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the atom. The impressive success of these and other reductions has led
in certain circles to the conviction that the ideal of science is to reduce
all natural sciences, including biology, to a comprehensive theory that
will provide a common set of principles of maximum generality capable
of explaining all our observations about the material universe.
To evaluate the validity of such claims, I will briefly examine some of
the necessary conditions for the reduction of one theory to another. I
will, then, attempt to show that, at the present stage of development of
the two sciences, the reduction of biology to physics cannot be effected.
I will further claim, in the second part of this paper, that there are pat-
terns of explanation which are indispensable in biology while they do not
occur in the physical sciences. These are teleological explanations which
apply to organisms and only to them in the natural world, and that can-
not be reformulated in non-teleological form without loss of explanatory
content.
I. CONDITIONS FOR REDUCTION
Simpson has suggested that the unification of the various natural sci-
ences be sought not "through principles that apply to all phenomena but
through phenomena to which all principles apply." Science, according to
Simpson, can truly become unified in biology, since the principles of all
natural sciences can be applied to the phenomena of life. 3 To be sure, the
theoretical laws of physics and chemistry apply to the physicochemical
phenomena occurring in organisms. Besides, there are biological theories
that explain observations concerning the living world but have no applica-
tion to non-living matter. To conclude therefore that biology stands at the
center of all science is true as far as it goes, but it is trivial and constitutes
no progress in scientific understanding that I can discern.
The goal of the reductionistic program is not, as Simpson seems to
believe, to establish a "body of theory that might ultimately be completely
general in the sense of applying to all material phenomena," nor a "search
for a least common denominator in science." It is rather a quest for a
comprehensive theory that would explain all phenomena - the living as
well as the inanimate world - with an economy of stated laws and a cor-
responding increase in our understanding of the world. Whether such an
ideal can be accomplished is a different issue that I shall consider presently.
to any other kind of objects in the natural world. I shall further claim
that, although teleological explanations are compatible with causal ac-
counts, they cannot be reformulated in non-teleological form without loss
of explanatory content. Consequently, I shall conclude that teleological
explanations cannot be dispensed with in biology, and are therefore dis-
tinctive of biology as a natural science.
The concept of teleology is in general disrepute in modern science.
More frequently than not it is considered to be a mark of superstition,
or at least a vestige of the non-empirical, a prioristic approach to natural
phenomena characteristic of the prescientific era. The main reason for
this discredit is that the notion of teleology is equated with the belief that
future events - the goals or end-products of processes - are active agents
in their own realization. In evolutionary biology, teleological explana-
tions are understood to imply the belief that there is a planning agent
external to the world, or a force immanent to the organisms, directing
the evolutionary process toward the production of specified kinds of or-
ganisms. The nature and diversity of organisms are, then, explained tele-
ologically in such a view as the goals or ends-in-view intended from the
beginning by the Creator, or implicit in the nature of the first organisms.
Biological evolution can however be explained without recourse to a
Creator or a planning agent external to the organisms themselves. There
is no evidence either of any vital force or immanent energy directing the
evolutionary process toward the production of specified kinds of orga-
nisms. The evidence of the fossil record is against any directing force,
external or immanent, leading the evolutionary process toward specified
goals. Teleology in the stated sense is, then, appropriately rejected in
biology as a category of explanation.
In The Origin of the Species Darwin accumulated an impressive number
of observations supporting the evolutionary origin of living organisms.
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, he provided a causal explana-
tion of evolutionary processes - the theory of natural selection. The prin-
ciple of natural selection makes it possible to give a natural explanation
of the adaptation of organisms to their environments. Darwin recognized,
and accepted without reservation, that organisms are adapted to their
environments, and that their parts are adapted to the functions they serve.
Penguins ale adapted to live in the cold, the wings of birds are made to fly,
and the eye is made to see. Darwin accepted the facts of adaptation, and
320 FRANCISCO J. AYALA
then provided a natural explanation for the facts. One of his greatest
accomplishments was to bring the teleological aspects of nature into the
realm of science. He substituted a scientific teleology for a theological one.
The teleology of nature could now be explained, at least in principle, as
the result of natural laws manifested in natural processes, without re-
course to an external Creator or to spiritual or non-material forces. At
that point biology came into maturity as a science.
The concept of teleology can be defined without implying that future
events are active agents in their own realization nor that the end-results
of a process are consciously intended as goals. The notion of teleology
arose most probably as a result of man's reflection on the circumstances
connected with his own voluntary actions. The anticipated outcome of
his actions can be envisaged by man as the goal or purpose toward which
he directs his activity. Human actions can be said to be purposeful when
they are intentionally directed toward the fulfilment of a goal.
The plan or purpose of the human agent may frequently be inferred
from the actions he performs. That is, his actions can be seen to be pur-
posefully or teleologically ordained toward the fulfilment of a goal. In
this sense the concept ofteleology can be extended, and has been extended,
to describe actions, objects or processes which exhibit an orientation to-
ward a certain goal or end-state. No requirement is necessarily implied
that the objects or processes tend consciously toward their specified end-
states, nor that there is any external agent directing the process or the
object toward its end-state or goal. In this generic sense, teleological ex-
planations are those explanations where the presence of an object or a
process in a system is explained by exhibiting its connection with a specific
state or property of the system to whose existence or maintenance the
object or process contributes. Teleological explanations require that the
object or process contribute to the existence of a certain state or property
of the system. Moreover, and this is the essential component of the con-
cept, teleological explanations imply that such contribution is the explan-
atory reason for the presence of the process or object in the system. Ac-
cordingly, it is appropriate to give a teleological explanation of the opera-
tion of the kidney in regulating the concentration of salt in the blood, or
of the structure of the hand of man obviously adapted for grasping. But
it makes no sense to explain teleologically the motions of a planet or a
chemical reaction. In general, as will be shown presently, teleological ex-
BIOLOGY AS AN AUTONOMOUS SCIENCE 321
NOTES
1 E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961,
pp. 338-345.
2 Ibid. p. 338; see also pp. 336-397.
3 G. G. Simpson, This View of Life, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964,
p. 107. According to J. G. Kemeny (A Philosopher Looks at Science, Van Nostrand,
1959, pp. 215-216) the most likely solution of the question of the reduction of biology
to physics is that a new theory will be found, covering both fields, in new terms. Inan-
imate nature will appear as the simplest extreme case of this theory. In that case, one
would say that physics was reduced to biology and not biology to physics.
4 Except for the general conclusion that biological phenomena will never be satis-
factorily explained by mechanistic principles.
5 E. S. Russell, The Interpretation of Development and Heredity, Oxford, 1930; see also
E. Mayr, 'Cause and Effect in Biology', Cause and Effect, D. Lerner (ed.) New York:
Free Press, 1965, pp. 33-50.
6 The temperature of the gas is identical by definition with the mean kinetic energy of
the molecules.
7 Th. Dobzhansky, 'Biology, Molecular and Organismic', The Graduate Journal
Vll(I), 1965, pp. 11-25.
8 For instance, the maintenance of a genetic polymorphism in a population due to
heterosis can be considered a homeostatic mechanism acting at the population level.
9 F. J. Ayala, 'Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology', Philosophy of Sci-
ence, 37 (1970), 1-15.
10 T. A. Goudge, The Ascent of Life, Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1961, p. 193.
11 E. Nagel, 'Types of Causal Explanation in Science', Cause and Effect, D. Lerner
(ed.), New York: Free Press, 1965, p. 25.
12 E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, p. 405; see also F. J. Ayala, ref. in note 9 above.
13 E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, p. 424.
14 The author is a recipient of a PHS Research Career Development Award from the
National Institute of General Medical Sciences.