84. ESTEVES VS. SARMIENTO The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rustico B. Gagate for petitioner.
G.R. No. 182374. November 11, 2008.*
JEREMIAS V. ESTEVES, petitioner, vs. RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T.
FERRER, in their respective capacities as Presiding Officer and Member of the
Second Division COMELEC, Manila and REYNALDO TEH BITONG, respondents.
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Certiorari; The
requirement that an aggrieved party must first file a motion for reconsideration of
a resolution of the Division to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc is
mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of the Supreme
Court.—Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions, the requirement that an
aggrieved party must first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the
Division to the COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the
power of review of the Supreme Court. Failure to abide by this procedural
requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
Same; Same; Same; The power of review of the Supreme Court of the rulings
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is limited only to the final decision or
resolution of the Commission on Elections
_______________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 570, NOVEMBER 11, 2008 657
Esteves vs. Sarmiento
(COMELEC) en banc and not the final resolution of its Division.—All election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC
in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the
COMELEC en banc. As held in Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 344 SCRA
358 (2000), the power of review of the Supreme Court of the rulings of the
COMELEC is limited only to the final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en
banc and not the final resolution of its Division. The Supreme Court has no power
to review, via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
Division of the Commission on Elections.
Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsiderations; Certiorari cannot be
resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioner’s own omission to
file the required motion for reconsideration.—Since the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure allows the review of a resolution of the Division by the COMELEC en
banc, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is premature.
The petition does not allege that petitioner indeed filed a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC en banc. The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is
that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of public
respondent. Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse
consequences of petitioner’s own omission to file the required motion for
reconsideration. A litigant should first exhaust the administrative remedies
provided by law before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide correctly the matter and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court. The premature invocation of
judicial intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
Delfin R. Lopez for private respondent.
658
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Esteves vs. Sarmiento
TINGA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Resolution 2 of the Second Division of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPR No. 46-2007. Said resolution set
aside the Order3 dated 8 September 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 96, Baler, Aurora and consequently dismissed the election protest filed by
herein petitioner Jeremias V. Esteves against private respondent Mayor Reynaldo
Teh Bitong.
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedent facts appear:
In the national and local elections conducted last 14 May 2007, petitioner and
private respondent both ran for the position of municipal mayor of the Municipality
of Casiguran, Aurora. On 15 May 2007, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor of Casiguran on the basis
of the results of the canvassing, which showed him having garnered 3,342 votes or
with a margin of 48 votes over petitioner, who obtained 3,294 votes. 4
On 25 May 2007, petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial
Court of Baler, Aurora. The protest was docketed as Election Protest Case (EPC)
No. 99 and raffled to Branch 96 presided by Judge Corazon D. Soluren.5
The RTC then issued a precautionary protection order directing the Municipal
Treasurer and Election Officer of Casiguran to take immediate steps to safeguard
the integrity of all the ballot boxes, lists of voters and other paraphernalia
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-20.
2 Dated 29 February 2008; signed by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer with
Presiding Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, dissenting; id., at pp. 21-29.
3 Id., at pp. 79-80.
4 Id., at p. 22.
5 Id.
659
VOL. 570, NOVEMBER 11, 2008 659
Esteves vs. Sarmiento
used in the elections and thereafter directed that all the election paraphernalia,
including the ballot boxes and lists of voters, subject of the protest be brought before
the court.6
Private respondent then filed an answer, which the RTC admitted in an Order
dated 2 August 2007. In the same order, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of private respondent’s counter-protest on the
ground of non-payment of filing fee. Thereafter, the RTC ordered the creation of
the revision committees.7
On 6 September 2007, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the election
protest, arguing that it was defective in form and substance as it did not specify
the precincts where fraud and irregularities were committed. On 8 September
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2007, the RTC issued the order denying private respondent’s motion to dismiss for
lack of merit.8
Thus, private respondent filed before the COMELEC a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.9 The petition sought to nullify the RTC
Order dated 8 September 2007 denying private respondent’s motion to dismiss. It
also prayed that the election protest filed by petitioner be dismissed and the
proceedings thereon enjoined on the ground that the election protest failed to
comply with the requirements of Section 11(f), Rule 210 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.
Petitioner filed an answer on 5 December 2007.
_______________
6 Rollo, p. 22.
7 Id., at pp. 22-23.
8 Id., at p. 23.
9 Id., at pp. 51-78.
10 Supreme Court A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC (2007), Rule 2, Section 11. Contents of
the Protest or Petition.—An election protest or petition for quo warranto shall
specifically state the following facts: x x x
(f) a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of
showing the electoral frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested
precincts.
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Esteves vs. Sarmiento
After hearing private respondent’s application, the COMELEC (Second
Division) issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) on 06 December 2007, which
directed Judge Soluren to desist from further proceeding with Election Protest Case
No. 96 until further orders from the COMELEC.11
Thereafter, petitioner filed before this Court a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with application for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 180792, prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the
COMELEC (Second Division) from taking cognizance of SPR Case No. 46-2007 and
that the TRO issued by the COMELEC be ordered lifted.
On 15 January 2008, the Court resolved to dismiss G.R. No. 180792 for failure
of the petition to state the material dates showing that the petition was filed on
time, failure to submit the required competent proof of identity in the
verification/certification, failure to give an explanation why service was not
personally made and failure to show that any grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the COMELEC in rendering the challenged order.
On 29 February 2008, the COMELEC (Second Division) issued the assailed
resolution penned by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer. The assailed resolution
nullified the 8 September 2007 Order of the RTC and, accordingly, dismissed EPC
No. 99.12 The other member of the Second Division, Commissioner Rene V.
Sarmiento, wrote a dissenting opinion.13 It appears that before the issuance of the
assailed resolution, the third member of the Second Division, Presiding
Commissioner Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. had retired from the service.
_______________
11 Rollo, pp. 81-82.
12 Rollo, p. 21.
13 Id., at p. 90.
661
VOL. 570, NOVEMBER 11, 2008 661
Esteves vs. Sarmiento
Hence, the instant petition, raising the following arguments: (1) the COMELEC
(Second Division) has no jurisdiction to entertain special relief cases like petitions
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus; (2) the challenged resolution did not
comply with the constitutional requirement that it must be decided by a majority
vote of all the members; and (3) the challenged resolution negated the spirit and
very purpose of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that under Section 5, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, only the private respondent is required to appear and
defend the case, both on his own behalf and on behalf of the public respondent
COMELEC, and prayed that the COMELEC be excused from filing the required
comment.14 In a Resolution dated 12 August 2008, the Court granted the motion of
the OSG.15
The petition deserves dismissal.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution expressly states:
“Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions,
and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”
Also, Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides:
“Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 107-110.
15 Id., at p. 112.
662
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Esteves vs. Sarmiento
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions, the requirement that an
aggrieved party must first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the
Division to the COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the
power of review of the Supreme Court. Failure to abide by this procedural
requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.16
All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by
the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by
the COMELEC en banc.17 As held in Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,18 the
power of review of the Supreme Court of the rulings of the COMELEC is limited
only to the final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc and not the final
Page 2 of 3
resolution of its Division. The Supreme Court has no power to review, via certiorari, 20 Alcosero v. National Labor Relations Commission, 351 Phil. 368, 378; 288
an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on SCRA 129, 137-138 (1998).
Elections. 21 Palomado v. National Labor Relations Commission, 327 Phil. 472, 481; 257
Moreover, pursuant to Section 5 (c), Rule 319 of the COMELEC Rules of SCRA 680, 687 (1996).
Procedure, a resolution issued by a Division of 22 Alcosero v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra.
_______________ 664
16 Repol v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161418, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
321, 330. Esteves vs. Sarmiento
17 Baytan v. Commission on Elections, 444 Phil. 812, 826; 396 SCRA 703, 716 premature resort to the court.23 The premature invocation of judicial intervention
(2003); See also Milla v. Balmores-Laxa, 454 Phil. 452, 462; 406 SCRA 679, 687 is fatal to one’s cause of action.24
(2003); Villarosa v. Commission on Elections, 377 Phil. 497, 506; 319 SCRA 470, WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DENIED.
478 (1999); Zarate v. Commission on Elections, 376 Phil. 722; 318 SCRA 608 Costs against petitioner.
(1999); Canicosa v. Commission on Elections, 347 Phil. 189; 282 SCRA 512 SO ORDERED.
(1997); Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 105628, 06 August 1992, Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
212 SCRA 307. Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-De
18 398 Phil. 257; 344 SCRA 358 (2000). Castro and Brion, JJ.,concur.
19 Sec. 5. Quorum; Votes Required. x x x Ynares-Santiago, J., On Leave.
(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Petition for certiorari and prohibition denied.
Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc Note.—Where administrative remedies are available, petitions for the issuance
663 of the peremptory writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus do not lie.
VOL. 570, NOVEMBER 11, 2008 663 (Olivares vs. Marquez, 438 SCRA 679 [2004])
Esteves vs. Sarmiento ——o0o——
the COMELEC must first be elevated to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion _______________
for reconsideration. 23 Joson III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160562, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA
The filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory because the mode by 360, 370-371.
which a decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to the 24 Metro Drug Distribution, Inc. v. Metro Drug Corporation Employees
Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules Association–Federation of Free Workers, G.R. No. 142666, 26 September 2005, 471
of Civil Procedure. It is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the SCRA 45, 58.
order, resolution or decision of the tribunal, board or office is, subject to well-
recognized exceptions, a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special civil © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
action for certiorari.The rationale therefore is that the law intends to afford the
tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may
have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had.20
Since the COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the review of a resolution of the
Division by the COMELEC en banc, the filing of the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition is premature. The petition does not allege that
petitioner indeed filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.
The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law against the acts of public respondent.21 Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a
shield from the adverse consequences of petitioner’s own omission to file the
required motion for reconsideration.22 A litigant should first exhaust the
administrative remedies provided by law before seeking judicial intervention in
order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide correctly the
matter and prevent unnecessary and
_______________
except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by
the division which issued the order.

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