G.R. No. 15450. September 20, 1919.

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCELO SOTAVENTO and PRIMITIVO SOTAVENTO, Defendants-Appellants.
TORRES, J.

FACTS: The present case has been brought to this court on an appeal presented by the two accused, Marcelino and
PrimitivoSotavento. This appeal which was made to appear in the record at the request of the two appellants presented October 4,
1918, was taken against the judgment of the preceding September 23, sentencing each one of them as authors, to cadenaperpetua
together with the accessories. After counsel de oficio had presented a written brief in defense of the accused, the fiscal petitioned
on the second of the present month, that said appeal be declared null and void inasmuch as said accused had failed to transmit a
written copy of the notice of appeal to the provincial fiscal of Leyte, in accordance with the provision of section 45, General Orders
No. 58, regarding criminal procedure.

Attached to the proceedings appears the written appeal signed by the accused and presented within fifteen days after the date on
which said judgment was rendered by the trial court and it was made to appear by the clerk on the same date that the accused have
been informed of said judgment, sections 45 and 47 of said General Orders No. 58 having thus been complied with.

The petition that the appeal presented by the accused be declared null and void is based on the fact that it does not appear in the
cause that a copy of the notice of appeal has been transmitted to the provincial fiscal as required by the aforementioned section 45
of General Orders No. 58, which became the law of criminal procedure followed and enforced by the courts of these Islands.

ISSUE: W/N the appeal may be declared null and void based on the failure of the accused to transmit a copy of the notice of appeal
to the fiscal

HELD: NO. The appellant’s failure in not serving a copy of his written notice of appeal to the provincial fiscal or to the official
government representative in the court that had rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a defect which can either nullify the
appeal or prejudice the unquestionable rights of the accused, inasmuch as what is important is that the appellant should be able to
exercise, at the proper time, as one of the rights essentially belonging to him, the right of appeal, against whatever resolution or
judgment he might consider prejudicial to his rights or interests, and that the actual and physical exercise of such right should be
effected in writing within the period of fifteen days; so that for the computation of this period it is necessary for the clerk of court to
cause to appear in the case the date of the service upon the accused of the notice, signed by the latter, of the rendition of the
judgment or resolution.
G.R. No. L-9043 July 30, 1955
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONSvs. TEODORO
LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS: On August 21, 1954, respondent Rafael Lacson was convicted and sentenced to death by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, together with other 21 co-accused. On August 24, 1954, respondent Lacson was confined in the Provincial Hospital of
Negros Occidental under guard by the Philippine Constabulary by order of the court. Lacson instituted a special civil action
of certiorari in the said Court of First Instance against the Director of Prisons, the Provincial Commander of the Philippine
Constabulary at Bacolod City, and all persons acting under them, the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Warden, alleging that his
transfer from the hospital to the new Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, Rizal for incarceration, would cause excitement and shock and
aggravate his already worsening condition, supporting this allegation with certificates of two physicians, and petitioning that he be
retained under guard in the Provincial Hospital for 30 days more, and that in the meantime a writ of preliminary injunction issue
against respondents. After the issues were joined, the Provincial Fiscal presented an urgent motion to lift the preliminary injunction
and for a reconsideration of the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction for the reason that more than 30 days have elapsed
since the original injunction had been granted and for the further reason that the court has no jurisdiction to issue the said
injunction. Opposition to this motion was filed by the attorney of Lacson and, in view thereof, the court ordered a committee of
physicians to conduct a physical examination of Lacson and to report their findings to the court.
On the basis of this report, the Honorable Jose Teodoro, Sr. denied the motion to lift the preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: W/N the Court of First Instance has the power and authority to issue the writ of preliminary injunction

HELD: NO. While no express provision similar to Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is contained in the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the same general principal should obtain in criminal cases. As a matter of principle, when an appeal has been perfected
from a judgment in a criminal case, the court from which the appeal is made loses jurisdiction over the case, and this (case) means
both the record and the person of the accused-appellant. In the same manner that after the judgment has become final, the trial
court loses jurisdiction to amend the same, so also upon the perfection of the appeal which brings about the finality of the judgment
or order of the court, the sentencing court must also lose jurisdiction or power to do anything or any matter in relation to the person
of the accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011
Yu vs. Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad
BRION, J.:

FACTS:Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa against the petitioner was filed
with the RTC. The RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It imposed on her a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment, a fine
of P3,800,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount as
the fine.

Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered
new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.
In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for new trial for lack of merit.

On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to
November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.

The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution’s motions when she filed her notice of appeal within
the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes.

In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to
criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules"
referred to the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal
casesmentioned.

ISSUE: W/N the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases.

HELD: YES. In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The
Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally
apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the
following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to
appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all casesshall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from."

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two
provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this
situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on
petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals
by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
G.R. No. 80481 June 27, 1990
People vs. Fernandez
REGALADO, J.:

FACTS: An appeal was interposed by accused-appellant JovenPitogo alone from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34 at
Calamba, Laguna, 2 finding both accused therein guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00. Upon appeal, the decision was reversed and set aside and the accused were acquitted.
During the trial, however, because accused Fernandez failed to appear for six (6) times before the hearing on April 7, 1986, an order
of arrest was issued on said date and the case against him ordered flied in absentia. The accused Fernandez has not been
apprehended till now.

ISSUE: W/N the judgement of the appellate court in this case should affect those who did not appeal

HELD: YES. Note must be taken of the present rule that an appeal shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. The court held that,“While, in effect, he committed an act
of defiance of the law by escaping, we are not without other prior incidents where such undesirable conduct, which should not be
condoned, has sometimes been ascribed to a sense of desperation of those who believe they are guiltless but fear that they cannot
prove their innocence. While we castigate and reprove his jumping bail and remaining at large up to now, we have to concede,
however, that our disquisition in this case is applicable and favorable to him, hence he is affected by and shall benefit from the
acquittal that we hand down in this appeal.”
[G.R. No. 129211. October 2, 2000]
People vs. Rodriguez
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: On appeal is the decision dated November 13, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29, [2] in Criminal Case
No. 91-99526, convicting appellant and his co-accused of the crime of murder, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity, and to pay the costs.
Appellant Larry Artellero was employed as a cement mixer and helper of co-accused Wilfredo Rodriguez, a mason in the
construction of the upper floors of the Far East Bank and Trust Company, Blumentritt Branch, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Both were charged
with the crime of robbery with homicide for the killing of the bank security guard, Ramon Matias y Ibay. The trial court found both
guilty of murder. Both appealed. However, Rodriguez withdrew his appeal for financial reasons.
Upon appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed and the accused were acquitted.The OSG points out that the prosecution
failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy between appellant and Rodriguez independent of the extrajudicial confession of the
latter. The OSG contends that the trial court erred in convicting appellant of murder considering that the Information failed to allege
the circumstances qualifying the killing to murder.

ISSUE: W/N the judgement of the appellate court in this case should affect those who did not appeal

HELD: YES. Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-established rule is that an appeal in a
criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. [29] The records
show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. [30] However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
provides that [a]n appeal taken by one or more [of] several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellant court is favorable and applicable to the latter. As we have elucidated, the evidence against and the
conviction of both appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellants acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to
Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.
People vs. Maguddayao
G.R. No. L-43923 September 12, 1984
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 561-T of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, MARTIN MAGUDDAYAO, FAUSTINO LIQUIGAN and
LAUREANO MAGUDDAYAO were accused of the murder of CiprianoBaliwag, Sr. and were subsequently found guilty.

All three accused filed notice that they were appealing to the Court of Appeals. The appellants were committed to the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, but Faustino Liquigan was able to post bail pending appeal and his release was authorized by the Court
of Appeals on November 26, 1973

On March 14, 1975, Martin Maguddayao filed a Motion For Withdrawal of Appeal. The Motion was granted by the Court of Appeals
on April 7, 1975.

ISSUE: W/N the accused may withdraw his appeal

HELD:YES. It should be stated that when Martin was allowed to withdraw his appeal the briefs had not yet been filed. The brief for
the appellants was filed on July 31, 1975; that for the appellee was filed on November 25, 1975.
G.R. No. L-2073 October 19, 1953
People vs Villanueva
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS: By a decision dated November 19, 1947, the Fifth Division of the defunct People's Court after trial of appellant Pedro T.
Villanueva on a charge of treason on several counts, found him guilty of treason and murder.
Villanueva duly appealed to this court. The records were sent up to us not only by virtue of the appeal but also under the provisions
of Rule 118, Section 9, of the Rules of Court which provides for review and judgment by this Tribunal of all cases in which the death
penalty shall have been imposed by a court of first instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not.
Thereafter before the said court defendant-appellant Villanueva filed a petition dated August 24, 1953, stating that about July 4,
1953, the Chief Executive granted executive clemency to all prisoners convicted of treason, including those whose cases were
pending appeal, on condition that such appeals be first withdrawn, supposedly to give finality to the judgment of the lower court,
and asking that he be allowed to withdraw his appeal. Acting upon said petition the Court of First Instance of Iloilo issued an order
dated September 10, 1953, directing the return of the case to the Court.

ISSUE: W/N the withdrawal of the appeal renders the decision of the court final

HELD: NO. An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be allowed to withdraw his appeal like any other
appellant in an ordinary criminal case before the briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the case from the
jurisdiction of this court which under the law is authorized and called upon to review the decision though unappealed.
Consequently, the withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve to render the decision of the People's Court final. Moreover,
"those prisoners whose cases are still pending on appeal shall be released only after their appeal has been withdrawn." The
implication is that the withdrawal of the appeal rendered the decision of the People's Court final, resulting in conviction, this is to
bring it into harmony with article VII, section 10 (6) of the Constitution which requires conviction as a condition precedent to the
exercise of Executive clemency. As we have already stated, despite defendant's withdrawal of his appeal from the decision imposing
the death sentence, there is no definite conviction or sentence until and after this court has reviewed the case and rendered its own
decision affirming, modifying or reversing that of the lower court, unless of course in the new decision of the trial court based on the
new trial a sentence other than death is imposed, in which case there would be no automatic review by the court.
G.R. No. L-31102 May 5, 1979
People vs. Dueno
SANTOS, J.:

FACTS: This is an appeal interposed on April 22, 1969 by the above named three defendants from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Capiz, 11th Judicial District, Roxas City, Hon. Judge Jose A. Aligaen presiding, in Criminal Case No. 3771 for murder,
finding them guilty as charged and imposing upon them the penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua with all accesory
penalties and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00).

The appeal was directed to the Court of Appeals, but, in view of the penalty involved, the records were forwarded to this Court on
October 4, 1969. 5 On January 2, 1977, and May 8, 1978 — after the case had been submitted for decision on February 1, 1972 -
appellants Felipe Dueno and SofronioDueno, respectively, withdrew their appeals. These withdrawals were allowed in resolutions
dated January 2, 1977 and June 28, 1978.

The evidence for the prosecution establish that in the afternoon of January 21, 1963, the three accused-appellants fired upon Roque
Dellomos and Federico Dolfo but missed them; and theft in the evening of the same day, the three again were Identified as the
assailants who fired upon and killed Bernardo Demontaño who was mistaken for Roque Dellomos and/or Federico Dolfo. It also
appears that their defense of alibi was not worthy of credence. The guilt of the three accused-appellants, therefore, has been
established and proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The civil indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, however, was raised from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00. The trial court's decision then
accordingly be modified.

ISSUE: W/N withdrawal of the appeal by the accused rendered the decision final

HELD: YES. Accused-appellants Felipe Dueno and SofronioDueno had withdrawn their appeals, and the decision of the trial court
already became final and executory as to them. The decision is binding as to the third accused-appellant, AndresitoBelonio, who
pursued his appeal.
G.R. Nos. L-16688-90 April 30, 1963
People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales
PAREDES, J.:

FACTS: This is an appeal interposed by the State against the decision of Branch XVIII of the CFI of Manila, dismissing Criminal Cases
Nos. 36894, 36899 & 36904, all entitled "The People of the Philippines vs. Pacita Madrigal Gonzales, et al.", for falsification of official
and public documents. When the appeal was in the stage of preparation and submission of briefs, the Solicitor General presented
with this Court a pleading captioned "MANIFESTATION AND PETITION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW APPEAL", instead of an appeal brief
for the State, as appellant. The above manifestation was opposed by the City Fiscal of Manila, Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., who
appeared in this Court, as amicus curiae.

After the perfection of the instant appeal, however, and during the pendency hereof, Branch X of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, presided by the Honorable HiginioMacadaeg, dismissed the information in Criminal Case No. 36882 against the said accused-
appellees herein without their consent; while Branch XIII of the same Court of First Instance, presided by the Hon. Bienvenido Tan,
after presentation by the prosecution of the available evidence against the same accused-appellees herein in Criminal Case No.
36885 for falsification, dismissed the said case by finding all said accused innocent, with costs de officio, in its decision promulgated
on March 24, 1960. ...."

The Solicitor General is of the belief that the dismissals of the cases by the three branches of the Manila CFI constituted double
jeopardy and, therefore, they are a bar to the further prosecution of the remaining 24 informations for falsification. Upon the other
hand, the amicus curiae claims that the appeal of the State is meritorious, there is no double jeopardy; and the Orders granting the
motions to quash (Cases Nos. 36894, 36899 and 36904) were erroneous.

ISSUE: W/N the appeal should be granted

HELD: NO. It will be noted that although all the informations in the 27 falsification cases were uniformly worded, the numbers of the
vouchers alleged to have been falsified and the amounts thereof are different. We have in the three (3) cases, subject of the
proceeding at bar, Voucher No. 4, dated September 3, 1955, for P2,275.00; Voucher No. 6, dated September 6, 1955, for P3,590.00
and Voucher No. 13, dated September 6, 1955, for P3,410.00. The other informations also show different vouchers, dates and
amounts. These undeniable facts, alleged in the informations, evidently show that different acts of falsification were committed on
different vouchers and covering distinct amounts. Each information did not refer to all said acts of falsification. Neither is there merit
in the argument that said acts of falsification constituted a continuing offense, so as to have them all prosecuted in only one
information.

Moreover, under the facts and circumstances appearing in the record, the grounds upon which the appellees anchor their defense
of double jeopardy in the motion to quash, are not clear and indubitable. One cannot build up the defense of double jeopardy on
mere hypothesis.
G.R. No. 90294 September 24, 1991
People vs Rio
PADILLA, J.:p

FACTS: On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio, in two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989, addressed to Division
Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his intention to withdraw the
appeal due to his poverty.

In the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, the action recommended was for the Court to ascertain from the accused-appellant,
through the clerk of court of the trial court, whether he desired the appointment of a counseldeoficio on appeal, in view of the
reasons stated by him for the withdrawal of his appeal, and inasmuch as poverty should not preclude anyone from pursuing a cause.
It was also recommended that the clerk of court of the trial court be required by the Court to submit the response of the accused-
appellant along with a certificate of compliance with the duty imposed on him by Section 13, of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

The branch clerk of the trial court submitted the reply of the accused-appellant informing the Court that he was no longer interested
in pursuing his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn his appeal.

Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, however, the Court in a resolution dated 1 October 1990, denied the appellant's
motion withdrawing the appeal and appointed a counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant for, as correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, all the letters of the accused-appellant reveal that the only reason offered by him for the withdrawal of his appeal
is his inability to retain the services of a counsel de parte on account of his poverty, a reason which should not preclude anyone from
seeking justice in any forum.

ISSUE: W/N accused has a right to a counsel de oficio during appeal

HELD: YES. This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues, even
during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an intent to appeal.
Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to
inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the court
must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with
greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life must have more in law." 9 Justice should never be limited to those who have
the means. It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in
order to favor one party over another.
G.R. No. 92415 May 14, 1991
People vs Mapalao
GANCAYCO, J.:

In due course, an amended information was filed in the RTC of Baguio City charging Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar
HadjiEdris, GumanakOmpa and Omar Mapalao of the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Presidential Decree No. 532, which was allegedly committed on September 20, 1987 at Km. 24 along Halsema Road, Caliking, Atok,
Benguet.After the trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the trial court on January 12, 1990 convicting the accused of the
offense charged. Not so satisfied therewith the accused Omar Mapalao and Rex Magumnang appealed the decision to the Court.
After arraignment and during the trial, Rex Magumnang escaped from confinement and had not been apprehended since then.
Accordingly, as to him the trial in absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated.

ISSUE: W/N the appeal should be dismissed

HELD: the Court, may "upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." In this case, appellant Magumnang
remained at large even as his appeal was pending. Hence, by analogy his appeal must be dismissed.

The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country,
he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any
right to seek relief from the court.

Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement during the trial on the merits and after his arraignment, and so the trial in
absentia proceeded and the judgment against him was promulgated in accordance with Section 14(2) Article III of the 1987
Constitution, nonetheless, as he remained at large, he should not be afforded the right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily
submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment against him.
While at large as above stated he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no standing
in court.