES VS CALIFORNIA

Facts of the case

Harry Bridges, the leader of a longshoreman's union, sent

a telegram to Frances Perkins, the Secretary of Labor,
regarding a case pending that was in the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County. Bridges implied that he would
have his union go on strike if the Superior Court ruled
unfavorably. A copy of the telegram was given to James
D. O'Neil, who distributed the telegram to various West
Coast Newspapers. The Superior Court found Bridges in
contempt of court and fined him. Similarly, the Los
Angeles Times was also found in contempt of court and
fined for publishing several editorials regarding a case
pending in the Superior Court. Bridges and the Times
challenged their punishments separately in the Superior
Court. The Superior Court upheld their fines, and both
appealed separately to the Supreme Court of California.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the Superior
Court. Bridges and the Times appealed separately to the
Supreme Court, where the cases were consolidated.

Question

Was the Superior Court's findings of contempt against

Bridges and the Times in violation of the free speech and
free press clauses of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. the Court reversed the Supreme Court of California

and found the fines for contempt unconstitutional. Justice
Hugo L. Black, writing for the majority, relied on the "clear
and present danger" standard set forth in Schenk v.
United States. Bridges' telegram was his exercise of his
First Amendment right to petition the government, and his
supposed intention to call a strike was consistent with
California law. The Times editorials, meanwhile, had
"negligible" effect "on the course of justice." The dangers
that the California Superior Court attributed to the
telegram and the editorials were neither "serious" nor
"substantial." Therefore, they did not pose the "clear and
present danger" required to justify the restrictions placed
by the California Superior Court.
IN RE SOTTO

FACTS

Vicente Sotto issued a written statement, published in the

Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, in
connection with the Court’s decision in In re: Angel Parazo.

Sotto is disappointed with how the Court interpreted the Press

Freedom Law, of which he is the author, in the case of Angel
Parazo. More so, he declared the incompetency and narrow-
mindedness of the majority of the Court’s members. He
furthers that the only remedy for the deliberate “narrow-
mindedness” is to change the members of the Court.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court.

HELD:

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness,

soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if
well-founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the
correction of an error if committed but if it is not well-taken
and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the
Court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the
respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement
that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the
intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from
what he, as proponent of the original bill, which became a law
had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for
it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the
Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice
that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by
both Houses of Congress, and the clause “unless the Court
finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the
State” was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed
by Congress and not by any particular member thereof, the
intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be
the one to be determined by this Court in applying said act.

2. The respondent does not merely criticize or comment

on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is
pending reconsideration of the Parazo case. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill in the next Congress reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from
eleven to seven, as to change the members of this Court which
decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are
incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the
final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or
obstruct the administration of justice. But, the respondent
also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into
disrepute and degrading the administration of justice.

It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech

and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, but
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should
not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as
the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise
of the right of citizen, is the maintenance of the independence
of the judiciary. In the words of Justice Holmes in US v. Sullens,
“[t]he administration of justice and the freedom of the press,
though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither
should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have
correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold
the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the
former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction.
The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously
recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon
it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of
judicial business unhampered by publications which
reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or
otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will
not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for
contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the
disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from
outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions.
This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court,
and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-
defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced
tribunal.”

Sotto was found guilty of contempt of Court; thus, fined of Php

1,000.

IN RE: LAURETA

Ilustre, whose case before the Supreme Court was resolved

against her favour, wrote to the members of the First Division
of the Court and threatened them. Furthermore, she filed a
complaint before the Tanodbayan.

Facts:

Wenceslao Laureta is the counsel of Eva Ilustre. Ilustre wrote

to the members of the First Division of the Supreme Court,
namely Justices Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano. In her
letter, she threatened the members for their minute
resolution which went against her favour.
She threatened the members that the entire Filipino
population would know the procedures in the Court and to
charge them, which she apparently did so. She filed an
affidavit-complaint before the Tanodbayan for having
“knowingly and deliberately rendered with bad faith, an unjust
extended Minute Resolution.”

Atty LAURETA circulated copies of the complaint to the press,

without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices
charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged
with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the
complaint. Now, the SC is charging them with contempt. They
claim that the letters were private communication, and that
they did not intend to dishonor the court.

Issue

WON privacy of communication was violated.

Held

The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter
of concern for the entire court.

There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s

authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must
act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous
attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to
safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.

The Court finds Ilustre has transcended the permissible

bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the
individual Justices; in the language of the charges she filed
before the Tanodbayan; in her statements, conduct, acts and
charges against the Court and/or the official actions of the
Justices; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer
expect justice from the Court. The fact that said letters are not
technically considered pleadings nor the fact that they were
submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved
does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed.
The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to
privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts
against the Court.

IN RE: TULFO

Facts:

In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On
Target' stating that the Supreme Court rendered an idiotic
decision in legalizing checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16, 1989,
where he called the Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak
na mga bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo
was required to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt. Tulfo said that he was just reacting emotionally
because he had been a victim of harassment in the
checkpoints, and “idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and
"bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the
case had been decided and terminated, there was not
contempt. Lastly, the article does not pose any clear and
present danger to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or Not Tulfo is in contempt.

Held:

Yes. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case
had not yet been decided upon, and the Supreme Court was
still acting on an MR filed from the CA. There are two (2) types
of publication of newspaper comments on proceedings in
court, which have been considered in contempt proceedings,
namely: (1) those in which the object of the publication is to
affect the decision in a pending case or action, and (2) those
which have for their purpose the bringing of courts or judges
or other court officers into discredit. Tulfo's articles comprise
both types of publication. As already pointed out, at the time
his articles were written and published, the case on the
checkpoints was sub judice as the Court's decision therein had
not became final.

Reading through the two (2) articles written by Tulfo,

respectively entitled "Idiotic decision" and "Sangkatutak na
Bobo", it is plain that Tulfo intended to ridicule and degrade
the Court and its members before the public, not merely to
criticize its decision on the merits, as he would now like to
make this Court believe. The general tone and language used
in Tulfo's articles belie his belated allegation that the word
"idiotic" was used in the sense of the decision being merely
"illogical, irrational, unwarranted and unwise."

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan
Gonzales filed a motion for reconsideration. He was found
guilty of contempt of court and of gross misconduct as an
officer of the court and a member of the bar.

Ruling:

1. The “clear and present danger” doctrine invoked by

respondent’s counsel is not a magic incantation
which dissolves all problems and dispenses with
analysis and judgment in the testing of the
legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which
compels a court to exonerate a defendant the
moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of
impending apocalypse. The clear and present
 danger doctrine has been an accepted method for
making out the appropriate limits of freedom of
speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not,
however, the only test which has been recognized
and applied by courts.
2. Under either the “clear and present danger” test or
the “balancing-of-interest test,” the Court believes
that the statements here made by Gonzales are of
such a nature and were made in such a manner and
under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. It is important to
point out that the “substantive evil” which the
Supreme Court has a right and duty to prevent does
not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical
disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of
public order. What is here at stake is the authority
of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a
“substantive evil” consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular
case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of
the degradation of the judicial system of a country
and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and
officers of the court. The “substantive evil” here
involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a
threat to public disorder or rioting, but is certainly
no less deleterious and more far reaching in its
implications for society.
 US v. Kottinger
Kottinger was charged for keeping for sale in the raided store
of Camera Supply Co. of obscene and indecent pictures. The
pictures revealed six different postures of non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines.

Facts:

1. The premises of Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta,

Manila was raided and subsequent to said raid, post-
cards were used as evidence against the manager of
the company (J.J. Kottinger).
2. Kottinger was charged for keeping for sale in the store
of obscene and indecent pictures in violation of
Section 12 of Act No. 277. Act No. 277 is the
Philippine Libel Law. Section 12 made obscene or
indecent publications as misdemeanours. The
pictures reveal six different postures of non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines, including the “Bontoc
Woman,” “Moros,” and “Kalinga Girls,” among
others.

Ruling:

1. The word “obscene” and the term “obscenity” may be

defined as meaning something offensive to chastity,
decency, or delicacy. “Indecency” is an act against
good behaviour and a just delicacy. The test
ordinarily followed by the courts in determining
whether a particular publication or other thing is
obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is
whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication or other article charged as being
 obscene may fall. Another test of obscenity is that
which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men
as an indecency.
2. The Philippine statute does not attempt to define
obscenity or indecent pictures, writings, papers or
books. But the words “obscene or indecent” at
themselves descriptive. They are words in common
use and every person of average intelligence
understands their meaning. Indeed, beyond the
evidence furnished by the pictures themselves, there
is but little scope for bearing on the issue of obscenity
or indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or
indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the
case.
3. “Obscene” as used in the Federal Statutes making it a
criminal offense to place in the mails any obscene,
lewd, or lascivious publication, according to the US
Supreme Court and lesser Federal courts, signifies
that form of immorality which has relation to sexual
impurity, and has the same meaning as is given at
common law in prosecutions for obscene libel.
4. The pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country
in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in
the regions in which they live, are not obscene or
indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. The
pictures in question merely depict persons as they
actually live, without attempted presentation of
persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate
judgment of the Philippine community, the moral
sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not
be shocked by photographs of this type. The court is
convinced that the post-card pictures in this case
 cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or
foul or filthy.

Gonzales v. Katigbak
The Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, upon
condition that certain parts be changed and removed,
classified the motion picture “Kapit sa Patalim” as “for adults
only.”

Facts:

1. The motion picture “Kapit sa Patalim” was classified

“For Adults Only.” As such, the president of the
Malaya Films (Jose Antonio Gonzales) questioned the
scope of the power of the Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television and how it should be
exercised. The chairman of the said board is Maria
Kalaw Katigbak and Gen. Wilfredo Estrada as its vice-
chairman.
2. In classifying the said movie as “For Adults Only,”
there must be made certain changes and deletions
enumerated. For this purpose, a petition for
certiorari was filed.

Ruling:

1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for

the communication of ideas and the expression of
the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception
by our people of issues and public officials or public
figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are
considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v.
Wilson is the importance of motion pictures as an
organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that
they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.
 There is no clear dividing line between what involves
knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such
distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of
the basic right to free expression.
2. Press freedom, as stated in the opinion of the Court
in Reyes v. Bagatsing, may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter
of public concern without censorship or punishment.
This is not to say that such freedom, as is the
freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if
there be a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the State has a right to prevent.
3. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all
there is to free speech or free press. As early as
1909, in the case of US v. Sedano, a prosecution for
libel, the Supreme Court already made clear that
freedom of the press consists in the right to print
what one chooses without any previous license.
4. It is the opinion of the Court that to avoid an
unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of
respondent Board is limited to the classification of
films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional
objections, determine what motion pictures are for
general patronage and what may require either
parental guidance or be limited to adults only. That
is to abide by the principle that freedom of
expression is the rule and restrictions the
exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is
not to be presumed, rather the presumption is
against its validity.
5. The test to determine whether freedom of
expression may be limited is the clear and present
danger of an evil of a substantive character that the
 State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not
only be clear but also present. There should be no
doubt that what is feared may be traced to the
expression complained of. The causal connection
must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable
apprehension about its imminence. The time
element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if
such danger be only probable. There is the require
of its being well-nigh (almost) inevitable. The basic
postulate is that where the movies, theatrical
productions, radio scripts, television programs, and
other such media of expression are concerned –
included that they are in freedom of expression –
censorship, especially so if an entire production is
banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest. There is merit to
the observation of Justice Douglas that “every
writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium
of expression he may use, should be freed from the
censor.”
6. It is the consensus of this Court that where television
is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for
observance. This is so because unlike motion
pictures where the patrons have to pay their way,
television reaches every home where there is a set.
Children then likely will be among the avid viewers
of the programs therein shown. It cannot be denied
that the State as parens patriae is called upon to
manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the
young.
 7. The petition was dismissed because the enough
number of votes was not mustered.

People v. Go Pin
Go Pin held an exhibition of what was alleged to be indecent
and/or immoral pictures in a recreational center.

Facts:

1. Go Pin, a Chinese citizen, exhibited at the Globe

Arcade in Manila, a recreational center, a large
number of one-real 16 mm films about 100 feet in
length each, which are allegedly indecent and/or
immoral. He pleaded not guilty at first but when
allowed to change his plea, he did so.

Ruling:

1. Paintings and pictures of women in the nude,

including sculptures of the at kind are offensive to
morals where they are made and shown not for the
sake of art but profit would commercial purposes,
that is, when gain and profit would appear to be the
main, if not the exclusive consideration in their
exhibition, and the case of art only of secondary or
minor importance.
2. If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown
in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to
be viewed and appreciated by people interested in
art, there would be no offense committed.
However, the pictures here in question were used
not exactly for art’s sake but rather for commercial
purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic
qualities of said pictures were being commercialized
so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor
 importance. Gain and profit would appear to have
been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in
their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the
persons who went to see those pictures and paid
entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not
exactly artists and persons interested in art and who
generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy
and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people
desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and
taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including
the youth who because of their immaturity are not
in a position to resist and shield themselves from the
ill and perverting effects of these pictures.
3. The decision is affirmed.

Dela Cruz v. Ela

Members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses applied for a permit
from the Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Zambales in order to hold a
public meeting with a kiosk at the public plaza. It was
granted by the Mayor however specified that they hold the
meeting at the north-western part of the plaza.

Facts:

1. Members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses sought to hold

a public meeting at the public plaza of Sta. Cruz,
Zambales, together with the kiosk on such date and
time. As such, they applied for a permit from the
respondent Mayor (Norberto Ela).
2. In his answer, Ela stated that he had not refused the
request of the petitioners to hold a religious meeting
at the public plaza as he gave them permission to
use the north-western part of the plaza on the said
date (July 27, 1952). However, the members of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses declined to avail of it. As such,
 petitioners brought an action to compel Ela to issue
a permit.

Ruling:

1. The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully

assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is
not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it
may not be “injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights
of the community or society,” and this power may
be exercised under the police power of the State.
2. It is true that there is no law nor ordinance which
expressly confers upon respondents the power to
regulate the use of the public plaza, together with
this kiosk, for the purposes for which it was
established, but such power may be exercised under
his broad powers as chief executive in connection
with his duty “to issue orders relating to the police
or to public safety” within the municipality (Section
2194(c) of the Revised Administrative Code). And it
may even be said that the above regulation has been
adopted as an implementation of the constitutional
provision which prohibits any public property to be
used, directly or indirectly, by any religious
denomination.
3. The power exercised by the respondent cannot be
considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the
peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that
the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a
short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The
proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused
some concern on the part of the authorities that to
avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the
 happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it
necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any
religious denomination as a place of meeting of its
members. This was the policy adopted by
respondent for sometime previous to the request
made by the petitioners.

US v. Apurado
Several individuals compelled the members of the municipal
council to dismiss several officials and replace them with the
people they had recommended.

Facts:

1. A large number of individuals assembled about the

building of San Carlos, Occidental Negros, crowded
into the council chamber and demanded the
dismissal from office of the municipal treasurer, the
municipal secretary and the chief of police, and the
substitution in their places of new officials who were
suggested by the spokesman of the party. This was
done upon the opening of the session by the
municipal council.
2. The council, even though the persons who took part
in the movement where wholly unarmed except that
a few carried canes, acceded to their wishes and
drew up a formal document setting out the reasons
for its actions, which was signed by the councillors
present. Moreover, the crowd was fairly orderly and
well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into
the council chamber during a session of that body.
The cause of such movement was that the members
of the movement believed that said officials whom
they want dismissed have outspoken allegiance to
 one of the factions into which the town was at that
time divided.
3. Apurado, together with several individuals, was
convicted of the crime of sedition.

Ruling:

1. It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder

will mark the public assembly of the people to
protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is
always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and
the greater the grievance and the more intense the
feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be
permitted to seize upon every instance of such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd
as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a
seditious and tumultuous rising against the
authorities, then the right to assemble and to
petition for redress of grievances would become a
delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it
on the most righteous occasion and in the most
peaceable manner would expose all those who took
part therein to the severest and most unmerited
punishment, if the purposes which they sought to
attain did not happen to be pleasing to the
prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly
conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty
individuals should be sought out and punished
therefore, but the utmost discretion must be
exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and
 seditious conduct and between an essentially
peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.
2. The evidence does not establish the guilt of the
accused.

Malabanan v. Ramento
Student leaders at the Gregorio Araneta University, after
holding the meeting, marched towards the Life Science
building using megaphones and giving utterance to language
severely critical of the school authorities. Classes were
disturbed while the non-academic personnel’s work was
interrupted.

Facts:

1. Petitioners organized a meeting, being officers of the

Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation. They were granted the
permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00
p.m. on August 27, 1982 at the Veterinary Medicine
and Animal Science basketball court. However, they
held the general assembly at the second floor lobby
of the VMAS, contrary to what is stated in the
permit.
2. During the gathering, they manifested their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute
of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture, in
a vehement and vigorous language.
3. After the assembly, at around 10:30 a.m., they
marched toward the Life Science building and
continued their rally, using megaphones and giving
utterance to language severely critical of the
University authorities. As a result, classes were
disturbed aside from the work of non-academic
employees within hearing distance.
 4. The petitioners were placed under preventive
suspension for their failure to explain the holding of
an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science
building.
5. Respondent, the Director of NCR of the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports, found the petitioners
guilty of the charge of having violated paragraph
146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools, more
specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which
was characterized by the violation of the permit
granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and
oral defamation.

Ruling:

1. It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place

other than that specified in the permit and
continued it longer than the time allowed.
Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and
caused the work of the non-academic personnel to
be left undone. Such undesirable consequence
could have been avoided by their holding the
assembly in the basketball court as indicated in the
permit. Nonetheless, suspending them for one year
is out of proportion to their misdeed.
2. As declared by the Court in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the
invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable
assembly carries with it the implication that the right
to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both
are embraced in the concept of freedom of
expression which is identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public
interest without censorship or punishment and
which “is not to be limited, much less denied, except
 on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent.”
3. Petitioners are entitled to invoke their rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech. They enjoy
like the rest of the citizens, the freedom to express
their views and communicate their thoughts to
those disposed to listen in gatherings such as in this
case. They do not shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate. While, therefore, the authority of educational
institutions over the conduct of students must be
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of
constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level,
there is persuasive force to this formulation in Tinker
v. Des Moines Community School District: “The
principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to
accommodate students during prescribed hours for
the purpose of certain types of activities. Among
those activities is personal intercommunication
among the students. This is not only an inevitable
part of the process. A student’s rights do not
embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in
the cafeteria or on the playing field, or on campus
during the authorized hours, he may express his
opinions, even on controversial subjects like the
conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without ‘materially
and substantially interfering with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school’ and without colliding with the rights of
others. But conduct by the student, in class or out of
it, which for any reason – whether it stems from
time, place or type of behaviour – materially disrupts
 classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others is not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”
4. If in the course of such demonstration with an
enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances,
extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let
loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders
are hardly the timid, diffident types. They are likely
to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be
ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded
and judicious language of the academe. At any rate,
even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They
take into account the excitement of the occasion,
the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the
exuberance of youth.
5. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech
are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters
affecting their welfare or involving public interest is
not to be subjected to previous restraint or
subsequent punishment unless there be a showing
of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil
that the State has a right to prevent. As a corollary,
the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the
content of the placards displayed or utterances
made. The peaceable character of an assembly
could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder
under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that
may be aired being susceptible to correction through
the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from its
school authorities, who are devoid of the power to
 deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In
granting such permit, there may be conditions as to
the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel. Even if, however, there be
violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should
not be disproportionate to the offense.
6. Petitioners cannot be totally absolved for the events.
There was violation of the terms of the permit.
Accordingly, they could be disciplined.

Villar v. TIP
The facts are similar with Malabanan v. Ramento. However,
the petitioners have incurred failing grades thus were
disallowed to enrol.

Facts:

1. Petitioners had engaged in some assembly. For this

purpose, they were barred from enrolling.
2. Aside from the assembly, the failed subjects of the
petitioners were considered in their being barred
from enrolling.

Ruling:

1. In the aforementioned Malabanan v. Ramento

decision, the Court held that “[a]s is quite clear from
the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of
the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries
with it the implication that the right to free speech
has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced
in the concept of freedom of expression, which is
identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully, any matter of public interest without
 censorship or punishment and which is not limited,
much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the State
has a right to prevent.” An equally relevant excerpt
from the opinion therein follows that “[p]etitioners
invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech, they are entitled to do so. they enjoy like
the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their
views and communicate their thought to those
disposed to listed in gatherings such as was held in
this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion
of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community
School District, shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”
2. Petitioners have a valid cause for complaint if the
exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech
and peaceable assembly was visited by their
expulsion from respondent College.
3. The academic freedom enjoyed by “institutions of
higher learning” includes the right to set academic
standards to determine under what circumstances
failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students.
Once it has done so, however, that standard should
be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to
discriminate against those students who exercise
their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and
free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate
grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right
to the equal protection clause being disregarded.
 PBM Employment Association v. PBM
In airing their concerns regarding the excesses of the Pasig
police, employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills decided to
stage a mass demonstration at the Malacañang. The
Company feared of losses to be incurred from 6 am to 2 pm.

Facts:

1. Petitioners decided to stage a mass demonstration

at the Malacañang in protest of the alleged abuses
of the Pasig police.
2. Said demonstration would be participated in by the
workers in the first shift (from 6 am to 2 pm) as well
as those in the regular second and third shift (from 7
am to 4 pm and from 8 am to 5 pm, respectively),
and that they informed the respondent company,
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. of their proposed
demonstration.

Ruling:

1. The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of

liberty, equality and security “against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour,
the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn
and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles.” In the pithy language of Justice
Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to
withdraw “certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials, and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One’s rights to life, liberty and property to free
speech, or free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
 submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections.” Laski proclaimed that “the happiness
of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was
the criterion by which its behaviour was to be
judged. Is interest, not its power, set the limits to
the authority it was entitled to exercise.”
2. The freedoms of expressions and of assembly as well
as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the
rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the
ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we
cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to
protect the minority who want to talk, but also to
benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as
Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of
one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.
3. The rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man’s enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.
Thru these freedoms, the citizens can participate not
merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition
of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees
4. Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
 human rights are extinguished by the passage of
time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to
limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs – political, economic or otherwise.
5. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such
priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.” The
superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by
the law and its object or purpose – that the law is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive –
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or
impairs property rights. On the other hand, a
constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
requires a more stringent criterion namely existence
of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent.
6. The freedoms of speech and of the press, as
declared in New York Times v. Sullivan, as well as of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or “when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed.”
7. The demonstration held by petitioners before the
Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen, not against their employer; said
 demonstration was purely and completely an
exercise of their freedom of expression in general
and of their right of assembly and petition for
redress of grievances in particular before the
appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, again the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and
political rights for their mutual aid protection from
what they believe were police excesses. As a matter
of fact, it was the duty of PBM Co. to protect
petitioners from the harassment of local police
officers. It was to the interest of PBM to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its
employees so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence
perform more efficiently their respective tasks,
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
the employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police.
8. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of
expression as well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, the employees and laborers of PBM
were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the
weapons afforded them by the Constitution – the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human
rights. The pretension of the employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 am to 2 pm, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights.
9. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
 collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is a “potent means
of inhibiting speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as
well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition.
10. It has been likewise established that a violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction;
and as a consequence, its judgment is null and void
and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal
conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus
proceedings even long after the finality of the
judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to
obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted
by final judgment through a forced confession,
which violated his constitutional right against self-
incrimination; or who is denied the right to present
evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty
without due process of law, even after the accused
has already served sentence for 22 years.

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

The enactment of RA 3350 which directed that the agreement
between employer and labor organization is not binding to
members of religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members to any such organization. In order to remain with the
Company, according to the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
the employee should likewise be a member of the Union.

Facts:
1. Benjamin Victoriano was a member of the Iglesia ni
Cristo and was employed by Elizalde Rope Factory,
Inc. since 1958. He was a member of the Workers’
Union, whose collective bargaining agreement with
the company provided that “[m]embership in the
Union shall be required as a condition of employment
for all permanent employees.”
2. Republic Act 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961. It
introduced amendment to Section 4[4(a)] of RA 875.
Said section of RA 875 did not preclude the employer
from making an agreement with a labor organization
to require as a condition of employment membership
therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees. However, due to
the amendment introduced by RA 3350, such
agreement (between employer and labor
organization) shall not cover members of any
religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization.
3. Being a member of a religious sect which prohibits
affiliation of its members with any labor organization,
Victoriano tendered his resignation to the Union in
1962. However, no action was taken by the Union;
thus, petitioner reiterated his resignation 12 years
later. The Union, on the other end, wrote a formal
letter to the Company asking for the separation of
Victoriano from service as he was resigning from the
Union as a member.
4. The management in turn notified Victoriano and his
counsel that unless they (Victoriano) could achieve a
satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss him from
service.
Ruling:

1. Both the Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom

of association. Section 1(6) of the Article III of the
1935 Constitution as well as Section 7 of Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of RA 875
provides that employees shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose
of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and
other mutual aid or protection.
2. What the constitution and the Industrial Peace Act
recognize and guarantee is the “right” to form or join
associations. Notwithstanding the different theories
propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence
regarding the nature and content of a “right,” it can
be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to,
a right comprehends at least two broad notions,
namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of
legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for
himself without being prevented by law; and second,
power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join
or refrain from joining an association. It is therefore,
the employee who should decide for himself whether
he should join or not an association; and should
choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to
which association he would join; and even after he
has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power
to leave and cancel his membership with said
organization at any time.
3. It is clear that the right to join a union includes the
right to abstain from joining any union. Inasmuch as
what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace
Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the
employee, is the “right” to join associations of his
choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also
imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the
duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an
employee to sign up any association.
4. The right to refrain from joining labor organizations
recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is
limited. The legal protection granted to such right to
refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law,
where a labor union and an employer have agreed on
a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may
employ only member of the collective bargaining
union, and the employees must continue to be
members of the union for the duration of the contract
in order to keep their jobs.
5. What the exception provides is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with employers; that in spite of any
closed shop agreement, members of said religious
sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed
from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not
members of the collective bargaining union. It is
clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from
infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of
association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not
prohibit the members of said religious sects from
affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not
 to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding
their religious beliefs, the members of said religious
sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can
do so. if in deference and fealty to their religious
faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law
does not coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining; and neither may the
employer or labor union compel them to join. RA
3350 does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of association.

In re: Edillon
Atty. Edillon did not want to pay the membership dues. He
questioned the so-called infringement of the integration of the
Integrated Bar on right to association.

Facts:

1. Respondent, Atty. Marcial Edillon, stubbornly refused

to pay his membership dues to the IBP despite the
due notice of the Board of Governors of the IBP which
recommended to the SC the removal of his name
from the Roll of Attorneys.
2. Edillon contends that membership and the obligation
to pay membership dues infringe his constitutional
right because he is compelled, as a precondition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues.

Ruling:

1. An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which

every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations by individual lawyers themselves,
 membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of
the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.
2. The State, in order to promote the general welfare,
may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State
for, as the Latin maxim goes, “Salus populi est
suprema lex.” The public welfare is the supreme law.
To this fundamental principle of government the
rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because
then society will fall into anarchy. It is an undoubted
power of the State to restrain some individuals from
all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
3. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
 associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a
member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar Examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national
organizations for the well-defined but unorganized
and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already
a member.
4. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The SC, in order to further
the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program – the lawyers.

Subido v. Ozaeta
Petitioner wanted the Register of Deeds of Manila, in
compliance to Justice Circular No. 128, to furnish him a list of
real estates sold to aliens and registered with the Register of
Deeds of Manila.

Facts:

1. Petitioner, the editor of the Manila Post, prays that an

order issue “commanding the respondents to furnish
to petitioner the list of real estates sold to aliens and
registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila since
the promulgation of Justice Circular No. 128 or to
allow the petitioner or his duly accredited
 representatives to examine all records in the
respondents’ custody relative to said transaction.
2. Said request was first denied by the Register of Deeds
and by the Secretary of Justice, on appeal.

Ruling:

1. The petition in part is grounded on the liberty of the

press. The Court however believes that this
constitutional right is not in any way involved. The
refusal by the respondents does not constitute a
restriction upon or censorship of publication. It only
affects facilities of publication, and the respondents
are correct in saying that freedom of information or
freedom to obtain information for publication is not
guaranteed by the Constitution.
2. The right to examine or inspect public records is
purely a question of statutory construction.
3. The right of inspection of title records is a subject of
express statutory regulation in the Philippines.
Section 56 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No.
3300, provides that “all records relating to registered
lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be
open to the public subject to such reasonable
regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office with the approval of
the Secretary of Justice.” The Chief of the General
Land Registration Office does not seem to have
adopted any regulations in pursuance of this
provision.
4. The Register of Deeds has inherent power to control
his office and the records under his custody and has
some discretion to exercise as to the manner in which
 persons desiring to inspect, examine, or copy the
records may exercise their rights.
5. The power to regulate is not synonymous with the
power to prohibit. Stated differently, the power to
make regulations does not carry with it the power to
prohibit. To the extent that newspapers and others
who have no direct or tangible interest in the records
are obstructed from making an examination thereof,
a part, indeed the larger part of the public, is thereby
excluded from the right granted by law. Such
prohibition is at war with the requirement that the
books and records of registered lands shall be open to
the public. “Public” is a comprehensive, all-inclusive
term. Properly construed, it embraces every person.
From the language of section 56 of Act No. 496, as
amended, the regulations which the Register of
Deeds or the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, or the Secretary of Justice is empowered to
promulgate are confined to prescribing the manner
and hours of examination to the end that damage to,
or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the
books and documents and other employees may be
prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to
make inspection may be insured and the like.
6. When it is clear that the purpose of the examination
is unlawful, it is not duty under the law of registration
officers to concern themselves with the motives,
reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to
the records. It is not their prerogative to see to it that
the information which the records contain is not
flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not
made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of
 the records, it is the legislature and not the officials
having the custody thereof which is called upon to
devise a remedy. As to moral or material injury which
the publication might inflict on the parties, that is the
publisher’s responsibility and lookout.
7. Newspapers have a better-established right of access
to records of titles by reason of their relations to the
public than abstractors or insurers of title. Whether
by design or otherwise, newspapers perform a
mission which does not enter into the calculation of
the business of abstracting titles conducted purely for
private gain. Newspapers publish information for the
benefit of the public while abstractors do so for the
benefit of a limited class of investors and purchasers
of real estate only. It is through the medium of
newspapers that the public is informed of how public
servants conduct their business. The public through
newspapers have the legitimate right to know the
transactions in real estate which they believe have
been registered in violation of the Constitution. The
publication of these matters is certainly not only
legitimate and lawful but necessary in a country
where, under the Constitution, the people should
rule.
8. Petition was granted commanding the respondents to
allow the petitioner or his accredited representatives
to examine, extract, abstract, or make memoranda of
the records of sales of real properties to aliens subject
to such restriction and limitation as may be deemed
necessary not incompatible with this decision.
 Baldoza v. Dimaano
To know the peace and order situation of the municipality,
employees of the Municipal Mayor of Taal wanted to examine
the criminal docket records of the municipal court. However, it
was refused by the judge. As such, he was charged of abuse of
authority.

Facts:

1. The employees of the Municipal Mayor of Taal

wanted to examine the criminal docket records of the
municipal court to secure data in connection with
their contemplated report on the peace and order
situation of the municipality. However, it was not
approved by the respondent municipal judge.
2. The said municipal trial court judge was charged with
abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees to
access the records of the Municipal Trial Court.

Ruling:

1. In a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in

matters of social and political significance; hence, the
people’s right of free access to public records is
predicated on their right to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
2. Mandamus would lie to compel a public official to
allow an interested party access to the records in his
custody. Thus, predicating the right to examine
public records on statutory provisions and to a certain
degree by general principles of democratic
institutions, this Court stated that while the Register
of Deeds has discretion to determine the manner in
which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy
 the records in his office may exercise their rights, such
power does not carry with it the authority to prohibit.
3. Public’s right of access to public records is not merely
predicated on statutory right but on the
constitutional right of the press to have access to
information as the essence of press freedom. The
New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the
people are entitled to information on matters of
public concern and thus are expressly granted to
access to official records, as well as documents of
official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to
such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation
of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in
a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by
the public of the nation’s problems, nor a meaningful
democratic decision-making if they are denied access
to information of general interest. Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope
with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly
observed, “[m]aintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its
dissemination since, if either process is interrupted,
the flow inevitably ceases.”
4. Restriction on access to certain records may be
imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to
control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a
showing of immediate and impending danger that
renders ordinary means of control inadequate to
maintain order.
5. The case against respondent was dismissed.
 Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission
Legaspi requested information regarding the civil service
eligibilities of two sanitarians in the Health Department of
Cebu City. However, the CSC initially denied said request.

Facts:

1. Legaspi requested for information on the civil service

eligibilities of certain persons (Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas) employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City. They were,
according to petitioner, represented themselves as
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians. But, his request was
denied.
2. For this purpose, a special civil action for mandamus
was instituted.

Ruling:

1. The new provision reads that “[t]he right of the

people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.” These
constitutional provisions are self-executing. They
supply the rules which the right to information may
be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating
the duty to afford access to sources of information.
Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may
be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
 Legislature. What may be provided for by the
Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations
upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy
of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest. However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever limitation may be
prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty
under Article III, Section 7 have become operative and
enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New
Charter.
2. In recognizing the people’s right to be informed, both
the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter, expressly
mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford
access to official records, documents, papers and in
addition, government research data used as basis for
policy development, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. The guarantee has been
further enhanced in the New Constitution with the
adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this time,
which reads: “Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.”
3. Government agencies are without discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of
public concern. This is not to lose sight of the
reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said
agencies in custody of public records on the manner
in which the right to information may be exercised by
the public.
4. The Court is emphatic in the statement that the
authority to regulate the manner of examining public
 records does not carry with it the power to prohibit.
A distinction has to be made between the discretion
to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a
particular information and the authority to regulate
the manner in which the access is sought to be
afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability
of access to the information sought, which only the
Legislature may impose. The second pertains to the
government agency charged with the custody of
public records. Its authority to regulate access is to
be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss
of, public records may be avoided, undue
interference with the duties of said agencies may be
prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of
the same constitutional right by other persons shall
be assured.
5. While the manner of examining public records may be
subject to reasonable regulation by the government
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of
said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be
made contingent upon the discretion of such
agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the
constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The
constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its
performance may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus in a proper case.
6. But the constitutional guarantee to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not
open every door to any and all information. Under
the constitution, access to official records, papers,
 etc. are subject to limitations as may be provided by
law. The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those
affecting national security. It follows that, in every
case, the availability of access to a particular public
record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or
one that involves public interest, and (b) not being
exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
7. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not
the information sought is of public interest or public
concern. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this
does not give the agency concerned any discretion to
grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the
government agency has the burden of showing that
the information requested is not of public concern or,
if it is of public concern, that the same has been
exempted by law from the operation of the
guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the
constitutional right. As aptly observed, the
government is in an advantageous position to
marshal and interpret arguments against release. To
safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of
access by the government agency concerned is
subject to review by the courts, and in the proper
case, access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus.
8. In determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. “Public concern” like “public
 interest” is a term that eludes exact definition. Both
terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which
the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine in a case by case basis whether the matter
at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public.
9. The information sought by the petitioner in this case
is the truth of the claim of certain government
employees that they are civil service eligible for the
positions to which they were appointed. The
constitution expressly declares as a State policy that
“[a]ppointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness to be determined, as
far as practicable, and except as to positions which
are policy determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical, by competitive examination.”
10. But, it is not enough that the information sought is of
public interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given case,
the information must not be among the species
exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
11. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of
public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the register
of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the
civil service eligibility of any person occupying the
position becomes imperative.
 Valmonte v. Belmonte
Valmonte, through a letter, requested the GSIS to furnish him
a list of the names of the opposition members of the Batasang
Pambansa who were able to secure a loan of Php 2 million.

Facts:

1. Valmonte wrote to Belmonte, who is the GSIS

General Manager at that time, requesting the latter
to furnish the list of names of the opposition
members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able
to secure a clean loan of Php 2 million each on
guaranty of Imelda Marcos.
2. However, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS
replied that they cannot respond positively to his
request.

Ruling:

1. The cornerstone of this republican system of

government is delegation of power by the people to
the State. In this system, governmental agencies
and institutions operate within the limits of the
authority conferred by the people. Denied access to
information on the inner working of government,
the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public office as a public
trust, institutionalized in the Constitution to protect
the people from abuse of governmental power,
would certainly be mere empty words if access to
such information of public concern is denied, except
under limitations prescribed by implementing
legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
2. The right to information is an essential premise of a
meaningful right to speech and expression. But this
is not to say that the right to information is merely
an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application
by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the
press. Far from it, the right to information goes
hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full
public disclosure and honesty in the public service.
It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in
checking abuse in government.
3. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute. The people’s right to
information is limited to “matters of public concern,”
and is further “subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.” Similarly, the State’s policy of full
disclosure is limited to transactions involving public
interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law.”
4. When the information requested from the
government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a
potential conflict between the rights to information
and to privacy may arise. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and
not to public and governmental agencies like the
GSIS. A corporation has no right to privacy since the
entire basis of the right to privacy is injury to the
feelings and sensibilities of the party and a
corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its general manager,
the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature.
 5. The government, whether carrying out its sovereign
attributes or running some business, discharges the
same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans,
was exercising a proprietary function would not
justify the exclusion of the transactions from the
coverage and scope of the right of the right to
information.
6. The consideration in guaranteeing access to
information on matters of public concern does not
however, accord to citizen the right to compel
custodian of public records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire such information.
7. The petition was granted.

Badoy Jr. v. COMELEC

Badoy, who is a candidate for the Constitutional Convention
for the lone district of North Cotabato, prayed that Section
12(f) of the Constitutional Convention Act be declared
unconstitutional for it abridged the freedom of expression of
individuals.

Facts:

1. Anacleto Badoy, Jr. is a candidate for delegate tot eh

Constitutional Convention for the lone district of
North Cotabato.
2. He prays that the Section 12(f) of RA 6132
(Constitutional Convention Act) be declared
unconstitutional for in so far as it prohibits the
printing and publication of such comments and
articles, which are not paid, unless the names of all
candidates are mentioned with equal prominence.
He purports that said provision unduly abridges the
 freedom of expression of an individual whether
candidate or not.

Ruling:

1. Freedom of expression is not immune to regulation

by the State in the exercise of its police power. The
validity of the abridgment is gauged by the extent of
its inroad into the domain of the liberty of speech
and of the press, when subjected to the applicable
clear and present danger rule or the balancing of
interests tests. If the restriction on the invaded is so
narrow that the basic liberty remains, then the
limitation is constitutional.
2. The evident purpose of the limitation in Section 12(f)
of RA 6132 on the freedom of the candidate or his
sympathizer to spend his own money for his
candidacy alone and not for the furtherance of the
candidacy of his opponents. It is to give the poor
candidates a fighting chance in the election. While it
is true that the mere mention of the poor opponent
in the same advertisement or paid articles does not
by itself alone engender perfect equality of chances,
at least the chance of the poor candidate for victory
is improved because thereby his name will be
exposed to the reading public in the same article as
that of the wealthy candidate.
3. Section 12(f) of RA 6132. Prohibiting the publication
of paid comments or paid articles without
mentioning the names of all the other candidates
with equal prominence, is not unconstitutional as
unduly abridging the freedom of expression of an
individual. Against the background of the several
facilities accorded by the law for all candidates, rich
 and poor alike, and the prohibitions as well as penal
sanctions to insure the sanctity of the ballot against
desecration and the equality of chances among the
candidates, the restriction on the freedom of
expression of the candidate or any other individual
prescribed in Section 12(f) is so narrow as not to
affect the substance and vitality of his freedom of
expression itself.
4. Under the guarantee of free expression, the
candidate who pays for a comment or an article has
the duty not only to inform the electorate about his
qualifications and proposals for constitutional
reforms, but also to inform truthfully the public who
his opponents are, so that the public or particularly
the electorate can determine the truth and merit of
his claims vis-à-vis those of the other candidates.
Otherwise, the candidate will be guilty of gross and
unpardonable deceit on the people. This duty on
the part of the candidate was underscored by John
Milton in his stirring rhetorical denunciation of the
suppression of truth as he appealed for the “liberty
to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to
conscience, above all liberties.” The same was
stressed by Justice Murphy when he delineated the
contours as well as facets of the freedom of
expression as the “freedom to publish publicly and
truthfully all matters of public concern without
previous restraint or fear of subsequent
punishment.”
5. The candidate, to enjoy the freedom, therefore has
the concomitant duty to campaign for himself
truthfully according to his conscience. If he is not
truthful, he forfeits the freedom. His freedom of
 expression is not and should not be limited to his
own personal right to know the truth of the claims of
the other candidates.
6. Petitions were denied.

PCIB v. PHILNABANK Employees Association

The PHILNABANK Employees Association had used placards in
their demonstration against the incompetence of the bank’s
management. The petitioners found the cards to be causing
dishonour because it read that their bad accounts were
transferred to the PNB.

Facts:

1. PHILNABANK Employees, in denouncing the lack of

business foresight, incompetence, mismanagement,
arbitrary and despotic acts of the management to
heed the legal and legitimate demands, put up
placards along the PNB building in Escolta, Manila.
The placards read: PCIB Bad Accounts transferred to
PNB-NIDC?
2. According to petitioner, these placards were causing
dishonour, discredit or contempt of a juridical
person.

Ruling:

1. The labor union made use of its constitutional right

to picket. From the time of Mortera v. CIR, a 1947
decision, this Court has been committed to the view
that peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of
speech guarantee of the Constitution. The latest
case in point where such a principle was reaffirmed
expressly is Associated Labor Union v. Gomez, a
1980 decision. There is no mention of the other
 placards but it is not unlikely that to bolster its claim,
mention was likewise made and in bold letter at that
of such alleged failing of its management.
2. It is a fact of industrial life, both in the Philippines as
in the United States, that in the continuing
confrontation between labor and management, it is
far from likely that the language employed would be
both courteous and polite. Such being the case,
there is no affront either to reason or to the law in
the complaint for libel being dismissed. In pricing
reliance on the constitutional right of freedom of
expression, this Court once again makes manifest its
adherence to the principle first announced by Justice
Malcolm in US v. Bustos. In no uncertain terms, it
made clear that the judiciary, in deciding suits for
libel, must ascertain whether or not the alleged
offending words may be embraced by the
guarantees of free speech and free press.
3. Decision is affirmed.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

The Expanded Value-Added Tax Law was challenged by
several petitions. The Philippine Press Institute contends that
the law discriminates against the press after the law removed
the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintained
those granted to others.

Facts:

1. Several motions were filed in order to have RA 7716

declared unconstitutional. RA 7716 is known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
2. It is contended by the Philippine Press Institute that
by removing the exemption of the press from the
VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the
 law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
averred, “even non-discriminatory taxation of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional.”

Ruling:

1. As a general proposition, the press is not exempt

from the taxing power of the State and that what the
constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are
laws which single out the press or target a group
belonging to the press for special treatment or which
in any way discriminate against the press on the
basis of the content of the publication, and RA 7716
is none of these.
2. It would suffice to say that since the law granted the
press a privilege, the law could take back the
privilege anytime without offense to the
constitution. The reason is simple: by granting
exemptions, the State does not forever waive the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in
withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects
the press to the same tax burden to which other
businesses have long ago been subject.
3. The license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co.
was found to be discriminatory because it was laid
on the gross advertising receipts only of newspapers
whose weekly circulation was over 20,000, with the
result that the tax applied only to 13 out of 124
publishers in Louisiana. These large papers were
critical of Sen. Long who controlled the state
legislature which enacted the license tax. The
censorial motivation for the law was thus evident.
4. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm’r of Revenue, the tax was found to be
discriminatory because although it could have been
made liable for the sales tax or in lieu thereof, for
the use tax on the privilege of using, storing, or
consuming tangible goods, the press was not.
Instead the press was exempted from both taxes. It
was however later made to pay a special use tax on
the cost of paper and ink which made these items
“the only items subject to the use tax that were
component of goods to be sold at retail.” The US SC
held that the differential treatment of the press
suggests that the goal of regulation is not related to
suppression of expression, and such goal is
presumptively unconstitutional. It would therefore
appear that even a law that favors the press is
constitutionally suspect.
5. The VAT is different. It is not a license tax. It is not a
tax on the exercise of a privilege; much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter,
lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale
or exchange of services and the lease of properties
purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to
its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right
any more than to make the press pay income tax or
subject it to general regulation is not to violate its
freedom under the Constitution.