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METROHEIGHTS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. CMS
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TOMASITO T. CRUZ, TITA F.
CRUZ, SIMONETTE F. CRUZ, ANGEL T. CRUZ, ERNESTO T. CRUZ AND
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS), Respondents.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and the Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dated October 10, 2012 and September 30, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
89085.
On June 29, 1992, petitioner Metroheights Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc. filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)3 of Quezon City a complaint4 for damages with prayer
for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents CMS Construction and Development
Corporation (CMS Construction), Tomasito Cruz, Tita Cruz, Simonette Cruz, Angel Cruz,
Ernesto Cruz (the Cruzes), and Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS).
Petitioner alleged, among others, that it sought the assistance of respondent MWSS to
address the insufficient supply of water in its subdivision to which the latter advised the
improvement and upgrading of its private internal water distribution lines, foremost of
which was the transfer or change in the location of its tapping source and the change in
size of its water service line from the old line tapped at Sanville Subdivision to a new
tapping source on Visayas Avenue, Quezon City; that on November 16, 1990, petitioner
entered into a contract with respondent MWSS for the new water service connection, and
respondent MWSS awarded the project to a contractor which implemented the same, the
cost of which was solely shouldered by contribution from petitioner's members amounting
to P190,000.00, inclusive of labor, materials, and respondent MWSS' fees and charges; and
that since then, there was already sufficient and strong water pressure twenty-four (24)
hours a day in the petitioner's subdivision.
However, sometime in April 1992, respondent CMS Construction made diggings and
excavations, and started to lay water pipes along Fisheries Street and Morning Star Drive in
Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City, petitioner's neighboring subdivision; that in the process,
respondent CMS Construction, with the knowledge and consent of respondent MWSS but
without petitioner's knowledge and consent, unilaterally cut-off and disconnected the
latter's new and separate water service connection on Visayas Avenue; that on May 28,
1992, petitioner's members were waterless, which lasted for three (3) days, and that
petitioner's polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipes and radius elbow, valued at around P30,000.00,
were stolen by respondent CMS Construction's workers; that when petitioner's officers
discovered the illegal cutting of the water connection on May 30, 1992, they immediately
complained to the respondents and demanded for the restoration of their water line; that
respondent CMS Construction only made a temporary reconnection with the use of a 2-inch
rubber hose to the new water line it constructed at Sanville Subdivision; and that despite
petitioner's verbal and written demands, respondents have failed to restore petitioner's
water line connection in its original state and to return the missing PVC pipes and radius
elbow.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent MWSS averred, among others, that on August
16, 1991, it entered into a contract with respondent CMS Construction for the mainlaying
and rehabilitation of the existing water main and appurtenances, and the
installation/replacement of water service connection at Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City;
that in connection with the said undertaking, it necessitated the creek crossing of a 150
mm cast iron pipe to be placed alongside the bridge situated along Morning Star Drive in
Quezon City; that alongside the said bridge, there existed two pipes with casings, one of
which was owned by petitioner; that it designed the placing of the 150 mm cast iron pipe
alongside the above-stated bridge and the design included the interconnection of the two
existing pipes; that the aforementioned interconnection features the use of split tap tees,
one of which was for the 100 mm pipe allegedly owned by petitioner; and that the
infrastructure project aimed to improve the water pressure of eight (8) subdivisions in
Tandang Sora which included Metroheights Subdivision.
On the other hand, respondents CMS Construction and the Cruzes claimed that they were
awarded by respondent MWSS a contract for the latter's Manila Water Supply Rehabilitation
Project II, covering the Tandang Sora area, to provide an improved and equitable water
distribution to eight (8) subdivisions located therein; that its proposed working drawings
had been reviewed and approved by respondent MWSS; that it is not true that it started
laying water pipes along the Morning Star Drive water pipeline by unilaterally cutting off
and disconnecting petitioner's existing water pipeline measuring 100-mm (4-inches) in
diameter along the said creek as the same was replaced with a PVC water pipe measuring
150-mm in diameter; that the alleged cutting off, disconnection and replacement of
petitioner's pipeline bigger in diameter took only three to four hours, and the resumption of
the water flow after replacement could not have rendered the homeowners waterless for
three (3) days; and that the officers and engineers of petitioner were previously consulted
on the rehabilitation project.
On March 30, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision,5 the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
Defendants are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum of:
1. P190,000.00 as and by way of actual damages;
2. P100,000.00 as and by way of nominal damages;
3. P100,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages;
4. P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
5. The costs of this [s]uit.
The RTC found, among others, that respondents did not have the authority to simply cut,
disconnect and transfer petitioner's water supply with impunity, without notice to or
without getting its consent; and that respondents acted in concert and in bad faith, which
made them jointly and severally liable for damages.
Respondent MWSS filed its notice of appeal while respondents CMS Construction and the
Cruzes filed a motion for new trial which the RTC granted.
On May 18, 2006, the RTC issued a Decision 7 which affirmed its earlier Decision dated
March 30, 1999.
The RTC found that respondents' claim of damnum absque injuria was not tenable. Under
the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a person's right, even if
it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury and the law
does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. However, this principle admits of exception as
when there is an abuse of a person's right. The exercise of one's right should be done in a
manner that will not cause injustice to another. Since water is a basic necessity, the lack
thereof not only caused inconvenience but posed health concerns as well. Notice to
petitioner of the interruption of the water supply should have been made prior to the
implementation of the project. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Respondents filed their appeal with the CA. On October 10, 2012, the CA issued its assailed
decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 18, 2006, as well as
the Decision dated March 30, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint below is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The CA found that the respondents' rehabilitation project was not undertaken
without any notice at all; that respondents' actions were merely consequential to the
exercise of their rights and obligations to manage and maintain the water supply system,
an exercise which includes water rehabilitation and improvement within the area, pursuant
to a prior agreement for the water supply system; and that the alleged abuse of right was
not sufficiently established.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
September 30, 2013.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in finding that there was prior notice
upon the petitioner of the rehabilitation project before it was undertaken by the
respondents;
II. Whether or not the court of appeals cannot be held liable under article 19 of the
civil code;
III. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in finding that the abuse of right of the
respondents was not sufficiently established;
IV. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in dismissing the complaint and
absolving respondents of any civil liability in favor of the petitioner.
The issue for resolution is whether the respondents should be held liable for damages for
the cutting off, disconnection and transfer of petitioner's existing separate water service
connection on Visayas Avenue without the latter's knowledge and consent which also
resulted in petitioner's subdivision being waterless.
To begin with, to address the perennial problem of insufficient supply of water in
Metroheights Subdivision, petitioner had filed its application for transfer location of
tapping/change size of the water service connection on Visayas Avenue with respondent
MWSS, which the latter approved and implemented; thus, petitioner had uninterrupted
water supply. On August 16, 1991, respondent MWSS entered into a contract with
respondent CMS Construction for the mainlaying and rehabilitation of existing water main
and appurtenances, and the installation/replacement of water service connection at
Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City. In the process, petitioner's existing water service
connection on Visayas Avenue was cut-off, disconnected and transferred by respondents,
and petitioner's homeowners experienced loss of water supply for three (3) days.
The RTC found respondents liable for damages on the basis of abuse of right under Article
19 of the New Civil Code, giving credence to petitioner's claim that there was no notice to
it prior to the implementation of respondents' project. The CA reversed the RTC and found
that there was no abuse of right committed by the respondents, as the project was not
undertaken without notice to petitioner.
We reverse the CA. Article 19 of the New Civil Code deals with the principle of abuse of
rights, thus:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
"The principle of abuse of rights x x x departs from the classical theory that 'he who uses a
right injures no one.' The modern tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional
theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights,
even when the act is not illicit."10
"Article 19 [of the New Civil Code] was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide[,] specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in
one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason
should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to abuse
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of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of the law, together with an
absence of all information or belief of fact which would render the transaction
unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as understood by men of
affairs."11
"While Article 19 [of the New Civil Code] may have been intended as a mere declaration of
principle, the 'cardinal law on human conduct' expressed in said article has given rise to
certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or
unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good
faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are:
(1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another."
Here, it was admitted by Engr. Victor Cariaga,13 an MWSS consultant, and Mr. Tomasito
Cruz,respondent CMS Construction's President, that petitioner has its own pipeline or
source of water coming from Visayas Avenue. Respondents also admitted that because of
the rehabilitation project they were undertaking, petitioner's water pipeline, measuring 100
mm in diameter along the side of the creek, was replaced with a PVC plastic pipe 150 mm
in diameter; and that petitioner's water line had to be transferred, and in the process of
transferring, petitioner's existing water line had to be cut off. Considering that respondents
would disconnect and change petitioner's existing water line tapped from Visayas Avenue
to another tapping source, good faith and prudence dictate that petitioner should be
informed or notified of such actions, as respondents admitted that prior notice to affected
areas is a standard operating procedure. More so, petitioner's members had spent their
own money to pay for their existing water connection on Visayas Avenue to address the
perennial problem of the lack of water supply in their area.
The CA found that the rehabilitation project was not undertaken without notice to
petitioner, which was contrary to the RTC's finding that there was no notice given to
petitioner. The matter of whether there was notice to petitioner is factual. It is elementary
that a question of fact is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The parties may raise only questions of law because the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts. However, we may review the findings of fact by the CA when
they are contrary to those of the trial court, as in this case. 15
In finding that there was notice given by the respondents to petitioner, the CA relied on the
testimonies of Tomasito Cruz, President of respondent CMS Construction, that prior to the
actual implementation of the project, permissions from the Office of the City Engineer and
the affected homeowners' associations were sought; and that of Engr. Victor Cariaga,
consultant of respondent MWSS, saying that it is an operating procedure to give letters to
the homeowners, as well as to the barangays affected, notifying them of the objective of
the project and The alleged meetings, claimed by Tomasito Cruz to have taken place to
show that petitioner had already been notified of the rehabilitation project, were not
substantiated at all. Even Engr. Cariaga's assertion that it is an operating procedure to give
letters to the homeowners, as well as the barangays affected, regarding the objective of
the project and calling for meetings was not also established by any documentary
evidence. It is, therefore, established that there was no notice, not even a generalized
notice, given by respondents to petitioner regarding the rehabilitation project.
In Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held: What is peculiar in the stand of
Defendant is that while it would insist on the giving of notices and warnings, it did not have
any competent and sufficient evidence to prove the same. Demands in open were made by
Plaintiff counsel whether Defendant could show any written evidence showing that notices
and warnings were sent to Plaintiff. Not a single piece of evidence was produced. Normally,

if a notice is refused, then the original and its copies would still be in the hands of the
public utility concerned. In the instant case, it has to be repeated, not a single copy,
original or duplicate, triplicate, etc. of any notice to pay or warning of disconnection was
produced in court. The court cannot believe that Defendant, as what the testimonies of its
witnesses would like to impress upon this Court, conducts its business that way. Defendant
is a big business concern and it cannot be said that it treats its business as a joke. Its
personnel should realize this, for only with such an awareness can they respond faithfully
to their responsibilities as members of a big business enterprise imbued with public
interest over which the Philippine Government is concerned.
In fact, it was only after petitioner's officer investigated the reason behind the loss
of water supply in their subdivision that it was learned that their existing line was cut-off
and transferred by respondents. Also, it was only when petitioner's officer went to the
office of respondent CMS Construction and complained about the loss of water supply in
their subdivision that petitioner's homeowners' water line was temporarily reconnected
with a 2-inch rubber hose. The testimony of respondent CMS Construction's President
revealed this matter on cross-examination.
Clearly, had petitioner's officer not complained about the water service interruption
in their subdivision and the rubber hose connection was not made to temporarily fix
petitioner's concern, petitioner's homeowners would have continuously suffered loss of
water service.
Notably, respondents admitted in their respective Comments that the inconvenience of the
temporary stoppage of water supply in petitioner's area was highly inevitable in the
process of changing petitioner's water pipe size crossing the bridge up to Visayas Avenue
where the tapping source is connected. Notwithstanding, respondents proceeded with the
cutting off and disconnection of petitioner's water connection without the latter's consent
and notification thereby causing prejudice or injury to the petitioner's members because of
the unexpected water loss for three (3) days. Respondents' actions were done in total
disregard of the standards set by Article 19 of the New Civil Code which entitles petitioner
to damages.
In MWSS v. Act Theater, Inc.,20 we held that petitioner's act of cutting off respondents'
water service connection without prior notice was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the
latter, justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the New Civil Code, thus:
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms (set under Art. 19)
resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held
accountable. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the respondent
what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondent's water
service connection. As correctly found by the appellate court:
While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to plaintiff-appellee prior to
the disconnection of the latter's water services, this was done only a few hours before the
actual disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the matter, Act
sent its assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the MWSS office but he was treated
badly on the flimsy excuse that he had no authority to represent Act. Act's water services
were cut at midnight of the day following the apprehension of the employees. Clearly, the
plaintiff-appellee was denied due process when it was deprived of the water services. As a
consequence thereof, Act had to contract another source to provide water for a number of
days. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit with MWSS the sum of P200,000.00
for the restoration of their water services.21
We do not agree with the CA's finding that respondents' actions were merely consequential
to the exercise of their rights and obligations to manage and maintain the water supply
system. "Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to
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be exercised."22 Article 19 of the New Civil Code sets the standard in the exercise of one's
rights and in the performance of one's duties, i.e., he must act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith. "The exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The
mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modem
concept of social law."23 Here it was established, as shown by the above discussions, that
respondents indeed abused their right.
We find that respondents MWSS and CMS Construction should be held liable for damages
to petitioner but not the Cruzes who are the directors and stockholders of respondent CMS
Construction. Section 31 of the Corporation Code is the governing law on personal liability
of officers for the debts of the corporation, to wit:
Sec. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. — Directors or trustees who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty
of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any
personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall
be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.
We find that petitioner failed to show that the Cruzes committed any of those above-
quoted acts to make them personally liable.
Petitioner is entitled to the award of actual damages. Petitioner alleged that it had spent
P190,000.00 for the transfer location of tapping/change size of the water service
connection, which was unilaterally cut off, disconnected and transferred by respondents.
However, only the amount of P161,541.85 was duly proved by the checks, which petitioner
had paid to their contractor, thus, such amount should be awarded. "Actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved, and proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty."
Petitioner is also entitled to the award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00. Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good. We also award the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees as petitioner was
compelled to litigate to protect its interest by reason of the unjustified act of respondents.
We find no basis to award nominal damages since there is an award of actual damages.
"Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages." 25
Finally, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is
imposed on the monetary awards computed from the finality of this Decision until full
payment.26
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated
October 10, 2012 and the Resolution dated September 30, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 89085 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decisions, dated March
30, 1999 and May 18, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, of Quezon City are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Thus, as modified, the Decision dated March 30, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court is as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
Metroheights Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc. Defendants Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System and CMS Construction and Development Corporation
are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum of:
(a) P161,541.85 as and by way of actual damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages;
(c) P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
(d) The costs of this suit.

All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA
CRISTINA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C.
MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH
181, respondents.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8,
1994 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of
way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R.
Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during
the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and
children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated
at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to
acquire said property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora
Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to be
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos
Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiffs property, the row of
houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of
Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of
defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit D). As an access to P. Burgos
Street from plaintiffs property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway
is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasas residence
to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of
houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff
Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said
passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in
length has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises
and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in
February, 1982. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa
went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first
passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by
defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway.
Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a
way that the entire passageway was enclosed (Exhibit 1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. D
for plaintiff, Exhs. 1-C, 1-D and I -E) And it was then that the remaining tenants of said
apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed
said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle
pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. She
also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway
such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows.
4
Some of their footwear were even lost. x x x[3] (Italics in original text; corrections in
parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive
part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access - ingress
and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight
Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private
respondents, went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the
lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier
stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court
with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The
Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five
Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral
Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the
appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[6]
Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or
not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper, and whether or not
the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the
same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private
respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners,
the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners
cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial
court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer
be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may
not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in
the decision of the lower court.The appellee can only advance any argument that he may
deem necessary to defeat the appellants claim or to uphold the decision that is being
disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views
expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the
appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the
purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellees favor and giving him other
affirmative reliefs.
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages
has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show
that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico
Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the
leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.

However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action
for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause
of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a
breach or wrong.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria. in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach
of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff
and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there
must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability
merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering)
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause
damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that
act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may
happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person
or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law
does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to
the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the
principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21
of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The
defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and
fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that (e)very owner may enclose
or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any
other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any
servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either
by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said
passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right
of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which
gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the
5
compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the
exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and
their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in
the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have
been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by
petitioners is damnum absque injuria.
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according
to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general
rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own
property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or
an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When
the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the
property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can
complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be
considered as a mere consequence of community life.
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an
action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has
been invaded One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though
the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latters
favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can
give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to
achieve a lawful end by lawful means.
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of
the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE T.
CALDERON, respondent.
Thru this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC), seeks the reversal and setting aside of
the decision dated November 25, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
60016, which partially affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Makati
City, Branch 61, insofar as it grants moral damages and costs of suit to herein
respondent, Jose T. Calderon.
The decision under review recites the factual background of the case, as follows:
Plaintiff-appellee [now respondent] Jose T. Calderon (Calderon for brevity), is a
businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad, either in his capacity
as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. In addition thereto, he is a stockholder of
PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who
travels at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, the
defendant-appellant [now petitioner] Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC for brevity), is
one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in

commercial banking, such as acceptance of deposits, extension of loans and credit card
facilities, among others.
Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International
Visa card (Visa card for brevity). The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar
transactions within and outside the Philippines. The credit limit for the peso transaction is
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS; while in the dollar transactions, Calderon is
required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of
dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.
In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates,
went to Hongkong for business and pleasure trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon
accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store located at the
basement of the Peninsula Hotel (Hongkong). There and then, Calderon purchased several
Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total purchase
amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in
cash, he used his Visa card (No. 4921 6400 0001 9373) to effect payment thereof on
credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady who promptly referred
it to the store cashier for verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of
his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his
Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card
from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into
pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.
Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon
paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that he bought.
Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and
embarrassment on account of EBCs wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit
card while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon filed with the Regional Trial Court at
Makati City a complaint for damages against EBC.
In its Answer, EBC denied any liability to Calderon, alleging that the latters credit card
privileges for dollar transactions were earlier placed under suspension on account of
Calderons prior use of the same card in excess of his credit limit, adding that Calderon
failed to settle said prior credit purchase on due date, thereby causing his obligation to
become past due. Corollarily, EBC asserts that Calderon also failed to maintain the required
minimum deposit of $3,000.00.
To expedite the direct examination of witnesses, the trial court required the parties to
submit affidavits, in question-and-answer form, of their respective witnesses, to be sworn
to in court, with cross examination to be made in open court.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 10, 1997, the trial court, concluding that
defendant bank was negligent if not in bad faith, in suspending, or blacklisting plaintiffs
credit card without notice or basis, rendered judgment in favor of Calderon, thus:
WHEREFORE PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as against defendant EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, which is hereby
ORDERED to pay plaintiff as follows:
1. the sum of US$150.00 as actual damages;
2. the sum of P200,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;
3. the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. the sum of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P500.00 per court hearing and
5. costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, EBC went to the Court of Appeals (CA), whereat its recourse was docketed
as CA G.R. CV No. 60016.
6
After due proceedings, the CA, in a decision dated November 25, 2002, affirmed
that of the trial court but only insofar as the awards of moral damages, the amount of
which was even reduced, and the costs of suits are concerned. More specifically, the CA
decision dispositively reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the decision of the court a
quo dated 10 October 1997 is AFFIRMED insofar as the awards of moral damages and
costs of suit are concerned. However, anent the award of moral damages, the same is
reduced to One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos.
The rest of the awards are deleted.SO ORDERED.
Evidently unwilling to accept a judgment short of complete exemption from any
liability to Calderon, EBC is now with us via the instant petition on its lone submission that
the court of appeals erred in holding that the respondent is entitled to moral
damages notwithstanding its finding that petitioners actions have not been
attended with any malice or bad faith.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury. However, to be entitled to the award thereof, it is not enough that one
merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the
actuations of the other party. In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, we have had the occasion to reiterate the conditions to be met in order that moral
damages may be recovered, viz:
An award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation, or
physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable
act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly,
that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Articles
2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral damages are
recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of
gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations. Verily, the breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive.
Here, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no malice or bad faith attended petitioners
dishonor of respondents credit card. For, as found no less by the same court, petitioner was
justified in doing so under the provisions of its Credit Card Agreement with respondent,
paragraph 3 of which states:
xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her approved credit limit, otherwise, all
charges incurred including charges incurred through the use of the extension CARD/S, if
any in excess of credit limit shall become due and demandable and the credit privileges
shall be automatically suspended without notice to the CARDHOLDER in accordance with
Section 11 hereof.
We are thus at a loss to understand why, despite its very own finding of absence of
bad faith or malice on the part of the petitioner, the CA nonetheless adjudged it liable for
moral damages to respondent.
Quite evidently, in holding petitioner liable for moral damages, the CA justified the
award on its assessment that EBC was negligent in not informing Calderon that his credit
card was already suspended even before he left for Hongkong, ratiocinating that
petitioners right to automatically suspend a cardholders privileges without notice should
not have been indiscriminately used in the case of respondent because the latter has

already paid his past obligations and has an existing dollar deposit in an amount more than
the required minimum for credit card at the time he made his purchases in Hongkong. But,
as explained by the petitioner in the memorandum it filed with this Court, which
explanations were never controverted by respondent:
xxx prior to the incident in question (i.e., April 30, 1986 when the purchases at the Gucci
store in Hongkong were made), respondent made credit purchases in Japan and Hongkong
from August to September 1985 amounting to US$14,226.12, while only having a deposit
of US$3,639.00 in his dollar account as evidenced by the pertinent monthly statement of
respondents credit card transactions and his bank passbook, thus exceeding his credit
limit; these purchases were accommodated by the petitioner on the condition that the
amount needed to cover the same will be deposited in a few days as represented by
respondents secretary and his companys general manager a certain Mrs. Zamora and Mr.
F.R. Oliquiano; respondent however failed to make good on his commitment; later,
respondent likewise failed to make the required deposit on the due date of the purchases
as stated in the pertinent monthly statement of account; as a consequence thereof, his
card privileges for dollar transactions were suspended; it was only four months later on 31
January 1986, that respondent deposited the sum of P14,501.89 in his dollar account to
cover his purchases; the said amount however was not sufficient to maintain the required
minimum dollar deposit of $3,000.00 as the respondents dollar deposit stood at only
US$2,704.94 after satisfaction of his outstanding accounts; a day before he left for
Hongkong, respondent made another deposit of US$14,000.00 in his dollar account but did
not bother to request the petitioner for the reinstatement of his credit card privileges for
dollar transactions, thus the same remained under suspension.
The foregoing are based on the sworn affidavit of petitioners Collection Manager, a certain
Lourdes Canlas, who was never cross examined by the respondent nor did the latter
present any evidence to refute its veracity.
Given the above, and with the express provision on automatic suspension without
notice under paragraph 3, supra, of the parties Credit Card Agreement, there is simply no
basis for holding petitioner negligent for not notifying respondent of the suspended status
of his credit card privileges.
It may be so that respondent, a day before he left for Hongkong, made a deposit of
US$14,000.00 to his dollar account with petitioner. The sad reality, however, is that he
never verified the status of his card before departing for Hongkong, much less requested
petitioner to reinstate the same.
And, certainly, respondent could not have justifiably assumed that petitioner must
have reinstated his card by reason alone of his having deposited US$14,000.00 a day
before he left for Hongkong. As issuer of the card, petitioner has the option to decide
whether to reinstate or altogether terminate a credit card previously suspended on
considerations which the petitioner deemed proper, not the least of which are the
cardholders payment record, capacity to pay and compliance with any additional
requirements imposed by it. That option, after all, is expressly embodied in the same Credit
Card Agreement, paragraph 12 of which unmistakably states:
The issuer shall likewise have the option of reinstating the card holders privileges which
have been terminated for any reason whatsoever upon submission of a new accomplished
application form if required by the issuer and upon payment of an additional processing fee
equivalent to annual fee.[18]
Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore, petitioner could not have been properly
adjudged liable for moral damages.
7
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the dishonor of his card.
There is, however, a material distinction between damages and injury. To quote from our
decision in BPI Express Card Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such
cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages
is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must
first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of
the injury. (Emphasis supplied).
In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case of damnum absque
injuria.
We do not take issue with the appellate court in its observation that the Credit Card
Agreement herein involved is a contract of adhesion, with the stipulations therein
contained unilaterally prepared and imposed by the petitioner to prospective credit card
holders on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. As said by us in Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals:
A contract of adhesion is one in which one of the contracting parties imposes a ready-made
form of contract which the other party may accept or reject, but cannot modify. One party
prepares the stipulation in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature
or his adhesion thereto giving no room for negotiation and depriving the latter of the
opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
On the same breath, however, we have equally ruled that such a contract is as
binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract
is free to reject it entirely.
Moreover, the provision on automatic suspension without notice embodied in the
same Credit Card Agreement is couched in clear and unambiguous term, not to say that
the agreement itself was entered into by respondent who, by his own account, is a
reputable businessman engaged in business activities here and abroad.
On a final note, we emphasize that moral damages are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claim for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision under review
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Heirs of PURISIMA NALA, represented by their attorney-in-fact EFEGENIA DIGNA
DUYAN, petitioners, vs. ARTEMIO CABANSAG, respondent.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision dated December 19, 2002 and Resolution dated October 28, 2003,
dismissing petitioners' appeal and affirming with modification the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Decision dated August 10, 1994 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-91-10541.
The facts of the case are as follows:

Artemio Cabansag (respondent) filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 for damages in October
1991. According to respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses
Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Felisa Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is part of a
400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he
received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del Prado), in behalf of
Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves
the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will
be filed against him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of such
demands, respondent suffered damages and was constrained to file the case against Nala
and Atty. Del Prado.3
Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was
merely acting in behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership.
Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-square meter property owned by her late
husband, Eulogio Duyan, which was subsequently divided into two parts. The 400-square
meter property was conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the
agreement that it will be merely held by them in trust for the Duyan's children. Said
property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 281115 in the name of spouses
Gomez. Nala also claimed that respondent is only renting the property which he occupies.
After trial, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93, rendered its Decision on August 10, 1994, in
favor of respondent. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, the Court finds
in favor of the plaintiff and hereby orders the defendants, jointly and severally, to
pay plaintiff the following:
1. P150,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
3. P20,000.00 as and for reasonable attorney's fees and other
litigation expenses; and
4. to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.
Nala and Atty. Del Prado appealed to the CA. The herein assailed CA Decision dated
December 19, 2002 affirmed the RTC Decision with modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, in Civil Case
No. Q-91-10541 is heretofore AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Defendants-
appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount
of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages. It is further ordered to pay him exemplary
damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and P10,000.00, attorney's fees. SO
ORDERED.
In affirming the RTC Decision, the CA took note of the Decision dated September 5, 1994
rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80, dismissing Civil Case No. 91-8821, an
action for reconveyance of real property and cancellation of TCT No. 281115 with damages,
filed by Nala against spouses Gomez.
Hence, herein petition by the heirs of Nala (petitioners) with the following assignment of
errors:
(a) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the right of Purisima Nala
to assert her rights and interest over the property.
(b) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the Decision rendered by
the Court of Appeals in the case for reconveyance which upheld the rights and
interest of Purisima Nala and her children over a certain parcel of land, a portion
of which is subject of the present case.
8
(c) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and attorney's fees
without any basis.
Atty. Del Prado filed a motion for extension of time to file his separate petition but it was
denied by the Court per its Resolution dated January 19, 2004 issued in G.R. No. 160829.
Petitioners argue that their predecessor-in-interest had every right to protect and assert
her interests over the property. Nala had no knowledge that the property was sold by
spouses Gomez to respondent when the demand letters were sent. What she was aware of
was the fact that spouses Gomez were managing the rentals on the property by virtue of
the implied trust created between them and Eulogio Duyan. When spouses Gomez failed to
remit the rentals and claimed ownership of the property, it was then that Nala decided to
procure the services of legal counsel to protect their rights over the property.
Petitioners also contend that it was error for the CA to take note of the RTC Decision in Civil
Case No. 91-8821 without further noting that the CA had already reversed and set aside
said RTC Decision and ordered reconveyance of the property to Nala and her children in a
Decision dated March 8, 2000 rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 49163. Petitioners also argue
that respondent did not substantiate his claim for damages.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular
provision of law under which it held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on
the allegations in respondent's complaint, it may be gathered that the basis for his claim
for damages is Article 19 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise
of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law
as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts
with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is
an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring
another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
injure another.
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in
bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Good faith is presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad
faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence,
dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of
known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel,
Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent.
In the first place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that the property
was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the
same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by

Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only after
respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such
sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the property does not give rise
to the conclusion that the sending of the demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith.
Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or malice could not be attributed
to petitioner since Nala was only trying to protect their interests over the property.
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts were done with
the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received the demand letters;
however, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal
invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the
injury. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations
are often called damnum absque injuria.
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the
demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable
rights over the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right
does no injury. Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely
by him.
Nala's acts in protecting her rights over the property find further solid ground in the fact
that the property has already been ordered reconveyed to her and her heirs. In its Decision
dated March 8, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 49163, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's
Decision and ordered the reconveyance of the property to petitioners, and TCT No. 281115
was declared canceled. Said CA Decision was affirmed by this Court in its Decision dated
March 18, 2005 in G.R. No. 144148, which became final and executory on July 27, 2005.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 19, 2002 and
Resolution dated October 28, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
48580 are NULLIFIED. Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against respondent.
THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., EXEQUIEL D. ROBLES, CARLO R.H.
MAGNO, CONRADO L. BENITEZ II, VICENTE R. SANTOS, HENRY CUA LOPING,
MARIZA SANTOS-TAN, TOMAS B. CLEMENTE III, AND FRANCIS C.
MONTALLANA, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO V. YU AND MANUEL C. YUHICO, Respondents.
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks
to reverse the Resolutions dated September 16, 20091 and January 21, 20102 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106918, which reconsidered and set aside its Resolution
dated January 15, 20093 granting petitioners a 15-day period within which to file a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules.
The present case is a continuation of Yu v. The Orchard Gold & Country Club,
Inc.4 decided by this Court on March 1, 2007. For brevity, the relevant facts narrated
therein are quoted as follows: COn May 28, 2000, a Sunday, [respondents] Ernesto Yu and
Manuel Yuhico went to the Orchard Golf & Country Club to play a round of golf with another
member of the club. At the last minute, however, that other member informed them that
he could not play with them. Due to the "no twosome" policy of the Orchard contained in
the membership handbook prohibiting groups of less than three players from teeing off on
9
weekends and public holidays before 1:00 p.m., [respondents] requested management to
look for another player to join them.
Because [Orchard] were unable to find their third player, [respondent] Yu tried to
convince Francis Montallana, Orchard's assistant golf director, to allow them to play
twosome, even if they had to tee off from hole no. 10 of the Palmer golf course. Montallana
refused, stating that the flights which started from the first nine holes might be disrupted.
[Respondent] Yu then shouted invectives at Montallana, at which point he told [respondent]
Yuhico that they should just tee off anyway, regardless of what management's reaction
would be. [Respondents] then teed off without permission from Montallana. They were thus
able to play, although they did so without securing a tee time control slip before teeing off,
again in disregard of a rule in the handbook. As a result of [respondents'] actions,
Montallana filed a report on the same day with the board of directors (the board).
In separate letters dated May 31, 2000, the board, through [petitioner] Clemente,
requested [respondents] to submit their written comments on Montallana's incident report
dated May 28, 2000. The report was submitted for the consideration of the board.
Subsequently, on June 29, 2000, the board resolved to suspend [respondents] from
July 16 to October 15, 2000, and served notice thereof on them.
On July 11, 2000, [respondents] filed separate petitions for injunction with
application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction with the
Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), at that time the tribunal vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and
decide intra-corporate controversies. The cases, in which [respondents] assailed the
validity of their suspension, were docketed as SEC Case Nos. 07-00-6680 and 07-00-6681.
They were eventually consolidated.
After a joint summary hearing on the aforesaid petitions, the SEC-SICD, on July 14,
2000, issued a TRO effective for 20 days from issuance, restraining and enjoining
[petitioners], their agents or representatives from implementing or executing the
suspension of [respondents].
On August 1, 2000, the SEC en banc issued its "Guidelines on Intra-Corporate
Cases Pending Before the SICD and the Commission En Banc of the Securities and
Exchange Commission" (guidelines). Sections 1 and 2 of these guidelines provided:
Section 1. Intra-corporate and suspension of payments or rehabilitation cases may
still be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or before August 8, 2000.
However, the parties-litigants or their counsels or representatives shall be advised that the
jurisdiction of the Commission over these cases shall be eventually transferred to the
Regional Trial Courts upon effectivity of The Securities Regulation Code by August 9, 2000.
Section 2. Prayers for temporary restraining order or injunction or suspension of
payment order contained in cases filed under the preceding section may be acted upon
favorably provided that the effectivity of the corresponding order shall only be up to
August 8, 2000. Prayers for other provisional remedies shall no longer be acted upon by
the Commission. In all these cases, the parties-litigants or their counsels or representatives
shall be advised that the said cases will eventually be transferred to the regular courts by
August 9, 2000. (Emphasis ours)
After hearing [respondents'] applications for preliminary injunction, the SEC-SICD
issued an order dated August 2, 2000 directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the individual [petitioners], their agents and representatives from
suspending [respondents], upon the latter's posting of separate bonds of P40,000. This
[respondents] did on August 4, 2000.
On August 7, 2000, the SEC-SICD issued a writ of preliminary injunction against
[petitioners] directing them to strictly observe the order dated August 2, 2000.

On October 31, 2000, the board held a special meeting in which it resolved to
implement the June 29, 2000 order for the suspension of [respondents] in view of the fact
that the writs of injunction issued by the SICD in their respective cases had already
[elapsed] on August 8, 2000 under the SEC guidelines.
In separate letters dated December 4, 2000 addressed to each [respondent],
[petitioner] Clemente informed them that the board was implementing their suspensions.
On December 12, 2000, [respondents] filed a petition for indirect contempt against
[petitioners] in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmarinas, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2228-00.
In an order dated December 13, 2000, the Dasmarinas, Cavite RTC, Branch 90,
through Judge Dolores [L.] Español, directed the parties to maintain the "last, actual,
peaceable and uncontested state of things," effectively restoring the writ of preliminary
injunction, and also ordered [petitioners] to file their answer to the petition. [Petitioners]
did not file a motion for reconsideration but filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62309, contesting the propriety of the December
13, 2000 order of Judge Español. They also prayed for the issuance of a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction.
The CA reversed the Dasmarinas, Cavite RTC in the x x x decision dated August 27,
2001.
In view of the CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 62309, [petitioners] finally implemented
[respondents'] suspension.
In the meantime, [respondents] filed a motion ad cautelam dated August 30, 2001 in the
RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of injunction
to enjoin [petitioners] from implementing the suspension orders. They alleged that neither
the CA nor this Court could afford them speedy and adequate relief, hence[,] the case in
the RTC of Imus, Cavite. The case was docketed as SEC Case Nos. 001-01 and 002-01.
On September 7, 2001, the Imus, Cavite RTC issued a TRO. [Petitioners] filed a
motion for reconsideration on September [11,] 2001.
It was after the issuance of this TRO that [respondents] filed, on September 12,
2001, a motion for reconsideration of the CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 62309. In a
resolution dated October 10, 2001, the CA denied [respondents'] motion, prompting them
to elevate the matter to this Court via petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
150335.
In an order dated September 21, 2001, the Imus, Cavite RTC denied [petitioners']
motion for reconsideration and directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
This prompted [petitioners] to file another petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
[docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67664] which x x x issued [on March 26, 2002] a TRO against
the Imus, Cavite RTC, enjoining it from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction.
At this point, [respondents] filed their second petition in this Court, this time a
special civil action for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 152687, which included a prayer for
the issuance of a TRO and/or the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
enforcement of the CA-issued TRO.
On May 6, 2002, the Court issued a resolution consolidating G.R. No. 152687 and
G.R. No. 150335.
In G.R. No. 150335, the issue for consideration [was] whether Sections 1 and 2 of
the SEC guidelines dated August 1, 2000 shortened the life span of the writs of preliminary
injunction issued on August 7, 2000 by the SEC-SICD in SEC Case Nos. 07-00-6680 and 07-
00-6681, thereby making them effective only until August 8, 2000.
10
At issue in G.R. No. 152687, on the other hand, [was] whether or not the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by issuing a TRO
against the Imus, Cavite RTC and enjoining the implementation of its writ of preliminary
injunction against [petitioners].y
On March 1, 2007, the Court denied the petitions in G.R. Nos. 150335 and 152687. In G.R.
No. 150335, it was held that the parties were allowed to file their cases before August 8,
2000 but any provisional remedies the SEC granted them were to be effective only until
that date. Given that the SEC Order and Writ of Injunction were issued on August 2 and 7,
2000, respectively, both were covered by the guidelines and the stated cut-off date. As to
G.R. No. 152687, We ruled that the petition became moot and academic because the TRO
issued by the CA on March 26, 2002 already expired, its lifetime under Rule 58 of the Rules
being only 60 days, and petitioners themselves admitted that the CA allowed its TRO to
elapse.
Meanwhile, per Order dated September 24, 2002 of the Imus RTC, SEC Case Nos.
001-01 and 002-01 were set for pre-trial conference.6 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
On December 4, 2008, the Imus RTC ruled in favor of respondents. The dispositive
portion of the Decision7 ordered:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Club's Board of Directors
suspending [respondents] Ernesto V. Yu and Manuel C. Yuhico is hereby declared void and
of no effect, and its' (sic) enforcement permanently enjoined. The writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby declared permanent.
[Petitioners] are hereby directed to jointly and severally pay each of the [respondents] the
following amounts:
(a) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(b) P2,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(c) P500,000.00 as attorney's fees[;] and
(d) P100,000.00 as costs of litigation. SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon receiving a copy of the Imus RTC Decision on December 22, 2008, petitioners
filed a Notice of Appeal accompanied by the payment of docket fees on January 5,
2009.9 Respondents then filed an Opposition to Notice of Appeal with Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution,10 arguing that the December 4, 2008 Decision already became final
and executory since no petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules was filed before the
CA pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 04-9-07-SC.
Realizing the mistake, petitioners filed on January 13, 2009 an Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Petition.11 Before the Imus RTC, they also filed a Motion to
Withdraw the Notice of Appeal.
On January 15, 2009, the CA resolved to give petitioners a 15-day period within
which to file the petition, but "[s]ubject to the timeliness of the filing of petitioners' Urgent
Motion for Extension of Time to File 'Petition for Review' Under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court dated January 13, 2009."13 Afterwards, on January 21, 2009, petitioners filed a
Petition for Review.
In the meantime, respondents filed an Opposition to Petitioners' Urgent
Motion. Subsequently, they also filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's Resolution
dated January 15, 2009.
Before the Imus RTC, respondents' motion for execution was granted on February
17, 2009. The trial court opined that the proper appellate mode of review was not filed
within the period prescribed by the Rules and that the CA issued no restraining order. 17 On
March 2, 2009, the Writ of Execution was issued. 18 Eventually, on March 30, 2009, the
Sheriff received the total amount of P9,200,000.00, as evidenced by two manager's check

payable to respondents in the amount of P4,600,000.00 each, which were turned over to
respondents' counsel.
On September 16, 2009, the CA granted respondents' motion for reconsideration,
setting aside its January 15, 2009 Resolution. It relied on Atty. Abrenica v. Law Firm of
Abrenica, Tungol & Tibayan (Atty. Abrenica)20 and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ascot
Holdings and Equities, Inc., (LBP),21 which respondents cited in their Opposition to the
Urgent Motion and Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners moved to reconsider, but it was
denied on January 21, 2010; hence, this petition.
The Court initially denied the petition, but reinstated the same on October 6, 2010.
We grant the petition.The cases of LBP and Atty. Abrenica are inapplicable. In LBP, the
Court affirmed the CA's denial of the bank's motion for extension of time to file a petition
for review. Examination of said case revealed that the bank filed a motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's adverse judgment dated March 15, 2006, in violation of
Section 8(3), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799. It was held that the filing of such prohibited
pleading did not toll the reglementary period to appeal the judgment via a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules. Thus, the CA already lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
petition which the bank intended to file, much less to grant the motion for extension of
time that was belatedly filed on July 25, 2006.
Also, in Atty. Abrenica, We found no compelling reasons to relax the stringent
application of the rules on the grounds as follows:
First, when petitioner received the trial court's consolidated decision on December
16, 2004, A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC was already in effect for more than two months.
Second, petitioner had known about the new rules on the second week of January,
2005 when he received a copy of respondents' Opposition (To Defendant's Notice of
Appeal) dated January 6, 2005. In their opposition, respondents specifically pointed to the
applicability of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC to the instant case. Third, petitioner originally insisted
in his Reply with Manifestation (To the Opposition to Defendant's Notice of Appeal) that the
correct mode of appeal was a "notice of appeal."
Petitioner reiterated in his Opposition to respondents' motion for execution dated
January 14, 2005 that a notice of appeal was the correct remedy.
Finally, petitioner filed his Motion to Admit Attached Petition for Review only
on June 10, 2005, or almost eight months from the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC on
October 15, 2004, after he received the trial court's Order of May 11,
2005.nroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Unlike LBP and Atty. Abrenica, petitioners in this case committed an excusable delay of
merely seven (7) days. When they received a copy of the Imus RTC Decision on December
22, 2008, they filed before the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition
on January 13, 2009. Meantime, they exhibited their desire to appeal the case by filing a
Notice of Appeal before the Imus RTC. Upon realizing their procedural faux pax, petitioners
exerted honest and earnest effort to file the proper pleading despite the expiration of the
reglementary period. In their urgent motion, they candidly admitted that a petition for
review under Rule 43 and not a notice of appeal under Rule 41 ought to have been filed.
The material dates were also indicated. Hence, the CA was fully aware that the 15-day
reglementary period already elapsed when it granted the time to file the petition.
In general, procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing a
petition for review are inviolable considering that appeal is not a constitutional right but
merely a statutory privilege and that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. 25 However, procedural
rules may be waived or dispensed with in order to serve and achieve substantial
11
justice.26 Relaxation of the rules may be had when the appeal, on its face, appears to be
absolutely meritorious or when there are persuasive or compelling reasons to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not
complying with the prescribed procedure.
Notably, under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC (Re: Mode of Appeal in Cases Formerly
Cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission), 28 while the petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules should be filed within fifteen (15) clays from notice of the
decision or final order of the RTC, the CA may actually grant an additional period of fifteen
(15) days within which to file the petition and a further extension of time not exceeding
fifteen (15) days for the most compelling reasons. This implies that the reglementary
period is neither an impregnable nor an unyielding rule.
Here, there is also no material prejudice to respondents had the CA allowed the
filing of a petition for review. When the Imus RTC declared as permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction, the injunction became immediately executory. Respondents'
suspension as Club members was effectively lifted; in effect, it restored their rights and
privileges unless curtailed by a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
More importantly, the substantive merits of the case deserve Our utmost consideration.
In the present case, Yu acknowledged that there was an offense committed. Similarly,
Yuhico admitted that he was aware or had prior knowledge of the Club's "no twosome"
policy as contained in the Club's Membership Handbook and that they teed off without the
required tee time slip.Also, while Yu recognized telling Montallana "kamote ka," Yuhico
heard him also say that he (Montallana) is "gago."
Respondents assert that the "no twosome" policy was relaxed by the management
when a member or player would not be prejudiced or, in the words of Yu, allowed when
"maluwag."32 Yet a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic records (TSN)
disclosed that such claim is based not on concrete examples. No specific instance as to
when and under what circumstance the supposed relaxation took place was cited. Yuhico
roughly recollected two incidents but, assuming them to be true, these happened only
after May 28, 2000.33 Further, the tee pass or control slip and the Club's Palmer Course
Card,34which was identified by respondents' witness, Pepito Dimabuyo, to prove that he
and another member were allowed to play twosome on June 13, 2004, a Sunday, indicated
that they were allowed to tee off only at 1:45 p.m. 35 Lastly, granting, for the sake of
argument, that the "no twosome" policy had been relaxed in the past, Montallana cannot
be faulted in exercising his prerogative to disallow respondents from playing since they
made no prior reservation and that there were standing flights waiting for tee time. Per
Cipriano Santos' Report, May 28, 2000 was a relatively busy day as it had 200 registered
players to accommodate as of 8:00 a.m.
It was averred that respondents teed off without the required tee time slip based
on the thinking that it was no longer necessary since Santos, the Club's Manager, allowed
them by waving his hands when Yuhico's caddie tried to pick up the slip in the registration
office. Such excuse is flimsy because it ignored the reality that Santos, a mere subordinate
of Montallana who already earned the ire of Yu, was practically more helpless to contain
the stubborn insistence of respondents.
Definitely, the contentions that respondents were not stopped by the management
when they teed off and that they did not cause harm to other members playing golf at the
time for absence of any complaints are completely immaterial to the fact that
transgressions to existing Club rules and regulations were committed. It is highly probable
that they were tolerated so as to restore the peace and avoid further confrontation and
inconvenience to the parties involved as well as to the Club members in general.

With regard to the purported damages they incurred, respondents testified during
the trial to support their respective allegations. Yuhico stated that he distanced himself
from his usual group (the "Alabang Boys") and that he became the butt of jokes of fellow
golfers.36 On the other hand, Yu represented that some of his friends in the business like
Freddy Lim, a certain Atty. Benjie, and Jun Ramos started to evade or refuse to have
dealings with him after his suspension.37 Apart from these self-serving declarations,
respondents presented neither testimonial nor documentary evidence to bolster their
claims. Worse, Yu even admitted that Freddy Lim and Atty. Benjie did not tell him that his
suspension was the reason why they did not want to transact with him.
Records reveal that respondents were given due notice and opportunity to be
heard before the Board of Directors imposed the penalty of suspension as Club members.
Respondent Yu was served with the May 31, 2000 letter 39 signed by then Acting General
Manager Tomas B. Clemente III informing that he violated the "no twosome" policy, teed off
without the required tee time slip, and uttered derogatory remarks to Montallana in front of
another member and the caddies. In response, Yu's counsel asked for a copy of
Montallana's report and a formal hearing to confront the complainant and all the
witnesses.40Subsequently, on June 13, 2000, Yu, through counsel, submitted his
explanation that included an admission of the "no twosome" policy. 41 Finally, on September
15, 2000, Yu was advised of the Board resolution to give him another opportunity to
present his side in a meeting supposed to be held on September 20, 2000. 42 It appears,
however, that Yu refused to attend.
Likewise, respondent Yuhico was given by Clemente a letter dated May 31, 2000
informing him of violating the "no twosome" policy and teeing, off without the required tee
time slip.44 After receiving the same, Yuhico called up Clemente to hear his side. 45 Like Yu,
however, Yuhico later refused to attend a meeting with the Board.
Respondents were suspended in accordance with the procedure set forth in the
Club's By-laws. There is no merit on their insistence that their suspension is invalid on the
ground that the affirmative vote of eight (8) members is required to support a decision
suspending or expelling a Club member. Both the provisions of Articles of
Incorporation47 and By-Laws48 of the Club expressly limit the number of directors to seven
(7); hence, the provision on suspension and expulsion of a member which requires the
affirmative vote of eight (8) members is obviously a result of an oversight. Former Senator
Helena Z. Benitez, the Honorary Chairperson named in the Membership Handbook, could
not be included as a regular Board member since there was no evidence adduced by
respondents that she was elected as such pursuant to the Corporation Code and the By-
laws of the Club or that she had the right and authority to attend and vote in Board
meetings. In addition, at the time the Board resolved to suspend respondents, the
affirmative votes of only six (6) Board members already sufficed. The testimony of Jesus A.
Liganor, who served as Assistant Corporate Secretary, that Rodrigo Francisco had not
attended a single Board meeting since 1997 remains uncontroverted. 49 The Court agrees
with petitioners that the Club should not be powerless to discipline its members and be
helpless against acts inimical to its interest just because one director had been suspended
and refused to take part in the management affairs.
Lastly, contrary to respondents' position, the recommendation of the House
Committee50 to suspend a Club member is not a pre-requisite. Section 1, Article XIV, 51 not
Section 2 (b), Article XI,52 of the By-Laws governs as it outlines the procedure for the
suspension of a member. Even assuming that the recommendation of the House
Committee is mandatory, respondents failed to prove, as a matter of fact, that petitioners
acted in bad faith in relying on the subject provision, which employs the permissive word
12
"may" in reference to the power of the House Committee to recommend anytime the
suspension of a Club member.
Way different from the trial court's findings, there is, therefore, no factual and legal
basis to grant moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit in favor of
respondents. The damages suffered, if there are any, partake of the nature of a damnum
absque injuria. As elaborated in Spouses Custodio v. CA:
xxx [T]he mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover
damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.
Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action,
since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or
wrong.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of
a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages
are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed
to the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that
an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of
some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded;
it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff
suffered some pain and suffering.
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause
damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may
happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person
or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law
does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action
will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been
invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the
means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter's
favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can
give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to
achieve a lawful end by lawful means.
"One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum
damnum facit. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum
absque injuria."55 In this case, respondents failed to prove by preponderance of evidence
that there is fault or negligence on the part of petitioners in order to oblige them to pay for
the alleged damage sustained as a result of their suspension as Club members. Certainly,

membership in the Club is a privilege.56 Regular members are entitled to use all the
facilities and privileges of the Club, subject to its rules and regulations. 57 As correctly
pointed out by petitioners, the mental anguish respondents experienced, assuming to be
true, was brought upon them by themselves for deliberately and consciously violating the
rules and regulations of the Club. Considering that respondents were validly suspended,
there is no reason for the Club to compensate them. Indeed, the penalty of suspension
provided for in Section 1, Article XIV of the By-Laws is a means to protect and preserve the
interest and purposes of the Club. This being so, the suspension of respondents does not
fell under any of the provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to the grant of moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation costs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
September 16, 2009 and January 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
106918, which reconsidered and set aside its Resolution dated January 15, 2009, granting
petitioners a fifteen-day period within which to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules, is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. SEC Case Nos. 001-01 and 002-01 filed and
raffled before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Imus, Cavite are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondents are ORDERED TO RETURN to
petitioners the total amount of P9,200,000.00 or P4,600,000.00 each, within THIRTY (30)
DAYS from the time this decision becomes final and executory. Thereafter, said amount
shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum until fully paid.
SPS. CRISTINO & EDNA CARBONELL, PETITIONERS, VS. METROPOLITAN BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, RESPONDENT.
The petitioners assail the decision promulgated on December 7, 2006, whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on May 22, 1998 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 157, in Pasig City (RTC) dismissing the petitioners' complaint in
Civil Case No. 65725 for its lack of merit, and awarded attorney's fees under the
respondent's counterclaim.
Antecedents
The petitioners initiated against the respondent Civil Case No. 65725, an action for
damages, alleging that they had experienced emotional shock, mental anguish, public
ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their trip to Thailand because of
the respondent's release to them of five US$100 bills that later on turned out to be
counterfeit. They claimed that they had travelled to Bangkok, Thailand after withdrawing
US$1,000.00 in US$100 notes from their dollar account at the respondent's Pateros branch;
that while in Bangkok, they had exchanged five US$100 bills into Baht, but only four of the
US$100 bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the fifth one was
"no good;" that unconvinced by the reason for the rejection, they had asked a companion
to exchange the same bill at Norkthon Bank in Bangkok; that the bank teller thereat had
then informed them and their companion that the dollar bill was fake; that the teller had
then confiscated the US$100 bill and had threatened to report them to the police if they
insisted in getting the fake dollar bill back; and that they had to settle for a Foreign
Exchange Note receipt.
The petitioners claimed that later on, they had bought jewelry from a shop owner by using
four of the remaining US$100 bills as payment; that on the next day, however, they had
13
been confronted by the shop owner at the hotel lobby because their four US$100 bills had
turned out to be counterfeit; that the shop owner had shouted at them: "You Filipinos, you
are all cheaters!;" and that the incident had occurred within the hearing distance of tel low
travelers and several foreigners.
The petitioners continued that upon their return to the Philippines, they had confronted the
manager of the respondent's Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had
insisted that the dollar bills she had released to them were genuine inasmuch as the bills
had come from the head office; that in order to put the issue to rest, the counsel of the
petitioners had submitted the subject US$100 bills to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
for examination; that the BSP had certified that the four US$100 bills were near perfect
genuine notes; and that their counsel had explained by letter their unfortunate experience
caused by the respondent's release of the fake US dollar bills to them, and had demanded
moral damages of P10 Million and exemplary damages.
The petitioners then sent a written notice to the respondent, attaching the BSP certification
and informing the latter that they were giving it five days within which to comply with their
demand, or face court action. In response, the respondent's counsel wrote to the
petitioners on March 1996 expressing sympathy with them on their experience but
stressing that the respondent could not absolutely guarantee the genuineness of each and
every foreign currency note that passed through its system; that it had also been a victim
like them; and that it had exercised the diligence required in dealing with foreign currency
notes and in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Prior to the filing of the suit in the RTC, the petitioners had two meetings with the
respondent's representatives. In the course of the two meetings, the latter's
representatives reiterated their sympathy and regret over the troublesome experience that
the petitioners had encountered, and offered to reinstate US$500 in their dollar account,
and, in addition, to underwrite a round-trip all-expense-paid trip to Hong Kong, but they
were adamant and staged a walk-out.
In its judgment rendered on May 22, 1998, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing plaintiffs complaint for lack of merit;
2. On the counterclaim, awarding Metrobank the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners appealed, but the CA ultimately promulgated its assailed decision on
December 7, 2006 affirming the judgment of the RTC with the modification of deleting the
award of attorney's fees, to wit:
As to the award of attorneys fees, we agree with appellants that there is simply no factual
and legal basis thereto. Unquestionably, appellants filed the present case for the
humiliation and embarrassment they suffered in Bangkok. They instituted the complaint in
their honest belief that they were entitled to damages as a result of appellee's issuance of
counterfeit dollar notes. Such being the case, they should not be made answerable to
attorney's fees. It is not good public policy to put a premium on the right to litigate where
such right is exercised in good faith, albeit erroneously.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification that the award of

attorney's tees is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Hence, this appeal, with the petitioners contending that the CA gravely erred in affirming
the judgment of the RTC. They insist that inasmuch as the business of banking was imbued
with public interest, the respondent's failure to exercise the degree of diligence required in
handling the affairs of its clients showed that it was liable not just for simple negligence
but for misrepresentation and bad faith amounting to fraud; that the CA erred in giving
weight and relying on the news clippings allegedly showing that the "supernotes" had
deceived even the U.S. Secret Service and Central Intelligence Agency, for such news were
not based on facts.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
The General Banking Act of 2000 demands of banks the highest standards of integrity and
performance. As such, the banks are under obligation to treat the accounts of their
depositors with meticulous care. However, the banks' compliance with this degree of
diligence is to be determined in accordance with the particular circumstances of each case.
The petitioners argue that the respondent was liable for failing to observe the diligence
required from it by not doing an act from which the material damage had resulted by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution in the performance of its duties. Hence, the
respondent was guilty of gross negligence, misrepresentation and bad faith amounting to
fraud.
The petitioners' argument is unfounded.
Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties; it is a
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It
evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
In order for gross negligence to exist as to warrant holding the respondent liable therefor,
the petitioners must establish that the latter did not exert any effort at all to avoid
unpleasant consequences, or that it wilfully and intentionally disregarded the proper
protocols or procedure in the handling of US dollar notes and in selecting and supervising
its employees.
The CA and the RTC both found that the respondent had exercised the diligence required
by law in observing the standard operating procedure, in taking the necessary precautions
for handling the US dollar bills in question, and in selecting and supervising its employees.
Such factual findings by the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect especially
after being affirmed by the appellate court, and could be overturned only upon a showing
of a very good reason to warrant deviating from them.
In this connection, it is significant that the BSP certified that the falsity of the US dollar
notes in question, which were "near perfect genuine notes," could be detected only with
extreme difficulty even with the exercise of due diligence. Ms. Nanette Malabrigo, BSP's
Senior Currency Analyst, testified that the subject dollar notes were "highly deceptive"
inasmuch as the paper used for them were similar to that used in the printing of the
genuine notes. She observed that the security fibers and the printing were perfect except
for some microscopic defects, and that all lines were clear, sharp and well defined.
14
Nonetheless, the petitioners contend that the respondent should be liable for moral and
exemplary damages on account of their suffering the unfortunate experience abroad
brought about by their use of the take US dollar bills withdrawn from the latter.
The contention cannot be upheld.
The relationship existing between the petitioners and the respondent that resulted from a
contract of loan was that of a creditor-debtor. Even if the law imposed a high standard on
the latter as a bank by virtue of the fiduciary nature of its banking business, bad faith or
gross negligence amounting to bad faith was absent. Hence, there simply was no legal
basis for holding the respondent liable for moral and exemplary damages. In breach of
contract, moral damages may be awarded only where the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith. That was not true herein because the respondent was not shown to have
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. This is pursuant to Article 2220 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages
if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The
same rule applies to breaches of contract where defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith.
With the respondent having established that the characteristics of the subject dollar notes
had made it difficult even for the BSP itself as the country's own currency note expert to
identify the counterfeiting with ease despite adhering to all the properly laid out standard
operating procedure and precautions in the handling of US dollar bills, holding it liable for
damages in favor of the petitioners would be highly unwarranted in the absence of proof of
bad faith, malice or fraud on its part. That it formally apologized to them and even offered
to reinstate the USD$500.00 in their account as well as to give them the all-expense-paid
round trip ticket to Hong Kong as means to assuage their inconvenience did not necessarily
mean it was liable. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of liability,
and is inadmissible as evidence against the offeror.
Even without taking into consideration the news clippings to the effect that the US Secret
Service and Central Intelligence Agency had themselves been deceived by the 1990 series
of the US dollar notes infamously known as the "supernotes," the record had enough to
show in that regard, not the least of which was the testimony of Ms. Malabrigo as BSP's
Senior Currency Analyst about the highly deceptive nature of the subject US dollar notes
and the possibility for them to pass undetected.
Also, the petitioners' allegation of misrepresentation on the part of the respondent was
factually unsupported. They had been satisfied with the services of the respondent for
about three years prior to the incident in question.The incident was but an isolated one.
Under the law, moral damages for culpa contractual or breach of contract are recoverable
only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or
abusive. In order to maintain their action for damages, the petitioners must establish that
their injury resulted from a breach of duty that the respondent had owed to them, that is,
there must be the concurrence of injury caused to them as the plaintiffs and legal
responsibility on the part of the respondent. Underlying the award of damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. In this regard, there must
first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of
the injury. That was not so in this case.

It is true that the petitioners suffered embarrassment and humiliation in Bangkok. Yet, we
should distinguish between damage and injury. In The Orchard Golf & Country Club, Inc. v.
Yu the Court has fittingly pointed out the distinction, viz.:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone bears the
consequences because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that
does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. For instance, in BPI Express Card Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, the Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder whose
credit card had been cancelled after several defaults in payment, holding therein that there
could be damage without injury where the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of
a legal duty towards the plaintiff. In such situation, the injured person alone should bear
the consequences because the law afforded no remedy for damages resulting from an act
that did not amount to a legal injury or wrong. Indeed, the lack of malice in the conduct
complained of precluded the recovery of damages.
Here, although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the
counterfeit US dollar bills, the respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper
protocols and procedure in handling the US dollar bills involved, did not violate any legal
duty towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor remiss in its exercise of the
degree of diligence required by law or the nature of its obligation as a banking institution,
the latter was not liable for damages. Given the situation being one of damnum absque
injuria, they could not be compensated for the damage sustained.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES,
a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA, respondent.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel
Nikko) and Ruby Lim assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001
reversing the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as
well as the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the
human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein)
Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name Amay Bisaya, alleged that at
around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the
lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who
then approached him. Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse
in celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes
asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: of course Mr. Reyes then went up
with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the
celebrant. At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after
which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. After a couple of hours, when the buffet
dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for
Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud voice and within the presence and
hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told
him to leave the party (huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang). Mr.
15
Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within hearing
distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Not
long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman
approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. Like a common criminal, he was
escorted out of the party by the policeman. Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One
Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees.
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not
under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was
the Hotels Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years. One of her functions
included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka. The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an
exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly. The guest list was limited to
approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel employees and
that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited. At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at
the bar counter ordering a drink. Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party
intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the captain waiter, to inquire as to the
presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited. Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the
group of Dr. Filart. As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms.
Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida
Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto
to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. Mr. Reyes, however, lingered
prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to
leave. When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung
whom she later approached. Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other,
Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell
Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim
spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no
other guests in the immediate vicinity. However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself
to the food, she decided to wait. When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms.
Lim approached him and said: alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total
nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po
umalis na kayo. She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough
decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and
even threatened to dump food on her.
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also
gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the
party. According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits
intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the
penthouse but to Altitude 49. When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes
to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. All the while, she thought
that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col.
Batung. Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting. She ignored Mr.
Reyes. She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, giving more
credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown
out of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the
birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to

which he was not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law
imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can
be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault
(Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of
defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his
attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must
therefore fail.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more
commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a
loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish
his food and to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which
is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the
appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New
Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not
prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a
formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a
manner contrary to morals or good customs.
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several
people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was
uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have
talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim
was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in
private that the latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends
around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she
who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation, appellant could
not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness
or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this
duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad
faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a
known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud
(Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr.
Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount
of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000). On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its
earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had been amply discussed and
passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered.
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court
of Appeals seriously erred in
I. NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY
ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II. HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR.
FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA COULD NOT HAVE
SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION, WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION
16
III. DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV. IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS
POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V. IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF,
THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a
gate-crasher.
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in
law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger,
even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine
does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the
risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil
Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to
unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking
Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where he was not invited by the
celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her
employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable
conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without
choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule
is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising
errors of law. One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. The lower court
ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked
to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is
liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his
food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts,
however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the
party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts
findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel, for-invitation-only, thrown
for the hotels former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly
uninvited (by the celebrant) and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is
known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the
party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the
celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants instruction to keep
the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the gate-crasher in the most hush-
hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in
the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call

attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to
follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the
hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim
loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why
Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr.
Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms.
Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at
the buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she
shouted?
A: Yes. She said, wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang.
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and
expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a
very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein
being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she
acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court
was correct in observing that
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to
leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant
to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause
embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the
other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take
him out.
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes,
however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses Danny
Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited
him to the party.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he
was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employee.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of
this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the
following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for
17
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages
arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within
her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an
act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of
must be intentional.
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms.
Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other
personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for
an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim,
being single at 44 years old, had a very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes)
possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign
businessmen. The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that
a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has
nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise
acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our
imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally approaching
Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise
to a cause of action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person,
which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Without proof
of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to
abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told
her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment
which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and
Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages especially for the reason stated
by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latters lowly
station in life. This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be
established. Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but
due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of
example or correction for public good and to avert further commission of such acts,
exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very
facts of the case and the evidence on hand. It is not disputed that at the time of the
incident in question, Mr. Reyes was an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program
over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular
singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official
candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of
humanitarian organizations of the Philippines. During his direct examination on rebuttal,
Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other
hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the social and economic standing of
petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot
withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr.
Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the
bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001
and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P.
MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein
complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P.
MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to
Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of
the Province of Rizal. He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City
sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a
friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39.
Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to
another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in
having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her
that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents,
and was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996.
They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of
the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was
single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through
their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City.
However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house
only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from
Eduardo, he would slap her. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left,
and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the
National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been
previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract. She was
so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married
when they exchanged their own vows.
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where
she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He
18
informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to
marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that
she had a love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he
declared he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith
that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for
the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she
threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975
and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her
again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid
because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6)
years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to
indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of
moral damages, plus costs of suit.
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that
Eduardos belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-
year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling
of this Court in People v. Bitdu, the trial court further ruled that even if the private
complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be
criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally
liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith
and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the
private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted.
He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice
for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the
private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a
fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390
of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court
in United States v. Pealosa and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos defense of good faith and
reliance on the Courts ruling in United States v. Enriquez were misplaced; what is
applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco, the OSG further posited that as
provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even
assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to
judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover,
the OSG maintained, the private complainants knowledge of the first marriage would not
afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the
private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial
court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with
modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of
the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant,
there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent
spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan and Domingo
v. Court of Appeals to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision
promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby
reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision
is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
I. The court of appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioners first wife cannot be legally presumed dead under article 390 of
the civil code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as
provided for under article 41 of the family code.
II. The court of appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the
award of php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in
law.
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the
felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers
that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been absent for 21 years since 1975;
under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points
out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been
absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all
purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal
presumption of death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation
of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He
insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and
that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under
Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law,
as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner
concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article
390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective.
Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first be a
judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He further
asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a
judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a
requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
19
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral
damages in favor of the private complainant. The private complainant was a GRO before
he married her, and even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved and took
care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit
relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA
affirming the petitioners conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the
evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente disuelto
el anterior, ser castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of
marriage established by law. The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the
impression that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of
death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed
death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy.
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent
marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage must
be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element
of a felony by dolo. On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two
elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved;
and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage
is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by
a court of competent jurisdiction. As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals and Mercado v. Tan, under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada
and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2)
a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act. He
explained that:
This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly
incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of
the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is
no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be
supported by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall

be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a
second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first
wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed since he has
had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her,
cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no
fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime.
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony
by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist
without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary. Although the words with malice do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, such phrase is included in the word voluntary.
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without
legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission
defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the
law presumes it to have been intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that
every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence
of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt
exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an
evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975,
and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to
subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in
1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the
private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years
since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring
the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes
proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part
when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held
guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as
protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because
he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on
mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. Marriage is a social institution of the highest
20
importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital
relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner
prescribed and the causes specified by law. The laws regulating civil marriages are
necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings.
A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over
transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses
and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and
the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an
invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the
law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive
evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-
grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe what they
wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a
first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence of
the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic
ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals. Only with such
proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages. Thus, Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only
upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of
accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse.
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for
bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or
not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the
age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including
the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for
four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and
has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it
being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without

any necessity of judicial declaration. However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus,
before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute
summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the
following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two
years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in
Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead;
and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a
summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition
is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in
relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is
designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not
for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize
civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned
by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela that, for purposes
of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its
sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of
the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the
former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
21
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. In In Re Szatraw, the Court declared that a
judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of
the person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in
another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if
a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been
heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that
it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and
meaningless act. The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other
spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court declared that the words proper
proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by
law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or
settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines, the
Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil
Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an
absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the provision of Article
349 or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment reached in the proper proceedings is erroneous and should be considered as not
written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been
legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in
a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the
supposition is not true. A second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present. Former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree
of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second
marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not
illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy. Former Justice Luis B. Reyes,
on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and
convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive
death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present
spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead.[57] Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse
who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged
with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As
explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
providing that the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy
in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for
the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or
she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the latters reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present
spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the
Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing
spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in
contracting a second marriage is already established.
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice)
who wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death
is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not
be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the
Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee
as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said
absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x should be
disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is
a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on
Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must
be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made only in the
proceedings for the settlement of his estate. Before such declaration, it was held that the
remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith. Justice Regalado
opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of
Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article
41 of the Family Code, which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry.
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed
under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding
moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral
damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed
to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc, where an award of moral damages for bigamy was
disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce
evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its
finding that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while
22
bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not
proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled
that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil de Filipinas
autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto,
violacin, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta
enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal
para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence
and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v.
Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. An award for
moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal
cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and
analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where
the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out
of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the
inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 and analogous cases (which refer to those cases
bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other
respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private
complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private
complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones
rights but also in the performance of ones duties. The standards are the following: act with
justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for
abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do
not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20
provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides that
any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter
provision
is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury
should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it
is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes. Whether or not
the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or
Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the
circumstances of each case.
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry
her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the
private complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance that he was
single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in
the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully
performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband.
For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant
had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners chicanery
and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous
series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the
private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium,
attributes and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured
mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful
husband.
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before,
during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with
malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a
23
bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab, the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent
physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are
not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at
p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all
recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery
may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though
they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma
v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833
(App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendants conduct was
not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was
bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff,
and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to
compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF.
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957).
The plaintiff testified that because of the defendants bigamous marriage to
her and the attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and
ashamed to go out but couldnt sleep but couldnt eat, had terrific
headaches and lost quite a lot of weight. No just basis appears for judicial
interference with the jurys reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive
damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249,
117 A.2d 298 (App. Div. 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and
general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy,
she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public
policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to
do an act which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to
be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he
has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages
sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v.
Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E.
892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the
defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff
was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to
have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the
law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no
bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her
damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the
promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not
her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved
to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be
recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106
Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of
action upon any transgression of the law by herself but upon the
defendants misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed,
innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the
defendants fraud for which damages may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter
into the marriage relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions.
Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson
v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97
Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411.
Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral
turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendants
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon
any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its
aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the
cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154
N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award
of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive
of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense
that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one
Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant
cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that
defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win
Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues
involved are purely of law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of
one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old
and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and
Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his
aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was
an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father.
Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to
24
the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray
the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts
not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school.
They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their
infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship.
The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955,
and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing
Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese
national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence
at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said
house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's
clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside
Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size,
was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we
will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to
the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that
defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing
plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in
spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on
between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of
plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their
complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that defendant
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the
absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who
deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and
sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the
defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on
their part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will
bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried
woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's
affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious
scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him.
This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that
he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits
to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and
was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other
and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used
to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the
knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even
from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a

Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she
disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this
chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations
with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering
the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21
of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to
pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and
expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., respondents.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said
of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of
promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the
latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said
court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite,
P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due
course, later on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima,
as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite,
ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty
pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the
actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to
P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for
breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher
in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10)
years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged,
although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching
and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed
among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the
movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was
then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she
was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris
Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the
present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain
permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code
provides:
25
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to
contract marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the
enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by
a minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the
celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who
without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the
expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers
must be brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to
celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De
Jesus vs. Syquia , that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of
such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code
of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the
report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But
these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the
Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in
other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions
that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That
authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of
marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be
broken.1awphîl.nèt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under
Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future
spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent
or guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty
years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without
such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the
basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen
years is not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil
responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be
brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the
aggrieved party even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or
guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may
institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material
and pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents,
of the affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be

liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is
rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement
shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on
account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in
the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The
history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men.
It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called
Balm suit in many of the American States.
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in
legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that
the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in
consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to
be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday,
May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the
clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of
promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly,
untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power,
plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual
desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold
that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages
may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the
new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs
preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language
used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is
the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal
Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say
that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10)
years younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed
to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to
petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension
of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that
complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of
the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4)
P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of
P1,114.25 — consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in
connection with the parturiation, and the balance representing expenses incurred to
support the child — and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.
26
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost
in this instance. It is so ordered.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU
T. GONZALES, respondents.
Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of
promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is
twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married
after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then
visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their
approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live
with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a
week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change;
he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a
day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and
asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone
living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner
to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other
relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of
the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because
the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed
that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent;
he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his
apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because
he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally,
no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof,
he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00
for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident
(sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987
up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern,
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a
(sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the
plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on
16 October 1989 a decision favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus
ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and
private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by
him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture
and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and
expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the
evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent
Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and
that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just
a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several
times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on
August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and
inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The
photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with
members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on
that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters
that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987,
and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they
agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise
27
allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few
days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later
returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's
apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would
tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her
medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day
and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship,
plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort
the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding
him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time
plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted
a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City.
Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry
plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was
already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated
by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for
sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for
pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to
the forthcoming wedding.
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, he contended that the trial court
erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering
him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in
toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of
fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who
was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose
morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate
experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described
by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive
promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the
lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so
the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for
otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in
the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's
pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the
restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went
to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at
(sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at
(sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1,
1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry

her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City
where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's
hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special
relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed have
led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites
Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where
defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and
defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had
accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for
Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod
City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod
City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but
did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not
surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending
to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country
girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her.
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise
to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to
him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these
acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory
and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has
been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-
appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this
case.
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he
raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the
case at bar.
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed
any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not
professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never
maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions
and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with
such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the
subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem
upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take
28
four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he
does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is
now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian
Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that
even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed
his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not
be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise
is not actionable.
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and
the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support
of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility
of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not
disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment
and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or
value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower
court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs.Asistio, Jr., this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica
v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v.
Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts
must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions
that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to
marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus
vs. Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and
in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to
abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience
which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm
suits in many of the American states. . . .
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of
justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces
the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age.
Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and
though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she
and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
29
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil
law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is
much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious
acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of
Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21
has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of
his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief
that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her
virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because
of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier
adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent
was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals, this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger
than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and
as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner,
then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance
found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if
there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not

convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and
conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth
in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who
had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more
than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some
sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must
yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit.
Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the
path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do
have that effect, and which result in her person to
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of
her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the
enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the
injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises
out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for
the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to
allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the
demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward
for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be
swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult
age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts
of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to
fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude
that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause
of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint.
30
In his annotations on the Civil Code, Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently
retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been
carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was
due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to
marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that
there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages
will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of
moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for
the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction,
not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But
when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of
age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is
an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the
action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit
as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the
act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence,
pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter
even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or
damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a
doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate
and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25,
1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can
give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial
assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament
prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner.
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of
the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by
him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all

moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances
could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the
poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able
to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of
morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can
even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent
may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where
his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue
influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally
rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud.
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be
no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40
Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said
that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the
petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-
appellant.
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is
worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided
to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left
this note for his bride-to-be:
31
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the
Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would
only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE
MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff
adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955,
judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages;
P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut.
But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before
it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving
at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition
for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day
his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for
relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City —
the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two
weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on
September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956
calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however,
defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition.
Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a
quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a
valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to
his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against
plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to
fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this
stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-
3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or
a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it
having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province
of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent

to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and
thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code
authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-
14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable
wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil
Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may
be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September
4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances).
The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion
were purchased . Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts
received. And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28
years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My
mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the
day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon."
But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No
question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert
hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of
P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under
Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid
of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in
a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that
considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment
is hereby affirmed, with costs.
32
ELSA NATIVIDAD, et al. vs. RONALD TUNAC, et al.
This case originated in a complaint for damages filed by petitioner Elsa Natividad against
respondent Ronald Tunac for breach of promise to marry. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
81, Quezon City rendered judgment for petitioner, ordering respondent to pay moral and
exemplary damages, but, on appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
It appears that petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in
Barangay Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents, petitioners Marino and
Clarita Natividad and respondent Eusebio and Elisa Tunac, resided. At age nineteen (19),
the two became lovers. One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in
Pasig City to get the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for
employment. Upon arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there. Ronald asked
Elsa to go with him inside his room and, once inside, started kissing Elsa until he
succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss of her virginity, but Ronald
appeased her by promising to marry her.
Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June
1992. Ronald reassured her, again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31,
1992, Ronald and his parents, accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all,
went to Elsa's house and asked her parents for the hand of their daughter.
The two families agreed to have the wedding in January 1993 as Elsa's sister had gotten
married that year, and they thought it was not good to have two weddings in a family
within the same year. Meanwhile, Elsa started living with Ronald in the house of the latter's
family while waiting for the baby to be born. Unfortunately, on December 19, 1992, Elsa
gave birth to a premature baby which died after five (5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's
discharge from the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa should go back to her
parents so her mother could take care of her during her postnatal period. During said
period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house.
It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards the
former occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting,
Ronald informed Elsa that he no longer wanted to get married to her. Hence, this case.
Petitioners succinctly contend they are suing respondents not merely because Elsa became
pregnant but because Ronald reneged on his promise to marry her after their agreement
had already been much publicized in their town.
 33

This contention has no merit. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, our laws do
not provide for a right to relief for cases arising purely from a breach of one's promise to
marry another, the chapter on breach of promise to marry proposed by the Code
Commission having been deleted by Congress in enacting the Civil Code apparently
because of lessons from other countries, particularly the United States and England, that
the action readily lends itself to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men
(Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, 14 May 1949, 2352).

In cases where this Court has allowed moral or exemplary damages arising from similar
circumstances, there was found moral seduction or misrepresentation (Gashem Shookat
Basksh v. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 115 (1993)); Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals (109
Phil. 629 (1960)). In Baksh, it was held -

[T]hat where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate

cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

(Id., p. 128)

In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less
by his parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two
became lovers before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction
contemplated by the Code Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where
the defendant is in a position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We fail to see
any of these circumstances in this case.

In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the
families of the parties. That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after
Elsa's miscarriage, is already beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case
of a relationship gone awry.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS