Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the
House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election."2 The
mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent
is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8:4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED

IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and
seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same
day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of

Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing
of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or
before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's
Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed
with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she
noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to

register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District
of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing
a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition
with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his
purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the
congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other
Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious
that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict
of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful,
free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2
to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA
95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March
31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues,
namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline
for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency
requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed
word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be
allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual
and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in
the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since
childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is
Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always
intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned.
Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she
has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that
she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed
when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow
respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never
disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in
Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest

mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE.
Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of
origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not
cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she
thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is
not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates
about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly
of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent
fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or

misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be

made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance
of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the
"inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or
deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly
conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment
cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation.
The change in the number of years of residence in the place where
respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her
qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate
material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the
filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the
shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of
the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her
residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow
an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical
accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her
certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that
she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the
said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by
her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24,
1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List
of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time,
starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only
sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to
believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy

cannot be admitted by this Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear
that respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of
the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as

synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends
to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs.
RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to
the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San
Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila
and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First
District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of
qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot
hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her
affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years
after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959,
after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan,
Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served
as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not
have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of
Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office
of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with
the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation
of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-
registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts
manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her
claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the
First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make

Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on
 several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she
spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned
such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the
case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one
acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be
animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay
in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of
that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she
spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be
conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect
that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the
accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice
of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her
conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban.
Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had
been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First
District of Leyte "since childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of
the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed
out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No.
18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six
months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it
refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she
was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa
leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the
district for six months only. 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified
to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission

RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised
therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event
that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner
alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833
votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the
First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner
comes to this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may
be classified into two general areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995
elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in

disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election
Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed

exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the
May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the
application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake
the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an
elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic
20
this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to
which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts
and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when
the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes
such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly
normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to

indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place
of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a
case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected
does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that
in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change
of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election
law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971

Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the
place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a
candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
 Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of
not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think

Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time
to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially

considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says
that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick
to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election
law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the
residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance
is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First
Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word
"seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading
to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted
petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These
circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that
she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private
respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close
look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence
(Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,

Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________
Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay
in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances
surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means
more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of
Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains
that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few
decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of
her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In
1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila,"
the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does
not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been
a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which
this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own
house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever
had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or
with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other
municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and
 provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter
municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as
the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other
places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election
is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire
to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his
professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as
he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the
opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially
in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his
home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may
be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural
desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong
feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive
proof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition
that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her
domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the
deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's
domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in
the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated
from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now
Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in
Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in
Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband
lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,
when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines,
she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to
Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines
 and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the
benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings
and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with
either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the
history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely
ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest
of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin
because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in
1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her
domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new
one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte
was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her
father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and

establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case
at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation
of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a
clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino,
writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and

residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in
residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical,
independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court
may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they
affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon
marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su

residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de
esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais
extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to
another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance
more consistent with the concept of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be
reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article
109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:

Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This
takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in
one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with

reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of
some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration
of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are
used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence
of a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in
place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the
place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been
established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently,
even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common
matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses
could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a
residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original
domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held
that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband
during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that
the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an
event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her
husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that
the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques
de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses
to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such
rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that
an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an
order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to
live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the
courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in
England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution
of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts
 were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree,
enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the
delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this
practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to
enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883,
Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a
decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be
enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished
the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in
appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a
stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far
as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code
of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the
State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to

have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a
wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to
do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in
her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the
ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her
from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp.
1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the
marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences
that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her
property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which
of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed
any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil
Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in
an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article
110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the
spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under
the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil
Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence
should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage
and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of
origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's
permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an
act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having
been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various
parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover,
and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either
reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it
would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death
of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the
subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this
point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the
election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate
the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated
it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs.
Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often

determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury
 results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the
law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute

containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be
entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory
provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting
the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the
mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of
the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the
statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a
decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in
the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely
on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.
881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a
pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that
the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to
ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in
a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established
principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-
EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA
ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she
justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the
past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications
to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED

SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoralty elections. In the May 1995
elections, he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He
assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 and he was ordered
to vacate the post by reason of a COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election
protest filed against him which declared his opponent Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor of San
Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term. Again, on May 11,
1998 elections, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21,
1998, his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify the petitioner from running
for mayor of San Antonio on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same
post. On May 13, 1998, the petitioner was proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the First Division
of the COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition which was also affirmed by the
COMELEC En Banc.
Hence, this petition.
The Court ruled that the two requisites for the application of the three-term rule in this case
were absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in
the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term
by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the
contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost
in the May 1995 mayoralty elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null
and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of valid
election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by the Court that a
proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all while a proclaimed candidate
may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents contention that
the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he
served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregarded the second
requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e. that he had fully served three consecutive
terms.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999]

ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION

ON ELECTION and EUFEMIO MULI, repondents.

SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; TERM OF OFFICE; THREE
 TERM RULE; INTENDED TO FORESTALL ACCUMULATION OF MASSIVE POLITICAL
POWER. - The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now
embodied in Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective
local government official from running for the same position after serving three consecutive terms. The said
disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective
local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also
considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to
infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of
nine years. The mayor was compared by some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief
executive of his political territory and is most likely to form a political dynasty. The drafters however, recognized
and took note of the fact that some local government officials run for office before they reach forty years of age;
thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive
the people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local
government official should be barred from running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus
of at least one term, he may again run for the same office.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REFERS TO OFFICIAL ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE BY REASON OF ELECTION.
- The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials with the exception of barangay officials
from serving more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in the case of Benjamin Borja, Jr., vs.
COMELEC and Jose Capco, Jr. where the issue raised was whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of
the mayor by operation of law upon the death of the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term
should be considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of computing the three term limit. The
court pointed out that from the discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates
proceeded from the premise that the officials assumption of office is by reason of election.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TWO CONDITIONS FOR APPLICATION OF DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON
THEREOF. - This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCLAMATION SUBSEQUENTLY DECLARED VOID IS NO
PROCLAMATION AT ALL; CASE AT BAR. - After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots
the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor
cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been
repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while
a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is
only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Petitioner
Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he
was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later
overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in May 1995 mayoral elections.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INVOLUNTARY SEVERANCE FROM OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME
AMOUNTS TO AN INTERRUPTION OF CONTINUITY OF SERVICE; CASE AT BAR. - The petitioner
cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before
the expiration of the term. The respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one
full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it;
it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt
to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation
of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by
voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC
 to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
6. ID.; ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NOT DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION BY REASON OF
PROCLAMATION OR ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE OF CANDIDATE AGAINST WHOM PETITION
FOR DISQUALIFICATION IS PENDING. - The petitioners contention that the COMELEC ceased to have
jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant
petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 elections and was resolved on
May 21, 1998 or after the petitioners proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC and Trinidad
that the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is
pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and
to resolve it on the merits.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. - This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should
continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The
outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved
after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may
encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been
proclaimed.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the
resolutions issued by the COMELEC First Division dated May 21, 1998 and by the COMELEC
En Banc dated August 11, 1998 in SPA 98-190 entitled, In the matter of the Petition to Disqualify
Mayoralty Candidate Romeo Lonzanida of San Antonio, Zambales. Eufemio Muli, petitioner, vs.
Romeo Lonzanida, respondent. The assailed resolutions declared herein petitioner Romeo
Lonzanida disqualified to run for Mayor in the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales in the May
1998 elections and that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted and if he has been proclaimed
winner the said proclamation is declared null and void.
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections
Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed
office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his
then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections. The court
ruled:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court hereby renders judgment declaring the results of the election
for the office of the mayor in San Antonio, Zambales last May 8, 1995 as null and void on the ground that
there was a failure of election.
Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby declared
vacant.
Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved the
election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots
declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his
favor totaling 1,720 votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the
COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which obeyed, and
Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of
San Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify
Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had
served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was
proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned
resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for
the same post for the fourth time. The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by
virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of
the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under
the Constitution and the Local Government Code. The finding of the COMELEC First Division
was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11, 1998.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding him
disqualified to run for mayor of San Antonio Zambales in the 1998 elections. He maintains that he
was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995
cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995
elections as evidenced by the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 in EAC no. 6-97
entitled Juan Alvez, Protestant-Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida, Protestee-Appellant, wherein the
COMELEC declared Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner
also argues that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification
after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections; as the proper remedy is a petition
for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure.
Private respondent Eufemio Muli filed comment to the petition asking this court to sustain the
questioned resolutions of the COMELEC and to uphold its jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification. The private respondent states that the petition for disqualification was filed on
April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 mayoral elections. Under section 6, RA 6646 and Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure petitions for disqualification filed with the COMELEC
before the elections and/or proclamation of the party sought to be disqualified may still be herd
and decided by the COMELEC after the election and proclamation of the said party without
distinction as to the alleged ground for disqualification, whether for acts constituting an election
offense or for ineligibility. Accordingly, it is argued that the resolutions of the COMELEC on the
merits of the petition for disqualification were issued within the commissions jurisdiction. As
regards the merits of the case, the private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of
office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of
mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral
elections.
The Solicitor-General filed comment to the petition for the respondent COMELEC praying
for the dismissal of the petition. The Solicitor-General stressed that section 8, Art. X of the
Constitution and section 43 (b), Chapter I of the Local Government Code which bar a local
government official from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position speaks
of service of a term and so the rule should be examined in this light. The public respondent
contends that petitioner Lonzanida discharged the rights and duties of mayor from 1995 to 1998
which should be counted as service of one full term, albeit he was later unseated, because he served
as mayor for the greater part of the term. The issue of whether or not Lonzanida served as a de jure
or de facto mayor for the 1995-1998 term is inconsequential in the application of the three term
limit because the prohibition speaks of service of a term which was intended by the framers of the
Constitution to foil any attempt to monopolize political power. It is likewise argued by the
respondent that a petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court is proper when the petition
for disqualification is filed after the elections and so the instant petition for disqualification which
was filed before the elections may be resolved by the COMELEC thereafter regardless of the
imputed basis of disqualification.
The petitioner filed Reply to the comment. It is maintained that the petitioner could not have
served a valid term from 1995 to 1998 although he assumed office as mayor for that period because
he was no t lawfully elected to the said office. Moreover, the petitioner was unseated before the
expiration of the term and so his service for the period cannot be considered as one full term. As
regards the issue of jurisdiction, the petitioner reiterated in his Reply that the COMELEC ceased
to have jurisdiction to hear the election protest after the petitioners proclamation.
The petition has merit.
Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected.
The issue before us is whether petitioner Lonzanidas assumption of office as mayor of San
Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term
for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is
now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar
to any elective local government official from running for the same position after serving three
consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation
of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to
perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of
the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political
arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. The
mayor was compared by some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief
executive of his political territory and is most likely to form a political dynasty. i The drafters
however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials run for office
before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office
after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from.
As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred
from running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term,
he may again run for the same office.ii
The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective officials with the exception of
barangay officials from serving more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in the
case of Benjamin Borja, Jr., vs. COMELEC and Jose Capco, Jr.iii where the issue raised was
whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of law upon the death
of the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term should be considered to have served
a term in that office for the purpose of computing the three term limit. This court pointed out that
from the discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates proceeded
from the premise that the officials assumption of office is by reason of election. This Court stated:iv
Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first
is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a
prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the
people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the
assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. This is clear from the following
exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI sections 4
and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will
allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before-if the Gentlemen will remember-was: How
long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is
six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during
the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third
year or on the sixth year thereafter, his particular member of the Senate can run. So it is not really
a period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committees stand.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC
that Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of
election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such officials
from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective
official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which the the official concerned
was elected. The purpose of the provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of
terms an elective official may serve.
This Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms
as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995
elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He
assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was
ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the
election protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected
mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second,
the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the
COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995
mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by
reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all v and while a proclaimed candidate may
assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. vi
Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to
March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive
winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality
that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because
he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents contention
that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because
he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second
requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of
the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation
of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term porvided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the
full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a
term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding
him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set
aside.
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his
then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners
incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be
imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any
political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was
not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was
pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial
courts decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume
office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to
have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis
to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding
mayoral election.
The petitioners contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition
for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for
disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 elections and was resolved on
May 21, 1998 or after the petitioners proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC
and Trinidadvii that the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a
petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of
jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:
Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial
and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The
outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained
unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward
the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of
the petition until after he has been proclaimed.
The court stated:
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word shall signified that
this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced.
Theimplication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case
even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which
remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre vs. Duavit in effect disallows what R. A. No. 6646
imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be
countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings
of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or
administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body
or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy
between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to forsee. A candidate guilty of
election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of
thedisqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason
caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate
sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that
the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided before the
election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the
law.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest
the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the
disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held-
Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power.
It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private
respondents petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass
and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to COMELEC xxx Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded
from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office
thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate
from running or, if elected. From serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously,
the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed
condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC
declaring petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are
hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009

ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

We grant Rosalinda A. Penera’s (Penera) motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11
September 2009 (Decision).

The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008
of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second
Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.

In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:

1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA
8436 as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369.

2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial

evidence against Penera for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has
consistently disputed the charge of premature campaigning.

4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as

admitting she engaged in premature election campaigning.

Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The second
sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides
that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy." The immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful
acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period." These two provisions determine the resolution of this case.

The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate
of candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already
consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the
promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which
he/she may be disqualified."1

Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of
the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers
the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts
done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. lawphil

The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.

The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that a person who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this Court
explained:

Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a
person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the
campaign period.

The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one
who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his
certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period
has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.

Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day,
which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign
period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day.
Before such last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On
the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to
apply since Section 80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.

Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to
acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one
candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for
elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.

There is no dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were
committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his
certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he committed those acts
before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of
candidacy to 120 days before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from 23 March
2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial question is: did this change in the deadline
for filing the certificate of candidacy make one who filed his certificate of candidacy before 2 January
2004 immediately liable for violation of Section 80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisan
political activities prior to the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?

Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:

SECTION 11. Official Ballot. – The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot
which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in
an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be
arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space
where the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate
the official ballot shall be provided.

Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.

For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/
manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days
before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and
vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding
to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided,
finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of
candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the party-
list system as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list
system shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for
other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.

The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which
the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon
certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the
printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens’ arms of the Commission
may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.

To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the
serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by
inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that
identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are
provided on the ballot.

The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1)
ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.

Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to
give ample time for the printing of official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the
Bicameral Conference Committee:

SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the same[,]
uniform for local and national officials?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the present
periods.

SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, he’s already a
candidate, and there are many prohibited acts on the part of candidate.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .

SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began (sic).

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we don’t provide that the filing of the certificate will not
bring about one’s being a candidate.

SENATOR GONZALES. If that’s a fact, the law cannot change a fact.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the certificate of
candidacy will not result in that official vacating his position, we can also provide that insofar he is
concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yet commence. Because here, the
reason why we are doing an early filing is to afford enough time to prepare this machine readable
ballots.

So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will
withdraw its proposal and will agree to the 120-day period provided in the Senate version.

THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

xxxx

SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan acts which
apply immediately upon being a candidate?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this provision is just to afford the
Comelec enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not intend to change the campaign
periods as presently, or rather election periods as presently fixed by existing law.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other prohibition.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). That’s right.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no conflict anymore
because we are talking about the 120-day period before election as the last day of filing a certificate
of candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. So that is election period already. But he will still
not be considered as a candidate.

Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots,
Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended
the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become
immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent
prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to
meet the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x
x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still
not be considered as a candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)

Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until
the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who
explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an automated
election system. There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine
into law, realizing that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that —

The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law"
prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a
candidate."4 (Emphasis supplied)

Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline
required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan
political act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress
expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended
Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:

xxx

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files
his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing and
underlining supplied)

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second
sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled
by this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot
without repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second
sentence.

The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any
portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision
considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory — reversing Lanot
but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In
so doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second
sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 15 of RA 8436. The original provision in RA 8436 states —

x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.

In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads —
x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election
offenses can be committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly
means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.

When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these
provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots,
until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.

We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:

x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read
together with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "‘candidate’ refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to
merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because "any person
who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus
file a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of
candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining one’s
possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no "election
campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to
the start of the campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law
does not consider Penera a candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted
a day before the start of the campaign period. x x x

The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera
filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009
only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a
candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March
2007, the date when she became a "candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan
political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are
within the realm of a citizen’s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the
campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the
campaign period.5

The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the first proviso in the third
paragraph, the amended Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to candidates take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The Decision states that:

x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period," does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be
committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the
pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the
start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with
impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a
candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described
under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity,
However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign
period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign
period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.
Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a
candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature
campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about
to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature
campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.6 (Emphasis
supplied)

It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is
specially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow
grounds involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does
not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for
Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan
activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that
"any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period." The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the
start of the campaign period, are lawful.

In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may
be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts
before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of
the law.

The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified
or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law
says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan
political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start
of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a
candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the
campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before
the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign
period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the
Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void
for vagueness.

Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of
the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law
that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be
considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that
"any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period."

The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court
but the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and
express as the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third
paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration. We SET

ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as
the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the
COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor
of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., G.R. No. 184836

DANILO B. FALLER AND
FERDINAND N. TALABONG,
Petitioners,
PUNO, C J.,

CARPIO,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus -
VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,
 BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD, and

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

WILFREDO F. ASILO,

Respondents.
Promulgated:

December 23, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of

office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and
Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?

The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension

is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide
complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the
three-term limit rule.

The present petitionii seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

THE ANTECEDENTS

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In
September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however,
subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the
functions of his office and finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners)
sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he
had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated
the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA
7160.

The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its
Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as
Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the
Sandiganbayan had ordered.

The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its October
7, 2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the following ISSUES:

1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the

three-term limit rule; and

2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as

contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160

Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive suspension constituted
an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

General Considerations
 The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of the
Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an elective
officials term. To be sure, preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public
official, has been mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on Elections.ii Doctrinally,
however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with the
application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective official acquired by succession.

a. The Three-term Limit Rule:

The Constitutional Provision Analyzed

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any
difference in wording does not assume any significance in this case.
 As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits
an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch
of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.

Significantly, this provision refers to a term as a period of time three years during which
an official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,ii a Resolution promulgated
on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a term connotes, as follows:

The word term in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which
the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the
term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of
the officers term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and
authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the
most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by
the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis
supplied].

A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,ii reiterated that [T]he term means the time during
which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another.

The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. This formulation no more than three
consecutive terms is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives
no exact indication of what to serve. . . three consecutive terms exactly connotes, the meaning is
clear reference is to the term, not to the service that a public official may render. In other words,
the limitation refers to the term.
 The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it
expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This declaration
complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.

A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect continuity of service for
a full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does
not serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase voluntary renunciation, by
itself, is not without significance in determining constitutional intent.

The word renunciation carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to

give up, abandon, decline, or resign.ii It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to
an act that operates from the outside. Read with the definition of a term in mind, renunciation, as
mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that
results in cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word voluntary
linked together with renunciation signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderees own freely
exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of the
three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to
be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.

The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the term
voluntary renunciation shed further light on the extent of the term voluntary renunciation:

MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the

Committee? This term voluntary renunciation does not appear in Section 3 [of
Article VI]; it also appears in Section 6 [of Article VI].
 MR DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution.

Could the Committee please enlighten us exactly what voluntary renunciation
mean? Is this akin to abandonment?

MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot

circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term.

MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary

renunciation is more general than abandonment and resignation?

MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.ii

From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the term voluntary
renunciation, the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize
to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary renunciation has been rendered
unavailable as a mode of defeating the three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the
constitutional provision, we note further that Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the
negative formulation of the first branch of the provision and the inflexible interpretation that it
suggests.

This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances
surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high
priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be
defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth. We view preventive
suspension vis--vis term limitation with this firm mindset.

b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the

Three-term Limit Rule

 Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts
within the provisions contemplation, particularly on the interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term that it speaks of.

Lonzanida v. Commission on Electionsii presented the question of whether the

disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to
be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term
had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for
the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three
consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said:

The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of
a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel
the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner
vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued
by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]

Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of
title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.

Ong v. Alegreii and Rivera v. COMELEC,ii like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of
whether there had been a completed term for purposes of the three-term limit disqualification.
These cases, however, presented an interesting twist, as their final judgments in the electoral
contest came after the term of the contested office had expired so that the elective officials in these
cases were never effectively unseated.

Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly
elected), the Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule based on the following premises: (1) the final decision that
the third-termer lost the election was without practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and
continuously exercised the functions of the office from the start to the end of the term. The Court
noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view that the official (referring
to the winner in the election protest) would, under the three-term rule, be considered to have served
a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served
the term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. This factual variation led
the Court to rule differently from Lonzanida.

In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost
the election contest was merely a caretaker of the office or a mere de facto officer. The Court
obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when
an official fully served in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as caretaker or
de facto officer, he exercised the powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him
to stay on indefinitely.

Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of
what they directly imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still
gave full effect to the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit
elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it
guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term
limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.

Adormeo v. Commission on Electionsii dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term limit
disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the disqualification applies if the
official lost in the regular election for the supposed third term, but was elected in a recall election
covering that term. The Court upheld the COMELECs ruling that the official was not elected for
three (3) consecutive terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a
private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the election
for the third term.

Socrates v. Commission on Electionsii also tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit
disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run
for a fourth term, he did not participate in the election that immediately followed his third term. In
this election, the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 years
after Mayor Socrates assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated against
him, leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor
in the recall election, but Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn)
had fully served three terms prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run
because of the three-term limit rule. We decided in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek

immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is
no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.

When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective
 local officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election
after three terms, or whether there would be no immediate reelection after three
terms.

xxxx

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a

fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way
in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate reelection after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office.
What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.ii

Latasa v. Commission on Electionsii presented the novel question of whether a municipal

mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run as city mayor in light of the
intervening conversion of the municipality into a city. During the third term, the municipality was
converted into a city; the cityhood charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality
shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were
held for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city
did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the
office of the city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the
municipality; the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for
3 consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held
power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The Court said:

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically

included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern
them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power
over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the
same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after
having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously
 defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be
allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner
would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.ii

Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and

Socrates, that no three-term limit violation results if a rest period or break in the
service between terms or tenure in a given elective post intervened. In Lonzanida,
the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective office for a few
months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the
private respondents lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months,
respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the law contemplates a complete
break from office during which the local elective official steps down and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit.

Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on

Elections,ii where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-
mayor by operation of law. The question posed when he subsequently ran for councilor was
whether his assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his term as councilor that would
place him outside the operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had
intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the results
in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective official continued to hold public office and did
not become a private citizen during the interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with
the rest, however, is that the elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher
post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption
that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
 c. Conclusion Based on Law

and Jurisprudence

From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an elective
official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title
to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however
short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article
X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay
in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example and
standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand,
temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if
involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve
the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while
retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by
law.

An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to
hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs
during an office holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions
for reasons established by law. Of course, the term failure to serve cannot be used once the right
to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that
none is really lost.
 To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by structure
and substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in office to three
consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as
an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of term,
not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective
position. The voluntary renunciation it speaks of refers only to the elective officials voluntary
relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary cessation
of the exercise of power or authority that may occur for various reasons, with preventive
suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:ii

Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official
steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
[Emphasis supplied].

Preventive Suspension and

the Three-Term Limit Rule

a. Nature of Preventive Suspension

Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code,ii the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act,ii or the Ombudsman Actii is an interim remedial measure to address the
situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence
preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
 Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code when the evidence of
guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in
office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the records and other evidence. Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed
after a valid information (that requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court, while
under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence
of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not
vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual
finding of guilt or liability.

Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled

conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the
individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary
prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the officials office; the official is reinstated to the
exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary
incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is
preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.

That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the
exercise of all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and the laws. The imposition of
preventive suspension, however, is not an unlimited power; there are limitations built into the
lawsii themselves that the courts can enforce when these limitations are transgressed, particularly
when grave abuse of discretion is present. In light of this well-defined parameters in the imposition
of preventive suspension, we should not view preventive suspension from the extreme situation
that it can totally deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an
effective interruption of an election officials term.

Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective
officials service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive
suspension involves protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents the
office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other
hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in office without any break.
Its companion concept interruption of a term on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If
preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this
common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even
on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by
its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of
term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.

b. Preventive Suspension and

the Intent of the Three-Term

Limit Rule

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office
beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions
and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term
is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by
equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term
that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or
involuntary some of them personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily
prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that
preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the
enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office
holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office.
Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within
a term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective
interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in
implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be
interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of
the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an
effective interruption is.

c. Preventive Suspension and

Voluntary Renunciation
 Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a
voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have
voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this
perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary
renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office
as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office
demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary
renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not
the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and non-
comparable.

But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important
consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.

Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render
service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not
allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.

Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term
and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat,
however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it
be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does
not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily
fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been
imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term
can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution
expressly disallows as an interruption.
Conclusion

To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed

preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials
term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth
term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no
less than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.ii

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly

NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared
DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth
term. Costs against private respondent Asilo.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Manila

EN BANC

P.E.T. Case No. 001 February 13, 1996

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, protestant,

vs.
FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS, protestee.
RESOLUTION

In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Miriam
Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be
dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed completed.

We deferred action on that motion and required the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their
respective memoranda on the issue of whether this case had been rendered moot by the election of
the Protestant as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on 30
June 1995.

The Protestant answers this issue in the negative. Relying on Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,1
Lomugdang vs. Javier,2 and De Castro vs. Ginete,3 she asserts that an election contest involves not
only an adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates, but more
importantly, the paramount need to dispel, once and for all, the uncertainty that beclouds the true
choice of the electorate. Hence, it is imbued with public interest and should be pursued to its final
conclusion to determine the bona fide winner. She further asserts that an election case may be
rendered moot only if the term of the contested office has expired,4 thus her election as Senator and
assumption of office as such cannot, under the rule laid down in Moraleja vs. Relova,5 be construed
as an abandonment of the instant protest. Finally, she alleges that this Court has departed from the
orthodox view that a case should be dismissed if it has been mooted.6

For his part, the Protestee submits that there is strong legal basis for this Tribunal to rule that the
Protestant is deemed to have abandoned the instant protest, in light of the ruling in Dimaporo vs.
Mitra7 which construed Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).8 He submits,
however, that public interest requires that this protest be resolved on the merits considering that: (a)
it involves a matter of paramount and grave public interest; and (b) it was filed merely to keep
Protestant Santiago in the limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. He likewise claims
that a resolution on the merits would confirm his victory in the 11 May 1992 presidential election and
prove that the instant protest is unfounded. Further more, it would establish guiding and controlling
principles or doctrines with respect to presidential election protest cases, thereby educating the
bench and the bar and preventing the indiscriminate filing of baseless protest cases.

We cannot subscribe to the view of the Protestee that by filing her certificate of candidacy for
Senator Protestant Santiago ipso facto forfeited her claim to the office of President pursuant to
Section 67 of B.P. Blg. 881. Plainly, the said section applies exclusively to an incumbent elective
official who files a certificate of candidacy for any office "other than the one he is holding in a
permanent capacity." Even more plain is that the Protestant was not the incumbent President at the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy for Senator nor at any time before that. Thus, the holding in
Dimaporo does not apply to the Protestant.

Neither do we find any convincing logic to the Protestee's proposition that this case should
nevertheless be resolved on the merits because its filing was done in bad faith, i.e., merely to keep
the Protestant in the limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. If that were so, then public
interest would be served if this case were put to an abrupt end after the Protestant won a seat in the
Senate. Finally, neither do we find any cogent nor compelling reason to proceed with this case, in
the event that we find it to be moot, simply to establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines
with respect to election protests involving the office of the President or the Vice-President.

I.
The key then to the resolution of the aforestated issue is the consideration of public interest and
public policy and their encompassing effects on election cases which have been unequivocally
expressed in the cases cited by the Protestant.

In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,9 this Court stated:

It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication
and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount
need of dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the
electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within
their gift, is a proceeding imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over
and above ordinary civil actions. For this reason, broad perspectives of public policy
impose upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their
command who is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible,
without being fettered by technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will
of the people may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al., G.R. L-17512, December
29, 1960; Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So inextricably
intertwined are the interests of the contestants and those of the public that there can
be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition that even the voluntary cessation in
office of the protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him or the character of an
adversary in the contest inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep his political
opponent out of the office and maintain therein his successor, but also does not in
any manner impair or detract from the jurisdiction of the court to pursue the
proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595, 597;
Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584, 587; Galves vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206).

Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the
proceedings in the election protest filed against him, and it may be stated as a rule
that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite
the death of the protestee. (In Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 520 [1967], where the
trial court proceeded with the trial of an election protest and decided it even if the
protestee had already died and his Vice-Mayor had assumed office by succession,
this Court, instead of dismissing the appeal brought on behalf of the deceased
protestee, required the Vice-Mayor to intervene on the side of the appellant)

In Lomugdang vs. Javier,10 this Court declared:

Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with
public interest, wherefore, public policy demands that an election contest, duly
commenced, be not abated by the death of the contestant. We have squarely so
ruled in Sibulo vda. de Mesa vs. Judge Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, October 26,
1966, in the same spirit that led this Court to hold that the ineligibility of the protestant
is not a defense (Caesar vs. Garrido, 53 Phil. 57), and that the protestee's cessation
in office is not a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor detract the Court's
jurisdiction to decide the case (Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595; Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584).

In the same Sibulo case, already cited, this Court likewise ruled that by virtue of
Section 7, Republic Act 2264, the vice-mayor elect has the status of a real party in
interest in the continuation of the proceedings and is entitled to intervene therein. For
if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice mayor succeeds to
the office of mayor that becomes vacant if the duly elected cannot assume the post.
In Moraleja vs. Relova,11 this Court ruled:

As to the contention that by accepting such appointment as Technical Assistant,

protestant has abandoned his protest, all that need be said is that once the court has
acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved demands
that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties, so
much so that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind
of cases. (Francisco, How To Try Election Cases, p. 163, citing Civilio v. Tomacruz,
62 Phil. 689). In the same manner that the acceptance by the protestee of an
appointment to another position is not a ground for dismissal of the protest
(Philippine Law on Elections by Martin, 1970 ed., pp. 258-259, citing Calvo v.
Maramba, G.R. No. L-13206, January 7, 1918) like the resignation of the protestee
from the contested office (Angeles v. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595), simply because it is of
public interest that the real winner be known, neither can the acceptance of a more
or less temporary employment, such as that of a technical assistant of the Vice-
Governor, which is a primarily confidential position, be considered as inconsistent
with protestant's determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in
the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. In such instances, the plight of
protestant may be viewed in the same light as that of an employee who has been
illegally dismissed and who, to find means to support himself and family while he
prosecutes his case for reinstatement, accepts a temporary employment elsewhere.
Such employee is not deemed to have abandoned the position he seeks to recover.
(Tan v. Gimenez, et al. G.R. No. L-12525, February 19, 1960, 107 Phil. 17; Potot v.
Bagano, G.R. No. L-2456, January 25, 1949, 82 Phil. 679). Of course, the case of
protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office could be
different, but We are not ruling on it here.

In De Castro vs. Ginete,12 this Court stated:

The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed

elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate. What
is sought in an election protest is the correction of the canvass of the votes, which is
the basis of the proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest involves a
public office in which the public has an interest. Certainly, the act of a losing
candidate of recognizing the one who is proclaimed the winner should not bar the
losing candidate from questioning the validity of the election of the winner in the
manner provided by law.

The factual milieu in these cases is not on all fours with the instant protest.

In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, as in the later case of Silverio vs. Castro,13 the protestee had been
proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate and had assumed office, and then died during the
pendency of the election protest. While in Lomugdang, it was the protestant who died during the
pendency of the protest.

In Moraleja, the election protest survived the protestant's acceptance of temporary employment
during the pendency of his election protest. Likewise, in De los Angeles vs. Rodriguez,14 cited in
Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, an election protest was continued despite the resignation from office of the
protestee.

Finally, in De Castro, the only issue presented was whether the protest should be dismissed on the
ground of estoppel. In this proceeding, the protestant congratulated the protestee after the latter was
proclaimed the winner by the board of canvassers and even exhorted those present during the
inauguration and installation into office of the protestee to support the latter's administration.

May the above dicta apply to the case of Protestant Santiago who assumed the office of Senator
after her election as such in the 8 May 1995 election? This question was impliedly raised but not
resolved in Moraleja. For after holding that the acceptance by the protestant therein of a temporary
appointment during the pendency of his protest did not amount to an abandonment thereof, nor
could it be considered inconsistent with his determination to protect and pursue the public interest
involved in the election protest, this Court noted: "Of course, the case of a protestant who accepts a
permanent appointment to a regular office could be different, but We are not ruling on it here."15

Indeed, it would be entirely different where the protestant pursued the new position through a
popular election, as in the case of Protestant Santiago who filed a certificate of candidacy for
Senator in the 8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office, and submitted herself to be voted
upon. She knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six
years, to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election16 and to end at
noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during
her campaign, she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this
protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any qualification,
condition, or reservation.

In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate that if elected, she would assume
the office of Senator, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for
which she was elected. These are givens which are in full accord with the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that, public office is a public trust, and public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.17

Indeed, it has been aptly said:

It is impossible that government shall be carried on, and the functions of civil society
exercised, without the aid and intervention of public servants or officers, and every
person, therefore, who enters into civil society and avails himself of the benefits and
protection of the government, must owe to this society, or, in other words, to the
public, at least a social duty to bear his share of the public burdens, by accepting and
performing, under reasonable circumstances, the duties of those public offices to
which he may be lawfully chosen.18

In this jurisdiction, an elected public official may even be held criminally liable should he refuse to
discharge an elective office.19

The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of
which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992
synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed in
proving in the instant protest. that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the
office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the
very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the
public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment
or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest
would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992
presidential election, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this
period of national recovery.
It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election
protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications
thereof, on the following grounds:

(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;

(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof;

(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules;

(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after
the filing of the protest; and

(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are
not clearly legible.20

Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a
suppletory character, 21 may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which,
the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds.22 In sum, if an election
protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it
has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.

II.

There is yet another reason why this case should now be dismissed.

This Tribunal cannot close its eyes to the fact that the Protestant has decided to waive the revision
of the remaining unrevised ballots from 4,017 precincts out of the 17,527 precincts of the designated
three pilot areas. This is an unabashed reversal from her original stand in her Motion and
Manifestation dated 18 October 1993. Taking this into account, this Tribunal declared in its
resolution of 21 October 1993:

After deliberating on the foregoing pleadings and the arguments of the parties, the
Tribunal rules for the Protestant insofar as the revision of the remaining ballot boxes
from her pilot areas are concerned, and against the immediate application of Rule 61
of the Rules of the Tribunal to the Protestee in respect of the Counter-Protest.

At this stage of the proceedings in this case it cannot be reasonably determined

whether the revised ballots are "considerable" enough to establish a trend either in
favor of or against the Protestant as would justify an appropriate action contemplated
in Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, or whether the unrevised ballots from said
areas would not, in the language of the Protestant, "materially affect the result of the
representative sample of the ballot boxes so far revised." As to the 1,300 ballot
boxes from Makati, the proper time to raise the objections to the ballot boxes and its
contents would be during the revision stage.

Consequently, we resolved therein to:

A. ORDER the revision of the remaining unrevised ballot boxes enumerated in the
aforequoted paragraph A of the 5 October 1993 Resolution and for that purpose to
DIRECT the Acting Clerk of Court of the Tribunal to collect said ballot boxes and
 other election documents and paraphernalia from their respective custodians in the
event that their revisions in connection with other election protests in which they are
involved have been terminated, and if such revisions are not yet completed, to
coordinate with the appropriate tribunal or court in which such other election protests
are pending and which have already obtained custody of the ballot boxes and started
revision with the end in view of either seeking expeditious revisions in such other
election protests or obtaining the custody of the ballot boxes and related election
documents and paraphernalia for their immediate delivery to the Tribunal; and

B. REQUIRE the Protestant to inform the Tribunal, within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof, if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas she
would present evidence in connection therewith.

Until the present, however, the Protestant has not informed the Tribunal whether after the
completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still intends to present evidence in
connection therewith. This failure then, is nothing short of a manifest indication that she no longer
intends to do so.

It is entirely irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings that the Protestant's revisors discovered in the
course of the revisions alleged irregularities in 13,510 out of the 17,525 contested precincts in the
pilot areas and have objected to thousands of ballots cast in favor of the Protestee. Revision is
merely the first stage, and not the alpha and omega, of an election contest. In no uncertain terms
then, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 18 March 1993 that:

Protestant knows only too well, being a lawyer and a former judge herself, that the
revision phase of her protest is but the first stage in the resolution of her electoral
protest and that the function of the revisors is very limited. In her 12 February 1993
Comment on Protestee's 5 February 1993 Urgent Motion for the issuance of a
resolution which, inter alia, would clarify that revisors may observe the objections
and/or claims made by the revisors of the other party as well as the ballots subject
thereof, and record such observations in a form to be provided for that purpose,
Protestant unequivocally stated:

8. Further, the principle and plan of the RPET [Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal] is to subdivide the entire election contest into various
stages. Thus, the first stage is the Revision Proper. Second is the technical
examination if so desired by either party. Third is the reception of evidence.
And Fourth, is the filing of parties' memoranda.

and described the function of the revisors as "solely to examine and segregate the
ballots according to which ballots they would like to contest or object (contested
ballots) and those which they admit or have no objections (uncontested ballots)."
Indeed, revisors do not have any judicial discretion; their duties are merely clerical in
nature (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. 632 [1913]). In fact, their opinion or decision
on the more crucial or critical matter of what ballots are to be contested or not does
not even bind the Tribunal (Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781 [1929]; Olano vs.
Tibayan, 53 Phil. 168 [1929]). Thus, no undue importance may be given to the
revision phase of an election contest. It can never serve as a logical or an acceptable
basis for the conclusion that massive fraud or irregularities were committed during an
election or that a Protestant had won in said election. If that were so, a Protestant
may contest all ballot boxes and, in the course of the revision thereof, object for any
imagined ground whatsoever, even if the same be totally unfounded and ridiculous to
 all ballots credited to the Protestee; and then, at the end of the day, said Protestant
may even announce to the whole world that contrary to what is reflected in the
election returns, Protestee had actually lost the elections.

All told, a dismissal of this election protest is inevitable.

III.

However, three Members of the Tribunal outrightly disagree with the foregoing disquisitions. Hence,
a reply to the important points they raise is in order.

Mr. Justice Puno's perception that the majority would dismiss this "election protest as moot and
academic on two (2) grounds: first, that the findings of irregularities made by the revisors of the
protestant in the course of the revision of ballots in 13,510 contested precincts are entirely irrelevant;
and second, she abandoned her protest when she filed her certificate of candidacy in the 8 May
1995 senatorial elections," is inaccurate. The dispositive portion of this resolution leaves no room for
any doubt or miscomprehension that the dismissal is based on the ground that the protest "has been
rendered moot and academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence
of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions
thereof." There is, therefore, ONLY ONE reason or ground why the protest has been rendered moot
and academic, i.e., it has been abandoned or withdrawn. This was the very issue upon which the
parties were required, in the resolution of 26 September 1995, to submit their respective
memoranda.

The majority neither conveyed, asserted nor even suggested, as Mr. Justice Puno has apparently
understood, that this protest has become moot and academic because the finding of irregularities by
the Protestant's revisors in the course of the revision of the ballots in 13,510 contested precincts in
the pilot areas are "entirely irrelevant," and that the Protestant has abandoned this protest by filing a
certificate of candidacy for the office of Senator in the 8 May 1995 elections. The majority's views on
"irrelevancy" and "on the filing of the certificate of candidacy" are not the grounds themselves, but
parts only of the arguments to strengthen the conclusion reached, i.e., abandonment. Otherwise
stated, in order to make the point crystal clear, the majority never held that the irrelevancy of the
finding of irregularities is a ground why this protest has become moot and academic. It only declared
that the Protestant's: (a) waiver of revision of the unrevised ballots from the remaining 4,017
contested precincts in the pilot areas; and (b) failure to comply with the resolution of 21 October
1995 requiring her to inform the Tribunal within ten days from notice if she would still present
evidence after completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas rendered such "findings"
of irregularities entirely irrelevant considering the Tribunal's disquisitions on what revision is in its 18
March 1993 resolution.

In his dissent, Mr. Justice Puno lifted the words "entirely irrelevant"; from the fourth paragraph under
the heading "II" of this Resolution. It must, however, be stressed that the said paragraph is
inexorably linked to the preceding two paragraphs relating to the above-mentioned waiver and non-
compliance, which provide the major premises for the fourth paragraph; more concretely, the latter is
nothing more than the logical conclusion which the major premises support.

The reasons adduced by Mr. Justice Puno for the Protestant's turn-around are mere speculations. In
any event, the protestant's possible "belief . . . that the contested ballots in 13,500 precincts when
properly appreciated will sufficiently establish her electoral victory," cannot stand against her
previous insistence to proceed with the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots and the
aforementioned finding of the Tribunal in its resolution of 21 October 1993. The Tribunal is not to
blame for "the slow pace of the protest," if at all she so believes in such a state of things. Neither can
the thought of cutting costs be a valid reason. The Protestant knew from the outset that the revision
of the ballots in the pilot areas was a crucial phase of this protest because, under Rule 61 of the
Rules of the Tribunal, the protest could forthwith be dismissed if the Tribunal were convinced that
she would probably fail to make out a case but only after examination of the ballots from the pilot
areas and the evaluation of the evidence offered in connection therewith. It goes without saying that
every ballot then in the pilot areas counts.

Then too, it was never the view of the majority that the Protestant's filing of the certificate of
candidacy for a seat in the Senate in the 8 May 1995 election was the sole and exclusive operative
act for what Mr. Justice Puno perceives to be the majority's second ground why this protest has
become moot and academic. To the majority, such filing was only the initial step in a series of acts
performed by the Protestant to convincingly evince her abandonment of this protest, viz.,
campaigning for the office of Senator, assumption of such office after her election and her discharge
of the duties and functions of the said office. Precisely, in the resolution of 26 September 1995, this
Court directed the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective memoranda on the issue

[o]f whether or not the protest has not been rendered moot and academic by the
election of the Protestant as Senator and her subsequent assumption of office as
such on 30 June 1995. (emphasis supplied)

As to the concept of abandonment, Mr. Justice Puno and Mr. Justice Kapunan cite Black's Law
Dictionary and the cases of Roebuck vs. Mecosta Country Road Commission,23 Dober vs. Ukase Inv.
Co., 24 and McCall vs. Cull,25 cited therein. We have turned to the primary sources of these cases,
meticulously perused them, and found none materially significant to this protest.

The first two cases above refer to abandonment of property. Roebuck involved the issue of whether
a roadway had been abandoned by the Mecosta Road Commission. The Court therein held that in
order for there to be an abandonment of land dedicated to public use, two elements must concur,
viz., (a) intention to relinquish the right or property, but without intending to transfer title to any
particular person; and (b) the external act which such intention is carried into effect. While Dober, on
the issue of whether the plaintiff therein abandoned a certain property, quoted Corpus Juris that the
intention to abandon must be determined from the facts and circumstances of the case. There must
be a clear, unequivocal and decisive act of the party to constitute abandonment in respect of a right
secured an act done which shows a determination in the individual not to have a benefit which is
designed for him.

It is, of course, settled that a public office is not deemed property.26

Only McCall involved the issue of abandonment of office. It is stated therein as follows:

Abandonment is a matter of intention and, when thought of in connection with an

office, implies that the occupant has quit the office and ceased to perform its duties.
As long as he continues to discharge the duties of the office, even though his source
of title is two appointments, one valid and the other invalid, it cannot be said he has
abandoned it. It was said in Steingruber v. City of San Antonio, Tex. Com. App., 220
S.W. 77, 78: "A public office may be abandoned. Abandonment is a species of
resignation. Resignation and abandonment are voluntary acts. The former is a formal
relinquishment; the latter a relinquishment through non-user. Abandonment implies
non-user, but non-user does not, of itself, constitute abandonment. The failure to
perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with actual or imputed intention on
the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. The intention may be
inferred from the acts and conduct of the party, and is a question of fact.
 Abandonment may result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal
or discharge, but, as in other cases of abandonment, the question of intention is
involved.

Strictly speaking, McCall is inapplicable to this protest for, as correctly stated in the dissent of Mr.
Justice Kapunan, the Protestant could not abandon the office of President which she was not
holding at the time she filed the certificate of candidacy for Senator. But the majority of the Tribunal
never declared, nor even implied, that she abandoned the office of President because it knew that
she had yet nothing to abandon. Precisely, she filed this protest to be declared the winner for that
office, to thereafter assume and perform the duties thereof, and exercise the powers appertaining
thereto. What the Tribunal explicitly states is that the Protestant abandoned this Protest, thereby
rendering this protest moot.

Mr. Justice Puno also insists that abandonment raises a question of fact and that the Tribunal cannot
resolve it "for lack of competent evidence"; moreover, he notes that the Protestee "has not adduced
evidence which can be the basis for a finding that she intentionally abandoned her protest; on the
contrary, the Protestee does not want the protest to be dismissed on a technicality but prays that it
be decided on the merits." Suffice it to say that the Protestant herself has not denied nor questioned
the following facts, which by themselves, constitute overwhelming proof of the intention to abandon
the protest:

(a) Filing of a certificate of candidacy for Senator for the 8 May 1995 elections;

(b) Campaigning for the office of Senator in such election;

(c) Taking her oath of office as Senator upon the commencement of the term
therefor;

(d) Assumption of office as Senator; and

(e) Discharge and performance of the duties appertaining to the office of Senator.

These acts speak for themselves res ipsa loquitur to negate any proposition that the Protestant has
not abandoned this protest.

Thus, what initially appears to be the correct view in the dissent is, in the final analysis, misplaced.
This must also be the verdict upon the following pronouncements of Mr. Justice Puno:

A more fundamental reason prevents me from joining the majority. With due respect,
I submit that the majority ruling on abandonment is inconsistent with the doctrine that
an election contest is concerned less with the private interest of the candidates but
more with public interest. Under a republican regime of government, the overarching
object of an election contest is to seek and enforce the judgment of the people on
who should govern them. It is not a happenstance that the first declaration of policy
of our Constitution underlines in bright that "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The first duty of a citizen as a particle of
sovereignty in a democracy is to exercise his sovereignty just as the first duty of any
reigning government is to uphold the sovereignty of the people at all cost. Thus, in
Moraleja vs. Relova, we emphatically held that ". . . once the court has acquired
jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved demands that the
true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties so much so
that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of
 cases." Wisely, this Tribunal has consistently demurred from dismissing election
contests even on the ground of death of the protestee or the protestant.

The majority appears to stray away from this lodestar of our Constitution. It will
dismiss the case at bar even while the protestee and the protestant are yet alive,
even while the term of the 1992 president-elect has yet to expire, and even while the
protestee and the protestant together plead, that the Tribunal should determine the
true will of the people by deciding their dispute on the merit[s] and not on
technicalities that trifle with the truth. I submit that it is the better stance for the
Tribunal to decide this election contest on the merit[s] and vindicate the political
judgment of the people which far surpasses in significance all other considerations.
Our duty to tell the people who have the right to govern them cannot depend on the
uncertain oscillations of politics of the litigants as often times they are directed by the
wind of convenience, and not by the weal of the public.

For one, the majority has, in no uncertain terms, demonstrated the dissimilarities in the factual
settings of the instant protest vis-a-vis the earlier cases that enunciated the doctrine relied on by Mr.
Justice Puno. Then, too, it must be reiterated, to avoid further miscomprehension, that the Moraleja
ruling even conceded that the matter of abandonment "could be different" if the petitioner therein had
accepted "a permanent appointment to a regular office" during the pendency of his protest. In short,
Moraleja in fact intimates abandonment of an election protest if, in the meantime, the Protestant
accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office. If that be so, then would it be, and for weightier
reasons, against a protestant who voluntarily sought election to an office whose term would extend
beyond the expiry date of the term of the contested office, and after winning the said election, took
her oath and assumed office and thereafter continuously serves it.

In Moraleja, the Supreme Court was meticulous in excluding abandonment from the enumeration of
specific "acts or wishes" of the parties which must be disregarded because of the public interest
component of an election protest. As reflected in the above quotation from Mr. Justice Puno's
dissent, only default, compromise, or stipulation of facts are included.

Finally, with all due respect, the above pronouncement of Mr. Justice Puno forgets that, as distinctly
pointed out in the early part of this Resolution, the Rules of the Tribunal allow summary dismissal of
election protests even for less important grounds, to repeat, such as the petition filed with the
Tribunal or the annexes attached thereto are not clearly legible, or the filing fees and cash deposits
were not filed within the periods fixed in the Rules,27 and the additional provision for dismissal under
Rule 61. All these provisions of the Rules would then be put to naught or, at the very least, modified
or amended in a way not authorized by the Rules, if the theory of Mr. Justice Puno be accepted.
Such theory would unreasonably bind the Tribunal to the technical minutiae of trial on the merits to
bring to their ultimate end all protests or contests filed before it including those filed by candidates
who even forgot to vote for themselves and obtained no votes in the final count, but, unable to
accept defeat, filed a protest claiming massive fraud and irregularities, vote-buying, and terrorism.
Consequently, all the time and energy of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be spent
appreciating millions of revised ballots to the prejudice of their regular judicial functions in the Court,
as the electoral protest of every Juan, Pedro, and Jose who lost in the presidential elections would
have to be heard on the merits. Public policy abhors such a scenario and no public good stands to
be thereby served.

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby resolved to

(1) GRANT the Protestant's Motion of 16 August 1995 to dispense with the revision
of ballots and other election documents in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas;
 (2) DISMISS the instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot and
academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of
her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and
functions thereof; and

(3) DISMISS, as a consequence, the Protestee's Counter-Protest.

No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012

EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to review and nullify the Resolution2 dated 2
February 2011 and the Order3 dated 12 January 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
En Banc in Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo v. Romeo D. Lonzanida, docketed as SPA No. 09-158 (DC). The
petition asserts that the COMELEC issued the Resolution and Order with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate
of candidacy on 1 December 2009.4 On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due
course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected,
and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior
to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was
eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution5 and Section
43(b) of the Local Government Code6 both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution7 on 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy. Pertinent portions of the 18 February 2010 Resolution read:

Respondent Lonzanida never denied having held the office of mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
more than nine consecutive years. Instead he raised arguments to forestall or dismiss the petition on
the grounds other than the main issue itself. We find such arguments as wanting. Respondent
Lonzanida, for holding the office of mayor for more than three consecutive terms, went against the
three-term limit rule; therefore, he could not be allowed to run anew in the 2010 elections. It is time
to infuse new blood in the political arena of San Antonio.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Certificate of
Candidacy of Respondent Romeo D. Lonzanida for the position of mayor in the municipality of San
Antonio, Zambales is hereby CANCELLED. His name is hereby ordered STRICKEN OFF the list of
Official Candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in May 10, 2010 elections.

SO ORDERED.8

Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the
May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of
votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Raymond C.
Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010.9 On the same date, Aratea wrote the Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor,
he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification.
DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 201010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by
reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida’s disqualification, the Office of the
Mayor was deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an
acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for
reconsideration. In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to
take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24 August 2010,
then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent
Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases
pending before the [COMELEC]."11

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution12 disqualifying Lonzanida from
running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on
two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three
consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment
of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each
count of falsification to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prisión correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of
conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People,13
before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. Pertinent portions of the 11
August 2010 Resolution read:

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales for more than three (3) consecutive terms and for having been convicted by a final
judgment of a crime punishable by more than one (1) year of imprisonment, is clearly disqualified to
run for the same position in the May 2010 Elections.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.14

On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-
Intervention.15 She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because
Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February
2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his
name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the
May 2010 elections.

In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who
received the second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor
could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent
vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by
Section 4416 of the Local Government Code to succeed as Mayor.

The COMELEC’s Rulings

The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12 January 2011, stating:

Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention" filed by
Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) and pursuant to the power of this Commission to suspend its Rules or
any portion thereof in the interest of justice, this Commission hereby RESOLVES to:

1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion;

2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by Antipolo;

3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN RACEL

ARATEA, proclaimed Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, to file their respective Comments on
the Petition-in- Intervention within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof;

4. SET the above-mentioned Petition-in-Intervention for hearing on January 26, 2011 at 10:00 a.m.
COMELEC Session Hall, 8th Floor, Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros, Manila.

WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for their information and compliance.

SO ORDERED.17

In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc no longer considered Lonzanida’s
qualification as an issue: "It is beyond cavil that Lonzanida is not eligible to hold and discharge the
functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. The sole issue to be resolved at this
juncture is how to fill the vacancy resulting from Lonzanida’s disqualification."18 The Resolution further
stated:

We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo could never be
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Antipolo [sic] for being a second placer in the elections. The
teachings in the cases of Codilla vs. De Venecia and Nazareno and Domino vs. COMELEC, et al.,
while they remain sound jurisprudence find no application in the case at bar. What sets this case
apart from the cited jurisprudence is that the notoriety of Lonzanida’s disqualification and ineligibility
to hold public office is established both in fact and in law on election day itself. Hence, Lonzanida’s
name, as already ordered by the Commission on February 18, 2010 should have been stricken off
from the list of official candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby:

1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of respondent ROMEO D. LONZANIDA;

2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo;

3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to

PROCLAIM Intervenor Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales;

4. Orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the
Office of the Mayor, and to cause a peaceful turn-over of the said office to Antipolo upon her
proclamation; and

5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as well as the Regional Election Director of Region III
to cause the implementation of this Resolution and disseminate it to the Department of Interior and
Local Government.

SO ORDERED.19

Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February 2011.

The Issues

The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under
Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is
determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales.

The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution and 12 January 2011
Order. They hold that Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, should be
declared Mayor pursuant to the Local Government Code’s rule on succession.

The dissenting opinions make three grave errors: first, they ignore prevailing jurisprudence that a
false representation in the certificate of candidacy as to eligibility in the number of terms elected and
served is a material fact that is a ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78; second, they ignore that a false representation as to eligibility to run for public office due
to the fact that the candidate suffers from perpetual special disqualification is a material fact that is a
ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; and third, they resort to a
strained statutory construction to conclude that the violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a
ground for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, even when it is clear and plain
that violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to
elective office.

The dissenting opinions tread on dangerous ground when they assert that a candidate’s eligibility to
the office he seeks election must be strictly construed to refer only to the details, i.e., age,
citizenship, or residency, among others, which the law requires him to state in his COC, and which
he must swear under oath to possess. The dissenting opinions choose to view a false certification of
a candidate’s eligibility on the three-term limit rule not as a ground for false material representation
under Section 78 but as a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the same Code. This is
clearly contrary to well-established jurisprudence.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at
all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

Qualifications and Disqualifications

Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for the qualifications
of elective local officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section 40 of the Local
Government Code provide in pertinent part:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. ‒ (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province x x x; a resident therein for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.

xxxx

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

xxxx

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he
again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code are
specifically enumerated:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this
Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied)

A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts
and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country."20 All the offenses mentioned
in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of
other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify
including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under
Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,21 this Court ruled:

[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. x x x

Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of
the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition
under Section 68.

False Material Representation

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or
cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities,
highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was thus required to provide 12 items of
information in the certificate of candidacy:22 name; nickname or stage name; gender; age; place of
birth; political party that nominated the candidate; civil status; residence/address; profession or
occupation; post office address for election purposes; locality of which the candidate is a registered
voter; and period of residence in the Philippines before 10 May 2010. The candidate also certifies
four statements: a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; a
statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; a
statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and a statement of the
candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.23 The certificate of
candidacy should also be under oath, and filed within the period prescribed by law.

The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him
perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This
perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code
are as follows:

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x

Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prisión mayor
and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except
when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it
shall be that of the principal penalty.

xxxx

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties
of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following
effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held,
even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the
rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of

this article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of
perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall
produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term
of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence,
according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public
office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification.

Art. 42. Prisión mayor — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it
that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,24 the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under
Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office.” The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal
penalty of prisión mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual
special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public
office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office,
and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he
is eligible to so run.

In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import
of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellee’s conviction
of a crime penalized with prision mayor which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised
Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he
had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office
and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27,
paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict
of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from
temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised
Penal Code, provides:

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according
to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
the period of disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied
distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind
of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary
special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are
necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states
that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means according to whether
the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives
the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually.”

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend
on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The
last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction
becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the
time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes
ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he
became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time
the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction was
promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his
certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 . 26

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not
eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under
oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,27 the
false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers from
perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from
perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible
to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false
material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in
Fermin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on
the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is
false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for.
It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC,
following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the
Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with
the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a
petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.28 (Emphasis supplied)

Latasa, Rivera and Ong:

The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility

Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks
election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing x x x is eligible for said office.” The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of choice,29 is found both
in the Constitution30 and the law.31 After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an
elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular
election32 because he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not
"eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"33 means having the right to run for
elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the
public office.

In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,34 petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the
Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality of Digos was
converted into the City of Digos during Latasa’s third term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy
for city mayor for the 2001 elections. Romeo Sunga, Latasa’s opponent, filed before the COMELEC
a "petition to deny due course, cancel certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section
78 on the ground that Latasa falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to
run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa argued that he did not make any false representation. In his
certificate of candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote after the phrase "I am eligible" and indicated
"*Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city
mayor." The COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasa’s certificate of candidacy for violation of the
three-term limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court affirmed the COMELEC En
Banc’s denial of Latasa’s motion for reconsideration.

We cancelled Marino Morales’ certificate of candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission on Elections

(Rivera).35 We held that Morales exceeded the maximum three-term limit, having been elected and
served as Mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms (1995 to 1998, 1998 to 2001, 2001 to
2004, and 2004 to 2007). We declared him ineligible as a candidate for the same position for the
2007 to 2010 term. Although we did not explicitly rule that Morales’ violation of the three-term limit
rule constituted false material representation, we nonetheless granted the petition to cancel Morales’
certificate of candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed the cancellation of Francis Ong’s
certificate of candidacy in Ong v. Alegre,36 where the "petition to disqualify, deny due course and
cancel" Ong’s certificate of candidacy under Section 78 was predicated on the violation of the three-
term limit rule.

Loong, Fermin and Munder:

When Possession of a Disqualifying Condition

is Not a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification

It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for
eligibility and ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may
represent that he is a resident of a particular Philippine locality37 when he is actually a permanent
resident of another country.38 In cases of such overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his
choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available multiple remedies.39
Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the
election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification
using grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy under Section 78.

The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was discussed
in Loong v. Commission on Elections40 with respect to the applicable prescriptive period. Respondent
Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for
the office of Regional Vice-Governor of the Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false
representation as to his age. The petition was filed 16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the
prescribed 25 day period from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that
Ututalum’s petition was one based on false representation under Section 78, and not for
disqualification under Section 68. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period provided in Section 78
should be strictly applied. We recognized the possible gap in the law:

It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a
certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-
day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such
misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate committing the
misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of
the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under
Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is
made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the
candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could
avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto
against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which,
according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied.

At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the
government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to eligibility of candidates
for elective offices must be filed, as seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent
Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called “procedural gap", but it is not for it to
prescribe what the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether
the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to
decide and remedy.41

In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,42 the issue of a candidate’s possession of the required one-
year residency requirement was raised in a petition for disqualification under Section 68 instead of a
petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Despite the
question of the one-year residency being a proper ground under Section 78, Dilangalen, the
petitioner before the COMELEC in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and 5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 780043 and filed the petition under Section 68. In Fermin, we ruled that "a COMELEC
rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for
disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said
grounds."44 A petition for disqualification can only be premised on a ground specified in Section 12 or
68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Thus, a petition
questioning a candidate’s possession of the required one-year residency requirement, as
distinguished from permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country, should be filed
under Section 78, and a petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy.

In Munder v. Commission on Elections,45 petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate of candidacy for
Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur on 26 November 2009. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip filed a petition
for Munder’s disqualification on 13 April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder misrepresented that he
was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he was eligible to register as a voter in
2003 even though he was not yet 18 years of age at the time of the voter’s registration. Moreover,
Munder’s certificate of candidacy was not accomplished in full as he failed to indicate his precinct
and did not affix his thumb-mark. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Sarip’s petition and
declared that his grounds are not grounds for disqualification under Section 68 but for denial or
cancellation of Munder’s certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Sarip’s petition was filed out of
time as he had only 25 days after the filing of Munder’s certificate of candidacy, or until 21 December
2009, within which to file his petition.

The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the COMELEC Second
Division, the COMELEC En Banc did not rule on the propriety of Sarip’s remedy but focused on the
question of whether Munder was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court reinstated
the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution. This Court ruled that the ground raised in the petition,
lack of registration as voter in the locality where he was running as a candidate, is inappropriate for a
petition for disqualification. We further declared that with our ruling in Fermin, we had already
rejected the claim that lack of substantive qualifications of a candidate is a ground for a petition for
disqualification under Section 68. The only substantive qualification the absence of which is a
ground for a petition under Section 68 is the candidate’s permanent residency or immigrant status in
a foreign country.

The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under
Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from
running for public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the [Local
Government Code]." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the law what is not found in the
law. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification under said Section. The
grounds for filing a petition for disqualification under Section 68 are specifically enumerated in said
Section. However, contrary to the specific enumeration in Section 68 and contrary to prevailing
jurisprudence, the dissenting opinions add to the enumerated grounds the violation of the three-term
limit rule and falsification under the Revised Penal Code, which are obviously not found in the
enumeration in Section 68.
The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanida’s possession of a disqualifying condition (violation of the
three-term limit rule) with the grounds for disqualification under Section 68. Section 68 is explicit as
to the proper grounds for disqualification: the commission of specific prohibited acts under the
Omnibus Election Code and possession of a permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign
country. Any other false representation regarding a material fact should be filed under Section 78,
specifically under the candidate’s certification of his eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the three-
term limit as a condition for eligibility, the dissenting opinions resort to judicial legislation, ignoring the
verba legis doctrine and well-established jurisprudence on this very issue.

In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and thus
qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not
specifically ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an elective position,
such fact is material in determining a candidate’s eligibility, and thus qualification for the office.
Election to and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a
candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida
misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he
was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanida’s representation that he
was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material representation as to his
qualification or eligibility for the office.

Legal Duty of COMELEC

to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification

Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is under a
legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment
of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for
public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is
part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the
Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment
under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for
elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC
is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election."46 The disqualification of a convict to run for elective public office under the Revised Penal
Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and
administration of "all the laws" relating to the conduct of elections.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes.47 We quote from the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution with approval:

As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second Division had already
ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the
list of official candidates for the mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the
Commission En Banc in its resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution
disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme Court no less. The
disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was
 emphasized in our En Banc resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he
violated the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he
is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s
disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never
a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be
considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified
candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.48 (Boldfacing and underscoring in
the original; italicization supplied)

Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run
for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is
1âw phi 1

immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for
Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and the Order
dated 12 January 2011 of the COMELEC En Bane in SPA No. 09-158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The
COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to
proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren
Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 203818-19

AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203922

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by its President Congressman Ponciano
D. Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203936

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President Michael Abas Kida, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203958

KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203960

1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203976

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203981

ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms.
Lourdes L. Agustin, the party’s Secretary General, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204002

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204094

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204100

1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly PGBI, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204122

1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
Commissioner, andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204125

AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA), represented by its Secretary General,Ronald D.
Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204126

KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly known as AKO AGILA NG
NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204139

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Cataluña Causing, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204141

BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, President, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204153

PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204158

ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO,
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA,
LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204174

AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204216

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204220

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204236

FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204238

ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204239

GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204240

AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary
General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204263

A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204318

UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204321

ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204323

BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante Navarroand Guiling
Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA
CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204341

ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul
Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204356

BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204358

ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS (AAMA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204359

SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by its Chairman, Carlito B.
Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204364

ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO

BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their
capacities as Commissioners thereof, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204367

AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204370

AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204374

BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204379

ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204394

ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND
NANNY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204402

KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q.
Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204408

PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204410

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204421

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST,
represented herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204425

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF,
INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204426

ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-EH), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their
respective capacities as COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204428

ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204435

1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204436

ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T. Suplico, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204455

MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204484

PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M. Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204485

ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204486

1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st KABAGIS), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204490

PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

PERLAS-BERNABE,*

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Cases

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups and
organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation
of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012,2 20 November 2012,3 27
November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7

The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.

G.R. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

No.
A. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the COMELEC
Division’s resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 20128
1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not
(PLM) Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.
Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129
2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and
(PLM) Savings and loan association cannot be
Loan considered marginalized and
Association, Inc. underrepresented; and
(Manila - The first and second
Teachers) nominees are not teachers by
profession.
3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its
(PLM) Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs marginalized; and
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to
Inc. (ALA-EH) qualify.
Resolution dated 27 November 201210
4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to
(PLM) Advocating qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party,
(1AAAP) two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Resolution dated 27 November 201211
5 204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay - Failure of the group to show
Kalusugan that its nominees belong to
(AKIN), Inc. the urban poor sector.
Resolution dated 29 November 201212
6 204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a
(AAB) marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 201213
7 204436 12-009 Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the
(PP), Party (AI) party represents a
12-165 marginalized and
(PLM) underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.
Resolution dated 4 December 201214
8 204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of - Failure to establish that the
Organizations, group can represent 14
Networks and Associations sectors; - The sectors of
of homeowners’
the Philippines, associations, entrepreneurs
Inc. (ALONA) and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
B. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for reconsideration
of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 201215
9 204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng - Failure to prove track
Mamamahayag record as an organization;
(ALAM) - Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
 group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 201216
10 204402 12-061 (PP) Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an
(KALIKASAN) advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 14 November 201217
11 204394 12-145 (PL) Association of - Failure to prove
Guard, Utility membership base and track
Helper, Aider, record;
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities
Domestic that sufficiently benefited its
Helper, intended constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong
and to any of the sectors which
Nanny of the the group seeks to represent.
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
Resolution dated 5 December 201218
12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the
(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB
was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as
an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP,
and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution
No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to
determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from participating in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections:

G.R. No. SPP Group Grounds for Denial

No.
Resolution dated 10 October 201224
1 203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and
19 (PLM) Political Party accreditation as a political
12-177 (AKB) party, but denied participation
(PLM) in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225
2 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.
3 203981 12-187 Association for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Righteousness accreditation
Advocacy on - Failure to comply, and for
Leadership violation of election laws;
(ARAL) - The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.
4 204002 12-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.
5 204318 12-220 United Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Movement accreditation
Against Drugs - The sectors of drug
Foundation counsellors and lecturers,
(UNIMAD) veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.
Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226
6 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration
(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector
Brotherhood, it seeks to represent; and
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) - The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
7 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity;
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community
GUARDIANS) volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.
8 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled registration
(PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven
Farmers and nominees do not belong to
Fishermen the sector of farmers and
International, fishermen, the sector sought
Inc. (A to be represented; and
BLESSED - None of the nominees are
Party-List) registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.
Resolution dated 16 October 201227
9 203960 12-260 1st Cancelled registration
(PLM) Consumers - The sector of rural energy
Alliance for consumers is not
Rural Energy, marginalized and
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
- The party’s track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.
Resolution dated 16 October 201228
10 203922 12-201 Association of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Philippine accreditation
Electric - Failure to represent a
Cooperatives marginalized and
(APEC) underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 23 October 201229
11 204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
( AT ) - The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230
12 203976 12-288 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Rural and accreditation
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
 to participate in the party-list
elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231
13 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration
(PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately
Pilipinas after the May 2010 elections;
Movement - The nominees do not belong
(AGRI) to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.
14 203936 12-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration
(PLM) Magsasaka-Partido - Failure to show that
Tinig ng majority of its members are
Masa (AKMA-PTM) marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.
15 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent
Agilang and Certificate of Nomination
Pilipinong were not signed by an
Magsasaka appropriate officer of the
(KAP) party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
16 204364 12-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration
(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that
Ordinaryong nominees actually belong to
Tao Para sa the sector, or that they have
Lupa, Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
Hanapbuhay at activities for the sector.
 Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
17 204141 12-229 The True Cancelled registration
(PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that
(for God, majority of its members are
Country and marginalized and
People) underrepresented; and
Association of - Failure to prove that two of
the Philippines, its nominees actually belong
Inc. (BANTAY) to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
18 204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration
(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from
Country – Urban urban poor youth to urban
Poor Youth poor) necessitates a new
Advancement application;
and Welfare - Failure to show track record
( PA C YAW ) for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.
19 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
MASDA) conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.
20 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala, na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA) Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
 for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 30 October 201232
21 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 201233
22 204094 12-185 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy - Failure to represent an
(ANAD) identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234
23 204239 12-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) the Environment accreditation
Sons and - The party is an advocacy
Daughters of group and does not represent
Mother Earth the marginalized and
(GREENFORCE) underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.
24 204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
 - Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.
25 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled registration and
(PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the party’s
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.
Resolution dated 7 November 201235
26 204358 12-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration
(PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group
Advancement which may not be allowed
for National registration under the party-list system; and
Progress - Failure to establish that the
(AAMA) nominees actually belong to
the sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 201236
27 204359 12-272 Social Cancelled registration
(PLM) Movement for - The nominees are
Active Reform disqualified from
and representing the sectors that
Transparency the party represents;
(SMART) - Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 201237
28 204238 12-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
 - Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the construction
industry, the
sector it claims to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 201238
29 204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and
(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.
Resolution dated 7 November 201239
30 204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
party’s nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 201240
31 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five
Alliance, Inc. nominees are members of the
(A-IPRA) indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees are
bona fide
members.
Resolution dated 7 November 201241
32 204216 12-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with
Federation, Inc. private and government
(COCOFED) agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
 government in various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.
Resolution dated 7 November 201242
33 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration
(PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track
(ABANG record of continuously
LINGKOD) representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.
Resolution dated 14 November 201243
34 204158 12-158 Action Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Brotherhood for Active accreditation - Failure to show that the
Dreamers, Inc. party is actually able to
(ABROAD) represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 28 November 201244
35 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and
(PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga - The party receives
Magsasaka assistance from the
(BINHI) government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 28 November 201245
 36 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The party’s nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.
Resolution dated 3 December 201246
37 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
Bayan - Declaration of untruthful
Ginhawang statements;
Sangkatauhan - Failure to exist for at least
(1st one year; and
KABAGIS) - None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 4 December 201247
38 204410 12-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation
(PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The party’s nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.
Resolution dated 4 December 201248
39 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration
204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election
12-191 in the laws because its nominees
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-sharing
(SENIOR agreement.
CITIZENS)

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List,
1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG,
ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD,
ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status
Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante
Orders, namely:

G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012
203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)
203981 12-187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy on
(PLM) Leadership (ARAL)
204002 12-188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
(PLM)
203922 12-201 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(PLM) (APEC)
203960 12-260 1st
(PLM) Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)
203936 12-248 Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa
(PLM) (AKMA-PTM)
203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,
(PLM) Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976 12-288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
(PLM) Inc. (ARARO)
Resolution dated 20 November 2012
204094 12-185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(PLM) (ANAD)
204125 12-292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,
(PLM) Inc. (A-IPRA)
204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
(PLM) (1BRO-PGBI)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012
204141 12-229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country
(PLM) and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)
204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng
(PLM) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
204216 12-202 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(PLM) (COCOFED)
204158 12-158 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.
(PLM) (ABROAD)
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
204122 12-223 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
(PLM) (1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
(PLM)
204318 12-220 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation
(PLM) (UNIMAD)
204263 12-257 Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen
(PLM) International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)
204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
(PLM)
204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong
(PLM) Magsasaka (KAP)
204364 12-180 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa
(PLM) Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
(PLM) LINGKOD)
204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)
(PLM)
204238 12-173 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
(PLM)
204239 12-060 Green Force for the Environment Sons and
(PLM) Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)
204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
(PLM)
204323 12-210 Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
(PLM)
204341 12-269 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
(PLM)
204358 12-204 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement
(PLM) for National Progress (AAMA)
204359 12-272 Social Movement for Active Reform and
(PLM) Transparency (SMART)
204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
(PLM)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
 204408 12-217 Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor
(PLM) Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)
204428 12-256 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
(PLM)
204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
(PLM)
204379 12-099 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
(PLM)
204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
204426 12-011 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs
(PLM) and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)
204455 12-041 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,
(PLM) Inc. (Manila Teachers)
204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga
(PLM) Magsasaka (BINHI)
204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
204435 12-057 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party
(PLM) (1AAAP)
204486 12-194 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang
(PLM) Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
204410 12-198 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
(PLM)
204421, 12-157 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
204425 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
12-191
(PLM)
204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
12-165
(PLM)
204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and
Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG
(PLM) MASDA)

The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by
the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this
Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all
the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

The Party-List System

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended
to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative
district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5, Article VI

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the
party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the
voters’ registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read
in light of the following discussion among its framers:

MR. MONSOD: x x x.

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not synonymous with that of the
sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the
members of the sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by
Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean
that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats.
And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the
farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are
the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we
had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other
sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And as
we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become because when we make an enumeration we
exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the
farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a
lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that
sector.

The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect,
giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system.
Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or
a sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under
the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his
legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be
represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered
with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented
in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had
been garnered by each party or each organization — one does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate
as a party — and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party,
organization or coalition.

When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the party list system. So, we
have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the
parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the
minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the
percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women’s party gets 2 1/2
percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these
parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.

What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the
National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has
200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special
interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor
groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are
not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band
together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the
dynamics of a party list system.

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time making sure that those
who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These
sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a
seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we
count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each
of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly
even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of
the party list system.

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list system though we refer to
sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?

MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to mention sectors because
the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list system.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and
we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this:
Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run
under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for
the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20
percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party
list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he
qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass
on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties,
are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral
lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the contention
of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at
mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin
ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably
also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to
register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or isang laborer?
Halimbawa, abogado ito.

MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral representation. My
question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?

MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really organized along a specific
sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of individuals who are actually
members of such sectors. The lists are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector
the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the
existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be
summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis
supplied)

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-
sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As
explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as
they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."53

In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the House of
Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice
Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two
staunch positions — the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in
Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting
the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the
sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and
less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger
and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first
five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the party-list
system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates
for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise — that the party-list system be open only
to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under
the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was
unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved
seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be
expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more
veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of
seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties
only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district
elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in
legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both
these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral
parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and
regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the
same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never
their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is
composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1)
leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or
organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not
represent any particular sector.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress
after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-
list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list
representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only
for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after
the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or
type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in the
Constitution, provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated
in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly,
a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from
the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is
to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the
party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political
party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No.
7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that
the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."56 The sectors mentioned
in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition
"marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy
of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require national or regional
parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice
and hearing.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented."

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.57
Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House of
Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the
sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the
sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.

How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific implementing
provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature,
economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral
party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is
sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and
underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth,
need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-
defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of
society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those
"marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own
members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do
not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system
to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of
Representatives.

To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties under the party-list
system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-
list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.’ "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani,
in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically
disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani
has been compounded by the COMELEC’s refusal to register sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT
merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list
system, even through their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in
the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus,
major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to
the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral
wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized
and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them
to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-
defined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the
entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-
defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political
party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, officers
and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which
provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided
the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification
only for the nominee from the youth sector.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election.

Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term.
1âwphi 1

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of
sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track
record of advocacy for such sector.

In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani
laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list
system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.

xxxx

Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.

xxxx

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered."

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. x x x.

xxxx

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941
reads as follows:

"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees. x x x.

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority officially
excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong
Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.

The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list system through their sectoral
wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in
the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come
to an end.

We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing
jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-
list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the
COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not
declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders
of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and
subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-
defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
 majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1)
all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and
(2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been
disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent
may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-
sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been
disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.
As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or
political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write
the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders
but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission
on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been
granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on
Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct
summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA,
Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No.
10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying
Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2
February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a U.S. passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest
myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11
dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in
entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14
April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the
Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14
 1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
dated 03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-
time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously
residing in his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del

Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay
and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the
Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations
Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of
Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April
1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that

Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local
Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim
that he is a Filipino citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on
03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to
run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained
use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined
as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby
ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991
take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that
"the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21
He raised the following contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence
consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show
that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American

citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not
perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of
time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction
over the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo
warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is
prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which
allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has
been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of
the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case
of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their
original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to
be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen
who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in
the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he
applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about
three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for
his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12,
2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably
pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control during that
time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of
foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in
this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it
is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his
American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation.
Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to
the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges
of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to
his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with
the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for
running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them
is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a
citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is
disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for
the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the
highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him
after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His
ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when
they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed
as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc
for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now
seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public
office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the
Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as
the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC
En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision,
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc
has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-
placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this
Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents
therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has
ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by
Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these
twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when
he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA,
and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By
taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the
time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of
the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the
date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as
a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States
of America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself
as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid
for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify
as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or
from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not
just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently
using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that
he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his
foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public
office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of
the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to
obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US
passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used
his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US
passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US
passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US
passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship,
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential
spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address
the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office
of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were
opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to
the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No.
2045 having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
second re-election absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in
the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the
two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that
some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of
canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be
determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to
the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the
deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we
have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former
must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one
case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the
question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis
supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the
strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained
the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no
one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that
town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and
additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to
stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and
explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another
candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging
another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and
bestowing upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express
legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed
upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials,
those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we
pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled
that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election
victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient
basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in
the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after
the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-
ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling.
We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling
can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For
one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates
election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an
informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section
78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins.
To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an
election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so
he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an
open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
1âw phi 1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate
candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who
turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes
the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed
as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado
failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15
June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was
both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of
the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC
En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10
May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 205033 June 18, 2013

ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B.
NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT,
ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 file under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) En Bane Resolution No. 96132 dated January 15, 2013,
ordering the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos' certificate of
candidacy (CoC) as a mayoralty candidate for Zamboanga City.

The Facts

On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 132875-76, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos," convicting petitioner by final judgment of two (2)
counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.4 Consequently, he was
sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal5 for each
count, respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).6 On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months
and three (3) days (Order of Commutation). After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of
Discharge From Prison on March 18, 2009.7

On April 26, 2012,8 petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of
his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election
Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of
Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City, Branch 1
(MTCC).9 Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC10 on October 5, 2012, seeking to run as
mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013 (May 2013
Elections). In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is
a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.

On October 18, 2012,11 the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual
absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial
was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 14 (RTC) in its October 31,
2012 Order12 which, pursuant to Section 13813 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and executory.

Meanwhile, five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC’s First and Second Divisions
(COMELEC Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner’s
CoC. Pending resolution, the COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 961314 on
January 15, 2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections"
due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter
registration requirement. As basis, the COMELEC En Banc relied on the Court’s pronouncement in
the consolidated cases of Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC and Agapito Cardino v.
COMELEC15 (Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino).

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues Before the Court

Submitted for the Court’s determination are the following issues: (a) whether the COMELEC En
Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing,
violated petitioner’s right to due process; and (b) whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute
disqualification to run for elective office had already been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC).

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, the Court observes that the controversy in this case had already been mooted by the
exclusion of petitioner in the May 2013 Elections. Nevertheless, in view of the doctrinal value of the
issues raised herein, which may serve to guide both the bench and the bar in the future, the Court
takes this opportunity to discuss on the same.

A. Nature and validity of motu

proprio issuance of Resolution No.
9613.

Petitioner claims that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions’ jurisdiction by
cancelling motu proprio petitioner’s CoC through Resolution No. 9613, contrary to Section 3, Article
IX-C of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which reads:

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Concomitantly, he also claims that his right to procedural due process had been violated by the
aforementioned issuance.

The Court is not persuaded.

The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
En Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial
power. It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of
administrative functions. The distinction between the two is well-defined. As illumined in Villarosa v.
COMELEC:16

The term ‘administrative’ connotes, or pertains, to ‘administration, especially management, as by

managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of
persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of
evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. While a ‘quasi-judicial function’ is a term which
applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them,
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Crucial therefore to the present disquisition is the determination of the nature of the power exercised
by the COMELEC En Banc when it promulgated Resolution No. 9613.

The foregoing matter is not without established precedent. In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the Court
held that the COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in view of a
candidate’s disqualification to run for elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed under
its mandate to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections. Accordingly, in
such a situation, it is the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate’s CoC,
notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of
the same. Thus, the Court stated:17

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment
of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public
office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of
the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the
Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment
under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for
elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC
is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election." The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as
affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all
laws" relating to the conduct of elections.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so
grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and
served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce
and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from
running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final
judgment. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In Aratea v. COMELEC (Aratea),18 the Court similarly pronounced that the disqualification of a
convict to run for public office, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relating to the conduct of elections.19

Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise
its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over
any pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely
performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis
of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final
conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions,
dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.

Lest it be misunderstood, while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one’s CoC
generally necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions commenced through
a petition based on either Sections 1220 or 7821 of the OEC, or Section 4022 of the LGC, when the
grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on account of final and executory judgments – as when a
candidate’s disqualification to run for public office is based on a final conviction – such exercise falls
within the COMELEC’s administrative functions, as in this case.

In this light, there is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would
be acting in a purely administrative manner. Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.23 As
petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a previous case and
now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc to cancel his CoC as a
matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

Equally compelling is the fact that the denial of petitioner’s Petition for Inclusion as a registered voter
in Zamboanga City had already attained finality by virtue of the RTC’s Order dated October 31,
2012. In this accord, petitioner’s non-compliance with the voter registration requirement under
Section 39(a) of the LGC24 is already beyond question and likewise provides a sufficient ground for
the cancellation of his CoC altogether.

B. Petitioner’s right to run for

elective office.

It is petitioner’s submission that Article 30 of the RPC was partially amended by Section 40(a) of the
LGC and thus, claims that his perpetual absolute disqualification had already been removed.

The argument is untenable.

Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in connection with those
already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and
stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.25

On the one hand, Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective candidates, provides:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC reads:

ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The penalties
of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following
effects:
 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may
have held, even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be
elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of
any of the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in

paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory construction principle, the Court observes that the
conflict between these provisions of law may be properly reconciled. In particular, while Section
40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years
from the time he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases
wherein the law26 imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory,27 which has the effect of
disqualifying the convict to run for elective office. An example of this would be Article 41 of the RPC,
which imposes the penalty of perpetual28 absolute29 disqualification as an accessory to the principal
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal:

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties. - The penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for elective
office. To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based on the presumptive
rule that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of
moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office,30 as the same partakes of a privilege which the State
grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common good.31

Pertinently, it is observed that the import of Article 41 in relation to Article 30 of the RPC is more
direct and specific in nature – insofar as it deprives the candidate to run for elective office due to his
conviction – as compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC which broadly speaks of offenses involving
moral turpitude and those punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment without any
consideration of certain disqualifying effects to one’s right to suffrage. Accordingly, Section 40(a) of
the LGC should be considered as a law of general application and therefore, must yield to the more
definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali – general
legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted
as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially designed
therefor should prevail.32

In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him
to run for elective office. As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a
penal provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically prohibits the convict from
running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his
commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.

Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said
accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.33 In this case, the same
accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any
subsequent pardon and as such, petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to
subsist.

Further, it is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory
penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the
prison term which is imposed as its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court’s ruling in
Lacuna v. Abes,34 where the court explained the meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to the
penalty of disqualification to run for public office:

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office
and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27,
paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict
of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from
temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Likewise, adopting the Lacuna ruling, the Court, in the more recent cases of Aratea,35 Jalosjos, Jr.
and Cardino,36 held:

Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives
the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually."

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on
the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The
last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction
becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the
time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes
ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. (Emphasis underscoring supplied)

All told, applying the established principles of statutory construction, and more significantly,
considering the higher interests of preserving the sanctity of our elections, the Court holds that
Section 40(a) of the LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which
petitioner continues to suffer. Thereby, he remains disqualified to run for any elective office
1âw phi1

pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is
upheld."

In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:

"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a determination
as regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of
the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC
Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a
qualification not otherwise required by the constitution."1 (as originally underscored)

The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:

"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque."2

Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus: petitioner is
a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated,
was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013.
Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent
oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.

We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of
the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May
2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on
petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x As
the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis of her
due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we
here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY
BASIS.

1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc has already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to
reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First Division that CANCELLED petitioner's
certificate of candidacy.

2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of

petitioner's certificate o candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her
proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been removed, there was not even
any attempt to remove it.

3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to

proclamation may be removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:

"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission
En Bane shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme Court."

Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for
a restraining order that will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation
of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the Supreme Court may
remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That did not
happen. Petitioner did not move to have it happen.

It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from
being proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate
of candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because
there was a final finding against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed a restraining
order from the Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the
decision adverse to her became executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention
became even more imperative. She would have to base her recourse on the position
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate
of candidacy and that a restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will
 have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May
2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly
available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law
into her hands" and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC
En Bane decision that was final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory five days
thereafter.

4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule
18 in the provision that the COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL
AND EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained, moves
from promulgation into becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section 5
of Rule 18 it is stated:

Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a

division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon
the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram.

5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very
date of its promulgation on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us
that she in fact received a copy of the decision on 16 May 20 13.4 On that date, she
had absolutely no reason why she would disregard the available legal way to remove
the restraint on her proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a
proclamation two days thereafter. The utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane
decision and of the Rule stating that her proclamation at that point MUST be on
permission by the Supreme Court is even indicative of bad faith on the part of the
petitioner.

6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted
proclamation as the very reason to support her argument that she could no longer be
reached by the jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the HRET that has
exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of her qualifications for office.

7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which
she directs, as well as in her objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with
her procured proclamation that petitioner nullifies the COMELEC's decision, by
Division and then En Banc and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the
COMELEC decision. In other words, petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all
administrative and judicial actions thereon, past and present. And by her
proclamation, she claims as acquired the congressional seat that she sought to be a
candidate for. As already shown, the reasons that lead to the impermissibility of the
objective are clear. She cannot sit as Member of the House of Representatives by
virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with knowledge of the existing
legal impediment.

8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET
which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives
is a written constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because
she is NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her
 proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such membership.5 Indeed, the
action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is
the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly
lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and
was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing
left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings
in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a candidate for Representative
of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The bar
remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme
Court within five days from 14 May 2013.

9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning
the COMELEC First Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane
decision, her baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of
promulgation alone become valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the
Supreme Court regarding the decision of the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate
of candidacy was indispensably needed, not to legalize her proclamation on 18 May
2013 but to authorize a proclamation with the Supreme Court decision as basis.

10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil
action for a writ of Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed
by set rules and principles.

a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard
summarily. The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC
Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the
Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of the
Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17
further provides in Section 3 that when the proceedings are authorized to be
summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be
required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter-
affidavits and other documentary evidence; x x x and that this provision shall
likewise apply to cases where the hearing and reception of evidence are
delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x x.

b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court
thus:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility.6
It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise of the
COMELEC summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the Supreme Court's
authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling that is brought before it, that defines the way petitioner's
submission before the Court should be adjudicated. Thus further explained, the disposition of 25
June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was
a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question
and present controverting evidence.

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission. In
view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was
filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of
five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given
her.

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)

As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the
COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:

"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office the law
requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements.
Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her
American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however,
specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the
USA.

Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7,

2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she
continues to use until June 30 2012 petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden
now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent
utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her
COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had
availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter,
made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen
and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines."
(Emphasis in the original.)

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC,
respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a
US passport, and that her status is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.
9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted
no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A.
No. 9225 to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted that
she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen,
thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that
she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with
rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's explanation. If petitioner
executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225
applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the
COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was
executed in September 2012. 1âw phi 1

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of
office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of
natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference
to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and
evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that
was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of questions
-Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she
did, why did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an
admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial
Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be
considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as
prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing
Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised
Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus,
petitioner s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance
in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.

These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s citizenship.
Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.7

11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the
HRET insofar as the petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned.
The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s certificate of candidacy, and its due
course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can
be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a
continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an
original action before the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but
on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En
Bane decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to
the HRET. In that sense, the HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the
qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based
proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such membership. The HRET
jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is
original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the
proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET
proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be
the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness,
that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the House because
there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till
termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the
terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner
is not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute
between the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque,
while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.

12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste
can be attributed, as the dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition
promulgated on 25 June 2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise by the HRET
of its constitutional duty. Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition was
done to pave the way for the unimpeded performance by the HRET of its
constitutional role. The petitioner can very well invoke the authority of the HRET, but
not as a sitting member of the House of Representatives.8

The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was contained
in a letter to the members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was internal to the
Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts approval to have the explanation published as it is now
appended to this Resolution.

The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well be in
order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties,
but continues until the case is terminated.9 When petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari jurisdiction
vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court exercised such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition.
Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the petition by petitioner.

More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly has
legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition, negative
and nullify the Court's Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against
trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, petitioner cannot
withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests. Obviously, she cannot, as she
designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.

WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed.
Entry of Judgment is ordered.

SO ORDERED.