FACTS:

This case is many topics hahahahahahaah

This case started on March 1958, when Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos
were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round
trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the
plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a
“better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated, and upon
advice of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and were transferred
to the plane’s tourist class.

After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air
France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court,
Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist
class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who
told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following:

First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene

The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the
issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be
seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent
between the parties.

Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the
note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the testimony of Carrascoso regarding the note which was not
presented in court is admissible in evidence.

HELD: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The
subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry
does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened,
the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in
the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster
incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the
hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

The court therefore holds that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible
in evidence.
 G.R. No. 122290 April 6, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REYNALDO BAGO y MADRID, accused-appellant, ARMANDO CAPARAS
y CUENCO and RODOLFO ONGSECO y VEGO, accused.

FACTS:
This stemmed when Accused Bago is a trusted employee of Azkcon and detailed with
Power Construction Supply Company in charge of the Cutting Department; and that
as such he was authorized by Mr. William Hilo, Controller Manager of Azkcon, to
pull out from the Power Construction Supply the cut materials and to deliver the
same to Azkcon;
On April 21, 1992, accused Bago, together with his co-employees, Danilo Baylosis
and Candido Querobin entered the Azkcon premises with deliveries of two cold
rolled sheets loaded in the truck. Security Guard Manangan inspected the materials in
the truck and after confirming that the materials were loaded in the truck, he stamped
the receipts upon request of accused Bago. Thereafter, accused Bago brought out
another receipt and requested Security Guard Manangan to likewise stamp the same.
Security Guard Manangan checked the goods covered by the third receipt and found
there were no cold rolled sheets for the third receipt. The third receipt carried a
different date. Security Guard Manangan asked accused Bago as to the whereabouts
of the materials covered by the third receipt and the latter replied that they had long
been delivered. Nevertheless, Security Guard Manangan stamped this last receipt
because he trusted that accused would not do anything bad;
On April 21, 1992, William Hilo, the material controller of Azkcon, discovered that
there were three (3) receipts which came in, but only two materials were delivered
inside the company compound. The materials covered by the two (2) receipts were
delivered but the materials covered by the third receipt were not. Hilo conducted an
inventory and asked accused Bago the whereabouts of the materials in question.
Accused Bago insisted that the materials had long been delivered. Hilo proceeded
with his investigation and was able to secure from the Power Construction Supply
Company Gatepass Invoice No. 51111 dated March 22, 1992 (Exh. "D") which
shows that the materials covered by the third receipt were taken out by accused Bago
from the premises of Power Construction Supply on March 23, 1992;
Hilo was able to secure from Power Construction Supply a document dated March
23, 1992 (Exh. "E") which contained information on the truck used in pulling out the
materials from Power Construction Supply on March 22, 1992. The truck bears Plate
No. PRC-513 and is not owned by Azkcon. As per copy of the certificate of
registration secured from the Land Transportation Office, the truck is owned by a
certain Ruel Fernando who has no contractual relations with Azkcon. Said vehicle is
likewise not authorized to pull out materials from the Power Construction Supply.
The trial court concluded that the foregoing circumstances lead to a reasonable
conclusion that appellant asported the materials covered by Exhibit "C".

ISSUES:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT BASED
ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVEN THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED,
REYNALDO BAGO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

RULING:
YES. Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove even by
circumstantial evidence that he asported the cold rolled sheets in question. He asserts
that these materials were delivered to Azkcon as evidenced by the receipt duly
stamped by the guard on duty. He states:
The best evidence that the materials were actually delivered at Azkcon Metal
Industries is the receipt duly stamped by the guard on duty. Res ipsa loquitor. To
receive the testimony of the security guard, that he stamped the receipt even without
the goods because he trusted the accused, would set a precedent that will eventually
convict an innocent person. After duly stamping the receipt, it is very easy for the
security guard to claim otherwise to avoid liability.
Appellant cannot rely on the best evidence rule which states:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
The rule cannot be invoked unless the content of writing is the subject of judicial
inquiry, in which case, the best evidence is the original writing itself. The rule pertains
to the admissibility of secondary evidence to prove the contents of a document. In the
case at bar, no secondary evidence is offered to prove the content of a document.
What is being questioned by appellant is the weight given by the trial court to the
testimony of Manangan over the receipt which on its face shows that the materials in
question were delivered to Azkcon's premises. Clearly, the best evidence rule finds no
application on this issue.
Second. It is well settled that before conviction can be based on circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain of events
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the
exclusion of others, as the author of the crime. Thus, the following requisites must be
met: 1) there must be more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the trial court convicted the appellant based on the chain of events.
 [G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO

FACTS:
The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior and
subsequent to the event we know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph E.
Estrada and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo were elected as president and vice-president
respectively. When the downfall of the Estrada administration due to many
controversies that was exposed in newspapers and in media , there was a call for
resignation, due to pressure President Estrada left Malacanang, and pursuant to this,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then the Vice President under Estrada’s reign took his
place. Estrada now goes to the court to contest the legitimacy of Macapagal-Arroyo’s
presidency, arguing that he never resigned as President, and hence, claims to still be
the lawful President of the Philippines. The reference by the Court to certain
newspapers reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible
evidence for being hearsay. The news account only buttressed these facts as facts. For
all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as false.
Among the pieces of evidence offered to prove that Estrada had indeed resigned from
the presidency is the Angara Diary, chronicling the last moments of Estrada in
Malacanang.

ISSUE:
Whether the Angara Diary is inadmissible as hearsay evidence? - NO.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the Angara diary is not an out of court statement but is
a part of the pleadings of the case. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Angara
diaries contained direct statements of Estrada with respect to his proposal for the
holding of a snap election, his intent to leave his post by Monday and his exasperation
over the bureaucracy, controversy and red tape. An ANALYSIS of the same leads to
the conclusion that the contents of the diary may be more accurately classified as
admissions of a party. Pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, “the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

Moreover, the statements cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence because the same
can be properly categorized as independently relevant statements. Independently
relevant statements are those which are “independent” from the truth of the
statements. Independently relevant statements may be classified into statements which
consist of the very facts in issue and those which are circumstantial evidence of the
facts in issue, such as the statements of a person showing his state of mind or
statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind
of another. Pursuant to this, it may well be said that the entries in the Angara diary
may be regarded as containing statements regarding the state of mind of Estrada,
hence constituting circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign.
 SIXTO TIMBOL Y MANALO, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JANUARIA MANALO, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
G.R. No. L-2696. May 5, 1906

FACTS:

This case started when Sixto Tambol requested the assistance of Atty. Adolfo
Garcia Feijoo, who was a resident attorney in the province of Pampanga, for the
purpose of taking the acknowledgement of the last will and testament of Cesaria
Manalo y Manalo, the mother of Sixto. The will consists of the inventory of all the
property of the Cesaria and it was declared that Sixto is one of her heirs. Sixto was
then appointed as executor without bond, and he was also given the full power to do
all things necessary for the execution of its provision, the testatrix further declared
that the prior will executed by her is null and void for non-compliance of the
requirements. Eugenio Ayuyao, Ignacio Sugay, and Pablo Torres are the witnesses of
the will. It was interpreted in Pampango by Sugay and then Torres signed the will at
the request of the testatrix who could not write.
The copy of the will containing the seal and signature of the notary public was
then admitted to the Court of First Instance for its probate. The counsel of Januaria,
Alejandra, Lino Lacson, and Sinforoso Manalo opposed the said probate. After the
examination of witnesses, the court declared the will is in accordance with the
requirements of the law which was in force in these Islands prior to the enactment of
the Code of Civil Procedure and issued the letters of administration to Sixto Timbol.
One of the oppositors appeals hence this case.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the will left by the deceased Cesarea Manalo y Manalo can be
admitted to probate through a copy only and even in the absence of original copy.

RULING:
YES. A copy of the will left by the decease Ceasarea Manalo y Manalo can be
admitted to probate. The will was executed three years before the New Civil
Procedure went into effect, however, it does not provide for a retroactive effect. It is
apparent that the will in question is a nuncupative will and is proven to be in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. It is also provided under Article
1221 of the Civil Code that:
Should the original instrument, the protocol, and the original record have
disappeared, the following shall constitute evidence:
1. First copies made by the public official who authenticated them.
2. Subsequent copies issued by virtue of a judicial mandate, after citing the persons
interested.
3. Those which, without a judicial mandate, may have been taken in the presence of
the persons interested and with their consent.

In the absence of the said copies, any other copies, thirty or more years old, shall be
the evidence, provided they have been taken from the original by the official who
authenticated them or by the other in charge of their custody.
Copies less than thirty years old, or which may be authenticated by a public official, in
which the circumstances mentioned in the preceding paragraph do not concur, shall
serve only as a basis of written evidence

It is sufficient to show either by statement or a certificate from the official who had
custody of the protocol or by any other accepted means of proof that the original was
lost. In this case, it is proven that the protocols and archives of the notary of
Pampanga were lost; hence, it is sufficient that the copy of said will although not as
old as contemplated by the law, appears to be the authenticated copy of its original
and it is certified through the presence of the seal of the notary public. Also, the
evidence presented was not successfully rebutted by the opposing parties. There is
also no legal ground for the allowance of will because it was executed in accordance
with the Civil Code.
The copy of the will presented before the court is satisfactorily considered the
best evidence to prove the fact of execution of the original will. Such copy contains
the exact recital of the original and it also bears the evidence of authenticity and
legitimacy. It is also confirmed through the testimony of the attesting witnesses.
Therefore, the ruling of the lower court is affirmed.
 MODESTO LIMJOCO and TEODORA HONSAYCO
vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS.
G.R. No. L-30528 October 25, 1929

FACTS:
This case started when spouses Modesto Limjoco and Teodora Honsayco filed
a petition to register land but it was opposed by the Director of Lands, the Director
of Forestry, Santiago Quijano, and Rafael Villaroman.

In the lower court the application was denied due to insufficiency of evidence. The
spouses filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the court reverses its dismissal
and that the case be re-opended for further evidence.

The motion was granted and the applicants was given chance to present further
evidences on the condition that the portions claimed by Santiago Quijano and Rafael
Villaroman be excluded, to which the applicant agreed.

The spouses presented pieces of evidence which is enough for the court to overrule
the opposition especially the following exhibits(Exhibit C supported the mortgage
land of Isabel Gatbonton which consist of around 800 hectares and Exhibit D shows
that it is true copy of the record of the composition of the lands in barrio of
Calauitan, which is initiated by Isabel Gatbonton and recorded in the files of Bureau
of Lands and certified by the Director of Lands) against such application and further
ordered the presentation of an amended plan excluding the lands involved in the
opposition of Santiago and Rafael.

The provincial fiscal of Pampanga in behalf of Director of Lands not satisfied with
the decision of the trial court appealed the case to the Supreme Court through bill of
exceptions.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the applicants have proved the identity of the land they allege belongs
to them and which they seek to register

RULING:
 YES. The lower court is correct in its ruling that the application for registration
should be upheld. This court held that the contention of the opposing party is without
merit because it is groundless. In the case at bar, the composition title which will
certify the Exhibit C has not been produced because said document was lost during
the confusion which resulted from the change of sovereignty. But this Court believes
that the State doubtlessly issued the composition title to Isabel Gatbonton with the
authority of the notary public and with the presentation of Exhibit D. it is clear that
Exhibit D is not the composition title itself but a true copy of the record of the
composition of the lands in barrio of Calauitan, which is initiated by Isabel
Gatbonton and recorded in the files of Bureau of Lands and certified by the Director
of Lands. Thus it is seen that the original owner of the land in question had a
composition title with the State obtained from the Spanish Government. As stated,
the ownership of this land was successively transmitted to several persons until it
came to the applicant, Modesto Limjoco. And these persons as successive owners
held possession of the land, using the lowlands as fishery, and the elevated portions
for the cultivation of rice, corn and vegetables. In referring to the cultivation of the
land, it should be noted that the talajal growing thereon which appears to have been
abandoned, was left for the purpose of shading and keeping the water of the fishery
cool.
Hence, the evidence adduced by the applicants clearly showed that the lower court is
correct in upholding that the applicant was entitled to the registration and
adjudication of the land in question. And that the failure to present the composition
title with the State cannot prejudice the applicant's right, for, its lost having been
proved, its contents could be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the collection of a witness. And in the instant case it is
evident that the recital of its contents was made in the authentic document, Exhibit C.
 G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
v.
NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGPITAppellants.

Facts:
This case stemmed when PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the
vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a suspiciously
parked taxi. They approached the taxi driver Enojas and asked for his documents.
Having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they
invited him in their mobile car to the police station for further questioning. Enojas
complied leaving his taxi behind. Upon reaching 7-11 on Zapote-Alabang Road, they
stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached
the store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and a shootout
ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to
escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death. PO2 Gregorio was
also engaged in a shootout with two more armed robbers who managed to escape. He
then went back to the patrol car and noticed that Enojas fled. Suspecting that Enojas
was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched his abandoned taxi and found a
mobile phone apparently left behind by Enojas. The police officers monitored the
incoming messages and posed as Enojas. The accused appellants were later on
arrested in an entrapment operation and were convicted of murder by RTC Las Pinas.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not
having been properly identified.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a
conviction.

Held:
1. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in
conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on
Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved
by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
 knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas,
exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap
them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in
his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them.
2. This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented
sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the accused.
 IBM PHILIPPINES VS NLRC
G.R. NO. 117221 April 13, 1999

FACTS:

This case stemmed when private Respondent filed a complaint before the
Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for
an illegal dismissal by herein petitioner, private respondent claimed that he was
not given the opportunity to be heard and was summarily dismissed. Petitioner
contend that he was given a chance or warning to improve his attitude toward
attendance but never did, and was duly informed thru emails, it also pointed
out that as an employee of IBM they are assigned ID’s and passwords,
employees may also respond/reply thru email by encoding his message-
response and admits also that the system automatically records the time and
date of each message was sent or received including the identification of the
sender and the receiver thereof. Petitioner attached to its position papers copies
of print-outs which allegedly contains computer message/entries sent by
petitioner to private respondent thru IBM’s internal computer system. Through
this computer print-outs petitioner sought to prove that private respondent was
sufficiently notified of the charges and was guilty thereof for failure to deny the
same. Prior to the release of the labor arbiter’s decision private respondent filed
a “Motion to admit attached new evidence for the complainant”. The Labor
arbiter’s decision upheld the print-out attached by petitioner as evidence and
promulgated a resolution ordering petitioner to pay private respondent salary
from June 1 to August 31, 1990 excluding all benefits. Aggrieved with the
decision private respondent appealed to the NLRC which ordered
reinstatement to complainant to its former position with his seniority rights,
backwages from August 31, 1990 in the amount of P40, 516, 65 a month
including all its benefits and bonuses. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Did NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that no just

cause or due process was observed in dismissing private respondent because
computer print-outs are inadmissible in evidence?
RULING:

Petitioner contend that in administrative /labor cases the technical rules

on evidence are not binding hence, the computer print-outs need not be
identified nor authenticated, same reason why private respondent was allowed
to submit additional evidences even after the case was deemed submitted for
resolution. However, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is
subject to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process; this
procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain
fundamental evidenciary rules. The evidence presented before us must be at
least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value.
The computer print-outs, which constitute only evidence of petitioners, afford
no assurance of their authenticity since they are unsigned. The liberal view in
the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have nonetheless
consistently required some PROOF OF AUTHENTICITY OR
RELIABILITY as condition for the admission of documents. The procedural
technicality and concerns are more paramount principles and requirements of
due process, which may not be sacrificed to speed or expediency, Article 22 of
the Labor Code which states that “…DUE PROCESS MUST NEVER BE
SUBORDINATED TO EXPEDIENCY OR DISPATCH”
 [A.M. No. CA-05-18-P. April 12, 2005]
ZALDY NUEZ, complainant, vs. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent.

Facts:

Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainant’s reinstatement but
a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by
the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his
former job pending adjudication of the case. Desiring an expeditious decision
of his case, Nuez sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004
after learning of the latter’s employment with the CA from her sister,
Magdalena David. Nuez communicated to the respondent through telephone
conversation and text messages. A week after their first telephone conversation,
respondent allegedly told complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of
his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision was in
return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he
had been jobless for a long time and August of 2004, he sought the assistance
of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-
SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. Thereafter,
he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking
for the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that
respondent’s offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was
formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.

On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in
person at the 2nd Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., the place where the
entrapment operation was later conducted. Respondent was brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found positive
for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money. She was later
detained at the WPD Headquarters.
As evidence, complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction
with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee
that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a
favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not the text messages may be admitted as evidence.

Held:

The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same
are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
which provides:

"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text

messagesand other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is
not recorded or retained."

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral

electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ."

In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore
had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.
Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in
complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers.
Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the
text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and
attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is
also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative
value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof
of respondent in this case.
Complainant’s testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on
the latter’s demand for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by
the testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador
who was present when the parties met in person. Siringan was privy to the
parties’ actual conversation since she accompanied complainant on both
meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.

Respondent’s evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and

sister as well as an acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and
complainant first met. Respondent’s own testimony consisted of bare denials
and self-serving claims that she did not remember either the statements she
herself made or the contents of the messages she sent. Respondent had a very
selective memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were
propounded by the Committee.

When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in
complainant’s cellphone and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent
admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not remember
those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.
 MAGTOLIS
VS
CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
A.M. No. CA-05-20-P; September 9, 2005

Facts:
Respondent is charged and held liable for offenses on inefficiency and incompetence
of official duty; conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
directly and indirectly having financial and material interest in an official transaction
considering his undue interest in the service of the order of release and actual release
of Melchor Lagua.

Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City. Lagua’s petition for bond was approved in a
Resolution where the appellate court directed the issuance of an order of release in
favor of Lagua. The resolution was brought to the office of Atty. Madarang, Division
Clerk of Court, for promulgation.
Respondent served the resolution and order of release of Lagua at the National
Penitentiary, where Lagua was detained for homicide.
Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who
introduced herself as Lagua’s relative, asking how much more they had to give to
facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty, and that they sought the help of a certain
Rhodora Valdez of RTC Pasig, but was told that they still had a balance. When Atty.
Madarang was able to get the mobile number of respondent, he represented himself
as Lagua’s relative and exchanged text messages with said respondent for a possible
pay-off for the Lagua’s provisional liberty. Atty. Madarang later discovered that the
respondent did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release
upon the accused-appellant and his counsel. but gave them to a certain Art Baluran,
allegedly Lagua’s relative.

Later on, Complainant called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the
respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other
case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution and order of release
intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran. Complainant then lodged the
complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003.
Issue:
Whether or not the admission of the text messages as evidence against respondent
Salud constitutes a violation of his right to privacy

Held:
No. The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence
against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages
have been classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k),
Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of
a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.” Any
question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the
respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of
the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-
Apao. In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking
for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the
CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now
covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text

messages and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not
recorded or retained.”
 ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010
Facts:
Complainant Irish Sagud and accused Rustan Ang were sweethearts. However,
Irish broke up with him when she learned he had taken a live-in partner whom he had
gotten pregnant. Rustan convinced her to elope with him for he did not love the
woman whom he was about to marry, but Irish rejected the proposal. She changed
her cellphone number but Rustan managed to get hold of it and send her text
messages.
Irish received through multimedia message a picture of a naked woman with spread
legs and with her face superimposed on the figure. The sender’s cellphone number,
stated in the message, was one of the numbers used by Rustan. After she got the
obscene picture, she received text messages from Rustan threatening her that he will
spread the picture he sent through the Internet.
Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone number he
used in sending the picture and text message. She asked him to meet her at a resort
and he did. Upon parking his motorcycle and walking towards Irish, the police
intercepted and arrested him. The police seized his cellphone and several SIM cards.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture
presented in the case.
Held:
YES. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA. Rustan claims that the
obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Electronic Evidence.

The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the
pictures on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed
to have waived such ground for objection.
 Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.
Petition denied.
 LAPULAPU FOUNDATION VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004]
FACTS:
This case stemmed when petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President Lapulapu
Foundation,Inc., obtained four loans from Allied Banking Corporation covered by
four promissory notes in the amounts of P100, 000 each. When the entire obligation
became due, it was not paid despite demands by the bank. The Bank filed with the
RTC a complaint seeking payment by Lapulapu Foundation and Elias Tan, jointly and
solidarily, of the sum representing their loan obligation, exclusive of interests, penalty
charges, attorney’s fees and costs
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner Foundation denied incurring
indebtedness from the respondent Bank alleging that the loans were obtained by
petitioner Tan in his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit and it never
authorized petitioner Tan to co-sign in his capacity as its President any promissory
note thus it never benefited, directly or indirectly, therefrom. The petitioner
Foundation then interposed a cross-claim against petitioner Tan alleging that he,
having exceeded his authority, should be solely liable for said loans, and a
counterclaim against the respondent Bank for damages and attorney’s fees.
For his part, petitioner Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the
respondent Bank in his personal capacity. The parties, however, agreed that the loans
were to be paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares of common stocks in the
Lapulapu Industries Corporation, a real estate firm. The loans were covered by
promissory notes which were automatically renewable every year at an amount
including unpaid interests, until such time as petitioner Tan was able to pay the same
from the proceeds of his aforesaid shares.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor the Allied Banking Corporation and
Requiring the Elias Q. Tan and Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., to pay jointly and
solidarily litigation expenses of P1, 000.00 plus costs of the suit.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the court a quo by
deleting the award of attorney’s fees in favor of the respondent Bank for being
without basis.
Further, the CA found that there are two (2) demand letters on different dates was
made by the respondent Bank, asking settlement of the obligation were sent and was
received by the petitioners as shown by the registry return cards presented during trial
in the court a quo.
However it was denied by the petitioner and did not recognize the signatures thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is enough to overcome the
disputable presumption that a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the
regular course of mail (par. V, Section 3, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence)
Held: NO, the presumption still holds.
There is no dispute that the promissory notes had already matured. However, the
petitioners insist that the loans had not become due and demandable as they deny
receipt of the respondent Banks demand letters. When presented the registry return
cards during the trial, petitioner Tan claimed that he did not recognize the signatures
thereon. The petitioner’s allegation and denial are self-serving. They cannot prevail
over the registry return cards which constitute documentary evidence and which enjoy
the presumption that, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, these
were regularly issued by the postal officials in the performance of their official duty
and that they acted in good faith. Further, as the CA correctly opined, mails are
presumed to have been properly delivered and received by the addressee in the regular
course of the mail. As the CA noted, there is no showing that the addresses on the
registry return cards were wrong. It is the petitioner’s burden to overcome the
presumptions by sufficient evidence, and other than their barefaced denial, the
petitioners failed to support their claim that they did not receive the demand letters;
therefore, no prior demand was made on them by the respondent Bank.