Professional Documents
Culture Documents
TEEHANKEE
G.R. No. L-28790 On December 17, 1924, Po executed a deed of sale of the land to
Price in consideration of P17,000. This sale was recorded with the RD
Facts: on January 22, 1925.
Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151,
he isentitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges On February 16, 1927, Price with the consent of his wife, sold the land
as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering to the Province of Leyte for P20,570. On March 17, 1927, the OCT
certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title. The was issued in the name of the spouses Price. Later, the proper transfer
Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring certificate of title was provided for the Province of Leyte. On October
himto explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. 12, 1927, Katigbak transferred the property to Po Sun Tun for P8,000.
Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that
of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same Presently, the possession of the property has been under the control
manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that of Price and the Provincial Government and has not been under the
he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, he material control of Po Sun Tun. The latter filed an action to gain the
was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES). Noblejas filed this possession of the property before the CFI and decided in favor of
case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of Price.
discretion. On the appeal, it was found out that the deed in favor of
Katigbak had not been registered in the corresponding registry of
ISSUE: property.
Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be
investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank ISSUE:
equivalent to a judge). Whether the deed in favor of Katigbak with the note “ Register
of Deeds, Received December 23, 1923, Province of Leyte” can it be
Ruling: No. said to be recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
If the law had really intended to include the general grant of “rank and HELD:
privileges equivalent to Judges”, the right to be investigated and be No. the term "To register" it has been said that it means to "enter in a
suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list"
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine
of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court The mere presentation to the office of the register of deeds of a
with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive document on which acknowledgment of receipt is written is not
officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto,the control of the Chief equivalent to recording or registering the real property. Escriche says
Executive over such officials. that registration, in its juridical aspect, must be understood as the entry
made in a book or public registry of deeds.
Petitioner’s theory that the grant of “privilege of a Judge of First
Instance” includes by implication the right to be investigated only by If any doubt remained on the subject, it would be dispelled by turning
the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its to Act No. 2837 amendatory of section 194 of the Administrative Code,
recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being and recalling that it is therein provided that "No instrument or deed
possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the establishing, transmitting, acknowledging, modifying or extinguishing
legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. This rights with respect to real estate not registered under the provisions of
include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the DOJ; (b) the Assistant Act No. 496, entitled 'The Land Registration' and its amendments,
Solicitors General; (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City; (d) the City Fiscal shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, until such
of Manila and (e) SEC Commissioner. instrument or deed has been registered, in the manner hereinafter
prescribed, in the office of the register of deeds for the province or city
Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a where the real estate lies."
judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and
binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Hence, since the deed made by Gabino in favor of Katigbak was not
Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean only not first recorded in the registry of deeds but never legally so
that they are judicial in character.Still, the resolution of the consultas recorded, and since the purchaser who did record his deed was Price,
are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions. who secured a Torrens title and transferred the same to the Province
of Leyte, that Po Sun Tun, the holder of a defeasible title, has no legal
Petition is Dismissed. rights as against Price and the Province of Leyte, the holders of
indefeasible titles. Further, it could beruled that within the meaning of
PO SUN TUN vs. W.S. PRICE and PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF section 38 of the Land Registration Law, Price and the Province of
LEYTE G.R. NO. 31346 DECEMBER 28, 1929 Leyte are innocent purchasers for value of the disputed property.
In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney- • In 1976, Manuel Leonen saw the carabao of
General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory petitioner Alejandro Pang-oden devouring the Leonens' sugar cane
evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. crops planted on the property in question. It was then that Manuel
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for Leonen discovered that petitioners had encroached on the 1,336.5-
which he asked for registration. square meter portion of their property and had in fact occupied the
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted. same.
22.G.R. No. L-27088 July 31, 1975 • Despite Repeated demands from respondents,
HEIRS OF BATIOG LACAMEN vs. HEIRS OF LARUAN Alejandro Pang-oden refused to surrender possession of said land. So
the respondents filed a complaint for the Recovery of Possession
Based on Ownership.
• Petitioners contend that no new creek was created The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under
and that the present creek is the same creek which bounds their Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened is
property on the west, thus making them the owners of the property in that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further
question. down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any
accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result
• RTC and CA ruled in favor of the Leonens and of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the
ordered the Pang-odens to vacate said lot. Thus this petition. river.
Issue: Who between the petitioners and the respondents, own the On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of
strip of land subject of the suit.||| Mrs. Virginia Acuña to the effect that:
... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were
Ruling: already dry almost at the level of the Pilapil of the property of Dr.
The SC ruled that the owners of the subject strip of Land are the Tancinco, and that from the boundaries of the lots, for about two (2)
respondents herein. arms length the land was still dry up to the edge of the river; that
The CA and the trial court relied on the testimonies of two (2) sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was established on the boundaries of
disinterested witnesses: Gregorio Libao, a retired employee of the Lots 1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was transferred to the new
NIA, and Anacleto Dicta-an, a resident of Sudipen, La Union. Both Pilapil and this was done sometime in 1951; that the new lots were
testified as to the existence of an old creek which served as the then converted into fishpond, and water in this fishpond was two (2)
common boundary of the respective properties of the parties, and of meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .
the subsequent diversion of the creek to its present position which now
cuts through the middle portion of the respondents' property. The The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence
witnesses' testimonies were amply supported by the report and sketch establishes the fact of accretion without human intervention because
plan prepared by the court-appointed commissioner, which revealed the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete.
the existence of an old creek running from south to north, and the
creation of a new creek from south to northwest. ISSUE:Whether or not the subject land is registrable as an accretion.
According to Article 434 of the Civil Code: "In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength RULE:
of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim." We agree with the petitioner.Article 457 of the New Civil Code requires
Hence, in order that an action for the recovery of property may the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this
prosper, it is indispensable that the party who prosecutes it must fully particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the
prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the
of the same. effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.The requirement that the
The evidence presented in this case showed that the property subject deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
of the dispute rightfully belongs to the respondents, as it was indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all
established that the same is part of the parcel of land declared under deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the
the name of respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Dionisio Leonen. exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence
Indeed, the verification survey of the contested property conducted by whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made
Juvenal Quitoriano, a geodetic engineer, revealed that it was in the gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and
name of Dionisio Leonen. Thus, petition is denied. Bocaue rivers.
There is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and
man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the
REPUBLIC vs.CA G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984 Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but
respondent Court of Appeals. as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, AzucenaTancinco Reyes, Marina upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast
(should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the fishpond
registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate adjoining it. It is under two meters of water.
of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the
registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property. On April danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land.
5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in
representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the The instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is
application for registration. hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal ordered to move back the dikes of their fishponds to their original
of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu- location and return the disputed property to the river to which it
131892 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner belongs.
appointed by the Court.On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered
withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with respect Leonida Cureg, Romeo Carniyan, et al. v. IAC, Domingo Apostol,
to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.On June 26, 1976, the et al.
lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding GR No. 73465 | September 7, 1989 | Medialdea, J. (Gel)
that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents'
fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. Facts: In 1982 Apostol, et al filed a complaint for quieting of title and
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent damages with preliminary injunction against the Carniyans with the
Court of Appeals.On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered RTC of Isabela. Apostol, et al. alleged that they are the legal heirs of
a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. The Domingo Geraro who has been in OCEN possession of a parcel of
dispositive portion of the decision reads: DAHIL DITO, land referred to as "motherland" since time immemorial or before July
anghatolnainiakyat ay sinasangayunan at 26, 1894. During the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition with
pinagtitibaysakanyangkabuuannangwalangbayad. Voluntary Reconveyance, the motherland already showed/manifested
signs of accretion of about 3 has on the north caused by the northward construction of their house within the land.On April 21, 1987, Pedro
movement of the Cagayan River. Apostol declared the motherland and transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio.
its accretion for tax purposes under a tax declaration. Apostol, et al. On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of
were about to cultivate their “motherland” together with its accretion, Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance
they were prevented and threatened by the Carniyans from continuing from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an
to do so. access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The
proposed roadwill run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez
Carniyans’ answer: the “motherland” is non-existent; that Antonio Compoundtraversing the lot occupied by the respondents.
Carniyan, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a Respondents immediately opposedand the project was suspended.
piece of land bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when
land of Gerardo as claimed by private respondents; that the “subject several officials from the barangay and the city planning office
land” is an accretion to their registered land and that petitioners have proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.
been in possession and cultivation of the “accretion” for many years On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the
now. respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty
(30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property.
RTC: Apostol is the absolute owner Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim over the subject
IAC: affirmed RTC. property and expressing intent for a further dialogue.The request
remained unheeded.
Issue: WoN can be considered riparian owners who are entitled to the Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of
“subject land” which is an accretion Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners.
Held: Yes. OCT is better than tax declarations! ISSUE:
Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.
Apostol's claim of ownership is anchored on 4 tax declarations, while
Carniyans relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their HELD:
OCT No. P-19093, dated November 25, 1968.The declaration of
ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is No.
not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. As against tax declarations It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from
and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-
nor proof of the area covered therein, an OCT indicates true and legal cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over
ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises. the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, which remains in effect,in relation to Article 457 of the Civil
Since OCT clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by Code.
the Cagayan River, Apostol's claim over their “motherland,” allegedly
existing between petitioners’ land and the Cagayan River, is deemed ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to
barred and nullified with the issuance of the OCT. creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from
the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Thus the alleged “motherland” claimed by private respondents is Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
nonexistent. The “subject land” is an alluvial deposit left by the the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to NCC 457: current of the waters.
“To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public
waters.” domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of
the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction
However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must
P-19093 is only 4,584 m2. The accretion attached to said land is register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
approximately 5.5 hectares. The increase in the area of petitioners’ property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third
land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward persons.
movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by
registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has
covered by a Torrens title. (Grande v. CA, 1962). As such, it must also been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding
be placed under the operation of the Torrens System. Petition granted. property of public domain.Even a city or municipality cannot acquire
IAC reversed. them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITYv. MARIO D. dominion,the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible
EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010 public domain by clear provision of law.
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE International Hardwood filed before the CFI a petition for declaratory
PHILIPPINES v. UP relief seeking a declaration that UP does NOT have the right to:
August 13, 1991 1. Supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and
Davide, Jr., J other forest products,
Luciano, Noel Christian O. 2. Scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or
3. Collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from
SUMMARY: International Hardwood was the grantee of a License Hardwood and/or
4. Impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that
portion of its concession covered by a License Agreement, over the area to UP
ceded in full ownership to UP by RA 3990 a. Thus, UP became the owner of the land,
subject only to existing concession
Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000 in damages. 3. Since there is an express proviso on existing
concessions, this means that the right of Hardwood
UP filed its Answer: as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired,
1. Interposed affirmative defenses of improper venue and that or diminished; it must be respected
the petition states no cause of action 4. BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its
2. Set up counterclaim for payment of forest charges on the rights as grantor of the license were effectively
forest products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP
under RA 3990 a. Having been effectively segregated and
removed from the public domain or from a
CFI DECISION: CFI rendered judgment in favor of Hardwood: public forest and, in effect, converted into a
1. RA 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure, and seal registered private woodland, the authority and
the timber cut by International Hardwood within the tract of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it
land and collect the corresponding charges prescribed by were likewise terminated
NIRC b. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber
2. Dismissed UP’s counterclaim cut from the subject area and to collect forestry
charges and other fees thereon because of this
CA DECISION: Elevated the case to the SC as the case involves full transfer.
purely legal questions.
III. As owner, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the
ISSUE: WON UP as owner had the right to scale, measure, and seal thing without other limitations than those established by
the timber cut by Hardwood and collect forestry charges thereon. law. In this case, that exception is made for Hardwood
as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has
HELD: YES, by virtue of the full cession of ownership to UP. been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber
from the area ceded and transferred to UP until February
I. Arguments of the Parties 1985.
A. UP asserts that: A. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and
1. Under RA 3990, the Philippines may effect obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties to the
collection of forest charges through UP because the new owner, UP
License Agreement does not expressly provide that B. Thus, the charges should not be paid to the Government
they be paid to the BIR but to UP.
2. UP is vested with administrative jurisdiction over C. It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to
and has ownership over the land in question. Thus, supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
it acquired full control and benefit of the timber and logging, felling and removal of timber within the area
other resources in the area covered by R.A. No. 3990
3. UP is entitled to the income derived from the tract of
land ceded to it by RA 3990 DISPOSITIVE: Judgment is rendered reversing the decision of the trial
4. UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central court. Thus:
experiment station 1. Forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber
5. Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of cut pursuant to its License Agreement within the area ceded
Hardwood by UP was intended by RA 3990 and transferred to UP pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid
6. BIR and the Bureau Of Forestry issued specific to UP;
rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect 2. UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
royalties and charges personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within
B. Hardwood contends: the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
1. UP has not been granted by RA 3990 the authority
to collect forest charges or the authority to supervise REPUBLIC v CA & CHAVEZ
the operation of the timber concession G.R. No. L-62680 November 9, 1988
2. Cession of the land was expressly made subject to CRUZ, J.:
any concession, if any
3. Rulings of BIR and Bureau of Forestry are incorrect FACTS:
4. It has acquired vested right to operate the timber The case deals with the confirmation of an imperfect title over a tract
concession under the supervision and control of the of land situated in Guimaras. In 1976, private respondent Chavez filed
Bureau of Forestry an application for its registration which is solely opposed by the DoL.
The application was granted. Petitioner appealed to the CA which
II. Discussion on the effect of the laws affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
A. The laws:
1. Under Proc. 791 – a parcel of land of the public Petitioner argues that (1) the subject land was not sufficiently Identified
domain was withdrawn from sale or settlement and with indubitable evidence since what was submitted was not the
was reserved for the UP College of Agriculture as tracing cloth plan but only the blueprint copy of the survey plan; and
experiment station, subject to private rights, if any (2) the nature and length of possession required by law had not been
2. Under RA 3990 – the very same lot referred to in adequately established.
Proc. 791 was ceded fully to UP, subject to any
existing concessions, if any ISSUE:
B. Effect of the laws on the concession of Hardwood: 1. WON there is ample evidence to establish the Identity of the subject
1. When RA 3990 ceded the property to UP, the property.
Philippines completely removed it from the public 2. WON the length of possession required is adequately established.
domain and segregated the areas covered by the
timber license from the public forest HELD:
2. The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights 1. YES. The Bureau of Lands has certified to the correctness of the
blueprint copy of the plan including the technical description that go contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also
with it. It contained all the details and information necessary for a was that no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry
proper and definite Identification of the land sought to be registered, to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property
thereby serving the purpose for which the original tracing cloth plan is still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the
required. – lots in question are forestal land.
where the subject land is located,
its area of in square meters, Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession
the land as plotted, of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant
its technical descriptions and to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of
its natural boundaries private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the
2. NO. There is not enough evidence except his own unsupported burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their
declarations. The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to application.
substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which
are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. The Sherwill Development Corporation vs. SitioSto. Nino Residents
private respondent showed that he had been paying taxes on the land Association, Inc.
only from 1972 and up to 1977. GR No. 158455. June 28, 2005
Even assuming that he had really planted those trees, such an act will
hardly suffice to prove possession as this would constitute what this FACTS:
Court has called "a mere casual cultivationwhich does not constitute This is a petition for review on certiorari dismissing civil action
possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not on the ground of litispendenia and forum shopping.
exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from Petitioner is the register owner of 2 parcels of land in
the state. Muntinlupa, Rizal. In 2002, petitioner filed a Complaint for
quieting of title against respondents and Land Management
The Court finds that although the subject property was sufficiently Bureau, alleging among others, respondents unlawfully
Identified with the blueprint copy of the survey plan, the applicant has entered and occupied the lots in Muntinlupa, Rizal. Among
failed to prove the peaceful, exclusive, continuous, and open said unauthorized persons are members and officers of
possession necessary to support his claim of ownership. For this respondents.
reason, the registration sought should have been, as it is now, denied. o From all indications, LMB is set to recommend to
REPUBLIC v CA & CENIZA the Philippine Government, [through] the Office of
G.R. No. 127060. November 19, 2002 the Solicitor General (OSG), the “nullification” of
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: TCT Nos. 131918 and 131919 and/or the reversion
thereof to the Philippine Government, despite the
FACTS: fact that the latter, sometime in 1927 or thereabout,
On November 4, 1986, private respondents applied for registration of sold and/or disposed of subject lots, then covered
their respective titles over the property they inherited from by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 684,
ApolinarCeniza (the declared owner in 1948), with the RTC of pursuant to Act No. 1120 and other pertinent laws.
Mandaue City. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by Petitioner is the third or fourth transferee and buyer
the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the application. RTC in good faith of the lots in question.
granted the application. This was affirmed by the CA by ruling that Petitioner prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
mere possession of public land for the period required by law would issued, ordering the LMB to cease and desist from
entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title. proceeding with the hearings in LMB Case No. 7-98, a case
pending before it where petitioner’s titles to the subject lots
ISSUE: were being questioned by the respondents SSNRAI and
WON there is a need for private respondents to establish that the land NildaDevilleres.
subject of their application was alienable and disposable despite Respondents filed an MTD contending forum shopping and
proofs showing their possession thereof for more than 30 years; and litispendentia. Such contention was opposed by petitioner.
The petitioner pointed out that in LMB Case No. 7-98, the
HELD: private respondents (as the petitioners therein) sought the
YES. Before one can be granted a confirmation of title to lands of the declaration of the nullity of the said titles issued in its favor,
public domain, the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must on their claim that their issuance was “highly irregular and
prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, erroneous,” and that the subject properties were not
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the disposed of in accordance with Act No. 1120, otherwise
same must either be since time immemorial or for the period known as the Friar Lands Act. On the other hand, in SP Civil
prescribed in the Public Land Act. Only when these conditions are met Action No. 02-237, the petitioner’s right of action was based
may the possessor of the land acquire, by operation of law, a right to on the private respondents’ act of disturbing and casting
a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of clouds over TCT Nos. 131918 and 131919, considering that
title being issued. such titles have long become indefeasible and conclusive.
Trial Court: dismissed on the grounds of
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is litispendentia and forum shopping.
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive ISSUE:
order; an administrative action;investigation reports of Bureau of Whether or not there was forum shopping and whether the court has
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute jurisdiction over the matter.