CASE #1
Commission.
AIDA EUGENIO vs. CSC
G.R. 115863
March 31, 1995
FACTS
Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the PH Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a
Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank, she was given a CES eligibility.
She was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service
Board. Later on, the CSC passed Resolution No. 93-4359 abolishing the Career Executive
Service Board while transferring all personnel, budget and properties to the Office for
Career Executive Service of the CSC. This Resolution became an impediment to the
appointment of the petitioner as CS Officer, Rank IV.
Hon. Antonio T. Carpio, Chief Presidential legal counsel sent a letter to petitioner stating
that due to the Resolution, the Office of the President has refrained from considering
appointments of career service eligible to career executive ranks. The respondent alleged
that the recommendation was a valid act of the Career Executive Service Board of the CSC
and does not have any defect. Also, the Office of the President is estopped from questioning
the recommendation since the President has previously appointed to CESO rank four (4)
officials similarly situated as the petitioner.
Also, the Integration of the CESB into the Commission is authorized by law under (Sec. 12
(1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of the 1987). Hence, the
petitioner filed this petition to annul the said resolution.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it
abolished CESB, an office created by law, through the issuance of the resolution
RULING
Petition is GRANTED. The CESB was created by P.D. 1 on September 1, 1974 which
adopted the Integrated Plan. It cannot be denied that the CESB was created by law and it
can only be abolished by the legislature. It is undisputed that the creation and abolition of
public office can is a legislative function. (AM JUR 2d on Public Officers and Employees).
In the case at bar, the legislature has not enacted any law which abolishes the CESB.
Respondent invokes Sec. 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 giving it the power to abolish the CESB.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that Sec. 17 must be read with Sec. 16 which only
gives the Commission’s power to reorganize limited to offices under its control. The CESB
was intended to be an autonomous entity which is administratively attached to the
Commission. The autonomous character is not negated by its attachment to the said
Commission and by its attachment, it is not made to fall within the control of the
RATIO DECIDENDI
All offices created by the legislature are wholly within the power of that body, and it may
prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the office holders, and,
if it sees fit, abolish the office.
CASE #2
JIMMY DE CASTRO vs. COMELEC
G.R. 125249
February 7, 1997
FACTS
Petitioner and respondent were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Gloria, Oriental
Mindoro, respectively, during the 1995 elections. Petitioner’s rival candidate, the late
Nicolas Jamila, filed an election protest and pending such petition, he died. Four (4) days
after his death, the election protest was dismissed as the case was said to be personal. The
death of the protestant extinguished the case.
The respondent, upon knowing such, filed in the trial court an Omnibus Petition/Motion
(For Intervention/Substitution with Motion for Reconsideration) which was later on
denied ruling that an election protest, being personal to protestant, is ipso facto
terminated by the latter’s death. Disagreeing with the trial court’s dismissal of the election
protest, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the COMELEC assailing
that the orders issued was attended with grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC granted the petition ruling that an election contest involves the private
interests of the rival candidates and the public interest in the final determination of the
real choice of the electorate hence an it necessarily survives the death of the protestant or
the protestee.
ISSUE
Whether or not an election protest is a personal action which extinguishes upon the death
of the real party in interest
RULING
Petition is DISMISSED. While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the
public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or
to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to
continue the protest proceedings. An election contest involves not merely conflicting
private aspirations but also imbued with public interest.
In the case at bar, the death of the protestant neither constitutes a ground for the dismissal
of the contest nor ousts of its jurisdiction to decide the election contest. Petitioner’s
contention that respondent is not a real party in interest entitled to be substituted in the
action is without legal basis.
The filing by respondent of his Omnibus Petition/Motion was in compliance with Sec. 17,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Since the Rules of Court, though not generally
applicable to election cases, may however be applied by analogy or in a suppletory
character, respondent was correct to rely thereon.
RATIO DECIDENDI
It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property
transmissible to his heirs upon death. Thus, applying the doctrine of actio personalis
moritur cum persona, upon the death of the incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to
continue holding his office in his place.
CASE #3
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
G.R. 120295
June 28, 1996
FACTS
Frivaldo filed his COC for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 1995 elections.
Raul Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that the petitioner
be disqualified by reason of not yet being a citizen of the PH. The COMELEC granted such
petition disqualifying the petitioner to run as Governor of Sorsogon. Petitioner’s M/R
remained unacted upon until after the election so his candidacy continued and was voted
for during the elections. The COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC
division. Frivaldo alleged that he took his oath of allegiance as citizen of the PH after his
petition for repatriation under PD 725. When the order of the COMELEC was received by
Frivaldo on 30 June 1995, there was no more legal impediment to his proclamation as
Governor. The COMELEC held Lee to not have garnered the highest number of votes and
was this not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor. Frivaldo contends
that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period
of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which
renders the said Resolutions null and void.
ISSUES
Whether or not Frivaldo is qualified to run as the Governor of Sorsogon by virtue of his
repatriation, curing his lack of citizenship
RULING
Petition is DENIED. On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of
legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The
mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that
such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation
under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome.
In fact, P.D. 725 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations
to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate.
In repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to
reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-
born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his
naturalization in the United States. The law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship. These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost
his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted
by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon
this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.
CASE #4
SEC. RICARDO GLORIA vs. HON. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR.
G.R. No. 116183
October 6, 1995
FACTS
Respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA
now PSCA) which was created by virtue of P.D. 1078. The PAFCA Board of Trustees issued
Resolution No. 91-026 requiring that all faculty and administrative employees are
subject to the required civil service eligibilities. The respondent was only issued a one-
year temporary appointment as Board Secretary II (from Jan.1 to Dec. 31 1992) because
they lacked appropriate civil service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary
qualification standards for their respective positions.
The said resolution emphasized that temporary appointments were good and renewable
only up to 1992. Respondent was actually relieved from his office by reason of loss of
confidence on March 24, 1992. During his appointment, R.A. 7605 was enacted into law
which converted PAFCA into a state college to be known as the Philippine State College of
Aeronautics (PSCA). The Board of Trustees likewise was the governing body of the PSCA
and the power to make appointments was retained by the Board.
It was only in Dec. 7, 1992 that petitioner Col. Julian Loleng, Jr. informed the respondents
of their separation from the service upon the expiration of their temporary appointment.
However, she was designated as Coordinator for Extension Services and barely five (5)
months after the lapse of their terms, respondent indicated her acceptance by such
designation. Respondents filed a petition for mandamus and reinstatement with
backwages and damages.
The complaint in effect prayed that then DECS Secretary Armand Fabella complete the
filling up of positions for Board of Trustees and order the Board of Trustees to reinstate
the respondents in the case at bench to their respective positions. Petitioners opposed to
the said petition on the ground that mandamus will not lie to compel reinstatement since
the reappointment is discretionary by the appointing power. Also, Sec. Fabella claimed
that their mandamus is unavailing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Rosario Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement to the position of
Coordinator for Extension Services
RULING
Petition is GRANTED. Cerillo, although temporarily extended an appointment as Board
Secretary II, was dismissed because of loss of confidence. This dismissal was neither
contested nor appealed by her. Respondent being assigned as Coordinator for Extension
Services was a mere designation. This designation, not being a permanent appointment,
cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement. Even with a valid reinstatement, it would
not be possible since the position is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla. As a mere
designee, she could not have acquired any right to the position even if the position existed.
Designation does not confer security of tenure since he occupies in an acting capacity only.
The fact that respondent only passed the Civil Service Examination after termination of
her temporary appointment is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint her.
Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be
considered by the appointing authority are: performance, degree of education, work
experience, training, seniority, and, more importantly, as in this case, whether or not the
applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the appointing power.
The position Board Secretary II is primarily confidential in nature. The choice of an
appointee from among those who possessed the required qualifications is a political and
administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the
interests of the service which can best be made by the Head of the office concerned.
PSCA Board Resolution No. 91-026 must yield to CSC policies on the issuance of temporary
appointments. When the CSC directed that temporary appointments were to be effective
only up to 1992, it did so in pursuance of the general purpose of the civil service law which
is to ensure and promote appointments according to merit and fitness, provide within the
public service a progressive system of personal administration to ensure the maintenance
of an honest and
efficient progressive and courteous civil service in the Philippines. Thus, it is vested with
the function to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the civil service and
adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel
administration in the government. We hold that reappointment to the position of Board
Secretary II is an act which is discretionary on the part of the appointing power.
Consequently, it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which is essentially
discretionary, to be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. Such exercise of the discretionary power of appointment cannot be
controlled, not even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by the appointing
authority.
CASE #5
MA. ANGELINA MATIBAG vs. ALFREDO BENIPAYO, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 149036
April 2, 2002
FACTS
COMELEC en banc appointed Matibag as Acting Director IV of the EID. On March 2001,
Pres. GMA appointed ad interim Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and the other
respondents as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to the
CoA the appointments of the respondents but it was not acted upon. As COMELEC
Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the
EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the
EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. The reassignment was
questioned for failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID.
Matibag appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.
She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against
Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus
Election Code and other rules and regulations. During the pendency of her complaint
before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that
the ad interim appointments of the respondents violate the constitutional provisions on
the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails
as illegal her removal as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department. In the meantime, President GMA renewed once again the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as
Commissioners, respectively, for a term of seven years.
ISSUES
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of
the ad interimappointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;
Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad
interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate
the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
RULING
Petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment to the
COMELEC is a temporary appointment that is prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution. Petitioner interprets the last sentence of such provision to mean that
the ad interim appointee cannot assume office until his appointment is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments for only then does his appointment become permanent
and no longer temporary in character. This is without merit. An ad interim appointment
is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. In the instant case, the
President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Respondents were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress.
They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and the first
assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are constitutional, the renewal of
the their ad interim appointments and their subsequent assumption of office to the same
positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution. An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the
Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the
time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor
an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral
action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The phrase "without reappointment"
applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office.
There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous
appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will
lead to absurdities and negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments.
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were
no previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. A
reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad
interim appointments and renewals of appointments will also not breach the seven-year
term limit because all the appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008.63 Any delay in their
confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office. Consequently, there
is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of these three
respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be exorcised by the twin
prohibitions in the Constitution. The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment
of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office expire on February 2,
2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution.
CASE #7
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA vs SENATOR JOVITO SALONGA
G.R. No. 86439
April 13, 1989
FACTS
In August 1987, the President designated petitioner Bautista as acting chairman of the
CHR. Eventually, this extended to a permanent appointment. The Secretary of the CA
requested her to submit information and documents required by its rules with the
confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of the CHR
Petitioner
 The petitioner contended that the CA has no jurisdiction to review her
appointment since under the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President
of the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made without the review or participation
of the Commission on Appointments.
Respondent
 The ad interim appointment was denied by the Commission pursuant to Sec. 6
(a) Chapter II of the Rules of the Commission.
 The President had designated PCHR Commissioner Mallillin as acting chairman
of the commission pending the resolution of Bautista’s case.
 In effect, the President had asked Bautista to vacate her office and give way to
Mallillin (Mari Villa), the newly appointed CHR Chairman.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR, an
"independent office" created by the 1987 Constitution, is to be made with or without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments (CA, for brevity).
RULING
Petition is GRANTED. All that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the
appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office before
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon. Fernan. The appointment was a completed act
on the part of the President. Upon the appointment, the President’s power over the office
is terminated in all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him. The right to
the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional power of
accepting or rejecting it.
The presidential act of appointment to the subject position which, under the Constitution,
is to be made, in the first place, without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, was then and there a complete and finished act, which, upon the acceptance
by Bautista, as shown by her taking of the oath of office and actual assumption of the duties
of said office, installed her as the lawful Chairman of the CHR for a term of seven (7) years.
There was thus no vacancy in the subject office on 14 January 1989 to which an
appointment could be validly made. In fact, there is no vacancy in said office to this day.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only
to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is
why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for
the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
CASE #8
PEDRO MENDOZA vs. RAY ALLAS & GODOFREDO OLORES
G.R. No. 131977
February 4, 1999
FACTS
Petitioner held many positions in the Bureau of Customs until he eventually got appointed
as Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In
1989, the said position was reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance
with R.A. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's position was thus
categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office.
In 1993, he was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X,
Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director
III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector, however,
he continued to receive the salary and benefits of the position of Director III.
Petitioner was terminated from the Bureau of Customs in view of the respondent’s
appointment as Director III by Pres. Fidel Ramos. In view of this, petitioner filed a petition
for quo warranto against respondent and it was granted. The court found that he was
illegally terminated without due process of law and he appointment of the respondent was
declared void ab initio.
Respondent Allas appealed to the CA and while the case was still pending, he was
promoted to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customers for Assessment and
Operations. Because of this, petitioner moved to dismiss the respondent’s appeal, which
was granted. He filed for a Motion for Execution but the court denied the motion on the
ground that the position was now being occupied by respondent Olores who was not a
party to the quo warranto petition. Petitioner filed a special civil action
for certiorari and mandamus with the CA but the petition was dismissed. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not a writ of execution may no longer be issued considering that respondent
Olores was not a party to the case now occupies the subject position
RULING
Petition is DENIED. Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or
corporation to show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining
to the state which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally
exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state. Where the action is filed
by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position,
otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.
Petitioner's removal was illegal and he was deemed never to have vacated his office when
respondent Allas was appointed to the same. Respondent Allas' appointment was null and
void and this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his successor-in-interest.
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his
successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases.
In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against
respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and
right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against
Godofredo Olores.
RATIO DECIDENDI
A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even
though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature
of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always
against the person — to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized
to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. 22
CASE #9
LUIS MALALUAN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120193
March 6, 1996
FACTS
Petitioner Malaluan and respondent Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the
Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. Respondent was proclaimed as winner of the
said election but petitioner contested this hence he filed an election protest in the RTC.
The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected mayor
Respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered 10,498 votes
as against petitioner's 9,792 votes. Evangelista was, thus, said to have a winning margin of
706 votes. But, on May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial
Court contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The trial court
declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato
with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found private
respondent liable not only for Malaluan's protest expenses but also for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. On February 3, 1994, private respondent
appealed the trial court decision to the COMELEC.
The petitioner filed for an execution for the decision pending appeal and this was granted
by the court. He assumed office but no long enough, the COMELEC ordered petitioner to
vacate said office since they found the respondent the duly elected mayor of said
municipality. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awarding damages in favor
of private respondent
RULING
Petition is GRANTED. The petition of the right to the mayoralty seat has become moot and
academic since the elective post to which their right to the office no longer exists. There
was no breach of contract or quasi-contract or tortious act nor crime which may make the
petitioner liable for actual damages and neither was respondent able to point out a specific
provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing
party.
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provide that "in all election contests the Court may
adjudicate damages and attorney's fees as it may deem just and as established by the
evidence if the aggrieved party has included such claims in his pleadings."
The respondent claimed as part of damages the salary and other emoluments that would
have accrued had there not been an execution of the trial court’s decision pending appeal
from the COMELEC.
It is a rule that notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an
elective official proclaimed by the COMELEC as winner in an electoral contest and who
assumed office and entered into the performance of the duties of that office, is entitled to
the compensation, emoluments and allowances legally provided for the position.
COMELEC ruled that the election protest filed by the protestant was filed in bad faith
without sufficient cause or filed for the sole purpose of molesting the protestee-appellant
for which he incurred expenses. Also, he was claimed as a usurper but such is not the case.
While a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the
petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto.
It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as
the winner, because both have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests.
Petitioner is considered to be a de facto officer but is still legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Sec. 259 of the Omnibus Election Code only provides for the granting in election cases of
actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. The victorious party in an
election case cannot be indemnified for expenses which he has incurred in an electoral
contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation clearly
attributable to the losing party.
CASE #10
RODRIGO, JR., ET. AL. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 125498
February 18, 1999
FACTS
Petitioners Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are the Municipal Mayor and
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, respectively, of San Nicolas,
Pangasinan, while petitioner Alejandro A. Facundo is the former Municipal Treasurer of
the same municipality.
Mayor Rodrigo entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by
Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Caboloan, San Nicolas. Mejica, prepared an
Accomplishment Report stating that the Caboloan Power Generation project was 97.5%
accomplished. Due to this, payment was made by the Municipal Treasurer Facundo to
Philwood Construction.
Subsequently, petitioners received a Notice of Disallowance from the Provincial Auditor
of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr., who found that as per COA evaluation of the
electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project was actually accomplished.
Petitioners requested the Provincial Auditor to lift the notice of disallowance and to re-
inspect the project. However, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa
before the Ombudsman against petitioners. Likewise impleaded were Larry Lu and Ramil
Ang, President and General Manager, and Project Engineer, respectively, of Philwood
Construction. Acting Ombudsman Francisco Villa approved the filing of an information
against petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.3019 before the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners
1. They filed a motion to quash on the ff. grounds:
a. The facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense, and
b. The same information charged more than one offense
2. They faulted the Provincial Auditor for instituting the complaint against them
notwithstanding the pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance.
3. They also argued that the evidence against them did not establish the element of
damage nor the presence of any conspiracy between them.
The Sandiganbayan denied said motion. The prosecution moved to suspend
petitioners pendente lite but petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it had
jurisdiction over petitioners pendente lite.
4. Their opposition to the disallowance would betray the absence of the elements
of evident bad faith or negligence, and damage; evidence does not establish
conspiracy among them.
5. They contend that Mayor Rodrigo occupies a position of Grade 24 and is,
therefore, beyond the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
6. They claim that at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, Mayor
Rodrigo, the highest public ranking public official impleaded in this case, was
receiving a monthly salary of P10,441.00. Such amount is supposedly equivalent
to a fourth step increment in Grade 24 under the Salary Schedule prescribed in
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6758.
7.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Salary Grade of the petitioners are covered under the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction
RULING
Petition is DISMISSED. To distinguish the "big fish" from the "small fry," Congress deemed
the 27th Grade as the demarcation between those who should come under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan and those within the regular courts'. (While H.B. No. 9825 originally
intended only officials of Grade 28 and above as within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the resulting law included officials of Grade 27.) Thus,
officials occupying positions of Grade 27 and above, charged with crimes referred to in
Section 4 a. and b., are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
those below come under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.Although some positions of
Grade 27 and above are stated by name in Section 4 a., the position of Municipal Mayor is
not among them. Nevertheless, Congress provided a catchall in Section 4 a. (5). This
catchall is necessary, for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list
down each position created or will be created pertaining to Grades 27and above.
At present, Volume III of the 1997 edition of the Index of Occupational Services, Position
Titles and Salary Grades, which was prepared by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758 (Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989) lists the following positions under Salary Grade 27, including
the position of "Municipal Mayor I". In the 1989 version of the same Index, the Municipal
Mayor was also assigned a Salary Grade of 27. It appears, therefore, that petitioner Mayor
comes within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
That petitioner received a salary less than that prescribed for such Grade is explained by
Sections 10 and 19 (b) of R 4 No. 6758, which respectively provide The rates of
paying·LGUs shall be determined on the basis of the class and financial capability of
each LGU: Provided, That such rates of pay shall not exceed the following percentages of
the rates in the salary schedule prescribed under Section 7 hereof:
Hence, a local government official's actual salary may be less than what the Salary
Schedule under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class and financial capability of his
or her respective local government unit. This circumstance, however, has no bearing on
such official's Grade. As the foregoing discussion shows, an official's salary is
determined by the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the nature of his
position — the level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification
requirements of the work.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to level of
difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work" so that
they may be lumped together in "one range of basic compensation." The DBM drafted the
1989 Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, later revised
in 1997. In both versions, the position of Municipal Mayor was assigned a Salary
Grade 27
CASE #11
ANTONIO SANTOS vs. CA
G.R. 139792
November 22, 2000
FACTS
Petitioner was appointed as judge of the MTC of QC. He optionally retired from the
Judiciary under R.A. 910, as amended, and received his retirement gratuity under the law
for his entire years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has been
regularly receiving a monthly pension.
On December 1993, petitioner re-entered the government service and was appointed
Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. His appointment was approved by
the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Congress enacted R.A. 7924 reorganizing the MMA renaming it as Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA). The MMDA issued Resolution No. 16 authorizing the
payment of separation benefits to the officials and employees of the former MMA who
would be separated as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 7924.
MMDA informed him that in view of his voluntary option to be separated from the service
his services would automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on 15
September 1996, and that he would be entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one
and one-fourth (1) monthly salary for every year of service as provided under Section 11
of the MMDA Law.
Petitioner submitted a position paper asserting that the retirement gratuity he received
under R.A. 910, as amended, is not an additional or double compensation, all the years of
his government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited in the
computation of his separation benefits under R.A. No. 7924.
Petitioner already received and is continually receiving gratuity for his years of service as
an MTC Judge. Equity dictates that he should no longer be allowed to receive further
gratuity for said years of service in the guise of separation pay.
For the purpose of computing petitioner’s separation pay under Sec. 11 of R.A. 7924, his
years of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay should be
solely confined to his services in the MMA.
Under Sec. 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can
continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government
position to which another compensation is attached. The retirement benefits which
petitioner had received or has been receiving under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not
constitute double compensation. He could continue receiving the same even if after his
retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as Director III thereof.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 does not specifically authorize payment of additional
compensation for years of government service outside of the MMA.
RULING
Petition is DENIED.
RATIO DECIDENDI
CASE #12
CELERINO VALERIANO vs ECC & GSIS
G.R. 136200
June 8, 2000
FACTS
Petitioner was employed as a fire truck driver. Sometime in 1985, he was standing along
Santolan Road, QC, when he met a friend named Alexander Agawin. They went out for
dinner and on their way home, the jeepney they were riding met a collision with another
vehicle. Because of the strong impact, petitioner was thrown out of the vehicle and was
severely injured. He claimed for income benefits under P.D. 626 with the GSIS. The claim
was opposed since the injuries sustained did not directly arise or result from the nature if
his work.
The petitioner appealed to the ECC which ruled against the appellant. In the case at bar,
the injuries appellant sustained from the accident did not “arise out of [and] in the course
of his employment”. Considering therefore the absence of a causal link between the
contingency for which income benefits [are] being claimed and his occupation as fireman,
his claim under PD 626, as amended, cannot be given due course."
The CA affirmed the ruling of the ECC that the petitioner’s injuries and disability were not
compensable since they were not work-connected. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner’s injuries are work-connected which he can claim income
benefits on the compensability of petitioner’s injuries and resulting disability
RULING
Petition is DENIED. Disability benefits are granted an employee who sustains an injury or
contracts a sickness resulting in temporary total, permanent total, or permanent partial,
disability. For the injury and the resulting disability to be compensable, they must have
necessarily resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. In
the case at bar, petitioner was not able to demonstrate how his job as a firetruck driver
was related to the injuries he had suffered.
That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function --
having dinner with some friends -- is clear from the records of the case. His injuries were
not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing an act
within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus, we
agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that his injuries and consequent
disability were not work-connected and thus not compensable.
RATIO DECIDENDI
While the policy is to extend the applicability of P.D. No, 626 to as many qualified
employees as possible, but this must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying
undeserving claims for compensation.