From the war on drugs to viable solutions of drug trafficking in Mexico

By Aram Barra

INTRODUCTION
Throughout this paper I will tackle the drug trafficking problematic in the particular case of
Mexico, and all the implications that it brings along with it. I will utilize a ‘globalization’
perspective in order to further understand the subject, and be able to propose viable
solutions for it. Thus, it is important to explain the idea of globalization that will be used all
the way through this paper.

THEORETICAL APPROACH
Globalization, as a theory, argues that states and societies are increasingly being
'disciplined' to behave as if they were private markets operating in a global territory (Gill).
It is in that sense that the market of drugs acts accordingly and grows in a global dynamic
that behaves equally worldwide.

It is not news that liberalizing markets eases the selling of products abroad, making
exports and imports a common task. It is in that same note that we part from the idea that
drugs, as any other market that has an offer and a demand, can undergo the
characteristics of liberalization and globalization. Thus, drug trafficking is a problem that
affects the entire world and not only Mexico. In the specific case of the Americas, from los
Andes to the United States, drug smuggling affects us all. Moreover, the problematic has
to be treated with all the implications that such a rooted topic can carry along.

This specific illegal market sees no difficulty in Latin America since it is one of the world
regions that lack so-called ‘institutionalization’. When new strategies appear on behalf of
the government, new tactics are also applies by cartels around the world. In the Americas,
this last refers to a reaction to proceedings taken to effect such as Plan Colombia. Thus,
cartels have suffered a transformation in the past eight years, since the plan came into
effect, turning into institutions themselves that act through smaller cartels; in contrast with
earlier years.

Actions and policies taken by former president Vicente Fox, modified the traditional
scenery of cartels in Mexico. The disappearance of the Arellano Felix cartel in Tijuana and
the Chapo Guzmán cartel in Sinaloa are just some examples of this. Furthermore, a
reorganization of strategies and tactics respond on behalf of cartels, through smaller
cartels and ‘narcoretail’ in this case.

Nevertheless, as said before, Mexico is not alone and it is not a unique case. The trade of
illegal drugs is a multi-billion dollar global business. Worldwide, the UN estimates there are
more than 50 million regular users of heroin, cocaine and synthetic drugs (BBC News).
Therefore, if the market for illegal drugs were to really disappear, Mexico would not be the
first to put a war against it, but it also would suffer the swing of such part of the economy
as a producer and exporter of the market.

Drug trafficking is not an American disease, as it is commonly said, and it is not a problem
only of producers and exporters either. If the international community really wants to make
a war on drugs (which would be a first question that would be needed to be asked) there
are many strategies and actions that have to be taken in parallel. There is no unique
solution and there is no unilateral action that will ever be able to solve the problem.
In that regard, let’s quickly take a look at Plan Colombia and exercise a comparison with
the Mexican case to see which viable proposals could be integrated.

When Plan Colombia was first officially announced by Colombian President Andrés
Pastrana Arango in 1999, it had social and economic revitalization as a goal, thus ending
the armed conflict and creating an anti-drug strategy, or as he himself put it, "a set of
alternative development projects which will channel the shared efforts of multilateral
organizations and [foreign] governments towards Colombian society" (Gómez y Pastrana).

The plan called for a budget of US$7.5 billion, with 51% dedicated to institutional and
social development, 32% for fighting the drug trade, 16% for economic and social
revitalization, and 0.8% to support the then on-going effort to negotiate a political solution
to the state's conflict with insurgent guerrilla groups (Colombia Ambassy). Although
Pastrana was eventually able to complete the total sum by asking the international
community to cooperate, the fundraising soon came with an obstacle: an economic crisis.

Furthermore, studies such as the one prepared by the US Defense Department through its
National Defense Research Institute (Peter H. Reuter) revealed that having armed forces
interdicting drugs have minimal or no impact of traffic and might even raise profits.
Additionally, Amnesty International released a press communicate relating the initiative
and human rights violations:

Plan Colombia is based on a drug-focused analysis of the roots of the conflict and the human
rights crisis which completely ignores the Colombian state's own historical and current
responsibility. It also ignores deep-rooted causes of the conflict and the human rights crisis. The
Plan proposes a principally military strategy (in the US component of Plan Colombia) to tackle
illicit drug cultivation and trafficking through substantial military assistance to the Colombian
armed forces and police. Social development and humanitarian assistance programs included in
the Plan cannot disguise its essentially military character. Furthermore, it is apparent that Plan
Colombia is not the result of a genuine process of consultation either with the national and
international non-governmental organizations which are expected to implement the projects nor
with the beneficiaries of the humanitarian, human rights or social development projects. As a
consequence, the human rights component of Plan Colombia is seriously flawed. (Amnesty
International)

It is important to also note that throughout the 1990’s Colombia was the worst case of
human rights violations and atrocities committed; it had the highest murder rate in the
world at 62 murders per 100,000 people (Colombian Crime). However, it has now
descended to 29 murders per 100,000 people and there have also been improvements in
general education, having over 93% of the entire population over 15 years of age being
able to read and write (World Bank).

Now, why is this important for the Mexican case and the relations between Mexico and the
United States? There are certain achievements that are worth mentioning from Plan
Colombia: as a significant reduction in coca cultivations has been observed from peak
2001 levels of 1,698 square kilometers to an estimated 1,140 square kilometers in 2004
(Center for International Policy). Nevertheless, shall we not only learn from the experience
of a similar case? Should we create a Mexico Plan and apply it? It seems by looking at
any current newspaper that the strategy that Felipe Calderon’s administration is following
is precisely the militarization of the problem.

However, there are many other solutions and tactics that have to put to action if the
problem wants to be solved. Drug trafficking is not an issue that can be tackled
unilaterally, as said before, and it needs the cooperation of the international community.
Furthermore, it needs other forms of action that have an impact before, during and after
the problem, and not only focus on attacking traffic and the offer of the market; this is the
first step to be taken in the direction of a solution: recognizing that military actions are only
a limited tactic by themselves.

In the second place, there must be a reform to the Mexican penitentiary system if changes
want to be seen. There is no use for putting the heads of cartels in jail if they can still
direct their organization from there. This is a point that, however, is accompanied by other
subjects that need to be addressed; for one, there must be an improvement in the salaries
of policemen and their quality of life if corruption is to be avoided.

Thirdly, there must be a cooperation from destine markets in order to control their demand
over exporting countries. In the case of Mexico, it is not merely sufficient with tackling the
border smuggling, but also taking actions to prevent and punish the consumption of drugs.

The latter point brings us immediately to: educational programs for prevention and
treatment of drug addicts. Better safe than sorry, it is said; this is no exception. Better
financed campaigns and pre-campaigns for prevention and education are one of the key
elements that need to be taken into account. Immediately followed by preventive policies
that support such initiatives.

Furthermore, there must be a common action by civil society and government initiatives.
There is no policy that functions positively without the aid and cooperation of the
population. In the case of drug trafficking, there is a need for widespread collaboration.

Latin America is the perfect scenery for cultivating and trafficking drugs because of the lack
of governability that exists, as it was mentioned before. Augmentation of
institutionalization and better governability is a must if corruption is to be avoided in this
subject. Additionally, there should be units of financial intelligence created (by the
Economy and Finance related ministries) in order to control and prevent illicit movements
of money that come along with money laundry, corruption and drug trafficking.

CONCLUSIONS
It is important to note that all the above mentioned measure function correctly and have a
direct impact on society and decreasing drug trafficking levels. Example of this is precisely
Plan Colombia, as it has been explained before.

Although there is no definite formulas or pathways for correcting one same problem in
different parts of the world, parting from the basis of globalization we shall understand that
there are many common characteristics of drug trafficking worldwide. As a matter of fact,
because of this, the United Nations has dealt and proposed procedures for the
international community. In 2000, the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
also called the Palermo Convention, was adopted and Mexico ratified it. The Merida
Convention that deals with corruption is also a relevant adopted measure. Both
conventions have been signed and ratified by Mexico and nevertheless, according to
Eduardo Buscaglia from the United Nations Office Against Drugs and Crime (ONUDD),
only 87% of the Palermo Convention is seen in the books (through policies) and only 64%
is really applied. Meanwhile, Colombia sees 94% of its proposals reflected in its law and
100% of it in action; the results of this practice are evident.
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