295.

Kummer vs. People (705 SCRA 490)

G.R. No. 174461 September 11, 2013

FACTS: The prosecution filed an information for homicide against the petitioner and Johan. Both
accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and
the trial.
The RTC find both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the
recognizance of his father. Johan subsequently left the country without notifying the court; hence,
only the petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with the CA. The CA rejected the petitioner’s
arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment, holding that the discrepancies between the sworn
statement and the direct testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily discredit them because the
contradictions are minimal and reconcilable. The CA also ruled that the inconsistencies are minor
lapses and are therefore not substantial. The petitioner’s positive identification by the eyewitnesses
as one of the assailants remained unrefuted. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s petition is meritorious.

HELD: The petitioner’s argument is founded on the flawed understanding of the rules on amendment
and misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every case. Thus, we do not see any merit in
this claim. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint
even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Same; Same; Same; The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood,
would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have
would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might
have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended. ― A mere change in the date
of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial.
Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment
would not alter the nature of the offense. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced
by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when
any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and
when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as
amended.

Same; Same; Arraignment; Actions; Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so
that he may be informed of the reason for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and
the corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted against him. ― Arraignment is indispensable in
bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusations against
him. The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed
of the reason for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding
penalty that could be possibly meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time,
is given the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative that he is
thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the
imputed crime.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Complaints; The need for
arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This however pertains only
to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments. ― The need for arraignment is equally
imperative in an amended information or complaint. This however, we hastily clarify, pertains only
to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge
an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the
theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not
adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the
commission of the offense.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance
with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form.―We further
stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not
call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is,
to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already been
attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have
conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new
offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.

296.

People vs. Lopit (574 SCRA 372)

G.R. No. 177742 December 17, 2008

FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with three (3) counts of rape committed against his own 14-
year old daughter AAA on September 5, 7, and 9, 2003. Accused-appellant entered a plea of “not
guilty”. During the pre-trial conference manifested his desire to plea-bargain. In open court, he
expressed willingness to plead guilty in Criminal Case No. 85-2003, on the condition that the
Informations in the other 2 cases are withdrawn. Victim AAA, assisted by her mother BBB and the
provincial prosecutor, expressed her conformity thereto. Thus, accused-appellant entered a new plea
of “guilty” to the crime of rape. The court rendered its Decision imposing upon the accused-appellant
the supreme penalty of death. Accused-appellant’s appeal by way of automatic review was
transferred to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification in the moral and
exemplary damage. The CA forwarded the records of the case to this Court for automatic review. In
his Brief, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court gravely erred in imposing on him the supreme
penalty of death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has satisfied the requirement as mandated by Rule 116 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure

HELD: YES. “SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.”

In the prosecution of criminal cases, especially those involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is
charged must be established. — In the prosecution of criminal cases, especially those involving the
extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be established. Qualifying circumstances
or special qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form. As a qualifying
circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to
the accused-appellant must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.
297.

Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. How (338 SCRA 511)

G.R. No. 140863 August 22, 2000

FACTS: On May 1999, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an Information for estafa against Ma. Fe
Barreiro (private respondent) based on the complaint filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc.
(petitioner). Before the scheduled arraignment of private respondent on could take place,
respondent court issued an Order, resetting the arraignment of private respondent on September 2,
1999 on the ground that private respondent had “filed an appeal with the Department of Justice
(DOJ).” Respondent court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Said order further
rescheduled the arraignment of private respondent to November 18, 1999.
Petitioner bewails the fact that six months have elapsed since private respondent
appeared or submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court and up to now she still has to
be arraigned. Respondent court allegedly violates Section 7, of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA
8493) and Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DEFYING SECTION 12, RULE 116, OF
THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

HELD: Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that:
“Section 12. Suspension of Arraignment. — The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time
thereof: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the case against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In
such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such
purpose.
(b) The court finds the existence of a valid prejudicial question.” There is nothing in the above-
quoted provision that expressly or impliedly mandates that the suspension of arraignment shall be
limited to the cases enumerated therein. Moreover, jurisprudence has clearly established that the
suspension of arraignment is not strictly limited to the two situations contemplated in said
provision.53 In fine, no grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the assailed order
suspending the arraignment of private respondent until her petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice is resolved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

298.

Dimatulac vs. Villon (297 SCRA 679)

G.R. No. 127107 October 12, 1998

Facts: On November 2005, all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Yabut went to the house of
PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Some of the accused positioned themselves around the house while the
others stood by the truck with the mayor stayed and his bodyguard. Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut
& Franncisco Yambao went inside the house strongly suggested to go down to see the mayor outside
and apologize. As Dimatulac went down, he was shot resulting to his death.
The Assistant Prosecutor found that the accused offense was only homicide not murder and
hereby subject to bail P20,000.00 for each of the accused. The herein petitioner appealed the
resolution to the Secretary of Justice. Pending appeal to the DOJ, Judge Roura hastily set the case for
arraignment.

Issue: Whether or not arraignment to lesser penalty of homicide is proper while the case is pending
in the DOJ subject for Review.
Held: NO. Indubitably then, there was on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the
filing of information of homicide, he should have ask the petitioner as regards to the status of the
appeal or warned them that the DOJ would not decide the appeal within the certain period. It is
indubitable that petitioner had the right to appeal to the Secretary of Justice. Section 4 of Rule 112 of
the rules of court provides that “If upon petition by the proper party the secretary of Justice reverses
the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal
concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting any preliminary investigation to
investigate or to dismiss or move for the dismissal of the complaint or information”. There is nothing
that forecloses the power of authority of the secretary of justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases despite information already having been filed in court. The secretary
of justice is only enjoined to refrain far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from action of the prosecutor once the complaint or information is filed in court. In Any case,
the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the secretary of justice reverses
an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. We do not hesitate to rule that court
committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the Yabut’s on the assailed
information for homicide. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set
aside arraignment. So must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void.

299.

TRINIDAD vs. VICTOR ANG (641 SCRA 214)

G.R. No. 192898 January 31, 2011

FACTS: The OCP of Masbate City, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for
Violation of B.P. 22 against the petitioners. On October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed with the DOJ a
petition for review. On March 3, 2009, the OCP filed before the MTCC of Masbate City an Information
for B.P. 22 against the petitioners. As the case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
MTCC ordered the petitioners to submit their counter affidavits and to appear in court within 10
days from receipt of the said order. The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer
Arraignment and Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest praying,
among others, for the deferment of their arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition for
review before the DOJ. The MTCC, granted the motion, “subject to paragraph (c), Section 11, Rule 116
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.” On August 10, 2009, the MTCC reconsidered this order,
and set the petitioners’ arraignment on September 10, 2009.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, but it was denied. The petitioners moved
for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule.

HELD: NO. The pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment for a
period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.—In Samson v.
Daway, 434 SCRA 612 (2004), the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is
a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the
accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. In the present case, the petitioners filed their
petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the
petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed. This period was way
beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules.

---- Note.—The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on
the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized
against him. Consequently, when accused-appellant entered a negative plea during his arraignment, the same was not binding on
the court as an indication of his innocence. Rather, it is a general denial of the charges impugned against him and an exercise of
his right to be heard of his plea. (People vs. Monteron, 378 SCRA 340 [2002])