TORRES, Mark Anthony Alonzo

16-166631, Juris Doctor, 2C

College of Law, Malolos Campus

Bulacan State University

1. HOW TO STAY IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT

BUGARIN vs. PALISOC

G.R. No. 157985, 02 December 2005
Quisumbing, J.

The present controversy arouse from a complaint for ejecment filed before the MeTC of
Parañaque City by respondent Palisoc.

On 27 February 2002, the court declared the respondent as the rightful possessors of
the properties in dispute and ordered the petitioner Bugarin to vacate the premises and pay
rentals to the respondent.

On appeal with the RTC, the latter affirmed the ruling of the MeTC. Bugarin filed a MR
with Opposition to the Issuance of the Writ of Execution. The RTC denied the MR and granted
Palisoc’s Motion for Execution for failure of Bugarin to post a supersedeas bond or to pay the
back rentals. Hence, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued. Consequently, Bugarin
was served with the writ and notice to vacate.

Petitioner file a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Writ of Execution. In response,

the respondent filed a Motion to Issue a Special Order of Demolition since Bugarin refused to
vacate the premises. The RTC deferred action on the motions to allow petitioners to exhaust
legal remedies available to them. Bugarin filed a Supplement to the Motion to defer
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Opposition to Motion to Issue Special orer of
Demolition on the ground that Sec. 28 of RA 7279 was not complied with.

Palisoc countered by filing a Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special
Order of Demolition.

The RTC ruled dismissing with finality Bugarin’s appeal and remanded the case to the
MeTC without acting on the motions. Thus, Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and an Urgent Vigorous
Opposition to Suspend Proceedings on Palisoc’s Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of
Special Order of Demolition before the CA.

Issue : WON the Orders of the MeTC are proper.

Ruling : The Court ruled in favor of Palisoc holding that Under Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is
immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the court’s duty to
order the execution is practically ministerial. The defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecting
and appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of
the appeal. Once the RTC decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory
under Section 21, Rule 70, without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the
CA or SC.

ANTONIO vs. GERONIMO

G.R. No. 124779, 29 November 2005
Tinga, J.

The fundamental precept that underlies this case is that expropriation has no binding
legal effect unless a formal expropriation proceeding has been instituted.

This case precipitated from the filing of a complaint for unlawful detainer by Alexander
Catolos before the MTC of Antipolo. He alleged that he was the registered owner of four
parcels of land situated in the said province. The defendants therein were the petitioners, who
were occupying the said properties.

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 Private respondent claimed he allowed petitioners to occupy portions of his land
without requiring them to pay rent, on the condition that the latter would immediately vacate
the same in the event that the former would need the premises. However, when private
respondent did notify petitioners of his need to use the premises, petitioners refused to vacate
the land even after demand.

The complaint was resolved in favor of private respondent.

Private respondent then filed a motion for issuance of a writ of demolition. The lower
court granted the motion and directed the issuance of a writ of demolition.

Partial demolition had already taken place by Apr i l 1994. Private respondent filed an
urgent ex parte m o t i o n , seeking the full implementation of the writ of demolition. This was
granted on 24 April 1995, with respondent judge ordering the Chief of Police of the Regional
Special Action Force in Canlubang, Laguna to provide assistance to Deputy Sheriff Villaran in
the implementation of the writ.

On 20 June 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo, Rizal passed a Resolution

authorizing Mayor Garcia to acquire thru expropriation or purchase the subject properties for
public purposes/socialized housing. Another resolution, No. 88-95, was issued on 30 August
1995 amending the previous resolution by further authorizing the municipal mayor to secure
financing for the acquisition of the said parcel of land subject of this case.

In Resolution No. 119-957 passed on 18 October 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan

informed respondent court of the expropriation and the fact that the funds required for the
same have already been included in the 1996 budget, and requested that the demolition be
held in abeyance. At this point, the writ of demolition had not yet been fully implemented.

The demolition proceeded despite said resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan. On 28

November 1995, petitioners filed a motion to stay execution with the MTC on the ground that
supervening events have rendered execution unjust and inequitable. A Supplement to the
Motion to Stay Execution was filed on 1 March 1996.

The court a quo denied the Motion on the basis that no action for expropriation had yet
been filed in court and that petitioners had not complied with CA No. 538 in paying the current
rents.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Issues : WON a resolution for expropriation by a local government unit can suspend
the writ of execution and demolition in an ejectment case.

Ruling : In actions for ejectment, the general rule is if judgment is rendered against the
defendant, it is immediately executory. Such judgment, however, may be stayed by the
defendant only by: (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a
periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites must concur. Thus, even if
the defendant had appealed and filed a supersedeas bond but failed to pay the accruing
rentals, the appellate court could, upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the defendant, and
upon proof of such failure, order the immediate execution of the appealed decision without
prejudice to the appeal taking its course. Such deposit, like the supersedeas bond, is a
mandatory requirement; hence, if it is not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of
right.

Thus, even if the defendant had appealed and filed a supersedeas bond but
failed to pay the accruing rentals, the appellate court could, upon motion of the plaintiff with
notice to the defendant, and upon proof of such failure, order the immediate execution of the
appealed decision without prejudice to the appeal taking its course. Such deposit, like the
supersedeas bond, is a mandatory requirement; hence, if not complied with, execution will
issue as a matter of course.

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 ONCE vs. GONZALES
L-44806, 31 March 1977
Aquino, J.

The City Court of Iloilo City ordered Once to vacate an apartment building owned by
Peña and to pay rentals until the premises have been vacated. No back rentals were adjudged
nor was it indicated in the decision when the payment of the monthly rental should commence.
Petitioner Once filed an MR alleging that he has been occupying the property since 1966; that
he was the only one singled out for ejectment and that he was only occupying the said
premises for carinderia as his sole means of livelihood thus he should be given preference to
reoccupy the same after the completion of its repairs.

The MR was denied by the city court. Once appealed and deposited in the city court
rentals. Respondent Gonzales countered by filing a motion in the same court for the immediate
execution of the city court’s judgment in the grounds that Once failed to file a supersedeas
bond. EJ Rovira granted Gonzales’ motion.

Once filed an MR reiterating his contention that the execution was improper because he
had deposited in court the current rentals. The lower court, however, denied the MR and the
motion for suspension of the execution filed by him.

Hence, this petition.

Issues : WON the lower court erred in ordering execution of the city court’s
judgment pending appeal.

Ruling : The lower court committed a patent error in ordering the execution of the city
court’s judgment on the ground that Once did not file a supersedeas bond. No such bond was
necessary because no back rentals were adjudged in the city court’s judgment.

Once’s timely deposit of the rentals stayed the execution of the judgment
pending appeal. In such a situation, no supersedeas bond was required to stay execution of
the city court’s judgment.

Consequently, the order of execution was groundless. It was not justified under
Sec. 8, Rule 70 of the ROC. Sec. 8 requires supersedead bond only if there are accrued rentals
in arrears. It dispenses the bond only if the defeated tenant deposits in court rentals due from
time to time. Thus, the execution proceeding is void.

FERRER vs. RABACA

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580, 06 October 2010
Bersamin, J.

This is an administrative case which charged Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the
Presiding Judge of Branch 25 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), with ignorance
of the law, disregard of the law, dereliction of duty, knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory
order, and violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Officials.

The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in a civil
case filed before the said MeTC for an ejectment suit entitled Young Women’s Christian
Association, Inc. v. Conrado Cano. After trial, the respondent judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff
ordering the defendant to vacate the premises and surrender is possession thereof to the
plaintiff; to pay the sum of arrears in rentals plus reasonable value for the continued use and
occupation of the premises until the same is finally vacated and possession thereof is turnover
plus attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.

The plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for immediate execution praying that a writ of
execution be issued for the immediate execution of the aforesaid judgment. The respondent
judge, however, denied the motion by elevating the records of the case to the RTC of Manila
for appropriate proceedings and disposition. Respondent judge further ruled that no more
action shall be taken on the motion for execution filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.

According to the complainants, their counsel talked with respondentJudge about the
matter. Allegedly, respondent Judge told their counsel that “if you think the court is wrong, file

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a motion for reconsideration.” With that, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration , which
respondent Judge nonetheless denied stating that the Court has already given due course to
the appeal of the defendant which was perfected within the reglementary period, no more
action will be taken on the MR. He immediately directed the COC to elevate the records of the
case to the RTC.

Thus, this petition.

Issues : WON respondent judge erred in failing to act accordingly with the
complainants motion for immediate execution.

Ruling : The Court agrees with the evaluation of the Court Administrator that Judge
Rabaca erred when he did not act on complainants’ motion for immediate execution.

Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
“SEC. 19. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately
upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff
to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed
from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the
amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment
of the Municipal Trial Court.

It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an appeal by itself is not
sufficient to stay the execution of the judgment in an ejectment case. The losing party should
likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents, damages
and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount
of the rent before the appellate court from the time during the pendency of the appeal.
Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial and imperative.

2. REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS

PEFIANCO vs. MORAL
G.R. NO. 132248, 19 JANUARY 2000
Bellosillo, J.

The nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the subject of discussions in several
cases. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfil a
discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be
necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed , it mu s t nevertheless be clear. The writ will
not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty
not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither
confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

LIM TAY vs. CA

G.R. NO. 132248, 19 JANUARY 2000
Bellosillo, J.

In order that a writ of mandamus may issue, it is essential that the person petitioning for

the same has a clear legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties and is
never issued in doubtful cases. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed
and to perform a duty already imposed.”

In the present case, petitioner has failed to establish a clear legal right. Petitioner’s
contention that he is the owner of the said shares is completely without merit. Quite the
contrary and as already shown, he does not have any ownership rights at all. At the time
petitioner instituted his suit at the SEC, his ownership claim had no prima facie leg to stand on.
At best, his content ion was disputable and uncertain. Mandamus will not issue to establish a
legal right, but only to enforce one that is already clearly established.

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3. DURATION OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Re: Complaint against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals
A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, 20 March 2007
PER CURIAM

The Court of Appeals may issue a temporary restraining order only for a limited period
of sixty days which cannot be renewed or extended.

In A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, the Supreme Court agree with the Investigating Justice that
respondent’s “deliberate act of extending indefinitely the temporary restraining order or the
status quo order pending resolution of PNB’s motion for reconsideration, relying on the Eternal
Gardens Memorial Park case, betrays his culpable gross ignorance of the law.”

As correctly put by Investigating Justice Pardo, Eternal Gardens is totally inapplicable.

The July 24, 2001 resolution, which “temporarily enjoined” the public respondent from
implementing the assailed writ of execution, was a temporary restraining order, regardless of
the nomenclature Justice Asuncion used to characterize it. As such, its full life span can only
be sixty (60) days. Section 5, par. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is explicit: the Court of
Appeals may issue a temporary restraining order only for a limited period of sixty days which
cannot be renewed or extended. After sixty days, the restraining order immediately ceases,
without need of any judicial order terminating it.

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