GOD AS IPSUM INTELLIGERE SUBSISTENS IN AQUINAS’ DE POTENTIA

ANDREW M. HAINES

In Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei,1 Thomas Aquinas articulates a theory of creation that

is much indebted to a familiarity with the Neoplatonic doctrine of participation, as well as his

own original analysis of ens as having both active and passive senses.2 Here, Thomas argues that

all finite entia are necessarily creata by inferring that—insofar as they are called “beings”—they

share a common principle that is beyond any individual, limited essence; this principle is their

common cause. Furthermore, he argues that God alone can be the first cause of such being, and

he gives two senses of the word creatio with regard to the relation between the divine cause and

its finite effects.

The line of reasoning implemented throughout De potentia in favor of God’s creative

power is especially interesting for two reasons: first, it provides a unique window into the

relationship between existence and intelligibility in Thomas’s particular brand of realism;

second, it affords a singular vantage point for examining the Doctor’s reconciliation of the

ontological primacy of thought (viz., what in Neoplatonism is the conflux of Being and Nous3)

1
Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, In Quaestiones disputatae, Vol. 2, ed. P. M. Pession
(Marietti, 1965), 1-276. (All translations of this and other Thomistic texts, unless otherwise noted, are my own.)
2
The tension between a participation metaphysics and an actus-based ontology is evident throughout the Thomistic
corpus, and especially in the later works. Wayne Hankey captures the character of this interplay well—and of the
broader implications for an intermittent Neoplatonism in Aquinas—when he writes: “Aristotle uses against Plato
criticisms already found in the later dialogues of his teacher. He thus anticipates Aquinas’ use of one aspect of the
Platonic tradition against another.” (Hankey, “Aquinas and the Platonists,” In The Platonic Tradition in the Middle
Ages: A Doxographic Approach, ed. Stephen Gersh and Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, with the assistance of Pieter Th.
van Wingerden (Berlin—New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), 8.)
3
For Plotinus, at least, the beginning of an ontology, properly speaking, occurs at the level of Intellect or Nous.
There is, of course, at the beginning of the cosmological emanation the One; but this is a sort of superens that, by
with the causal dynamism of an Aristotelian actus purus.4 As such, the teaching of De potentia

permits an unusual glimpse of the correlation, in Thomas’s broader metaphysical worldview,

between the individual actus essendi of finite, created beings and the vital, dialectical nature of a

Creator who is both necessarily simple as well as w{ste taujto;n nou:V kai nohto;n.5

In light of these considerations, the purpose of this essay is twofold: first, I aim to explore

and to draw out some of the implications of Thomas’s unique approach to God as cause in De

potentia; second, I wish to show that these implications align naturally with—and are even the

fruit of—Thomas’ broader project of resolving certain Aristotelian and Platonic principles of

being. As such, the paper is divided into three parts: Part I consists in highlighting briefly the

significance of act and intelligibility in the created actus essendi as it is specifically presented in

the argument model outlined above. In Part II, I attempt to demonstrate the plausibility and

importance of positively naming the creator God of this work as ipsum intelligere subsistens.

Part III constitutes an analysis of my preliminary arguments in II, and introduces a broader

conclusion surrounding the active Platonism in Aquinas’s doctrine of creation. In short, the

position I aim to defend is that the degree to which God produces creatures a seipso diversas,

virtue of its essential determinism, remains outside the realm of being. (Cf. Étienne Gilson, God and Philosophy
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002), 49-50.)
John Dillon and Lloyd Gerson identify the balance between cognition-based reality and necessary
simplicity when they write: “[T]he intelligible world itself is a hierarchy, ordered according to the idea that the
simpler is prior to the more complex. What this means above all is that there must be an absolutely first principle of
all, and it must be absolutely simple.” (Neoplatonic Philosophy: Introductory Readings (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 2004): xx.)
4
For a compendious rendition of Aquinas’s distinctly mediaeval approach to this resolution, I turn again to
Professor Hankey, who writes: “Being is act, and, as perfect act, it is also simple. As perfect simplicity, it is also
good, and, as good, infinitely self-diffusive. As diffusive good, the divine unity must be inclusive as well as a
transcending negation. As a perfect return upon itself into unity, it is thinking. Thought’s inherent desire for itself as
object implies that the divine is the good to itself as will. Because the activities of thinking and willing are purely
internal, they are self-relations. But relations existent in the simple must be subsistences, and so the trinitarian
differences, the Persons, appear. Thus, in its medieval Neoplatonic context, Aristotle’s purus actus is an entelecheia
both self-differentiating and complete within the undifferentiated unity of essence.”
5
I have used the Greek phrasing here, following an Aristotelian formulation, since it captures something
indispensible to the character of God as internally cognizant—as incorporating both subject and object and, in fact,
their very unity. (Cf. Hankey, “Aquinas’ First Principle: Being or Unity?” Dionysius 4 (1980): 143.)

1
aliqualiter tamen sibi assimilatas (“diverse from himself, but somewhat like himself”) can be

understood as referring either to some principle of act or to a coextensive principle of

intelligibility in finite beings;6 insofar as the Creator is the exemplar of both, he can be named

according to both.

I.

Act & Intelligibility in Created Being. It is important to realize that Aquinas does not always

argue for the participation of finite beings in an unparticipated Source from the “top down.”7

Moreover, when he begins such a proof by engaging with the reality of created beings, he

proceeds alternatively between arguing from a participated character to the real distinction of

essence and existence, and vice versa.8 Thus, it should come as no surprise that in De potentia—

as in a good many other of Aquinas’s later works—an assertion of God’s proper nature (known

descriptively and not in quid, of course) might be inferred as the result of a prior investigation

into the meaning of limited existence per se. In sum, what enables Thomas to move so fluidly

from the created actus essendi toward a notion of God as substantially namable is the primacy he

affords to esse even as it is encountered in creation. In De potentia, q. 7, a. 2, he writes: “Esse is

the highest perfection of all; and this is proven since act is always more perfect than

potentiality.”9 Accordingly, an encounter with esse at the level of finite ens reale (i.e., active

existence occurring in such-and-such a manner) serves well as an entrée into a discussion of the

character of esse in se—i.e., ipsum esse subsistens.10

6
Cf. De pot., q. 7, a. 8.: “Et ideo ad summam Dei simplicitatem consequitur quod infinitae habitudines sive
relationes existant inter creaturas et ipsum, secundum quod ipse creaturas producit a seipso diversas, aliqualiter
tamen sibi assimilatas.”
7
Cf. John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, In Studies in Philosophy and the History of
Philosophy, Vol. 10 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984): 150.
8
Ibid., 162.
9
“Esse est inter omnia perfectissimum; quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio potentia.”
10
For a lengthier discussion on the mechanics of this move, see De potentia, q. 1, a. 1.

2
 To pursue this claim, understanding the constitution, as it were, of the created actus

essendi is a critical step. For Thomas, the term denotes a participated principle since, as he says

in the Commentary on De Hebdomadibus, a being (ens) is said to exist insofar as it participates

in the act of existence.11 Thus, actus essendi signifies something that belongs to a particular ens

only in a partial sense—i.e., inasmuch as esse, which is itself not proper to any finite being,

actualizes a proper essence.12 In this way, there is contained in the concept of actus essendi a

subjection of ens to esse, which entails a necessary correspondence between actuality and

intelligibility. In other words, precisely because ens is at bottom both real and knowable, one

might rightly regard the character of an act of existence either from the standpoint of the

dynamism of act or the dialectic of truth.13

What is clear even from this cursory analysis is that, for Aquinas, the first causal

principle of all finite beings must be something that can account for both the intensity of act as

well as the “extrinsic reference” of essential definition.14 Here, the discussion of creation from

De potentia sheds light. In taking up a defense of the necessity of creation from the standpoint of

metaphysical participation, Thomas addresses the conjoined notions that: i) the activity and

11
Cf. Lect 2: “Ita possumus dicere quod ens . . . sit inquantum participat actum essendi” (Expositio libri Boetii de
ebdomadibus, In Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia, Vol. 50 (Rome: Leonine edition, 1882–).); also cf.
Wippel, Metaphysical Themes, 151.
12
This is not to say, of course, that two beings can share the same act of existence; only that the act of existence of a
single created being is not something possessed by that being in virtue of what it is—i.e., by its very definition. (Cf.
De Hebd., lect. 2, n. 32: “Ipsum esse neque participat aliquid, ut eius ratio constituatur ex multis; neque habet
aliquid extraneum admixtum, ut sit in eo compositio accidentis; et ideo ipsum esse non est compositum. Res ergo
composita non est suum esse.”)
13
Cornelio Fabro spends considerable time developing an approach to Thomas’ actus essendi that juxtaposes both
the existential and intelligible forces at play in such a doctrine. A few of Fabro’s remarks cast light on what I mean,
here, by considering the act of existence as both dynamic as well as dialectical: “L’esse, come atto di essere, non è
soltanto il fatto di esistere, o ‘id per quod aliquid constituitur extra suas causas:’ ciò piuttosto è l’effetto esterno
dell’atto di essere, ma secondo S. Tommaso l’atto di essere è di natura più profonda. Esso è anzitutto ciò per cui
(quo) ogni formalità può essere indicata come reale, cioè distinta, non solo nozionalmente, da ogni altra, ma
‘separata’ realmente in natura, è l’atto dell’essenza.” (La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione, In Opere Complete,
Vol. 3 (Roma, Italia: Editrice del Verbo Incarnato, 2005): 195.)
14
Norris Clarke uses the term “extrinsic reference” in a related manner, namely with regard to God’s internal act of
being. The term functions well here; and Clarke’s implementation foreshadows the argument of Part II of this essay.
(Cf. The Philosophical Approach to God: A New Thomistic Perspective (New York: Fordham University Press,
2007): 52.)

3
intelligibility of created being does not belong to—viz., is not accounted for by—ens as such;

and ii) whatever is the cause of created things must be so precisely because it possesses these

principles per se. It is worth noting that each of these contentions is a feature of what Aquinas

maintains as the real distinction between essence and existence: insofar as a participated actus

essendi unifies these principles in a created thing, both essence and existence are proper to ens

only inasmuch as is permitted by the cause of such a being, which in itself must possesses the

fullness of both activity and intelligibility.15

A few passages from De potentia serve to elucidate these points. Concerning the first

(i.e., that activity and intelligibility are not proper to created beings through themselves), we

might turn once again to the famous q. 7, a. 2, ad 9, where Thomas remarks on the character of

the distinction between essence and esse:

[We may not think that being] can have something added to it that is more formal, which determines it as
act determines potentiality: being . . . is essentially something other than that to which it is added and by
which it is determined. . . . Being is not determined by something as potentiality is by act, but rather as act
by potentiality; for in defining forms, the proper matter is put forth instead of the difference, as it is said
that the soul is the act of an organic, physical body. In such a way, this esse is distinct from that esse insofar
as it is of this or that nature.16

Clearly, neither existence nor essence constitutes an ens as such; furthermore, each is

apprehended only with regard for the other. Thus, a created being could be, of itself, active and

intelligible only if it possessed both principles through itself; but since it refers to a cause for its

15
Once again, Fabro sheds considerable light on this distinction: “L’ipsum Esse è talmente ciò che è che, essendo sè,
è tutte le alter formalità e più ancora: riassumendo in sè la perfezione di una formalità, non esclude quella di un’altra
ma anzi la implica; onde tutte le perfezioni sono in lui presenti senza alcuna contrarietà formale. Così questa
suprema ‘ragion d’essere’ (poichè si astrae ancora se, di fatto, esista in realtà), può esser veramente considerate
come il ‘plesso di tutti gli enti’ e di tutte le formalità. L’‘ipsum esse’ esprime adunque la ‘totalità metafisica
trascendentale’ di cui le singole perfezioni e formalità reali non sono che particolari realizzazioni ed espressioni,
cioè ‘PARTECIPAZIONI.’” (La Nozione Metafisica, 191.)
16
“Nec intelligendum est, quod ei quod dico esse, aliquid addatur quod sit eo formalius, ipsum determinans, sicut
actus potentiam: esse enim quod huiusmodi est, est aliud secundum essentiam ab eo cui additur determinandum.
Nihil autem potest addi ad esse quod sit extraneum ab ipso, cum ab eo nihil sit extraneum nisi non-ens, quod non
potest esse nec forma nec materia. Unde non sic determinatur esse per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut
actus per potentiam. Nam et in definitione formarum ponuntur propriae materiae loco differentiae, sicut cum dicitur
quod anima est actus corporis physici organici. Et per hunc modum, hoc esse ab illo esse distinguitur, in quantum est
talis vel talis naturae.”

4
existence, an equally self-sufficient cause is required for its intelligibility. Another passage from

q. 3, a. 6 presents the dependency in a different manner, this time in terms of the empirical order

of created reality:

If diverse beings were each of contrary principles that were not reduced to one principle, they could not
concur in a single order except by accident. . . . Now we see corruptible and incorruptible, spiritual and
corporeal, perfect and imperfect concurring in one order. . . . Therefore all of these diverse things must be
reduced to some first principle by which they are ordered as one: and hence the Philosopher concludes that
there is but one supreme ruler.17

Although not concerned expressly with intelligibility, Aquinas’s argument here draws on

precisely the same principle that accounts for essential dependency between lower and higher

beings, namely the subordination of natural kinds to generic archetypes (e.g., corruptible to

incorruptible, corporeal to spiritual, etc.).18 In this way, both act and intelligibility in created

things depend on ultimate, supreme principles; what is more, the source of either must be the

source of both.

Thomas’s progression from the status of created being to the necessary qualities of its

cause is perceptive, but so far it says nothing of the way in which those qualities are present in

the unparticipated Source, i.e., God. This requires a further inferential step; and it is this step and

its logical implications that we take up, now.

II.

Naming the First Cause as Ipsum Intelligere Subsistens. The first cause of active, intelligible

existence, insofar as it is necessarily perfect, must possess all of its causal power in a manner that

pertains simultaneously to each of the perfections found in created entia. This much seems
17
“Si diversa entia essent omnino a contrariis principiis in unum principium non reductis, non possent in unum
ordinem concurrere nisi per accidens. . . . Videmus autem corruptibilia et incorruptibilia, spiritualia et corporalia,
perfecta et imperfecta in unum ordinem concurrere. . . . Oportet ergo omnia ista diversa in aliquod unum primum
principium reducere a quo in unum ordinantur: unde philosophus concludit quod unus est principatus.”
18
My reading of this passage seems to be confirmed by Thomas’ further statement in De potentia, q. 3, a. 6 ad 24,
that: “Opera Dei perseverant in aeternum, non secundum numerum, sed secundum speciem vel genus, et secundum
substantiam, non secundum modum essendi.”

5
evident, for Aquinas, given his insistence on the identity of first principles in one agent and the

manifold character of actus essendi as discussed in the previous section. But is this logically

necessary manner of existence—or essence—of the unparticipated Source something positively

effable?

Drawing on Thomas’s treatment of esse and essence in De potentia, John Wippel

concludes that in this work Aquinas “clearly defends the human intellect’s capacity in this life to

apply certain names to God substantially.”19 These names are no doubt applied to God’s very

essence, which Thomas famously says is indistinct from his act of existence (esse)20—a claim

echoed time and again throughout the Thomistic corpus.21 What is peculiar, however, concerning

the Doctor’s approach to naming God substantially in De potentia is the move he makes in

establishing a point of departure: while similar arguments in Summa Theologiae and the

Commentary on De Hebdomadibus commence from the familiar standpoint of an Aristotelian

reduction of all things to purus actus,22 here we recognize an attempt to positively attribute

substantial qualities to God by tracing the principles of a discernibly Neoplatonic model of

cosmological participation. In short, the claim for naming God substantially in De potentia is

afforded not only on the basis of a priori truths (viz., by following Aristotle), but also by way of

his creative power vis-à-vis the generation of real, finite beings. Thomas admits that names—

even names derived from examining a direct causal relationship—can be applied to God’s

essence, and that they do in fact describe some actual feature of his substance.23

19
Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 2000): 527.
20
Cf. De pot., q. 7, a. 2.
21
For example, cf. ST Ia, q. 3, a. 4, De Hebd., lect. 2, n. 33, and De ente, cap. 4.
22
For example, Thomas offers this claim outright in a passage related to ST Ia, q. 3, a. 4, namely ST Ia, q. 54, a. 1:
“Impossibile est autem quod aliquid quod non est purus actus, sed aliquid habet de potentia admixtum, sit sua
actualitas, quia actualitas potentialitati repugnat. Solus autem Deus est actus purus.”
23
Ibid. “Cum omne agens agat in quantum actu est, et per consequens agat aliqualiter simile, oportet formam facti
aliquo modo esse in agente.” (De substantiis separatis, In Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia, Vol. 40 (Rome:

6
 Given these considerations, the name that might best be applied to the divine essence

following the structure and arguments of De potentia concerns the primacy of God’s intellectual

power in his own self-contained act of existence. By emphasizing, as he does, the dependence of

created being upon a proper actus essendi, itself dependent upon another more perfect principle

for its own intelligibility and dynamism—and by identifying this higher cause as necessarily the

first cause of both features—Thomas takes the Plotinian lead in favor of a supremely simple

principle, which by its very nature demands conformity by participation. This much is clear in

De substantiis separatis, written shortly after the present volume, where he affirms:

While the first principle must indeed be most simple, it is necessary that its mode of being not be by
participation, but rather existing being itself. Since truly subsistent being is not able to exist unless it is
singular, . . . it is necessary that all other things below it have their existence as participants in being.24

As Wayne Hankey argues, it is in fact in the treatise De potentia Dei that the Thomistic

pendulum swings decidedly in favor of a creationism not opposed to the Neoplatonic thesis that

“all is derived from one exalted First Principle.”25 However, it should come as no surprise that

Aquinas’ particular stripe of Platonism is flavored by a Porphyrian influence—no doubt thanks

to the thought of Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius—and that the primacy of subsistent being is

possible only because of a conflation in the Godhead of both One and Nous.26 Hence, God’s

supreme act of existence and the subsistence of his intellect are identical, and for this reason it

Leonine edition, 1882–).) For a more thorough discussion of Thomas’ acceptance of this position in light of Moses
Miamonades’ rejection of the generalized fact that God, as cause, is unlike his effects, cf. Wippel, Metaphysical
Thought, 525.
24
Cap. 9: “Cum enim necesse sit primum principium simplicissimum esse, necesse est quod non hoc modo esse
ponatur quasi esse participans, sed quasi ipsum esse existens. Quia vero esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum,
sicut supra habitum est, necesse est omnia alia quae sub ipso sunt, sic esse quasi esse participantia.”
25
Hankey, “Aquinas and the Platonists,” 5.
26
The Neoplatonist, Porphyry—a student of Plotinus and the editor of his Enneads—was the first to identify the
highest hypostases of Plotinian thought, namely the One and the first intelligible triad, thereby bringing into accord
necessary Unity and complex Being, or ei|nai. (Cf. Hankey, “Aquinas’ First Principle,” 142.)

7
seems plausible that Aquinas might have considered the Creator of De potentia not only as ipsum

esse, but also ipsum intelligere subsistens.27

Of course, this in itself would not have been revolutionary. Thomas does employ such a

name in ST Ia, q. 54, a. 1, during a discussion of whether or not the activity of angels constitutes

their substance. He writes:

It is impossible that something which is not pure act [purus actus] . . . be its own actuality. . . . Now only
God is pure act. Thus in God alone is his substance his existence and his act. Moreover, if an angel’s act of
understanding were its substance, it would need be a subsistent understanding. But subsistent understanding
is not possible unless it is singular . . . Thus the substance of an angel would not be distinct from God’s
substance, which is the act of understanding subsisting itself [ipsum intelligere subsistens], nor from the
substance of another angel.28

Undoubtedly, there is a deep connection between this passage and the words of De substantiis

separatis, above—most especially the phrase, “intelligere autem subsistens non potest esse nisi

unum.” But once again, the distinction is rooted in a logical reduction rather than an account of

cosmology;29 and the terminology of subsistent intelligence is thereafter abandoned.30 I wish to

27
In calling God ipsum esse, Thomas is careful to maintain that God’s existence is not merely unqualified esse (i.e.,
esse commune), but rather esse that is identical with an essence. In other words, God is “real esse” and not mere
“esse itself.” This is the ontological move reflected in what I have called his Porphyrian turn; and it is this move that
permits him not only to avoid the essentialist errors of strict Platonism, but also to name God as ipsum intelligere
subsistens. (Cf. Stephen L. Brock, “On Whether Aquinas’ Ipsum Esse is ‘Platonism’,” The Review of Metaphysics
60, 2 (December 2006): 291-2.)
28
“Impossibile est autem quod aliquid quod non est purus actus, sed aliquid habet de potentia admixtum, sit sua
actualitas, quia actualitas potentialitati repugnat. Solus autem Deus est actus purus. Unde in solo Deo sua substantia
est suum esse et suum agere. Praeterea, si intelligere Angeli esset sua substantia, oporteret quod intelligere Angeli
esset subsistens. Intelligere autem subsistens non potest esse nisi unum; sicut nec aliquod abstractum subsistens.
Unde unius Angeli substantia non distingueretur neque a substantia Dei, quae est ipsum intelligere subsistens; neque
a substantia alterius Angeli.” (Summa Theologiae, In Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia, Vols. 4–12 (Rome:
Leonine edition, 1882–).)
29
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.4.1001a4-33.
30
Fabro briefly considers this idea of God as ipsum intelligere subsistens in the monograph cited above. Although
his investigation is limited to a few sentences, his considerations—and concerns—are well received, here. Fabro
states: “È una questione ulteriore qualla di decidere se il nome più proprio di Dio sia quello di ‘Ipsum Esse
subsistens’ o di ‘Ipsum Intelligere subsistens,’ che nel suo aspetto tecnico esula dalla nostra ricerca. Un’esegesi
accurate del pensiero tomista forse potrebbe conciliare ambedue le posizioni che oppongono fra di loro i seguaci
dell’Angelico su questo punto, come farebbe pensare il testo seg.: ‘Esse secundum Dionysium est nobilius quam alia
quae consequuntur esse; unde esse simpliciter est nobilius quam intelligere, si posset intelligi intelligere sine esse.
Unde illud quod excedit in esse, simpliciter nobilius est omni eo, quod excedit in aliquo de consequentibus esse
quamvis secundum aliud posit esse minus nobile.’ (In I Sent., Dist. 17, q. I, a. 2 ad 3um).” (La Nozione Metafisica,
190.)

8
suggest that, in De potentia, the idea of naming God according to the perfection of his essence—

that is, as subsistent intelligence—seems to be an even more proximate possibility than in either

Summa Theologiae or De substantiis separatis precisely because the name is a foreseeable,

logical consequence of an empirical investigation into the origins of the cosmos as ens commune.

Concerning the language of De potentia itself, perhaps the most summary articulation for

the plausibility of naming God as ipsum intelligere subsistens occurs in q. 7, a. 8, where Thomas

says:

From God’s supreme simplicity it follows that an infinite number of respects or relations exist between
creatures and him, insofar as he produced creatures diverse from himself, but somewhat like himself.31

So far as I can tell, this constitutes a considerable shift from the argumentative style employed in

the passages from Summa Theologiae and De substantiis separatis. The simplicity of God,

firmly established by way of the logical reduction—both on the level of his existence and

essence—is here the terminus of an account of real being (ens commune). It follows from God’s

simplicity, Thomas says, that an “infinite number of respects or relations” must occur between

creatures and God. However, divine simplicitas taken as such is not the cause of these relations;

but rather, the account is based on the fact that creatures are a seipso diversas, aliqualiter tamen

sibi assimilatas—a feature of entia participating in, but not identical with actus essendi. In other

words, simplicity is a requisite quality of the being that could act as a cause to such a diverse

array of creatures, but it is not sufficient to explain the necessary infinity of relations that would

subsequently occur. This characteristic would only be proper to a subsistent intelligence—i.e., a

While grappling with Fabro’s contentions would entail no small number of pages, it should suffice here to
say that the aim of this paper is not to undermine the primacy of ipsum esse subsistens, but simply to argue for a
name that is equally significant and, I think, strongly supported by the creation doctrine of De potentia.
31
“Et ideo ad summam Dei simplicitatem consequitur quod infinitae habitudines sive relationes existant inter
creaturas et ipsum, secundum quod ipse creaturas producit a seipso diversas, aliqualiter tamen sibi assimilatas.”

9
supreme knower having the ability per se to measure and account for an infinite series of

generated similarities. And this is ipsum intelligere subsistens.32

Further evidence for this claim arises from Thomas’s exposition of God’s causality in De

potentia, q. 5, a. 1. Having established that all beings depend for their coming into existence

upon an efficient cause, and for their sustained existence upon a formal cause—and inferring that

both of these must be reduced to some single, first, and immaterial cause—Aquinas says:

Now this incorporeal agent by which everything is created, both corporeal and incorporeal, is God, as was
proved in [q. 3], from whom things not only have form but also matter. . . . Thus it follows that with the
cessation of the divine operation, all things would at the same moment descend into nothing.33

The argumentative structure, here, mirrors that of q. 7, a. 8. In short, Thomas concludes that by

investigating finite entia, whose participation in actus essendi necessarily entails the type of

formal and efficient causality herein described, one approaches an understanding of God not only

as the ultimate cause of being ex nihilo, but also as the cause that sustains being in reality (i.e.,

causa essendi).34 In other words, the efficient and formal aspects of God’s causal act—

understood as part and parcel of his being actus purus—are so identically. Inasmuch as this

primordial act, from the standpoint of efficiency, is necessarily called esse subsistens, from the

standpoint of formality it is equally appropriate to name it intelligere subsistens.

32
For the sake of clarity, this conclusion could be divided into two steps: the first, which names such a being as
intelligere simpliciter; and the second, which combines this notion with the already established purus actus in order
to arrive at intelligere subsistens.
33
“Hoc autem agens incorporeum, a quo omnia creantur, et corporalia et incorporalia, Deus est, sicut in alia
quaestione ostensum est, a quo non solum sunt formae rerum, sed etiam materiae. Et quantum ad propositum non
differt utrum immediate, vel quodam ordine, ut quidam philosophi posuerunt. Unde sequitur quod divina operatione
cessante, omnes res eodem momento in nihilum deciderent, sicut auctoritatibus est probatum in argumentis sed
contra.”
34
Cf. ibid.: “Huiusmodi inferiora agentia sunt causa rerum quantum ad earum fieri, non quantum ad esse rerum per
se loquendo. Deus autem per se est causa essendi: et ideo non est simile. Unde Augustinus dicit: non enim sicut
structuram cum fabricaverit quis abscedit, atque illo cessante et abscedente stat opus eius; ita mundus vel in ictu
oculi stare poterit, si ei Deus regimen suum subtraxerit.”

10
 III.

Some Neoplatonic Overtones. While the arguments in De potentia lead to the same sorts of

conclusions we find elsewhere in Aquinas’s work, that he proceeds in this text along distinctly

Platonic lines is nevertheless apparent—in fact, it is even a hallmark of his method, and of the

conclusions reached, above. Here, Thomas demonstrates that he is able to reconcile the diverse

modalities of Aristotelianism and Platonism by putting them to work at different places in his

system.35 On the one hand, he invokes God as actus purus; however, he demonstrates the weight

of this claim not only by a priori reduction but also by the force of empirical observation.36 And

this is a watershed in Western thought.

By way of elucidation, it is helpful to note that the two arguments highlighted above

correspond to explicitly Neoplatonic references elsewhere in Thomas’ writings. Regarding the

first—that from simplicissimum follow an infinite number of relations—we see similar language

in Aquinas’s talk of pure being as supremely formal. In ST Ia, q. 7, a. 1, for example, during a

discussion of whether or not infinite being is perfect or imperfect, he concludes that quod est

maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse.37 This, of course, is derived from a previous distinction,

voiced in q. 4, a. 1, which states:

Being itself is the most perfect of all things, since it is compared to all things insofar as they are in act, for
nothing has actuality except insofar as it exists. Hence being itself is the actuality of all things, and even of
their forms. . . . When I speak of the existence of a man, or of a horse, or of any other thing, existence itself
is considered as formal and received, and not as something belonging to esse.38

35
Cf. Hankey, “Ab Uno Simplici Non Est Nisi Unum: The Place of Natural and Necessary Emanation in Aquinas’s
Doctrine of Creation,” In Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to
the Rev'd Dr Robert D. Crouse, ed. Willemien Otten, Walter Hannam and Michael Treschow, Studies in Intellectual
History (Leiden: Brill, 2007): 314.
36
Another way of putting this might be to say that Thomas makes use of the significance of emanation/participation
in the Neoplatonic cosmology in a way that both coincide with his own religious beliefs, as well as elucidates his
Aristotelian commitments on act and potency and cause and effect.
37
“Illud autem quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse, ut ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur esse divinum
non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum est quod ipse
Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.”
38
This passage is difficult to translate, particularly the final sentence, since the word esse is employed to signify a
variety of things without a clear delineation on Thomas’ part: “Ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur

11
All of this is to say that, for Aquinas, esse in its unreceived mode (i.e., esse subsistens) is also

necessarily supremely formal;39 but the term maxime formale is the result of a cosmological

rather than an a priori investigation.40 In short, to call God maxime formale omnium is precisely

to reduce into a single hypostasis both One and Nous, and in a manner wholly attuned to an

Aristotelian stance on the primacy of act.41 Regarding the second argument concerning God’s

power as the causa essendi of all beings, a related text is found in De veritate, q. 2, a. 4, where

Thomas makes explicit reference to the thought of Pseudo-Dionysius in defending God’s

simultaneous causation and knowledge of particular beings as a feature of his essence. Thomas

writes:

Accordingly, we say that something is in the divine cognition insofar as God, by his essence, is its cause. . .
. Thus, since he is the cause of all proper and common causes, he knows all proper and common causes
through his essence, because nothing is in a thing determining its common nature of which God is not the
cause. And therefore, the reason by which he knows the common nature of things is the same reason by
which he knows the proper nature of each one, and their proper causes. And this is affirmed by Dionysius
in De divinis nominibus, VII, when he says: if by one cause God gives being to all things, by the same
cause he knows them all.42

Even in a work finished as early as the 1250s, Aquinas’ commitment to reconciling Platonic and

enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium
rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut
receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut
formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.”
39
This language is mirrored even within De potentia, at q. 7, a. 2, where Thomas famously says that “esse est
actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum,” etc.
40
An instance of similar argumentation occurs in SCG I, cap. 26: “Relinquitur ergo quod res propter hoc differant
quod habent diversas naturas, quibus acquiritur esse diversimode. Esse autem divinum non advenit alii naturae, sed
est ipsa natura, ut ostensum est. Si igitur esse divinum esset formale esse omnium, oporteret omnia simpliciter esse
unum.” (Summa contra Gentiles, In Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia, Vols. 13–15 [Rome: Leonine edition,
1882–].)
41
It is worth noting that Thomas introduces the respondeo of q. 7, a. 1 with a line from John Damascene’s De fide
orthodoxa: “Deus est infinitus et aeternus et incircumscriptibilis.” It is the same Damascene whom Aquinas
references elsewhere as a direct link with the Neoplatonic tradition of Dionysius the Areopagite. (Cf., for example,
Super Sent. lib. I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1.)
42
“Secundum hoc autem aliquid in cognitione divina ponimus, secundum quod ipse per essentiam suam est causa
eius; sic enim in ipso est ut cognosci possit. Unde, cum ipse sit causa omnium causarum propriarum et communium,
ipse per essentiam suam cognoscit omnes causas proprias et communes, quia nihil est in re per quod determinetur
eius natura communis, cuius Deus non sit causa; et ideo per quam rationem ponitur cognoscere communem naturam
rerum, per eamdem ponetur cognoscere propriam naturam uniuscuiusque, et proprias causas eius. Et hanc rationem
assignat Dionysius VII cap. de divinis nominibus, sic dicens: si secundum unam causam Deus omnibus existentibus
esse tradidit, secundum eamdem causam sciet omnia.” (Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, In Sancti Thomae de
Aquino Opera omnia, Vol. 22 (Rome: Leonine edition, 1882–).)

12
Aristotelian notions of supremacy and simplicity is wholly evident.43

In his book, Aristotle and Other Platonists, Lloyd P. Gerson ably summarizes the

primary commitments of a Neoplatonist vis-à-vis an encounter with the Eleatic Stranger in

Plato’s Sophist.44 Gerson writes:

Motion, life, soul, and thought belong in the perfectly real. Therefore, the perfectly real is not motionless.
Hence, we cannot admit that the real is only changeless, nor can we, if we wish to include intellect in what
is real, admit that the real is only what is changing. For without things that are at rest there can be no
objects for intellect to attain. Therefore, that which is real or the sum of all that is real must include both
what is changeless and what is changing.45

So far as the doctrine of creation in De potentia is concerned, Aquinas appears a Christian

Neoplatonist through and through. By investigating, as we have seen, the substance of the

Creator by way of the foundational character of the finite actus essendi and of the

interconnectedness of intelligibility with ens, Thomas demonstrates the existence of a First

Mover whose essence is not merely dynamic but also dialectic. To take up Father Norris Clarke’s

terminology, Aquinas’ God causes both the intensity of finite act as well as the “extrinsic

reference” of essence precisely because he contains, in his own act of existence, the perfection of

each. Thus, insofar as God is ipsum esse subsistens and actus purus—and since he creates beings

that participate in this act in an intelligible manner—it seems right and fitting that he might also

be called ipsum intelligere subsistens.

43
Moving in another direction, we see the consummation of this argument from De veritate occur in a later passage
from De potentia, q. 10, a. 1. Here, in speaking of the Trinitarian processions, Aquinas—again drawing upon his
Neoplatonic sources—extends his theory of twofold causation to touch even upon the immanent life of God himself.
44
Cf. Plato, Sophist, 247E1–4.
45
Lloyd P. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005): 40.

13
REFERENCES

Primary sources:
Aquinas, Thomas. Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia. Leonine edition. Rome, 1882–. Vols.
4–12, Summa Theologiae. Vols. 13–15, Summa contra Gentiles. Vol. 22, Quaestiones
disputatae de veritate. Vol. 40, De substantiis separatis. Vol. 50, Expositio libri Boetii de
ebdomadibus.

______________. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia. In Quaestiones disputatae, Vol. 2. Edited

by P. M. Pession (Marietti, 1965), 1-276.

Secondary sources:
Brock, Stephen L. “On Whether Aquinas’s Ipsum Esse is ‘Platonism’.” The Review of
Metaphysics 60, 2 (December 2006), 269-303.

Clarke, W. Norris. The Philosophical Approach to God: A New Thomistic Perspective (New
York, New York: Fordham University Press, 2007).

Dillon, John and Lloyd Gerson. Neoplatonic Philosophy: Introductory Readings (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 2004).

Fabro, Cornelio. La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione. In Opere Complete, Vol. 3 (Roma,

Italia: Editrice del Verbo Incarnato, 2005).

Gerson, Lloyd P. Aristotle and Other Platonists (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
2005).

Gilson, Étienne. God and Philosophy (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002).

Hankey, Wayne. “Ab Uno Simplici Non Est Nisi Unum: The Place of Natural and Necessary
Emanation in Aquinas’s Doctrine of Creation.” In Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval,
and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Rev'd Dr Robert D. Crouse. Edited
by Willemien Otten, Walter Hannam and Michael Treschow. Studies in Intellectual
History (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 309-333.

_____________. “Aquinas and the Platonists,” In The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A
Doxographic Approach. Edited by Stephen Gersh and Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, with the
assistance of Pieter Th. van Wingerden (Berlin—New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2002),
279-324.

_____________. “Aquinas’ First Principle: Being or Unity?” Dionysius 4 (1980), 133-172.

Wippel, John F. Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas. In Studies in Philosophy and the
History of Philosophy, Vol. 10 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 1984).

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_____________. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 2000).

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