UP Law F2021 [283] De Leon v.

CA
Civil Procedure Rule 36, Sec. 5 2002 Quisumbing

SUMMARY

A complaint for collection of sum of money plus interests arising from loan agreement was filed with the
RTC of Bataan by Rodolfo de Leon against spouses Avelino and Estelita Batungbacal. Based on the answer
of Estelita (who obtained the loan) admitting to the existence of loan, a motion for partial judgment was
filed by de Leon which the RTC granted on May 14, 1996. No appeal was taken by the respondent Spouses.
A judgment after trial on merits was issued on June 2, 1997 by the RTC. A copy was received by the
repsondents on June 6. They appealed the decision on June 20. RTC denied the appeal. The Spouses filed
and appeal with the CA. De Leon filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the orders being appealed are
already final and not appealable. CA denied the motion to dismiss and CA took cognizance of the
respondents’ appeal. A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by De Leon with the SC averring that
CA erred in taking cognizance of the appeal, the RTC judgments being final and not appealable and for
appeal being filed beyond the reglementary period. SC denied the petition, saying that the 15-day
reglementary period for appeal runs only after the final order was issued by the court and a copy of the
same was received by the parties. Final order ends the litigation, which in this case was the June 2, 1997
decision received on June 6. The same being appealed on June 20, or 13 days after receipt, the appeal is filed
well-within the reglementary period and CA is well-within its powers and authority to take cognizance of
the same.

FACTS

 Private respondent Estelita Batungbacal obtained a loan with 5% stipulated interest evidenced by a
promissory note amounting to P500,000.00 from petitioner Rodolfo de Leon;
 The check she issued to pay the principal and the remaining interest was dishonored by the bank;
 Mar. 11, 1996 – Petitioner de Leon filed with the RTC of Bataan a complaint for a sum of money plus
damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against the private respondents Avelino and Estelita
Batungbacal;
 Estelita admitted to the loan obligation, but Avelino denied liability on the ground that his wife was
not the designated administrator and therefore had no authority to bind the conjugal partnership and
that Estelita contracted the obligation without his consent;
 Based on Estelita’s admission, de Leon filed for a motion for partial judgment;
 May 14, 1996 - TC granted the motion and no appeal was taken from this order;
 A motion for execution was also granted and a writ was issued. The sheriff was able to partially satisfy
the judgment award against the paraphernal property of Estelita and the conjugal properties of the
spouses Batungbacal;
 June 2, 1997 – after trial of merits, the RTC ordered Avelino to pay the principal and the interest of the
loan and other amounts in accordance with Art 121 of Family Code. The same was received by the
respondents on June 6;
 June 19 - Avelino filed a notice of appeal;
 June 25 – a new counsel, on conformity of Estelita only, appeared in collaboration with the counsel of
record for the respondents, appealing both the May 14, 1996 and June 2, 1997 orders;
 TC denied the notice of appeal saying that it was filed beyond the reglementary period;
 Spouses Batungbacal filed an appeal with the CA;
 De Leon filed a Motion to Dismiss averring among others, that May 14, 1996 and June 2, 1997
decisions are final and not appealable, and the appeals were filed beyond the reglementary period;
 CA denied the motion to dismiss and took cognizance of the appeal. A subsequent MR was likewise
denied;
 De Leon filed for petition for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that CA erred in taking cognizance of
the appeal. He argued that the May 14 decision had become final and executory and in fact partial
execution had been carried out already without objection from the private respondent spouses. As for
the June 2, 1997 decision, de Leon argued that the appeal was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period.
 RATIO

W/N the cognizance of the appeal was appropriate

Yes.

Trial court’s judgments are not several1 hence between the two judgments rendered by the trial court, there
could only be one judgment that finally disposes of the case on the merits. Receipt of notice of this final
judgment marks the point when the reglementary period is to begin running.

A final order is that which gives an end to the litigation. When the order or judgment does not
dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits, it is merely
interlocutory. Quite obviously, the partial judgment ordering Estelita to pay petitioner is an interlocutory
order because it leaves other things for the trial court to do and does not decide with finality the rights and
obligations of the parties.

In this case, the final judgment is the decision rendered by the trial court on June 2, 1997 and it is
only from the date of notice of this decision that the reglementary period began to run. The partial
judgment dated May 14, 1996 was rendered only with respect to one issue in the case and is not the
final and appealable order or judgment that finally disposes of the case on the merits. It must,
therefore, only be appealed together with the decision dated June 2, 1997.

Reglementary period begun to run on June 6, 1997 when counsel for private respondents received a copy of
the June 2, 1997 decision. Private respondents' appeal had been taken within the reglementary
period since Avelino Batungbacal had filed a notice of appeal on June 19, 1997 or 13 days from their
counsel's receipt of the decision on June 6, 1997. Respondent spouses having been jointly sued under a
common cause of action, an appeal made by the husband inures to the benefit of the wife.

FALLO

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The resolutions dated January 13, 1999 and April 19, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57989 are AFFIRMED, and the Court of Appeals is ordered to proceed
with the appeal and decide the case with dispatch. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

1
A several judgment is proper only when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that
the claims against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not
necessarily affect the other. Where a common cause of action exists against the defendants, as in actions against solidary debtors, a
several judgment is not proper. In this case, private respondents are sued together under a common cause of action and are sought to
be held liable as solidary debtors for a loan contracted by Estelita.