First of a two-part article published by the Los Angeles Daily Journal that speaks to the litany of ways the current enforcement of the Talent Agencies Act is at best, wrong-headed; and in all probability, unconstitutional.
Original Title
"Is The Labor Commissioner's Enforcement of the TAA Defensible?" LADJ 5 16 19
First of a two-part article published by the Los Angeles Daily Journal that speaks to the litany of ways the current enforcement of the Talent Agencies Act is at best, wrong-headed; and in all probability, unconstitutional.
First of a two-part article published by the Los Angeles Daily Journal that speaks to the litany of ways the current enforcement of the Talent Agencies Act is at best, wrong-headed; and in all probability, unconstitutional.
Enforcement Of The Talent Agencies Act Defensible? Part I On its face, the Writers Guild of America’s war with the Association of Talent Agents wanting to eliminate packaging and agencies having equity in production entities is a classic two-party dispute. But the WGA’s real target is the current interpretation and enforcement of California’s Talent Agencies Act (Labor Code Sections 1700 et seq.), which has allowed the agencies to engage in those two practices. The problem is in part that the TAA is outdated and, in large part, the vagueness of the licensing scheme. Did the California Legislature mean to give talent agencies a monopoly on procurement activities, which led to the marketplace abnormalities of employment counselors also becoming their clients’ employers and talent agencies making more money on projects than then those the agencies have a fiduciary responsibility to represent? There is neither legislative history showing the TAA was created to limit an artist’s choice of who they want to represent them, nor any legislative history showing that rationale has ever changed. The antecedent to the legislation now known as the TAA was created in 1913 to curtail abuses by those holding themselves out as talent agents. In particular, it was to stop owners of burlesque halls and bordellos luring ingenues to become their employees by masquerading as talent agents and telling the young actresses that those were the jobs that were available. Soon after, the Legislature empowered the labor commissioner to administer and enforce the provisions of the licensing scheme. Yet, in the 1950s, the commissioner turned a blind eye when then-president of the Screen Actors Guild, Ronald Reagan, gave MCA — the top talent of the time — a waiver allowing the talent agency to also become a production entity. The labor commissioner also stood silent in the 90s, when television studios made eight-figure deals with personal management companies who then became their clients’ employers. Over the last decade, the commissioner has made no public sign of protest as WME — the successor company created by the merger of the William Morris and Endeavor Talent Agencies — first acquired International Management Group and then led a group that paid $4 billion to own the Ultimate Fighting Championship, meaning the agency represents sports figures while owning the events where their clients perform. WME now also has a film production entity, Endeavor Content; and likewise, Creative Artists Agency and United Talent Agency have film production and financing arms. While barring employment counselors from also being employers was the very reason for the codifying the TAA, one of the major precepts of the act is to ensure employment counselors prioritize the interests of their clients over the studios and networks to whom they sell. That mindset is best stated in Manera v. Stamelman, TAC-96, where the commissioner found that a deal memo giving the representative “a 2% profit participation” from the employer, Sony, violated Labor Code Section 1700.39: “No talent agency shall divide fees with an employer, an agent or other employee of an employer.” “Acquiescence of this practice would encourage agents to negotiate monies benefitting the agent over and above the commission percentage … and would effectively supersede the amount of compensation approved by the Labor Commissioner and render regulatory control over compensation meaningless.” Id. “Packaging” is where, for the perceived value of attaching artists they represent to a project, a talent agency is not compensated by the employer with 3-5 percent of the project’s total budget and back end profits. It is impossible to reconcile how the Manera determination, barring agents from receiving profit fees directly from the employer, can co-exist with “lawful packaging.” Illogically, it does. In a May 19, 1964, opinion letter to the WGA’s executive director, the labor commissioner explained that packaging was acceptable because Labor Code Section 1700.39 “does not lend itself to a construction [prohibiting agents] from obtaining a fee from the employer,” but rather it “prohibits[] the talent agent from sharing his fee” with others. Either packaging is lawful for all or it is unlawful for all. Profit participation cannot be acceptable when part of a package from a major talent agency but otherwise a violation. A 1998 opinion letter used tortured logic to separate packaging from procuring because, according to the commissioner, the sale of a package predates any employment. See “WGA’s nuclear option and the Talent Agencies Act,” Daily Journal (April 11, 2019). Only after the idea is sold and the artist begins work does the labor commission have jurisdiction. Except in Strouse v. Corner of the Sky, Inc., TAC 13-00, the commissioner found the sale of a finished script was an attempt to procure employment due of the expectation of future employment; to not take jurisdiction and allow “that activity to be [outside] regulation … would create a standard that would be both arbitrary and unenforceable.” The arbitrary nature of TAA enforcement, particularly around the procurement issue, has long been the subject of controversy. As noted in Marathon Entertainment v. Rosa Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974, 988 (2008): “The Act contains no definition, and the Labor Commissioner has struggled over time to better delineate which actions involve mere general assistance to an artist’s career and which stray across the line to illicit procurement.” That “line” is impossible to discern. For instance, it is universally accepted that unlicensed personal managers can lawfully deliver their clients to a talent agent, then choose the 8x10 inch, edit the videos and create the resumes that agents pitch to buyers. Hiring the sales team and creating the sales materials is inarguably part of the procurement process; how is that then inside the legal line? Recently, in reply to a suit brought by the National Conference of Personal Managers challenging the TAA’s constitutionality, the labor commissioner wrote that it was also inside the legal line to, “send [] out resumes, photographs, videotapes, or written materials for an artist.” Does the line get crossed if a buyer receives the legal submission and contacts the unlicensed representative? Is it legal if the buyer responds with a non- negotiable offer? Is it legal for a non-licensed representative to receive any non- negotiable offer? Recently, when faced with a similar set of unanswered questions, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a municipal ordinance, concluding the ordinance had failed “to draw a clear line between innocent and criminal conduct. … A ‘statute cannot require the public to speculate as to its meaning while risking [] property in the process.’ See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).” Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F 3d 1147, 1155 (2014). For a law to pass constitutional scrutiny, there must be clarity as to what activities are regulated and what the consequence is for anyone found to have wrongly engaged in the regulated activity. The labor commissioner has admitted the vagueness of what is and is not lawful is problematic. Quoting State Labor Commissioner C. Robert Simpson Jr., “There is an inherent inequity — and some question of constitutional due process” because the term “procure procurement” “is so unclear and ambiguous as to leave reasonable persons in doubt about the meaning of the language or whether a violation has occurred.” The 1986 Report of the CA. Entertainment Commission, Pg. 25. The labor commissioner’s interpretation that the TAA bars unlicensed procurement, which dates back to at least 1953 and which adjudicators have subsequently followed, is not aligned with the licensing scheme’s plain language. While most licensing schemes reserve activities to licensees, there are a few — for instance the geologists, psychologists, landscape architects, nurses and accountancy acts — that simply reserve the occupational titles for those who have licensing status. Unlike other licensing schemes, which expressly bar non-licensees from engaging in specific activities, the geologists and like statutes have code sections that define the activities the practitioners of those occupations engage in, but have no laws prohibiting non-licensees from engaging in the defined activities. And no one risks consequences by using psychological principles to affect another’s behavior, keep a businesses’ books, or maintain or beautify an outdoor area without wrongly claiming the reserved title. As the TAA is written that way, it should be enforced that way. Rick Siegel is a personal manager who is often engaged as an expert witness on the history, construction and application of the Talent Agencies Act.