Crimpro Case Digests Ver. 12 Long PDF

2018 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
I. INTRODUCTION
1. PEOPLE vs. REGALARIO

-------------------------------------------------------------------Read at your own risk. Read the full text--------------------------------------
DOCTRINE: Thus, in People vs. Tamani, although the appeal of the accused was demonstrably filed out of time, to obviate
a miscarriage of justice the Court nevertheless reviewed the case and rendered judgment on the merits thereof, in view of
the fact that the filing of the appeal out of time was due to the inadvertence of the defense counsel and the further
consideration that the briefs of the parties had already been filed. Considering that the same features also obtain in the
present case, and in view of the gravity of the offense and the penalty involved, the Court felt that it should also follow the
same judicial path and, in the oft-invoked broader interests of substantial justice, grant to appellants in this case the benefit
of judicial review.
FACTS: On September 18, 1986, Menardo Garcia, accompanied by two companions, were on their way home from
attending their classes. Outside the gate of their school were herein defendants of the case.
Among the defendants, Carlos Pabillar, asked Menardo where his “Balisong” was, to which Menardo replied that such was
in his possession anymore. Carlos Pabilar then boxed Menardo and uttered “Tirahinnayan!” Menardo ran. The defendants
gave chase. When they caught up to Menardo, herein defendant, Alex Regalario, stabbed Menardo. The six boxed
Menardo until he can no longer get up. Menardo eventually died and his earlier companions witnessed the event.
Herein defendants were all found guilty for the murder of Menardo Garcia. Judgment of conviction was promulgated on
Jan 17 and a copy of which was received by the appellants’ counsel the next day, January 18. Appellants filed a Motion for
reconsideration on January 31 but the court denied the same on February 22. On March 14, appellants filed notice of
appeal but the trial court denied the appeal for having been filed out of time.
Appellants argue that the computation of 15 days within which to file notice of appeal should have been counted from
day after their MR was denied, and not from Jan 31 which was the day the of the denial of the MR was given. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in denying notice of appeal on the ground of being filed out of time?
HELD: No. The lower Court did not err in denying the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal was filed beyond the
reglamentary period set by law Section 6 of Rule 122 states that: “…appeal must be taken 15 days from promulgation or
notice of judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of order overruling the motion shall have been served upon
the accused or his attorney...”The rule states period shall only be “interrupted” thus appellants only had 1 day with which
to file notice of appeal with the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not should the Supreme Court review the present case despite being filed out of time? (Counsel for
the state questions authority of the Supreme Court to review the case)
HELD: Ordinarily, the appeal herein could have been dismissed outright for being time-barred. However, in People vs.
Tamani, although the appeal of the accused was demonstrably filed out of time, to avoid a miscarriage of justice the Court
nevertheless reviewed the case and rendered judgment on the merits thereof, in view of the fact that the filing of the
appeal out of time was due to the inadvertence of the defense counsel and the further consideration that the briefs of
the parties had already been filed.
Considering that the same features also obtain in the present case, and in view of the gravity of the offense and the
penalty involved, the Court felt that it should also follow the same judicial path and, in the oft-invoked broader interests
of substantial justice, grant to appellants in this case the benefit of judicial review.
2. MIRANDA vs. TULIAO| March 31, 2006

DOCTRINE: It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction
of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest or
through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court.
FACTS: On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodies
of Vicente Bauzon and ElizerTuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tuliao.
Two informations for murder were filed against the 5 police officer including SPO2 Maderal in RTC of Santiago City. The
venue was later transferred to Manila. RTC Manila convicted all the accused and sentenced them for two counts of
J.V.CASES.E.L 1
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. Upon automatic review,
the SC acquitted the four accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the herein petitioner Miranda and 4
others responsible for the death of the victims. Respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal complaint for murder against the
petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumalian issued warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the
warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumalian noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint
order denying the said urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons,
the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. The petitioners appealed the resolution of the Public prosecutor to the
DOJ.
The new Presiding Judge named Judge Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of
Judge Tumalian. He also ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent Tulia filed a petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for TRO seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding of the case and
seeking to nullify the Joint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a resolution granting the prayer. Notwithstanding the
said resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing the information against the petition. Respondent Tuliao filed
a motion to cite Judge Anghad in contempt. The SC referred the said motion to the CA. The CA rendered the assailed
decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City as well as
the issuance of warrant of arrest. Petitioners appealed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not should the motion to quash the warrant of arrest be granted despite the absence of the
petitioners during the hearing for the said motion?
HELD: No. Generally one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the
Court. An exception would be in the case of a pleading where the prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction
of the court. – Motions to quash a warrant of arrest is one of the said exception.
For the same is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the
person of the accused that is the very issue in a to quash a warrant of arrest.
----------------------------Distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person------------------------------------
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication
of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being
in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him
to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes,
but is not limited to, detention
----------------------------End of Distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person--------------------------
3. TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY
DOCTRINE: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Laches,
in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting
a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power
of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
FACTS: On July 19, 1948, barely a month after the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 – Spouses Tijam filed for the
recovery of P1,909, exclusive of interests, against herein respondents, Spouses Sibonghanoy. As prayed for in the
complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the Court against Spouses Sibonghanoy’s properties, but the same was
dissolved upon the filing of a counter bond by Spouses Sibonghanoy along with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Defendants
then filed a counterclaim.
The Court rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses Tijam. The Court then issued a writ of execution against Spouses
Sibonghanoy which, however, returned unsatisfied. Spouses Tijam then moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
against Manila Surety’s bond.
J.V.CASES.E.L 2
Manila Surety opposed such motion on the ground that no prior demand has been made and so the Court denied the
prayer of Spouses Tijam. Thereafter, demand was made, however, Manila Surety failed to comply. Another motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution was made which was granted by the Court. Subsequently, Manila Surety moved to quash
the writ. The Court denied the motion and so Manila Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Spouses Tijam. Manila Surety filed a motion asking for an extension of time within
which to file a motion for reconsideration. Two days later, instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, Manila Surety
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Republic Act No.
296 otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective which placed within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not
exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. I.e. CFI had no jurisdiction over the case.
The Court of Appeals resolved to set aside its decision and certified the case to the Supreme Court. Hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not should the case against Spouses Sibonghanoy and Manila Surety be dismissed?
HELD: No. The Court was of the opinion that Manila Surety is now barred by laches – The action was commend in the
Court of First Instance on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before Manila Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising
the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Laches, in a general
sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power
of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Compare with Regalario--------------------------------
It is the settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the
lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings.
It was however held in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy that the appellants were barred by laches, considering that it took the
appellants 15 years in raising the issue of jurisdiction (based on the Judicial Act of 1948) from the filing of the case (January
17, 1948) to the appeal (January 8, 1963) despite their active participation throughout the case. The same principle was
cited in the case of People vs. Regalario, holding that parties are estopped from appealing a case after the reglamentary
period provided by law.
However, in the latter case, appeal was granted in view of the gravity of the offense and its penalty. The offense
charged, having been murder, and the penalty, having been reclusion perpetua, the Supreme Court still afforded the
appellants judicial review to avoid miscarriage of justice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------End of Compare with Regalario-----------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Compare with Fukuzume-------------------------------
A similar ruling to that of People vs. Regalario was held in the case of People vs. Fukuzume as opposed to the denial of the
court of the appeal in the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In People vs. Fukuzume, the Court granted the appeal of the
appellant for want of jurisdiction (the proper court, having been Paranaque RTC and not Makati RTC). The court noted the
distinction between the facts surrounding the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy as a civil case and the facts surrounding the
case of People vs. Fukuzume as a criminal case.
As a general rule, question on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal (people vs. Fukuzume)
but exception to the rule is when the appellant is barred by laches (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy). But even when barred by
laches, appeal may still be granted in view of the gravity of the offense and its penalty (People vs. Regalario).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------End of Compare with Fukuzume----------------------
4. PADERANGA vs. CA
DOCTRINE: Right to bail is accorded to persons constructively arrested even though they have not been physically arrested.
FACTS: Miguel P. Paderanga was included in an amended information for the crime of multiple murder as the mastermind.
Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bail before a Warrant of Arrest could be issued by the
lower court.
J.V.CASES.E.L 3
Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment that needed medical attention. His counsel manifested
that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing, he considered being in the custody of the law.
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on his right to bail. The Court of Appeals reasoned
that Paderanga was granted bail when was not in the custody of the law, thus not eligible for the grant of the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not should bail be granted by the Court of Appeals?
HELD: Yes. Right to bail is only extended only to those persons who have been arrested, detained, or otherwise deprived
of their freedom. A person is considered to be in the custody of the law:
 When he is arrested either by virtue of warrant of arrest or by warrantless arrest
 When he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper
authorities
In the foregoing facts, petitioner can be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Through his lawyers,
he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person:
 Firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial court
 Secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and
 Thirdly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court.
For purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the
law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court. An arrest is made either by:
 Actual restraint of the arrestee; or
 Merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. (house arrest)
5. LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DOCTRINE: R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Not being a
penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender
and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the
information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the
complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented
by the parties at the trial.
FACTS: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in
bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those
included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found
the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended
the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended
informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or one of the “principal
accused” are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal
accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law
shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
J.V.CASES.E.L 4
ISSUE: Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
HELD: No. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal
laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are
those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define
crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal
law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation
to the office of the accused PNP officers?
HELD: No. In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
In this case a perusal of the information lacks a specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while
in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the
exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with
the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not jurisdiction of the court is determined by evidence and not allegation?
HELD: No. The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear
in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that
the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial.
6. PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN | September 15, 2010

DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action,
not at the time of the commission of the offense. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by RA No. 8249.
FACTS: Private respondent, Rolando Plaza, is a member of the Sanguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu with a salary
grade 25. He was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, or the
Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received.
Private respondent then questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offense charged. Private respondent
contends that he should not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as he does not belong the salary grade 27
and that his violation is not among those enumerated by law to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan even if the offender
is below salary grade 27.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines
committed by a public official below salary grade 27?
HELD: Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines committed by a
public official below salary grade 27.
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that
they hold the positions thus enumerated by RA No. 8249. Among those enumerated are members if the
SangunuiangPanlungsod. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Another Doctrine-------------------------------------------------
J.V.CASES.E.L 5
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the
time of the commission of the offense.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------End of another doctrine----------------------------------------
II. WARRANTLESS ARREST
7. PEOPLE vs. PALIZA

DOCTRINE: Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an
accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
FACTS: On 29 March 2005, at around 6:00 in the evening, an informant reported to SPO3 Melchordela Peña that a pot
session was taking place at the house of a certain "Obet" located at Barangay Cuyab, Laguna. SPO3 dela Peña formed a
team to conduct police operations against the suspect.
When the team arrived, the members saw that Obet’s house was closed. Since the house was not surrounded by a fence,
they approached the house and peeped through a small opening in a window where the saw four persons in a circle having
a pot session.
The team found an unlocked door and caught the four persons engaged in a pot session by surprise. After they introduced
themselves as police officers, they arrested the four suspects and seized the drug paraphernalia found at the scene. Among
those arrested were herein appellants, namely Jeric Paliza and Juan Delos Reyes, from each of whom a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance were confiscated after a body search was conducted on their persons. The team
marked the plastic sachets which were then transmitted to the crime laboratory for where they tested positive for
"shabu."
Consequently, appellants were charged with violation of Section 13, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in two separate
informations. When arraigned, both appellants pleaded not guilty to the offense. A joint trial of the cases ensued.
Appellants contend that their warrantless arrest was illegal and, therefore, the items seized from them as a result of that
arrest were inadmissible in evidence against them. The RTC ruled that what transpired was a lawful arrest. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid?
HELD: Yes. The Court held that the warrantless arrest is valid. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure lists the
situations when a person may be arrested without a warrant. Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in
flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites
must concur:
(1) The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
A perusal of the evidence in its totality reveals that the prosecution successfully established that the petitioner was
arrested in flagrante delicto. A warrant of arrest cannot be obtained immediately judging from the surrounding
circumstances, as the pot session/ crime may well be done before the warrant be issued. The “time element” was
considered here by the Court.
8. PESTILOS vs. GENEROSO

DOCTRINE: Even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest
if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of
probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable
cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order
to comply with the element of immediacy.
FACTS: Sometime in February 2005, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso
somewhere in Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.
Atty. Generoso called the Police District to report the incident. Police officers were dispatched to go to the scene. They
arrive at the scene less than one hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
J.V.CASES.E.L 6
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. Police officers then invited the petitioners to go
to the Police Station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed
Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon and fortunately survived the attack. An Information was filed, charging the
petitioners of the crime of attempted murder.
March 2005, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not
been lawfully arrested. They claimed that they were just “invited” to the police station.
The RTC denied the urgent motion. It likewise denied their motion for reconsideration. They elevated the case to the CA
by petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The arrest was valid
pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant?
HELD: Yes, it is a valid warrantless arrest. Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Here, the applicable provision is Sec. 5(b) or described as a “hot pursuit” arrest. The police officers had personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest
against the petitioners.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police
officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly,
the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
Even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on
his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable
cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and
the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply
with the element of immediacy.
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not require actual
presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the
crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
The term “invited” is construed to mean as an authoritative command. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint
of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. The application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary.
9. PEOPLE vs. VILLAREAL

DOCTRINE: For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) of section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in
fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had
committed it.
J.V.CASES.E.L 7
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required.
Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime
has just been committed.
FACTS: On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon) was driving his
motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and
scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special
Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he
recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.
Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended. Despite appellant’s attempts to resist
arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his
possession. Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the Police Station to fix his handcuffs, and then they proceeded
to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic sachet with "RZL/NV 12-25-06," representing his and
appellant’s initials and the date of the arrest.
Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of appellant to the investigator, PO2
Randulfo Hipolito who, in turn, executed an acknowledgment receipt and prepared a letter request for the laboratory
examination of the seized substance.
Upon qualitative examination, the items seized tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride and consequently,
appellant was charged with violation of of RA 9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. When arraigned, appellant
entered a plea of not guilty. The RTC convicted appellant as charged. The CA sustained appellant’s conviction a clear case
of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest?
HELD: No. For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in
fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had
committed it.
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required.
Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime
has just been committed.
The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been
indisputably committed by the appellant. In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his
hands, even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by
themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless
arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused
is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested, which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree and as the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
10. PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ

DOCTRINE: Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.
FACTS: September 2, 2006, at around 12:45 in the afternoon, PO1 Bernard Azardon was on duty at the Police Community
Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen which PO1 Azardon does not personally know
entered the precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad
J.V.CASES.E.L 8
Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz, and members of the Special
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team went to the house of Gonzales.
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria coming out of the side door and
immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and Rezin Martinez
in a room. In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and
pieces of used aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested. The accused were subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they were found to be
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. RTC held the accused guilty of the crime Possession of Dangerous Drugs
during parties, social gatherings or meetings. The CA affirmed the RTC. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence against the accused are inadmissible?
HELD: Yes. The evidence against the accused are inadmissible. This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest or a plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered
valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the
circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of the
arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause
to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that the accused had just committed an
offense.
The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of
an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the very corpus delicti
of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.
11. PEOPLE vs. MOLINA

DOCTRINE: To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
FACTS: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana
pusher in Davao City. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-
appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of
the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested. In the morning of
August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Davao City. He
called for assistance at the PNP proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged
pusher to pass by.
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, a “trisikad” carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance,
SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. The police officers then ordered the “trisikad” to
stop. SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. Molina
replied, “Boss, if possible we will settle this.” SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana
leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the
marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained due to an unlawful warrantless
J.V.CASES.E.L 9
arrest. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but this
was likewise denied.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court sentenced the accused-appellants to death. This case is an automatic review by virtue of
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, and of Sec. 10 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest?
HELD: No. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court,
however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.“ Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person:
commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto);..”
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag
on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a
crime.
12. PEOPLE vs.MENGOTE | G.R. No. 87059 | June 22, 1992

DOCTRINE: The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.
FACTS: On August 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious looking persons at a corner in Tondo. Undercover officers were dispatched and they saw two men. The officers
approached these persons (Mengote and Morellos). They tried to run away, but they were unable to escape because they
were surrounded by other lawmen. A .38 caliber revolver with six live bullets was found in possession of Mengote, while
a fan knife was found from Morellos. Both Mengote and Morellos was brought to the police station for investigation.
Rigoberto Danganan was one of the witnesses who testified that the weapon was one of the things stolen from him during
a robbery in his house on June 1987. Danganan pointed Mengote as one of the robbers, while Mengote claimed that the
weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of PD 1866 or Illegal/Unlawful
Possession of Firearms Law (as amended by RA 9516).Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mengote’s warrantless arrest was valid?
HELD: No, Mengote’s warrantless arrest was invalid. In the case of Mengote, none of the reasons under Section 5 are
applicable.
 Par. (a) Requires that the offender (1) has committed, actually committing, or attempting to commit an offense,
and (2) does these acts in the presence of the arresting officer. It cannot be applied to Mengote because he was
just “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen.” Mengote did not commit any offense as stated in the
case at bar.
 Par. (b) Cannot be applied because the prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote’s arrest an offense
had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indication that
Mengote had committed it. The information the authorities had was only hearsay.
 Par. (c) Cannot also be applied because Mengote is not an escapee.
Mere holding of one’s abdomen and shifty look on suspicion cannot be a ground to arrest or restrain someone’s liberty.
The officers were not aware of what crime the offenders committed until Danganan appeared in the police headquarters.
It was also only later when they discovered that Mengote did not own the weapon nor he was licensed to possess it. The
Court reversed the decision and Mengote was acquitted.
13. PEOPLE vs. TANGLIBEN |G.R. NO. L-63630 | April 6, 1990

DOCTRINE: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
FACTS: In the late evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando
Police Station were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal. It was around 9:30 in the evening that
J.V.CASES.E.L 10
said Patrolmen noticed Medel Tangliben carrying a traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him.
Tangliben refused only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves.
The patrolmen found inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or
less. Tangliben explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves. Tangliben was
taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation.
Appellant, through counsel, contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful
search without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing him
to life imprisonment. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the package of marijuana allegedly seized from appellant was a product of an unlawful search
without a warrant?
HELD: No. One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest.
Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore
falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
The case at bar presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic
notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. Faced with such
on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly.
14. PEOPLE vs. MALMSTEDT

DOCTRINE: Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense are
in the placed sought to be searched.
FACTS: Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And information also was received about a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced
that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan
noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s
passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever
it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the
officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped
to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused
finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each; upon inspection the stuff toy contained also
hashish.
The accused raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted
to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take
the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and
asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
The Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court denied his defense of planted evidence
for failure to raise at the earliest opportunity.
J.V.CASES.E.L 11
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid arrest considering there was no search warrant issued to the defendant?
HELD: Yes. There was a valid arrest. The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph a of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the
placed sought to be searched.
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus
the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances
arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused.
15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN

DOCTRINE: A lawful arrest must precede a valid search; the process cannot be reversed. While a contemporaneous search
of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the
crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon
or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed.
FACTS: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of
Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal
area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay
Tammocalao requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted.
According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised
to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao
beach and there conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was
later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speed boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored straw
bag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed direction.
Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers; however,
Chua did not understand what they’re saying. And by resorting of “sign language”, Cid motioned with his hands for the
man to open his bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics
containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his
constitutional rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a valid
exemption from the warrant requirement?
HELD: The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body,
personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with
the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the following cases, to wit:
1. Search of moving vehicles; 4. Waiver or consent searches;
2. Seizure in plain view; 5. Stop and frisk situations; and
3. Customs searches; 6. Search incidental to a lawful arrest
J.V.CASES.E.L 12
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause means a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of Chua's participation in ongoing
criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. Chua was not identified
as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to
the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the
Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
A lawful arrest must precede a valid search. The process cannot be reversed. While a contemporaneous search of a person
arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and
which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or
evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search.
The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented search. If
Chua could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the police's "sign language?"
More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately,
intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search.
Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the
accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
16. PEOPLE vs. SALCEDO

DOCTRINE: In further ensuring the right to counsel of the person being investigated, it is not enough that the subject be
informed of that right; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of the same and should be told that
he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he decides not
to retain a counsel of his choice or avail himself of one to be provided him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to
counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer.
FACTS: The facts of the case as the prosecution presented are as follows. In the evening of June 20, 1988, at Barangay
Gabi of the Province of Masbate, Edwin Cortes, a 30-year old farmer was together with herein victim, HonorioAparejado,
when several armed men led by Accused Noli Salcedo arrived. Salcedo shouted for him and the victim to come out of the
house. Once outside, Cortes and Aparejado were ordered to lie on the ground where they then were hogtied.
Thereafter, they were told to get up and were led away from the house, where they were ordered to lie down again.
Salcedo shot Aparejado twice, then hacked him. Salcedos companions likewise hacked the victim. Afterwards, they turned
Aparejado’s body around, opened his stomach and took out his liver. His kneecap was also removed. Then all the accused
left, bringing with them the victims liver and kneecap. Cortes claimed to have witnessed all these.
After the accused had left, Cortes untied himself. He then informed the relatives of the victim and to the police authorities
of the incident. Although he admitted not knowing the identities of Salcedos companions at the time of the murder, he
identified each of the accused before the trial court and said that they were the ones who killed Aparejado.
The authorities admitted during cross-examination, that the Danilo Laurio, Juan Sual, Jr. and Edison Banculo were not
assisted by counsel when they signed their respective waivers nor during the investigation nor at the time they affixed
their signatures to their respective statements.
Admittedly the police testified that they were not armed with a warrant for their arrest but had only received a wire from
the headquarters that the three were suspects in the murder of Aparejado. The defense presented different alibis for each
respective accused, and that their confessions were obtained through force and intimidation.
The trial court convicted the accused and acquitted three other suspects who were mere implicated but were not proven
to have taken part in the action. Herein appellants contend that the trial court erred in not considering their respective
contentions. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confessions and warrantless arrest conducted in the case at bar constitute to be valid?
HELD: No. In further ensuring the right to counsel of the person being investigated, it is not enough that the subject be
informed of that right; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of the same and should be told that
J.V.CASES.E.L 13
he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he decides not
to retain a counsel of his choice or avail himself of one to be provided him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to
counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a
lawyer.
Even assuming that in the instant case the extrajudicial confession made by appellant spoke the truth and was not
extracted through violence or intimidation, still the failure of the police investigators to inform appellant of his right to
remain silent, coupled with the denial of his right to a competent and independent counsel or the absence of effective
legal assistance when he waived his constitutional rights, rendered the confession inadmissible under Sec. 12, par. 3, Art.
III, of the 1987 Constitution.
Significantly, the absence of counsel at the time of the investigation of the three above-named appellants was confirmed
by the police investigator himself. Under these circumstances, the Court ruled to exclude the sworn statements of Laurio,
Sual, Jr. and Banculo from the evidence against them.
With respect to Appellant Salcedo, his defense of alibi, juxtaposed with the positive identification made by Witness
Cortes, pales in probative value and is totally inadequate to justify an exoneration. Salcedo tried to establish that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime since he was supposedly working in Manila at that
time. But when asked by the public prosecutor the name of his employer in Manila, he simply replied that he could not
answer. As aptly observed by the trial court, it is highly impossible for one not to remember either the name of his
employer or the firm where he had worked. This lends grave doubt as to the truthfulness of his defense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is partially GRANTED. Appellants Edison Banculo, Juanito Sual, Jr. and
Danilo Laurio are hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The assailed Decision finding Noli Salcedo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
A voluntary extrajudicial confession of an accused, even where it reflects the truth, if given without the assistance of
counsel and without a valid waiver thereof, is inadmissible in evidence against him.
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
17. PEOPLE vs. COGAED| July 30, 2014

DOCTRINE: Rule 126, Section, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to
be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a checkpoint, the driver of the
jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was carrying marijuana inside his bag; the police officer
then approached Cogaed and asked the accused about the contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what
was inside and that he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barrio-mate. Cogaed subsequently opened the
bag revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police officers.
The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability
under the Juvenille Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. Trial against Cogaed ensued and he was found Cogaed guilty for
Possession of dangerous drugs. Cogaed appealed the trial court’s decision. However, the Court of Appeals denied his
appeal and affirmed the RTC’s decision. The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless
searches when “without any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac. He voluntarily opened his bag.” Hence, this appeal was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure?
HELD: No. There is no valid search and seizure. As a general rule, searches conducted must be done through a warrant but
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For this rule to be applied,
requirements for Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court should also be present which provides that a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
J.V.CASES.E.L 14
In the instant case, at the time of Cogaed’s arrest, he has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a
crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of
drugs at that time. Also Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner hence he could not have qualified for the last allowable
arrest. Any searches done against the rule provided shall constitute an invalid and unreasonable search and seizure.
Hence, there is an invalidity and illegality in the search conducted that means there will be no evidence left to convict
Cogaed.
18. PEOPLE vs. MARIACOS| June 16, 2010

DOCTRINE: When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be
valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search
that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s decision which
found herein appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act 9165. The facts are what follows.
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence
Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave.
The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an
"O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was
in motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks
of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the
bag, but no one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers. A few moments later
that the said bag were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced
himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to
the police station. The bags were opened and bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper were recovered. An information
was filed with the RTC against Belen for violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165. The trial court found her guilty of such crime, a
decision which the CA affirmed. Hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search was lawful?
HELD: Yes. Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. Such instances include
that of a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to which this case squarely fits. The search of a moving vehicle is one of
the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue
of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only
as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
RATIO: It is impracticable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle since it can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. (Asked by Judge.)
19. MICLAT vs. PEOPLE | August 31, 2011

DOCTRINE: Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. For the plain view doctrine to be valid, the
elements are:
a) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;
b) The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are;
c) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
d) “Plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting Abraham Miclat Jr. for violation of section 2 of Republic Act 9165.
J.V.CASES.E.L 15
November 8, 2002, P/Insp. Jose Valencia of Caloocan City Police Station called upon his subordinates after the receiving
an information regarding drug-trading activities along Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias “Bokbok” and one Mic
or Jojo. Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a surveillance team including herein witness PO3 Antonio.
When the surveillance team arrived at the house on one alias “Abe”. Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window,
PO3 Antonio peeped inside and saw “Abe” arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be
containing shabu.
Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while "Abe," on the other hand,
voluntarily handed over to the former the four pieces of small plastic sachets. PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect
under arrest and brought him and the four pieces of plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance to their
headquarters.
The RTC rendered the decision finding the petitioner guilty of Violation of Section 11, Section II of RA No. 9165. The CA
subsequently affirmed the RTC. Hence this appeal where petitioner assails that the arresting officer who was peeping
through a window is not sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his house without a valid search warrant
and/or warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not peeping through a curtain-covered window is within the meaning of “plain view doctrine” for a
warrantless seizure to be lawful?
HELD: Yes. Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the petitioner, petitioner
was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within
the view of the arresting officer.
As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established exceptions. The 1987 Constitution
mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The right
against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely:
1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 5) Customs search;
2) Search of evidence in "plain view"; 6) Stop and Frisk; and
3) Search of a moving vehicle; 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
4) Consented warrantless search;
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured.
It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3
Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure made by PO3
Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the
purview of the "plain view" doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. For the plain view doctrine to be valid, the elements are:
a) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties;
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since petitioner’s arrest is
among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the
petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the
arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt of
the offense charged.
20. ROAN vs. GONZALES | 1986

DOCTRINE: It is axiomatic that the magistrate must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the
claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit
but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
J.V.CASES.E.L 16
FACTS: This is a case presented to the supreme court for the annulment of a search warrant against herein petitioner
Josefino S. Roan. A search warrant was issued by respondent judge Romulo T. Gonzales.
On May 10, 1984, the application for the said search warrant was personally filed by PC Capt. Mauro Quillosa. Together
with Quillosa were two witnesses who presented to respondent judge. The application was not yet subscribed and sworn
to, as such respondent Judge proceeded to examine Quillosa on the contents of the application to ascertain if he knew
and understood the same. Afterwards, Quillosa subscribed and swore the said application before respondent Judge.
Roan’s house was searched two days after the issuance of the search warrant. The said search was conducted by military
authorities. Despite none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered, the officers who performed the search found
one Colt Magnum revolver and 18 live bullets which they confiscated. The said items served as bases for the charge of
illegal possession of firearms against the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid?
HELD: No. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some
authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
There must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and
indiscriminate use of the warrant. Probable cause, as described by Judge Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, refers to “such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.” The
probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.
Capt. Quillosa was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information
personally known to him as required by settled jurisprudence. It is axiomatic that the magistrate must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining
magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not valid because:
1. There was no valid search warrant; and
2. Absent of such warrant the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner.
In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner’s premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right to
seize the pistol and bullets.
21. SPS. MARIMLA vs. PEOPLE (2009)

DOCTRINE: A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining
Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in
special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the order of the Regional Trial
Court denying petitioner spouses Joel and Marietta Marimlas’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence
Illegally Seized.
On February 15, 2002, Special Investigator Ray Lagasca filed for a search warrant filed two (2) applications for search
warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search Spouses Marimla’s house located in Angeles City allegedly
violating Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
All requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant were met. i.e. the same were founded on the following:
1. The personal knowledge of SI Lagasca; 3. A series of surveillance operations; and
2. Personal knowledge of witness Roland D. 4. A test buy made at petitioner’s house.
Fernandez;
The examination was in the form of questions and answers. Judge Mario Guaria III issued the warrant. The search ensued
and they were able to seize various amounts of dried flowering tops and cash at around 15,000. An information for
violation of RA 6425 was filed against Petitioners, who in turn filed a motion to quash search warrants and to suppress
evidence illegally seized.
J.V.CASES.E.L 17
An information for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was filed against
petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized
on the ground that the application for search warrant was filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of
the court where the alleged crime was committed. The RTC denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, however, the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not search warrant issued was in accordance with the laws?
HELD: Yes, the warrant was in accordance with the laws. Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive
Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants
involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the
PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF.
On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search warrant
shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling
reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime
is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue
until further orders from the Supreme Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-
8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers,
Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal
cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Hence,
the two provisions are in harmony thus no violation in the enforcement of the search warrant. The case was dismissed.
22. People vs. CA (2000)

DOCTRINE: The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on
the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time
of the day or night.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which had reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
On August 13, 1992, the operatives of the Philippine National Police- Special Investigation Service Command (PNP-CISC)
were conducting a surveillance of suspected drug-pushing activities at the Regine Condominium of Makati City. Among
their targeted suspects was private respondent Valentino Toto Ortiz. Spotting the latter alighting from his jeep and noting
that he had a suspiciously bulging pants pocket, the police officers immediately moved in and accosted him. Ortiz was
frisked and yielded an unlicensed firearm and live ammunition. A search of his vehicle resulted in the retrieval of Shabu.
The police then took private respondent into custody.
Later that same day, the PNP-CISC applied for a search warrant against private respondent. Supporting the application
were the depositions of two police officers asserting that they had personal knowledge that private respondent was
keeping, in his residence in Paranaque, unlicensed firearms with corresponding ammunitions. The judge issued a Search
Warrant commanding the PNP officers to make an immediate search at any reasonable hour of the day or night.
Armed with aforesaid warrant, a PNP CISC team, accompanied by a representative of the MTC judge and a barangay
security officer, went to private respondent’s residence in Paranaque at about 7:30 PM of the same date to search said
premises. Private respondent’s wife and their child’s nanny were both present during the search, but neither consented
to be a witness to the search. The search resulted in the seizure of unlicensed firearms and ammunition.
At the preliminary investigation, the investigating state prosecutor ruled the warrantless search of private respondent’s
person and jeep in Makati invalid for violating his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
However, the prosecutor found the search conducted in Paranaque valid.
Private respondent moved for the illegality of the search conducted in his house in Paranaque. The trial court denied the
same, a decision which was subsequently reversed by the CA. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an illegal search?
HELD: No. The conduct of the nighttime search was reasonable under the circumstances in this case. The unlicensed
firearms and ammunition taken from private respondent’s residence are admissible in evidence against private
respondent. The rule governing the time of service of search warrants is Section 8 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which
J.V.CASES.E.L 18
provides “the warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of
the day or night.”
The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the rule allows an exception,
namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the application asserts that the property is on the
person or place ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive assertion
of the applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and ammunition were kept at private respondent’s residence.
23. PEOPLE vs. BOLASA | 1999

DOCTRINE: For the plain view doctrine to be valid, the elements are:
a) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;
FACTS: This is an appeal seeking to reverse the decision of the trial court which found herein appellants guilty for violating
Section 8 of Art. II, of RA 6425.
On September 11, 1995 the police received a tip about two people who were repacking prohibited drugs at a house in
Metro Manila. Three officers went to check and parked 300 meters away from the said house. The police officers together
with the informant went to the house. They peeped inside through a small window and saw one man and a woman
repacking what they suspect was marijuana.
They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers. They confiscated the tea bags and some drug
paraphernalia and then arrested the two suspects. NBI confirmed that the bags contained marijuana. The two suspects,
Bolasa and delos Reyes, were found by the trial court guilty for violating RA 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Hence this appeal assailing the non-applicability of the plain view doctrine as asserted by the authorities.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid application of the plain view doctrine?
HELD: No. Specifically for the plain view doctrine to be valid, the elements are:
(1) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties;
(2) The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are;
(3) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(4) “Plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
In this case, the accused-apellants’ apprehension did not fall under application of the plain view doctrine. First, there
was no valid intrusion. Second, the tea bags that were found to contain marijuana was not accidentally discovered. The
officers should have done a surveillance first to be much more certain of the identities and address of the suspects. Since
the arrest was illegal, the search is also illegal which means that the accused-appellants should be acquitted.
24. PEOPLE vs. MONTILLA | 1988

DOCTRINE: A legitimate warrantless arrest, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search
and seize from the offender: (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense.
On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could
be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).These instances have been
applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto.
FACTS: On June 19, 1994 at 2:00pm an informer reported to the authorities that a drug courier, whom said informer could
recognize by face, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undetermined
amount of marijuana.
And so at around 4:00am of June 20, 1994, with the aid of the informant, appellant was pinpointed by the informer when
appellant had alighted from a jeepney. Appellant was subsequently approached by the authorities and was asked to open
up his bag. Appellant acceded which then revealed bricks of marijuana. Appellant was then apprehended.
J.V.CASES.E.L 19
Appellant denied ownership of the prohibited drugs. Trial was held on scheduled dates, which culminated in a verdict of
guilty which imposed the extreme penalty of death upon appellant. The same was elevated, hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal?
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search are legal. Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a
judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision.
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription, the exceptions are the following:
(1) customs searches; (4) consented searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; &
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view (6) "stop and frisk" measures
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the law enforcers was that
there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of
June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under
these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the
corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do
not reveal that he knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could
readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor,
and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense.
In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident
and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance
team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding
the tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and around
the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when and the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect
would show up, and how he would do so.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to
validly search and seize from the offender:
(1) Dangerous weapons, and (2) Those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense.
25. HOMAR vs. PEOPLE | 2015
DOCTRINE: There must be a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which
must precede the search. For this purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made
— the process cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only
occasions when a person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Ongcoma Homar seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA). Homar was charged for violation of Sec. 11, Article II of RA 9165.
PO1 Eric Tan together with a civilian agent was told to patrol in the South Wing of Roxas Boulevard. While preceding to
the place, they saw the petitioner crossing a “No Jaywalking” portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him
and told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area. The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting the
agent to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife. They conducted further search on the petitioner’s body, found and
confiscated a plastic sachet containing shabu.
He was charged before the MeTC for the possession of the kitchen knife but he was eventually acquitted. The RTC
convicted the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC’s ruling that
the warrantless arrest was valid as he was committed in flagrante delicto being that the petitioner committed jaywalking
in the presence of the police officers; hence, warrantless arrest for jaywalking was lawful. Furthermore, the subsequent
frisking and search done on the petitioner’s body which produced the knife and the shabu were incident to a lawful arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search incidental to a lawful arrest conducted to the petitioner is valid?
J.V.CASES.E.L 20
HELD: No. There must be a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which
must precede the search. For this purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made
— the process cannot be reversed.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions when a person may be lawfully
arrested without a warrant. In the present case, the respondent alleged that the petitioner’s warrantless arrest was due
to his commission of jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in the presence of Tan and Tangcoy. When Tan and Tangcoy
allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, however, they did not arrest him but accosted him and pointed to him the right
place for crossing.
Clearly no arrest preceded the search. In fact, the illegality of the search for the shabu is further highlighted when it was
not recovered immediately after the alleged lawful arrest, if there was any, but only after the initial search resulted in the
recovery of the knife. Thereafter, according to Tan, Tangcoy conducted another search on the person of the petitioner
resulting in the alleged confiscation of the shabu. Clearly, the petitioner's right to be secure in his person was callously
brushed aside twice by the arresting police officers.
IV. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
26. FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT SOBREPEA, and RAFAEL PEREZ DE TAGLE, JR. vs. WILSON GO
DOCTRINE: The decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting
fiscal and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless
made with grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS: Herein petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). Herein respondent
Wilson Go offered to buy a parcel of land from petitioners. Respondent fully complied with the terms of the sale.
Petitioners, however, failed to comply. Respondent then demanded the fulfillment of the terms and conditions of their
agreement. FEPI once again failed to comply but assured respondent that the project will push through eventually.
Respondent was not satisfied and so demanded upon the petitioners to return of his payment. Petitioners did not heed
his demand. Go filed a complaint for Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioners as
officers of FEPI.
The City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for Estafa. Herein Respondent appealed the City Prosecutor's
Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in turn reversed the City Prosecutors findings. Petitioners filed with
the Court of Appeals, a petition for review of the findings of the DOJ. The appellate court dismissed the petition and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.
The appellate court ruled that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a mode of appeal from the
ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or officers exercising quasi-judicial functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary
of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case?
HELD: No. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from
decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43.
Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are
appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to
indict petitioners for Estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.
Courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged. The decision
whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately,
that of the Secretary of Justice. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse
of discretion.
27. ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING vs. CA | G.R. No. 101837 | February 11, 1992
DOCTRINE: The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense
and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right.
J.V.CASES.E.L 21
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a plea at arraignment.
FACTS: Herein petitioner, Rolito Go, while travelling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision
with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, namely Eldon Maguan,
and then drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down the petitioner's plate number and reported the
same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt of the petitioner after an investigation of the incident.
Six days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself to the police station, accompanied by two lawyers, the police
detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge for frustrated homicide was brought to the Provincial Prosecutor against
petitioner. Petitioner then posted bail. Maguan died pending the complaint.
The prosecutor filed an information for murder against the petitioner to the lower court, setting and commencing trial
without a preliminary investigation on the ground that petitioner had already posted bail and that what took place was a
lawful warrantless arrest. Hence petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation?
HELD: No. Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor
any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When the complaint was filed with the prosecutor, preliminary
investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. The failure to accord the right to PI, however,
does not impair the validity of the information charged.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Another Issue-----------------------------------------------------
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful?
HELD: No. There are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful.
Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule.
The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on
the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who has
escaped from the penal institution. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is
baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is
probable cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him
from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial,
which he should not be deprived of.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------End of another issue--------------------------------------------
28. ALVAREZ YUSOP vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: The right of a person to preliminary investigation is recognized by the law and is governed by the Rules of Court.
However, the failure to accord this right does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of the information; the case is merely
suspended, and the prosecutor directed to conduct the proper investigation.
FACTS: Although the Petitioner had not been named as a respondent in the September 19, 1995 Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman in Mindanao, the latter issued a Resolution recommending the prosecution of Petitioner Alvarez Yusop,
among others, for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic
Act No. 3019 as amended. An Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond
before the Regional Trial Court. On the same day, he filed a Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman For Preliminary
Investigation.
The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-
graft court. Herein Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. In an
Order, the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted himself
to its jurisdiction. Upon arraignment, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been accorded preliminary
investigation. The Sandiganbayan rejected his claim and proceeded with the arraignment. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner should be availed of the right of Preliminary Investigation?
HELD: Yes. The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner
would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him
must be conducted.
The Court explained that the rationale of a preliminary investigation is to protect the accused from the inconvenience,
expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been
J.V.CASES.E.L 22
first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. The failure to accord this right, however, does not
ipso facto result in the dismissal of the information. The case is merely suspended, and the prosecutor directed to conduct
the proper investigation.
29. DUTERTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (APRIL 27, 1998)

DOCTRINE: The right to preliminary investigation is not a mere formal right, it is a substantive right. To deny the accused
of such right would be to deprive him of due process.
FACTS: Petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan for violating Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly entering into an anomalous contract for the purchase of computer
hardware and accessories with the Systems Plus, Incorporated.
It appears that four years prior to filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan, petitioners were merely directed to
submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in a civil case filed against them before the RTC and on
the allegations in an unverified complaint filed before the Ombudsman by the Anti-Graft League.
Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary investigation as in fact there was no indication
in the order that a preliminary investigation was being conducted. Petitioners filed a motion a motion for reconsideration
alleging among others that they were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process and the speedy
disposition of their case, which the Sandiganbayan denied.
They filed a motion to quash but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman?
HELD: Yes. The preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners has been conducted not in the manner laid
down in Administrative Order No. 07. The inordinate delay in the conduct of the “preliminary investigation” infringed
upon their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their case.
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were completely
unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that
petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the procedure to follow in a preliminary
investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason
to assume that the charges against them had already been dismissed.
30. BAUTISTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS; G.R. No. 143375 | July 6, 2001
DOCTRINE: Preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus: the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation
does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information.
FACTS: Sometime in April 1998, herein petitioner Ruth Bautista issued to private respondent Susan Aloña a check dated
May 8 1998 for Php 1,500 drawn on Metrobank Cavite Branch.166 days later private respondent presented the check for
payment. The bank dishonored the check due to insufficient funds. Private respondent filed a complaint with the City
Prosecutor of Cavite City.
The investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of information against petitioner for violation of
BP 22, which did the city prosecutor approve. Bautista filed a motion to review the resolution with the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor but the same was denied.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the resolution of the ORSP, the same was dismissed. The
CA stated that it is an error to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of Rules of Civil Procedure in their case because
ORSP resolution does not fall under a quasi-judicial body.
The petitioner elevated the complaint to the SC on the ground that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation
performs a quasi-judicial function.
ISSUE: Whether or not a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function?
HELD: No. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making."
J.V.CASES.E.L 23
The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information.
It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.
31. WEBB vs. DE LEON

DOCTRINE: Preliminary investigation should determine whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.
FACTS: On June 1994, the NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging herein petitioner Hubert Webb, and other
persons with the crime of rape with homicide. Forthwith, DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by assistant chief
state prosecutor to conduct the PI of the charged with the rape and killing of the Vizconde in their home in Paranaque.
During PI, Webb asserted he was not in the Philippines when the crime happened. A year later, DOJ Panel issued a
resolution finding probable cause to hold the respondents for trial. Webb with other accused voluntarily surrendered to
the police. Herein petitioners then filed a case before the court based on the following issues.
ISSUE: Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge accused with
crime of rape and homicide?
HELD: No. Probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed
and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. In this case there was a valid determination of such.
ISSUE: Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to conduct a
preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?
HELD: No. Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that – “upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the
accused.”
ISSUE: Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
information as an accused?
HELD: No. The decision whom to prosecute is not a judicial function but of the executive department whose principal
power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is the
prosecution of its violators.
32. HO vs. PEOPLE | NARCISO vs. PEOPLE | October 9, 1997

DOCTRINE: The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge while the preliminary
investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged
and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function
of the Prosecutor.
FACTS: Both petitions have the same factual backdrop and has been consolidated by the court. On August 8, 1991, the
Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Doris Teresa Ho, and
Rolando Narciso for violation of R.A. 3019. The office of the Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations to the
Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against Narciso and Ho. Ho filed an urgent motion to recall
warrant of arrest/motion for reconsideration which was adopted by Narciso alleging that, in the determination of probable
cause, the Sandiganbayan had issued the warrant by merely relying on the information and resolution filed by the
Ombudsman and without other supporting document.
J.V.CASES.E.L 24
The Sandiganbayan denied said motion on the ground that besides from the information and resolution by the
Ombudsman, they had used the facts and evidence appearing in the resolution/memorandum of responsible
investigators/prosecutors in the determination of probable cause. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not should the warrant of arrest be void?
HELD: Yes. In the issuance of a warrant, the SC gave these 3 vital matters to be considered:
First, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made
by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should
be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or
evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding
probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have
supporting evidence other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the
existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and examined by the judge. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan had issued a warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and
recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such
bare findings and recommendation. Hence, the petition was granted and the warrant issued is declared null and void.
33. LEVISTE vs. ALAMEDA; GR NO. 182677 | August 3, 2010

DOCTRINE: Reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the information. Due process of law
demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be admitted without conducting another or a new
preliminary investigation.
FACTS: On January 16, 2007, an information was filed against herein petitioner, Jose Leviste charging him with homicide
for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC. The Branch, presided by herein respondent Judge
Alameda, forthwith issued a commitment order against petitioner who was placed under police custody while confined at
the Makati Medical Center.
The private complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed a motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the
public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
The same was granted and was subsequently questioned by petitioner before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed a manifestation praying for the Trial Court to await the decision of the CA or, alternatively, to grant him
time to comment on the prosecutor’s recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of
probable cause. Nonetheless an amended information for murder against petitioner was admitted by the trial court.
The trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the
CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge should have at least allowed petitioner’s motion for a hearing for judicial
determination of probable cause?
HELD: No. The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued. Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing
for judicial determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner “cannot determine beforehand how cursory or
exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records should be since the extent of the judge’s examination depends on the
exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case require.”
ISSUE: Whether or not a reinvestigation of the criminal case should be allowed?
J.V.CASES.E.L 25
HELD: Yes. The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the ensuing
disquisition. The standing principle is that once an information is filed in court, any remedial measure such as a
reinvestigation must be addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.
A substantial amendment to the complaint or to the information, however, requires another or a new Preliminary
Investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a substantial amendment to the information?
HELD: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be mere formal
amendments:
(1) New allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction;
(2) An amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one;
(3) Additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused
and affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
(4) An amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and;
(5) An amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce
new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the
original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the present
case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information.
There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in
the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the claimed
circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
34. MENDOZA v. PEOPLE |G.R. No. 197293 | April 21, 2014

DOCTRINE: While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the prosecutor,
the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment
of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the Regional Trial
Court's dismissal of the complaint against petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza for qualified theft and Estafa.
On June 2007, Cars hired Mendoza as Trade-in/Used Car Supervisor. A partial audit was done by the company and it was
found that in sum, Mendoza had caused Php 1,046,000.00 in damages against Cars by reason of his pilferage of company
property. A case for qualified theft and Estafa was filed against him.
The Provincial Prosecutor found probable causeand the same was submitted to the court, however, the RTC Judge
dismissed the complaint holding that “the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses
of qualified theft and Estafa.
Cars’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Cars filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals and argued that
“the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to
the public prosecutor.” The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. Mendoza then raised the issue to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own
independent finding of lack of probable cause?
HELD: Yes. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information:
(a) Dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause;
(b) Issue a warrant of arrest if it binds probable cause; and
(c) Order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice in case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause.
J.V.CASES.E.L 26
In the instant case, paragraph a is applicable because there was no sufficient evidence to establish probable cause hence
the dismissal of it is valid.
V. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION
35. CRESPO vs. MOGUL | 151 SCRA 462

DOCTRINE: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to
prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant.
FACTS: Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set
for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However, Judge Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in
a much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.
The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the CA. The CA
ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the Court. Undersecretary
of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. Judge Mogul
denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment.
The accused then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary
writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining
order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders from the
Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits?
HELD: Yes. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case
as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records of the investigation.
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of
the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already
been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the
fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious
or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval
of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for review to the
Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the
Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be
filed in Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over
the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for
the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated
upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
J.V.CASES.E.L 27
36. VILLAREAL vs. ALIGA | January 13, 2014

DOCTRINE: The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely
vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or
the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.
FACTS: Dennis VIllareal is the President and General Manager of Gentrade Inc., and respondent Consuelo Aliga was one
of his accounting clerks. Respondent has custody of Villareal’s personal checks and is in charge of typing its contents and
submitting them for signature before encashment of the same. Sometime in October 1996, Villareal learned of Aliga’s
falsification of checks by increasing their amount.
She was caught in an operation by NBI agents when she encashed three falsified checks. When summoned by VIllareal in
his office, respondent arrived and executed a statement voluntarily giving back the amount of P60,000 to Villareal in the
presence of his lawyers. Aliga was found guilty by the RTC, but the judgment was reversed by the CA. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villareal may assail the judgment of acquittal?
HELD: Yes, but Villareal lacks legal standing. The People may assail a judgment of acquittal only via petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings
of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated. A petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two
and separate remedies.
A petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 covers errors
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an
allowable ground under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. Under
Section 1 of Rule 45:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order
or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts whenever authorized
by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions
of law which must be distinctly set forth.
However, the provision must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order "unless the accused will thereby be placed in double
jeopardy." The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting the
accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for
review.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
A judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately
executory upon its promulgation.
The rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due
process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under
exceptional circumstances.
37. RICARZE vs. CA | February 9, 2007

DOCTRINE: Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may
be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court
and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if
the same is beneficial to the accused.
FACTS: Eduardo Ricarze was a collector-messenger of City Service Corporation. He was assigned to collect checks payable
to Caltex. He then opened a bank account in the name of Dante Gutierrez, a regular customer of Caltex. He did so by
forging the signatures of the dorsal portions of the stolen check and deposited it in that same bank account. Upon
knowledge of his crimes, he was charged by the officers of Caltex with Estafa through falsification of commercial
documents.
In the original infomation filed by the prosecutor, Caltex appeared to be the only offended party because the prosecutor
was not informed that PCI Bank credited certain amount to Caltex. After the arraignment and enter of plea, PCIBank
J.V.CASES.E.L 28
appeared as the complainant. Then, Ricarze averred that the information can no longer be amended because he had
already been arraigned under the original information, and that doing so would place him in double jeopardy.
PCIBank argued that it had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been
subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not an information can be amended even after the accused had been arraigned and had entered his
plea?
HELD: Yes, because the amendment in the name of the complainant is one of form. Before the accused enters his plea, a
formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of
a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.
After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would
be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The substitution
did not alter the basis of the charge in both informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary
evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before
the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
38. PEOPLE vs. AQUINO | August 6, 2002

DOCTRINE: Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the Information allege, specify or enumerate the attendant
circumstances mentioned in the law to qualify the offense. These circumstances need not be preceded by the words
“aggravating/qualifying,” “qualifying,” or “qualified by” to be considered as qualifying circumstances.
It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him
to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during the trial. When the prosecution specifically
alleges in the Information the circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving them
beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated by law. This includes the death
penalty in proper cases.
FACTS: Herein Appellant Rodelio Aquino, raped his seven year old niece, was charged and convicted by the Court for the
crime of qualified rape. Appellant argues that although the victim’s minority and their relationship were stated in the
information, both were not specifically alleged to qualify the charge against him. Hence this motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not should qualifying and aggravating circumstances be specifically stated to qualify and aggravate
the charge?
HELD: No. The Court has repeatedly held even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, that
qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify
an offense.
The change in the wording did not make the use of the words aggravating/qualifying circumstances an essential element
in specifying the crime in the Information. As in the old law, the essential element that raises rape to a heinous crime is
the attendance of a circumstance mentioned in Article 266-B. As an essential element of the heinous crime, such attendant
circumstance must be specifically alleged in the Information to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the accused
must be informed of the nature of the charge against him.
The use of the words aggravating/qualifying circumstances will not add any essential element to the crime. Neither will
the use of such words further appraise the accused of the nature of the charge. The specific allegation of the attendant
circumstance in the Information, coupled with the designation of the offense and a statement of the acts constituting the
offense as required in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, is sufficient to warn the accused that the crime charged is qualified
rape punishable by death.
39. ZAPANTA vs. PEOPLE | March 20, 2013

J.V.CASES.E.L 29
DOCTRINE: When the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged;
thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of
the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. (Emphasized by Judge)
FACTS: An information was filed with the RTC charging the petitioner with the crime of qualified theft. The petitioner,
Anthony V. Zapanta, then Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being undertaken then by
the Construction Firm, ANMAR. A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga building
construction. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and erection of the building’s structural and steel framing to ANMAR,
owned by the Marigondon family.
The petitioner orchestrated the crime by instructing the truck driver, and some ANMAR welders to unload numerous steel
beams at ANMAR’s alleged new contract project along Marcos Highway.
The RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. The CA set aside the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC’s
decision. Later, CA denied the motion for reconsideration that followed, the petitioner filed the present petition.
The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed "sometime in the month of October,
2001," he was convicted for acts not covered by the information, i.e., November 2001, thus depriving him of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the date “sometime in october” is enough to make the charge sufficient?
HELD: Yes. When the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged;
thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of
the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the information stated the
approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words "sometime in the month of October, 2001."
The petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the
contents of the information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to enable
him to prepare his defense.
We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense was committed, as to be inclusive
of the month of "November 2001" since the date was not a material element of the offense. As such, the offense of
qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Clearly,
the month of November is the month right after October.
*See also 6 and 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.*
40. AGUSTIN vs. PAMINTUAN | August 22, 2005

DOCTRINE: Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case
is determined by the allegations in the complaint or Information, and the offense must have been committed or any one
of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
FACTS: Petitioner Victor Agustin was charged with 4 separate informations of libel by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio. He was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to all the charges. On September 10, 2001, he then filed a Motion to
Quash the Informations on the sole ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He pointed out
that the said informations did not contain any allegation that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City or
that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City.
Private complainant opposed the motion alleging that he was a bona fide resident and acting general manager of Baguio
Country Club.
The RTC issued an order denying the MTQ and the motion for reconsideration of the Order. Petitioner then brought the
case to the CA. The CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition and the motion for reconsideration of the decision for
lack of merit. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Baguio City has jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the four Informations.
HELD: No. The SC held that venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court over
the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or Information, and the offense must have been
committed or any of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
J.V.CASES.E.L 30
Article 360 of the RPC provides that the criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed
and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
In the case at bar, the Informations did not allege that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City at the time
of the commission of the offenses, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City. It
cannot even be inferred from the allegation 'the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country
Club and of good standing and reputation in the community that the private complainant was actually residing in Baguio
City.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the
residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in
the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein.
To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the
place, combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time.
One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident
therein. Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute.
Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.
The absence of any allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually residing where the crimes
charged were allegedly committed is a substantial defect.
41. PACOY vs. CAJIGAL | September 28, 2007

DOCTRINE: It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before
or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
AMENDMENT SUBSTITUTION
Amendment may involve either formal or substantial Substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original
changes charge
Amendment before plea has been entered can be Substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original
effected without leave of court information has to be dismissed
Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no In substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is
need for another preliminary investigation and the entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information
retaking of the plea of the accused
An amended information refers to the same offense On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new
charged in the original information or to an offense information involves a different offense which does not include or is not
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot
the original charge, hence substantial amendments to claim double jeopardy.
the information after the plea has been taken cannot
be made over the objection of the accused, for if the
original information would be withdrawn, the accused
could invoke double jeopardy.
FACTS: SSGT. JOSE M. Pacoy, was charged with Homicide for the alleged killing of his commanding officer. During
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty; therefore the case was set for pre trial and trial. While the case is pending, Judge
Cajigal ordered the prosecuting attorney to amend the information, i.e., to change the title of the information from
Homicide to Murder, considering the aggravating circumstance of disregard of a rank. Pacoy opposed the amendment and
moved to quash the information, contending that no amendment is allowed since he already entered his plea. He further
argued that he would be put in double jeopardy for the reason that when judge cajigal ordered the amendment, the
former information was terminated without his consent. Judge Cajigal granted the motion and ordered the reinstatement
of the previous information. Pacoy assailed the decision of the lower court. He argued that the motion is as if was not
granted since his motion is for the quashal of the information and not for the reinstatement of the previous information
filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint or information may be amended after arraignment?
HELD: Yes. In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14,
Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second
information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
J.V.CASES.E.L 31
information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense
which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient
to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second
offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense
charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of
the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-
versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form a part of those constituting the latter.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is double jeopardy?
HELD: No. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present:
1. A first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
2. The first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
3. A second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
In this case, the prior information was not yet dismissed or terminated but was only amended. Considering also that the
crime of Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of Murder. In order for the second jeopardy to attach, it should be
wholly different from the first information filed.
42. PEOPLE vs. CATUBIG | August 23, 2001

DOCTRINE: The term “aggravating circumstances” used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense; The ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction
that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender—relative to the civil
aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Relevantly, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, made effective on 01 December 2000, requires aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110
of the Rules of Court now provide:
A court would thus be precluded from considering in its judgment the attendance of “qualifying, or aggravating
circumstances” if the complaint or information is bereft of any allegation on the presence of such circumstances.
The retroactive application of procedural rules, nevertheless, cannot adversely affect the rights of the private offended
party that have become vested prior to the effectivity of said rules.
FACTS: On November 27, 1997, herein victim Dannilyn Catubig, and her four (4) younger siblings were watching television
in the sala of their house located at Sunlife Subdivision, Bulacan. Dannilyn’s father, herein appellant Danilo Catubig, arrived
and told Dannilyn’s siblings to proceed to her aunt’s house which is just located nearby. Thereafter, appellant told Dannilyn
to go inside a room and to lie down on the bed. After Dannilyn had complied, appellant removed Dannilyn’s shorts and
underwear and then proceeded to lay on top of Dannilyn. Afraid of appellant who beat and raped her in the past, Dannilyn
was not able to resist appellant who succeeded the penetration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 is applicable?
HELD: No. The information failed to state the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender, both special
qualifying circumstances under Republic Act No. 7659, and for want of such allegations, the trial court erred in imposing
the death penalty on the accused. Appellant could only thus be convicted under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Thus, in the case at bar, although relationship has not been alleged in the information, the offense having been committed,
however, prior to the effectivity of the new rules, the civil liability already incurred by appellant remains unaffected
thereby.
43. BALTAZAR vs. CHUA | February 27, 2009

DOCTRINE: The rule is that once an information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, be it dismissal, conviction, or
acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the court.
J.V.CASES.E.L 32
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in
court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.
FACTS: Jaime and Jovito were charged before the RTC, presided by Judge Cruz, with the crimes of homicide and frustrated
homicide for the death of Ildefonso Baltazar and the wounding of Edison Baltazar. Herein petitioners Lourdes Baltazar and
Edison Baltazar, through counsel, filed a motion for reinvestigation of the cases, praying that Jaime and Jovito be charged
with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder, instead of homicide and frustrated homicide.
The same was granted by the Office of the City Prosecutor and was then subsequently accepted by the court. Jaime and
Jovito appealed the Resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice. The Secretary of Justice modified the
resolution of the City Prosecutor by directing the latter to amend the Informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder to
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide against Jovito and to drop Jaime from the charges. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration bu the same was denied.
The City Prosecutor filed with the RTC a Motion for the Withdrawal of the Informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder
and for the Admission of New Informations for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide which the RTC granted. Petitioners
moved for the reconsideration of the charges against Jovito and of the exclusion of Jaime.
The RTC granted the motion and ordered the reinstatement of the informations for murder and frustrated murder.
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied by the trial court. The Court of Appeals, on
the other hand, granted defendants’ petition. Hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Hidalgo may review the findings of the Secretary of Justice?
HELD: Yes, the rule is that once an information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, be it dismissal, conviction, or
acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in
court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.
VI. RULE 111
44. CASUPANAN vs. LAROYA | August 26, 2002

DOCTRINE: The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such
civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Thus, the offended party can file two
separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto
is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-forum shopping.
FACTS: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Capitulo and driven by petitioner
Casupanan, figured in an accident. This prompted the filing of two cases before the MCTC of Capas Tarlac: 1st – a criminal
case for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property filed by respondent against Casapunan; 2nd – a civil case
arising from a quasi-delict filed by the petitioners against the respondent. The civil case was filed pending preliminary
investigation on the criminal case. Respondent as defendant in the civil case filed a motion to dismiss on ground of forum
shopping due pendency of the criminal case.
The MCTC granted the motion for dismissal on basis of forum shopping. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
the ground that a separate civil action may be instituted separately and independently from the criminal case, however,
the same was denied. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari before Capas RTC to assail MCTC’s Order,
however the RTC dismissed the same for lack of merit. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously
and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case?
HELD: Yes. The right of the accused to file a separate civil action for quasi-delict is akin to the right of the offended party
to file an independent civil action pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 111. Under the said rule, the independent civil action in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately
by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code.
J.V.CASES.E.L 33
The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action
is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits
for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed
instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases
can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action
will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal
case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused may be litigated in a separate civil action.
This is only fair for two reasons.

 First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in
the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended
party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since
the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
 Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same
way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the
accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Petitioners is proper.
45. RIMANDO vs. PEOPLE | October 13, 2014

DOCTRINE: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: *RLD≈LDR
(a) The acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) The court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) The civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted.
FACTS: On January 21, 2004, an Information was filed before the RTC charging petitioner Leonora Rimando of the crime
of Estafa through the use of false manifestations and fraudulent representations. According to the prosecution, Rimando
enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business under the assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8%
monthly interest. Convinced by Rimando’s proposal and taking into consideration their long friendship, Sps. Aldaba gave
Rimando a check in the amount of P500k as investment in her business. Rimando then gave them 3 post dated checks,
one for P500k and the other two for P40k each, and made them sign an investment contract with Multitel International
Holding Corp.
Upon maturity of the checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted to encash the same but were dishonored for being drawn against
insufficient funds. Despite demands, Rimando still failed to settle the same. Hence, the spouses filed a criminal complaint
for Estafa. However, Rimando contends that they weren't friends and she didn't entice them into investing in a business,
rather she just referred them to Multitel Investment Manager Cayaban, who handled their investment. The spouses later
filed another criminal case against Rimando for violated of BP 22 with the MTC. The petitioner was acquitted both in the
BP 22 case and the Estafa case, but was still held civilly liable towards the Aldabas for P500k for being an accommodation
party. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Rimando was still civilly liable in the Estafa case despite her acquittal and exoneration from
civil liability in the BP 22 case?
HELD: Yes, while a BP 22 case and an Estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they nevertheless present
different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered separate, distinct, and independent from each other.
Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final adjudication. It is well-settled that the acquittal of the accused does not
automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where:
a) The acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
b) The court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
c) The civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted.
J.V.CASES.E.L 34
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
In this case, Rimando’s civil liability didn't arise from any purported act constituting the crime of estafa as the RTC
clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on the Aldabas to induce them to invest money in Multitel.
Rather, her civil liability rooted from being an accommodation party to the check for P500k. In lending her name to
Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and as such, she may be held directly liable for the value of the
issued check. Since Rimando’s said civil liability did not arise from or is not based upon the crime she is charged with, and
hence, the CA correctly upheld the same despite her acquittal in the Estafa case.
46. DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION vs. JANIOLA | June 30, 2009

DOCTRINE: A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires
a decision before the final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected.
The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
FACTS: This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding filed by the
petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question with respect to the civil case belatedly
filed by the respondent.
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, through its president and VP, filed a complaint for violation of BP 22 against private
respondent Janiola with the Office of City Prosecutor. Janiola then instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Notably, the checks that
were subject of the criminal cases before the MTC were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Janiola filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the criminal case, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts
and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, Janiola claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial
question as against the criminal cases.
The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioner appealed to the RTC but the same was
denied the. Hence, this petition raised.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a prejudicial question?
HELD: No. SEC. 7 Rule 111: Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) The previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action; and
(b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision
before the final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil
action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to
speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. It must be emphasized that the
gravamen of the offense charged is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued is irrelevant
to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. The clear intention of the framers of BP 22 is to make the mere act of
issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
It is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question (resolution of the issue in the civil
action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed) is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial
question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable in this case.
47.MANLICLIC vs. CALAUNAN | January 25, 2007

DOCTRINE: The extinction of civil liability referred to Section 2(b) of Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi delict only and not
as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused.
J.V.CASES.E.L 35
Failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law; Hearsay
evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other
evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.
FACTS: Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and owner-type jeep owned by respondent Modesto
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza. The two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit
the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water
resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. When the civil case was heard,
counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies in the criminal case be
received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case. The versions
of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
Respondent’s version:
According to the respondent and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow
lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was
about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was
hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep following
the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff
swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Petitioner’s version:
The petitioner explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the
latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it
observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. CA found no reversible error and affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, Manliclic, may be held liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the CA in the criminal case that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
HELD: Yes. From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from or based on quasi-
delict: Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner
PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees.
It appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of
the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads: (b)
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration
in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to
a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The
extinction of civil liability referred to in the quoted provision, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused.
In sum, the court distinguished civil liability arising from a crime and that arising from quasi-delict:
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIME CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICT
If an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
preponderance of evidence only. If an accused is acquitted on individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict
the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission or crime. The same negligence causing damages may produce
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the
acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or Civil Code. The acquittal of the accused, even if based on a
ex delicto. finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability based on quasi delict. Civil liability arising
from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act
J.V.CASES.E.L 36
or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final

judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist). An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is
entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Another Issue-----------------------------------------------------
ISSUE: Whether or not the transcripts may be admitted in evidence?
HELD: Yes. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the
three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility. It is
elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence;
otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may
waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of
the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of
failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.
Failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law;
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like
any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------End of another issue--------------------------------------------
48. PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS | September 2, 1994
DOCTRINE: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon.
FACTS: Bayotas was convicted of rape by the RTC of Roxas City. During the pendency of his appeal regarding his conviction,
he died. The SC dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. The Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. Bayotas' counsel
opposed the said view arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. Hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
HELD: Yes. Art. 89 of the RPC provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished as to personal penalties, by the death
of the convict and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment.
As opined by Justice Regalado, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
sensostrictiore. "Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
49. MADARANG vs. CA | July 14, 2005

DOCTRINE: A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal
action.
FACTS: On February 11, 1994, private respondent Janice Young-Chua and her husband, Eduardo Chan-Chua, filed a
complaint for replevin and damages against petitioners William Madarang and Evans Kho in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The complaint alleged that private respondent is the owner of a 1990 dark gray Kia Pride car; and that
petitioners, through force and intimidation, took possession of the subject car by virtue of a falsified Deed of Sale dated
allegedly executed by private respondent in favor of petitioner Madarang.
On May 12, 1994, upon complaint of private respondent, petitioner Madarang was charged with Falsification of Public
Document in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On the same date, petitioners were charged with Grave Coercion
in the same MeTC. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
On August 8, 1996, a Motion to Suspend Criminal Proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was filed by petitioner
Madarang in the MeTC, claiming that the issues presented in the replevin case pending in RTC are intimately related to
the issues pending before the MeTC, the resolution of which would necessarily determine the guilt of the accused in the
criminal case for falsification.
J.V.CASES.E.L 37
The MeTC denied petitioner Madarangs motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the decision in the civil case
for replevin will not be determinative of the guilt of the accused in the criminal charge for falsification. The RTC dismissed
the complaint for replevin upon finding that the deed of sale is genuine and that private respondent voluntarily
surrendered possession of the car to the petitioners. Private respondent filed an appeal with the CA.
Petitioner Madarang filed a Motion to Dismiss the falsification case on the ground that the decision dismissing the replevin
suit in RTC involving the same parties absolved him of criminal liability in the falsification case. The MeTC granted the
Motion to Dismiss of petitioner Madarang.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution on the ground that the dismissal was unwarranted since the
decision dismissing the replevin suit in RTC, Branch 84 is not yet final and executory, as it is pending appeal before the CA
and the accused deliberately omitted to send the private prosecutor a copy of said Motion to Dismiss. The MeTC recalled
the dismissal of the case for falsification.
Petitioners filed a Second Omnibus Motion to Quash on the ground that that the findings of the RTC are binding and must
be given due respect by the MeTC notwithstanding the appeal taken by private respondent. On March 26, 1999, the MeTC
denied petitioners motion to quash, ruling that the decision rendered by the RTC in the replevin case cannot absolve
petitioners of the charges in the criminal cases as said decision has not attained finality since it is pending appeal before
the CA; and that petitioners waived any grounds of a Motion to Quash pursuant to Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC. They assailed the MeTCs denial of their motion to quash the
informations for falsification of public document and grave coercion. The RTC dimissed the same along with the motion
for reconsideration which followed it. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which was also dismissed.
Hence, the present petition for review
ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she denied their motion to quash
the Informations and refused to dismiss the charges against them?
HELD: No. The Court gave five reasons. First. The petitions for certiorari in the RTC and CA are defective since petitioners
failed to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent therein. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The
prosecution of offenses is thus the concern of the government prosecutors.
Second. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial
of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered,
the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when
an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.
Only when the court issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. No such special circumstances
are present in the case at bar.
Third. Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the governing law at the time of the filing of the
indictments, provides the grounds on which an accused can move to quash the complaint or information. These are:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) The court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) The court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) The officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) The information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) More than one offense is charged, except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses;
(g) The criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) The information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) The accused has been previously convicted or is in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged.
Section 8 of the same Rule specifically provides: *Refer to Section 8, Rule 117* Thus, a motion to quash may still be filed
after pleading to the complaint or information where the grounds are that no offense is charged, lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy. Nowhere in the enumerated excepted grounds is
there any mention of res judicata as a ground to quash an information.
J.V.CASES.E.L 38
Fourth. Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court explicitly recognizes that a final judgment rendered in a civil action
absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action.
Fifth. Article 33 of the Civil Code provides that in cases involving alleged fraudulent acts, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is clear, therefore, that the civil case for replevin may proceed independently of the criminal cases for falsification and
grave coercion, especially because while both cases are based on the same facts, the quantum of proof required for
holding the parties liable therein differs.
50. SPS. JOSE vs. SPS. SUAREZ | June 30, 2008

DOCTRINE: A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
FACTS: Spouses Laureano and Purita Suarez, had availed of Carolina Jose’s (Carolina) offer to lend money at the daily
interest rate of 1% to 2% which was later on increased to 5% per day. Respondents were forced to accept because they
allegedly had no other option left. Purita would then issue checks in favor of petitioners in payment of the amount
borrowed from them with the agreed 5% daily interest.
In 2004, Sps. Suarez filed a Complaint against Jose seeking to nullify the 5% interest per day, alleging that same is
iniquitous, contrary to morals, done under vitiated consent and imposed using undue influence by taking improper
advantage of their financial distress. Thereafter, Jose filed several cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent
Purita before the MTCC.
Purita, in turn filed motions to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondents
claimed that if the 5% interest per month is nullified and loans are computed at 1% per month, it would mean that the
checks subject of the BP Blg. 22 cases are not only fully paid but are also in fact overpaid.
The motion to suspend was denied. Hence, Sps. Suarez filed before the RTC a “Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with Temporary Restraining Order” seeking to restrain the MTCCs from further proceeding with the B.P. Blg. 22 cases on
the ground of prejudicial question. The RTC granted the motion. CA affirmed. Hence, petitioners appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a prejudicial question exists such that the outcome of the validity of the interest rate is
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent spouses in the criminal case?
HELD: No. There is none. A prejudicial question has two essential elements:(i) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal cases. The
cause or reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under BP Blg. 22. What
the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, which is a malum prohibitum, and not the purpose for which it was
issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores
will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of
bouncing checks. The primordial question is whether the law has been breached, that is, if a bouncing check has been
issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent spouses are guilty of forum shopping?
HELD: Yes. There is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already
been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. Forum shopping is the act of one party against
another, when an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly favorable opinion
in another forum other than by appeal or by special civil action of certiorari; or the institution of two or more acts or
J.V.CASES.E.L 39
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.
Respondents filed their motions to suspend proceedings in the MTCCs hearing the BP Blg. 22 cases but unfortunately, the
same were denied. Failing to get the relief they wanted, respondents sought before the RTC, the suspension of the criminal
proceedings which was granted. Respondents tried to extricate themselves from the charge of forum shopping by
explaining that after the denial of their motions to suspend, their only remedy was the application for preliminary
injunction in the civil case—a relief which they had already asked for in their complaint and which was also initially not
granted to them. Any which way the situation is viewed, respondents’ acts constituted forum shopping since they sought
a possibly favorable opinion from one court after another had issued an order unfavorable to them.
51. MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS | July 31, 2000

DOCTRINE: He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for Concubinage, it was held that the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes
presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
FACTS: On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage
having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda
Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on
petitioner’s complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it
was celebrated without a marriage license.
Thereafter, on April 30, 1952, defendant filed a motion in the aforementioned criminal case, praying that it be provisionally
dismissed on the ground that the civil action for annulment of the second marriage is a prejudicial question. The court
denied this motion and thus the defendant filed for an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes
a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
HELD: No. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for Concubinage, it was held that the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes
presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted rests upon
the defense, but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed
that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the
criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy.
Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared
indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a
potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution.
52. PEOPLE vs. ARAGON | February 17, 1954

DOCTRINE: A decision in such civil action is not essential before the criminal charge can be determined. It is, therefore, not
a prejudicial question. Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; this is its first element. Jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second element. In an action for bigamy, for example, if the accused
claims that the first marriage is null and void, and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil
action for nullity must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed; hence, the validity of the first marriage
is a prejudicial question.
FACTS: An information was filed on May 22, 1951 against defendant Abelo Aragon is being charged in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu with the crime of bigamy, for having contracted a second marriage with Efigenia Palomer on September
J.V.CASES.E.L 40
21, 1947 while his previous marriage with Martina Godinez was still valid and had not been dissolved. On October 11,
1951, while the case was pending trial, Efigenia Palomer filed a civil action in the same Court of First Instance against
defendant that the latter ―by means of force, threats and intimidation of bodily harm, forced plaintiff to marry him, and
praying that their marriage on September 21, 1947 be annulled.
Thereafter, on April 30, 1952, defendant filed a motion in the aforementioned criminal case, praying that it be provisionally
dismissed on the ground that the civil action for annulment of the second marriage is a prejudicial question. The court
denied this motion and thus the defendant filed for an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of the second marriage will establish a prejudicial question on the bigamy case of
the petitioner?
HELD: No. Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage contracted by defendant to Efigena Palomer was illegal and void.
However, its nullity cannot be used as a defense by defendant for the criminal action filed against him. Defendant cannot
use his own malfeasance to defeat the action based on his criminal act.
Thus, the pendency of the civil action for the annulment of the marriage filed by Elfigenia Palomer, is absolutely immaterial
to the criminal action filed against defendant. The said civil action does not decide that defendant did not enter the
marriage against his will and consent, because the complaint does not allege that he was the victim of force and
intimidation in the second marriage. The decision in the said case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. Therefore it is not a prejudicial question.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
A second marriage contracted by a man while the first marriage is not yet dissolved is illegal and void. Its nullity, however,
is no defense to a criminal action for bigamy filed against him.
The filing, while the bigamy case is pending, of a civil action by the woman in the second marriage for its annulment by
reason of force and intimidation upon her by the man, is not a bar or defense to the criminal action. The civil action does
not decide that he entered the marriage against his will and consent, because the complaint therein does not allege that
he was the victim of force and intimidation in the second marriage. It was he who used the force or intimidation and he
may not use his own malfeasance to defeat the action based on his criminal act.
VII. ARREST AND SEARCH WITH WARRANT
53. HO vs. PEOPLE | October 9, 1997

-------------------------------------------------------------------Refer to case no. 32------------------------------------------------------------------
54. LUNA vs. PLAZA | November 29, 1968
DOCTRINE: Before a municipal judge may issue a warrant of arrest, the following conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he
must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; (3) the examination must be reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
The term "searching questions and answers" means only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary
examination which is to determine "whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial", such
questions as have tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof. What would be searching
questions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense, the date, time, and
place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission; the subject, his age, education, status, financial and social
circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his
age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the subject
of inquiry may differ from case to case. The questions, therefore, must to a great degree depend upon the Judge making
the investigation.
The Constitution, in Section 1(3), Article III, provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The
existence of probable cause depended to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination.
J.V.CASES.E.L 41
Preliminary examination is not an essential part of due process of law. Preliminary examination may be conducted by the
municipal judge, prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, either in the presence, or in the absence, of the accused.
55. PEOPLE vs. MACAM | November 24, 1994

DOCTRINE: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information, confessions or admissions from the accused.
Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the trial, inasmuch as the accused
was "confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." However, as a result of
the changes in patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adversaries and the judicial system
well before his trial begins. It is therefore appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution
even before the trial. The law enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the
prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a
mere formality." A police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings.
After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is
inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims before the
confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that
may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.
FACTS: On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to
the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the accused,
Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who
were waiting in a tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while E. Roque remained
in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and
pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and
Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she
screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The total
value of the items taken was P536,700.00.
Appellants contend that their arrest without a warrant and their uncounseled identification by the prosecution witnesses
during the police line-up at the hospital are violative of their constitutional rights under Section 12, Article 3 of the
Constitution
ISSUE: Whether or not their right to counsel has been violated?
HELD: No. It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before trial. A police
line-up is considered a “critical” stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police
line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant’s identification at the
line-up. The witnesses identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification
as being tainted by illegal line-up.
The arrest of appellants was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. However, appellants are estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. This issue is being raised for the first time by appellants before this Court. They
have not moved for the quashing of the information before the trial court on this ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant
to their arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a
plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. (People v. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 [1990]).
OTHER DOCTRINES:
In Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988), the Court held that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information, confessions or admissions
from the accused.
VIII. BAIL
56. LEVISTE vs. CA | March 17, 2010

DOCTRINE: Under Sec 5 of Rule 114, bail is discretionary upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other circumstances:
J.V.CASES.E.L 42
a. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
b. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without a valid justification;
c. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
e. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
FACTS: Jose Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide.
He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA and then he filed an application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his
advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a
prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.
On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3)
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but
not more than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an
appellant pending appeal. Hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion?
HELD: No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114, bail is discretionary upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of
the following or other circumstances:
a. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
b. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without a valid justification;
c. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
e. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of
discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
57. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG vs. OLALIA | April 19, 2007

DOCTRINE: Foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending
the finality of an order of deportation. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
FACTS: The Philippines and Hong Kong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons. Private
respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice
a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent Muñoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the NBI which,
in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The NBI
agents arrested and detained him.
Muñoz filed a petition for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr. holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail
in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high “flight risk.” After Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
allowing private respondent to bail?
J.V.CASES.E.L 43
HELD: No. Although the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations
under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region it does not necessarily mean
that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and
due process guaranteed by the Constitution. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution,
but also by international conventions, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Philippines is
a party.
We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant
is satisfactorily met. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted
bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”
OTHER DOCTRINES:
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one
accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender
him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition
proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure
his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty
on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the
machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates
the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused,
pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and
extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential
extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length
of time of the detention should be reasonable.
58. PADERANGA vs. CA | 247 SCRA 741

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59. MIRANDA vs. TULIAO | March 31, 2006
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60. OBOSA vs. CA | January 16, 1997
DOCTRINE: Although the grant of bail is discretionary in noncapital offenses, nevertheless when imprisonment has been
imposed on the convicted accused in excess of six (6) years and circumstances exist, accused must be denied bail.
FACTS: Obosa was charged with two counts of murder for the ambush and slaying of former Secretary of Interior and Local
Governments Jaime Ferrer and his driver Jesus Calderon. However, he was only convicted of two counts of homicide by
the trial court.
Obosa applied for bail with the trial court. While this is pending, he appealed the case to the CA, which found strong
evidence of guilt along with the attendance of treachery which qualified the crime of homicide to that of murder.
Meanwhile, the trial court approved Obosa’s bail bond, prompting the prosecution to request the Court of Appeals to
cancel the bail bond approved by the trial court to which CA did. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused is entitled to bail?
J.V.CASES.E.L 44
HELD: No. In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage, the court analyzed the purpose of bail and why it should be denied to
one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of
the proceeding against him with a death sentence, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.
The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to an appellant who, though convicted of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. Such
appellant can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his
conviction (and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and
infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In such an
instance, the appellant cannot but be sorely tempted to flee.
In Quemuel vs. CA, et al., the Court held that the appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this
includes the penalty, which may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review, even factual
questions may once more be weighed and evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of conviction upon the
original charge is ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously demonstrated that evidence of the accused's
guilt is strong, as it had done so in this case, such determination subsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a lesser
offense, since such determination is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any
bearing on whether petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the charge.
61. BASCO vs. RAPATALO | March 5, 1997

DOCTRINE: The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is the court's
determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting bail.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a case for murder against Roger Morente. The accused filed a petition for bail. The hearing for bail
was repeatedly rescheduled and it was discovered later on that the accused was already granted to post bail. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent judge Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established
rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.
Respondent judge, in his comment, alleged that he granted the petition based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose
the petition as well as the latter's recommendation setting the bail bond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that
when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He
further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was
doing since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private
prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended bail.
Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bail bond posted by accused was cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was
issued on account of complainant's motion for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed
to and approved the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion granting bail to an accused in a murder case?
HELD: Yes. An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the accused
without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the offense
charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended
by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.
Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's declaration not to oppose the
petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on
account of the latter's familiarity with the case due to his having conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty. Said
reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the
guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty
will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is the court's
determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting bail. Respondent
Judge should not have relied solely on the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have ascertained
personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation.
Moreover, there will be a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application for bail without hearing
since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against the accused's provisional release will
be determined at the hearing.
IX. MOTION TO QUASH
J.V.CASES.E.L 45
62. IVLER Y AGUILAR vs. SAN PEDRO | September 17, 2010

DOCTRINE: Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail
bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his
bondsman potentially liable on its bond.
FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of
the second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of
offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RT C), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler
sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a
prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the
filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent?
HELD: No. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders
his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused
within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be
convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact
that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.
HELD: Yes. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
The court holds that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences; There shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be
filed in the same first level court.
If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so
that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as
grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect
of this ruling.
63. PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN | March 21, 2011
J.V.CASES.E.L 46

DOCTRINE: The dismissal order arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be
appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS: On May 21, 2004, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 89 of PD No. 14452 before the
Sandiganbayan. On October 20, 2004, private respondent was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution
presented its lone witness, Manolo Tulibao Villad, Commission on Audit State Auditor. Thereafter, the prosecution filed
its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
On April 20, 2006, private respondent filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On June 16, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motion. On June 30, 2006, private respondent filed his demurrer to
evidence. On July 26 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Resolution which found the demurrer to evidence
well taken, then subsequently dismissed the case. Petitioner filed for a petition for certiorari against the Sandiganbayan,
hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in giving due course to and eventually granting the demurrer to evidence?
HELD: No. An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an acquittal unless the
order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed
because this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still
reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be
shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed
judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to
a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to
prove that the government suffered any damage from private respondent’s non-liquidation of the subject cash advance
because it was later shown, as admitted by the prosecution’s witness, that private respondent liquidated the same albeit
belatedly.
In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against them was one on the merits of the
case which is to be distinguished from other dismissals at the instance of the accused. All the elements of double jeopardy
are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime
charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution
had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused.
The dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot be
invoked.
64. PACOY vs. CAJIGAL | September 28, 2007

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65. PEOPLE vs. TAN | July 26, 2010
DOCTRINE: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is “filed after the prosecution had rested its case,” and when the
same is granted, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused.” Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would
be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
FACTS: Two separate information were filed against respondent Tan for violation of the Revised Securities Act, when he
failed to file with SEC the amount of all BWRC (Best World Resources Corporation) shares of which he is the beneficial
owner within 10 days after he became such beneficial owner.
During the trial, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. RTC admitted the pieces of evidence, but denied admission
of all other exhibits. Tan filed Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. Petitioner filed its Opposition to which Tan
filed a Reply. In the end, RTC issued an order granting Tan’s Demurrer to Evidence.
J.V.CASES.E.L 47
Petitioner filed a petition before the CA assailing the order of RTC which granted Tan’s motion. CA denied, ruling that the
dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for
which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. Hence, the
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in granting Tan’s Demurrer to Evidence?
HELD: No. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is “filed after the prosecution had rested its
case,” and when the same is granted, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount
to an acquittal of the accused.” Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be
appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends
there.
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not present in this case. RTC did not violate petitioner’s right to due
process as the petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case which led to grant of Tan’s demurrer.
RTC never prevented petitioner from presenting its case. In fact, one of the main reasons for the RTCs decision to grant
the demurrer was the absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the Best World Resources Corporation stocks
were divided into, whether there are preferred shares as well as common shares, or even which type of shares respondent
had acquired,
Petitioner argues that the RTC displayed resolute bias when it chose to grant respondents demurrer to evidence
notwithstanding that it had filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Resolution of Tan’s Demurrer to Evidence and The
Prosecution’s Opposition Thereto. Petitioner contends that instead of acting on the motion, the RTC peremptorily granted
Tan’s demurrer to evidence which prevented petitioner from its intention to file a petition to question the orders.
While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in
the rules, however, is it mandated to do so. Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the same as an error on the
part of the RTC, the same would merely constitute an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction
as persistently argued by petitioner.
66. PEOPLE vs. LACSON | October 7, 2003

DOCTRINE: The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy
for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
FACTS: Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution remanding this case to the RTC for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure on the dismissal of criminal cases filed against Panfilo Lacson and his co-accused with the said court. In the
criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven
male victims.
The Court ruled that the provisional dismissal of criminal cases were with the express consent of the respondent as he
himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of witnesses. The petitioners contend that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
not applicable in the present case and the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisional dismissal issued by the Court was proper
HELD: No. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal
of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the CA, the respondent is burdened to
establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional dismissal of
the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
J.V.CASES.E.L 48
3. The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent
requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for
a provisional dismissal of the case “no objection” or “with my conformity,” the writing amounts to express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal
case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods
provided in the new rule. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over
his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the
right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the
statute of limitations.
Respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present
when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The prosecution did not file any motion
for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or
otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere
provisional dismissal of the cases.
67. VILLAREAL vs. ALIGA | October 7, 2003

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X. ARRAIGNMENT AND RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
68. UY vs. ARSENIO | October 27, 2006

DOCTRINE: The balancing test is used to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated. The
conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to wit: (1) length of the delay;
(2) reason for the delay; (3) defendants assertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting
from the delay. None of these elements, however, is either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and must
be considered together with other relevant circumstances.
FACTS: Herein petitioners Spouses Uy had been engaged in manufacturing, delivering, and selling fake Marca Pia soy
sauce, Orlando S. Bundoc, Intelligence Officer II of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau, applied for a search
warrant for unfair competition which was granted on February 14, 1994. When the search warrant was implemented, the
National Bureau of Investigation in Tarlac, seized fifty-five bottles of label Marca Pina soy sauce.
Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court charging petitioner Sps. Uy with violation of
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code i.e. Unfair Competition .
After preliminary examination of the prosecution witnesses, the court found probable cause to indict petitioners. On
January 30, 1995, the court issued a warrant of arrest against petitioners. They were released after posting a cash bond
on February 1, 1995. On July 10, 1995, petitioners were arraigned, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Petitioners, through counsel, waived the pre-trial conference on October 25, 1995. The initial trial was set on
November 27, 1995.
However, it was only on February 26, 1996 that the first witness of the prosecution, Atty. Estavillo of the NBI, testified. In
the meantime, in October 1996, this Court issued Administrative Order providing, inter alia, that the RTC shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over violations of Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
Despite the administrative order of the Court, the MTC continued with the trial. In the meantime, Articles 188 and 189 of
the Revised Penal Code were amended by R.A. No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code.
On December 12, 1999, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence. In the meantime, on October 22, 1999, Atty.
Joselito Lim had moved to withdraw his appearance as counsel for petitioners; the court had granted the motion, and the
new counsel of petitioners, Balbastro and Associates, had entered its appearance.
The prosecution rested its case.
J.V.CASES.E.L 49
On March 10, 2000, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. The
court granted the motion. Petitioners also contend that under both R.A. No. 166, as amended, and its repealing law, R.A.
No. 8293, the RTC had jurisdiction over the crime charged; hence, the amended complaint should be quashed.
In its Resolution dated May 16, 2000, the court held that there was prima facie evidence which, if unrebutted or not
contradicted, would be sufficient to warrant the conviction of petitioners. However, the court ruled that the RTC was
vested by law with the exclusive and original jurisdiction to try and decide charges for violation of R.A. No. 166 as amended
by R.A. No. 8293. Accordingly, the court denied the demurrer to evidence and ordered the records of the case forwarded
to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
The City Prosecutor forwarded the case records to the Clerk of Court of RTC, Br. 63, Tarlac City. On June 19, 2000, the RTC
ordered the City Prosecutor to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation and to file the necessary Information if he
found probable cause against petitioners.
The City Prosecutor found probable cause and so filed an Information before the RTC for violation of Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information, alleging among others that:
 Their rights to due process and speedy trial had been violated.
 Other than the notice of hearing sent by the court, they never received a subpoena which required them to submit
their evidence during a preliminary investigation.
 Petitioners further averred that certain delays in the trial are permissible, especially when such delays are due to
uncontrollable circumstances or by accident.
 In this case, the inordinate delay was obviously brought by the lackadaisical attitude taken by the prosecutor in
prosecuting the case.
 Petitioners pointed out that there was already a delay of six (6) long years from the time the initial complaint was
filed, and that they had already been prejudiced.
 Their life, liberty and property, not to mention their reputation, have been at risk as there has been no
determination of the issue of whether or not to indict them.
 Thus, the case should be dismissed in order to free them from further capricious and oppressive dilatory tactics
of the prosecution. Indeed, their right to a speedy trial is part of due process, both of which are guaranteed by no
less than the fundamental law itself. They insisted that they should not be made to unjustly await the prosecution
of the charges against them.
The Court denied the MTQ. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied. Petitioners
then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which was also denied. Hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion?
HELD: No. Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the accused is entitled to a
speedy, impartial and public trial. Section 2, Rule 119 of the said Rules provides that trial, once commenced, shall be
continuous until terminated.
However, any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court motu proprio, or on motion of either the
accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the
order that the ends of justice is served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused on
a speedy trial, shall be deducted.
The trial court may grant continuance, taking into account the following factors:
(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would likely make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice; and
(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due to the number of accused or the
nature of the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time
established therein.
In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because of congestion of the courts calendar
or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the prosecutor.
Under the Constitution and Section 1(7) of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused shall be
entitled to have a speedy and impartial trial. Speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In
determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered, in view of
the entirety of the proceedings. Indeed, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the
realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum.
J.V.CASES.E.L 50
More than a decade after the 1972 leading U.S. case of Barker vs. Wingo was promulgated, this Court, in Martin v. Ver,
began adopting the balancing test to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated. As this
test necessarily compels the courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis, the conduct of both the prosecution
and defendant are weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to wit:
A. Length of the delay;
B. Reason for the delay;
C. Defendants assertion or non-assertion of his right; and
D. Prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay.
None of these elements, however, is either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered
together with other relevant circumstances.
A. Length of the Delay – The length of delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay, which is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity to inquire into the other three factors. Nevertheless, due to the imprecision
of the right to a speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the
peculiar circumstances of the case.
B. Reason for the Delay – Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused have the
burden to prove the factual basis of the motion to quash the Information on the ground of denial of their right to a speedy
trial. They must demonstrate that the delay in the proceedings is vexatious, capricious, and oppressive; or is caused by
unjustified postponements that were asked for and secured; or that without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried. On the other hand, the prosecution is required to present evidence
establishing that the delay was reasonably attributed to the ordinary processes of justice, and that petitioners suffered no
serious prejudice beyond that which ensued after an inevitable and ordinary delay.
In this case. Not only the petitioners but the State as well were prejudiced by the inordinate delay in the trial of the case.
C. Petitioners Assertion of the Right – The assertion of the right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight
in determining whether defendant is being deprived thereof. Failure to claim the right will make it difficult to prove that
there was a denial of a speedy trial.
D. Prejudice to the Petitioners – prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interests of a defendant which the speedy
trial right was designed to protect, namely:
(1) To prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration;
(2) To minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
(3) To limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
A perusal of the records failed to reveal that the delay in bringing petitioners to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction
caused them any prejudice tantamount to deprivation of their right to a speedy trial. Petitioners in this case were not
subjected to pretrial incarceration, oppressive or otherwise, thus eliminating the first Barker consideration bearing on
prejudice.
69. PEOPLE vs. ORTILLAS | May 24, 2005

DOCTRINE: The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art.III, §14(2) of the Constitution which provides
that the accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in Rule 115, §1(f) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront and cross-
examine the witness against him.
FACTS: An information was filed against Marlon Ortillas for the crime of murder. On the trial on the merits, the prosecution
presented Russel Guiraldo. However, the only other hearing that took place after the testimony of Guiraldo was on
September 5, 1995 when NBI Medico-Legal Officer Roberto Garcia testified for the prosecution. All in all, the continuation
of the hearing was postponed 13 times when the prosecution finally rested its case with the submission of its documentary
evidence. Witness Guiraldo was never presented for cross-examination. The last time he was subpoenaed was for the
hearing set on November 6, 1995, but records do not show that he appeared on said date. Although several hearings were
scheduled thereafter, Guiraldo was not subpoenaed anymore. The RTC convicted the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC deprived accused of his constitutional right to meet the witness face to face
HELD: Yes. The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or half-truths,
uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate
J.V.CASES.E.L 51
inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance
to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
Due to the numerous postponements, there was no chance to examine Guiraldo. It is only on September 25, 1995 that
Atty. Leopoldo Macinas appeared as new counsel for appellant since Atty. de Leon withdrew from being the council of the
accused. Although it appears in the Minutes of the hearing that the same is for cross-examination of Guiraldo, there is no
showing that he was present during that day. In fact, the Minutes show that Guiraldo had to be notified for the next
hearing set on November 6, 1995.
Thereafter, Guiraldo was never notified of the subsequent hearings. Judge Alumbres’ refusal to give opportunity for Atty.
Teresita Carandang-Pantua of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), the new counsel for appellant, to cross-examine
prosecution witness Guiraldo on the ground that prosecution had already rested its case, is patently a grave abuse of
discretion on his part. Although Atty. Pantua had adequately explained appellant’s predicament, on the first scheduled
date of hearing for the presentation of defense evidence, Judge Alumbres, upon the perfunctory objection of the
prosecution, unreasonably refused to heed Atty. Pantua’s request. Judge Alumbres should have known that the interest
of justice required that appellant should have been given the opportunity to cross-examine Guiraldo, as it was not his fault
that Guiraldo had not been cross-examined.
70. PEOPLE vs. SESBREO | September 9, 1999

-------------------------------------------------------------------Synopsis nalang. Inaantok na ko.-------------------------------------------------
DOCTRINE: The right to speedy trial is not violated when it is accused himself who caused the delay.
Right to be assisted by counsel, not violated when he, as lawyer, chose to defend himself.
SYNOPSIS: Appellant was found by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City guilty of murder for the shooting of one Luciano
Amparado and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His principal defense, which was outright denial, however, the same
was not appreciated by the trial court.
Appellant puts in issue alleged violation of his fundamental rights, including his right to due process of law. However, the
Court found no breach of appellant’s fundamental rights, including his right to due process and to counsel, which would
justify reversal of the assailed decision.
The Court sustained the findings of the trial court as the same was supported by sufficient evidence. Both testimonial and
real evidence presented by the prosecution led the Court to the firm conclusion that the presumption of appellant’s
innocence had been overcome and his guilt established beyond reasonable doubt. However, the crime committed is only
homicide as the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery were not appreciated.
Moreover the right to speedy trial is not violated when it is accused himself who caused the delay. Appellant’s conduct of
his own trial contributed to time-consuming tussles in the lower court, he cannot complain for he is also to blame.
71. PEOPLE vs. AYSON | July 7, 1989

DOCTRINE: The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. The
objective of the Miranda Rights is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."
FACTS: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. The PAL
manager sent him a letter regarding his involvement on the irregularities of the sales of plane tickets, wherein an
investigation is to be made on 09 February 1986. The day before the said investigation, Ramos sent a handwritten note to
his superiors stating that he is willing to settle the said irregularities of approximately P76,000.00.
In the said investigation done by the PAL Baguio Branch Manager, Edgardo Cruz in the presence of Station Agent Antonio
Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Ramos agreed that his answers
be taken down in writing. Two months later, Ramos was charged with estafa allegedly committed from March 12, 1986 to
January 29, 1987 to which Ramos entered a plea of “Not Guilty.”
The private prosecutors raised that the statements of Felipe Ramos taken on the investigation of 09 February 1986,
together with his handwritten note, were confessions to the crime that the latter was being accused of. The trial court
judge dismissed the use of the said evidences since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of his constitutional
rights to remain silent, and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the
assistance actually of a counsel.
J.V.CASES.E.L 52
ISSUE: Whether or not the right against self-incrimination is available in an administrative case?
HELD: Yes. The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is
accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal,
or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating
questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse
to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some
crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to
appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must
obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength
of the constitutional guaranty.
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed
by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly,
or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
ISSUE: Whether or not all statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the
constitutional right in custodial investigation?
HELD: No. In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police
custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be
afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and
until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in

self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the constitutional
protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the
statement is not protected.
ISSUE: Whether or not all statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the
constitutional right in custodial investigation?
HELD: No. In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court,
has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police:
The continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these
rights rejected; and
AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —

 To refuse to be a witness;
 Not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to
him by such refusal;
 To testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution;
 While testifying, to refuse to answer a specific
question which tends to incriminate him for
some crime other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
J.V.CASES.E.L 53
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the
disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the same
juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to
substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the
actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case
before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered
with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the facts that Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation (that which is initiated by
government officers under custody). The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear,
too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation,
February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during
the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him, just as it is obvious that the note that he sent to his superiors
on February 8, 1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was
a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights"
had not been accorded to Ramos.
Respondent judge misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in the Constitution. His Orders
were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should hereby be annulled and set aside.
72. PEOPLE vs. ESTOMACA | April 22, 1996

DOCTRINE: Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the judge himself or
by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein,
then reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The
requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and knows is a mandatory
requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused
by way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of
the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the
necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
FACTS: The accused, an illiterate laborer, was charged guilty of five instances of rape of her daughter. When he was
arraigned, he pleaded guilty to all of the complaints against him. Eventually however, he informed the court that he was
only guilty of two counts of rape, that the other three might have been done by the victim’s boyfriend, and he was merely
blamed for it.
Since he was charged for a heinous crime, the case was elevated to Supreme Court, which found the arraignment process
of the accused to be questionable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arraignment was valid?
HELD: Yes. No. Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the judge himself
or by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated
therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the
charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and known is a
mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords
the accused by way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to
be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able
to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
In the case at hand, the arraignment appears to have consisted merely of the bare reading of the five complaints,
synthetically and cryptically reported in the transcript. Moreover, the court found out that the complaint or information
was not read to the accused in the language known to him, as his local dialect was kinaray-a and the lower court conducted
the arraignment in Ilonggo.
The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching
inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the
appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant’s full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The records
do not reveal any information about the personality profile of the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his
J.V.CASES.E.L 54
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the
appellant were not plumbed by the trial court.
73. DAAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN | March 28, 2008

DOCTRINE: Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of
the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference, but it may also
be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case.
FACTS: Joselito Daan and Benedicto Kuizon falsified the time book and payrolls making it appear that some laborers
worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries
thereon. They were charged with three counts of malversation of public funds. They were also charged with three counts
of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee. In the falsification cases, the accused offered to
withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty," provided, mitigating circumstances will
be appreciated. In the alternative, they are changing the plea to guilty but the crime of falsification by a private individual
instead of by a public officer. In the malversation cases, they are changing their plea to guilty to the lesser crime of failure
of an accountable officer to render accounts. The Sandiganbayan denied their plea bargaining offer.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abused of discretion?
HELD: Yes. It is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the
prosecution already presented several witnesses. The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that
petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public. The
Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against
them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they are likely to face would be
lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their
criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the
laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government."
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent
events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case
calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction. Equity seeks to reach complete justice where courts of
law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of
cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance
rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts and of its power of control and supervision
over the proceedings of lower courts, in order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
74. GELACIO vs. FLORES | June 20, 2000

DOCTRINE: A judge cannot grant a petition for bail without a trial. The procedural necessity of a hearing relative to the
grant of bail cannot be dispensed with especially in this case where the accused is charged with a capital offense. Utmost
diligence is required of trial judges in granting bail especially in cases where bail is not a matter of right.
FACTS: Herein petitioner Juana Marzan-Gelacio filed two counts of rape against Emmanuel Artajos before RTC, Branch 20,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein the respondent Judge Alipio Flores is the presider of the sala. After going over the records of
the case and the recommendation of the 1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Redentor Cardenas, the Judge concluded that
the evidence of guilt was weak but made a finding of probable cause.
Consequently he issued warrants of arrest with a recommendation of P200,000.00 bail bond in both cases. Gelacio through
her private prosecutor filed an urgent motion to deny bail. On a later date, the accused’s counsel filed a petition to reduce
bail bond to P100,000.00 for each case. After a series of exchange motions by the counsels of Gelacio and Artajos, and the
Judge’s recalls of his previous orders, the Judge ordered the grant of the Motion to reduce bail by the accused. Gelacio
through her counsel filed an Administrative Complaint against the Judge for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Evident
Partiality for granting the bail without any hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Judge can grant an accused’s petition for bail without a hearing?
HELD: No. A judge cannot grant a petition for bail without a trial. The procedural necessity of a hearing relative to the
grant of bail cannot be dispensed with especially in this case where the accused is charged with a capital offense. Utmost
diligence is required of trial judges in granting bail especially in cases where bail is not a matter of right. Certain procedures
must be followed in order that the accused would be present during trial. As a responsible judge, respondent must not be
swayed by the mere representations of the parties; instead, he should look into the real and hard facts of the case.
J.V.CASES.E.L 55
To do away with the requisite bail hearing especially in those cases where the applicant is charged with a capital offense
“is to dispense with this time-tested safeguard against arbitrariness.” It must always be remembered that imperative
justice requires the proper observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure it proper dispensation.
In this regard, it needs be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in capital offenses hinges on the issue of whether or
not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge.
75. CHAVEZ vs. CA | 24 SCRA 71

DOCTRINE: A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost “in the course of the proceedings” due to failure to
complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain
Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake.
FACTS: An information was filed against the herein petitioners accused for qualified theft of a motor vehicle belonging to
a Dy Lim. All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the prosecution asked roger Chavez to be the first witness.
Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal contends that the accused will only be an ordinary witness not a state witness.
Counsel of accused answered that it will only incriminate his client. But the Judge ruled in favor of the fiscal. Petitioner
was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitutional right of Chavez against self-incrimination had been violated?
HELD: Yes. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent.
It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did
not offer himself as a witness; Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky
defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the
privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection – even to the guilty.
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose
liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused‘s constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the
absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose
fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely
is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by
the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse
to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of
habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at
stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this
wise.
A court‘s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost ―in the course of the proceedings due to failure to complete
the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel,
who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of
the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned there under may obtain release of habeas corpus.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of
disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly
provided by law, ―to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
76. PEOPLE vs. DERILO | April 18, 1997

DOCTRINE: Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat i.e A law should be interpreted with a view to
upholding rather than destroying it.
FACTS: Petitioners Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doños, Alejandro Cofuentes and one John Doe were
charged with the so-called crime of murder. Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was
apprehended and brought within the trial court's jurisdiction. At his arraignment on March 18, 1985, and after the
information was translated in the Waray dialect with which he is well versed, appellant pleaded not guilty. However, by
the time the People had formally finished presenting its evidence on August 6, 1986, appellant, through his counsel de
parte, manifested to the court a quo that he wanted to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and substitute the same
with one of guilty. Consequently, a re-arraignment was ordered by the lower court and, this time, appellant entered a plea
of guilty to the charge of murder. Appellant does not deny his participation in the commission of the crime. Rather, in his
J.V.CASES.E.L 56
brief pitifully consisting of two pages, he merely asks for the modification of the death penalty imposed by the lower court
to life imprisonment.
Responding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being committed in the country, Congress passed a law imposing
the death penalty on certain heinous offenses and further amending for that purpose the Revised Penal Code and other
special penal laws. Said law was officially enacted as Republic Act No. 7659 and took effect on December 31, 1993. This is
now the governing penal law at the time of this review of the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty imposed to the appellant is reclusion perpetua to death as imposed by Sec. 6 of RA
7659?
HELD: No. Reclusion Perpetua to death cannot be imposed. At the time of the commission of the crime on Jan 1, 1982 and
the conviction of the accused on Oct 12, 1986, the substantive law in force dealing with the crime of murder was Art 248
of the RPC which took affect on Jan 1, 1932. Imposable penalty is RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its maximum period to death.
Feb. 2, 1987, the 1987 Constitution was ratified. It now provides the bill of rights specifically sec 19 (1) of Art III which was
inexistent in the two previous constitutions. It provides for the reduction of penalty particularly death penalty to reclusion
perpetua. RA 7659, on the other hand took effect on Dec. 31, 1993. Congress passed this law imposing the DEATH PENALTY
on certain heinous crimes.
This provision is the governing penal law at the time of the review of the case at bar. In effect, it amended art 248 of the
RPC which is the crime committed by the appellant by imposing a heavier penalty for murder than that originally
prescribed making it reclusion perpetua to death. No retroactivity of the law because the nature of our penal laws are
PROSPECTIVE unless favorable to the accused.
Being a penal law, such provision of RA 7659 may not be applied to the crime of murder committed in 1982 by appellant,
based on the principle of prospectivity of penal laws. It would also violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto law. From the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission, it can be seen that the reduction of the penalty is not
and was not made dependent on a law, decree, condition, or period before sec 19 of Art III can be applied by the courts.
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the
constitutional provisions themselves. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted
with a view to upholding rather than destroying it.
The fact, that no proclamation or grant of commutation was officially issued by the president will not prevent the
implementation and operation of sec 19 to appellant. It is apparent in the wording of the provision it used the word
“reduced” – “shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua” instead avoided the use of “commuted” as it is technically an
executive prerogative. The language of the constitution must be understood in the sense that it may have in common use.
Its word should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. From the foregoing, it is
apparent that NO presidential action is necessary in order that any accused sentenced to the death penalty under the
same circumstances as herein appellant may avail of the benefit of Sec. 19. While “commute” necessitates presidential
initiative, “to reduce” doe not.
XI. PRE-TRIAL
77. TIU vs. MIDDLETON | July 19, 1999

DOCTRINE: Pre-trial is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties cannot brush it aside as a
mere technicality. Where the pre-trial brief does not contain the names of witnesses and the synopses of their testimonies
as required by the Rules of Court, the trial court, through its pre-trial order, may bar the witnesses from testifying. However,
an order allowing the presentation of unnamed witnesses may no longer be modified during the trial, without the consent
of the parties affected.
FACTS: The Middletons filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property, accounting and damages against Tiu
before the RTC of Oroquieta City. Before the commencement of the trial, the court a quo sent a notice of Pre-trial
Conference stating in part: The parties are warned that witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the
pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial x x x. In his Pre-Trial Brief, Tiu averred that he would be presenting six
witnesses, but he did not name them.
In his Pre-trial Order, however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted or unnamed witnesses.
Rather, it simply provided that the defendant (Tiu) will present six witnesses. It made no mention at all that they would
be barred from testifying unless they were named. Significantly, it also stated that plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses,
without however naming them.
J.V.CASES.E.L 57
Trial ensued, and the Middletons presented their witnesses in due course. When his turn came, Tiu called a certain Antonia
as his first witness. Citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the Middletons objected, arguing that the witness
could not be allowed to testify because Tiu had failed to name her in his pre-trial brief. Sustaining the Middletons, the
lower court then issued the assailed orders. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge can exclude a witness whose name and synopsis of testimony were not included in the
pre-trial?
HELD: Yes. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. It is essential in the simplification
and the speedy disposition of disputes. In light of the objectives of a pre-trial and the role of the trial court therein, it is
evident that judges have the discretion to exclude witnesses and other pieces of evidence not listed in the pre-trial brief,
provided the parties are given prior notice to this effect.
In his Pre-trial Order, however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted or unnamed witnesses.
Rather, it simply provided that the defendant will present six witnesses. It made no mention at all that they would be
barred from testifying unless they were named. Significantly, it also stated that plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses, without
however naming them. Since the Order allowed respondents (as plaintiffs before the trial court) to present witnesses, it
necessarily follows that it should grant the same right to petitioner.
Indeed, the court and the parties must pay attention not only to the pre-trial briefs, but also to the pre-trial order. Section
7 of the same Rule states:
SEC. 7. Record of pre-trial. -- The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court
shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents
of the order shall control the subsequent course of action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice.
Hence, the provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six witnesses shall control the subsequent course
of action. The court a quo proceeded with the trial without modifying the Order. In the same vein, respondents did not
challenge it before the trial.
Neither did they invoke the power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and
summaries of their testimonies. By their silence, respondents acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation
of petitioner's unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or, worse, when the defendant is about to
present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules.
XI. TRIAL *CASES MAY BE GIVEN IN CLASS*
XII. JUDGMENT
78. CONSULTA vs. PEOPLE | February 12, 2009

DOCTRINE: When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
FACTS: Herein petitioner, Consulta is charged for stealing a gold necklace worth 3.5k owned by a certain Silvestre. He was
convicted by the lower court. Consulta raised before the CA the issue that his right to due process was violated and that
he is not guilty of Robbery.
ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was denied of due process.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Consulta’s claim of being misrepresented cannot be given due course. He was assisted by two
lawyers during the proceeding. In the earlier part, he was assisted by one Atty. Jocelyn Reyes who seemed not to be a
lawyer. Granting that she indeed is not a lawyer, her withdrawal from the case in the earlier part of the case has cured the
defect as he was subsequently assisted by a lawyer coming from the PAO.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of Robbery?
HELD: No. The elements of robbery are thus: 1) there is a taking of personal property; 2) the personal property belongs to
another; 3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and 4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with
force upon things.
J.V.CASES.E.L 58
Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. It may
be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator.
The Court finds that under the above-mentioned circumstances surrounding the incidental encounter of the parties, the
taking of Nelia’s necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain on appellant’s part. That intent to gain on appellant’s
part is difficult to appreciate gains light given his undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-feelings,
manifested by, among other things, the filing of complaints against him by Nelia and her family which were subsequently
dismissed or ended in his acquittal.
Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant, robbery does not lie against him. He is not necessarily scot-free, however.
From the pre-existing sour relations between Nelia and her family on one hand, and appellant and family on the other,
and under the circumstances related above attendant to the incidental encounter of the parties, appellant’s taking of
Nelia’s necklace could not have been animated with animus lucrandi. Appellant is, however, just the same, criminally
liable.
For "When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved."
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)
Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for one of its elements. Thus Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Art. 286. Grave coercions. – The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding six thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent
another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right
or wrong.
If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage or for the purpose of compelling another
to perform any religious act or to prevent him from exercising such right or from doing such act, the penalty next higher
in degree shall be imposed."
The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act. The motives of the accused
are the prime criterion:
"The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to
be the intention of the accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of another by use of force or
intimidation then, conviction for robbery. Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner
or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his will and to seize property, then, conviction for coercion
under Article 497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion. And there was no common robber
in the present case, but a man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own hands
and attempting to collect what he thought was due him. Animus furandi was lacking."
Appellant is thus guilty of Grave Coercion not Robbery.
79. VILLENA vs. PEOPLE | January 31, 2011

DOCTRINE: While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of appeal and that the trial court
thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this principle presupposes that the party filing the notice of appeal could validly
avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost standing in court.
The accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available
under the Rules of Court against the judgment.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.
J.V.CASES.E.L 59
FACTS: Petitioners were charged and found guilty of robbery-extortion by the RTC. During promulgation of their judgment
(September 3, 2007), they failed to appear despite proper notices. Warrants of arrest were issued against them pursuant
to Rule 120, Sec 6, Pars. 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court.
It was only in October 11, 2007, that petitioners separately filed their notices of appeal with the RTC, saying that they did
not receive the notices as they were transferred to another police station. The RTC found their reason unmeritorious as
they should have notified their court of their new addresses especially that they were the accused. Having to surrender is
their only option for appeal.
Petitioners argue that their notices of appeal have complied with the Rules of Court and have placed them under RTC's
jurisdiction and that the CA should have considered their motion for reconsideration as they have offered their explanation
for their absence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit?
HELD: No. The SC explained that to perfect an appeal, one should not have lost their standing in the court. As petitioner,
failed to appear during their promulgation of their judgment, they have lost standing thus waiving their right to appeal.
Their excuse was still not found convincing as they did not even prove their cause showing at least some documentary
evidence. Their mere filing of notices was not act of surrender as it should mean that they voluntarily and physically submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.
Moreover, there has been finality in their judgment as they only had 15 days to file the said of notice appeal. They file
their notice on October 11 while the filing was only until September 18.
80. PASCUA vs. CA | December 14, 2000

DOCTRINE: The accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against
the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies
within 15 days from notice.
In a criminal case, promulgation of the decision cannot take place until after the clerk receives it and enters it into the
criminal docket.
Under the third paragraph of the former and present Section 6, any accused, regardless of the gravity of the offense
charged against him must be given notice of the promulgation of judgment and the requirement of his presence; If the
accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, notice of promulgation shall be served at
his last known address.
Where there is no promulgation of the judgment the right to appeal does not accrue.
Essential elements for the validity of promulgation of judgment in absentia.— The only essential elements for its validity
are:
(a) That the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket; and
(b) That a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel.
Petitioner’s later receipt of the copy of the decision does not in any way cure an invalid promulgation.
FACTS: Petitioner was charged under 26 Informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The Informations alleged
that in 1989, petitioner issued 26 Philippine National Bank (PNB) checks to apply on account or for value in favor of Lucita
Lopez with the knowledge that at the time of issue, petitioner did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the face value of the checks in full. Upon presentment of the subject checks, they were dishonored
by the drawee bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account.
After trial, a judgment of conviction was rendered against petitioners. The judgment was initially scheduled for
promulgation on March 31, 1998. However, considering that the presiding judge was on leave, the promulgation was reset
to May 5, 1998.
When the case was called for the promulgation of judgment, petitioner intimated that would be late. After the lapse of
two hours, petitioner still had not appeared. The trial court again asked the public prosecutor and the defense counsel if
they were ready for the promulgation of judgment. Both responded in the affirmative and so promulgation was made.
J.V.CASES.E.L 60
No motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed by petitioner within 15 days from May 5, 1998. On June 8,
1998, a notice of change of address was filed by petitioner with the trial court. On the same date, without terminating the
services of her counsel of record, Atty. Marcelino Arias, the one who received the copy of the judgment of conviction,
petitioner, assisted by another counsel, Atty. Rolando Bernardo, filed an urgent omnibus motion to lift warrant of arrest
and confiscation of bail bond, as well as to set anew the promulgation of the subject decision on the following allegations:
that petitioner failed to appear before the trial court on the scheduled date of promulgation (May 5, 1998) because she
failed to get the notices sent to her former address at No. 21 La Felonila St., Quezon City.
On June 22, 1998, petitioner filed a notice of appeal, however, the same was denied however, the same was denied for
the decision appealed from had already attained finality. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals which at first dismissed the same but upon reconsideration granted the
petition.
After an exchange of pleadings, on June 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the decision assailed herein. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid promulgation of judgment as set forth in Sec. 6 of Rule 120?
HELD: No. The essential elements for the validity of promulgation of judgment in absentia.— The only essential elements
for its validity are:
a) That the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket; and
b) That a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel.
It is presumed that official duties are regularly performed and that the proceedings are made of record. This serves as a
substantial compliance with the procedural requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the
court. At any rate, petitioner does not question non-compliance of the requirement of the recording of the judgment in
the criminal docket.
Petitioner has presented evidence sufficient to controvert the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty
as regards the procedural requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the court by submitting
as evidence a notice to the court that they have not received a copy of the promulgation. The Court cannot presume
substantial compliance with the requirement of recording a judgment in the criminal docket. And in the absence of such
compliance, there can be no valid promulgation. Without the same, the February 17, 1998 decision could not attain finality
and become executory. This means that the 15-day period within which to interpose an appeal did not even commence.
81. JAYLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN | January 21, 2015

DOCTRINE: Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may be pronounced in the presence
of the counsel for the accused or the latter’s representative, the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment; The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket
and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known address or through counsel.
When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of
filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).
FACTS: In a Decision dated 17 April 2007, the Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, and Habalo guilty of
homicide. During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan’s judgment on 17 April 2007, none of the accused appeared
despite notice. The court promulgated the Decision in absentia, and the judgment was entered in the criminal docket. The
bail bonds of the accused were cancelled, and warrants for their arrest issued. The court ruled that the 15-day period from
the promulgation of the judgment had long lapsed without any of the accused giving any justifiable cause for their absence
during the promulgation. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, however the same was ignored.
Petitioners assail the decision of the Sandiganbayan. According to petitioners, the right to file a motion for reconsideration
is a statutory grant, and not merely a remedy "available in the Rules," as provided under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, it is available at all times and the Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court cannot operate to diminish or
modify the right of a convicted accused to file a motion for reconsideration.
Thus, according to them, their absence at the promulgation of judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed to
have resulted in the loss of their right to file a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred?
J.V.CASES.E.L 61
HELD: No. Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may be pronounced in the presence
of the counsel for the accused or the latter’s representative, the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date
of promulgation of judgment; The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known address or through counsel.
When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies
of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).
The reason is simple. When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction,
they are considered to have lost their standing in court. Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its
jurisdiction to seek relief.
82. SEVILLA vs. PEOPLE | August 13, 2014

DOCTRINE: In case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense proved
when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.
FACTS: Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public document,
penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC, after he stated in his C.S. Form 212 or Personal Data Sheet, both official
documents which were submitted to the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City Council, that he “had no criminal case
pending against him”, when in fact, he knew fully well that he is an accused in a pending criminal case entitled People vs
Sevilla for the crime of assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the “no” answer vis-à-vis the
question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, he averred that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He
claimed that it was a member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS. He instructed Mendoza to copy the entries in
the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by
Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed
to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box
corresponding to the “no” answer.
Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC
since he did not act with malicious intent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s
PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla
of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC. Sevilla claims that his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the
Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information
only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the constitutional right to be informed?
HELD: No. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily
included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only
charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.
Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of public
document is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its medium period. In this case,
taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed upon
Sevilla the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prisión correccional as maximum.
Sevilla’s appeal is anchored mainly on the variance between the offense charged in the Information that was filed against
him and that proved by the prosecution.
The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
viz.:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.— When there is variance between the offense charged
in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
J.V.CASES.E.L 62
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense proved
when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.
83. RICALDE vs. PEOPLE | January 21, 2015

DOCTRINE: Variance doctrine is provided under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance between the offense charged
SEC 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.— An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
former continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
FACTS: On January 30, 2002, at around 2:00 a.m., XXX, then 10 years old, woke up as “he felt pain in his anus and stomach
and something inserted in his anus.” He saw that Ricalde, 31 years old, a distant relative and textmate of XXX, “fondled
his penis.” When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told
his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.
Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the court should have applied the “variance doctrine” in
People v. Sumingwa, and the court would have found him guilty for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
RTC found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault. CA affirmed the conviction but lowered
the amount of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Whether or not the invocation of “Variance doctrine” is proper?
HELD: No. Variance doctrine is provided under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. It states:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance between the offense charged
SEC 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.— An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
former continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during trial. The prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.
OTHER ISSUES:
ISSUE: Whether or not XXX’s failure to categorically state that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw
a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice fatal?
HELD: No. The Court held that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the
court to find that rape through sexual assault was committed. In People v. Soria, the Court ruled that “We find it
inconsequential that “AAA” could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object that was inserted into her
genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require “AAA” to
identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due
process.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Whether or not the absence of trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa
disproves penile or object penetration?
J.V.CASES.E.L 63
HELD: No. Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of
spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection
and penetration. This result does not contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible,
natural, and consistent with human nature.
The Court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the possibility of convictions for rape
based on the victim’s credible lone testimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not the slightest penetration into one’s anus constitutes rape through sexual assault?
HELD: Yes. XXX testified that he “felt something was inserted into his anus.” The slightest penetration into one’s sexual
organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape.
Long line of cases consider a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing jurisprudence on rape involves a woman
victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration
to the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is not important. Rape is an
“assault on human dignity.”
84. JAVIER vs. GONZALES | January 23, 2017

DOCTRINE: Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to promulgate a judgment in
absentia and gives the accused the opportunity to file an appeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice to the
latter or the latter’s counsel; otherwise, the decision becomes final.
If the accused has been notified of the date of promulgation, but does not appear, the promulgation of judgment in
absentia is warranted. This rule is intended to obviate a repetition of the situation in the past when the judicial process
could be subverted by the accused by jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment.
FACTS: The A criminal case was filed against Pepito Gonzales and was charged of Murder with Frustrated Murder and
Multiple Attempted Murder. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Baler, Aurora.
That on December 25, 1997, at around 11:30 in the evening, Pepito Gonzales with intent to kill with treachery and evident
premeditation throw a grenade inside the house of Leonardo Hermenigildo which resulted to the death of Rufino
Concepcion. Hermenigildo sustained fatal wounds which the latter also died. As a consequence of the explosives, three
more persons, Julius Toledo, Ariel Cabusal and Jesus Macatiag sustained not necessary mortal wounds.
Accused filed a Motion for bail. An opposition to the Motion for Bail was filed by Carmen Macatiag, sister of the victim
Rufino Concepcion. Gonzales filed a comment on the said Motion and a reply was likewise filed. Gonzales granted to post
bail and a Motion for Reconsideration on the grant of bail was filed by Macatiag and was denied. Macatiag filed again an
Urgent Motion for transfer venue. Motion to Suspend hearing was filed by Macatiag pending the resolution of the Urgent
Motion to transfer venue. The Motion to transfer venue was granted and the case was re assigned to RTC, Palayunan City.
Trial on the merits proceeded and the Court admitted the prosecution's evidences. The accused filed a Motion for Leave
of Court for Demurrer to Evidence and the Demurrer was attached to the Motion and subsequently was denied.
The promulgation of decision was set on December 15, 2005 and notice was received by the sister of the accused Gonzales
but refused to sign the Return.
On the day of promulgation, the accused failed to appear but his counsel filed a Withdrawal as counsel with the conformity
of the accused. The promulgation was reset to December 22, 2005. The decision was promulgated in absentia when the
accused again failed to appear and counsel de officio was appointed to assist him. The accused was convicted of the
charges against him and was sentenced to a death penalty. Issuance for the arrest was ordered for his non appearance
and forfeiture of his bail bond was ordered. The decision was entered in the docket book of the Court. Judge Buted ordered
the immediate transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals for automatic review. In less than a month, the accused
filed an omnibus Motion thru counsel to reconsider the promulgated decision be reconsidered and set aside. Judge
Soluren, new Judge gave due course on the Motion filed by the accused granting the said Motion and reinstated his bail.
Gonzales was acquitted from all the charges against him.
A petition for certiorari was filed by Carmen Macatiag against Judge Soluren to the Court of Appeals. Court of appeals
dismissed the said Petition.
J.V.CASES.E.L 64
ISSUE: Whether or not the first promulgation of judgment was valid and whether a special civil action is the proper
remedy to question the acquittal of the private respondent.
HELD: The promulgation of the decision rendered by Judge Buted was ruled to be valid. The accused and the offended
parties were properly notified of the scheduled promulgation. Under Sec. 6, par 5, Rule 120, Rules on criminal procedure,
Judgment is for conviction and he failure of the accused to appear was without a justifiable cause shall lose the remedies
available in these rules against the judgment and the Court shall order for his arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred Affirming the Decision of Judge Soluren setting aside the first decision
of the Trial Court and in dismissing the petition filed by heir of the offended party.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Petition for certiorari filed by Macatiag was with merit considering that she
has sufficient interest and personality to file said Petition, under Rule 1 and 2, Rule, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Judge
Soluren as an officer acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
The filing of a motion for reconsideration to question a decision of conviction can only be resorted to if the accused did not
jump bail, but appeared in court to face the promulgation of judgment.
An acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really ‘acquit’ and
therefore does not terminate the case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment.
View that the rule on double jeopardy espouses that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated
either by acquittal, conviction or any other manner without the consent of the accused, he cannot be charged again with
the same or identical offense.
For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (i) the information against the accused must have
been valid, sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (ii) the information must have
been filed with, and judgment rendered by, a court of competent jurisdiction, (iii) the accused must have been arraigned
and had pleaded, and (iv) the accused must have been convicted or acquitted, or the case must have been dismissed
without his express consent.
J.V.CASES.E.L 65

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2018 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1. PEOPLE vs. REGALARIO

2. MIRANDA vs. TULIAO| March 31, 2006

ISSUE: Whether or not should bail be granted by the Court of Appeals?

5. LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

6. PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN | September 15, 2010

II. WARRANTLESS ARREST

7. PEOPLE vs. PALIZA

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid?

8. PESTILOS vs. GENEROSO

9. PEOPLE vs. VILLAREAL

10. PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ

11. PEOPLE vs. MOLINA

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest?

12. PEOPLE vs.MENGOTE | G.R. No. 87059 | June 22, 1992

ISSUE: Whether or not Mengote’s warrantless arrest was valid?

13. PEOPLE vs. TANGLIBEN |G.R. NO. L-63630 | April 6, 1990

14. PEOPLE vs. MALMSTEDT

15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN

16. PEOPLE vs. SALCEDO

III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE

17. PEOPLE vs. COGAED| July 30, 2014

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure?

18. PEOPLE vs. MARIACOS| June 16, 2010

ISSUE: Whether or not the search was lawful?

19. MICLAT vs. PEOPLE | August 31, 2011

20. ROAN vs. GONZALES | 1986

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid?

21. SPS. MARIMLA vs. PEOPLE (2009)

22. People vs. CA (2000)

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an illegal search?

23. PEOPLE vs. BOLASA | 1999

24. PEOPLE vs. MONTILLA | 1988

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal?

IV. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation?

29. DUTERTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (APRIL 27, 1998)

31. WEBB vs. DE LEON

32. HO vs. PEOPLE | NARCISO vs. PEOPLE | October 9, 1997

ISSUE: Whether or not should the warrant of arrest be void?

33. LEVISTE vs. ALAMEDA; GR NO. 182677 | August 3, 2010

ISSUE: Whether or not a reinvestigation of the criminal case should be allowed?

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a substantial amendment to the information?

34. MENDOZA v. PEOPLE |G.R. No. 197293 | April 21, 2014

V. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION

35. CRESPO vs. MOGUL | 151 SCRA 462

36. VILLAREAL vs. ALIGA | January 13, 2014

ISSUE: Whether or not Villareal may assail the judgment of acquittal?

37. RICARZE vs. CA | February 9, 2007

38. PEOPLE vs. AQUINO | August 6, 2002

39. ZAPANTA vs. PEOPLE | March 20, 2013

40. AGUSTIN vs. PAMINTUAN | August 22, 2005

41. PACOY vs. CAJIGAL | September 28, 2007

ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint or information may be amended after arraignment?

ISSUE: Whether or not there is double jeopardy?

42. PEOPLE vs. CATUBIG | August 23, 2001

43. BALTAZAR vs. CHUA | February 27, 2009

VI. RULE 111

44. CASUPANAN vs. LAROYA | August 26, 2002

This is only fair for two reasons.

45. RIMANDO vs. PEOPLE | October 13, 2014

46. DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION vs. JANIOLA | June 30, 2009

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a prejudicial question?

XI. TRIAL CASES MAY BE GIVEN IN CLASS