Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR Sec Elisea Gozun et al

FACTS:

In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it comes to either
technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA
authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio.
After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR
to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act
No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep.
Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private
property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that
private property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They
assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot,
on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.

Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid
exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves
the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic
exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such
circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase.”

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are;

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;

(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is not w/o just
compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a
consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and
regulations.

Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the surface
owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the
construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.

Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry, acquisition and
use of private lands.

Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs. Energy Secretary Reyes (2015)

G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527 | 2015-04-21

Subject: Courts may decide cases otherwise moot and academic; Locus Standi of petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards; Former President Arroyo cannot be impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner; Service
Contracts are allowed under the 1987 Constitution; Agreements Involving Technical or Financial Assistance are
Service Contracts with Safeguards; SC-46 is null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987
Constitution; General Law on Oil Exploration (PD No. 87 not repealed by the enactment of the present 1987
Constitution); President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress (alter-ego doctrine
does not apply since the requirements are not mere formalities but constitutionally placed safeguards); Service
Contract No. 46 in violation of NIPAS Act and PD 1586 (non- compliance with EIA and ECC for protected areas);
Requirement of a law passed by Congress specifically allowing exploration in the Tanon Strait, a NIPAS area

Facts:

In G.R. No. 180771, the “Resident Marine Mammals” ,as petitioners, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and
other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated
between the islands of Negros and Cebu. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio , to
be collectively known as “the Stewards” who allegedly seek the protection of the aforementioned marine species. Also
impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others

In G.R. No. 181527, petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-
profit, non-governmental organization, established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk, and other individuals
representing the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.

On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of Energy (DOE), entered into
a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd.
(JAPEX), a Japanese company. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.

On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into Service Contract No. 46 (SC -46),
which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources in a block covering
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.

From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. JAPEX committed to
drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine
waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX
agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment(EIA) requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1586.

Having obtained the required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), JAPEX began to drill an
exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. The drilling
began onNovember 16, 2007 and lasted until February 8, 2008.

Petitioners filed the present Petitions for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction to enjoin respondents from
implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain
international and municipal laws.

Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) filed a Motion to Strike its name as a respondent on the ground that it is not the
Philippine agent of JAPEX. SOS claimed that it had acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas
exploration activities in the Philippines.

JAPEX PH, branch office of JAPEX (Japan) alleged that it had already stopped exploration activities in the Tañon
Strait way back in 2008, rendering this case moot.

The various issues raised by the petitioners may be condensed into two primary issues: (1) Procedural Issue: Locus
Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771; and (2) Main Issue: Legality
of Service Contract No. 46.

Held:

I. Procedural Issues

Courts may decide cases otherwise moot and academic

1. This Court makes clear that the “‘moot and academic principle’ is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case.” Courts have decided cases otherwise moot and academic under the following
exceptions:

(a) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

(b) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(c) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and
(d) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
2. In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve these consolidated petitions
as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the
Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the public’s interest, and the
respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition.

Locus Standi of petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards

3. The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects
standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. The 1997 Rules of Court
demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates
the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative.

4. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While
developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as [granting] legal standing for
inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in
environmental cases. [For instance], the Court [recently] passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, which allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations
of our environmental laws.

5. Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure “may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.”

6. In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is
worth noting that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named
cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal
standing to file this petition.

Former President Arroyo cannot be impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner

7. Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 10. Unwilling co- plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he
may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.

8. When the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party
defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead
him or her through its processes. The unwilling party’s name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or
her knowledge and consent, as such would be a denial of due process.
9. Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President Arroyo in their petition, is
not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-
petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against
embroiling the President in suits, “to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office holder’s time, also demands undivided attention. Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be
impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.

II. Substantive Issues

Service Contracts are allowed under the 1987 Constitution

10. This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987
Constitution. In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we held that the deletion of the words “service
contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in
length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in
deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in
the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial
law regime.

Agreements Involving Technical or Financial Assistance are Service Contracts with Safeguards

11. The phrase “agreements involving either technical or financial assistance”, referred to in paragraph 4, Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones
are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal
or “owner” of the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical
know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and
the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire
operation.

12. Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The
grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:

(i) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion
of terms disadvantageous to the country.

(ii) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to
the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to
law and can withstand public scrutiny.

(iii) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.

SC-46 is null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution

13. While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the
absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such
contract, renders it null and void.

(a) General Law on Oil Exploration (PD No. 87 not repealed by the enactment of the present 1987 Constitution)

14. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines
are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted
by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the
utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people
and the revenues to the Philippine Government. PD No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.

15. Likewise, the Court could not simply assume that PD No. 87 had been impliedly repealed. Implied repeals are not
lightly presumed. It is a settled rule that when laws are in conflict with one another, every effort must be exerted to
reconcile them. Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction
that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred.

16. Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners’ contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground that there is no
general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving
oil exploration and extraction.

17. However, while PD No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration
and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be
allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.

(b) President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress (alter-ego doctrine does
not apply since the requirements are not mere formalities but constitutionally placed safeguards)

18. As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract.
Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed
written therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties. (see Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of
Appeals)

19. Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any
service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC -46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the
DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public
respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.

20. The argument that, based on the “alter ego principle,” the [Energy Secretary's] acts are also that of then President
Macapagal-Arroyo’s, cannot apply in this case.

21. The alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive.

22. While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As we have explained in La
Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the framers of the Constitution to “eliminate or minimize the abuses
prevalent during the martial law regime.” Thus, they are not just mere formalities, which will only render a contract
unenforceable but not void, if not complied with. They are requirements placed, not just in an ordinary statute, but in
the fundamental law, the non -observance of which will nullify the contract.

23. Our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service agreements with foreign- owned
corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils. This power cannot be taken lightly. In contrast, under PD No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now
the DOE, obtain the President’s approval for the execution of any contract under said statute. Even if we were inclined
to relax the requirement in La Bugal, it must be shown that the government agency or subordinate official has been
authorized by the President to enter into such service contract for the government. Otherwise, it should be at least
shown that the President subsequently approved of such contract explicitly. None of these circumstances is evident in
the case at bar.

Service Contract No. 46 in violation of NIPAS Act and PD 1586 (non- compliance with EIA and ECC for
protected areas)

24. True to the constitutional policy that the “State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature” Congress enacted the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act) to establish a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas.

25. Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their
unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against human
exploitation. The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a protected area under
the category of Protected Seascape. A management plan was designed to protect and enhance the permanent
preservation of its natural conditions. Consequently, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is required prior to
undertaking any activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be
implemented.

26. The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586.
It prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or operating in any declared environmentally
critical project or areas without first securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been declared as a protected
area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to
an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.

27. It is true that the restrictions found under the NIPAS Act are not without exceptions. However, while an
exploration done for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is allowed under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act,
this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to undergo an EIA under Section 12. Stated differently,
surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement in
Section 12— instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites before any exploration for energy resources may
be done in protected areas.

28. The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the second sub-
phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that when the seismic surveys were
done in the Tañon Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the
management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section
4 of PD No. 1586.

29. The respondents’ subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46 cannot and will not
cure this violation.

Requirement of a law passed by Congress specifically allowing exploration in the Tanon Strait, a NIPAS area

30. SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy resources in the
Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties’ rights and obligations relating to extraction and petroleum production
should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation
and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress,
since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction
in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.

WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, ON BEHALF OF THE RESIDENTS OF WEST TOWER

CONDOMINIUM AND IN REPRESENTATION OF BARANGAY BANGKAL, AND OTHERS, INCLUDING
MINORS AND GENERATIONS YET UNBORN, PETITIONERS, VS. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, FIRST GEN CORPORATION AND THEIR RESPECTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS, JOHN DOES, AND RICHARD DOES, RESPONDENTS.

Subject: Real Parties-in-Interest; Residents of West Tower Condominium are real parties in interest and have legal
standing to file the petition; Condominium corporation has legal standing to file the petition in behalf of its unit
owners; Residents of Barangay Bangkal are real parties-in-interest; Organizations that indicated their intention to join
the petition and submitted proof of juridical personality have legal standing; TEPO not lifted until a determination is
made by the DOE that the WOPL pipeline is safe to resume operations; Precautionary principle is not applicable to
the instant case; DOE certification issued previously did not render the petition moot and academic; Trust fund is
limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment; Damages cannot be awarded in a petition
for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan; Court will not rule on the liability of the FPIC and FGC officials which can be
properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending against them

Facts:

This petition is for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan for the leak in the oil pipeline owned by First Philippine
Industrial Corporation (FPIC)

FPIC operates two pipelines: the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System and the Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System.
These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of
Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.

The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than double the standard safety allowance against
leakage, since they are made out of heavy duty steel that can withstand more than twice the current operating pressure
and are buried at a minimum depth of 1.5 meters, which is deeper than the US Department of Transportation standard
of 0.9 meters.

In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower
Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the condominium. A fuel leak from the wall of its Basement
2 was discovered. What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. The fumes
compelled the residents of WestTower to abandon their respective units and the condo’s power was shut down.

When confronted by an offcial report, FPIC admitted that the source of the fuel leak is the WOPL, which was already
closed since October 24, 2010, but denied liability by placing blame on the construction activities on the roads
surrounding West Tower.

West Tower Condominium Corporation (petitioner) initiated the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan against FPIC and First Gen Corporation (FGC). The petitioner contend that FPIC’s omission or failure to
timely replace its pipelines and to observe extraordinary diligence caused the petroleum spill in the City of Makati.
Thus, for petitioners, the continued use of the now 47-year old pipeline would not only be a hazard or a threat to the
lives, health, and property of those who live or sojourn in all the municipalities in which the pipeline is laid, but would
also affect the rights of the generations yet unborn to live in a balanced and “healthful ecology,” guaranteed under
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

The Supreme Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). The
TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check the
structural integrity of the whole span of the 117-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent
and avert any untoward incident that may result from any leak of the pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon within
60 days from receipt thereof.

In their return, FPIC and FGC posit that (i) petitioners had no legal capacity to institute the petition, (ii) the continued
operation of the pipeline should be allowed in the interest of maintaining adequate petroleum supply to the public, (iii)
not all requirements for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan are present and (iv) there is no showing that West Tower
Corp. was authorized by all those it claimed to represent.

In the meantime, petitioners also filed civil and criminal complaints against respondents arising from the same incident
or leakage from the WOPL.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA, in its Report and Recommendation,
submitted that (i) FPIC be ordered to submit a certification from the Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary that the
WOPL is already safe for commercial operation, (ii) the prayer for the creation of a special trust fund to answer for
similar contingencies in the future be denied, (iii) the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be not held
liable in their individual capacities.

In compliance with the SC's directive, the DOE Secretary issued a Certification attesting that the WOPL is safe to
resume commercial operations, subject to monitoring or inspection requirements, and imposing several conditions that
FPIC must comply with.
Issues:

(1) WON West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners and whether the other petitioners,
apart from the residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest

(2) WON the TEPO should be lifted or be converted into a Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO)

(3) WON a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies

(4) WON FGC and the directors of FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the environmental protection order

Held:

I. Legal Standing

Real Parties-in-Interest

1. As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real parties-in-interest. In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses
the right sought to be enforced. Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

Residents of West Tower Condominium are real parties in interest and have legal standing to file the petition

2. The oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all
had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s electrical power
was shut It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the filing of the
petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put by the CA, not measured
by the number of persons who signified their assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive
environmental disaster.down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to their
condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.

Condominium corporation has legal standing to file the petition in behalf of its unit owners

3. West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to
file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise
known as The Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members.

4. It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the filing of the petition for
the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is not measured by the number of persons who
signified their assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive environmental disaster.

5. Moreover, the fact that no board resolution was submitted by West Tower Corp. authorizing Manuel Dy Chuaunsu,
Jr. to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping is irrelevant. The records show that petitioners
submitted a notarized Secretary’s Certificate attesting that the authority of Chuaunsu to represent the condominium
corporation in filing the petition is from the resolution of the total membership of West Tower Corp. issued during
their November 9, 2010 meeting with the requisite quorum. It is, thus, clear that it was not the Board of West Tower
Corp. which granted Chuaunsu the authority but the full membership of the condominium corporation itself.

Residents of Barangay Bangkal are real parties-in-interest

6. As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with the unit owners and residents of West
Tower and are real parties-in-interest to the instant case, i.e., if they so wish to join the petitioners.
Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical personality
have legal standing

7. The filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule
clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of [natural] persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.

II. TEPO

TEPO not lifted until a determination is made by the DOE that the WOPL pipeline is safe to resume operations

8. Petitioners’ plea is for the conversion of the TEPO into a Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO)
pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

9. FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place, will sufficiently address any
concern of oil leaks from the WOPL. The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive
and insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, the CA recommended that
FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already safe for commercial operation. The DOE submitted
a letter recommending certain activities and the timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations.

10. The Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter to be complied with by FPIC as
conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of the WOPL. The DOE should proceed with the
implementation of the tests proposed in the said letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate
reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operation of the WOPL. On the
other hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition
is irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of the WOPL may be ordered.

11. When the adjudication of a controversy requires the resolution of issues within the expertise of an administrative
body, such issues must be investigated and resolved by the administrative body equipped with the specialized
knowledge and the technical expertise. Hence, the courts, although they may have jurisdiction and power to decide
cases, can utilize the findings and recommendations of the administrative agency on questions that demand “the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Precautionary principle is not applicable to the instant case

12. The dissent’s contentions that the delay in the lifting of the TEPO may do more harm than good are anchored on
the mistaken premise that the precautionary principle was applied in order to justify the order to the DOE and the
FPIC for the conduct of the various tests anew.

13. Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the
Precautionary Principle, provides that “[w]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link
between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the
case before it.”

14. The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human activity sought to be
inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with full scientific certainty.
Here, however, such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in
the WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining whether the spillage of hazardous
materials into the surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human health or that of other organisms.
As a matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the environment and to the residents of the
affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.

15. It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL’s compliance with pipeline structure
standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the evidence
presented by the parties on the WOPL’s actual state.

16. Any delay in the reopening of the WOPL, if said delay is for the purpose of making sure that the pipeline is
commercially viable, is better than hastily allowing its reopening without an extensive check on its structural integrity
when experience shows that there were and may still be flaws in the pipeline. In this regard, the Court deems it best
to take the necessary safeguards, which are not similar to applying the precautionary principle as previously explained,
in order to prevent a similar incident from happening in the future.

DOE certification issued previously did not render the petition moot and academic

17. The DOE imposed several conditions upon FPIC for the resumption of the operations of the WOPL. It is a clear
message from the DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of commercial operations is not yet fully
determined. And it is only after an extensive determination by the DOE of the pipeline’s actual physical state through
its proposed activities, and not merely through a short-form integrity audit, that the factual issue on the WOPL’s
viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline’s structural integrity has not yet been rendered moot and
remains to be subject to this Court’s resolution. Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the
certification equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus officio at this point.

III. Creation of a Special Trust Fund

Trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment

18. Under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the
purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment. Said proviso pertinently provides:

SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. – If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include
the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney’s fees, costs of suit and
other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose
subject to the control of the court.

19. A reading of the petition reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies.
This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already suffered.

Damages cannot be awarded in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan

20. The Court is of the considered view that the creation of a special trust fund [for future contingencies] is misplaced.
The prayer is but a claim for damages, and Sec. 15(e), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
expressly prohibits the grant of damages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:

Section 15. Judgment. - xxx The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
xxx
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.

IV. Liability of Directors and Officers

Court will not rule on the liability of the FPIC and FGC officials which can be properly resolved in the civil
and criminal cases now pending against them

21. The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors and officers of FPIC
and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition
for a writ of kalikasan, the Court cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec.
15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal
complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the
individual liability of respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the management of FPIC
relative to the dire environmental impact of the dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the
WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.
SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V. v. EFREN JALOS, GR No. 179918, 2010-09-08

Facts:

This case is about a question of jurisdiction over an action against a petroleum contractor, whose pipeline operation
has allegedly driven the fish away from coastal areas, inflicting loss of earnings among fishermen.

On December 11, 1990 petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell) and the Republic of the Philippines
entered into Service Contract 38 for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan.

Shell discovered natural gas in the

Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its development

This entailed the construction and installation of a pipeline from Shell's production platform to its gas processing
plant in Batangas.

respondents Efren Jalos, Joven Campang, Arnaldo Mijares, and 75 other individuals (Jalos, et al) filed a complaint
for damages[1] against Shell before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),... claimed that they were all subsistence
fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely affected by the
construction and operation of Shell's natural gas pipeline.

alos, et al claimed that their fish catch became few after the construction of the pipeline.

They said that "the pipeline greatly affected biogenically... hard-structured communities such as coral reefs and led
[to] stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea."

Instead of filing an answer, Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint.

It alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action, as it is a "pollution case" under Republic Act (R.A.)
3931, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 984 or the Pollution Control

Law.
Under these statutes, the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and
actions for related damages

Shell also claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the State's consent.

Moreover, said Shell, the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not specify any actionable wrong or
particular act or omission on Shell's part that could have caused the alleged injury to Jalos, et al.

RTC dismissed the complaint.

t ruled that the action was actually pollution-related, although denominated as one for damages. The complaint
should thus be brought first before the PAB, the government agency vested with jurisdiction over... pollution-related
cases.

alos, et al assailed the RTC's order through a petition for certiorari[6] before the Court of Appeals (CA).

In due course, the latter court reversed such order and upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the action.

The CA also rejected Shell's assertion that the suit was actually against the State. It observed that the government
was not even impleaded as party defendant.

The CA also held that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable wrong

Issues:

Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the PAB;

Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action against Shell; and

Whether or not the suit is actually against the State and is barred under the doctrine of state immunity.

Ruling:

First.

it is unmistakable based on their allegations that Shell's pipeline produced some kind of poison or... emission that
drove the fish away from the coastal areas.

While the complaint did not specifically attribute to Shell any specific act of "pollution," it alleged that "the pipeline
greatly affected biogenically hard-structured communities such as coral reefs and led [to]... stress to the marine life
in the Mindoro Sea."[10] This constitutes "pollution" as defined by law.

It is clear from this definition that the stress to marine life claimed by Jalos, et al is caused by some kind of pollution
emanating from Shell's natural gas pipeline.

The power and expertise needed to determine such issue lies with the PAB.

Executive Order 192 (1987) transferred to the PAB the powers and functions of the National Pollution and Control
Commission provided in R.A. 3931, as amended by P.D. 984.

These empowered the PAB to "[d]etermine the location, magnitude, extent,... severity, causes and effects" of water
pollution.
he PAB's final decisions may be reviewed by the CA... under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Jalos, et al had, therefore, an administrative recourse before filing their complaint with the regular courts.

Consequently, resort must... first be made to the PAB, which is the agency possessed of expertise in determining
pollution-related matters.

To this extent, the failure of Jalos, et al to allege in their complaint that they had first taken resort to PAB before
going to court means that they failed to state a cause of action that the RTC could act on. This warranted the
dismissal of their... action.

Second.

As mentioned above, the complaint said that the natural gas pipeline's construction and operation "greatly affected"
the marine environment, drove away the fish, and resulted in reduced income for Jalos, et al.

But lack of particulars is not a ground for dismissing the complaint.

Here, all the elements of a cause of action are present.

First, Jalos, et al undoubtedly had the right to the preferential use of marine and fishing resources which is
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution.[23] Second, Shell had the... correlative duty to refrain from acts or
omissions that could impair Jalos, et al's use and enjoyment of the bounties of the seas. Lastly, Shell's construction
and operation of the pipeline, which is an act of physical intrusion into the marine environment, is said... to have
disrupted and impaired the natural habitat of fish and resulted in considerable reduction of fish catch and income for
Jalos, et al.

Thus, the construction and operation of the pipeline may, in itself, be a wrongful act that could be the basis of Jalos,
et al's cause of action.

Third.

Shell claims that it cannot be sued without the State's consent under the doctrine of state immunity from suit. But, to
begin with, Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines

It is but a service contractor for the exploration and... development of one of the country's natural gas reserves.

Consequently, Shell is not an agent of the Philippine government, but a provider of services, technology and
financing[31] for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV 82404 dated November 20, 2006. Respondent Efren Jalos, et al's complaint for damages against Shell
Philippines Exploration B.V. in Civil

Case P-1818-03 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro is ordered DISMISSED
without prejudice to its refiling with the Pollution Adjudication Board or PAB.

Principles:

Section 2(a) of P.D. 984 defines "pollution" as "any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological properties of
any water x x x as will or is likely to create or render such water x x x harmful, detrimental or injurious to public
health, safety or welfare or... which will adversely affect their utilization for domestic, commercial, industrial,
agricultural, recreational or other legitimate purposes."

A cause of action is the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of
the plaintiff.

Its elements consist of: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2)a duty on the part of the defendant to... respect
the plaintiff's right, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

FACTS:

From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the
Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement
between AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions
of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution

RULING: YES!

Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates
of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly,
the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of
the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of
men,” are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
574 SCRA 661 – Political Law – Ministerial vs Discretionary Functions – Mandamus

Constitutional Law – Right to a Healthful Ecology

In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB) filed an action for mandamus to
compel the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and other government
agencies to clean up the Manila Bay. CROMB argued that the environmental state of the Manila
Bay is already dangerous to their health and the inaction of MMDA and the other concerned
government agencies violates their rights to life, health, and a balanced ecology guaranteed by
the Constitution. CROMB also averred under the Environmental Code, it is MMDA’s duty to
clean up the Manila Bay.

The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al to clean up the Manila Bay.
MMDA assailed the decision on the ground that MMDA’s duty under the Environmental Code is
merely a discretionary duty hence it cannot be compelled by mandamus. Further, MMDA argued
that the RTC’s order was for a general clean up of the Manila Bay yet under the Environmental
Code, MMDA was only tasked to attend to specific incidents of pollution and not to undertake a
massive clean up such as that ordered by the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA may be compelled by mandamus to clean up Manila Bay.

HELD: Yes. It is true that in order for MMDA to implement laws like the Environmental Code,
the process of implementing usually involves the exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up
landfills. But this does not mean that their function or mandate under the law is already
discretionary. Looking closer, MMDA’s function to alleviate the problem on solid and liquid
waste disposal problems is a ministerial function. In short, MMDA does not have the discretion
to whether or not alleviate the garbage disposal problem in Metro Manila, particularly in the
Manila Bay area. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a
decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts
to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

Anent the issue on whether or not MMDA’s task under the Environmental Code involves a
general clean up, the Supreme Court ruled that MMDA’s mandate under the Environmental
Code is to perform cleaning in general and not just to attend to specific incidents of pollution.
Hence, MMDA, together with the other government agencies, must act to clean up the Manila
Bay as ordered by the RTC.