REPUBLIC V.

SERENO

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to
2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two
international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the
Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no
record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession.
Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities,
and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a
copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers
of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has
certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were
recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief
Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents,
among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government
and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC
announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a
letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner,
she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her
SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that
“considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years
old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the
clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record
that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to
have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno,
alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of
Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was
said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the
incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting
to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and
subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998
SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in
representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG,
invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in
relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the
petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s
appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno
therefrom. [yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for
Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing
actual bias for having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of
Representatives.

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Contentions:

Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to
question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of
committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office,
citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG
maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than
impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under
Section 11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment
proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo
warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the
king”) or prescription does not operate against the government. The State has a continuous
interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even
assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not
published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the disqualification.

Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which
created a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate
complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC
and contending that this is not a political question because such issue may be resolved
through the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons
of Judicial Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show
that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for
membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to
the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her
integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should
have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office.
Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum,
wherein malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment,
citing Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor
Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re:
Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the
clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category of
public officers who can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment
was chosen as the method of removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield
them from harassment suits that will prevent them from performing their functions which are
vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that the word “may”
on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial,
i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no
jurisdiction.

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Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case
because the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than
impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the
Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the
President and the Vice-President. There is no such provision for other impeachable officers.
Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo
warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such
would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised
disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much
higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which
vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the personnel
thereof.

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo
warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would
be rendered inutile.

Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that
a petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and
not from the “discovery” of the disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs
because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was
regular. OSG failed to overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO
that she had been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is
a political question which can only be decided by the JBC and the President.

Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot
give rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should
give an inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she
possessed the integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether
or not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a
constitutional requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The
intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and experience
are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity, probity, and
independence are mere subjective considerations.

ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five
Justices

Main Issues:

3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition
for quo warranto.

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 4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding
the fact that an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of
Representatives.

5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo

warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is
impeachment.

6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle
of separation of powers

7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription

8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the
character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;

9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the
position of Chief Justice.

10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs
as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules
and regulations

11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed
properly and promptly.

12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC

13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs
to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;

14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice,
whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President
cured such ineligibility.

15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.

HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or
preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of
intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon
compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second requirement that no
delay and prejudice should result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their
common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De
Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their would-be participation in the impeachment trial
as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the
impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The interest contemplated by law
must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It
is vested in the people, and not in any private individual or group, because disputes over title
to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a
private quarrel among rival claimants.

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Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
to inhibit in the case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it
in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However,
the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear
to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be
balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Bias must
be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at the
impeachment proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc,
given that the Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge. The
mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the
charge is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for
inhibition has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and
meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings
before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in
entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing
seeds of mistrust and discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the
Court are beholden to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and
promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who
has supposedly met consistent litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically
and positively be received in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the
Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best person to determine the propriety
of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be disqualified. [yourlawyersays]

Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and
SC has jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs,
including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such
writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case,
direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief
Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-
reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To
exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation
of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will
eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual
controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial
in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power
to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated
or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including
the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the

eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined
rules while impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust.
In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is
the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally
but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a
public wrong and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a
verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor

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General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible latitude within his legal
authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest and the
government policy on the matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding
is not forum shopping and is allowed.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies
are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing
and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively
availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable
decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining forum shopping is
whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of
action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is
the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be
considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is
for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s
title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment
necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office and thus, is an
impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable
offenses to warrant her removal from office.

Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be
adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover,
impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the
removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally
possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does
not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the
House is not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause.
The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against
Sereno. The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of
discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.

Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote
discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the
express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of
removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this express
provision.”

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The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be
criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they
are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be
charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public
officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide
for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the
eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying
that the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal
from office. If other causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can likewise
be availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers
are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect
pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised
in an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the
appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or
she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is
a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo
warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person
who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not
violative of the core constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively
tried and decided by the Senate. Again, the difference between quo warranto and
impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo warrantodoes not try a person’s
culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warrantoconclusively
pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
warrantoproceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of
determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of
Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed
power of impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic
bear out the conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the
position immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or
breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply because of perceived
availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation
of a process specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership
of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on
impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset,
may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time
of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render
such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition,
provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts
or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement
but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly
elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else,
which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act

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or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal
action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed
to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless
the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of
the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive
period has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their right of office,
unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief
Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the present petition for quo
warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person holding the highest position in the
Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed
by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason
to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by
proof must commence such action.” It may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil
or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right.
There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could
there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not
be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an
action for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no
statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would
allow an unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest position in the
Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification·
for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno
has not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s
appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered
obscure.

Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring
that the JBC complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means
“overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform
their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper·
actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What
is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of
discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an
exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of
the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the
JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to
ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not
accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived
or bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely
related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.”

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Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving
the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure
that a member of the Supreme Court must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration
under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA
3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie
evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the public
officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees.
The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that
failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public
service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-
compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it
may also result in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated
to perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno
herself in her dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum
onere, or with a burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations,
together with its benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and
legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their office.
The public has the right to demand the performance of those duties. More importantly, while
every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is

not merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not
affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum
prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined
by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the
Constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno
could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by
presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such
evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be
applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the
branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by
the OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to
be in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman
as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were
neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference.
Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there
is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December
1998.” This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.

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For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification
from UP HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge
her burden of evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different
when it is filed by the State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing
her SALN because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that
Sereno did not receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a
government worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on
RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]

Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During
the period when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office
of the President or the Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the
review of SALNs filed by officials and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P.
The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance order came about only on 2006
from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial
duty of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that
time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is
limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money
and property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date of her
resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and
in the shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN
requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does
not negate, nor supply her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been
disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered
Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was
squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent
appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her
qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party
sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in
violation of the Constitutional and statutory requirements .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty
if the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements.
The suspicious circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998
SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed
which were the years when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN
was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected,
suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first five months
as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying
with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity,
honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal
against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies,
inconsistencies and non-disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for
nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are
incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been

10
interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of
the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out from the rest of the applicants for having
failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC
did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance.
Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able to substantially comply
with the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing
justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from
U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government service
is not continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible
to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and
charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only
3 SALNs to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on
Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file
several SALNs during the course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material
fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from
a Member of the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs
but there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of
which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office
must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected.
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties
with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these
reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her
false representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact
she was counsel for the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is
proof of her compliance with SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to
truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new
Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without
requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation
at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO
in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the
Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer
the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with
respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of
survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the
processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly
confidential document involving national security against the latter among others, all belie
the fact that Sereno has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years
means that her integrity was not established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the
position of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero
proposed the addition of the requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid
what CJ Corona had gone through. Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means
that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness
or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver
of the confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that she

11
failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries
indicated in the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured
by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of
appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a
continuing requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of
the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the
position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a matter of course.
The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the
Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he
Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment
determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the
parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is
an office constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and
nomination process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,

subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the
exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee
is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the
appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a
de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the
position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such,
Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the
office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at
the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief
Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY

HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDEDtherefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial
and Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should
not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of
Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill
motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.

ZOLETA V. SANDIGANBAYAN – NO DIGEST

12
CANTOS V. PP

FACTS:

Major Joel G. Cantos is a Commanding Officer of the 22nd Finance Service Center in
the Presidential Security Group, Malacanang Park in Manila. On December 21, 2000, he took
and misappropriated the amount of P3, 270,000.00 from public funds, by reason of his position
in the Office and for his personal interest.

Meanwhile, Major Eligio T. Balao, a Disbursing Officer at the 22 nd FSU who acted as a
witness, revealed that Major Cantos called him at around 12 noon to his office and notified
him about the missing Special Duty Allowance for December and other Maintenance
Operating Expenses under his supervision all amounting to P3 Million pesos. Balao was taken
aback by what he had just found out about the said money.

When he asked Major Cantos where he kept it and asked why he did not keep the
money in a safety vault, there was no response from Cantos. Balao further narrated that he
was instructed by Major Cantos to get a screw driver to unscrew the safety vault and make
it appear that the money was stolen from the vault. Instructions on getting the combination
number of the vault from a certain Major Mendoza in Taguig were also given to Balao but he
was not able to find Mendoza. When Balao went back to the office, Col. Espinelli tried to
make him disclose that he took the money.

On the part of Major Cantos, he mentioned that he was informed by Major Mendoza
that the safety vault where he wished to keep the money was defective and so he kept the
money in a duffel bag in a steel cabinet. At that time, he had the keys to the steel cabinet.
The next day, he narrated that the duffel bag with the money was gone. At first, they wanted
to make it appear that the money was stolen by unscrewing the vault. But, Cantos later
informed Gen. Diaz about the lost money and was advised to relay the incident to Col.
Espinelli to which Espinelli made an investigation.

In the case at bar, it showed that all the elements of the crime of malversation of
public funds were found. He was public officer and had complete supervision and control of
the funds and he failed to explain adequately what had happened to the funds.

ISSUE:

Did the Sandiganbayan make a mistake in finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds? No.

HELD/RULING:

Petitioner Cantos failed to explain satisfactorily the missing money amounting to P3

Million and restitute the amount upon demand. The reasons he gave – the funds being stolen
and forcibly taken -- were not well-supported by evidence. There was no trace of the steel
cabinet where he placed the money being opened by force and it was only Cantos who had
the keys to the said steel cabinet.

His explanation was insufficient and did not overcome the presumption that he had
put the missing funds to personal use. Even if no direct evidence of misappropriation exists,
it was mentioned that the only required element is that there is shortage in the officer’s
account which has not been able to be explained adequately.

The petition was DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in convicting Major Joel
G. Cantos of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds was AFFIRMED and UPHELD. There
were costs against the petitioner.

13
YSIDORO V. PP

On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Brgy. Tinugtogan, was 70% done,
the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their
families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such
construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the
cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in
charge of the municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to
malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of
sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother
volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.

Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, t
o seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and
signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.0
0 to CSAP.

Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint
against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the
subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished children.
She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local
Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods.Thus, Ysidoro committed technical
malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.

The evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Re
solution 00-
133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. This appropriation was based on the ex
ecutive budget which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehe
nsive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services which covers the CSAP housing projects.

The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpose other than
that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation

Ruling: No.

The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code4 has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he
applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the
public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for
which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.Ysidoro claims that he could not
be held liable for the offense under its third element because the four sacks of rice and two
boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance
for a specific purpose.

Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those
providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If
Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP
housing beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food
intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.

Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the
CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he
consulted the accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries.
Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.

14
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of
diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to
another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. It is the
commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent
is completely irrelevant.

Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted,
constitutes the crime of technical malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize
that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.

GARCIA V. OMBUDSMAN

FACTS: Roman, being the Provincial Governor at that time, entered into a contract for the
construction of a mini-theater. Roman issued a Certificate stating that the project was 100%
completed.

Notwithstanding the various documents attesting to the project’s supposed completion, as

well as the disbursement of funds in payment therefor, Garcia, Roman’s successor–
authorized the inspection of the project and discovered that the construction remained
unfinished. Garcia filed Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents and violation of “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” against the respondents.

The Ombudsman cleared respondents from liability on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence, reasoning that “mere signature on a voucher or certification is not enough” to
establish any conspiracy among them which would warrant their conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing all the
criminal charges against respondents for lack of probable cause.

HELD: YES.

The Constitution and RA 6770, otherwise known as the “Ombudsman Act of 1989,” have
endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory
and prosecutorial powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and
employees. Hence, as a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s
findings and respects the initiative and independence inherent in its office, which “beholden
to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public
service.”

The foregoing principle does not, however, apply when the Ombudsman’s ruling is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, subjecting the same to certiorari correction. It may also be
committed when the Ombudsman patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. Indeed, any decision, order or resolution of a tribunal tantamount to overruling
a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably grave abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when it
disregarded the CoA Memo and patently misapplied existing jurisprudence – particularly, the
Arias case – in ruling that there was no probable cause for the crime of Violation of Section
3 (e), RA 3019.

CSC V. ALMOJUELA
Fact:

15
The present administrative case, filed against Desk Officer/ Supervisor SJO2 Almojuela,
sprang from the escape of a detention prisoner in the Makati City Jail. A BJMP Investigation
Report conducted on the incident concluded that SJO2 Almojuela and the rest of the jail
officers on third shift custodial duty all colluded to facilitate Lao’s getaway. SJO2 Almojuela
and JO1 Loyola moved for the reconsideration of Director Walit’s decision, which the latter
denied for lack of merit in a Joint Resolution dated June 21, 2006. In Administrative Case No.
04-11, CESO IV Director Arturo Walit, the BJMP hearing officer, rendered his decision dated
December 13, 2005, finding SJO2 Almojuela guilty of Grave Misconduct and were meted the
penalty of dismissal from the service. SJO2 Almojuela then appealed his conviction before
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which affirmed Director Walit’s decision in its Resolution
No. 080701. The CSC subsequently denied SJO2 Almojuela’s motion for reconsideration.
SJO2 Almojuela’s next recourse was a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court partially granted SJO2 Almojuela’s motion for reconsideration, and lowered
his liability from grave to simple misconduct. CSC appealed to the SC the decision of the CA.
Hence this case.

Issues:

1) Whether the CSC’s petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed as the CSC is not
the proper party to appeal the CA’s amended decision;

2) Whether SJO2 Almojuela had been deprived of due process when he was not allowed to
present his evidence and witnesses during the BJMP investigation;

Held:

1) No, The CSC is the proper party to raise an appeal against the CA’s amended petition. In
the present case, the CSC appeals the CA’s amended decision, which modified the liability
the former meted against SJO2 Almojuela from grave misconduct to simple misconduct, and
lowered the corresponding penalty from dismissal to three months suspension. Applying the
Dacoycoy principles, the CSC has legal personality to appeal the CA’s amended decision as
the CA significantly lowered SJO2 Almojuela’s disciplinary sanction and thereby prevented
the CSC from imposing the penalty it deemed appropriate to impose on SJO2 Almojuela.

2) No, SJO2 Almojuela was afforded due process in the BJMP investigations. The SC support
the CA’s conclusion that SJO2 Almojuela was accorded the right to due process during the
BJMP investigation. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings (such as the
BJMP investigation) is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where a party has been given the
opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects
in procedural due process may be cured. In SJO2 Almojuela’s case, he was informed of the
charges against him, and was given the opportunity to refute them in the counter-affidavit
and motion for reconsideration he filed before the BJMP hearing officer, in the appeal and
motion for reconsideration he filed before the CSC, in his petition for review on certiorari, in
his memorandum on appeal, and, finally, in the motion for reconsideration he filed before the
CA. In particular, SJO2 Almojuela admitted in his comment that he narrated in his
counteraffidavit the circumstances that, to his knowledge, transpired immediately before
Lao’s breakout. The Motion for Reconsideration to the CA’s original decision contained the
additional piece of evidence that SJO2 Almojuela claimed would have exculpated him from
liability: Captain Fermin Enriquez’s testimony during his cross-examination in Criminal Case
No. 3320236, filed against SJO2 Almojuela for conniving with or consenting to evasion under
Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. This piece of evidence was reiterated in the comment
SJO2 Almojuela filed before this Court. Notably, SJO2 Almojuela repeteadly mentioned ‘other
witnesses and other documentary exhibits’ that he would have presented to absolve him from

16
liability,68 but the only piece of evidence he submitted in his Motion for Reconsideration and
Comment was Captain Enriquez’s testimony. These circumstances sufficiently convince us
that SJO2 Almojuela had been given ample opportunity to present his side, and whatever
defects might have intervened during the BJMP investigation have been cured by his
subsequent filing of pleadings before the CSC, the CA, and before SC.

CAPULONG V. PP – NO DIGEST

PP V. GENOSA

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of
Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon,
which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds which
caused his death.

The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe
beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate
her self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of
killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.

Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept of
self-defense is applicable in this case.

Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from
the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of
the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to
use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probable—not necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to the accused, based
on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether,
these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of
the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

DINAMLING V. PP

Facts:

Ricky Dinamling, a policeman, was in a 5-year relationship with AAA. They had 2 common
children, aged 4 and 2. One night, he went to AAA’s boarding house with a friend after a
drinking session. As AAA was putting the children to bed, he started to evict her for the
reason that she was using the place as a “whore house” wherein she “brought her partners.”
She did not want to leave but he threw a baby’s feeding bottle outside. She went to BBB’s
house and requested to fetch her children. However, Dinamling already left the boarding
house with the older child and only the baby was left.

In the past, he would hit AAA’s head, pull her hair, and kick her When AAA went to the police,
she was merely told that it was a family problem that could be talked over.

17
6 days after the incident, AAA was at CCC’s house when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and
counted down for AAA to come out. When she came out, Dinamling punched her at the left
ear, which subsequently bled. When AAA asked him why he kept on following her when she
already had left him, Dinamling shouted her family name and told her she was “good-for-
nothing.” AAA left for the barangay captain's house, but Dinamling caught up with her and
kicked her until she fell to the ground. On the road, Dinamling pulled down AAA's pants and
panty and shouted at her while people looked on. Dinamling then threw the pants and panty
back at AAA and shouted her family name. Dinamling, then intoxicated, left on a motorcycle.
AAA stayed at her friend's home until she felt some back pain in the next morning. She found
out she was bleeding and about to miscarry so she was immediately brought to the hospital.
There, she was told that she was 19 weeks pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She
was hospitalized for four days. Dinamling visited her but showed no remorse over his acts.

Dinamling was charged with (2) criminal Informations in the RTC for violation of Section 5(i),
in relation to Section 6(f) of RA No. 9262.

His defense was denial and alibi, claiming that he was on duty at the town’s police station
at the time that the offenses were committed.

RTC found Dinamling gulty of both charges. CA affirmed but modified the penalty by applying
ISLaw.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding his defenses of denial and alibi as well as in
discounting the supposedly exculpatory nature of a part of a prosecution witness' testimony.

Held:

No.

On its face, there is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the victim AAA's
evidence. In particular, AAA's testimony narrating the specific incidents which gave rise to
the charges was clear, categorical and straightforward and, therefore, worthy of credence.

AAA also stated that the baby that she claims was aborted would have been her third child
with Dinamling. She also testified about always being afraid of Dinamling, even fearing the
sound of his motorcycle as that signalled that she or her children would be abused. She
previously filed with the police a complaint for physical injuries but nothing came of it. Later,
she learned from Dinamling that he had been discharged as a policeman.

In addition to AAA's testimony, her mother DDD also testified that her daughter was “like a
corpse” because of Dinamling's maltreatment. DDD narrated the history of maltreatment of
her daughter, including the times that she saw her with “bluish spots” and when AAA had a
miscarriage from all the boxing and kicking that she had received from Dinamling. She knew
that Dinamling was a married man when he had his relationship with AAA and she knew for
a fact that Dinamling did not live with AAA and the children because he always went home
to his own wife.

As for the first case filed against petitioner Dinamling, the elements have been proven and
duly established. It is undisputed that AAA, as the victim, is a woman who was then in a five-
year ongoing relationship with petitioner Dinamling. At that time, AAA and Dinamling had two
common children. AAA was often in fear of petitioner due to the latter's physical and verbal
abuse.

As for the second case, the crime's elements were likewise proven. In addition to the first
two elements of the victim being a woman and in a relationship with the offender, the

18
prosecution was able to prove another incident of mental or emotional anguish through public
ridicule or humiliation. AAA's suffering is so much that even the sound of petitioner's
motorcycle would put fear in her.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or
emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by
the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage
sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the
crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section
5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to
present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. All of this
was complied with in the case at bar.

In the face of the strong and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner Dinamling relies on a
defense of denial and alibi. On the nights of March 14 and 20, 2007, he claimed that he was
on duty at XXX Police Station. He denied seeing AAA on those dates. However, on cross
examination, he admitted that it takes only two to three minutes to go from the police station
to AAA's boarding house.

Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case, have been consistently held
as inherently weak and which, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot
prevail over the positive declarations of the victim.

Petitioner barks up the wrong tree because the fact of AAA's physical injuries from the
mauling, including her abortion, do not constitute an element of the crime with which he is
charged. Such injuries are likewise not alleged in the two informations against him.
Therefore, the testimony of Dr. Diaz or any physician as to the fact or existence of such
physical injuries is not indispensable to petitioner's conviction or acquittal. Simply put, AAA's
physical condition is not an element of the crime that petitioner was charged with, hence,
proof of the same is, strictly speaking, unnecessary.

In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence
done by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined
in Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical
violence done by the accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering;
in which case, such acts of physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical
violence was a means of causing mental or emotional suffering. In the case at bar, petitioner
Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping AAA of her pants and underwear,
although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence
since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in AAA's public ridicule and humiliation
and mental or emotional distress.

For his crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating
circumstances which increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven
with competent evidence for the penalty to be properly imposed.

AAA V. BBB – NO DIGEST

DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter,
Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise

19
to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son
in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo.Respondent remarried again a
Filipina and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also
resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the
complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the accused, he being an alien

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine
law?

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure
to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter
of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It
is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not
be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents
of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment
or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is
still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to
be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living
here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.

PP V. HIRANG

FACTS:

Jeffrey Hirang was charged with the crime of qualified trafficking in persons. Hirang intended
to sell his four victims, all minors, to his Korean customers for sexual activities. To induce
his victims to come along with him, Hirang told them that they would receive ₱5,000.00 after
a "gimik" with his Korean friends. He and his victims proceeded to meet with the Koreans at
a Chowking restaurant. Hirang instructed the girls to tell the Koreans that they were 16 years
of age, as this was their customers' preference. When their group arrived at Chowking, Hirang
talked to a Korean and then introduced the girls to him. The Korean handed money to Hirang.
The latter was subsequently arrested. He denied dealing with sexual trade.

ISSUE:

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Should Hirang be convicted with the crime of qualified trafficking in persons?

RULING:

Yes, Hirang should be convicted with the crime of qualified trafficking in persons under
R.A. No. 9208. The basic elements of trafficking in persons, as derived from Section 3, are:

(1) The act of recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons

with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;

(2) The means used which include threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another; and

(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes exploitation or the

prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

Under Section 6, the crime becomes qualified when the trafficked person is a child or when
committed in a large scale, that is, against three or more persons.

In this case, there is a recruitment and transportation of four minors for sexual activities and
exploitation, with Hirang taking advantage of their vulnerability through the guarantee of a
good time and financial gain. The crime was committed in a large scale as there were four
victims and all of them were under 18 years of age. Hirang was convicted.

PP V. CASIO

Facts:

On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM) coordinated with coordinated with the
police in order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. Several police
officers were designated then as decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to
entertain their guests. PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem St red light
district. Accused, Casio, noticed them and called their attention and offered if they’d like
some girls. After the conversation, Casio presented to the police officers two minors, AAA
and BBB. After having settled the negotiation, they went to Queensland Motel. The marked
money was handed to Casio and the two minors were brought to another room in the custody
of the representatives of IJM and DSWD.

The accused however, contends that there was no valid entrapment instead she was
instigated into committing the crime, since the police did not conduct prior surveillance and
did not even know who their subject was. She also denied being a pimp and asserted that
she was a laundrywoman. Also, AAA admitted that she worked as a prostitute thus, it was
her decision to display herself to solicit customers.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the entrapment operation conducted was valid

2. Whether or not the accused shall be liable for the crime human trafficking

Ruling:

1. Yes there was a valid entrapment and it was recognized by courts. It was the accused-
appellant who commenced the transaction with the officers by calling their attention
on whether they wanted girls and when the officers responded, it was the accused-

21
 appellant who told them to wait while she would fetch the girls for their perusal. This
shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she initiated the
transaction.

There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation
when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two
lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind
of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation,
the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who
adopts the idea and carries it into execution

2. Yes. The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when
their services were peddled to the police who acted as decoys. AAA was a child at the time
that accused peddled her services. AAA also stated that she agreed to work as a prostitute
because she needed money. Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and
as one who need money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses. Therefore, the
accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 4(a), qualified by
Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 Anti Trafficking Act.

RA 9208, SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:

(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat, or use
of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person
for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for
exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph

PP V. RODRIGUEZ

Facts: The evidence for the prosecution is anchored solely on the testimony of Police Officer
I Escober alleging that at around 11:00 P.M .PO1 Escober was at the police station preparing
for the police operation called Oplan Bugaw for the purpose of eliminating prostitution on
Quezon Avenue. PO1 Escober, designated to pose as customer, was accompanied by P02
Bereber as his backup, and P/lnsp. Lopez. While parking their vehicles at the target area, PO1
Escober was flagged down by Rodriguez who allegedly offered the sexual services of three
(3) pickup girls. PO1 Escober readily gave Rodriguez the pre-marked ₱500.00 bill as payment.
This signaled his backup to enter the scene and aid in the arrest. PO1 Escober then retrieved
the pre-marked bill. Thereafter, the officers brought Rodriguez and the three (3) pickup girls
to the police station.

In his defense, Rodriguez denied that he had offered a girl for sexual purposes to PO1
Escober.

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Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of qualified trafficking in persons.

Ruling: No. Section 3(a)29 provides the elements of trafficking in persons: (1) the
recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipts of persons with or without the
victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders; (2) the means used which
include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse
of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another; and (3) the purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

In the instant case, only PO1 Escober testified as to the actual unfolding of circumstances
which led him to believe that Rodriguez was committing human trafficking. The prosecution
did not bother to present the testimonies of the alleged victims. Their testimonies that they
were sexually exploited against their will through force, threat or other means of coercion
are material to the cause of the prosecution.

Ratio Decidendi: The gravamen of the crime of human trafficking is not so much the offer of
a woman or child; it is the act of recruiting or using, with or without consent, a fellow human
being for sexual exploitation.

Gist: This is an appeal assailing from the Decision of the CA, which affirmed appellant’s
conviction for qualified trafficking in persons, in violation of Republic Act No. 9208, otherwise
known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.

PP V. OYANIB

FACTS:

 Joint trial of two cases filed against Oyanib: (1) Crim Case No. 6012, for the killing of
Jesus Esquierdo; (2) Crim Case No. 6018, for the killing of Tita Oyanib, wife of accused.

 Manolito and Tita were married in 1979; 2 children; living in Iligan City.

 They separated de facto in 1994 due to marital differences, with Manolito keeping
custody of their children; Tita lived nearby, renting a room at the second floor of
Edgardo Lladas’ house.

 Manolito exerted efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of their children, but to no
avail. Tita was very reluctant to reconcile but instead, she was open about her
relationship with other mean and would flaunt it in front of Manolito.

 One instance, Manolito chanced upon Tita and Jesus in a very intimate situation by a
hanging bridge. He confronted them and reminded Tita that she was still his wife. They
ignored him and threatened to kill him.

 On September 4, 1995, Manolito went to the house where Tita was staying to inform
the latter of the meeting at the school re: the failing grades of their child. Upon
reaching the house, he heard kissing sounds. He opened the door using a hunting knife
and caught Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse, Jesus on top of Tita, with his
pants on his knees.

 Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek but the latter immediately stabbed the former.

 Lladas, upon hearing a commotion on the second floor of his house, went to check and
found Manolito stabbing Jesus while sitting on the latter’s stomach. Tita was sprawled
on the floor with her duster smeared with blood; she died on the way to the hospital.

23
  Jesus and Tita died of multiple stab wounds.

 Accused surrendered and admitted killing his wife and her paramour but invoked the
exceptional circumstances under Article 247, RPC.

 RTC: convicted him of Homicide and Parricide; with 2 mitigating circumstances:

passion/obfuscation and voluntary surrender.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247.
RULING:

Yes. Accused invoked Art. 247 of the RPC as an absolutory and an exempting cause.
An absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public
policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.

Art. 247 prescribes the following essential elements for such a defense, which must
be proved by the accused by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) That a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person;

(2) That he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and

(3) That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or
that he/she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.

The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply, the killing by the
husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery.

Elements:

(1) Present

(2) Present – accused surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
He was blinded by jealousy and outrage. He vented his anger on his wife when she
reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus, her paramour.

The vindication of a man’s honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife
creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with
death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as that it can only be
justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flragrante delicto; and it must be resorted
to only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the
sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. [People v. Wagas, 171 SCRA 69, 73 [1989]]

PP V. MACAL – NO DIGEST

PP V. BRUSOLA – NO DIGEST

PP V. SAN GASPAR

FACTS:

According to the Prosecution, in the afternoon of April 25, 1999, appellant, without informing
his lawfully married wife Imelda, went to Norala, South Cotabato together with his father to
attend the funeral of a relative. At that time, appellant and Imelda were not on speaking
terms for about a week already. At around 11:30 p.m. of the same day and while Imelda
and her two children Joramel and Cherme were already fast asleep, appellant returned home
and pounded on their front door. The thudding sound roused the whole household.

24
Apparently, appellant was mad because nobody immediately opened the door for him. He got
even more furious when he entered the house and saw Imelda sleeping side-by-side with her
grown-up children. Appellant thus kicked Imelda on the leg while she was still lying on the
floor and this started a heated altercation between them. Still enraged, appellant went
upstairs and returned with a shotgun. He loaded it and lit a kerosene lamp which he placed
near the door of their room. He then aimed the shotgun at his wife and in front of Joramel
and Cherme, shot Imelda on the head. Appellant thereafter immediately ran away. Imelda
was brought to the hospital where she passed away.On the other hand, according to the
Defense, appellant went to Norala, South Cotabato with his fatherto attend the funeral of a
relative. He returned home by himself at around 7:00 p.m. just to change clothes and again
returned to Norala after asking permission from Imelda. Imelda and her two children from her
previous relationship, Joramel and Cherme, were left behind in their house.It was already
around 11:00 p.m. when appellant came home. But as he pushed the door to enter their room,
he heard a gunshot from a shotgun. Since it was dark, appellant rushed downstairs to fetch
a lamp to see what had just happened. With a lit lamp, he saw Imelda lying on the
floor drenched in her own blood. Joramel and Cherme were beside her crying. Appellant thus
immediately went out of their house to look for a tricycle to transport Imelda to the hospital.
Both the RTC and the CA convicted the accused-appellant of the crim of
parricide. The accused-appellant
argues that the lower courts erred in not giving exculpatory weight to his defensethat the
shooting of Imelda was entirely accidental. He alleges that it was when he pushed the door
of their room that he heard the bursting sound of the shotgun. Clearly, therefore, the
proximate cause of the discharge of the shotgun that hit Imelda and eventually led to her
death was the movement of their bedroom door.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of parricide.

HELD: The accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of parricide.

Elements of Parricide obtaining in this case. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is
killed; (2) thedeceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate orillegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant,
or the legitimate spouse of the accused.In this case the prosecution was able to
satisfactorily establish that Imelda was shot and killed by appellant based on
the eyewitnesses’ account.

Joramel and Cherme positively and categorically identified appellant as the one who
shot and killed Imelda. Their testimonies corroborated each other on material details.
Moreover, there is no showing that Joramel and Cherme were impelled by any ill motive to
testify against appellant. It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives on the part
of the witnesses, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. Onthe other hand,
appellant only offered his bare denial of the offense. However, "the Court had consistently
stressed that denial, like alibi, is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of
positive identification of the accused by prosecution
witnesses." Anent the relationship of appellant and Imelda as legitimate husband and wife,
the CA correctly observed that the same has been sufficiently established by appellant’s
admission that Imelda was his wife andby a copy of their Marriage Certificate presented
during trial. Clearly, all the elements of the crime of Parricideunder Article 246 of the RPC
are present in this case.

Appellant’s defense of accident deserves no credence.

25
While appellant describes the prosecution’s version of events as "unnatural, implausible, and
contrary to human nature and experience," the Court finds that it is his story of accidental
discharge of the shotgun thatis incredulous and unbelievable. Contrary to what appellant
wants this Court to believe, a shotgun will not go off unless it is loaded, cocked, and its
trigger squeezed. To this Court, appellant’s allegation is nothing but a self-serving statement
without an ounce of proof or a lick of credibility.

PP V. NARAG – NO DIGEST

PP V. DULIN

 Tamayao was on Tamayao Street in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao at about 10:00

o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990 when a young man came running from the
house of Vicente Danao towards the house of Batulan, shouting that his Uncle Totoy
(Batulan) had been stabbed.

 Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s house, which was about 30 meters from his own
house, and there he saw Dulin stabbing Batulan who was already prostrate face down.
Dulin was on top of Batulan, as if kneeling with his left foot touching the ground. Dulin
was holding Batulan by the hair with his left hand, and thrusting the knife at the latter
with his right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao ran towards Batulan’s house to inform
Estelita Batulan, the victim’s wife who was his aunt, about the incident. He went home
afterwards.

 There has been a long standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of seeing them
fighting in April 1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two occasions: He will soon have
his day and I will kill him.

 Cabalza, a barangay tanod, was in his house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of
August 22, 1990 when he heard the commotion in Danao’s house which was facing his
house. It was Carolina, Danao’s daughter, screaming for help. He thus sought out a
fellow barangay tanod. O his return to the scene, he found Batulan at the door of
Danao’s house, with Dulin wielding a sharp pointed instrument, about 6-7 inches long.
Fearing for his safety, he rushed to the Barangay Hall to seek the assistance of Edwin
Cabalza and Nanding Buenaflor to bring Batulan to the Provincial Hospital in Carig,
Tuguegarao

 At the hospital, she was told that her husband had sustained two wounds in the back
and several stab wounds in the front, and was being attended to at the hospital’s
intensive care unit (ICU) before he expired.

 Defender’s Side: He was attacked first

 RTC rendered its decision convicting Dulin of murder. CA affirmed decision

RATIO DECIDENDI

Issue Ratio

W/N Dulin was in the act NO.

of self-defense
1. The CA observed that although Batulan had initiated the
attack against Dulin, the unlawful aggression from Batulan
effectively ceased once Dulin had wrested the weapon from the
latter.

2. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin, ceased to

be the

26
 aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the weapon.
Even if Batulan still went after Dulin despite the latter going
inside the house of Danao, where they again grappled for control
of the weapon, the grappling for the weapon did not amount to
aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held control of
the weapon at that point.

3. Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the

weapon – constituted retaliation against Batulan. In this regard,
retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the
aggression that the victim started already ceased when the
accused attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was
still continuing when the accused injured the aggressor. As
such, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan
to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin.

W/N Dulin’s actions may NO.

be considered as an
Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should prove the elements
incomplete form of self-
of incomplete self-defense by first credibly establishing that the
defense?
victim had committed unlawful aggression against him. With
Batulan’s aggression having already ceased from the moment
that Dulin divested Batulan of the weapon, there would not be
any incomplete self- defense. Moreover, as borne out by his
stabbing of Batulan several times, Dulin did not act in order to
defend himself or to repel any attack, but instead to inflict injury
on Batulan

RULING

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the judgment promulgated on August 26, 2005 by finding
ALFREDO

DULIN YNARAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer
the indeterminate sentence of EIGHT YEARS AND ONE DAY OF PRISION MAYOR, AS THE
MINIMUM, TO 14 YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, with full
credit of his preventive imprisonment; ORDERS him to pay to the heirs of Francisco Batulan
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on each item reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.

27