G.R. No.
L-5621 March 25, 1953 ocular inspection without receiving full evidence to determine the cause or
PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, vs.
PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, INC., Respondent.
Cipriano Cid for petitioner.
Salvador C. Bayani for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for review of two orders of the Court of Industrial Relations,
one dated November 8, 1951, and the other November 24, 1951, which give
authority to respondent to lay-off forty-four (44) of its employees in
accordance with its urgent petition on condition that, in the event work is
available in the future where their ability may be required, the same workers
should be reemployed and that, if after the termination of the case, the court
would find that at the time of their lay off work was available, the
respondent shall pay to them the back wages to which they are entitled.
These two holders were upheld by the court en banc in a resolution dated
March 10, 1952, which is also involved in the present petition for
review.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On October 2, 1951, respondent filed with the Court of Industrial Relations
an urgent petition seeking authority to lay-off 44 men working in three of its
departments, the first batch to be laid off thirty (30) days after the filing of
the petition and the rest 45 days thereafter, in order that in the intervening
period it may finish the filming of its pending picture. The ground for the lay-
off is the financial losses which respondent was allegedly suffering during the
current year.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner opposed the request alleging that the claim of financial losses has
no basis in fact it being only an act of retaliation on the part of respondent
for the strike staged by the workers days before in an attempt to harass and
intimidate them and weaken and destroy the union to which they
belong.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On November 5, 1951, date when the urgent petition was set for hearing, at
the request of counsel for respondent, Hon. Arsenio C. Roldan, presiding
judge of the Court of Industrial Relations, held an ocular inspection of the
studios and filming premises of respondent in the course of which he
interrogated about fifteen laborers who were then present in the place. On
the strength of the evidence adduced during the ocular inspection Judge
Roldan issued an order on November 8, 1951, allowing respondent to lay-off
the workers mentioned in its petition with respect to Unit No. 2 and those
assigned to the Ground Maintenance Department subject to the condition
that, in the event that work is available in the future, they should be re-
employed. With respect to the workers assigned to Unit No. 1, the hearing
was postponed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
A subsequent hearing was held in connection with the workers assigned to
Unit. 1 and on the strength of the evidence submitted by respondent, Judge
Roldan again found the petition justifiable and authorized their lay-off in an
order dated November 24, 1951, under the same condition as those
contained in his previous order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of both orders dated November 8
and November 24, 1951, which motion the court en banc denied in a
resolution issued on March 10, 1952. Hence this petition for
review.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The only issue submitted to this court for reconsideration is: May the Court
of Industrial Relations authorize the lay off of workers on the basis of an
motive of such lay-off?chanrobles virtual law library
It appears that when the case was called for hearing to look in the merits of
the urgent petition of respondent seeking to lay-off 44 men who were
working in three of its departments on the ground of lack of work and
because its business was suffering financial losses during the current year the
court, which was then represented by its presiding Judge, decided to make
an ocular inspection of the studios and filming premises of respondent
following a request made to that effect by its counsel, and in the course of
said inspection Judge Roldan proceeded to interrogate the workers he found
in the place in the presence of the counsel of both parties. The testimony of
those interrogated was taken down and the counsel of both parties were
allowed to cross-examine them. Judge Roldan also proceeded to examine
some of the records of respondent company among them the time cards of
some workers which showed that while the workers reported for work, when
their presence was checked they were found to be no longer in the premises.
And on the strength of the findings made by judge Roldan in this ocular
inspection he reached the conclusion that the petition for lay-off was
justified because there was no more work for the laborers to do in
connection with the different jobs given to them. It is now contended that
such a procedure is unfair to the labor union in that it deprived the workers
affected of the opportunity to disprove what apparently was represented to
the court during the ocular inspection which at best may only be the result of
prearrangement devised by the company to justify its claim of lack of work
and that what the court should have done was to make a full-dress
investigation if not a formal hearing giving both parties all the time and
opportunity to present their evidence before deciding such an important
matter which affects the position and the only means of livelihood of the
workers affected by the petition. In other words, the petitioning labor union
workers were deprived of their employment without due process of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The claim of petitioner that the laborers were not given an opportunity to
present their evidence to disprove the claim of lack of work is disputed by
counsel for respondent company who claims that the labor union had its day
in court because its counsel was present in the investigation or ocular
inspection and even presented some witnesses to protect its interest. The
record before the court on this matter is not clear and for such reason it has
no way of determining the truth of both claims. The stenographic notes
taken during the ocular inspection have not been elevated for the reason
undoubtedly that this is a petition for review and the only issue before the
court is one of law. In the face of this confusing situations on an issue which
is determinative of the controversy, the only guide that the court finds is the
order of the court of origin which happily contains a reference to the
evidence that it has considered and which has served as basis for its
conclusion resulting in lay-off of the workers in whose behalf the present
petition was brought before this court. We refer to the order of November 8,
1951, subject of the petition for review, wherein Judge Roldan makes express
mention of the evidence can only refer to testimony given by the workers
interrogated by him and to whatever documents he found or examined in
the course of such inspection. It is true, as counsel for respondent avers, that
hearing were conducted by the court a quo on October 8, and 15, 1951, and
on November 5, 6, 15, and 21, 1951, but it is likewise true that those hearings
do not necessarily refer to the petition under consideration but to other
matters and incidents which were then before the court for determination
such as the petition of the labor union containing fourteen (14) demands and
the petition of the same union to declare respondent in contempt for having
violated certain directives of the court. At any rate, this matter does not
appear clear and we are inclined to resolve the doubt in favor of labor
considering the spirit of our Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The right to labor is a constitutional as well as statutory right. Every man has
a natural right to the fruits of his own industry. A man who has been
employed to undertake certain labor and has put into it his time and effort is
entitled to be protected. The right of a person to his labor is deemed to be
property within the meaning of constitutional guarantees. That is his means
of livelihood. He cannot be deprived of his labor or work without due process
of law (11 Am. Jur., 333, pp. 1151-1153; 11 Am. Jur., section 344. pp. 1168-
1171).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Although the Court of Industrial Relations, in the determination of any

question or controversy, may adopt its own rules of procedure and may act
according to justice and equity without regard to technicalities, and for that
matter is not bound by any technical rules of evidence (section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103), this broad grant of power should not be
interpreted to mean that it can ignore or disregard the fundamental
requirements of due process in the trials and investigation of cases brought
before it for determination. As aptly pointed out by this court, there are
certain cardinal primary rights which the Court of Industrial Relations must
respect in the trial of every labor case. One of them is the right to a hearing
which includes the right of the party interested to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs.
Philippine Labor Union, 71 Phil., 124, 129). An ocular inspection of the
establishment or premise involved is proper if the court finds it necessary,
but such is authorized only to help the court in clearing a doubt, reaching a
conclusion, or finding the truth. But it is not the main trial nor should it
exclude the presentation of other evidence which the parties may deem
necessary to establish their case. It is merely an auxiliary remedy the law
affords the parties or the court to reach an enlightened determination of the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Considering the merits of the controversy before us, we are of the opinion
that the required due process has not been followed. The court a quo merely
acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of
the respondent company. The petition for lay-off was predicated on the lack
of work and of the further fact that the company was incurring financial
losses. These allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of the
place of labor specially when such inspection was conducted at the request
of the interested party. As counsel for petitioner says, such inspection could
at best witness "the superficial fact of cessation of work but it could not be
determinative of the larger and more fundamental issue of lack of work due
to lack of funds". This fundamental issue cannot be determined without
looking into the financial situation of the respondent company. In fact, this
matter is now being looked into by the court a quo in connection with the
fourteen demands of the labor union, but before finishing its inquiry it
decided to grant the lay-off pending final determination of the main case.
This action is in our opinion premature and has worked injustice to the
laborers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the orders subject of the present petition for review are hereby
set aside, and it is ordered that the cause be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings giving to petitioner an opportunity to present its
evidence in support of its opposition to the urgent petition for lay-off of
respondent company. No pronouncement as to
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur in the result.
G.R. No. L-10824 December 24, 1915
E. MICHAEL & CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADRIANO ENRIQUEZ, defendant-appellee.
Sepulveda, Pelaez and Espina for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
dismissing the action after trial on the ground that the plaintiff did not prove
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
We are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.itc-a1f
The action is based on a sale with a right to repurchase made by Adriano
Enriquez in favor of E. Michael and E. Michael & Co., sociedad en comandita,
of which appellant claims to be the successor, by reason of an instrument,
duly executed and delivered by said companies to appellant, transferring
property, business and assets of every kind, including the land which is the
subject of this litigation. It is alleged in the complaint that the time to
repurchase having expired, the title to the property became absolute in
appellant and that it is accordingly the owner of the land described in said
instruments. On the trial appellant sought to prove the execution and
delivery of the conveyance transferring to it the land described in the sale
with right to repurchase. The trial court prevented appellant from the
proving the fact. Appellant also attempted to prove the fact that the
instrument so executed and delivered was lost, it being his purpose to lay the
basis for the introduction of secondary evidence as to its contents. The trial
court also prevented appellant from proving that fact.
While the efforts of appellant's counsel to prove the execution and delivery
were at times rather informal and inartificial and objections to such
questions were properly sustained, at others the questions put for the
purpose of proving those facts were well framed and answer should have
been allowed to them; but, even in such cases, the trial court also sustained
objections to the questions and the evidence sought to be adduced was
excluded. The same may be said with respect to the attempts to establish the
loss of the document. Exceptions were taken by plaintiff's counsel to all
adverse rulings of the court respecting the admission of evidence tending to
establish the execution and delivery and the subsequent loss of the
document in question, thus laying them proper foundation for the bringing
up the rulings of the court on those matters.
Trial courts do well in refusing at all times to permit the introduction of
incompetent evidence and particularly secondary evidence of the contents of
written instruments unless the facts required by the Code of Civil Procedure
as the conditions precedent for such evidence are clearly shown to exist.
Section 321 of the Code provides: "An original writing must be produced and
proved, except as otherwise provided in this Act. If it has been lost, proof of
the loss must first be made before evidence can be given of its contents.
Upon such proof being made, together with proof of the due execution of
the writing, its contents may be proved by a copy or by a recital of its
contests in some authentic document, or by the recollection of a witness."
As will be seen from this section, the writing itself must be produced unless it
has been lost or destroyed in which case, before its contents may be proved
by other evidence, it must be shown by the person offering the secondary
evidence (1) that the document was duly executed and delivered, where
delivery is necessary, and (2) that it has been lost or destroyed. The
execution and delivery of the document may be established by the person or
persons who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, pr by any person who was present and saw it executed and
delivered or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the
signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instruments had
previously confessed the execution thereof. The destruction of the
instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be
shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who has
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place
where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the
person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find
it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the instrument is indeed lost. If it appears, on an attempt to prove
the loss, that the document is in fact in existence, then the proof of the loss
or destruction fails and secondary evidence is inadmissible unless section 322
of the Code of Civil Procedure should be applicable. After proper proof of the
due execution and delivery of the instrument and its loss or destruction, oral
evidence may be give of its contents by any person who signed the
document, or who read it, or who heard it read knowing, or it being proved
from other sources, that the document so read was the one in question. Such
evidence may also be given by any person who was present when the
contents of the document were talked over between the parties thereto to
such an extent as to give him reasonably full information as to its contents;
or the contents may be proved by any person to whom the parties to the
instrument have confessed or stated the contents thereof; or by a copy
thereof; or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document.
Objections were sustained by the trial court to several question put by
appellants counsel relative to the due execution and delivery of the
instrument of transfer between the partnership of E. Michael & Co., sociedad
en comandita, and appellant, on the ground that counsel, in an attempt to
identify the document to which his question referred, described or
characterized it as an instrument of transfer or cession. Counsel, if he had
desired to identify the instrument to which the question referred, might have
done better, perhaps, if he asked the witness if he knew of the execution of
an instrument between appellant and its predecessor in interest relating to
the lands described in the complaint or to the property and business of E.
Michael & Co., sociedad en comandita, instead of asking him if he knew of
the execution of a document between appellant and his predecessors in
interest transferring the lands in question, or the property and business of E.
Michael & Co., sociedad en comandita, the appellant. Having obtained an
affirmative answer to the question indicated counsel could then have shown
how the witness came to know of the execution or existence of the
document, and, if such circumstances disclosed that the witness was
sufficiently acquainted with the facts, he would have been allowed to testify
to its execution and delivery. After this had been done the document might
then have been presented for identification and when identified, offered in
evidence. If its contents showed that it referred to the lands described in the
complaint, its admissibility would have been instantly evident.
The mere fact that counsel for appellant, in putting his question to the
witness, characterized or described the instrument as one of transfer, while
objectionable, was not sufficient to cut him off altogether from proving the
execution and delivery of the document if other requisites were present.
While it is always best to avoid characterizations of that kind, its harm is
minimized where the case is tried before a court instead of a jury, the court
well knowing that it cannot accept the characterization as evidence but must
go to the document itself or the evidence of its contents to determine its
nature and legal effect. Trial courts should not be so strict with reference to
matters of the character under discussion as to cause a miscarriage of justice;
but on the other hand, they should see to it that they are not impose on by
the introduction of fabricated testimony and that injustice shall not result
from an evasion of the rules of evidence by designing persons.1awphil.net
We are of the opinion on the whole record that proper questions, tending to
the production of very material and competent evidence, were put by
plaintiff's counsel, objections to which were sustained by the trial court; and
that the error thus committed was not cure by subsequent questions and
answers or by the introduction of the same evidence in different manner or
form.

The judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered without costs in this
instance. So ordered.
G.R. No. 76595 May 6, 1988
PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TEODORO RANCES,
respondents.
Acaban, Corvera, Valdez & Del Castillo Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Valentin A Zozobrado for private respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioner, Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation (Pascor, in short),
seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Resolutions of the public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 14 August
1986 and 19 November 1986, denying Pascor's appeal for having been filed
out of time and denying its Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
Sometime in March 1984, private respondent Teodoro Rances was engaged
by petitioner Pascor as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to Pascor's
foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited. Four (4) months
later, and after having been transferred from one vessel to another four
times for misbehaviour and inability to get along with officers and crew
members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal terminated the services
of private respondent Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible work
attitude and incitement of others to insubordination. 1
Petitioner Pascor filed a complaint against private respondent with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration tion (POEA) for acts
unbecoming a marine officer and for, character assassination," which case
was docketed as POEA Case No: M-84-09-848. Private respondent denied the
charges set out in the complaint and by way of counterclaim demanded an
amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a court in Dubai had, he contended, awarded
in his favor against petitioner's foreign principal. In due course, on 4
September 1985, the POEA found private respondent liable for inciting
another officer or seaman to insubordination and challenging a superior
officer to a fist fight and imposed six (6) months suspension for each offense
or a total of twelve (12) months suspension, with a warning that commission
of the same or similar offense in the future would be met with a stiffer
disciplinary sanction. The POEA decision passed over sub silentio the
counterclaim of private respondent. 2
On 10 October 1985, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner,
docketed as POEA Case No: M-85-10-0814 and entitled "Teodoro Rances v.
Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation." In this complaint, he sought to
carry out and enforce the same award obtained by him in Dubai allegedly
against Pascor's foreign principal which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in
POEA Case No: M-84-09-848. Private respondent claimed that be had filed an
action in the Dubai court for US$ 9,364.89, which claim was compromised by
the parties for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a return ticket to (private respondent's)
country," with the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant"
US$ 1,500.00 'in case the wife of the claimant Rantes doesn't agree with the
amount sent to [her] Private respondent further claimed that since his wife
did not "agree with" the amount given to her as 'an allotment for the 3-
month period (of April, May and June 1984), he was entitled to recover the
additional US$ 1,500.00 "as mandated under the Compromise Agreement
which was the basis of the decision of the Dubai Civil Court. 3 As evidence of
this foreign award, private respondent submitted what purports to be an
"original copy (sic) of the decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic script
and language, With a copy of an English translation by an unidentified
translator and a copy of a transmittal letter dated 23 September 1984 signed
by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines." The full texts of
the purported English translation of the Dubai award and of the transmittal
letter are set out in the margin. 4
In its answer filed on 11 December 1985, petitioner Pascor made four
principal arguments: that the copy of the Dubai decision relied upon by
private respondent could not be considered as evidence, not having been
properly authenticated; that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court
proceedings; that the POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the
enforcement of foreign judgments; and that the claim had already been
resolved in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848, having been there dismissed as a
counterclaim.
In a decision dated 14 April 1986, the POEA held petitioner Pascor liable to
pay private respondent Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at the prevailing
rate of exchange at the time of payment." This decision was served on
petitioner's counsel on 18 April 1986, which counsel filed a 'Memorandum on
Appeal and/or Motion for Reconsideration" on 29 April 1986.
Private respondent moved the next day for dismissal of the appeal and for
issuance of a writ of execution, upon the ground that petitioner's appeal had
been filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period and that,
consequently, the POEA decision had become final and executory.
Petitioner opposed dismissal of its appeal and issuance of a writ of execution,
arguing that the one (1) day delay in filing its Memorandum on Appeal had
been occasioned by an excusable mistake.
On 20 May 1986, the POEA issued an order denying petitioner's appeal for
having been filed out of time. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, paid the
docket fee and posted the required supercedes bond in connection with its
appeal.
On 29 May 1986, the POEA denied private respondent's Motion for a Writ of
Execution and elevated the case to the NLRC.
On 14 August 1986, public respondent NLRC denied petitioner's appeal as
flied out of time. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was similarly
denied.
In the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraint ' 9 Order, Pascor urges that
public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of
its jurisdiction in denying its appeal and motion for reconsideration.
We think petitioner's contention has merit. The record shows, not an intent
to delay the proceedings but rather a genuine and substantial effort on the
part of petitioner Pascor to file, in a timely manner, its Memorandum on
Appeal which, in the circumstances of this case, should not have been
disregarded by respondent NLRC. The circumstances surrounding the one (1)
day delay in the filing of petitioner's Memorandum on Appeal are summed
up by petitioner in the following terms:
30.1. Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, who was newly hired as messenger in the
law firm representing the petitioner was tasked with the delivery of the
memorandum on appeal in the afternoon of April 28, 1986 (the last day for
filing the same).
30.2. When Mr. de la Cruz read the caption of the memorandum, he
noted that the same is addressed to the respondent NLRC and he
erroneously concluded that it should be filed with the offices of the NLRC in
Intramuros, Manila.
30.3. Wen Mr. de la Cruz presented petitioner's Appeal at the docket
section of respondent NLRC, he was advised that the same should be filed
with the offices of the POEA in Ortigas, San Juan, Metro Manila.
30.4. Mr. de la Cruz upon being apprised of his error immediately
proceeded to the offices of the POEA in order to have petitioner's (PASCOR's)
appeal received but unfortunately, by the time he arrived thereat, the POEA
office had already closed for the day. Thus, the appeal was filed the following
day.
To Support the above explanation, in addition to an affidavit executed by Mr.
Ruben de la Cruz, petitioner submitted a certification dated 2 May 1986
executed by Evelyn G. Sauza, receive . receiving clerk of respondent NLRC
stating that she had read to receive the Memorandum on Appeal on or about
4:15 P.M., 28 April 1986, because the Memorandum was supposed to be
filed with the POEA office in Ortigas and not with the NLRC in Intramuros.
The brevity of the delay in filing an appeal is not, of course, by itself a
sufficient basis for giving due course to the appeal. In the present case,
however, the factual circumstances combine with the legal merits of the case
urged by the petitioner to move us to the conviction that respondent NLRC
should have recognized and heeded the requirements of orderly procedure
and substantial justice which are at stake in the present case by allowing the
appeal. In Siguenza v. Court of appeals, 5 the Court stressed that the right to
appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules of
procedure especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the
interests of substantial justice would be served by permitting the appeal:
In the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (132 SCRA 782), we stressed the
importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal and ruled:
An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. We have advised the
courts to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal (National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Municipality of
Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and instructed that every party-litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities (A. One Feeds, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590).<äre||anº•1àw>
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical
sense. The rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override
substantial justice. (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals [72 SCRA 1201). Therefore,
we ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453) that a six-day delay in
the perfection of the appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And again in
Ramos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 396, this Court held that the delay in four (4) days
in filing a notice of appeal and a notion for extension of time to file a record
on appeal can be excused on the basis of equity.
We should emphasize, however, that we have allowed the of an appeal in
some cases where a sent application of the rules would have denied it only
when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of our equity junction.
In the case at bar, the petitioner's delay in their record on appeal should not
be strictly construed as to deprive them of the right to appeal especially since
on its face the appeal appears to be impressed appeal especially with merit.
6 Agreement which was the basis of the decision of the Dubai Civil Court. 8
We turn to the merits of the Petition. An examination of the complaint and of
the Manifestation and Motion filed by respondent Rances in POEA Case No:
M-85-08-14, shows that the cause of action pleaded by respondent Rances
was enforcement of the decision rendered by c. Dubai Court which purported
to award him, among other things, an additional amount of US$ 1,500.00
under certain circumstances. In the complaint dated 23 October 1985,
respondent Rances stated:
Details of cause of action (Why are you complaining?) (To include place and
date of occurrence of case of action and amount of claim, if any) P 2,295 US$
salary for three (3) months stated in the compromise of 1,500 TJS$ total of
2,795.50 US$ [as] per decision from Civil Court of Dubai U.A.E. 7
The Motion/Manifestation dated 3 December 1985 filed by respondent
Rances may be quoted in extension
1. Originally, complainant's claim was US$ 9,364.89 which he filed
with the Dubai Court for adjudication.
xxx xxx xxx
2. The US$ 9,364.89 claim was compromised by the court in a
decision dated September 12, 1984. Xerox copy of the decision is hereto
attached as Annex "B" and the authentication as Annex "B-l' and made an
integral part thereof.
3. Pertinent portion of the decision referred to above reads as
follows:
Both parties came to a decision that the opponent would pay to the claimant
the amount of Five Thousand & Five Hundred dollars for the withdrawal of
the claimant and providing him return ticket to his country. The opponent
declared that he would pay One Thousand & Five Hundred Dollars to the
opponent in case the wife of the claimant doesn't agree with the amount
sent to.
4. During the hearing leading to the Compromise, I emphasized that
the allotment I was giving my wife was US$ 765.00 per month and at the
time the case was filed the allotment was already 3 months in arrears which
already amounted to US$ 2,295.00.
5. The amount sent my wife which is only P 13,393.45 through
PASCOR and confirmed by a Certification of the Philippine National Bank,
Dagupan City Branch, hereto attached as Annex 'C' is definitely very meager
compared to the exchange value of US$ 2,295.00;
6. My wife certainly did not agree and cannot agree or admit that
only P 13,393.45 will be given her as an allotment for the 3-month period;
hence, urder the Compromise Agreement, we are entitled to recover the
additional US$ 1,500.00;
7. The agreement insofar as the additional remittance to my wife of
US$1,500.00 is reasonable in that adding the same to the P13,393.45 my wife
received would sum up to US$2,295.00 corresponding to the accumulated 3
month allotment due my wife.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Office to —
Cause or require respondent to remit and/or pay the undersigned or his wife
of the amount of US$ 1,500.00 as mandated under the Compromise
It should be noted that respondent Rances submitted to the POEA only the
Dubai Court decision; he did not submit any copy of the 'Compromise
Agreement' (assuming that to have been reduced to writing) which he
presumably believed to have been absorbed and superseded by the Dubai
decision.
That the cause of action set out in respondent Rances' complaint was
enforcement of the Dubai decision is further, indicated in the decision dated
14 April 1986 rendered by the POEA. This decision provided in part as
follows:
Complainant alleged that his original claim of US$ 9,364.89 for unpaid
salaries, termination pay and travel expenses was filed in Dubai. In a decision
rendered by the Dubai Court, his claim was compromised in the amount of
US$ 5,500.00 plus return plane ticket. The amount of US$ 1,500.00 will be
paid to his wife if she does not agree with the amount sent to her. The three
(3) months unremitted allotments refers to the months of April, May and
June 1984. As evidenced by the Allotment Shp, respondent approved the
authority given by complainant stating that the amount of US$ 765.00 be
remitted to his wife belong with the month of April 1984. The amount
remitted to his wife for allotment cover the three (3) month period was only
P 13,393.45. The basis of complainant's claim is the reservation in the
decision of the Dubai Court which states that in case the wife of the claimant
does not agree with the amount sent to her, the opponent shall pay US$
l,500.00. 9
Clearly, therefore, respondent Rances' action was for enforcement of the
Dubai decision to the extent that such decision provided for payment of an
additional amount of US$1,500.00 and that respondent relied upon such
decision.
Petitioner argues vigorously that the POEA had no authority and jurisdiction
to enforce the judgment of a foreign court. Under Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI
of the POEA Rules and Regulations, it will be seen that the POEA has
jurisdiction to decide all cases 'involving employer employee relations arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment, including seamen." Respondent Rances, however,
relied not upon the employer - employee relationship between himself and
petitioner corporation and the latter's foreign principal, but rather upon the
judgment obtained by him from the Dubai Court which had apparently
already been partially satisfied by payment to respondent Rances of US$
5,500.00. The POEA has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim for
enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a claim must be brought before the
regular courts. The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency
exercising, inter alia, adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. Neither the
rules of procedure nor the rules of evidence which are mandatorily
applicable in proceedings before courts, are observed in proceedings before
the POEA. 10
Even assuming (arguendo, merely) that the POEA has jurisdiction to
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, still respondent Rances cannot
rely upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision was not properly proved
before the POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record
of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country, and therefore a
public writing under Section 20 (a) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Sections 25 and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the manner of proving a public of
official record of a foreign country in the following terms:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied. if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
maybe be made by a secretary of embassy or litigation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a
writing is attend for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued
by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the
decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a
faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be
authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai.
The transmittal letter, dated 23 September 1984, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh,
Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the requirements of
either the attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by
Section 25. 11
There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of the
Dubai decision. The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document which
purports to be an English translation of that decision., but that translation is
legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires that documents written in a non-official language hke Arabic) shall
not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English
or Spanish or Filipino. 12 In Ahag v. Cabiling, 13 Mr. Justice Moreland
elaborated on the need for a translation of a document written in a language
other than an official language:
... Moreover, when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any
language other than Spanish, if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be
translated into Spanish by the official interpreter of the court, or a translation
should be agreed upon by the parties, and both original and translation sent
to this court. In the case before us, there is an untranslated exhibit written in
the Visayan language. 14
In Teng Giok Yan v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 15 the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Montemayor, had occasion to stress the importance of
having a translation made by the court interpreter who must, of course, be of
recognized competence both in the language in which the document
involved is written and in English. The Court said:
[t]he trial court was certainly not bound by the translation given by the
Chinese Embassy, specially in the absence of a delete assurance that said
translation was correct and that it was made by the Embassy Adviser himself.
On the other hand, the translation made by the court interpreter is official
and reliable not only because of the recognized ability of said interpreter to
translate Chinese characters into English, but also because said interpreter
was under the direct supervision and control of the court. .... 16
In the instant case, there is no showing of who effected the English
translation of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances submitted to the
POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made by an
official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai
Government. Neither the Identity of the translator nor his competence in
both the Arabic and English languages has been shown. The English
translation submitted by the respondent is not sworn to as an accurate
translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that translation
been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.
The foregoing does not exhaust the difficulties presented by reliance upon
the Dubai decision. The Dubai Court decision, even on the basis of the English
translation submitted by respondent Rances, does not purport on its face to
have been rendered against petitioner Pascor nor against the foreign
principal of petitioner. Respondent Rances simply assumed that the decision
was rendered against petitioner's foreign principal. The Dubai decision does
not Identify the parties to the litigation that was resolved by said decision.
Accordingly, the Dubai decision can scarcely be enforced against petitioner
Pascor. Further, even if the Dubai decision had on its face purported to be
rendered against petitioner Pascor, we must note that petitioner Pascor has
expressly denied that jurisdiction had ever been acquired by the Dubai court
over the person of Pascor in accordance with the Rules of Procedure
applicable before the Dubai Court. 17 Respondent Rances has not proved the
contents of the Dubai Rules of Procedure governing acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of a non-resident defendant.

Finally, if it be assumed (arguendo, once more) that the Dubai Court had
indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of Pascor's foreign principal —
Gulf East Ship Management Ltd. — it still would not follow that Pascor would
automatically be bound by the Dubai decision. The statutory agency (or
suretyship) of Pascor is limited in its reach to the contracts of employment
Pascor entered into on behalf of its principal with persons like respondent
Rances. 18 Such statutory inability does not extend to liability for judgments
secured against Gulf East Ship Management Ltd., in suits brought against Gulf
East outside Philippine territorial jurisdiction, even though such a suit may
involve a contract of employment with a Filipino seaman.

We conclude that the POEA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in

rendering its Decision dated 14 April 1986 and its Order dated 20 May 1986,
and that public respondent NLRC similarly acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in rendering its Orders dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November
1986 denying petitioner's appeal and Motion for Reconsideration. This,
however, is without prejudice to the right of respondent Rances to initiate
another proceeding before the POEA against petitioner Pascor, this time on
the basis alone of the contract of employment which existed between said
respondent and petitioner or petitioner's foreign principal; there, respondent
Rances may seek to show that he is still entitled to the allotments which he
claims were not remitted by his employer to his wife.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the Resolutions of

public respondent NLRC dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November 1986 are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by
this Court on 8 December 1986 is hereby made PERCENT. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76792 March 12, 1990
RESURRECCION BARTOLOME, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (now Court of Appeals) and HEIRS OF
SPOUSES BERNABE BARTOLOME and URSULA CID, respondents.
Rafael B. Ruiz for petitioners.
E.L. Peralta for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court "adjudicating the whole Lot No. 11165 in favor
of" Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid, thereby reversing the decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte, Branch XII at Laoag City. The
dispositive portion of the latter decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered adjudicating the eastern portion
to the heirs of the late Epitacio Batara measuring 27 meters from south to
north by 32 meters from east to west, with an area of 864 square meters,
bounded on the east by the Provincial Road; on the north by the heirs of Rufo
Manuel; on the west by a portion of the same Lot No. 11165; and on the
south by Lot No.11164; the remaining portion to the heirs of Doroteo
Bartolome, bounded on the east by the portion of Lot No. 11165 adjudicated
to the heirs of Epitacio Batara and heirs of Rufo Manuel; on the north by
Eugenio Andrada; on the west by Nieves Caday or Lot No. 11166; and on the
south by Lot No. 11164.
Likewise, the heirs of Epitacio Bartolome Batara are hereby ordered to
reserved (sic) the road right of way for the necessary expansion of the road
adjacent to the eastern side of said lot, subject, however, to just
compensation.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding Decree be issued
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The record shows that a 725-square meter portion of said Lot No. 11165
located in Barrio 11, Laoag, Ilocos Norte, was first declared as his property by
Epitacio Batara under tax declaration No. 5708 dated May 23, 1906. 3 The
property was described therein as bounded on the north by the property of
Pedro Manuel, on the east by the road, on the south by the property of
Doroteo Bartolome and on the west by the property of one named Esteban,
and as having "una casa de tabla de dimension 5 x 4 metros" as
improvement. Tax declaration No. 5708 was superseded by tax declaration
No. 37576 labelled as a "revision of declaration of real property (urban)"
dated April 23, 1914. 4 The residential lot described in the latter tax
declaration contained an area of 772 square meters with a "casa" and a
"granero" as improvements thereon.
Epitacio Batara and his wife, Maria Gonzales, had two children: Catalina and
Pedro. The latter died a bachelor and without issue. Catalina, who married
someone surnamed Bartolome, bore five children named Isabela, Tarcila,
Calixto, Resurreccion and Ruperta. In 1912, before he left Laoag to settle in
Culalabo, Gamo (Burgos), Isabela, Epitacio entrusted the lot to his cousin,
Doroteo Bartolome, who owned the lot bounding Epitacio's property on the
south. 5 Maria Gonzales remained in the lot for sometime. When she later
followed Epitacio to Isabela, she allowed Doroteo Bartolome to continue
taking charge of the property. 6
In 1916, Epitacio Batara died in Isabela. Five years later or in 1921, Maria
Gonzales and her grandchildren, Calixto and Resurreccion Bartolome,
returned to Laoag. As they found that the house on their lot was destroyed
by fire, they boarded in someone else's house. Calixto constructed a bamboo
fence around his grandfather's lot and he and Resurreccion, who was
studying in Laoag, cleaned it. Resurreccion went back to Isabela after Maria
Gonzales' death in 1926. 7 It was also in that year when Doroteo Bartolome,
to whom Epitacio had entrusted his land, migrated to Davao City. Doroteo
died there two years later. 8
Thereafter, the Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over the
land involved herein (Cadastral Case No. 53). On October 23, 1933, Ursula
Cid, the widow of the son of Doroteo Bartolome, Bernabe, who died in 1928,
9 filed an answer in Cadastral Case No. 53, claiming ownership over Lot No.
11165 with an area of 1660 square meters, described as bounded on the
north by the property of Rufo Manuel and Eugenia Andrada, on the east by
the provincial road, on the south by the property of Doroteo Bartolome, and
on the west by the property of Nieves Caday and Eugenia Andrada, and with
a house as improvement thereon. The land was allegedly acquired by Ursula
Cid through inheritance from Doroteo Bartolome, the father of Ursula's
deceased husband, Bernabe. 10
More than three months later or on January 30, 1934, Resurreccion
Bartolome also filed an answer in the same cadastral case claiming
ownership over a portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 864 square meters
described as bounded on the north by the property of the heirs of Rufo
Manuel, on the east by Blumentritt Street, on the south by the property of
Doroteo Bartolome, and on the west by the property of Bernabe Bartolome.
No improvements on the lot were indicated in the answer which also stated
that said portion of Lot No. 11165 was acquired by claimant Resurreccion
Bartolome "by inheritance from my grandfather and grandmother . . .
Epitacio Batara and Maria Gonzales." 11
From then on, no further proceedings were held in the cadastral case.
Meanwhile, in 1934, Resurreccion Bartolome verbally entrusted the portion
she had claimed to Maria Bartolome, whom she later described as the
daughter of Doroteo Bartolome. 12
In 1939, Ursula Cid and her children also migrated to Davao City leaving their
house on Lot No. 11165 to a lessee, Severino Ramos. Ursula and her son,
Dominador Bartolome, instructed Maria Bartolome, the sister of Bernabe, to
receive the rentals for the house from Severino Ramos. 13 Maria Bartolome
also paid the taxes on the property until 1948, when Dominador took over
the task. 14 But on September 22, 1950, Maria Bartolome, as "administrator
of the parcel of land situated at Bo. 11, Laoag, Ilocos Norte," leased Lot No.
11165 to the Philippine United Trading Co., Inc. 15 The rentals for the
property were paid by the lessee to Dominador Bartolome until the edifice
housing the company was burned down in 1968. 16 Resurreccion Bartolome,
who had been residing in Isabela, was given by Maria Bartolome a small
amount, which could have been about P50, in consideration of the lease
contract. 17
In June, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sent out
notices for the "continuation of the hearing" on June 13, 1968 in Cadastral
Case No. 53. 18 It should be remembered, however, that from the time
Ursula Cid and Resurreccion Bartolome filed their answers to the petition in
the cadastral case, there had been no progress in the proceedings.
A year later or in 1969, Maria J. Bartolome filed in Cadastral Case No. 53 a
"motion to admit answer in intervention," alleging that she is one of the
children of Doroteo Bartolome and that she and her co-heirs had been
excluded in Ursula Cid's answer to the petition. She therefore prayed that the
answer
of Ursula Cid be amended so as to include the rightful heirs of Doroteo
Bartolome. 19 At the same time, she filed an answer claiming co-ownership
over Lot No. 11165 with Clemente, Julia and Rosario Bartolome and Ursula
Cid, the widow of Bernabe. She likewise alleged therein that she and her
siblings inherited the 1660-square meter lot from Doroteo Bartolome. 20
Three months later, Ursula Cid filed a motion to amend her answer to reflect
the complete "ground or basis of acquisition" of Lot No. 11165. 21 In her
amended answer, Ursula Cid stated that she was the absolute owner of Lot
No. 11165; that she had been the possessor of Lot No. 11165 for over fifty
years; that she "acquired by inheritance from Bernabe Bartolome, who
together with her, purchased the . . . lot which used to be three adjoining lots
from their respective owners;" and that Lot No. 11165 had been declared for
tax purposes in the name of her late husband Bernabe Bartolome. 22
No hearing was conducted in the case until 1974. To buttress her claim that
she and her husband purchased Lot No. 11165, Ursula Cid presented at the
trial three deeds of sale: [a] one dated March 1, 1917 showing that Bernabe
Bartolome and Ursula Cid bought a 374-square meter lot for fifteen pesos
from the spouses Domingo Agustin and Josefa Manrique; 23 [b] another
document dated February 18, 1913 executed by Ignacia Manrique in favor of
Bernabe Bartolome evidencing the sale of another lot also for fifteen pesos;
24 and [c] still another deed executed by Maria Gonzales y Paguyo on
February 9, 1917 in favor of Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid ceding to the
latter 772 square meters of land for P103.75. 25 The last-mentioned piece of
land is the one being claimed by Resurreccion Bartolome.
On May 10, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte rendered a decision
the dispositive portion of which is quoted above. The court entertained only
the answers of Ursula Cid and Resurreccion Bartolome. It found that the lots
described in Exhibits 2 and 3 presented by Ursula Cid "are not within Lot
11165" and that said exhibits "are defective as the vendors are not the real
owner(s)" of the lots described therein. As to Exhibit 4, the court ruled that it
has "no probative value as the same is incomplete and unsigned." The court
also held that Ursula Cid's possession of the land "after the claimants had
filed their respective answer(s) or after the declaration of a general default,"
did not confer ownership on her because said possession was interrupted
and merely tolerated by all the parties during the pendency of the case. 26
Ursula Cid appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its decision
reversing the lower court, the appellate court held that the deeds of sale
presented by Ursula Cid are ancient documents under Section 22, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court. It also ruled that Ursula Cid's continuous possession of the
lot from its acquisition and her exercise of rights of ownership over it vested
her with the legal presumption that she possessed it under a just title.
Her motion for the reconsideration of said decision having been denied,
Resurreccion Bartolome filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
based on two principal issues: [a] whether the provisions of Rule 132 on
ancient documents are applicable with respect to Exhibit 4, and [b] whether
acquisitive prescription runs during the pendency of a cadastral case.
Exhibit 4 consists of three pieces of paper. The first piece is a blank sheet
which apparently serves as a cover page. The two other pages contain the
handwritten document in Ilocano stating that in consideration of the amount
of P103.75, Maria Gonzales y Paguyo sold to the spouses Bernabe Bartolome
and Ursula Cid 772 square meters of land bounded on the north by the
property of Pedro Manuel, on the east by the Bacarra road, on the south by
the property of Doroteo Bartolome and on the west by the property of
Bernabe Bartolome. The third sheet or page 2 thereof contains a warranty
against eviction and other disturbances with the last three lines indicating
the date of the execution of the instrument.
According to Dominador Bartolome, he first saw Exhibit 4 in the possession
of his mother, Ursula Cid, when he was just eleven years old. He noticed that
the document had a fourth page containing the signature of Maria Gonzales
and that all four pages were sewn together. 27 However, when the
document was entrusted to him by his mother in 1947 as he was then
representing the family in litigation concerning the land, the document's
fourth page was already missing. 28 He stated that his mother told him that
the fourth page was lost during the Japanese occupation while they were
evacuating from Davao City. 29
Dominador Bartolome also presented in court a sworn statement in Ilocano
executed by Ursula Cid on February 19, 1937. 30 In her statement, Ursula Cid
declared that the sale of the lot to her and her husband by Maria Gonzales
was evidenced by a written instrument; that the land had been transferred in
the name of her husband; that she had been paying taxes therefor, and that
they had been in continuous possession of the land for more than twenty
years. 31
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. — Where a private writing is
more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and
authenticity need be given.
We agree with the appellate court that the first two requirements ordained
by Section 22 are met by Exhibit 4. It appearing that it was executed in 1917,
Exhibit 4 was more than thirty years old when it was offered in evidence in
1983. 32 It was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an
heir of the person who would naturally keep it. 33 We notice, however, that
the Court of Appeals failed to consider and discuss the third requirement;
that no alterations or circumstances of suspicion are present.
Admittedly, on its face, the deed of sale appears unmarred by alteration. We
hold, however, that the missing page has nonetheless affected its
authenticity. Indeed, its importance cannot be overemphasized. It allegedly
bears the signature of the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in question
and therefore, it contains vital proof of the voluntary transmission of rights
over the subject of the sale. Without that signature, the document is
incomplete. Verily, an incomplete document is akin to if not worse than a
document with altered contents.
Moreover, there is a circumstance which bothers the Court and makes the
genuineness of the document suspect. If it is really true that the document
was executed in 1917, Ursula Cid would have had it in her possession when
she filed her answer in Cadastral Case No. 53 in 1933. Accordingly, she could
have stated therein that she acquired the portion in question by purchase
from Maria Gonzales. But as it turned out, she only claimed purchase as a
mode of acquisition of Lot No. 11165 after her sister-in-law, Maria J.
Bartolome and the other descendants of Doroteo Bartolome sought
intervention in the case and demanded their rightful shares over the
property.
All these negate the appellate court's conclusion that Exhibit 4 is an ancient
document. Necessarily, proofs of its due execution and authenticity are vital.
Under Section 21 of Rule 132, the due execution and authenticity of a private
writing must be proved either by anyone who saw the writing executed, by
evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or by a
subscribing witness. The testimony of Dominador Bartolome on Exhibit 4 and
Ursula Cid's sworn statement in 1937 34 do not fall within the purview of
Section 21. The signature of Maria Gonzales on the missing fourth page of
Exhibit 4 would have helped authenticate the document if it is proven to be
genuine. But as there can be no such proof arising from the signature of WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
Maria Gonzales in the deed of sale, the same must be excluded. 35 is hereby reversed and set aside.

Even if Exhibit 4 were complete and authentic, still, it would substantially be The eastern portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 772 square meters is
infirm. Under Article 834 of the old Civil Code, Maria Gonzales, as a surviving hereby adjudicated in favor of the heirs of Epitacio Batara who are herein
spouse, "shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding represented by Resurreccion Bartolome while the remaining area of Lot No.
by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants who has 11165 is hereby adjudicated in favor of the heirs of Doroteo Bartolome.
not received any betterment." And, until it had been ascertained by means of
the liquidation of the deceased spouse's estate that a portion of the conjugal Petitioners shall pay the cost of the survey and subdivision of Lot No. 11165.
property remained after all the partnership obligations and debts had been No costs.
paid, the surviving spouse or her heirs could not assert any claim of right or
title in or to the community property which was placed in the exclusive SO ORDERED.
possession and control of the husband as administrator thereof. 36 Hence, in
the absence of proof that the estate of Epitacio Batara had been duly settled,
Maria Gonzales had no right to sell not even a portion of the property subject
of Exhibit 4.

On the issue of whether acquisitive prescription runs during the pendency of

a cadastral case, we hold, as this Court held in Cano v. De Camacho, 37 that
the institution of cadastral proceedings, or at least the publication of the
notice therein issued, has the effect of suspending the running of the
prescriptive period. Hence, the appellate court erred in ascribing acquisitive
prescription in favor of Ursula Cid "up to the present." 38

Neither can Ursula Cid successfully assert that prior to the institution of the
cadastral proceedings, she and her husband had gained acquisitive
prescription over the property. Until Doroteo Bartolome migrated to Davao
City in 1926, he was in possession of the whole lot including the portion
entrusted to him by Epitacio Batara. Granting that the 1520-square meter lot
Bernabe Bartolome had declared as his own in 1925 39 is within Lot No.
11165, still, the period from 1925 until the filing of the cadastral case in 1933
failed to give him an advantage. It is short of the 10-year actual, adverse and
uninterrupted period of possession mandated by Section 41 of the Code of
Civil Procedure in order that a full and complete title could be vested on the
person claiming to be the owner of a piece of land.

Furthermore, while it is true that the property had been declared for tax
purposes by Bernabe Bartolome and that, subsequent to his death, taxes
thereon were paid in the name of his son, Dominador, 40 ownership thereof
had not been acquired by Ursula Cid or her heirs. Aside from the fact that
said declarations and payments were made during the pendency of the
cadastral case, a tax declaration in the name of the alleged property owner
or of his predecessor-in-interest, does not prove ownership. It is merely an
indicium of a claim of ownership. 41 In the same manner, neither does the
payment of taxes conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for.

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, the Court is unprepared to decree

824 square meters of Lot No. 11165 in favor of Resurreccion Bartolome and
her co-heirs to the estate of Epitacio Batara. The revised declaration of real
property in the name of Epitacio, which petitioners presented as Exhibit B,
reveals that Epitacio Batara owned only 772 square meters of the lot
involved. Certainly, petitioner and her co-heirs may not be entitled to an area
greater than what their grandfather claimed as his own.

Similarly, what remains of Lot No. 11165 after the portion herein adjudicated
to Resurreccion Bartolome and her co-heirs has been determined, may not
be granted to the heirs of Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid exclusively. The
two other deeds of sale presented as Exhibits 2 and 3 having been found
worthless by the trial court as they involve parcels of land not within Lot No.
11165 and the vendors of which were not the real owners of the property,
which findings of facts are binding on this Court, the law mandates that the
property, having been inherited from Doroteo Bartolome, must be shared in
equal portions by his children or their heirs.
G.R. Nos. 79597-98 May 20, 1991
HEIRS OF DEMETRIA LACSA, represented by: BIENVENIDO CABAIS, VIRGINIA
CABAIS, LEONOR CABAIS-PENA and DOLORES CABAIS-MAGPAYO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AURELIO D. SONGCO, ANGEL D. SONGCO ENCARNACION
D. SONGCO, LOURDES D. SONGCO, ANGELA S. SONGCO, LUDIVINA S.
SONGCO, JOSEPHINE S. SONGCO, ALBERT S. SONGCO, INOSENCIO S.
SONGCO, JAIME S. SONGCO, MARTIN S. SONGCO, and BERNARD S. SONGCO,
Being Heirs of Inocencio Songco, respondents.
Norbin P. Dimalanta for petitioners.
Dante S. David for private respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 08397-08398 dated 16 July 1987
affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Guagua, Pampanga, in favor of private respondents, and its resolution dated
14 August 1987 denying the motion for reconsideration.
This petition which originated with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga involves two (2) cases, namely: Civil Case No. G-1190 and Civil
Case No. G-1332.1
Civil Case No. G-1190 is an action for recovery of possession with damages
and preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioners, the heirs of Demetria
Lacsa, against Aurelio Songco and John Doe based on the principal allegations
that petitioners are heirs of deceased Demetria Lacsa who, during her
lifetime, was the owner of a certain parcel of land consisting partly of a
fishpond and partly of uncultivated open space, located in Bancal, Guagua,
Pampanga, evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1038 (11725);
that the principal respondent and his predecessor-in-interest who are neither
co-owners of the land nor tenants thereof, thru stealth, fraud and other
forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing the fishpond of
said parcel of land and caused the open space therein to be cleared for
expanded occupancy thereof, and refused to vacate the same despite
petitioner's demands on them to vacate.2
Civil Case No. G-1332 is an action also by herein petitioners against private
respondents before the same lower court for cancellation of title, ownership
with damages and preliminary injunction, based on the allegations that they
are the heirs of Demetria Lacsa who was the owner of the land also involved
in Civil Case No. G-1190; that the herein private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest, thru stealth, fraud and other forms of machination,
succeeded in occupying or possessing the fishpond of the said parcel of land,
and later abandoned the same but only after the case was filed and after all
the fish were transferred to the adjoining fishpond owned by the private
respondents; that on 31 October 1923 and 15 March 1924, by presenting to
the Register of Deeds of Pampanga certain forged and absolutely simulated
documents, namely: "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE
PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA",
respectively, and by means of false pretenses and misrepresentation,
Inocencio Songco, the private respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
succeeded in transferring the title to said property in his name, to the
damage and prejudice of the petitioners; and that a preliminary injunction
was necessary to prevent the private respondents from disposing of said
property.3
Private respondents denied the material allegations of both complaints and
alleged as special and affirmative defenses, petitioners' lack of cause of
action, for the reason that Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1038 (11725)
was merely a reconstituted copy issued in April 1983 upon petitioners'
expedient claim that the owner's duplicate copy thereof had been missing
when the truth of the matter was that OCT No. RO-1038 (11725) in the name
of Demetria Lacsa, had long been cancelled and superseded by TCT No. 794
in the name of Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin by virtue of the document
entitled "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION
EXTRA-JUDICIAL" entered into by the heirs of Demetria Lacsa; that the latter
TCT was in turn superseded by TCT No. 929 issued in the name of Inocencio
Songco (father of private respondents) by virtue of a document entitled
"ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA" executed by spouses Juan Limpin and
Alberta Guevarra in favor of said Inocencio Songo.4
Private respondents, in their answer, pleaded a counterclaim against
petitioners based on allegations that the latter headed by Carlito Magpayo,
by force and intimidation, took possession of a portion of the fishpond in the
land and occupied a hut therein, that at that time, private respondents had
3,000 bangus fingerlings left in the fishpond which upon petitioners' harvest
thereof left private respondents deprived and damaged in the amount of
P50,000.00 more or less; that such illegal occupancy caused private
respondents to suffer unrealized income and profits, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and serious anxiety which entitled them to actual, moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and P500.00 appearance
fee for every hearing.5
On 20 January 1985, the parties assisted by their respective counsel filed in
Civil Case No. G-1332 a joint stipulation of facts, alleging:
1. That on June 9, 1982, the plaintiffs, being heirs of Demetria Lacsa,
filed Civil Case No. 1190;
2. That after the defendants filed their Answer in the said Civil Case
No. G-1190, and learning the land subject of the two (2) abovementioned
cases (sic), said plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended and/or
Supplemental Complaint.
3. That the said motion was denied by the Honorable Court, hence,
said plaintiffs filed Civil Case No. G-1332, the above-entitled case, with the
same cause of action as that of the proposed Amended and/or Supplemental
Complaint;
4. That the evidences of both parties in Civil Case No. G-1190 and in
the above-entitled case are practically and literally the same;
5. That in view of the foregoing, and in order to avoid duplicity of
action by repeatedly presenting the same act of evidences and same set of
witnesses, the parties mutually agreed as they hereby agree and stipulate
that any and all evidences presented under Civil Case No. 1190 shall be
adopted as evidences for both parties in the above-entitled case, and upon
submission for resolution of Civil Case No. G-1190, the above-entitled case
shall likewise be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the
evidence presented in the same Civil Case No. G-1190.6
On the basis of this joint stipulation of facts, the lower court held that:
. . . the fishpond in question was originally owned by Demetria Lacsa under
Original Certificate of Title No. 11725. After Demetria Lacsa died her two
daughters Alberta Guevarra and Ambrocia Guevarra with their respective
husbands Juan Limpin and Damaso Cabais entered into an extrajudicial
partition of the properties left by Demetria Lacsa under the document
"Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Partition Extra-judicial" dated
April 7, 1923 (Exhibits "3","3-A" and "3-B") wherein the fishpond in question
was adjudicated to Alberta Guevarra and which deed was duly registered in
the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the
certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds marked as Exhibit "3-C". Aside
from the "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial"
written in the Spanish language, the spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan
Limpin and the spouses Ambrosia Guevarra and Damaso Cabais executed on
April 7, 1923, another deed of partition in the Pampango dialect marked as
Exhibit "3-D" "wherein the fishpond in question was adjudicated to Alberta
Guevarra. As a consequence, Original Certificate of Title No. 794 (Exhibit "4")
was issued to spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin. On January 20,
1924, the spouses Juan Limpin and Alberta Guevarra sold the fishpond in
question to Inocencio Songco under the deed entitled "Escritura de Venta
Absoluta" (Exhibits "7" and "7-A") which was duly registered in the Office of
the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the certification of the
Deputy Register of Deeds marked Exhibit "7-B". As a result of the sale,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 794 (Exhibit "4") in the name of the spouses
Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin was cancelled by the Office of the Registry
of Deeds of Pampanga and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 929 was issued to
Inocencio
Songco."7
The lower court thus held that the fishpond in question belongs to the
private respondents, having been inherited by them from their deceased
father Inocencio Songco.8
The dispositive portion of the judgment in favor of private respondents
reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
In Civil Case No. G - 1190
(A) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. G-1190;
In Civil Case No. G-1332
(B) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. G-1332;
In Both Civil Case No. G-1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332
(C) Ordering the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. RO-
1038 (11725) in the name of Demetria Lacsa;
(D) Ordering the plaintiffs to restore possession of the fishpond in
question located in Bancal, Guagua, Pampanga, to the defendants (sic);
(E) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants
the sum of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as
and for moral damages;
(F) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants
the sum of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as
and for exemplary damages;
(G) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants
the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as
attorney's fees;
(H) Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioners appealed the above-mentioned decision to the respondent Court
of Appeals assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the lower
court:
I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE IN
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS THAT THE TWO DOCUMENTS (EXHS.
3 & 7 AND THEIR SUB-MARKINGS) WERE FORGED AND ABSOLUTELY
SIMULATED DOCUMENTS. HENCE, NULL AND VOID;
II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE
SIGNATURE OF JUAN LIMPIN AND THUMBMARK OF ALBERTA GUEVARRA
APPEARING ON THE EXCRITUA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA (EXHS. 7 & 7-A) WERE
FORGED;
III. IN APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES THE DOCUMENTS
PRESENTED BY WITNESS JESUS CRUZ WHEN THEIR SOURCES COULD NOT BE
ACCOUNTED FOR AND THEIR AUTHENTICITY IS IN QUESTION;
IV. IN HOLDING THAT INOCENCIO SONGCO, THE PREDECESSOR-IN-
INTEREST OF THE APPELLEES WAS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE;
V. IN HOLDING THAT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 929 WAS
ISSUED TO INOCENCIO SONGCO BY THE REGISTERED TRY OF DEEDS OF
PAMPANGA;
VI. IN HOLDING THAT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. RO-1038
(11725) WAS ISSUED BY THE COURT (CFI-III PAMPANGA) IN EXCESS OF OR
WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE NULL AND VOID;
VII. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT THE VOLUNTARY
ABANDONMENT OF THE FISHPOND IN QUESTION BY THE APPELLEES WAS A
RECOGNITION OF APPELLANTS' TITLE TO IT;
VIII. IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE APPELLEES.10
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in the appealed case, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that appellants are not liable for moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners flied a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals but
the same was denied in its resolution dated 14 August 1987.12 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioners assign the following alleged errors to the Court of Appeals:
I. IN APPLYING THE "ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE" ON THE
QUESTIONED DOCUMENT ENTITLED "ESCRITURA DE PARTICION
EXTRAJUDICIAL" AND "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA; AND MARKED
DURING THE TRIAL AS EXHIBITS "3" AND "7", RESPECTIVELY, FOR THE
RESPONDENT HEREIN;
II. IN DISREGARDING THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF THE
NOTARIAL LAW WHICH TOOK EFFECT AS EARLY AS FEBRUARY 1, 1903;
III. IN DISREGARDING THE RULE ON PROOF OF PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL
RECORD, (SEC. 25, RULE 132, RULES OF COURT)13
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals wrongfully applied the "ancient
document rule" provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.14 The
rule states that:
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary.— Were a private writing is
more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and
authenticity need be given.
It is submitted by petitioners that under this rule, for a document to be
classified as an "ancient document", it must not only be at least thirty (30)
years old but it must also be found in the proper custody and is unblemished
by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion.15 Thus, according to
petitioners, exhibits "3" and "7", entitled "Traduccion Al Castellano de la
Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" and "Escritura de Venta Absoluta",
respectively, can not qualify under the foregoing rule, for the reason that
since the "first pages" of said documents do not bear the signatures of the
alleged parties thereto, this constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget
unlimited alterations.16
any alteration or circumstances of suspicion, there is no further need for
these documents to fulfill the requirements of the 1903 Notarial Law. Hence,
the other contentions of the petitioners that the documents do not fulfill the
mandatory requirements of the Notarial Law20 and that the proper person
or public official was not presented to testify on his certification of the
documents in question,21 need not be resolved as they would no longer
serve any purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

We are not persuaded by the contention. Under the "ancient document

rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due
execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30)
years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled; (1)
that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of
suspicion.17

The first document, Exhibit "3", entitled 'Traduccion Al Castellano de la

Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923 whereas
the second document, exhibit "7", entitled "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" was
executed on 20 January 1924. These documents are, therefore, more than
thirty (30) years old. Both copies of the aforementioned documents were
certified as exact copies of the original on file with the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Pampanga, by the Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further
certification with regard to the Pampango translation of the document of
extrajudicial partition which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of
Records Management of the Department of General Services.18

Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third
parties, must be recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The
documents in question, being certified as copies of originals on file with the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper
custody. Clearly, therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient
document rule" were met.

As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to be
genuine, petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to support their
allegation of falsification of the said documents. They merely alluded to the
fact that the lack of signatures on the first two (2) pages could have easily led
to their substitution. We cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof
whatsoever. As held in one case, a contract apparently honest and lawful on
its face must be treated as such and one who assails the genuineness of such
contract must present conclusive evidence of falsification.19

Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a

document must be unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of
suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself. The lack of
signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the
documents in question, which were certified as copied of the originals on file
with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free from any
blemish or circumstances of suspicion.

The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned in Sec. 22

of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.1âwphi1 Further proof of their due
execution and authenticity is no longer required. Having held that the
documents in question are private writings which are more than thirty (30)
years old, come from the proper repository thereof, and are unblemished by