SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 1 of 53

XIV. Partition and distribution of the estate (2 meetings)

Article 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
Civil Code, articles 1078-1090
 although it should purport to be a sale, and exchange, a compromise,
or any other transaction. (n)

SECTION 6
 Article 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the
Partition and Distribution of the Estate
estate unless the testator should have expressly forbidden its partition,
in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed twenty years as
SUBSECTION 1. Partition
provided in article 494. This power of the testator to prohibit division
applies to the legitime.

Article 1078. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of
the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates
subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. (n)
when any of the causes for which partnership is dissolved takes place,
or when the court finds for compelling reasons that division should be
Article 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs. (1051a)

assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may

belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value. (n)
Article 1084. Voluntary heirs upon whom some condition has been
imposed cannot demand a partition until the condition has been
Article 1080. Should a person make partition of his estate by an act fulfilled; but the other co-heirs may demand it by giving sufficient
inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it
security for the rights which the former may have in case the condition
does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

should be complied with, and until it is known that the condition has
not been fulfilled or can never be complied with, the partition shall be
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to keep any
understood to be provisional. (1054a)

agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail

himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the
Article 1085. In the partition of the estate, equality shall be observed
legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned, be
as far as possible, dividing the property into lots, or assigning to each
paid in cash. (1056a)

of the co-heirs things of the same nature, quality and kind. (1061)

Article 1081. A person may, by an act inter vivos or mortis causa,

Article 1086. Should a thing be indivisible, or would be much impaired
intrust the mere power to make the partition after his death to any
by its being divided, it may be adjudicated to one of the heirs, provided
person who is not one of the co-heirs.

he shall pay the others the excess in cash.

The provisions of this and of the preceding article shall be observed

Nevertheless, if any of the heirs should demand that the thing be sold
even should there be among the co-heirs a minor or a person subject
at public auction and that strangers be allowed to bid, this must be
to guardianship; but the mandatary, in such case, shall make an
done. (1062)

inventory of the property of the estate, after notifying the co-heirs, the
creditors, and the legatees or devisees. (1057a)

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 2 of 53

Article 1087. In the partition the co-heirs shall reimburse one another 8. Javelosa v. Barrios, 66 Phil 107 

for the income and fruits which each one of them may have received 9. Kalaw v. Daza, 77 Phil 1 

from any property of the estate, for any useful and necessary expenses 10. Torres v. Encarnacion, 89 Phil 678 

made upon such property, and for any damage thereto through malice 11. Marina Dizon-Rivera v. Estela Dizon, 33 SCRA 554 

or neglect. (1063)
12. Sebial v. Sebial, 64 SCRA 385

13. Gabila v. Perez, 169 SCRA 517 

Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a 14. Ralla v. Untalan, 172 SCRA 858 

stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be 15. Favor v. CA, 194 SCRA 308 

subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the 16. Heirs of Joaquin Teves v. CA, 316 SCRA 632 

price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month 17. Castro v. Miat, 397 SCRA 271 

from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. 18. Sanchez v. CA, 279 SCRA 647 

(1067a)
19. Layague v. De Ulgasan, 109 Phil 945 

20. Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, 9 SCRA 113 

Article 1089. The titles of acquisition or ownership of each property 21. Guidote v. BPI, 67 Phil 391 

shall be delivered to the co-heir to whom said property has been 22. Dolores C. Vda. De Gil v. Agustin Cancio, 14 SCRA 796 

adjudicated. (1065a)
23. Wenceslao v. Calimon, 46 Phil 906

24. Saturnino v. Paulino, 97 Phil 50 

Article 1090. When the title comprises two or more pieces of land 25. Castro v. Castro, 97 Phil 705 

which have been assigned to two or more co-heirs, or when it covers
26. Plan v. IAC, 135 SCRA 270 

one piece of land which has been divided between two or more co-
27. Garcia v. Calaliman, 172 SCRA 201

heirs, the title shall be delivered to the one having the largest interest,
and authentic copies of the title shall be furnished to the other co-heirs 

at the expense of the estate. If the interest of each co-heir should be
the same, the oldest shall have the title. (1066a)

Read: 

1. Reyes v. Barretto Datu, 19 SCRA 85 

2. Guico v. Bautista, 110 SCRA 584 

3. Acap v. CA, 251 SCRA 30 

4. Vicente Uriarte v. CFI of Negros Occidental, 33 SCRA 252 

5. Rodolfo V. Jao v. CA, 382 SCRA 407 

6. Adriano v. Obleada, 58 Phil 302 

7. Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil 383 

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Case #1: TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors, Azucena,
Flordelis and Tirso, Jr. all surnamed Reyes y Barretto, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. LUCILA MILAGROS BARRETTO DATU, defendant-
appellant.  [G.R. No. L-17818. January 20, 1967.]
FACTS: Bibiano Barretto married Maria Gerardo and they acquired a
vast estate consisting of real properties covered by their respective
TCTs. However, when Bibiano died in 1936, he had a will wherein he
left his share of these properties to Salud Barreto (wife of petitioners
Tirso Reyes and mother of Azucena, Flordelis and Tirso Jr.) and
respondent Lucila Milagros Barretto, and legacies to Rosa Barretto and
Felisa Barretto along with his nephews and nieces. On the other hand,
the usufruct of the fishpond was reserved for Maria, the latter was
appointed as administratrix. Later on, Maria prepared a project of
partition which she signed in her own behalf and as guardian of
Milagros. The project of partition made by Maria was approved by the
CFI of Manila - the estate was distributed and the delivery of the
shares were in accordance with this project. As a consequence, Salud
Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the
cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new
titles in her own name.
included, shall be null and void.” The Court a quo further rejected the
Later, Maria died in 1948, leaving two wills. In the first will, she
instituted both Salud and Milagros as her heirs, which she revoked in
her second will, by instituting Milagros only as her heir. The court
admitted the second will and rejected the first. In a separate action, it
was already decided that Salud was not the daughter of Maria and
Bibiano. 
establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its
So Tirso is now coming after remnant of Bibiano’s estate which was
given in usufruct to Maria, filing an action for the recovery of one-half
share in the fishpond, located in the barrio of San Roque, Hagonoy,
Page 3 of 53
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13734 of the
Land Records of this Province, being the share of petitioner's wards
Azucena, Flordelis, and Tirso Jr as minor heirs of the deceased Salud
Barretto, widow of petitioner Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors was
filed.
With Tirso’s action for recovery, Milagros was prompted to set up her
right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all
the other properties willed and delivered to Salud , for being a spurious
heir, and not entitled to any share in Bibiano’s estate, thereby directly
attacking the validity of the project of partition and the decision
pertaining to it.  
LOWER COURT RULING: Declared the project of partition submitted
in the proceedings for the settlement of Bibiano’s estate (Civil Case
No. 49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void
ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud,
predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the
spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project
of partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code
of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: "A partition in which a
person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been
contention advanced by plaintiffs that since Bibiano Barretto was free
to dispose of one- third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his
will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at
least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as defendant Milagros
was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover
from Salud, and from the latter's children and successors, all the
properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the
provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines
acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. Hence, as stated at the
beginning of this opinion, the Court a quo not only dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to return the properties received
under the project of partition previously mentioned as prayed for in
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
defendant Milagros Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied
defendant's prayer for damages.
and binding in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The Project of Partition from which
Salud acquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio and that Salud
did not acquire any valid title thereto, lastly, the court did not acquire
any jurisdiction of Milagros, since she was still a minor during that
time. Also, Milagros contends that the partition in question was void as
a compromise on the civil status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of
the old Civil Code. Since the court's distribution of the estate of the
late Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of partition
executed by Salud Barretto and the widow, Maria Gerardo (who signed
for herself and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto), and since
no evidence was taken of the filiation of the heirs, nor were any
 findings of fact or law made, the decree of distribution can have no
greater validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall
with it, being in the nature of a judgment by consent, based on a
compromise. Saminiada vs. Mata, 92 Phil. 426, is invoked in support of
the proposition. That case is authority for the proposition that a
judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of mistake
or fraud, upon petition led in due time, where petition for "relief was led
before the compromise agreement, a proceeding, was
consummated" (cas. cit. at p. 436).  Defendant-appellee further pleads
that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo) could not have
ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said
widow in agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was a fraud
on appellee's rights and entitles her to relief.
reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto. Nor does
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Tirso points out that Article 1081 of
the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the present case by the
court below.
reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked by appellee, is not at all
ISSUE: Whether the partition between Salud and Milagros is valid and
binding?
Page 4 of 53
RULING: YES, the partition between Salud and Milagros is valid
Bibiano Barretto, duly approved by the Court of First Instance of
Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, it is valid for not being
contrary to either articles 1081 or 1814 of the Civil Code of 1889;
(2) that Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition and
decree of distribution is barred by the statute of limitations; and (3)
that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in
bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the
properties inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally
untenable. It follows that the plaintiffs' action for partition of the
fishpond described in the complaint should have been given due
course.
Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano
Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros;
hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with
a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and
was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article
1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without
distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact
that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not
preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament;
for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his
estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (1/2) assigned to
Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that
the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller
than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there
was here no preterition, or total omission, of a forced heir. For this
applicable, that case involving an instance of preterition or omission of
children of the testator's former marriage. 
A compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through
mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Article 1809;
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2028); and the condition of Salud as
daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto, while untrue, was at no time
disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. There can
be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a compromise
over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by
the parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the
estate.
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own
name implies, is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate that the
court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the
distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto
and the parts to which each is entitled (Comia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629,
643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940 ; Rule 91, Revised
Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once nal,
that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in
conformity with law or the testament, the same should have been
corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become nal, its
binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly
set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. It is thus apparent that where
a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the
same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of
partition becomes irrelevant.
In the case before us, however, the agreement of partition was not only
ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually
consummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the deceased
were cancelled, and new certi cates issued in favor of the heirs, long
before the decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata does not
apply.
there was such fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained within 4
Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it
were shown that the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the
project of partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could
stand, since it was in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano
Barretto, against the provisions whereof no objection had been made.
Page 5 of 53
In fact, it was the court's duty to do so. Act 190, section 640, in force
in 1939, provided:
Sec. 640. Estate, How Administered. — When a will is thus allowed,
the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration
with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
Philippine Islands.Such estate, after the payment of just debts and
expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such
will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any,
shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in these
Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or
country." (Italics supplied)
That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate
court distributed the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that
the said court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of
distribution. So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros
Barretto was not only made a party by publication but actually
appeared and participated in the proceedings through her guardian:
she, therefore, can not escape the jurisdiction of the Manila Court of
First Instance which settled her father's estate.
In the first place, there is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano
Barretto was judicially settled and distributed appellants' predecessor,
Salud Lim Boco Barretto, knew that she was not Bibiano's child; so
that if fraud was committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was
solely responsible, and neither Salud nor her minor children, appellants
herein, can be held liable therefor. In the second place, granting that
years from its discovery, and the record shows that this period had
elapsed long ago.
Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16
years old (Exhibit 24), she became of age ve years later, in 1944. On
that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 6 of 53
fraud the court decree distributing her father's estate and the four-year
period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948 (Section 43, Act
190). In fact, conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true Case #2: DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs.
facts in 1946 (Appellee's Brief, p. 27), her action still became extinct in PABLO G. BAUTISTA, ET. AL., defendants and appellees. [G.R. No.
1950. Clearly, therefore, the action was already barred when in August L-14921. December 31, 1960.]

31, 1956 she led her counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of
distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate.
FACTS: Mariano Bautista married Gertrudes Garcia. Mariano died
intestate in 1947 and his properties were extrajudicially partitioned
In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto among his heirs. Gertrudes died intestate as well in 1956, leaving
introduced evidence that appellant Tirso Reyes had induced her to petitioners Dolores Guico et al and respondents Pablo Bautista et al
delay ling action by verbally promising to reconvey the properties (who are her grandchildren) as her legitimate heirs. During her lifetime,
received by his deceased wife, Salud. There is no reliable evidence of Gertrudes made several deeds of donations of her properties in favor
the alleged promise, which rests exclusively on the oral assertions of of Pablo et al. In the deeds of donation, it did not provide that the
Milagros herself and her counsel. In fact, the trial court made no properties donated would not be subject to collation, so that the
mention of such promise in the decision under appeal. Even more: donees are legally bound to bring into the mass of the estate by way of
granting arguendo that the promise was made, the same can not bind collation the value of the properties received by them in order that the
the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are the real parties in net hereditary estate may be divided equally among the heirs; and that
interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of the deceased Gertrudes Garcia left outstanding obligations to the
disposition, and not of administration, can not bind his wards, being Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and the G. A. Machineries, Inc.
null and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court Later, an action for liquidation and partition of the estate left by the
(Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil. 136, 142).
spouses Mariano and Gertrudes filed on October 20, 1956 by Dolores
et al., against Pablo G. Bautista, et al.



In response, Pablo et al filed a motion to dismiss alleging, among other
things, that Dolores’ action was premature because it is admitted in
the complaint that deceased Getrudes left certain debts.

LOWER COURT RULING: Dismissed Dolores’ complaint for being

premature without prejudice and without costs. 

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Include in their complaint is a prayer

for the appointment of an administrator during the pendency of this
case, in view of the existence of debts of the estate and the lack of
agreement among the heirs as to how said debts would be
paid. Dolores et al claim that there is nothing that would prevent the
trial court from directing and ordering that the pending obligations of
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
the estate be paid first, or that they should constitute as liens on the
respective shares to be received by the heirs. In other words, Dolores
propose that the administration of the estate for the purpose of paying
off its debts be accomplished right in this partition suit, with either the
Court performing the duties of the administrator, or an administrator
appointed to take care of such debts, as prayed for in their complaint. 
estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to
ISSUE: Whether an action for liquidation and partition of spouses
Bautista’s respective estates is premature?
50 Off. Gaz., 3041; Intestate Estate of Rufina Mercado vs. Magtibay, et
RULING: YES, an action for liquidation and partition of spouses
Bautista’s respective estates is premature. Gertrudes left
obligations must be first paid or compounded with the creditors
before the estate can be divided among the heirs; and unless they
reach an amicable settlement as to how such obligations should
be settled, if they shall assume personal liability for Gertrudes’
debts, the estate would inevitably be submitted to administration
for the payment of such debts. Obviously, an ordinary action for
partition can not be converted into a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased, without compliance with
the procedure outlined by Rules 79-90 of the Rules of Court,
especially the provisions on publication and notice to creditors. As
we see it, appellants' major objective in filing this action for
partition is to have an early determination of the question whether
or not the donation inter vivos received by the defendants from the
deceased are subject to collation. But there is no reason why this
question can not be determined just as expeditiously in a special
proceeding, because even before the known debts of the estate
are settled and paid and pending the expiration of the period for
the ling of other claims, the issue can, upon motion of the heirs,
be set for hearing, tried, and definitely settled.
There is no question that the law allowance the partition of the estate
of a deceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or through an
ordinary action for partition, without the ling of a special proceeding
and the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of the
Page 7 of 53
settlement of said estate, but this they may do only "if the decedent
left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are
represented by their judicial guardians" (sec. 1, Rule 74). The reason is
that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no
necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the
which they are immediately entitled (Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232;
Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317; Macalinao vs. Valdez, et al., 95 Phil., 318;
al., 96 Phil., 383).
The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending
obligations. In such cases, such obligations must be first paid or
compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided
among the heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to
how such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably be
submitted to administration for the payment of such debts. As
compared to ordinary partition, the regular estate proceedings offer the
advantage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to disclose
themselves and submit their respective claims within a comparatively
short period (12 months under Rule 87, unless claims are contingent),
otherwise, they are forever barred; while in ordinary judicial partitions
the creditors1 claims are only extinguished by the expiration of the
period of extinctive prescription. An heir, therefore, may have an
interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will be freed
from invisible claims, so that creditors may not later appear and initiate
the very estate proceedings sought to be avoided, and he may
properly object to an action for partition on this ground. Unless,
therefore, all the heirs are agreeable to assuming personal liability for
all the decedent's obligations, those known as well as those
undisclosed, regular estate proceedings can not be avoided.


SUCCESSION
Case #3: TEODORO ACAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
EDY DE LOS REYES, respondents. [G.R. No. 118114. December 7,
1995.]
FACTS: The title to Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental was evidenced by OCT No. R-12179. The lot has
an area of 13,720 sq. meters. The title was issued and is registered in
the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. After both
spouses died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975,
Felixberto executed a duly notarized document entitled "Declaration of
Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of Cosme Pido. Since
1960, petitioner Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the
said land, covering an area of nine thousand five hundred (9,500)
square meters. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto
to Cosme Pido, Acap continued to be the registered tenant thereof and
religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon
Pido's death, to his widow Laurenciana. Later on, Pido died interstate
and on 27 November 1981, his surviving heirs executed a notarized
document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre,". The said document was
signed by all of Pido's heirs, except for private respondent Edy de los
Reyes.
It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pido's death, title to the
property continued to be registered in the name of the Vasquez
spouses. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of
Rights in his favor, Edy filed the same with the Registry of Deeds as
part of a notice of an adverse claim against the original certificate of
title.
Thereafter, Edy sought for Teodoro to personally inform the latter that
Edy had become the new owner of the land and that the lease rentals
thereon should be paid to him. Further, Edy alleged that he and
Teodoro entered into an oral lease agreement wherein Teodoro agreed
to pay ten (10) cavans of palay per annum as lease rental. In 1982,
Teodoro allegedly complied with said obligation. In 1983, however,
Part 14 Digests Page 8 of 53
Teodoro refused to pay any further lease rentals on the land, prompting
Edy to seek the assistance of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform
(MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The MAR invited Teodoro to a
conference scheduled on 13 October 1983, which he did not attend
personally but sends his wife instead. During the meeting, an officer of
the Ministry informed Acap's wife about Edy's ownership of the said
land but she stated that she and Teodoro did not recognize Edy's
claim of ownership over the land.
On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four (4) years, Edy filed a complaint
for recovery of possession and damages against Teodoro alleging in
the main that as his leasehold tenant, Teodoro refused and failed to
pay the agreed annual rental of ten (10) cavans of palay despite
repeated demands.
LOWER COURT RULING: rendered a decision in favor of Edy. The
trial court stated that the evidence had established that the subject
land was "sold" by the heirs of Cosme Pido to Edy by executing a
Deed of Sale.
CA RULING: Affirmed the lower court’s ruling, it brushed aside
Teodoro's argument that the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights (Exhibit "D"), the document relied upon by Edy to prove his
ownership to the lot, was excluded by the lower court in its order
dated 27 August 1990. The order indeed noted that the document was
not identified by Cosme Pido's heirs and was not registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Negros Occidental. According to respondent
court, however, since the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights
appears to have been duly notarized, no further proof of its due
execution was necessary. Like the trial court, respondent court was
also convinced that the said documents stands as prima facie proof of
Edy's ownership of the land in dispute. With respect to its non-
registration, respondent court noted, Teodoro had actual knowledge of
the subject sale of the land in dispute to Edy because as early as 1983,
Teodoro already knew of Edy's claim over the said land but which he
thereafter denied, and that in 1982, Teodoro actually paid rent to Edy.
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Otherwise stated, respondent court considered this fact of rental
payment in 1982 as estoppel on Teodoro's part to thereafter refute
Edy's claim of ownership over the said land. Under these
circumstances, respondent court ruled that indeed there was
deliberate refusal by Teodoro to pay rent for a continued period of five
years that merited forfeiture of his otherwise preferred right to the
issuance of a certificate of land transfer.
registered the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights with
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Teodoro argues that the Regional Trial
Court, in its order dated 7 August 1990, explicitly excluded the
document marked as Exhibit "D" (Declaration of Heirship, etc.) as
private respondent's evidence because it was not registered with the
Registry of Deeds and was not identified by anyone of the heirs of
Cosme Pido. The Court of Appeals, however, held the same to be
admissible, it being a notarized document, hence, a prima facie proof
of private respondent's ownership of the lot to which it refers. In
addition, Teodoro points out that the Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights is not one of the recognized modes of acquiring
ownership under Article 712 of the Civil Code. Neither can the same be
considered a deed of sale so as to transfer ownership of the land to
private respondent because no consideration is stated in the contract
(assuming it is a contract or deed of sale).
extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Edy defends the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals as in accord with the evidence and the
law. He posits that while it may indeed be true that the trial court
excluded his Exhibit "D" which is the Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights as part of his evidence, the trial court declared him
nonetheless owner of the subject lot based on other evidence adduced
during the trial, namely the notice of adverse claim (Exhibit "E") duly
registered by him with the Registry of Deeds, which contains the
questioned Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights as an integral
part thereof.
document was neither registered with the Registry of Deeds nor
ISSUE: Whether the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights in
this case effectively transfers the ownership of the land to Edy’s name?
Page 9 of 53
RULING: NO, the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights in
this case did not transfer effectively the ownership of the land to
Edy’s name, for two reasons: Edy is a stranger to Pido’s
succession and the said document was unregistered with the
Registry of Deeds and was not identified by the heirs of Pido. The
trial court excluded it in its order. The reason is Edy never
the Registry of Deeds or with the MAR. Instead, he (private
respondent) sought to do indirectly what could not be done
directly, i.e., file a notice of adverse claim on the said lot to
establish ownership thereof. A declaration of heirship and waiver
of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the
Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and
divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they
see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs
under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. 
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary
rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the
existence of a contract or deed of sale between the
parties. 11 The second is, technically speaking, a mode of
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence
and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-
heirs in the succession. 12 Private respondent, being then a
stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively
claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the
waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a
sale, 13 or a donation, 14 or any other derivative mode of
acquiring ownership. On record, Exhibit "D", which is the
"Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights" was excluded by
the trial court in its order dated 27 August 1990 because the
identified by the heirs of Cosme Pido. There is no showing that

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
private respondent had the same document attached to or made
part of the record. 
to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the
Also, the Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed with Registry of
Deeds which contained the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of
rights and was annotated at the back of the Original Certificate of Title
to the land in question is insufficient to transfer the title of the land
under Edy’s name. It is to be noted that while the existence of said
adverse claim was duly proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a
deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and private
respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of
private respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in
the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be
sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private
respondent's name. 
is a notice of a case already pending in court." 15
In the first place, an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right
over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se
sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must
be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence,
ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode
or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual
process of acquisition transfer of ownership over a thing in question. 8
sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership
are generally classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode
(i.e, through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual
creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis
causa or tradition as a result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter,
donation, assignment or mutuum).
corresponding proof thereof.
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the
nature and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights,
equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the
same.
death), even if in 1982, private respondent allegedly informed petitioner
Page 10 of 53
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself
other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. 9 
What the trial court admitted was Annex "E", a notice of adverse claim
filed with Registry of Deeds which contained the Declaration of
Heirship with Waiver of rights an was annotated at the back of the
Original Certificate of Title to the land in question.
A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove
private respondent's ownership over the tenanted lot. "A notice of
adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the
registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court
at some future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which
It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was
duly proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was
executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent
transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private
respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the
tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be
respondent's name.
Consequently, while the transaction between Pido's heirs and private
respondent may be binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as a
registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily forfeited on a
mere allegation of private respondent's ownership without the
Petitioner had been a registered tenant in the subject land since 1960
and religiously paid lease rentals thereon. In his mind, he continued to
be the registered tenant of Cosme Pido and his family (after Pido's
that he had become the new owner of the land.

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Under the circumstances, petitioner may have, in good faith, assumed
such statement of private respondent to be true and may have in fact
delivered 10 cavans of palay as annual rental for 1982 to private
respondent. But in 1983, it is clear that petitioner had misgivings over
private respondent's claim of ownership over the said land because in
the October 1983 MAR conference, his wife Laurenciana categorically
denied all of private respondent's allegations. In fact, petitioner even
secured a certificate from the MAR dated 9 May 1988 to the effect that
he continued to be the registered tenant of Cosme Pido and not a
private respondent. The reason is the private respondent never
registered the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights with the
Registry of Deeds or with the MAR. Instead, he (private respondent)
sought to do indirectly what could not be done directly, i.e., file a
notice of adverse claim on the said lot to establish ownership thereof .
It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that there was no unjustified or
deliberate r e f u s a l by petitioner to pay the lease rentals or
amortizations to the landowner/agricultural lessor which, in this case,
private respondent failed to established in his favor by clear and
convincing evidence. Consequently, the sanction of forfeiture of his
preferred right to be issued a Certificate of Land Transfer under P.D. 27
and to the possession of his farmholdings should not be applied
against petitioners, since private respondent has not established
a cause of action for recovery of possession against petitioner.


Page 11 of 53
Case #4: VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN
URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents. [G.R.
Nos. L-21938-39. May 29, 1970.]
(Lifted from: http://docshare.tips/rule-73-
cases_58481038b6d87f96988b465d.html)
FACTS: Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died. Petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed
with respondent CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement
of the estate of the late Don Juan (Special Proceeding No. 6344)
alleging that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and
that, during the lifetime of Don Juan, Vicente had instituted a civil case
in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural
son. Private respondent Higinio Uriarte, nephew of the deceased, filed
an opposition to the petition alleging that Don Juan had executed a
Will in Spain and further questioned Vicente's capacity and interest
to commence the intestate proceeding of Don Juan’s estate. 
Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced
Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the CFI of Manila for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Don Juan, and on
the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros
Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that,
as the deceased Don Juan had left a last will, there was no legal basis
to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that Vicente had no
legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings,
since Vicente was not an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. 
To this, Vicente Uriarte opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss
contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance
of the settlement of deceased Don Juan’s estate, it had acquired
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 12 of 53
exclusive jurisdiction over it pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
of Court. 
alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in
which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
LOWER COURT RULING: The Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of
Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the
No. 6344 pending before it.
estate to be settled is that of a nonresident alien (like the
deceased) the Courts of First Instance in provinces where
Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction
51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the
therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these
proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila
by said court.
 Courts - province and city where the deceased left

 considerable properties. In accordance with settled
ISSUES: 
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take
1. Whether the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
Proceeding No. 6344? (NO)

purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the

2. Whether the Manila Court erred in not dismissing Special
course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of
Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding prior filing

first instance it is found it that the decedent had left a last
of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court? (NO)

will, proceedings for the probate of the of the latter should

replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in
RULINGS:
his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
1. NO, the Negros Court have not erred in dismissing Special
This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that
Proceeding No. 6344.  It can not be denied that a special
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved,
proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate
the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already
of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law
adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for
on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a
the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
"probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his
proceedings.

estate. While the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance

over "all matters of probate" is beyond question, the matter
2. NO, the Manila Court have not erred in not dismissing
of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the
Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding prior
special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by
filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court,
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
since wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect,
provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, Vicente Uriarte has waived the right to raise
such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches.
Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of a will executed by Don
Juan since 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the
initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; Vicente
Uriarte likewise was servedwith notice of the existence
(presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the
filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since
1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the
dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these
notwithstanding, it was only in1963 that he filed with the Manila
Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion
asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date. To
allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the
probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a
premium on his negligence. This Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was
not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have
the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raise too late. Vicente
Uriarte is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is
finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No.
51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its
reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to
submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment
as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in
its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are
the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a
particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged
natural child.
settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his
Page 13 of 53
 
Case #5: RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and PERICO V. JAO, respondents. [G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002.]
FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Jao and Respondent Perico Jao were the
only sons of spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died
intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. Perico instituted a petition for
issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City over the properties left by their parents and pending
appointment of a regular administrator, moved that he be appointed as
special administrator, alleging that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually
dissipating the assets of the estate. Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of
the petition on the ground of improper venue since the actual
residence of their parents was in Angeles City, Pampanga and stayed
only in Quezon City for medical treatment. Perico countered that their
deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo's house in Quezon City
at the time of their death and it was Rodolfo himself who supplied the
entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother. 
TRIAL COURT RULING: Denied Rodolfo’s motion to dismiss. A mere
perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in
1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the
last place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries
appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by
movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document.
Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own representation by taking an
inconsistent position other than his own admission.
CA RULING: Affirmed the trial court’s decision. Dismissed Rodolfo's
Petition for Certiorari as well as the motion for reconsideration.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case
of Eusebio v. Eusebio , et al . , where it was held that the situs of
permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
residence at the time of death, the following factors must be
considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and
freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c)
intention to stay therein permanently. 15 While it appears that the
decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City
for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted
Quezon City as their permanent residence. Also, Rodolfo strains to
differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2,
18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies
specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in
the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the
purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the
decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists
that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent
residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the
properties are kept and where most of the decedents' properties are
located.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence,
ISSUE: Whether the settlement proceedings should be instituted at
Quezon City?
the death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and
RULING: YES, the settlement proceedings should be instituted at
Quezon City, pursuant to Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines
shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper
court located in the province where the decedent resides at the
time of his death. Moreover, as to the issue ofvenue for the
settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or
domicile - it does not necessarily follow that the records of a
person's properties are kept in the place where he permanently
resides. Neither can it be presumed that a person's properties can
be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It
may be that he has his domicile in a place different from that
where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive
personal and business interests. No generalizations can thus be
Page 14 of 53
formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep
records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an
individual's choice and peculiarities. In the case at bar, there is
substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to
petitioner's Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently
refute respondent's assertion that their elderly parents stayed in
his house for some three to four years before they died in the late
1980s. Furthermore, the decedents' respective death certificates
state that they were both residents of Quezon City at the time of
their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up
his late mother's death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly
shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his
deceased mother's residence to be Quezon City. Moreover,
petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio's death certificate,
accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
were thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the
court a quo. We agree with the appellate court's observation that since
respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to
reflect the true situation at the time of their parents' death.
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the
decedents have been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths
and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be
substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the
challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the
court below considered not only the decedents' physical presence in
Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents' stay
therein was more than temporary. In the absence of any substantial
showing that the lower courts' factual findings stemmed from an
erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be
held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Case #6: CARMEN ADRIANO, petitioner , vs. ALFREDO OBLEADA,
TEODORICA MARIANO, NATALIA AREVALO VIUDA DE LOPEZ,
administratrix of the estate of Mariano Lopez, and PEDRO MA.
SISON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents. [G.R. No.
39938. August 12, 1933.]
balance of the promissory note which is the subject matter of the
FACTS: Petitioner Carmen Adriano, is the deceased Mariano Lopez's
surviving mother whom, under his will, Mariano has instituted Carmen
as his heiress entitled to receive two thirds of Mariano’s estate. After
the deceased Mariano's will had been admitted to probate and the
corresponding committee on claims and appraisal appointed,
respondents Alfredo Obleada and Teodorica Mariano, presented
before said committee their claim consisting in a credit amounting to
P4,750 alleged to be the unpaid balance of a promissory note for
P5,000 signed by Mariano and his wife, co-respondent Natalia Arevalo
Vda. de Lopez. Inasmuch as their claim was disallowed by the
aforementioned committee on claims and appraisal, the creditor-
claimants, Alfredo Obleada and Teodorica Mariano, appealed from the
committee's adverse resolution and filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila the corresponding action against Natalia Arevalo Vda. de
Lopez, as administratrix of Mariano's estate, for the recovery of the
said sum of P4,750 representing the unpaid balance of the promissory
note for P5,000, signed by the deceased Mariano and Natalia. The
promissory note in question was reproduced by the creditor-claimants
in their complaint which was registered as civil case No. 44327. On her
part, Natalia, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, Mariano
Lopez, filed an answer denying generally and specifically the facts
alleged in the complaint.
her the permission to intervene, which she seeks, the respondent
Carmen filed a motion in the court praying that she be permitted to
intervene in the aforementioned civil case No. 44327, alleging that she
had a legal interest in the case; that the promissory note upon which
the alleged creditor-claimants, Alfredo Obleada and Teodorica
Mariano, base their claim is fictitious; that the said promissory note is
Page 15 of 53
without consideration, and that it was obtained through fraud, in
connivance with Natalia.
CFI RULING: Denied Carmen’s motion for intervention.
ISSUE: Whether Carmen has a legal interest in the payment of the
action in which she seeks permission to intervene, regardless of the
fact that there is a judicial administratrix to represent the testamentary
estate of Mariano?
RULING: YES, Carmen has a legal interest in the payment of the
balance of the promissory note which is the subject matter of the
action in which she seeks permission to intervene, regardless of
the fact that there is a judicial administratrix to represent the
testamentary estate of Mariano. An heir has a legal interest in the
result of a claim based upon a promissory note signed by his
predecessor in interest, alleged to have been obtained through
fraud and lack of consideration. When a judicial administrator of a
testamentary estate, who is made a party defendant in an action
on appeal for the recovery from the testator of a claim rejected by
the committee on claims and appraisal, does not interpose the
necessary and effective legal defense, the heirs have the right to
intervene in order to protect the deceased's interests. Either
because the administratrix, Natalia Arevalo Vda. de Lopez, is in
connivance with the creditor-claimants, or because she is
negligent in protecting the interests of the testamentary estate
she represents, the petitioner herein has the right to intervene in
order that those interests may be the better protected. In denying
judge committed an abuse of discretion.
If the promissory note in question is declared null and void, the amount
thereof will form a part of the estate of the deceased Mariano Lopez,
by whom it had been executed. Therefore, the herein petitioner, whom
the said deceased, under his will, has instituted heiress of two thirds of
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 16 of 53
his hereditary estate, has a legal interest in the case. If there was fraud upon a promissory note signed by his predecessor in interest, alleged
in obtaining the promissory note in question, as the herein petitioner to have been obtained through fraud and lack of consideration; (2) that
alleges under oath, the fact that it was executed by the deceased when a judicial administrator of a testamentary estate, who is made a
Mariano Lopez does not prevent his heiress from impugning its validity party defendant in an action on appeal for the recovery from the
in the same way that the signer himself would not have been testator of a claim rejected by the committee on claims and appraisal,
prevented from so doing under the same circumstances. The petitioner does not interpose the necessary and effective legal defense, the heirs
herein having inherited the two-thirds undivided portion of the estate have the right to intervene in order to protect the deceased's interests;
left by the deceased, she has also inherited all rights of action her and (3) that the judge who denies the said heirs the permission to
predecessor in interest might have had in the same property.
intervene, which they seek in such cases, commits an abuse of
discretion and may be compelled to grant said authority through a writ
 As a general rule, when there is an administrator who represents a of mandamus.

testamentary estate, he alone is authorized to defend the rights of the

deceased against any claim or action that might be brought against Wherefore, the remedy applied for is hereby granted and the
him (sections 702, 705, 691, of Act No. 190). But when the respondent judge is ordered to permit the herein petitioner to intervene
administrator appointed is careless or negligent in the performance of as a party-defendant in the civil case No. 44327 of the Court of First
his duties, or is inefficient, the heirs may intervene in order to protect Instance of Manila, entitled Alfredo Obleada et al. vs. Natalia Arevalo
the deceased's rights which had become theirs by inheritance.
Vda. de Lopez, as administratrix of the testamentary estate of Mariano
Lopez, with costs against the respondents, Alfredo Obleada, Teodorica
In the case at bar, the creditor-claimants have reproduced the Mariano and Natalia Arevalo Vda. de Lopez. So ordered.

promissory note upon which they base their claim in the complaint
presented by them on appeal. In her answer to the complaint, the
defendant-administratrix, Natalia Arevalo Vda. de Lopez, has done
nothing more than enter a general and specific denial of the material
allegations contained therein. She has not specifically denied under
oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note in
question, knowing as she should know that the failure to enter a denial
in the form indicated above is deemed an admission thereof (section
103, Act No. 190; Bough and Bough vs. Cantiveros and Hanopol, 40
Phil., 209). Neither has she interposed a special defense by alleging
fraud and lack of consideration in order to entitle her to prove them
during the trial (Garriz, Terren & Co. vs. North China Ins. Co., 44 Phil.,
749; Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Laguna Coconut Oil Co., 48
Phil., 5).

In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so

hold: (1) That an heir has a legal interest in the result of a claim based
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 17 of 53
 
reasons to an ordinary action of partition.” In an attempt to justify
these administration proceedings the appellee confesses in her
Case #7: Intestate Estate of RUFINA MERCADO, deceased. brief that she has been obliged to institute the same in order to
CATALINA JAVIER, petitioner-appellee, vs. EULOGIO MAGTIBAY avoid a multiplicity of suits, because she proposes to ask for the
and SOLEDAD MAGTIBAY DE HERNANDEZ, respondents- annulment of certain transfers of conjugal property made by the
appellants. [G.R. No. L-6829. December 29, 1954.]
surviving husband of the deceased in favor of one of the heir
Soledad Sales Magtibay de Hernandez, and the validity of those
FACTS: Rufina Mercado died intestate on September 20, 1949, transfers could be ventilated in these proceedings without need of
survived by her second husband respondent Eulogio Magtibay, her bringing a separate action for the purpose. But if the aims is
only living daughter petitioner Catalina Javier and the descendants of merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits, that same objective could be
her two deceased daughters — all three daughters being of the first achieved in an action for partition, where the validity of those
marriage. Shortly after Rufina's death, these heirs made an transfers could also be inquired into in line with our decision in
extrajudicial partition of her properties. But alleging that there were Monserrat vs. Ibañez et al., Moreover, if appellee's purpose is
some properties not included in the partition, one of the heirs, the said really to avoid a multiplicity of suits, she has herself nullified that
Catalina Javier, on August 15, 1952, petitioned the court for letters of objective by actually filing, as reported by the appellants and
administration and the appointment of herself as administratrix. The admitted by her, a separate action for the annulment of the
other heirs opposed the petition on the ground that there was no property transfers already referred to. There appearing to be no
necessity for subjecting the estate to judicial administration since, good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Rufina
according to them, Rufina left no debts, all her properties had already Mercado with the costs and expenses of an administration
been partitioned and the heirs were all of age or represented by a proceeding, the trial court was not justified in issuing letters of
guardian. But the Court overruled the opposition and granted the administration. With this ruling, it is no longer necessary to decide
petition. Hence this appeal.
which, as between the appellee Catalina Javier and the widower
Eulogio Magtibay, should be preferred in the appointment of an
ISSUE: Whether it is proper that an action for extrajudicial settlement
administrator. 

of the estate be instituted rather than file an action for issuing letters of
administration in this case?
Section 1 of Rule 74 provides for the partition of the estate of the
RULING: YES, it is proper that an action for extrajudicial
settlement of the estate be instituted rather than file an action for
issuing letters of administration in this case. The trial court,
however, chose to depart from the accepted doctrine in the
mistaken belief that it had already been overruled by our decision
in the case of Rodriguez vs. Tan, 92 Phil., 273, where the statement
was made that section 1 of Rule 74 "does not preclude the heirs
from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has
no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good
deceased where no debts are due from it and the heirs are all of age or
properly represented. Resolving that question in those cases, this
Court has repeatedly held that "when a person dies without leaving
pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not
bound to submit the property to judicial administration, which is
always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the court," for "in such case the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings." (Utulo vs. Pasion, 66 Phil., 302 citing Ilustre
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 18 of 53
vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil. 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434;
Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil.,
367; and Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317.)
Case #8: CIRILO T. JAVELOSA, petitioner, vs. CONRADO BARRIOS,
Judge of First Instance of Iloilo, ET AL., respondents. [G.R. No.
The words in quotation sum up the doctrine of the cases cited, which, 46096. August 12, 1938.]

though rendered under section 596 of the former code of civil

procedure, has equal validity under section 1 of Rule 74, because the
two sections are fundamentally the same. It is, therefore, our view that,
now as before, the rule is that where administration proceeding is
unnecessary because the estate has no, debts and the more
expeditious remedy by partition is available the heirs or the majority of
them may not be compelled to submit the estate to such proceeding.
in certificate of title No. 8053. His widow, Flora Jagna-an, who was
The rule harmonizes with the law of succession contained in the Civil
Code under whose provisions "the rights to the succession of a person
are transmitted from the moment of his death," the heirs succeeding
"immediately to all the property of the deceased ancestor . . . as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death," so that as co-owners they may
immediately, if the property is not burdened with debts, administer it
jointly or divide it among themselves. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17
FACTS: In deceased Florencio Jagunap’s duly probated will of January
21, 1926, he made a partition of his properties in favor of his children
from his three successive marriages and ordered that his third wife,
Flora Jagna-an, and six children born of this marriage should inherit
various parcels of land among which are lots 2850 and 2877 described
appointed judicial administratrix of his properties, obtained a personal
loan in the year 1931 from the Chinese Uy Khia which became the
subject of a litigation wherein Flora was sentenced to pay to Uy Khia
the sum of P3,400. In order to prevent the execution of the judgment,
Flora Jagna-an borrowed from petitioner Cirilo Javelosa the sum of
P4,600, Flora and her children Loreto Jagunap and Maria Jagunap
sold in favor of Cirilo, on October 26, 1935, their respective shares, or
a total of nine-fourteenth parts, in the two lots mentioned (lots 2850 &
2877), with right of repurchase within the period of one year. 

Phil., 321.) For, as was said in a case, since the property of the
deceased belongs, from the moment of his death, to the heirs, "what
reason can there be," if there are no debts, "for the appointment of a
judicial administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive
the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately
entitled" (Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317.) Withholding the inheritance from
the heirs by subjecting it to an administration proceeding for no useful
purpose, would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being
wasted or squandered as not infrequently happens.
year, directed the clerk to send him notice of any proceeding in the
Cirilo prayed in the testate proceedings of Florencio’s estate for the
approval of the sale, notice of the hearing of his motion being sent to
Manuel F. Zamora, attorney for the judicial administratrix and other
heirs of Florencio, and to Ramon T. Jimenea, attorney for Pilar
Jagunap, another daughter and heir of Florencio. There being no
objection, the court approved said sale by order of November 21, 1936
and, on motion of Cirilo and by order of December 12th of the same
above-mentioned testate case. 

The attorney for the administratrix filed with the court for approval a
project of partition dated May 18, 1937, and inasmuch as in said
project the interest acquired by Cirilo in lots 2850 and 2877 was not
adjudicated to him, nor was any mention made of the sale executed in
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
his favor, Cirilo filed an objection to the approval of said project of
partition. Whereupon, for the first time, the aforesaid widow, Flora-
Jagna-an, and her children Loreto and Maria Jagunap objected to the
intervention of Cirilo in said proceedings on the ground that Cirilo was
neither an heir nor a creditor of the deceased. The court disallowed by
order of December 7, 1937 the intervention of the petitioner in said
testate proceedings, in view of the opposition of the administratrix and
other heirs and on the ground — so it states — that the shares of the
vendors Flora Jagna-an and the heirs Loreto and Maria Jagunap have
not been xed and they merely sold the rights, interests and
participations which they might have in lots 2850 and 2877 of the
Santa Barbara cadastre, with the result that the purchaser Cirilo T.
Javelosa lacks personality to intervene in these proceedings, through
he might bring the proper action against the vendors. Upon denial of
the motion for the reconsideration of the order, the instant petition for
mandamus was filed. In the answer to the petition, respondent
Conrado Barrios contend that the deed of sale executed in favor of
Cirilo is null and valueless.
acquired full ownership of the shares sold by them to the petitioner,
ISSUE: Whether the partition stated in Florencio’s will is valid and
binding to his heirs?
made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
RULING: YES, the partition stated in Florencio’s will is valid and
binding to his heirs, since there is no allegation that the said
partition impairs the legitime of the heirs. Thus, when Florencio’s
succession opened, Flora and her children acquired full ownership
of their shares to Florencio’s estate. Moreover, being the shares’
owners, the sale of the same which was made with Cirilo is valid
and Flora and her children cannot contest it on the ground of lack
of consent.
court without any objection on the part of the widow or any of the heirs
In the case of Montañano vs. Suesa (14 Phil., 676), this court
held: "With respect to the partition of the inheritance, there is the
definite provision of law that when the testator makes such partition by
an act inter vivos or by a last will, it shall be accepted in so far as it
Page 19 of 53
does not prejudice the legal portion of the heirs by force of law." (Art.
1056, Civil Code.)
"From this it follows that, as the testator, Montañano, had by his will
partitioned his property and assigned to his son Catalino, as his
portion, the lands in question herein, the said testamentary provision,
being binding on the heirs, constitutes prima facie evidence that the
said lands were actually inherited by Catalino, and not by the plaintiff
herein; other property was assigned to her in payment of her legal
portion. . . ." (Page 680.)
Consistently with the provisions of article 1056 of the Civil Code and
with the doctrine just cited, it is indubitable that the partition effected
by Florencio Jagunap in his will, in the absence of any allegation that it
impairs the legitime of his heirs, is valid and binding both upon his
widow and his children, and one of the legal effects of said partition is
that Flora Jagna-an and her children Loreto and Maria Jagunap
after the will of their grantor had been duly probated, for the reason
that according to article 1068 of the Civil Code: "A partition lawfully
awarded to him."
Wherefore, neither the heirs nor the widow Flora Jagna-an and her
children Loreto and Maria Jagunap can contest the validity of the sale
executed in favor of the petitioner on the ground of lack of consent of
all the heirs, because such consent was not necessary, Flora Jagna-
an and her two children having disposed of what was exclusively
theirs. Said sale is the more unassailable, since it was approved by the
to the corresponding motion led by the petitioner, notice of the hearing
of which having been sent to the attorney for the administratrix and
other heirs of Florencio Jagunap and to the attorney for Pilar Jagunap,
another heir. The allegation in the respondents' answer to the contrary
is consequently not true. It is stated in the order of the court of
December 7th that the testate estate of the deceased Jagunap has not
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 20 of 53
yet been liquidated, and in the respondents' answer it is for the rst time  

alleged that there were many debts to pay. These averments are not
consistent with the fact that the attorney for the administratrix led a
project of partition dated May 18, 1937, and the latter noti ed the
petitioner that on the 13th of the same month it would b submitted to
the court for approval. The presentation of a project of partition gives
Case #9: GREGORIO K. KALAW, petitioner, vs. IÑIGO S. DAZA,
Judge of First Instance of Batangas, VICTOR KATIGBAK and
GUILLERMO KATIGBAK, respondents. [G.R. No. L-363. August 5,
1946.]

rise to the presumption that there are neither debts nor a plan to pay
existing-debts, for the reason that according to the provisions of FACTS: Two separate special proceedings were instituted with the CFI
section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, distribution of the estate of Batangas for the settlement of deceased Lorenza Katigbak’s testate
among the heirs may be proceeded with after payment of the debts, estate:

funeral expenses, etc.

> No. 59 -> probate of Lorenza’s 1943 will initiated by Paz Kalaw

At any rate the mere allegation, made for the rst time in this court, that
> No. 60 -> probate of Lorenza’s 1944 will initiated by respondent
there are unpaid debts, is not su cient to invalidate the partition
Victor Katigbak.

ordained by Florencio Jagunap in his last will, in the absence of any

intimation that it is necessary to set aside said partition in order to pay
Petitioner Gregorio Kalaw filed an opposition in case No. 6 for the
existing debts. In other words, it is not alleged that to enable the
probate of the 1944 will and Victor’s appointment as special
payment of those supposed debts, it would be necessary to nullify the
administrator, praying that he and Andres Luz be appointed as special
partition as regards the properties adjudicated in favor of the widow
administrator and that cases nos. 59 and 60 be joined. The CFI ruled In
and the children of the third marriage. It does not appear from the
favor of Victor, the latter appointed as special administrator.

pleadings that the project of partition led with the court for approval
contains the same distribution made by Jagunap in his last will, or that
it is an entirely or partly different partition effected through mutual
agreement of all the heirs. If it be the latter case, the widow and the
heirs of Jagunap cannot disregard the sale executed in favor of the
petitioner, as it was a legal act validly done under a partition likewise
validly made by the deceased Jagunap in his last will and which
On August 30, 1945, all the parties submitted to the court a written
stipulation in special proceedings Nos. 59 and 60, signed by all the
parties, including Gregorio, agreeing, among other things, to partition
the properties left by the deceased Lorenza Katigbak in accordance
with the terms and conditions set forth in the 1943 will dated March
19, 1943. 

had already commenced to produce all legal effects from the moment

said will was duly probated.
CFI RULING: Issued an order approving the written stipulation and
directing the parties to comply with the terms and conditions thereof.

In view of what has been said, a writ of mandamus will issue directing
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to allow the petitioner's intervention On September 11, 1945, Gregorio filed a motion for reconsideration of
in the testate proceedings of the deceased Florencio Jagunap, civil the order of August 30, 1945. After due hearing held on September 21,
case No. 1478 of said court, in order that the petitioner may protect his 1945, the court denied the motion in an order dated September 22,
interest, title or participation in the lost above-mentioned. So ordered.
1945. The order of August 30, became final. Victor Katigbak presented
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 21 of 53
a project of partition in pursuance of the stipulation dated August 30, and Guillermo of the jewels and cash left by Lorenza, the
1945. The project of partition was approved with modification in an distribution having been made long before Victor's appointment as
order dated December 20, 1945. Gregorio was notified of the order on special administrator. Guillermo did not deny this allegation by
January 3, 1946. The order also became final. On March 28, 1946, the reason of which his motion dated July 20 1945, appears to be
court ordered Victor Katigbak to render final accounts of administration groundless. If it had any ground stand upon, Gregorio's inaction
and to distribute the estate in accordance with the order of December since his motion for reconsideration was denied on August 17,
20, 1945.
1945, and his having signed the stipulation dated August 30, 1945,
for the final and complete settlement of Lorenza’s estate, preclude
Gregorio complains because on August 3, 1945, the lower court him from seeking relief against proceedings which appear not to
denied his petition dated July 20, 1945, praying that special have affected him adversely in any way.

administrator Victor Katigbak be cited and required to produce in

court, for the inspection of all the heirs, the jewelries and money left by  

Lorenza. Gregorio alleges that on August 5, 1945, he moved for

reconsideration of the order of denial dated August 3, 1945, and his
motion was denied on August 17, 1945, without prejudice to its being
considered and acted upon at the hearing of the case on the merits. 

ISSUE: Whether Gregorio, in signing the stipulation, is precluded from

seeking relief (or filing a motion for reconsideration)?

RULING: YES, Gregorio, in signing the stipulation, is precluded

from seeking relief (or filing a motion for reconsideration). The
lower court did not err in not acting on said motion, because
petitioner's failure to insist that it be acted on at the time the court
approved the project of partition in accordance with the
stipulation signed and agreed upon by him constitutes an implied
waiver of his right, if he has any, to insist on said motion. In
Victor's answer, and under oath, it is alleged that at the time of
Gregorio’s filing of his motion of July 20, 1945, Gregorio knew fully
well that since November 1, 1944, Gregorio's own sister, Paz
Kalaw, had distributed all the jewels of Lorenza and respondent
Guillermo Katigbak all the cash in Philippine money to all the
legatees in pursuance of the 1943 will dated, and that the order of
December 20, 1945, approving the project of partition in
accordance with the stipulation of August 30, 1945, constituted a
confirmation and ratification of the prior distribution made by Paz
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Case #10: MARCELA DE BORJA VDA. DE TORRES, SATURNINA
DE BORJA VDA. DE ORTEGA, EUFRACIA DE BORJA VDA. DE
LIMACO, JACOBA DE BORJA, OLIMPIA DE BORJA, AND JUAN DE
BORJA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE DEMETRIO B.
ENCARNACION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and
CRISANTO DE BORJA, Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Marcelo de Borja, respondents. [G.R. No. L-4681. July 31, 1951.]
partition was long overdue and that the administrator was unduly
FACTS: Deceased Marcelo de Borja’s estate was subjected to an
intestate proceeding. The commissioners appointed by the court
submitted a project of partition of the land, in which it was assigned to
Miguel Dayco, one of Marcelo’s heirs. However the said land was in
the possession of petitioners Marcela de Borja and her siblings,
children of Quintin de Borja, who was the sister of Marcelo. 
what does not suit him. What the petitioners could have done was
Although the administratrix of Quintin de Borja's estate was the party
named in the partition in behalf of Quintin’s estate, Marcela and her
siblings took active part in the proceeding for the reason that they had
been declared Quintin's sole heirs in the settlement of Quintin's estate.
Moreover, one of these children was herself the duly appointed
administratrix of the last named intestate estate.
expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow, and
CFI RULING: The proposed partition was approved, Marcela and her
siblings were directed to deliver the land to the administrator of
Marcelo’s estate.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS: contests the jurisdiction of the
respondent Judge to issue the order; and lastly, the administrator's
remedy to recover that property is an action at law and not by motion
in the intestate proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether Marcella and her siblings can still attack the partition
collaterally?
the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing
Page 22 of 53
RULING: NO, Marcella and her siblings cannot still attack the
partition collaterally. As the administrator had refused, on
technical grounds, to turn over to them their or their father's
share, they moved for and secured from the probate court an
order for the execution of the partition. And when the
administrator elevated the case to this Court on certiorari, they as
respondents in that petition vigorously defended the probate
court's action. They complained bitterly that execution of the
delaying the closing of the estate. The order now before this Court
has to be sustained if for no other reason than that the petitioners
are in estoppel. In the face of what they have done, they are
precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of
it. A party can not, in law and in good conscience, be allowed to
reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate
to ask for a reconsideration or modification of the partition on the
grounds of fraud, excusable mistake, inadvertence, etc. if they
could substantiate such allegations. 
Pertinent to the question posed by the petitioners is section 1 of Rule
91 which provides as follows: "When the debts, funeral charges, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law,
have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing
upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to
which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover
their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other
person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under
by the judge, under oath.

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 23 of 53

"No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be xed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs."
property belonged to them or to their father's estate and that they are
Applying this Rule in the case of De Jesus vs. Daza, * 43 Off. Gaz., (No.
6), 2055, the facts of which were in all essential particulars analogous
to those of the present case, this Court said: ". . . the probate court,
having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most logical
authority to effectuate this provision within the same estate
proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which
this power and function of the court can be exercised and performed
without the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the
inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence and litigate
an entirely different action. There can be no question that if the
executor or administrator has the possession of the share to be
delivered the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same
estate proceeding to order him to deliver that possession to the person
entitled thereto, and we see no reason, legal or equitable, for denying
the same power to the probate court to be exercised within the same
hearing on the merits of their pretended title to the land in their
possession. The question of the petitioners' title and possession has
been concluded by the partition and become a closed matter. All they
could prove if allowed to call witnesses would be that the aforesaid
in possession of it to the exclusion of Marcelo de Borja's personal
representative. Granting all such proofs to be true, as indeed we may
for the purpose of this decision, yet they would not detract from the
authority of the court to make the order under consideration. The court
had only the partition to examine, to see if the questioned land was
included therein. The inclusion being shown, and there being no
allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or
without the petitioners' knowledge, the partition barred any further
litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the
control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to
the tenor of the partition. To all intents and purposes, the property was
in custodia legis. What the petitioners could have done was to ask for
a reconsideration or modification of the partition on the grounds of
fraud, excusable mistake, inadvertence, etc. if they could substantiate
such allegations. They can not attack the partition collaterally, as they
are trying to do in this case.

estate proceeding if the share to be delivered happens to be in the

possession of 'any other person,' especially when 'such other person'  

is one of the heirs themselves who are already under the jurisdiction of
the probate court in the same estate proceeding."

There are factors present in the case at bar but not in the De Jesus vs.
Daza case which greatly reinforce the probate court's authority to
make the order under review: The partition here had not only been
approved and thus become a judgment of the court, but distribution of
the estate in pursuance of the partition had fully been carried out,
except as to the land now in dispute, and the petitioners had received
the property assigned to them or their father's estate. And this was not
all. There is not much to the complaint that the respondent Judge
issued the order under consideration without affording the petitioners a
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Case #11: MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON,
JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON,
oppositors-appellants.  [G.R. No. L-24561. June 30, 1970.]
Thus, Marina filed her project of partition, while Estela and her other
FACTS: Deceased Agripina Valdez left a will and was survived by
seven compulsory heirs - six legitimate children named Estela Dizon,
Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, appointed executrix Marina Dizon,
Angelina Dizon and Jose na Dizon, and a legitimate grand-daughter
named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent.  Six of
these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-
appellee) are the oppositors-appellants. Agripina named the
abovementioned people as beneficiaries in her  will, together
with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr.,
Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson,
Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon. In her duly probated will,
Agripina divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties
appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except, two small parcels of land
appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a
bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga
Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00). 
(excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their-impaired legitimes, the
Being the executrix, Marina filed her inventory of Agripina’s estate, a Dr
Adelaido Bernardo filed his report of appraisal, which was affirmed in
toto by the lower court upon joint petition of the parties. The real and
personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a
total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the
seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (1/7 of the half of
the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and
descendants).
RULING: YES, Marina's testamentary disposition was in the nature
In her will, Agripina "commanded that her property be divided" in
accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised
and bequeathed speci c real properties comprising practically the
Page 24 of 53
entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight
grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus
respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her
will.
siblings presented a counter-project of partition. 
LOWER COURT RULING: In favor of Marina's project of partition. The
lower court ruled that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code
speci cally provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the
same shall be completed and satis ed. While it is true that this process
has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is
observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the
source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to
fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if
upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in
controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the
testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her
own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the
limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in
cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest
bene ciary of the will to be paid to her ve co-heirs, the oppositors
lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper
adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to
legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and
valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
ISSUE: Whether Marina's testamentary disposition was in the nature of
a partition of her estate by will?
of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of
her will after commanding that upon her death all her obligations
as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 25 of 53
expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and
her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes.

provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be

divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized
thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced
her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in
compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a
bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos."
contemplated and authorized in the rst paragraph of Article 1080 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for
of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must rst make
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of commentators doubt the e cacy of the amendment 13 but the question
the compulsory heirs.” 
does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will,
duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and
This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted,
of compulsory heirs to their legitime. 
other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of
partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-
The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such project of partition proposed by oppositors- appellants whereby they
compulsory heirs:
would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the
testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as
"ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable
title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the
be fully satisfied.
legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would
amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify
"ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the
the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would
legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the
further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code
same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.

that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him.

This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of

partition, wherein the ve oppositors-appellants namely Estela.
 

Bernardita, Angelina, Jose na and Lilia, were adjudicated the

properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the
testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or
properties of the executrix- appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Case #12: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GELACIO
SEBIAL. BENJAMINA SEBIAL, petitioner-appellee, vs. ROBERTA
SEBIAL, JULIANO SEBIAL and HEIRS OF BALBINA SEBIAL,
oppositors- appellants. [G.R. No. L-23419. June 27, 1975.]
children of second marriage received a one-fourth share (Tax
FACTS: Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943 in Pinamungajan Cebu.
According to the respondents, Gelacio Sebial, by his first wife Leoncia
Manikis, who allegedly died in 1919, begot three children named
respondents Roberta, Balbina and Juliano. By his second wife, Dolores
Enad, whom he allegedly married in 1927, he supposedly begot six
children named petitioners Benjamina, Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria,
Esperanza and Luciano. Benjamina was appointed as administratrix of
Gelacio’s estate. 
required the administratrix to submit another inventory. In compliance
On June 24, 1961 the probate court issued an order suspending action
on the pending incidents in view of the possibility of an amicable
settlement. It ordered the parties to prepare a complete list of the
properties belonging to the decedent, with a segregation of the
properties belonging to each marriage. Orders of the same tenor were
issued by the lower court on July 8 and October 28, 1961.
On November 11, 1961 the oppositors, Roberta Sebial, Juliano Sebial
and the heirs of Balbina Sebial, submitted their own inventory of the
conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia Manikis, consisting of
two parcels of land acquired in 1912 and 1915. They alleged that the
conjugal estate of Gelacio Sebial and Dolores Enad consisted of only
one parcel of land, containing an area of seven hectares, allegedly
purchased with money coming from the conjugal assets of Gelacio
Sebial and Leoncia Manikis. They further alleged that the said seven-
hectare land was sold by the children of the second marriage to
Eduardo Cortado (Tax Declaration No. 2591).
in her possession and administration of the same. The lower court
The oppositors claimed that the aforementioned two parcels of land
acquired during the rst marriage were partitioned in 1945 among (1)
Page 26 of 53
Roberta Sebial, (2) Juliano Sebial, (3) Francisco Sebial as the
representative of the estate of Balbina Sebial and (4) Valentina Sebial
as the representative of the six children of the second marriage, some
of whom were minors. They clari ed that under that partition the three
children of the rst marriage received a three-fourths share while the six
Declaration No. 06500). They also alleged that Eduardo Cortado,
Emilio Sialongo, Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo were the third
persons involved in the transfer of the lands pertaining to the estate of
Gelacio Sebial (Tax Declarations Nos. 04493, 06571 and 04471). To the
inventory submitted by the oppositors, the administratrix filed an
opposition dated November 18, 1961.
In an order dated November 11, 1961 the lower court inexplicably
with that order, Benjamina submitted an inventory dated November 17,
1961, wherein she reproduced her inventory dated April 17, 1961 and
added two other items, namely, two houses allegedly valued at P8,000
and the fruits of the properties amounting to P5,000 allegedly received
by the children of the first marriage. The oppositor interposed an
opposition to the said inventory.
LOWER COURT RULING: In its order of December 11, 1961 approved
the second inventory dated November 17, 1961 because there was
allegedly a "prima facie evidence to show that" the seven parcels of
land and two houses listed therein belonged to the decedent's estate.
In another order also dated December 11, 1961 the lower court
granted the motion of the administratrix dated May 4, 1961 for the
delivery to her of certain parcels of land and it directed that the heirs of
Gelacio Sebial, who are in possession of the parcels of land covered
by Tax Declarations Nos. 04493, 04491, 04490 and 04478, should
deliver those properties to the administratrix and should not disturb her
denied the oppositors' motion dated November 20, 1961 for "revision
of partition".
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
On December 29, 1961 Roberta Sebial moved for the reconsideration
of the two orders on the grounds (1) that the court had no jurisdiction
to approve an inventory led beyond the three-month period fixed in
section 1, Rule 84 of the Rules of Court; (2) that the said inventory is
not supported by any documentary evidence because there is no tax
declaration at all in Gelacio Sebial's name; (3) that the two houses
mentioned in the inventory were nonexistent because they were
demolished by the Japanese soldiers in 1943 and the materials thereof
were appropriated by the administratrix and her brothers and sisters;
(4) that the valuation of P17,000 indicated in the inventory was fake,
ctitious and fantastic since the total assessed value of the seven
parcels of land amounted only to P3,080; (5) that Gelacio Sebial's
estate should be settled summarily because of its small value as
provided in section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and (6) that an
ordinary action is necessary to recover the lands in the possession of
third persons.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Oppositors' contention in their
motion for reconsideration (not in their brief) that the probate court had
no jurisdiction to approve the inventory dated November 17, 1961
because the administratrix led it after three months from the date of
her appointment. Also, that inasmuch as the value of the decedent's
estate is less than ve thousand pesos and he had no debts, the estate
could be settled summarily under section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court or that an administration proceeding was not necessary (the limit
of six thousand pesos was increased to ten thousand pesos in section
2, Rule 74 effective on January 1, 1964)
ISSUE: Whether there is a need for the parties to present further proof
on the alleged partition?
in an administration proceeding — rests on a controversial basis,
RULING: YES, the probate court should require the parties to
present further proofs on the ownership of the seven parcels of
land and the materials of the two houses enumerated in the
amended inventory of November 17, 1961, on the alleged partition
effected in 1945 and on the allegations in oppositors' inventory
Page 27 of 53
dated November 7, 1961. After receiving evidence, the probate
court should decide once and for all whether there are still any
assets of the estate that can be partitioned and, if so, to effect the
requisite partition and distribution. If the estate has no more
assets and if a partition had really been made or the action to
recover the lands transferred to third person had prescribed, it
should dismiss the intestate proceeding. The Supreme Court set
aside the order directing the delivery of certain properties to the
administratrix because the probate court failed to receive
evidence as to the ownership of the properties, ruled that the
order approving the amended inventory should not be considered
as a final adjucation on the ownership of certain properties
mentioned therein, and ordered the remand of the case to the
probate court for further proceedings in accordance with the
guidelines laid down in the decision.
The three-month period prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule
84) of the Rules of Court is not mandatory. After the filing of a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration and the publication of the
notice of hearing, the proper Court of First Instance acquires
jurisdiction over a decedent's estate and retains that jurisdiction until
the proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was filed after the
three-month period would not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction
to approve it. However, an administrator's unexplained delay in ling the
inventory may be a ground for his removal (Sec. 2, Rule 82, Rules of
Court).
Where the contention — that the descendant's estate being less than
P5,000 could be settled summarily under Section 2, Rule 74, and not
because in the amended inventory the gross valuation was
P17,000 ,and no evidence was adduced to ascertain the actual value
of the estate so that the conflicting claims remain unresolved, HELD:
That the probate court is not precluded from proceeding with the
intestate proceedings. Moreover, no useful purpose could be served
by dismissing the proceedings and ordering a new petition for
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 28 of 53
summary settlement be filed. Inasmuch as a regular administrator had  

been appointed, notice to creditors issued, and no claims filed, the
probate court could proceed summarily and expeditiously to terminate
the proceedings.
Case #13: CARLOS GABILA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PABLO PEREZ,
RAMON PEREZ & MERCEDES PEREZ, defendants-appellees.
The probate court's approval of the inventory is not a conclusive [G.R. No. L-29541. January 27, 1989.]

determination of what assets constituted the decedent's estate and of

the valuation thereof, because such determination is only provisional in FACTS: On September 16, 1948, in the City of Davao, defendants-
character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action appellees Pablo, Ramon and Mercedes, all surnamed Perez, executed
on the issue of title or ownership.
in favor of plaintiff-appellant Carlos Gabila, a Deed of Sale of a parcel
of land registered in the name of their deceased father Mariano Perez
The general rule is that questions of title property cannot be passed under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 899 of the Registry of Deeds of
upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties Davao, which they inherited upon his demise. The Deed of Sale was
are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the duly signed and ratified before Notary Public Isidro Bastida of Davao
probate court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, City on the same date, September 16, 1958, and possession of the
the probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon.
land was immediately delivered to the vendee. The monthly
installments of the price of the sale were completely paid in due time.
 Matters affecting property under the administration may be taken However, Pablo, Ramon and Mercedes took no steps to comply with
cognizance of by the probate court in the course of the intestate their promise to execute an extrajudicial partition of their father's
proceedings provided that the interest of third persons are not properties so that the title to their father's land in question can be
prejudiced. However, the third person to whom the decedent's assets transferred in their names and from them, to the vendee Gabila, which
had been fraudulently conveyed may be cited to appear in court and prompted the latter to file an action against Pablo and his siblings.

may be examined under oath as to how they came into the possession
of the decedent's assets but a separate action is necessary to recover Pablo and his siblings alleged in their Answer that the deed of sale was
said assets.
intended merely to guarantee a loan of P2,500 contracted by one of
the defendants; that Mercedes Perez, one of the vendors, was a minor
Generally prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir as long as he when the deed of sale was made; that the deed of sale was not
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. But from the approved by the Secretary of Agriculture; and, that the consideration
moment that a co- heir claims absolute and exclusive ownership of the of P2,500 was unconscionable.

hereditary properties and denies the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer partition but that of ownership hence, In Reply, Gabila alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of
the principle of prescription will set in.
sale, Mercedes Perez stated that she was of age, and Gabila had no
reason to doubt that statement. But, assuming that Mercedes was
under age at the time, she ratified the sale by her failure to repudiate it
in due time; that the allegation that the deed was only a guarantee for
a P2,500 loan was not true because a part of the purchase price was
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 29 of 53
paid to the defendants in ten (10) monthly installments; that the price in TCT No. 899 Mariano Perez, who died on October 11, 1942, is
agreed upon in 1948 was fair and reasonable; and, that the approval of the father of the vendors, that "the vendors inherited said land
the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource was not from their deceased father, being the legitimate children" and that
necessary.
"the Vendors are the owners" of said land (Exh. A) is, in effect, an
adjudication of the land to themselves. Such adjudication renders
CFI RULING: In favor of Pablo and his siblings, dismissing Gabila's the stipulation in the deed of sale that "the Vendors will execute
complaint. It held that the defendants could not be ordered to execute immediately an Extrajudicial Partition of all the properties of their
an extrajudicial partition of all the properties of their deceased father deceased father" (Exhibit A-1), superfluous and unnecessary. It
because the properties to be partitioned are not identified in the may be overlooked or deemed not written at all. All that needs to
complaint, and, the defendants can no longer partition the land be done now is to register on the TCT No. 899 of the late Mariano
described in TCT No. 899, because it has been sold to the plaintiff. Perez the deed of sale (Exh. A) which may also be treated as an
The court held that the extrajudicial partition of the property should affidavit of adjudication of the land to the vendors in order that
have been done at the time of the sale, in the same instrument
their father's title may be canceled and a new one can be issued
to their vendee, Carlos Gabila.

ISSUE: Whether Pablo and his siblings may effect partition the land
among themselves?
 

RULING: NO, Pablo and his siblings may no longer effect the

partition of the land among themselves since when they sold it to
Gabila, it is no longer theirs. Pablo and his siblings, as the only
legal heirs of their father, the deceased Mariano Perez, became
the owners of the property in question upon his demise. The rights
to the succession were transmitted to them from the moment of
Mariano's death (Art. 77, Civil Code). Their sale to Gabila of the
property described in TCT No. 899, which they inherited from their
father put an end to their co-ownership over it (Art. 1082 Civil
Code). Consequently there is no further need for them to partition
it, the purpose of partition being to separate, divide, and assign a
thing held in common among those to whom it may belong (Art.
1079, Civil Code). The trial court correctly observed that the
defendants- appellees may no longer partition the land in question
because they had already sold it. A careful examination of the
deed of sale (Exh. A) reveals that it also serves the purpose of an
affidavit of adjudication of the lot in question to the defendants-
appellees as heirs of the former owner Mariano Perez. Their
declaration therein that the registered owner of the land described
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Case #14: PABLO RALLA, petitioner, vs. HON. ROMULO P.
UNTALAN, HON. DOMINGO CORONEL REYES, LEONIE RALLA,
PETER RALLA and MARINELLA RALLA, respondents. [G.R. No.
63253-54. April 27, 1989.]
project of partition whereby sixty-three parcels of land, apparently
FACTS: On January 27, 1959, Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a
petition for the probate of his own will in the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, which was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 564. In Rosendo’s will, he left his entire estate
to his son, petitioner Pablo (upon his death during the pendency of this
petition, was substituted by his heirs), leaving nothing to his other son,
Pedro. In the same year, Pedro Ralla filed an action for the partition of
the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella; this was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2023.
thereafter, he filed a "Motion to Intervene as Petitioner for the Probate
In the course of the hearing of Rosendo’s will probate proceeding case
(Special Proceedings No. 564), Pablo filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested in
the allowance of the will of his late father, Rosendo Ralla, for its
probate would no longer be beneficial and advantageous to him. This
motion was denied, and the denial was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. (The latter court agreed with the lower court's conclusion
that, indeed, Pablo stood to gain if the testate proceedings were to be
dismissed because then he would not be compelled to submit for
inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo Ralla 149 parcels of
land from which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving
income, to the exclusion and prejudice of his brother, Pedro Ralla, who
was being deprived of his successional rights over the said properties.)
The denial of this motion to dismiss was likewise affirmed by this Court
(in G.R. No. L-26253). 3 On the scheduled hearing on November 3,
1966, Pablo reiterated his lack of interest in the probate of the subject
will. Consequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho, declared
Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo Ralla who should
Page 30 of 53
share equally upon the division of the latter's estate, and thereupon
converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
Meanwhile, Pablo and Pedro agreed to compromise in the partition
case (Civil Case No. 2023). On December 18, 1967, they entered into a
forming the estate of their deceased mother, Paz Escerella, were
amicably divided between the two of them. This project of partition
was approved on December 19, 1967 by Judge Ezekiel Grageda.
Eleven years later, or on February 28, 1978, Joaquin Chancoco,
brother-in-law of Pablo filed a petition, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1106, for the probate of the same will of Rosendo on
the ground that the latter owed him P5,000.00. Pablo Ralla then filed a
manifestation stating that he had no objections to the probate;
of the Will." This motion was heard ex parte and granted despite the
written opposition of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. Likewise, the petition for
probate was granted; Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of the petitioner,
was appointed special administrator, again over and above the
objection of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. However, in taking possession of
the properties belonging to the estate of Rosendo Ralla, Teodorico
Almine also took possession of the sixty-three parcels of land covered
by the project of partition mentioned earlier. Consequently, the heirs of
Pedro Ralla (the private respondents herein) moved to exclude from
the estate of Rosendo Ralla the aforesaid parcels of land.
CFI RULING: respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan ruled, inter alia,
that the sixty-three parcels of land should be included in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla and that
said proceedings (both Special Proceedings No. 564 and Special
Proceedings No. 1106, which were ordered consolidated by this Court)
should proceed as probate proceedings.
About two years later, or on June 11, 1981, the private respondents
filed a "Petition To Submit Anew For Consideration Of The Court The
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 31 of 53
Exclusion Of 67 (sic) Parcels of Land Subject Of The Project Of mother, the late Paz Escarella. They are duty bound to respect the
Partition In Civil Case No. 2023."
division agreed upon by them and embodied in the document of
partition. Thus, the petitioner could no longer question the
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the exclusion of the lands subject of the partition from the
foregoing order but the same was denied 7 by respondent Judge proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla.

Domingo Coronel Reyes, to whose sala Special Proceedings No. 564

and No. 1106 were apparently transferred. Still, a second motion for   

reconsideration was filed; the same, however, was also denied.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The extra judicial partition of the 63

parcels made after the filing of the petition for the probate of the Will,
and before said Will was probated, is a NULLITY, considering that as
already decided by this Court in the case of Ernesto M. Guevara, vs.
Rosario Guevara et al., Vol. 74 Phil. Reports, there can be no valid
partition among the heirs till after the Will had been probated.

ISSUE: Whether there is a valid partition between the brothers?

RULING: YES, there is a valid partition between the brothers. The

above argument is obviously flawed and misleading for the simple
reason that the aforementioned partition was made in the civil
case for partition of the estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct
from, and independent of, the special proceedings for the probate
of the will of Rosendo Ralla. Verily, the rule is that there can be no
valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned
are the same properties embraced in the will. Thus the rule
invoked is inapplicable in this instance where there are two
separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special
Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each
involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and
Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties. In
fine, the partition in Civil Case No. 2023 is valid and binding upon
the petitioner and Pedro Ralla, as well as upon their heirs,
especially as this was accompanied by delivery of possession to
them of their respective shares in the inheritance from their
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 32 of 53
For his part, Prudencio narrated under oath that after the death of their
father and later of their brother Hilario, he and Gregorio verbally
Case #15: GREGORIO FAVOR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE partitioned their inheritance, but in 1948 Gregorio asked for a new
COURT OF APPEALS, PRUDENCIO FAVOR HEIRS: EUFEMIO partition. He refused. Gregorio then filed a complaint against him
FAVOR and AGUSTIN FAVOR, respondents. [G.R. No. 80821. which was, however, withdrawn after they signed the Compromise
February 21, 1991.] 
Agreement. He insisted that the agreement was a valid and binding
document that justified the dismissal of the new complaint. (On
FACTS: The deceased father in this case was Regino Favor, who left November 20, 1983, while the case was pending, Prudencio died and
three sons and several parcels of land in his name. Before the property was substituted by his legal heirs, Eufemio and Agustin Favor, the
could be divided among the three brothers, one of them died with herein private respondents.)

neither wife nor children. Only the surviving brothers, Gregorio and
Prudencio (or Florencio), are involved in this litigation.
RTC RULING: Rendered judgment declaring the Compromise
Agreement null and void, ordering partition of the disputed properties,
The dispute arose in 1972 when Gregorio filed a complaint in the Court and awarding the plaintiff damages and attorney's fees.

of First Instance of Negros Oriental against his older brother Prudencio

for partition of the following properties they had inherited from their CA RULING: Reversed by the CA, which held the Compromise
father. Prudencio’s reaction was to move to dismiss the complaint for Agreement to be valid and binding and ordered the dismissal of the
lack of a cause of action. He contended that the properties mentioned complaint.

in the complaint had already been partitioned under a Compromise

Agreement concluded between Gregorio and him on October 4, 1948, ISSUE: Whether the Compromise Agreement is in effect a deed of
and acknowledged before the justice of the peace of Luzuriaga, partition is valid and binding to the parties?

Negros Oriental.

RULING: YES, the Compromise Agreement is in effect a deed of

The motion to dismiss was denied, and Prudencio reiterated the same partition is valid and binding to the parties, since the presumption
defense in his answer. Gregorio filed an amended complaint in which of its validity was not overturned by Gregorio. But while upholding
he prayed, in addition to the partition, for the invalidation of the the Compromise Agreement, we must also find that the complaint
Compromise Agreement on the ground of fraud and mistake.
for partition should not have been entirely dismissed by the
respondent court. The reason is that there are still certain
At the trial, Gregorio testified that the greater portion of his father's properties of Regino Favor that have not been distributed between
properties were in the possession of Prudencio, who was occupying the brothers, as a close examination of the Compromise
16,794 square meters as against the 3,789 square meters left to him. Agreement will reveal. There still remain two parcels of land that
He also assailed the Compromise Agreement, claiming that he had have not yet been partitioned, to wit, Lot 4114, which by
signed it under the mistaken impression that it was a mortgage receipt agreement of the brothers "shall remain our property," and the lot
for P150.00 and not a partition. He alleged that he could not read or at Barrio Bong- ao, which was not included in the Compromise
speak English and that he was defrauded into signing the document by Agreement, as found by both the trial and the respondent
the defendant. Cdpr
courts. No such prohibition was made by Regino Favor, who died
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 33 of 53
intestate. And as the Compromise Agreement was entered into in as credible with respect to Gregorio, who actually signed the
1948, the provision therein for the co- ownership of Lot 4114 is agreement. cdrep

deemed to have expired in 1958, no extension thereof having been

established. Hence, these two lots must now be the subject of a Gregorio was in fact a businessman and even ran for the position of
separate partition conformably to the prayer in the complaint. We barangay captain, 3 for which the ability to read and write is prescribed
affirm the decision of the respondent court insofar as it upholds as an indispensable qualification. It is worth noting that he also signed
the Compromise Agreement partitioning three of the parcels of his complaint of February 15, 1972, and its verification as well, 4 but in
land mentioned therein. We must modify it, however, insofar as it the petition he filed with this Court — after the respondent court had
dismisses the complaint with regard to the other properties found that he was literate — he merely affixed his thumbmark to the
inherited from Regino Favor which have not been partitioned so verification. If his purpose was to convince us that he really could not
far.
write, he has not succeeded.

To prove defect or lack of consent, the evidence must also be strong

We must observe at the outset that although denominated a and not merely preponderant. 5 Gregorio's claim that he was tricked
Compromise Agreement, the document in question is deemed a deed by his brother into signing the Compromise Agreement, which he
of partition under Article 1082 of the Civil Code, which categorically believed was only a mortgage receipt, is not convincing enough for us.
provides as follows:
If any one was more likely to be deceived, it was not Gregorio but
the farmer Prudencio, who was less experienced than his brother in
Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs business matters and court litigations. It was Gregorio and not
and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it Prudencio who filed the first complaint that led to the execution of the
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other Compromise Agreement and also the second complaint which is the
transaction.
subject of the present petition.

As for its validity, we agree with the respondent court that the  

Compromise Agreement must be upheld, the challenge to it not having

been substantiated. A public instrument enjoys the presumption of
validity that has not been overcome by the petitioner in this case with
the full, clear and convincing evidence we have consistently required in
similar cases. The document appears to have been duly notarized, and
by the then justice of the peace, and ex officio notary public, of the
town where it was executed. Although it was written in English — and
precisely because of this — we can suppose that its contents were suf
ciently explained to the parties thereto, who both claimed to be
illiterate. That claim is believable in Prudencio, who declared he was a
farmer and merely affixed his thumbmark to the document, but it is not
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Case #16: HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES: RICARDO TEVES, ARCADIA
TEVES, TOMAS ZAMORA, FELICIA TEVES, HELEN TEVES,
ALFREDO OSMEÑA, ROBERTO TEVES, JOAQUIN TEVES, III,
PETER TEVES, MILDRED TEVES, WILSON MABILOG, LEONILO
PATIGAYON, EDUARDO PATIGAYON, ALEXANDER PATIGAYON,
ALDRIN PATIGAYON, NOEL PATIGAYON, VICTOR PATIGAYON, MA.
TEVES PATERNO OCHOTORENA, EXEQUILA TEVES, EMILIO JO,
EMILIANA TEVES, MILAGROS TEVES, EDSEL PINILI, VICENTE
TEVES, EMILIANA ISO, ALBERTO TEVES, ERLINDA TEVES,
DIOSDADO TEVES, VICTORIA TEVES AND VIVENCIO NARCISO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ASUNCION IT-IT
NAMELY: ELISA IT- IT, SUSANA IT-IT, NORBERTO IT-IT, ISA-AC IT-
IT, JR., JAIME IT-IT, FELICITAS IT-IT, TERESITA IT-IT, ANTONIO
NODADO, CORAZON IT- IT, JIMMY LERO, DANILO IT-IT, EDITA
GAMORA, PACITA VAILOCES, CRIS VAILOCES, CECILIA
CIMAFRANCA and CECILIA FLOR CIMAFRANCA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 109963. October 13, 1999.]
modification.
FACTS: Spouses Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died
intestate and without debts in 1943 and 1953, respectively. During their
lifetime, the spouses own two parcels of land designated as Lot 769-A
registered in the name of Marcelina and Lot 6409 registered in the
name of Joaquin and his two sisters. However, Joaquin's sisters died
without issue, causing the entire property to pass to him. After
Marcelina and Joaquin died, their children executed extrajudicial
settlements purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the ownership
over the two parcels of land and to alienate their shares thereto in favor
of their sister Asuncion Teves for a consideration. The division of Lot
769-A was embodied in two deeds. The first Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale was entered into on June 13, 1956 while the
second deed was executed on April 21, 1959. The Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale covering Lot 6409 was executed on
December 14, 1971. After the death of Asuncion Teves, her children,
private respondents It-it herein, extrajudicially settled her property;
Page 34 of 53
adjudicating unto themselves said lots. On July 2, 1984, the It-it sold
Lot 6409 to Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and Pacita Nocete-Baylosis. 
On May 9, 1984, herein petitioners, heirs of Marcelina and Joaquin,
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental
against private respondents for the partition and reconveyance of the
aforesaid parcels of land, alleging that the extrajudicial settlements
were spurious. Private respondents, on the other hand, maintained that
the assailed documents were executed with the formalities required by
law and are therefore binding and legally effective as bases for
acquiring ownership over the lots in question. Furthermore, it is
contended that petitioners have slept on their rights and should now
be deemed to have abandoned such rights. 
TRIAL COURT RULING: In favor of private respondents and upheld
the validity of the extrajudicial settlements. 
CA RULING: Affirmed the trial court's decision with a slight
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial settlements be upheld?
RULING: YES, the extrajudicial settlements be upheld.
The Supreme Court held that the extrajudicial settlements
executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca
are legally valid and binding - An extrajudicial settlement is a
contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law does not
relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all
the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was
doing, simply because the contract turned out to be a foolish or
unwise investment.38 Therefore, although plaintiffs- appellants
may regret having alienated their hereditary shares in favor of their
sister Asuncion, they must now be considered bound by their own
contractual acts. The Court upheld, finding no cogent reason to
reverse, the trial and appellate courts' factual finding that the
evidence presented by petitioners is insufficient to overcome the
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
evidentiary value of the extrajudicial settlements. Moreover, even
assuming that petitioners have a defensible cause of action, they
are barred from pursuing the same by reason of their long and
inexcusable inaction. In addition, an extrajudicial settlement is a
contract. Therefore, although petitioners may regret having
alienated their hereditary shares in favor of their sister Asuncion,
they must now be considered bound by their contractual acts.
The deeds are public documents and it has been held by this
Court that a public document executed with all the legal
formalities is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals
contained therein. 22 In order to overthrow a certificate of a notary
public to the effect that the grantor executed a certain document
and acknowledged the fact of its execution before him, mere
preponderance of evidence will not suffice. Rather, the evidence
must be so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
reasonable dispute as to the falsity of the certificate. When the
evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld. 23 The
appellate court's ruling that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-
appellants does not constitute the clear, strong, and convincing
evidence necessary to overcome the positive value of the
extrajudicial settlements executed by the parties, all of which are
public documents, being essentially a finding of fact, is entitled to
great respect by the appellate court and should not be disturbed
on appeal.
Romeo and Alexander that he would be forced to sell the Paco
Page 35 of 53


Case #17: Spouses VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B.
MIAT and ALEXANDER V. MIAT, petitioners, vs. ROMEO V. MIAT,
respondent.  [G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003.]
FACTS: Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two (2) parcels of
land during their marriage. The first is located at Wawa La Huerta,
Airport Village, Parañaque, Metro Manila and covered by TCT No.
S-33535. The second is located at Paco, Manila (Paco property), and
covered by TCT No. 163863. Concordia died on April 30, 1978. They
had two (2) children: Romeo and Alexander. While at Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that the Parañaque and Paco properties
would be given to Romeo and Alexander. However, when Moises
returned in 1984, he renegotiated the agreement with Romeo and
Alexander. He wanted the Parañaque property for himself but would
leave the Paco property to his two (2) sons. They agreed. Romeo and
Alexander lived on the Paco property. They paid its realty taxes and fire
insurance premiums. Romeo and Alexander orally divided the Paco
property between themselves. Later, however, Alexander sold his share
to Romeo. Alexander was given P6,000.00 as downpayment. Moises
ran into financial difficulties and he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco
property to the parents of petitioner Virgilio Castro. He informed
property if they would not redeem the mortgage. Eventually, Moises
proceeded to sell the property to the petitioners-spouses Castro.
Moises got one-third (1/3) of the proceeds while Alexander received
the remaining two-thirds (2/3). Romeo did not get a single centavo but
was given the right to till their Nueva Ecija property. Romeo filed an
action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses; to
compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance or
assignment of the Paco property to him upon payment of the balance
of its agreed price; and to make them pay damages. 

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 36 of 53

RTC RULING: Ordered Alexander V. Miat to execute a deed of sale of Miranda, who testified regarding the sale of Alexander's share to
his share in the property upon payment by Romeo of the balance of Romeo, were intensely questioned by petitioner's counsel.

the purchase price in the sum of P36,750.00 and for Romeo V. Miat to
recognize as valid the sale of Moises' share in the Paco property. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
According to the Court, the Paco property is clearly a conjugal
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
property since it was acquired by onerous title during the marriage of
Moises and Concordia and out of their common fund. Moises did not
CA RULING: Nullified the sale entered into between Moises Miat and bring the property into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as
spouses Virgilio and Michelle Castro and ordered Moises Miat and conjugal under the law. The Court also held that the petitioners-
Alexander Miat to execute a deed of conveyance over the Paco spouses Castro were not buyers in good faith. Petitioner Virgilio Castro
property in favor of Romeo Miat, upon payment by Romeo Miat of the admitted in his testimony that Romeo told him that Moises had given
balance of the purchase price in the sum of P36,750.00. 
the Paco property to them. In fact, they consulted a Judge on who had
the right to the property —Moises or Romeo. Virgilio Castro is further
Hence, the present petition.
aware that Romeo is in possession of the property, they being
neighbors. A purchaser is fully aware of another person's possession
ISSUE: Whether the validity of the oral partition between Romeo and of the lot he purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent
Alexander should be upheld and is enforceable?

purchaser for value. The Court also upheld the validity of the oral
partition between Moises and his sons. Its validity was established by
RULING: YES, the validity of the oral partition between Romeo and
the testimony of Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises, that before
Alexander should be upheld and it is enforceable. In ruling in favor
Concordia died, there was an agreement that the Parañaque property
of its validity which we affirm, the appellate court relied on a
would go to Moises, while the Paco property would go to Romeo and
portion of Moises' letter to Romeo. Ceferino Miat, brother of
Alexander. It was reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia. When
Moises, testified that before Concordia died, there was an
Moises returned to Manila for good, the agreement was affirmed in
agreement that the Parañaque property would go to Moises while
front of the extended Miat family members. Initially, Romeo and
the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. This was
Alexander orally divided the Paco property between them. Later,
reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia. When Moises returned to
Alexander sold his share to Romeo.  

Manila for good, the agreement was affirmed in front of the

extended Miat family members. Initially, Romeo and Alexander
orally divided the Paco property between them. Later, Alexander
sold his share to Romeo. We also hold that the oral partition
between Romeo and Alexander is not covered by the Statute of
Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander
accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as
downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco property.
Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 37 of 53



On October 25, 1979, or nine years later, Rolando and his siblings filed,
Case #18: ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, thru counsel, a motion to require Rosalia to submit a new inventory
ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ and MYRNA T. SANCHEZ , petitioners, vs. and to render an accounting over properties not included in the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD, compromise agreement.They likewise filed a motion to defer the
ARTURO S. LUGOD, EVELYN LUGOD-RANISES and ROBERTO S. approval of the compromise agreement, in which they prayed for the
LUGOD, respondents. [G.R. No. 108947. September 29, 1997.]
annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud. 

FACTS: Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca were married. Private RTC RULING: The compromise agreement is void and not binding,
respondent Rosalia Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan Sanchez since it was made without the said trial court's approval.

and Maria Villafranca, and her children (Arturo Lugod, Evelyn Ranises
and Roberto Lugod) are her co-respondents. Meanwhile, CA RULING: Declared the compromise agreement among the parties
petitioners Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed valid and binding even without the said trial court's approval.

Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. When Maria

died, Rosalia filed a petition for letters of administration over Maria’s PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Rolando and his siblings contend that,
estate (Special Proceedings No. 44-M) and Juan’s estate as well, who because the compromise agreement was executed during the
was at the time in state of senility. As administratrix of Maria's intestate pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to
estate, she submitted an inventory and appraisal of the said estate. shroud it with validity. They stress that the probate court had
 Before the administration proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 44- jurisdiction over the properties covered by said agreement. They add
M could formally be terminated and closed, Juan died on October 21, that Petitioners Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna were all minors
1968.
represented only by their mother/natural guardian, Laureta Tampus.

On January 14, 1969, Rolando and his siblings, as heirs of Juan C. ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement which was denominated
Sanchez, filed a petition for letters of administration (Special to be a deed of partition is valid and binding to the parties?

Proceedings No. 1022) over Juan’s intestate estate, which petition was
opposed by Rosalia. 
RULING: YES, the compromise agreement which
was denominated to be a deed of partition is valid and binding to
On October 30, 1969, however, Rosalia and Rolando with his siblings the parties. Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the
assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not
agreement wherein they agreed to divide the properties enumerated required for its perfection. In the case before us, it is ineludible
therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez.
that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid
compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective
Later on, a Memorandum of Agreement dated April 13, 1970, which counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four
the parties entered into with the assistance of their counsel, amended months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth
the above compromise agreement.
draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second drafts
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on
September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was nally signed
by the parties on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this
compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out
process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their
respective interests and to come out with the best they could,
there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely
and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be
valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims
and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto. 
RESOLVE WITH FINALITY, LIKEWISE APPLICABLE TO AN INTESTATE
Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not
only allowed but also encouraged in civil cases.36 Article 2029 of
the Civil Code mandates that a "court shall endeavor to persuade
the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair
compromise.” In opposing the validity and enforcement of the
compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the minority of Florida
Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code,
they contend that the court's approval is necessary in
compromises entered into by guardians and parties in behalf of
their wards or children. 
and ctitious all the deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and
However, we observe that although denominated a compromise
agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of
partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides
that "[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction.” For a partition to be valid,
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence
of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the
decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been
paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are
minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or
legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of
Page 38 of 53
a public instrument or a davit duly led with the Register of Deeds.
We  find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case.
We therefore a rm the validity of the parties' compromise
agreement/partition in this case.
8. ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; JURISDICTION OF PROBATE
COURT; DOCTRINE THAT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS FOR THE
PROBATE OF A WILL, THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP IS AN
EXTRANEOUS MATTER WHICH THE PROBATE COURT CANNOT
PROCEEDING; CASE AT BAR. — As a probate court, the trial court
was exercising judicial functions when it issued its assailed resolution.
The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings
involved in this case with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction,
it could resolve questions of title only provisionally. It is hornbook
doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with nality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with
equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar." In the
instant case, the trial court-rendered a decision declaring as simulated
June 26, 1967, Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in
favor of their daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren,
namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The
trial court ruled further that the properties covered by the said sales
must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code,
the lower court nulli ed said deeds of sale and determined with nality
the ownership of the properties subject thereof. In doing so, it clearly
overstepped its Jurisdiction as a probate court.
9. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; FRAUD; NOT
ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners' allegations of fraud in
the execution of the questioned deeds of sale are bereft of substance,
in view of the palpable absence of evidence to support them. The legal
presumption of validity of the questioned deeds of absolute sale, being
duly notarized public documents, has not been overcome. On the
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
other hand, fraud is not presumed. It must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, and not by mere conjectures or speculations.
GOOD FAITH WILL NOT BE DISCARDED EVEN IF THERE WAS A
11. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL APPROVAL IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE
PERFECTION THEREOF. — Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a
compromise agreement as “a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.'' Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the
meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required
for its perfection. Petitioners' argument that the compromise was not
valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in
Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court, through Justice Irene
R. Cortes, ruled: "It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal
to the compromise. A compromise is a consensual contract. As such,
it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the
contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon 23 Phil. 599 [1912]; see also De los
Reyes v. de Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505[1945]) And from that moment not only
does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De Ugarte
supra) it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata
(Civil Code, Art. 2037), even not judicially approved (Meneses v. De la
Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241,
L-24280,2.3 SCRA 762 [May 27,1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel,
L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977], 76 SCRA. 361)."
convinced that all these requirements were met and thus hold that the
12. ID.; ID.; A PARTY TO A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT CANNOT
ASK FOR A RESCISSION AFTER IT HAS ENJOYED ITS BENEFITS. —
It is also signi cant that all the parties, including the then minors, had
already consummated and availed themselves of the bene ts of their
compromise. This Court has consistently ruled that a party to a
compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its bene
ts." By their acts, the parties are ineludibly estopped from questioning
the validity of their compromise agreement. Bolstering this conclusion
is the fact that petitioners questioned the compromise only nine years
after its execution, when they led with the trial court their Motion to
Defer Approval of Compromise Agreement, dated October 26, 1979."
Page 39 of 53
13. ID.; ID.; A COMPROMISE ENTERED INTO AND CARRIED OUT IN
MISTAKE OF LAW OR FACT. — Courts have no jurisdiction to look into
the wisdom of a compromise or to render a decision different
therefrom. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that "the law does not
relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous
contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of what he was doing" and "a compromise entered into and
carried out in good faith will not be discarded even if there was a
mistake of law or fact, (McCarthy vs. Barber Steamship Lines, 45 Phil.
488) because courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations
voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be
disastrous deals or unwise investments. Volenti non fit injuria. 
The Supreme Court ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is appropriate and allowable when the following
requisites concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or o
ce exercising judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or o cer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. After a thorough review of the case at bar, the Court is
questioned decision and resolutions of the trial court may be
challenged through a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. At the very least, this case is a clear exception to the general
rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal because the trial
court's decision and resolutions were issued without or excess of
jurisdiction, which may thus be challenged or attacked at any time. 
 

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Case #19: FORTUNATO LAYAGUE and SANTIAGO ROMBO,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs. CONCEPCION PEREZ DE ULGASAN, in her
capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate of Alipia Perez,
defendant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-13666. October 31, 1960.]
land in question was in custodia legis when the heirs sold their interest
FACTS: On July 29, 1949, petitioners Fortunato Layague and Santiago
Rombo filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental an
action for declaratory relief against respondent Concepcion Perez de
Ulgasan, the judicial administratrix of deceased Alipia Perez’s estate,
praying that the deeds of sale, annexes "A", "C" and "E" of the
complaint - wherein certain portions of real property under
administration were sold to them by the heirs of Alipia in 1946 - be
declared legal and valid and that the same be confirmed. The
complaint alleged, among other things, that prior to the sales sought to
be declared valid, the real estate was partitioned by the heirs among
themselves and by virtue of such partition, the heirs took possession
of their respective shares.
the value of the fruits they had gathered from the estate, since
Concepcion, in her answer, claimed that the extrajudicial partition, as
well as the sales made by the alleged heirs of Alipia Perez, was null
and void. Concepcion, therefore, asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and, as counterclaim, prayed that for the coconut fruits
gathered from the lands plaintiff Fortunato Layague be sentenced to
pay P2,700.00 and plaintiff Santiago Rombo, P1,800.00 to the estate
of the deceased Alipia Perez, including interests from the
commencement of the action, plus costs and expenses of the
litigation.
administrator taking possession of the estate which should pass to the
No trial, however, was held on the main case, because on October 2,
1956, the plaintiffs and the defendant entered into a stipulation of
facts. It is admitted in the stipulation of facts that Fortunato and
Santiago were "during the years 1947- 48 up to September 1949" in
possession of two-thirds portion of the land under administration
proceedings by virtue of the deeds of sale executed by the heirs; that
Page 40 of 53
during that period, Fortunato Layague gathered 40,000 coconuts
which yielded about 8,000 kilos of copra, while Santiago Rombo
gathered 12,000 coconuts which he converted into 2,400 kilos of
copra; and that both of them sold the copra, the price thereof being
P55.00 per hundred piculs at the time. It is likewise admitted that the
or participation therein in 1946. As a matter of fact, the intestate
proceedings of the late Alipia Perez was instituted way back in 1936
and has not yet been closed or terminated.
CFI RULING: Upheld the sales made by the heirs of Alipia to Fortunato
and Santiago. It also upheld the validity of the stipulation of facts made
by the parties.
ISSUE: Whether Fortunato and Santiago should pay Concepcion the
value of the fruits they had gathered from the estate?
RULING: NO, Fortunato and Santiago should not pay Concepcion
there are no debts to be paid, there is no reason for the executor
or administrator taking possession of the estate which should
pass to the heirs. 
Under section 3, Rule 85, of the Rules of Court, the executor or
administrator shall have the right to take possession of the real or
personal properly of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the
payment of debts and expenses of administration. Where there are no
debts, however, to be paid, there is no reason for the executor or
heirs. (Buenaventura, et al. vs. Ramos, 43 Phil., 704.) The sale made in
the instant case by the heirs of their right, interest or participation in
the lands under administration in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees
having been declared valid and there being not even an intimation that
the estate is indebted, we are inclined to rule that the payment for the
value of the fruits gathered by the plaintiffs- appellees as purchasers to
the defendant administratrix is not necessary and might even prove to
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
be cumbersome. In any event, the quantity of the fruits gathered by
appellees is known and determinable in value. Conceding that the
proceeds they received from the fruits of the estate belong to the
estate, the court in the intestate proceedings has jurisdiction over them
and could, if necessary, compel said appellees to deliver to the
administratrix of the estate the necessary portion of said proceeds for
the payment of any claim against the estate. In this connection, we
note that the estate of the deceased has been under administration
proceedings for quite an unreasonably long time. This is patently
against the policy of the Rules of Court to close up the estate as
promptly and economically as possible. As was once held by this
Court, "All courts of first instance should exert themselves to close up
estate within twelve months from the time they are presented, and may
refuse to allow any compensation to executors and administrators who
do not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher
measures." (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil., 124.) The
defendant administratrix would, therefore, do well to accomplish the
administration of the estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch, with
a view to an early distribution of the remainder among the persons
entitled thereto.
prayed that Chung Kiat Hua, allegedly the eldest child of Chung, be


Page 41 of 53
Case #20: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
CHUNG LIU, NGO THE HUA, petitioner-appellant , vs. CHUNG KIAT
HUA, LILY CHUNG CHO, BONIFACIO CHUNG SIONG PEK and
CHUNG KA BIO, oppositors- appellees, CHUNG KIAT KANG,
oppositor-appellant , PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, special
administrator. [G.R. No. L-17091. September 30, 1963.]
FACTS: On December 7, 1957, petitioner Ngo The Hua, claiming to be
the surviving spouse of the deceased Chung Liu, filed a petition to be
appointed administratrix of Chung’s estate. Hua’s petition was
opposed by respondents Chung Kiat Hua, Lily Chung Cho, Bonifacio
Chung Siong Pek and Chung Ka Bio, all claiming to be children of
Chung Liu by his first wife, Tan Hua. They claim that Hua is morally and
physically unfit to execute the duties of the trust as administratrix, and
that Hua and Chung have secured an absolute divorce in Taiwan, both
being Chinese citizens, confirmed and legalized by the Taipei District
Court, Taipei, Taiwan on August 25, 1955. In this same opposition they
appointed administrator instead. These oppositors' prayer was in turn
opposed by Ngo The Hua who claimed that the oppositors are not
children of Chung Liu. On January 13, 1957, Chung Kiat Kang,
claiming to be a nephew of the deceased, filed his opposition to the
appointment of either Ngo The Hua or Chung Kiat Hua, on the ground
that to be appointed, they must first prove their respective relationship
to the deceased Chung Liu, and prayed that he be appointed
administrator.
LOWER COURT RULING: found that Ngo The Hua and Chung Liu
were validly divorced by the aforementioned Taipei District Court, and
that Chung Kiat Hua, Lily Chung Cho, Bonifacio Chung Siong Pek and
Chung Kiat Bio are children of the deceased. So it issued the order
appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator of the estate of Chung Liu.

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 42 of 53

On May 30, 1961, however, petitioner Hua filed a petition to withdraw making the appointment of the administrator did not purport to
her appeal stating that she had entered into an amicable settlement make a declaration of heirs.

with the oppositors-appellees. Hua’s petition was granted by this

Court in a resolution dated June 26, 1961.
Let it be made clear that what the lower court actually decided and
what we also decide is the relationship between the deceased and the
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Hua now contends that the lower parties claiming the right to be appointed his administrator, to
court erred in passing upon the validity of the divorce obtained by the determine who among them is entitled to the administration, not who
petitioner and the deceased and upon the filiation of the oppositors- are his heirs who are entitled to share in his estate. This issue of
appellees, such being a prejudgment "since it is well-settled that the heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the
declaration of heirs shall only take place after all debts, expenses and findings of the court in the case at bar on the relationship of the parties
taxes have been paid" in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 91 of the Rules is not a final determination of such relationships as a basis of
of Court.
distribution.

ISSUE: Whether it is deemed necessary to determine the relationship
of the parties to the deceased to be able to appoint an administrator in
accordance with the order of preference established in Section 5, Rule
79 of the Rules of Court?
proceeding concerning the estate of a deceased, it is necessary for
RULING: YES, it is deemed necessary to determine the
relationship of the parties to the deceased to be able to appoint an
administrator in accordance with the order of preference
established in Section 5, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. Since these
applicants were asking for the letter of administration on the
theory that they are preferred according to Section 5 of Rule 79
because of their relationship to the deceased Chung Liu, the lower
court necessarily had to pass first on the truth of their respective
claims of relationship to be able to appoint an administrator in
accordance with the aforementioned order of preference. Also, a
cursory reading of the Section 1, Rule 91 of the ROC discloses
that what the court is enjoined from doing is the assignment or
distribution of the residue of the deceased's estate before the
above-mentioned obligations chargeable to the estate are first
Having resolved the issue raised, it is unnecessary to rule on the other
questions raised by the appellant Chung Kiat Kang. It is well-settled
that for a person to be able to intervene in an administration
him to have interest in such estate (Sec. 4, Rule 80, Rules of Court;
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 ed. p. 382). An
interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would
be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a certain
claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, et
al., G.R. No. L-17759, Dec. 17, 1962; Intestate Estate of Julio
Magbanwa, 40 O.G., 1171; Williams vs. Williams, 113 Ga. 1006, cited
in Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. 1955 ed., p. 411). Appellant Chung
Kiat Kang does not claim to be a creditor of Chung Liu's estate.
Neither is he an heir in accordance with the Civil Code of the Republic
of China (Exh. 28 of Chung Kiat Hua), the law that applies in this case,
Chung Liu being a Chinese citizen (Art. 16, New Civil Code). The
appellant not having any interest in Chung Liu's estate, either as heir or
creditor, he cannot be appointed as co-administrator of the estate, as
he now prays.

paid Nowhere from said section may it be inferred that the court
cannot make a declaration of heirs prior to the satisfaction of  

these obligations. It is to be noted, however, that the court in

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Case #21: In the matter of the intestate of the deceased Valentin
Guidote y de Leon. VICENTA C. VDA. DE GUIDOTE, administratrix-
appellant, vs. THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-
appellee. [G.R. No. 45803. April 18, 1939.]
Rufinos and of the Bank of the Philippine Islands are unpaid, that
FACTS: In compliance with the CFI order in the intestate proceedings
of Valentin Guidote’s estate, appellant and judicial administratrix
Vicenta Guidote filed a project of partition suggesting that the
properties to be partitioned be adjudicated to the heirs of the
deceased Valentin Guidote named Mauricio, Eugenia, Anita,
Concepcion, Raymunda, Catalina, Pacita, Josefina, Caridad, and Jose,
all surnamed Guidote, in the proportions indicated in said project, but
declaring them subject to the mortgage which the said deceased had
executed in favor of Vicente A. Rufino, Mercedes P. Vda. de Rufino,
and Ernesto D. Rufino, with the exception of the land situated in
IbayoTanag of the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, which is
unaffected by any lien.
not be entitled to an order for their share, until the payment of the
On August 12, 1937, a month after Vicenta’s filing of the said project of
partition, the Bank of the Philippine Islands appeared in the case to
oppose the approval thereof on the ground that it has an unpaid credit
amounting to P20,000.
allowances, or any part thereof as remain unpaid or unprovided
CFI RULING: held that it would approve Vicenta's project should the
Bank's credit for P20,000 be paid in one of two ways: by selling the
unencumbered land situated in IbayoTanag, Antipolo, Rizal, for an
amount sufficient to pay said credit, or by conveying the said land to
the bank, should it so desire, in partial payment of its credit. But it also
held that should these arrangements be not made within thirty days, it
would approve the project of partition as presented, on condition that
the properties of the intestate would be subject to the mortgage of the
Rufinos and to the bank's credit.
Page 43 of 53
ISSUE: Whether the debt to BPI must be paid first before the project of
partition be approved?
RULING: YES, the debt to BPI must be paid first before the project
of partition be approved. The parties admit that the credits of the
of the former being P130,000, plus stipulated interest, secured by
a mortgage on all the properties of the intestate save the land
situated in Ibayo Tanag, municipality of Antipolo, Rizal; and that of
the latter being P20,000. While these credits, and possibly other
indebtedness and obligations of the intestate, have not been paid,
the project of partition filed by the administratrix cannot be
approved, and still less can the properties to be partitioned be
delivered to the heirs, unless the latter give the security required
by section 764 of Act No. 190 which reads as follows: "SEC. 754.
Parties interested may have order. — Such order may be made on
the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate; but the heirs, devisees, or legatees, shall
debts and allowances mentioned in the preceding section, and the
several expenses there mentioned have been made or provided
for, unless they give a bond with such surety or sureties as the
court directs, to secure the payment of such debts, expenses, or
for, and to indemnify the executor or administrator against the
same.” From this it follows that the lower court did not err in
holding that if the bank's credit is not paid within thirty days, it
would approve the project of partition, the properties to be
adjudicated to the heirs of the deceased being subject, however,
to the mortgage of the Rufinos and to the credit of the bank.
 

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
Case #22: DOLORES C. VDA. DE GIL, administratrix-appellee, vs.
AGUSTIN CANCIO, claimant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-21472. July 30,
1965.]
(Lifted from: https://vdocuments.mx/specpro.html)
notwithstanding the lapse of several years, and so Agustin Cancio filed
FACTS: Carlos Gil, Sr. died testate in Manila on November 28, 1943
instituting as his exclusive heir his widow Isabel Herreros subject to the
condition that should the latter die, the estate, if any, would be
inherited by Carlos Gil, Jr., the decedent's adopted son. In due time,
the decedent's will was duly admitted to probate, the widow Isabel
having been appointed as the administratix of the estate. Among the
properties constituting the estate were two parcels of residential land
and a house erected thereon situated in Guagua, Pampanga. During
the Japanese occupation, Isabel and Carlos secured from one Agustin
Cancio a loan of P89,000.00 and in payment thereof they agreed to
transfer to Cancio the two lots after the same had been finally
adjudicated to both or either of the two heirs. Subsequently, Carlos
died, Isabela as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband
Carlos Gil, Sr., filed a motion in the testate proceedings praying for an
order to authorize her to execute the necessary deed of transfer of the
two lots including the house erected thereon to Agustin Cancio or his
heirs. Copy of this motion was served on Dolores who expressed her
conformity thereto in her capacity as guardian of her minor children on
October 21, 1954. This motion was approved by Judge Ramon R. San
Jose on condition that the original of the deed of transfer should be
submitted to the court for approval. As Isabel died sometime in July,
1956, before being able to execute the deed of transfer in favor of
Cancio, said deed was executed by Dolores in her capacity as
coadministratrix and vendor of the properties, which deed was attach
to a motion she filed in the testate proceedings praying the court for its
approval. 
interregnum since the estate was then unproductive, a matter


Page 44 of 53
PROBATE COURT RULING: Issued an order directing the co-
administratrix to pay the estate and inheritance taxes due on the
properties covered by the sale before passing upon the motion filed for
the approval of the aforesaid deed of sale. 
Nothing was done on the matter by the co-administratrix
a motion in probate proceedings reiterating the former petition of the
co-administratrix dated requesting for the approval of the deed of sale
stating that the Office of the Commission on Internal Revenue agreed
to the registration of said deed of sale notwithstanding the non-
payment of the estate and inheritance taxes in view of the fact that the
value of the properties of the estate is more than sufficient to answer
for whatever estate and inheritance taxes that may be assessed
against the estate. However, co-administratrix Dolores C. Vda. de Gil,
Jr. filed a strong opposition to the petition on the ground that the late
Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr. entered into the agreement
to sell the properties without the authority of the court, that the
properties subject of the sale had never been finally adjudicated to
both or either of the two vendors, and that the alleged deed of sale
should only be considered as an equitable mortgage. 

ISSUE: Whether the original agreement between the late administratrix
Isabel and Cancio was without authority of the court?

HELD: NO, the original agreement between the late administratrix
Isabel and Cancio was with authority of the court. The widow and
children of the deceased are entitled to certain allowances for
their support out of the estate pending its liquidation and until
their shares have been delivered to them. It is probably for this
reason that both the widow and the son, who were the
prospective heirs, borrowed money from Agustin Cancio in order
that they may have means to support themselves in the
which comes perfectly within the purview of the law. And bearing
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
in mind this situation of the two heirs which happened during the
Japanese occupation, the probate court did not hesitate in
approving the agreement thereby giving to the administratrix the
necessary authority to execute the deed of sale covering the two
properties of the deceased in favor of Agustin Cancio provided
that the deed of sale be submitted to the court for its approval.
And this matter is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court The Court emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased
person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication.
Consequently, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed
out in a separate action.
It is true that the agreement between Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and
Carlos Gil, Jr., on the one hand, and Agustin Cancio, on the other,
concerning the transfer of the two lots in question in payment of
the loan of P89,000.00 is conditioned upon the nal adjudication of
said properties to both or either of them, and here such
adjudication has not been made in view of the early death of the
two heirs; but this circumstance is now of no consequence
considering that it is beyond dispute that the properties left by the
late Carlos Gil, Sr. were inherited, rst, by Isabel and, later, by the
children of Carlos Gil, Jr. who inherited them through their father
charged with the commitment in favor of Cancio. As a matter of
fact, Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, Jr., co-administratrix of the estate, is
now estopped from disputing the sale because she herself in her
capacity as co- administratrix led the petition in court asking for
the approval of the same sale which she now disputes for reasons
that do not appear in the record. And there is no doubt that an heir
can sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in
the property under administration, a matter which comes under
the jurisdiction of the probate court (Estefania R. Vda. de Cruz vs.
Ilagan, 81 Phil., 554).
for P5,000, the effectiveness of which depends upon the said
Page 45 of 53
Case #23: AMADO WENCESLAO ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
FAUSTINO CALIMON, defendant-appellant.  [G.R. No. 20950.
December 20, 1923.]
FACTS: This is a case of a legal redemption sanctioned by the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, to the effect that the defendant Faustino
Calimon should resell to the plaintiffs Amado Wenceslao et al a four-
fifth part of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Baluarte,
municipality of Bulacan, described in the complaint.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Three principal questions are raised
by Faustino in his brief, the first relating to the period of nine days for
the redemption, the second to the price of the repurchase, and the
third to the capacity of the redeemers.
ISSUE: Whether the period applicable in this case is contained in
Article 1067?
RULING: YES, the period applicable in this case is contained in
Article 1067, as the matter concerns heirs and an inheritance not
yet distributed, according to the stipulated of facts. But even
considering article 1524 to be applicable, the fact is that the
plaintiffs are minors and have no legal guardian. The period fixed
in said article could not have run against them. Contra non
valentem agere non currit prescriptio. This principle is recognized
in our substantive law and is expressly enshrined by sections 42
and 45 of our Code of Civil Procedure).
With regard to the price, the evidence and circumstances of the case
sufficiently show that the defendant did not pay but P7,700 and a note
defendant's taking possession of the land.
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 46 of 53
The evidence does not establish that this action was brought on behalf
of Anselmo Hilario. The admission of the affidavit Exhibit A does not
constitute any error. Those who have signed it have testified in court Case #24: QUIRICO L. SATURNINO, petitioner , vs. FELIZA LUZ
against what they had stated in said document (section 343, Code of PAULINO, MAXIMO DALEJA, JUANA LUCAS, NEMESIO LUCAS,
Civil Procedure).
DONATA GUILLERMO, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-7385. May 19, 1955.]

It is no obstacle to the upholding of the right of redemption that the

redeemers have no money to make the redemption. The lack of funds FACTS: Upon the death of Jaime Luz Paulino, on February 10, 1937,
may render such a right inefficacious, but does not affect its existence. he was survived by his children — Timoteo Esteban, Macario and
The plaintiffs cannot exercise such right unless they reimburse the respondent Feliza, all surnamed Luz Paulino and a grandson petitioner
purchaser with the purchase price paid by him (article 1067, Civil Quirico L. Saturnino, son of his deceased daughter Antonia Luz
Code).
Paulino. Among the properties left by Jaime Luz Paulino is a house
and lot, situated in Barrio No. 13, municipality of Laoag, province of
As to the offer to redeem made by Urbano Wenceslao on behalf of his Ilocos Norte, and more particularly known as Lot No. 11366 of the
children, the herein plaintiffs, we think it is valid. He is the natural Laoag Cadastre. On October 22, 1945, his daughter respondent Feliza
guardian of his children whom he represents in court and out of court. Luz Paulino executed a deed of absolute sale of said property in favor
Such an offer was not an act of administration of property but of of the spouses respondents Maximo Daleja and Juana Lucas and
representation of his children in their rights.
Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo, for the aggregate sum of
P1,200.00.

We find in the proceeding no sufficient ground for altering the

judgment appealed from; wherefore the same is hereby affirmed with  Meanwhile, or on November 19, 1945, Quirino L. Saturnino had filed,
the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
with said court, a petition, which was docketed as Special Proceeding
Case No. 37, for the probate of the will and testament of Jaime Luz
 
Paulino. Although, at first, all of the other heirs objected to said
petition, on June 30, 1949, they eventually withdrew their opposition
thereto, and the probate of the will was allowed by an order dated July
6, 1949. Said will provided that the property in dispute in Case No. 23,
be distributed, share and share alike among the heirs of the testator.

On or about March 10, 1950, the defendant in said Case No. 23 —

Feliza et al — filed a supplemental answer alleging that plaintiff —
Qurico — has no legal capacity to sue, because the property in
litigation therein is part of the estate which is the subject matter of
Case No. 37, in which an administrator was appointed but no
adjudication had, as yet, been made.

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests
LOWER COURT RULING: declaring the sale made by the defendant
Feliza Luz Paulino to her co- defendants null and void with respect to
one-fifth (1/5) of the lot in question and the plaintiff is declared owner
thereof as his undivided share; that the defendants are ordered to
receive from the Clerk of Court the sum of P960 corresponding to the
reimbursement of the price paid by them for four-fifths (4/5) of the lot in
question which their co-defendant Feliza Luz Paulino could legally
convey to them, and to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of the
plaintiff.
hope. Pending "partition" adjudication or assignment to the heirs"
CA RULING: Before delving into the merits of the appeal, we have first
to pass upon a prejudicial question. There is no dispute in this case
that the properties left by the late Jaime Luz Paulino are in custodia
legis, for they are subject to testate proceedings in said Civil Case No.
37 which is still pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.
Although the will of the testator has been allowed, no settlement of
accounts has been effected, no partition of the properties left by the
decedent has been made, and the heirs have not legally received or
been adjudicated or assigned any particular piece of the mass of their
inheritance. This being the case, and pending such partition,
adjudication or assignment to the heirs of the residue of the estate of
the testator Jaime Luz Paulino, none of his heirs can properly allege or
claim to have inherited any portion of said residue, if there be any,
because his or her right of inheritance remains to be in the nature of
hope. Consequently, neither Feliza Luz Paulino, nor any of her coheirs,
can legally represent the estate of the decedent, or dispose as his or
hers of the property involved in this case, included as item No. 20 of
the inventory (Exh. 4), or institute any ease in court to demand any part
of such estate as his own, or claim any right of legal redemption as
coheir in the sale of any piece of the mass of the inheritance that may
have been disposed of by any of the heirs. In the case at bar, even if it
were true that by agreement of the heirs the property involved herein
had been assigned to Feliza Luz Paulino as her share, that agreement
and subsequent sale are of no legal effect without' the sanction or
approval of the court before which Civil Case No. 37 is pending. The
Page 47 of 53
foregoing conclusion relieves Us from considering the other
points raised in the present controversy. WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and the complaint dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
ISSUE: Whether the right of Quirico is in the nature of a mere hope?
RULING: NO, the right of Quirico is not in the nature of a mere
of a deceased estator, their "right of inheritance" is not merely" in
the nature of hope," for — pursuant to Article 657 of the Civil Code
of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the
death of Jaime Luz Paulino — "the rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death" and the
heirs — pursuant to Article 661 of the same Code — "succeed to
the deceased in all his rights and obligations by the mere fact of
his death." In other words, the person concerned is an heir and he
may exercise his rights as such, from the very moment of the
death of the decedent. One of those rights is that of redemption
under Article 1067 of the aforesaid code (Article 1088 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines). What is more, this right of redemption
may be exercised only before partition, for said provision declares
explicitly: "If either of the heirs should sell his hereditary rights to
a stranger before the partition, any or all of his co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the purchase price, provided it be done within the period of one
month, to be counted from the time they were informed
thereof." (Italics supplied.)
With reference to the adjudication, which the Court of Appeals
seemingly considers essential to the enjoyment of the right of
redemption among co-heirs, it should be noted that a property
may be adjudicated either to one heir only or to several heirs pro-
indiviso. In the first case, the adjudication partakes, at the same
time, of the nature of a partition. Hence, if the property is sold by
the heir to whom it was adjudicated, the other heirs are not
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 48 of 53
entitled to redeem the property, for, as regards, the same, they are
neither co-heirs nor co-owners. In the second case, the heirs to
whom the property was adjudicated pro-indiviso are, thereafter, Case #25: MERCEDES CASTRO, EXEQUIEL CASTRO, MARIANO G.
no longer co-heirs, but merely co-owners. Consequently, neither SISON and GERARDO S. SISON, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. LUIS
may assert the right of redemption conferred to co-heirs, CASTRO, defendants- appellant.  [G.R. No. L-7464. October 24,
although, in proper cases, they may redeem as co-owners, under 1955.]

Article 1522 of the Civil Code of Spain (Article 1620, Civil Code of
the Philippines)
FACTS: The property originally pertained to Francisco Castro; and in
proceedings to settle his estate in Pangasinan, it was finally awarded
Again, the house and lot involved in the case at bar are not in custodia (in 1921) pro-indiviso to his children as follows: To Mercedes and
legis. Said property was sold by Feliza Luz Paulino to Maximo Daleja, Vicente — undivided 4.5/14 each; to Exequiel, Emiliano, Luis, Ildefonso
Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo on October 22, and Antonio 1/14 each.

1945, or almost a month before Special Proceeding Case No. 37 was

instituted (November 19, 1945). At that time, the buyers of said When Vicente Castro died about the year 1938, intestate proceedings
property were in possession thereof. They still held it when the judicial were instituted and in consequence of certain agreements therein the
administrator was appointed in Case No. 37, and this must have taken same property was adjudicated in August 1939 to:

place after the probate of the will on July 6, 1949 (Rule 78, section 4,
1. (a)  Maura Repato, widow of the deceased, 7/14;

Rule 79, sections 4 and 6, and Rule 80, section 5, Rules of Court). Up

to the present, said buyers remain in possession of the property in
2. (b)  Exequiel, Luis, Emiliano, Ildefonso and Antonio, brothers
litigation. Neither the court, taking cognizance of Case No. 37, nor the
1/14 each; and (c) Mercedes Castro 2/14.

judicial administrator therein appointed, has even tried to divest them

of said possession. In fact, if they were as they are —unwilling to yield Thereafter Exequiel and Luis purchased from Emiliano, and inherited
it and the administrator wished to take the property under his custody, from Ildefonso and Antonio their respective portions, so that the
it would be necessary for him to institute a separate civil action property was owned in March 1944 by the following: Maura Repato
therefor.
7/14; Mercedes Castro 3/14; Exequiel Castro 2.5/14; and Luis Castro
1.5/14.

In view of the foregoing, and considering that the Court of Appeals has
not passed upon the issues raised therein by respondents herein and On March 31, 1944 Maura Repato sold her share of the property to
that the decision of said court does not state the facts essential to the Mariano G. Sison and Gerardo S. Sison by a Deed of sale which was
determination of those issues, said decision is hereby reversed, and let duly registered in the Registry of Deeds on April 1, 1944.

the records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for

further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision.
Having been informed of the conveyance on or about May 15, 1944,
respondent Luis Castro immediately offered to repurchase Maura
  
Repato's share, but Mariano and Gerardo declined to sell.

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 49 of 53

The plaintiffs-appellees sued Luis Castro for actual partition of a parcel Exequiel and his brothers (5/14) and Mercedes Castro (2/14), their
of land in Bugallon, Pangasinan, in the following proportion: 7/14 to abstract hereditary rights became determinate and therefore they
Mariano and Gerardo Sison; 3/14 to Mercedes Castro; 2.5/14 to ceased to be co-heirs and became co-owners. Hence the sale by
Exequiel Castro and 1.5/14 to defendant.
Maura was a sale by a co-owner, governed by Articles 1522 and 1524.

Resisting the demand, Luis Castro interposed, in the form of a ISSUE: Whether Articles 1522 and 1524 that should govern the right of
counterclaim, his right to repurchase from Mariano and Gerardo Sison, legal redemption in this case?

alleging that the latter had bought their part from one of his co-heirs
(co-owners according to plaintiffs).
RULING: YES, Articles 1522 and 1524 that should govern the right
of legal redemption in this case. Once the portion corresponding
CFI RULING: In favor of Mercedes et al,  overruled Luis' counterclaim to each heir had been fixed — as in this case — the co-heirs
and approved the report of partition dated August 11, 1953 prepared turned into co-owners, and their right of legal redemption should
by Commissioner Norberto Castro, finding it to be reasonable and be governed by Articles 1522 and 1524. His Honor adopted the
agreeable to the parties concerned. The trial judge ruled that Article correct view. There was already a partition, or adjudication of the
1067 applies only where a co-heir sells his share before partition or respective shares; wherefore article 1067 does not apply.

distribution or before the determination of the portion to which each

heir is entitled.
"3. The sale to sent respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapuz of the
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Luis Castro rests his case on Article
1067 of the Civil Code providing that "if either of the heirs should sell
his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of his
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the purchase price, provided it be done within the
period of one month, to be counted from the time they were informed
thereof." He says he came to know the sale on May 15, 1944 and
immediately offered to buy.
the moment, Maura Repato was not, strictly speaking, the co-heir of
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: Mercedes Cite articles 1522 and 1524
of the Civil Code prescribing that any co-owner of a thing held in
common may redeem the share of any co-owner that is sold to a third
person, provided such right is exercised within nine days from the date
of the record of the transfer in the Registry of Deeds . . . And there is
no question that the sale by Maura Repato to Mariano and Gerardo
Sison was registered on April 1, 1944 and the offer to buy was made
after May 15, 1944. In addition, they argue that when, after 1938, the
property was adjudicated pro-indiviso to Maura Repato (7/14),
two parcels of land in question by Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga
took place after the project of partition had been approved by the
court (order of the probate court of March 11, 1946, in civil case No.
3960, the legal redemption case, Appendix 1 of respondents' answer),
on account of which article 1067 of the Civil Code cannot support
petitioners' claim, said article referring to a sale by any of the heirs of
his hereditary right to a stranger before partition." (De Jesus vs. Daza,
43 Off. Gaz., 2055, 2060.) Furthermore, disregarding the partition for
Luis Castro with regard to Francisco Castro (she was not heir of
Francisco). Neither was she a co-heir of Luis Castro with regard to
Vicente Castro, for the obvious reason that Luis inherited nothing of
this land from his brother Vicente. It is true that upon the death of
Vicente Castro this property was "adjudicated" to Maura Repato, and
his brothers Exequiel, Luis etc. But these brothers, specially Luis got
the same portion they had already received from their father Francisco
— namely 1/14 of the property. Luis therefore has not inherited any
portion of this property from Vicente Castro, and may not be
considered as "co-heir" of Maura Repato.

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 50 of 53

 
indicate that the sale was okayed by the probate court. It should be
noted that in 1963 the widow and four of her seven children as owners
Case #26: AMORANTE PLAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE of 7/8 interest in the said property had, in consideration of P9,600,
APPELLATE COURT and FEDERICO BAUTISTA, respondents. [G.R. agreed to sell that same property to Plan for the same amount of
No. 65656. February 28, 1985.]
P140,000 (12-17, Record on Appeal).

FACTS: In the intestate proceeding for the settlement of Regino
Bautista's estate, his widow, Florencia Topacio filed a motion dated
December 9, 1964 for authority to sell to Plan the two lots and theater
for not less than P140,000. The purpose was to pay the debts
amounting to P117,220. The motion was set for hearing on December
18, 1964. It was indicated in the motion that the children were notified
through one child named Milagros Bautista (18-20, Record on
Appeal). Federico, who claims a 1/8 interest in the property, alleged
that he was not notified of the sale. His mother had a 5/8 interest in the
property.
through Milagros Bautista.
Sixteen days after the sale, or on January 7, 1965, Federico Bautista
filed an "Opposition to Agreement to Sell, Absolute Sale, Project of
Partition and Request for Inventory and Accounting of Estate and for
Furnishing of Orders, Notices and Pleadings". The clerk of court set
the said opposition for hearing on January 26, 1965. On that date
Judge Jimenez gave Federico's counsel ten days within which to
interpose any opposition to the project of partition filed by the
administratrix on October 16, 1964 which had not been acted upon by
the court and of which the decedent's six children were notified

On December 22, 1964 Judge Jose B. Jimenez granted the authority
to sell to Plan the entire-estate of the deceased for not less than
P140,000 so as to pay the obligations of the estate "and it appearing
that all the heirs have conformed thereto" (20-21, Record on Appeal,).
aside "and the case tried upon its merits. Federico for the third time
On that day, Florencia Topacio and Plan executed a deed of absolute
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Federico contended that because
there was no compliance with section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court
the sale was void. He prayed that the order authorizing the sale he set
filed a separate action against Plan, Civil Case No. 2282, to annul the
sale. 

sale with assumption of mortgage obligations for the two lots with an
area of 664 square meters together with the theater (with a total RTC RULING: Dismissed Federico’s case on the same ground,
assessed value of P52,720) and the apparatus used therein.
namely, that his remedy is in the intestate proceeding. He should not
be allowed to seek relief outside the intestate court

It was recited in the deed of sale that Regino's estate owed Plan
P25,700 and a mortgage debt of P44,292.07 to the Philippine National CA RULING: Reversed Judge Fule's decision. It declared void the
Bank which Plan assumed. The amount actually received by the agreement to sell and the sale, ordered Plan to reconvey to Federico
administratrix as vendor was P70,007.93. Milagros Bautista-Alcantara, the disputed property for P140,000 and to pay him P3,000 a month
the heir through whom the other six children were allegedly notified, from December 22, 1964 up to the time the possession of the property
was an instrumental witness in the sale.
is turned over to Federico, with legal interest from that date until fully
paid, plus P50,000 as attorney's fees. The reconveyance was based
A motion to approve the sale was filed on January 5, 1965. Judge on article 1088 of the Civil Code.

Jimenez signed the original deed under the word "Approved" to

SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 51 of 53
ISSUE: Whether Federico could nullify in a separate action, instead of proceeding. Here, the purchaser had no objection to litigating the
in the intestate proceeding for his deceased father's estate, the sale of validity of the sale in the intestate proceeding. The probate court,
two conjugal lots? 
having authorized and approved the sale, should resolve the issue as
to its validity. More important is that if all the interested parties are
RULING: NO, Federico could not nullify in a separate action the heard, an amicable settlement may be reached.

sale of two conjugal lots, since the proceeds were used for the
payments of the estate’s debts. It is deemed final and cannot be  

subject of legal redemption under Article 1088 of the Civil Code. In

the instant case, we agree with Judges Fule, Catolico and Vallejos
that Federico's remedy is in the intestate proceeding where
his petition for relief has been pending for nearly twenty years. He
should amend it by impleading the present administratrix and Plan
himself and serving copies of the petition upon them. Plan, as the
purchaser of the disputed property, is a forced intervenor in the
intestate proceeding. He should answer the amended petition for
the annulment of the sale. The probate court has jurisdiction over
him.

Article 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal redemption in this
case because it refers to sale of hereditary rights, and not to specific
properties, for the payment of the debts of the decedent's estate as to
which there is no legal redemption."In the administration and
liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered by the
probate court for payment of debts are final and not subject to legal
redemption. Unlike in ordinary execution sales, there is no legal
provision allowing redemption in the sale of property for payment of
debts of a deceased person" (Abarro vs. De Guia, 72 Phil. 245). Such
sale is not the one contemplated in article 1067, now article 1088 of
the Civil Code (Vda. de Mendoza, 69 Phil. 155).

Federico should also ask for an accounting of the P70,007.93 received

by his mother. His brothers and sisters should also be served with
copies of the amended petition. The case of Tagle and Ignacio, Jr. vs.
Manalo, 105 Phil. 1123, cited by Federico Bautista in his brief, is not in
point because the testamentary proceeding in that case was already
closed and the purchaser did not want to be pulled into the probate
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 52 of 53
Iloilo, for legal redemption of the 3/4 portion of the parcel of land
inherited by the heirs from the late Gelacio Garcia, which portion was
Case #27: FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA sold by their co-heirs to the defendants.

GARCIA, petitioners, vs. JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA

TRABADILLO, & HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Third Division, CFI RULING: rendered judgment on September 12, 1957 in favor of
respondents. [G.R. No. L-26855. April 17, 1989.]
the plaintiffs

FACTS: On February 11, 1946, one Gelacio Garcia died intestate, CA RULING: reversed the decision of the trial court and rendered
leaving a parcel of unregistered land about 372 sq. meters, situated in another one dismissing plaintiff's complaint

the Municipality of Tubungan, Province of Iloilo (Exhibits, p. 19). On his

death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces, RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Jose and Paciencia claimed that the
grandnephews who are the descendants of his late brothers, Pedro, 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088 for Francisco and his siblings
Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos (TSN, Sept. 6, 1956, p. 3).
to exercise the right to legal redemption had already elapsed and that
the requirement of Article 1088 that notice must be in writing is
On December 3, 1954, the heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, deemed satisfied because written notice would be superfluous, the
Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia, Consolacion Garcia, purpose of the law having beenfully served when Francisco went to the
Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia signed a document Office of the Register ofDeeds and was for himself, read and
entitled, "Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Sale” and sold it for understood the contents of the Deeds of Sale.

a consideration of P500 to respondent spouses Jose Calaliman and

Paciencia Trabadillo. The document was inscribed in the Register of ISSUE: Whether Article 1088 is the applicable law in this case?

Deeds of Iloilo on February 24, 1955, Inscription No. 20814, Page 270,
Vol. 64. 
RULING: YES, Article 1088 is the applicable law in this case, as the
matter concerns heirs and inheritance not yet distributed.  It is
On December 17, 1954 another group of heirs, Rosario Garcia, undisputed that no notification in writing was ever received by
Margarita Garcia, Dolores Rufino, Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin petitioners about the sale of the hereditary interest of some of
Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, Fortunata Garcia and Simeon Garcia, their co-heirs in the parcel of land they inherited from the late
all residents of Isabela, Negros Occidental, also sold to the spouses Gelacio Garcia, although in a letter dated June 23, 1953 petitioner
Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo through their attorney-in-fact, Francisco Garcia wrote one of his co-heirs, Joaquin Garcia, who is
Juanito Bertomo, their shares, rights, interest and participation in the an uncle of petitioners, proposing to buy the hereditary interests
same parcel of land. The Deed of Sale was registered in the Register of of his co-heirs in their unpartitioned inheritance, (Exhibit, p. 3).
Deeds of Iloilo also on December 22, 1954, Inscription No. 20640, p. Although said petitioner asked that his letter be answered "in
88, Vol. 64 (Exhibits, p. 2122).
order that I will know the results of what I have requested
you," (Exhibit, p. 14) there is no proof that he was favored with
On May 7, 1955 the heirs petitioners Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and one.

Maria Garcia filed against the spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia
Trabadillo a Civil Case No. 3489 with the Court of First Instance of
SUCCESSION Part 14 Digests Page 53 of 53
In the decision of the Court in Castillo v. Samonte, it did not It is not known whether the other heirs whose names appear in the
consider the registration of the deed of sale with the Register of document had already signed the document at the time Paz Garcia
Deeds sufficient notice, most specially because the property was approached by Juanito Bertomo. Paz Garcia, however, testified
involved was unregistered land, as in the instant case. The Court that she immediately informed her brother Francisco that Juanita
took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale as Bertomo wanted to sell the land to Jose Calaliman (TSN, September 6,
sufficient notice of sale under the provision of Section 51 of Act 1957, p. 62). On December 26, 1954 he wrote respondents giving them
No. 496 applies only to registered lands and has no application notice of his desire to exercise the right of legal redemption and that
whatsoever to a case where the property involved is, admittedly, he will resort to court action if denied the right (Exhibits, p. 8). The
unregistered land.
respondents received the letter on January 13, 1955 but petitioner
Francisco Garcia did not get any answer from them. Neither did
Consistent with aforesaid ruling, in the interpretation of a related respondents show him a copy of the document of sale nor inform him
provision (Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) this Court had about the price they paid for the sale when he went home to Tubungan
stressed that written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of from Manila sometime in March 1955 and went to see the respondent
the sale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner, spouse about the matter on March 24, 1955 (TSN, September 6, 1957,
notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as p. 18).LLpr

exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its

terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is
not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the
method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does
not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
distinctive method for written notification of redemption (Conejero
Because of the refusal of respondent Jose Calaliman to show him the
document of sale or reveal to him the price paid for the parcel of land,
petitioner Francisco Garcia went to the Office of the Register of Deeds
on the same date, March 24, 1955 and there found two documents of
sale regarding the same parcel of land (TSN, Ibid, p. 19).

et al. v. Court of Appeals et al., 16 SCRA 775 [1966]; Etcuban v.

Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 607 [1987]; Cabrera v. Villanueva, G.R. Petitioners filed the case for legal redemption with the trial court on
No. 75069, April 15, 1988).
May 7, 1955.

Petitioners came to know that their co-heirs were selling the property  

on December 3, 1954 when one of the heirs, Juanito Bertomo, asked

Petitioner Paz Garcia to sign a document prepared in the Municipality  
of Tubungan because the land they inherited was going to be sold to
private respondent, Jose Calaliman (TSN, September 3, 1957, p. 60).
The document mentioned by petitioner Paz Garcia could be no other
than the one entitled "Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Sale" dated
December 3, 1954 as it is in this document that the name of Paz
Garcia, Maria Garcia and Amado Garcia appear unsigned by them
(Exhibits, p. 19).