Bernabe, Khristienne Rian C.

JD 2C

Court Where to Charge for Indirect Contempt is to be Filed

San Luis vs CA
G.R. No. 142649
September 13, 2001
Davide, JR., C.J.

Facts:

Private respondent T.N. Lal & Co., Ltd. filed a petition for indirect contempt against herein petitioner,
Antonio C. San Luis, Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City. The action arose from the alleged failure or refusal of petitioner to comply with the
order of 7 April 1999 of Hon. Ernesto A. Reyes, presiding judge of Branch 111 of said court. The order
directed the LRTA to immediately restore the power supply of private respondent's sound system in all
places, sites and locations in its area of responsibility within 24 hours from receipt of the same.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition for indirect contempt on the ground that it states no cause
of action. Public respondent Hon. Nelson Bayot, presiding judge of Branch 118, issued an order, a copy
of which was received by petitioner directing that the petition for indirect contempt, be transferred to
Branch 111 for disposition and appropriate action, since it was that branch which issued the order of 7
April 1999 and against which the contemptuous act was committed; hence, Branch 111 was in a better
position to determine whether or not the order of 7 April 1999 had been violated. Petitioner moved to
reconsider the order of Judge Bayot. The latter issued an order stating that the records of the case had
already been transferred to Branch 111 and that he believed the assailed order was correct and proper.
Accordingly, he would not act anymore on the motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a proper filing of the charge for indirect contempt of court.

Ruling:

No, the filing of indirect of court was not proper.

In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an
act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed.
As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt to properly rest in only one
tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy. Only the court which rendered the order
commanding the doing of a certain act is vested with the right to determine whether or not the order has
been complied with, or whether a sufficient reason has been given for noncompliance, and, therefore,
whether a contempt has been committed. It is a well-established rule that the power to determine the
existence of contempt of court rests exclusively with the court contemned. No court is authorized to
punish a contempt against another.

The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule. . . is that contempt proceedings are sui
generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempts are charged; the power to
punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its
presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes and in order that a court may compel
obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof,
for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of
half its efficiency.

Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides, in effect, that a charge for indirect contempt must be
filed with the court contemned. Although this provision is permissive in nature, in the event of concurrent
jurisdiction over cases of contempt of court, it would be a good practice to acknowledge the preferential
right of the court against which the act of contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty party.
Bernabe, Khristienne Rian C.
JD 2C

Court Where the Charge for Indirect Contempt is to be Filed

People vs. De Luna, et al.
G.R. Nos. L-10236-48
January 31, 1958
Conception, J.

Facts:

This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order, of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
granting a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant in each one of the above entitled cases, for lack of
jurisdiction and, also, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the amended informations, filed in said
cases, do not constitute the crime of contempt of court with which said defendants (Eustacio de Luna,
Jaime P. Marco, Santos L. Parina, Estela R. Gordo, Angelo T. Lopez, Generosa H. Hubilla Oreste
Arellano y Rodriguez, Abraham C. Calaguas, Roque J. Briones, Alawadin T. Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo,
Maria Velez y Estrellas and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr., are charged when they took his oath as a lawyer
knowing that they did not pass the bar and after having been duly informed and notified that certain
portions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and
therefore void and without force and effect.

After quoting from Rule 64, section 4, of the Rules of Court, the pertinent part of which reads: Where the
contempt . . . has been committed against a superior court or judge, or against an officer appointed by it,
the charge may be filed with such superior court; and from the Corpus Juris Secundum, the rule to the
effect that: It is a well-established rule that the power to judge the contempt rest exclusively with the court
contemned and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another. Accordingly,
disobedience of the order of a state court is not punishable as for contempt by a court of another state or
by a federal court. The lower court concluded that the contemptuous act allegedly committed by appellees
herein "was committed not against" said court "but against the Supreme Court of the Philippines" and
that, accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Manila "has no jurisdiction to try and punish" the
appellees herein.

Issue:

Whether or not the charge must be filed with the Supreme Court.

Ruling:

This conclusion is untenable. The above-quoted provisions of the Rules of court is permissive in nature. It
is merely declaratory of the inherent power of courts to punish those guilty of contempt against the same.
It does not declare that jurisdiction of the court concerned to so punish the guilty party is exclusive.
Indeed, in promulgating said Rules of Court, this Court could not have validly denied to other Courts, to
which the jurisdiction may have been vested by statute, the right to exercise said authority, for the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court is limited to the promulgation of "rules concerning pleadings,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," and does not extend to the
determination of the jurisdiction of the courts of justice in the Philippines.

Moreover, the amended informations specifically allege that the defendants herein did "perform acts
constituting improper conduct and manifestations that the tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack
the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts." To put it
differently the acts charged were committed, according to said amended informations, in contempt of the
Supreme Court, as well as of "all other courts of the Philippines," including the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Thus, the very authorities cited in the order appealed from do not justify the same.
Bernabe, Khristienne Rian C.
JD 2C

Court Where the Charge for Indirect Contempt is to be Filed

Igot vs CA, Meralco
G.R. No. 150794
August 17, 2004
Callejo, Sr. J.

Facts:

The petitioner and the respondent executed a service contract under which the latter would provide
electricity to the petitioner’s house at No. 1 Lucky Street, Santolan, Pasig City. The respondent installed
an electric meter on a Meralco post, along F. Pasco Avenue, Santolan, Pasig City, about fifteen (15)
meters away from the petitioner’s residence. Petitioner compiled all his electric bills and discovered that
his Meralco statement amounted to only P18.20 for the period of September 24, 1998 to October 26,
1998. Suspicious of the unusual figure, the petitioner inspected the electric meter which the respondent
installed near his house and discovered that the Meralco seal was still intact but that the meter had
stopped rotating. He sent a letter to the respondent requesting that his electric meter be checked at the
soonest possible time and if found to be defective, demanded that it be replaced.

The petitioner did not receive any reply from the respondent. He was surprised to receive his Meralco
electric bill3 showing his estimated electrical consumption amounting to P12,100.30. He wrote the
respondent requesting that he be furnished with a detailed computation. The petitioner received a letter
from the respondent demanding the payment of the sum of P111,182.05, within ten days from receipt
thereof, on account of the alleged findings of defects in the metering installation which was discovered
during an inspection by its employees. Worse, the petitioner received a notice of disconnection5 from the
respondent, which the latter threatened to implement should he fail to pay the amount of P123,282.35
within the day. The petitioner filed a complaint for damages with an application for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction against the respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The trial
court granted the petitioner’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting and approval of the
required bond in the amount of P124,000.00 to answer for the damages that the respondent may incur if
the writ would later on be found to have been wrongly issued.

For petitioner’s repeated failure to appear during the hearings set for the presentation of his evidence, the
trial court dismissed the complaint. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but it was
denied. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals for
the nullification of the trial court’s order dismissing his complaint. The CA issued a resolution at about
3:00 p.m. enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the case and, likewise, ordered the
respondent to cease and desist from enforcing its threatened act to disconnect the petitioner’s electric
supply. The petitioner filed an urgent motion for the reconnection of the electric supply to his house
within twenty-four hours. The CA, thereafter, issued a Resolution7 granting the petitioner’s request for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and requiring the respondent to restore the
electricity in the petitioner’s house within twenty-four hours.

The respondent filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, alleging that the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by the trial court was ineffective. The CA issued a Resolution granting the
petitioner’s motion with a warning to the respondent that it may be impelled to take a more drastic action.
The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court for the reversal of the decision of
the CA. The respondent filed a manifestation that it would reconnect the electric supply to the house of
the petitioner as soon as the decision of the CA had become final and executory. This Court issued a
Resolution denying the petition. The petitioner filed his petition for mandamus with this Court to compel
the CA to execute the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction it earlier issued; alternatively, to grant his
omnibus motion filed with the CA to direct the Chief of the Pasig Police Station to enforce the writs
issued by the appellate court; and to cite the officers and lawyers of the respondent in contempt of court
for resisting the writs issued by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the omnibus motion of the petitioner filed with the CA to
cite the officers and lawyers of the respondent in contempt of the CA.

The petitioner’s plea for the Court to cite respondent Meralco and its officers and lawyers for indirect
contempt for resisting to comply with the CA Decision and the Resolutions has no merit. The petitioner,
being a lawyer himself, ought to know that the charge must be filed before the court against which the
indirect contempt was committed. The pertinent rules on the matter are Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. As we ruled in San Luis v. Court of Appeals: "In whatever context it may arise, contempt
of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to
the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial
administration, jurisdiction has been felt to properly rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a
given controversy." Only the court which rendered the order commanding the doing of a certain act is
vested with the right to determine whether or not the order has been complied with, or whether a
sufficient reason has been given for noncompliance, and, therefore, whether a contempt has been
committed. It is a well-established rule that the power to determine the existence of contempt of court
rests exclusively with the court contemned. No court is authorized to punish a contempt against another.

The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule … is that, contempt proceedings are sui
generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempts are charged; the power to
punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its
presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes and in order that a court may compel
obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof,
for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of
half its efficiency.

The court that granted the preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order preserving the status
quo is vested with the power to hear and determine the sufficiency and merit of the contempt charge.
Only the court which issued the injunction can impose a sanction for contempt of that injunction, and a
court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court.