Professional Documents
Culture Documents
617 Phil. 45
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its
Resolution[2] dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No.
00-08-11:
INFORMATION
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful
marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage
was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial
proceeded.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil
wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal
Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49895 1/8
5/4/2019 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage
in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital
union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975
(Exhs. F, R, R-1).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582
for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.
xxxx
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49895 2/8
5/4/2019 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in
that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.[3]
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo
were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta
Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both
Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the
action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as
1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner's conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated
July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted
marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael
Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the
presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her
marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner's
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy
had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March
28, 2003, declaring petitioner's 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab
initio on the ground of Alocillo's psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and
executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its
Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[4] denied
reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned,
the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy."[5]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
where petitioner alleges that:
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49895 3/8
5/4/2019 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly.
It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved
for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed
involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for
suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA
struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[6] the Court categorically
stated that:
xxxx
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,[8] where it was held
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49895 4/8
5/4/2019 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly
thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already
been consummated. Moreover, petitioner's assertion would only delay the prosecution
of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question
in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case,
even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage
was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.[9]
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner's conviction
of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity
of petitioner's two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the
crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
petitioner's marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a
court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a
judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner's marriage to Uy make any difference.[10]
As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of
[Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage."[11]
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor,
which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90
thereof provides that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe
in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents x x x ."
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49895 5/8
5/4/2019 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978;
hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact
as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is
obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the
same, it remains self-serving.[12] Thus, for petitioner's defense of prescription to
prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978,
Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to
present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner's testimony that her
own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not
inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court
correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother - the person who
allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be
obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the
attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.[13]
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] "the prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to
being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.[15] Since
petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as
of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under
the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence
Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the
minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.[16]
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is
prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6
months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49895 6/8
5/4/2019 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly
court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed
penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years
and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of
10 years.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with Associate Justices Jose L.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Mariano C. del
[8] G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562.
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49895 7/8
5/4/2019 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly
[10] Abunado v. People, supra note 8; Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra note 4, at
752.
[12] Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R.
[14] G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155.
[17] See Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 00-1217,
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49895 8/8