PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v. TENSUAN, 230 SCRA 413 FACTS: PBC filed a compiaint with prayer for preliminary attachment against Brinell Metal Works Corporation and Spouses Jose and Nally Ang for collection of a loan evidenced by 2 promissory notes. Court granted PBC’s prayer. On Jan 28, 1992, respondents filed motion to dismiss on the {ground that court has lack of jurisdiction aver respondents, and for improper venue (it is declared in the promissory note: IWE HEREBY EXPRESSLY SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF MANILA, ANY LEGAL ACTION WHICH MAY ARISE OUT OF THIS PROMISSORY NOTE.). Court granted motion to dismiss. PBC moved for reconsideration; stating that in view of the absence of qualifying/restrictive word in the agreement which would indicate that Manila alone is the venue agreed upon by the parties. Court denied motion for reconsideration. As provided in Section 2(b) Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. Petition for review on certiorari was filed with the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not court erred in holding that the venue was improperly laid HELD: YES. RTC decisions in dismissing complaint and denying motion for reconsideration are reversed. Section 1(c) RoC- a motion to dismiss an action may be made within the time for pleading (on the ground that venue is improperly laid. Venue relates to the place of trial or geographical location jn which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. General rule: All personal actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. By written agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another. In Polytrade Corp v Blanco in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that the Manila and Manila alone is the venue means that the parties ‘merely consented to be sued in Manila; itis merely permissive. They did not waive the right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mention in Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of RoC. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. For, to restrict venue only to that place stipulated in the agreement is a construction purely based on technicality which, on the contrary, should be liberally construed.GESMUNDO, ET AL. v. JRB REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL. 234 SCRA 413 FACTS: On April 7, 1980, JRB Realty Corporation leased a room in Blanco Suites, Pasay City to Virgilio Gesmundo and it was stated in the lease contract that: venue for all suits, whether for branch hereof or damages or any cause between the lessor and lessee and persons claiming under each, being the courts of appropriate jurisdiction in Pasay City. On March 1993, Gesmundo filed complaint for damages alleging that they received a letter terminating their lease; none of the other tenants received such similar letter. And that respondent Blanco, told Gesmundo that since JRB did not pay him his retainer's fees, he did not want them in any of his apartment units. Gesmundo sent a letter asking for reconsideration of the termination of their lease. JRB sent a letter to Gesmundo with their statement of accounts, and reiterating that their lease had been terminated. They were forced to vacate the premises and leased another apartment. Petitioners prayed for P33,500 as actual damages and compensatory damages, P1,000,000 as moral damages and P50,000 as attorney's fees and costs. Respondents moved to dismiss the case on the ground that venue was improperly laid in the RTC of Makati. Court dismissed action on the ground of improper venue; and denied their motion for reconsideration. Petition for review on certiorari was filed with the SC. ISSUE: Whether venue was properly laid in the RTC of Makati HELD: NO. It is clear that the parties intended to limit to the "courts of appropriate jurisdiction of Pasay City” the venue of all suits between the lessor and lessee and those between parties claiming Under them. This means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided for in Rule 4, sec. 2(b). This is different from Polytrade Corp v Blanco. Rule 4 Sec 3 - Venue by agreement. — By written agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another. Gesmundo's wife and Blanco's (President of the Realty) inclusion in the case is, hot necessary. It is also notes that the stipulation applies not only to the parties to the contract but also to “any persons claiming under each.” Their ultimate cause of action is anchored on their right Under the lease contract; therefore, they cannot avoid the limitation as to the venue in that contract.BPI v.1AC 206 SCRA 408 FACTS: Spouses Arthur and Vivienne Canlas opened a joint current account on April 25, 1977 in the ‘Quezon City Branch of the Commercial Bank and Trust Company of the Philipines (CBTC) with an initial deposit of P2,250. Arthur already had an existing and separate personal checking account in the same branch. The teller mistakenly placed the account number of Arthur's separate checking ‘account for the inital deposit of the joint account. The spouses subsequently deposited other ‘amounts in their joint account. When Vivienne issued 2 checks in 1977, one of the checks was dishonored for insufficient funds and a charge of P20 was deducted ffom the account in both instances. The bank tried to contact the spouses but the spouses actually resided in Porac, Pampanga. The city address and tel no. they gave the bank belonged to Vivienne’s parents. On December 15, 1977, the spouses files a complaint against CBTC in CFI Pampanga. CBTC fled ‘motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. Motion was denied. During pendency of the ‘case, BPI and CBTC merged. BPI took over the prosecution and defense of any pending claims, ‘actions or proceedings by and against CBTC. On May 5, 1981, RTC Pampanga rendered a decision ‘against BPI sentencing BPI to pay actual,moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs. (On appeal, the IAC deleted the actual damages, and reduced the other awards, Petitioners filed motion for review with SC. Issues: (1) Whether venue was properly laid at Pampanga (2) Whether petitioner was in gross negligence in the handling of respondents’ bank account () Whether respondents are entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attomay's fees. neo: (DYES, There was ample proof hat the spouses resided in Porac, Pampange. The cy adress Of Mrs Canes" patents wes placed thre 2s suggested by the tater No waiver of the provinial residence for deterring tne verue ofan action against he bank may be fered from he “misepresertavon’ of ther re residence (2)YES, The mistake commited by the teller constutes serous negligence. cannot absolve BPI rom abity for damages fo respondents even on the sssumpion cf honest mistake because ofthe mbarassinetitean cause tos dopostos, (@)¥ES. Stor iteratonal VGA - 28a business afeted wih public infrest and because of he nature offs functions the bank is under obligation fo treat the accounts ofits depostors wh tmaticubus cor, avays having in mind the fiduciary nature of ther relabonshp. I caused Sorous anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation tthe private respondents for which they afe ented to recover reasonable moral damages (Amercan Express Inlernaona, Inc. vs [AG ‘87 SCRA 209), The award of reasonable atfomey’s fee s proper forthe private responcents were compel to ligate fo protect tne inferest (At. 2208, Chi Gove). However, the stvence of malice and bad fet renders the awerd of exemplary damages improper {Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778), me eS