CASE DOCTRINES:

Knights of Rizal v. DMCI (Preliminary Injunction)

Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent further injury until final
adjudication on the merits of the case. In the present case, since the legal rights of the Knights
of Rizal are not well-defined, clear and certain, the petition for Mandamus must be dismissed
and the TRO lifted.

Wack-Wack Gold and Country Club v. Won (Interpleader)

It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy of interpleader
was invoked by it. By then it was too late because to be entitled to this remedy, the applicant
must be able to show that he has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants.
And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present
interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing.

NOTE: Interpleader is a compulsory counterclaim.

Eternal Gardens v. IAC (Interpleader)

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from the
disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of
the property or funds in controversy with the court. it is a rule founded on justice and equity:
"that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during
the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled
thereto."

Department of Finance v. De La Cruz (Declaratory Relief)

The doctrine [of exhaustion of administrative remedies], however, is not without exceptions.
Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (4) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the
rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (6) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(7) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (8) where
the controverted acts violate due process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies had been rendered moot; (10) where there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest is involved; and (12) in quo warranto
proceedings.

In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-2013 is contrary to law and unconstitutional.
Respondents assail CPO 189-2013 as patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive. This case clearly
falls within the exceptions where exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be resorted
to by respondents.

Note: In the case at bar, the jurisdiction to try and decide petition for declaratory relief is with
the RTC

Cudia v. Superintendent (Mandamus)

For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is
ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
[the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform
the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer
has the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.

Villanueva v. JBC (Mandamus)

The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. The
petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not
included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his non-
inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.

It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform
the act required. The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right
to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the
respondent to perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Clearly, the use of
discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.

Lokin Jr. v COMELEC (Quo Warranto)

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible
person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the
action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because
the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.

Republic v. Sereno (Quo Warranto)

On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable officer such that a quo warranto petition
cannot prosper, the Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo
warranto are materially different. While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the
ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic,
impeachment proceedings are political in nature; while an action for quo warranto is judicial or
a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.

Furthermore, there is no forum-shopping, as alleged by the Respondent, because quo warranto

and impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously, as they differ as to (1)
jurisdiction (2)grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4)
limitations. The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo
warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising
of a public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense.
Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Respondent in a quo warranto
proceeding shall be ordered to cease holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold.
On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result in the removal of the Respondent
from the public office that he/she is legally holding.

Furthermore, the impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case
against the Respondent.

The proceedings in the House are merely in the nature of a preliminary investigation whereby
probable cause is sought to be determined.

Sereno Case Salient Points:

Remedial principles attacked/ amended

a. Prescription does not lie against the state

The one-year limitation is not applicable when the Petitioner is not a mere private individual
pursuing a private interest, but the government itself seeking relief for a public wrong and suing
for public interest. In the three instances enumerated by Rules of Court, the Solicitor General is
mandated under the Rules to commence the necessary quo warranto petition, as seen in the
use of the word “must.” In Agcaoili v. Suguitan, “As a general principle it may be stated that
ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding
brought to enforce a public right.” In effect, when the government is the real party in interest,
and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or
prescription.
b. Comparative with impeachment

On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable officer such that a quo warranto petition
cannot prosper, the Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo
warranto are materially different. While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the
ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic,
impeachment proceedings are political in nature; while an action for quo warranto is judicial or
a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts. Furthermore, there is no forum-shopping, as
alleged by the Respondent, because quo warranto and impeachment can proceed
independently and simultaneously, as they differ as to (1) jurisdiction (2)grounds, (3) applicable
rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Thecauses of action in the
two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the
usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office, while inimpeachment,
it is the commission of an impeachable offense. Likewise, the reliefs sought in the
twoproceedings are different. Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be ordered to
cease holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in
impeachment, a conviction shall result in the removal of the Respondent from the public office
that he/she is legally holding. Furthermore, the impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the
filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no
pending impeachment case against the Respondent. The proceedings in the House are merely
in the nature of a preliminary investigation whereby probable cause is sought to be
determined.

Remedial principles upheld

a. Heirarchy of courts

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this
case is justified considering that the qualification of a Member of the Court is in question, and
the issue is of public concern

b. Principle of transcendental importance

The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental importance. The instant petition is one of
first impression and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that the qualification,
eligibility and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary,
are being scrutinized through an action for quo warranto.

c. Venue

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over
petitions for quo warranto. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the venue for
an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when commenced by the Solicitor
General.

De La Cruz v. Hermano (Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer)

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in actions for forcible entry, it must be
alleged that the complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed anytime within one year
from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place. This requirement implies that
in those cases, possession of the land by the defendant has been unlawful from the beginning,
as the possession was obtained by unlawful means. Further, the complainant must allege and
prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he or she was deprived thereof
by the defendant. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry into the land, except when entry was made
through stealth; if so, the one-year period would be counted from the time the plaintiff learned
about it.

It is not necessary, however, for the complaint to utilize the language of the statute; i.e., to
state that the person has been deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. A statement of facts showing that dispossession took place under those conditions is
sufficient. Still, the complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol evidence.

The allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Complaint adequately aver prior physical
possession by respondents and their dispossession thereof by stealth, because the intrusion by
petitioner was without their knowledge and consent. The Court thus agrees with the findings of
the CA that contrary to those of the RTC that the case was an action for ejectment in the nature
of accion reivindicatoria, the case was actually for forcible entry and sufficient in form.

Likewise, the Court agrees with the CA’s findings that the Complaint was timely filed. It is
settled that where forcible entry occurred clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period
should be counted from the time the person who was deprived of possession demanded that
the deforciant desist from dispossession when the former learned about it. The owners or
possessors of the land cannot be expected to enforce their right to its possession against the
illegal occupant and sue the latter before learning of the clandestine intrusion. And to deprive
lawful possessors of the benefit of the summary action under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules,
simply because the stealthy intruder managed to conceal the trespass for more than a year,
would be to reward clandestine usurpations even if they are unlawful.
Erorita v. Dumlao (Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer)

To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant
lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b) the plaintiff
notified the defendant that his right of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in
possession and deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within
one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property. A complaint for accion
publiciana or recovery of possession of real property will not be considered as an action for
unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts is omitted.

A review of the complaint shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to allow the
petitioners to continue operating the school on the disputed property; (b) in a demand letter
dated February 12, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao told the petitioners to pay and/or vacate the
property; (c) the respondents refused to vacate the property; and (d) the Spouses Dumlao filed
the complaint (March 4, 2004) within a year from the last demand to vacate (February 12,
2004).

Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations contain
the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful
detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property’s assessed value.

Sison v. Caoibes (Contempt)

The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an
inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the
dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice
from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with
court orders.

At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in holding the complainant
for contempt, due to the latter’s refusal to comply with the judge’s Order of September 15,
1999. However, it is not lost upon this Court that the complainant was not a party to any of the
cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the contempt charge was, in fact,
the traffic violation incident involving the respondent judge’s son. Furthermore, the record
shows that when the complainant filed his reply to the charge as required by the respondent
judge, the same was refused by some staff member in the latter’s sala.

We agree with the Investigating Justice when he opined that the respondent judge should have
refrained from ordering the arrest and detention of the complainant, since the incident
involved his own son, and the matter was very personal to him. The fact that the respondent
judge insisted that the complainant personally file his comment in court gives rise to doubts as
to the motive behind it; as the Investigating Justice puts it, the requirement of personal filing
was deliberately inserted so that the respondent could confront and harass the complainant.
The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which smacks of
retaliation, as in the case at bar, is appalling and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which mandates that "a judge should so behave at all times to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."

Balindong v. CA (Contempt)

Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is to be exercised cautiously, sparingly,
and judiciously. Self-restraint in wielding contempt powers should be the rule unless the act
complained of is clearly contumacious. An act, to be contumacious, must manifest willfulness,
bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.

It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby disobey the decisions of the Court in G.R. No. 159962
and G.R. No. 173290. To start with, there was no indication in his Order that bad faith had
moved him to suspend the implementation of the warrants of arrest against Balindong, et al.,
or that he had thereby acted with a willful and deliberate intent to disobey or to ignore the
Court's bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the parties. In the absence of the clear showing
of bad faith on his part, his being prudent could only be an error of judgment, for which he
could not be held to account.

Oropesa v. Oropesa (Guardianship)

Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of
evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real
properties registered in his, his father’s and his sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations,
and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not
in any way relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only
medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological Screening"
which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor
offered as evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best,
for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of
respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average
was indeed competent.

In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at
issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion
is not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence
establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice."

The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo
O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own
affairs. On the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report
which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that
were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem
situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning,
except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation
of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.

Nery v. Sampana (Adoption and Custody of Minors)

Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for
adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien
adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption could be possible. Under
the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly
adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse,
and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.

Bartolome v. SSS (Adoption and Custody of Minors)

True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed,
aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years
after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under
such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the
biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who
was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is
not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the
parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned. The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to
fend for himself at such a tender age.

Tujan-Militante v. Cada-Deapera (Habeas Corpus)

The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan
and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig,
Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela. (emphasis ours)

In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is
proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region,
as here.

In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since
Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the
RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the
former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.

Datukan Malang Saliba v. The Warden (Habeas Corpus)

It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived
of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has
become legal, and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.

Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was
not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his
liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Silverio v. Republic (Change of Name/ Correction of Entries)

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female"
as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws)
should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a female" or "the distinction between male and
female." Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" and male is "the sex that has
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." Thus, the words "male" and "female" in
everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary." Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s
and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something
alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual
to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction
or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Republic v. Cagandahan (Change of Name/ Correction of Entries)

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been
suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those
individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’." The current state of Philippine
statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this
Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such
rigid classification.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life
to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking
lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He
chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to
reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become
or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to
take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy.
To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"
and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as
valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and
thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name
is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change
of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his
preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform
with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

Almojuela v. Republic (Change of Name/ Correction of Entries)

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of substantial changes
in the civil registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding.

In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead both the Local Civil
Registrar and his half-siblings. Although he claims that his half-siblings have acknowledged and
accepted him, the procedural rules nonetheless mandate compliance with the requirements in
the interest of fair play and due process and to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect his interest if he so chooses.

Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has allowed the subsequent
publication of a notice of hearing to cure the petition's lack/failure to implead and notify the
affected or interested parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made by petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties; (b) the parties themselves initiated the
corrections proceedings; (c) there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the
interested parties; or, (d) when a party is inadvertently left out, these exceptions are,
unfortunately, unavailing in this case.

In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and
controversial alterations renders the entire proceedings therein null and void.

Gan v. Republic (Change of Name/ Correction of Entries)

In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was born
out of wedlock; she did not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which would make her a natural child
pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner's·birth, either of her
parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the surname of her mother
pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname of her father
provided that she was acknowledged by her father.

However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed was
duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner's evidence consisted only of her birth
certificate signed by her mother, school records, employment records, marriage contract,
certificate of baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming that she is a natural child
pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still not insist on using her father's surname.
It was, thus, a blatant error on the part of the RTC to have allowed the petitioner to change her
name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan."

Caram v. Segui (Prerogative Writs)

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced
separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance"
within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent
DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of
the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of
the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in
her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian
before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore,
no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since
it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College (Prerogative Writs)

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering
the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the
said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough,
however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the
students who showed the images to Escudero.

Razon v. Tagitis (Prerogative Writs)

The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading,
the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting
the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light
of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the
petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or
who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision
that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token
gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details
available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing
a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action.
The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated
component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the
State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or
security – are present.

Roxas v. GMA (Prerogative Writs)

Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce
substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and
torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the
government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in
an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by
law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main
source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case.
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard—requiring the
"respondent who is a public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance
of duty." Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction
of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they
cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that
effect.

With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was
not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.

Note: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive
to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing
the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;
or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.

Meralco v. Lim (Prerogative Writs)

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under
prevailing Rules.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life,
liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports
allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to
privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all."

Lee v. Ilagan (Prerogative Writs)

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction
and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest
in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be
uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between
such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot
speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s
privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so
much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as
in this case.

In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be
dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that
Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets
the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because
nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards
the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on
record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in
order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s
reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she
reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal
and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the
allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to
reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.

Arigo v. Swift (Prerogative Writs)

We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot
in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been
accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to
Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture and marine habitat
adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these
reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef.
However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed
readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused by the
USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists
and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.

Paje v. Casino (Prerogative Writs)

As earlier noted, the writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or threatened

violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves
environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries. A
party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance
of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a
causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the
issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise,
the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with
due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This must be so if we are
to preserve the noble and laudable purposes of the writ against those who seek to abuse it.

An example of a defect or an irregularity in the issuance of an ECC, which could conceivably

warrant the granting of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of kalikasan, is a case where there
are serious and substantial misrepresentations or fraud in the application for the ECC, which, if
not immediately nullified, would cause actual negative environmental impacts of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules, because the government agencies and LGUs, with
the final authority to implement the project, may subsequently rely on such substantially
defective or fraudulent ECC in approving the implementation of the project.

To repeat, in cases of defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC, it is not sufficient to

merely allege such defects or irregularities, but to show a causal link or reasonable connection
with the environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. In the case at
bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to the
aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities
in the issuance of the ECC. This would have been sufficient reason to disallow the resolution of
such issues in a writ of kalikasan case.

Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes (Prerogative Writs)

In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits for others.
Uninterested persons will argue for the persons they represent, and the court will decide based
on their evidence and arguments. Any decision by the court will be binding upon the
beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the future generations. The court's decision
will be res judicata upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented.

The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its
potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of
"real party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a
judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern
rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what
their concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be
any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of
guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably
cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded arguments" on behalf of those they represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However, they should be
considered carefully so that no unintended or unwarranted consequences should follow. I
concur with the approach of Madame Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant
ponencia as it carefully narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident Marine
Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to file any kind of petition.

West Tower Condominium v. First Philippine Industrial Corporation (Prerogative Writs)

The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human
activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot
be established with full scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an
issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the WOPL, which is the
issue in the case at bar, is different from determining whether the spillage of hazardous
materials into the surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human health or
that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to
the environment and to the residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.