Baker vs.

Car
The Court delineated a series of factors, at least one of which must be
present, in order for the case to be a non-justiciable political question:
(a) commitment of the issue to a branch of government other than the
judiciary; (b) lack of standards for resolving the issue; (c) impossibility
of the judiciary to resolve the issue without first making a policy
determination; (d) a judicial decision of that matter as a lack of respect
for other branches of government; (e) a political decision has already
been made; or (f) the potential for multiple pronouncements by various
branches on one question.
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to
the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political
question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as
essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department;
(2) or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion;
(3) or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government;
(4) or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made;
(5) or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.

LAGMAN et al. vs MEDIALDEA et al.

b) Probable cause is the

allowable standard of proof for the
President.

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to

convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that
more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being
committed.176 To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would
restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Along this line, Justice
Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President Macapagal-
Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable
cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of either
invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that
probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most
expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the
existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of
martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other
standards of proof, which, in order to be met, would require much from
the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency
powers, the requirement of probable cause is much simpler. It merely
necessitates an "average man [to weigh] the facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he
has no technical knowledge. He [merely] relies on common sense [and]
x x x needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not,
a crime has been committed x x x by the accused."177

To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual

basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety
requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is
probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion
or invasion.

REPUBLIC VS. SERENO

Nevertheless, the remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but
rests on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first
requirement on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay
and prejudice should result as spelled out under Section 1, Rule 19 of
the Rules of Court, as follows:
Sec. 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene
in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
Each of the movant-intervenors in this case seek to intervene as citizens
and taxpayers, whose claimed interest to justify their intervention is
their "sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold
the Philippine Constitution". The movant-intervenors further assert a
"public right" to intervene in the instant case by virtue of its
"transcendental importance for the Filipino people as a whole". Apart
from such naked allegations, movant-intervenors failed to establish to
the Court's satisfaction the required legal interest. Our jurisprudence is
well-settled on the matter: Intervention is not a matter of absolute right
but may be permitted by the court when the applicant shows facts which
satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing intervention. Under
our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession
of a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the legal
interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must
be of a direct and immediate character so that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest
must be actual and material, a concern which is more than mere
curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and
contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral.
Clearly, herein movant-intervenors' sentiments, no matter how noble,
do not, in any way, come within the purview of the concept of "legal
interest" contemplated under the Rules to justify the allowance of
intervention. Movant-intervenors failed to show any legal interest of
such nature that they will "either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation of the judgment". Even the IBP's assertion of their
"fundamental duty to uphold the Constitution, advocate for the rule of
law, and safeguard the administration of justice", being the official
organization of all Philippine lawyers, will not suffice. Admittedly, their
interest is merely out of "sentimental desire" to uphold the rule of law.
Meanwhile, Senators De Lima and Trillanes' claimed legal interest is
mainly grounded upon their would-be participation in the impeachment
trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed
before the Senate as the impeachment court. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that as of the moment, such interest is still contingent on the
filing of the articles of impeachment before the Senate. It bears
stressing that the interest contemplated by law must be actual,
substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent
or expectant.

MARTIAL LAW
It is true that a party's failure to implead an indispensable party is
not per se a ground for the dismissal of the action, as said party may be
added, by order of the court on motion of the party or motu propio, at
any stage of the action or at such times as are just. However, it remains
essential - as it is jurisdictional - that an indispensable party be
impleaded before judgment is rendered by the court, as the absence of
such indispensable party renders all subsequent acts of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present.84 Joining indispensable parties into an
action is mandatory, being a requirement of due process. In their
absence, the judgment cannot attain real finality.85

LEB

Pimentel and the other petitioners claimed that Republic Act 7662, or
the Legal Education Reform Act, is unconstitutional, arguing that
Congress cannot create the said administrative office or board because
authority over the practice of law is reserved for the SC under the
Constitution.

Article 8, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, states that the SC shall

have the power over admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Executive privilege is the implied constitutional power of the President
to withhold information requested by other branches of the government.
The Constitution does not expressly grant this power to the President
but courts have long recognized implied Presidential powers if
"necessary and proper"14 in carrying out powers and functions expressly
granted to the Executive under the Constitution.
As the official in control of the nation's foreign service by virtue of the
President's control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices,22 the President is the chief implementer of the foreign policy
relations of the State. The President's role as chief implementer of the
State's foreign policy is reinforced by the President's constitutional
power to negotiate and enter into treaties and international
agreements.23 In the discharge of this responsibility, the President may
find it necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets to
the Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have conducted
diplomacy with considerable secrecy. There is every expectation that a
state will not imprudently reveal secrets that its allies have shared with
it.

Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of protecting

military, national security and diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential
communications, must be weighed against other constitutionally
recognized interests. There is the declared state policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest,24 the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern,25 the accountability
of public officers,26 the power of legislative inquiry,27 and the judicial
power to secure testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding
cases.28

The balancing of interests – between executive privilege on one hand

and the other competing constitutionally recognized interests on the
other hand - is a function of the courts. The courts will have to decide
the issue based on the factual circumstances of each case. This is how
conflicts on executive privilege between the Executive and the
Legislature,29 and between the Executive and the Judiciary,30 have been
decided by the courts.