G.R. No.

132026-27 June 28, 2001 'That on or about the 7th day of June, 1993, at about 10:30 o'clock P.M., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
firearms, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
vs. MARIO ABENDAN, JULIAN PADIGOS and PRIMITIVO "Tebong" ABENDAN, appellants.
premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there suddenly and
unexpectedly attack, assault and shoot one Carmelita Cañeda, hitting the latter on her
PANGANIBAN, J.: thigh, and inflicting upon her the following physical injuries, causing:

In denying this appeal, the Court iterates the following doctrines: (1) positive identification prevails over
denial and alibi; (2) delay in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of
witnesses; and (3) once conspiracy is established, the act of one is considered the act of all.
The Case
Mario Abendan, Julian Padigos and Primitivo Abendan appeal the July 15, 1997 Decision 1 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch 10, in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-33212, CBU-33213 and CBU-34692,
finding them guilty on two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder.
In two separate Informations both dated October 25, 1993, Prosecutor II Rustico D. Paderanga-NPSS-VIII
charged appellant Mario Abendan and seven others, whose identities were unknown at the time, with murder,
as follows:
'FRACTURE OF THE PUBIS (R)
SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND'
which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of said Carmelita Cañeda, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of [m]urder
as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the herein accused, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered on Carmelita Cañeda which prevented her death." 4
When arraigned on August 30, 1995, Mario Abendan with the assistance of Counsel de Oficio Elisa Porio,
pleaded not guilty.5 Subsequently, upon sufficient identification, the three Informations were amended to
include Julian Padigos and Primitivo Abendan in lieu of the two John Does charged therein. 6 Both also pleaded
not guilty upon their arraignment on March 6, 1996.7

After a consolidated trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of the City of Cebu, accuses Mario Abendan and seven
others whose names are unknown and herein described under fictitious names as Richard Doe,
Peter Doe, Patrick Doe, James Doe, Manuel Doe, Edward Doe and John Doe of the crime of "WHEREFORE,
[m]urder, committed as follows:
"I. In Crim. Case No. CBU-33212, the Court finds accused Mario Abendan, Primitivo Abendan and
"That on or about the 7th day of June, 1993, at about 10:30 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, Julian Padigos GUILTY of [m]urder beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences each to suffer
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of Samuel Tardin [in] the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay
firearm, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate the costs;
intent, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident prem[e]ditation, did then and there attack,
assault and sho[o]t one Olimpia Cañeda with said firearm, hitting the lat[t]er on the vital parts of
"II. In Criminal Case No. CBU-33213, the Court finds accused Mario Abendan, Primitivo Abendan
her body and inflicting upon her physical injuries and as a consequence of said injuries Olimpia
and Julian Padigos GUILTY of [m]urder beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences each to
Cañeda died instantaneously."2
suffer reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of Olimpia Cañeda [in] the sum of P50,000.00;
and to pay the costs; and
"The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of the City of Cebu, accuses Mario Abendan and seven
others whose names are unknown and herein described under fictitious names as Richard Doe,
"III. In Criminal Case No. CBU-34692, the Court finds accused Mario Abendan, Julian Padigos and
Peter Doe, Patrick Doe, James Doe, Manuel Doe, Edward Doe and John Doe of the crime of
Primitivo Abendan, GUILTY of [f]rustrated [m]urder beyond reasonable doubt and hereby
[m]urder, committed as follows:
sentences each to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6 years, 1 month and 11 days of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period as MINIMUM, to 10
"That on or about the 7th day of June, 1993, at about 10:30 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, years and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed as MAXIMUM; to indemnify Carmelita Cañeda [in] the sum of P10,000.00; and to pay the costs.
firearm, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate
intent, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident prem[e]ditation, did then and there attack,
"SO ORDERED."8
assault and sho[o]t one Samuel Tardin with said firearm, hitting the latter on the vital part of his
body and inflicting upon him physical injuries and as a consequence of said injuries Samuel Tardin
died instantaneously."3 Hence this appeal.9

In another Information dated February 8, 1994, the same accused and Roel Abendan were charged by The Facts
Prosecutor II Rodolfo V. Perez with frustrated murder, as follows:
Version of the Prosecution
"The undersigned Prosecutor II of the City of Cebu accuses MARIO ABENDAN, ROEL
ABENDAN, and others whose real names are unknown and are described herein under fictitious
The prosecution's version of the facts is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General as follows:
names as John Doe, Peter Doe, Elmer Doe[,] Charles Doe, Raymund Doe and Michael Doe of the
crime of [f]rustrated [m]urder, committed as follows:
 "[O]n the evening of June 7, 1993, Olimpia Cañeda and her daughter Carmelita slept on one bed
while a relative, one Samuel Tardin, a barangay tanod, slept on another bed inside the Cañedas' nipa
house in Sitio Caduldulan, Bulacio, Pardo, Cebu City. About seven (7) meters [from] the said nipa
house was an unfinished house where Carmelita's younger brother, Pedro, slept in the attic (TSN,
Nov. 9, 1995, p. 2; TSN, Oct. 30, 1995, p. 3).
"Sometime past 10:00 p.m. that evening, Pedro was awakened by the barking of the dogs. He
noticed the presence of several armed persons, one of whom he recognized as Mario Abendan,
while the others were just familiar to him. Mario gave a good evening greeting and simultaneously
kicked open the GI sheet door (TSN, Oct. 30, 1995, pp. 2-4).
"Mario stepped inside the house and shot the sleeping Samuel Tardin once in the head and another
in the chin. Mario then held Olimpia and was overheard saying, 'Nang, isog kaayo ka Nang Ha'
(Nang, you are very brave, Nang ha). Carmelita darted towards the door and when she turned her
head back, she saw Julian Padigos shoot her, hitting her in the right thigh. Carmelita fell into the
cow pen where she stayed to hide as she heard more gunshots (Ibid, pp. 4-5; TSN, Nov. 9, 1995, pp.
4-5).
"From the attic of the unfinished house, Pedro saw her mother pleading for her life, to no avail, as
Mario shot Olimpia anyway on the head. After the shooting, Pedro reported the incident to the
police and sought assistance from them (TSN, Oct. 30, 1995, pp. 5-6).
"Meanwhile, Carmelita crawled to the direction of the upper hill where Pedro and several
policemen found her. The lifeless bodies of Olimpia and Samuel Tardin were placed in one police
vehicle. Carmelita was initially taken to the Cebu City Medical Center but later transferred to the
Mandaue City District [H]ospital where she assumed the name Lolita Lopez and stayed for more
than a week (TSN, Nov. 9, 1995, pp. 7-8).
"SPO2 Mario Monelar interviewed Pedro xxx on the deaths of Olimpia and Samuel and the
wounding of Carmelita. After his investigation, SPO2 Monelar filed the present set of charges
against appellants and several John Does (TSN, Nov. 29, 1995, pp. 2-3)."10
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the facts according to the defense are summarized by the trial court in the following
manner:
"Accused Mario Abadiez Abendan disclaimed he had anything to do with the shooting of Samuel
Tardin and Olimpia Cañeda and the wounding of Carmelita Cañeda [o]n the evening of June 7,
1993. He testified that on that date and [at that] time, he was in the house of his relative, Letecia
Luga, in Poblacion, Consolacion, Cebu, drinking with Loloy, Arturo, and Rudy Luga. The drinking
session ended at 11:00 P.M. and after that, he went to sleep. The following morning, he heard from
the radio broadcast about a shooting in Bulacao, Pardo, and he was surprised why his name was
mentioned in the news report as the assailant, when he was not in Pardo at that time but in
Consolacion. He requested Letecia Luga to go to Pardo and verify the news. Letecia Luga was
formerly a neighbor of the victims. Upon the return of Letecia Luga from Pardo, she told him that
the reason why he was implicated in the shooting was because before the killing, someone
announced: 'Open the door, this is Mario Abendan.' The accusations against him are all lies because
the prosecution included his brother Roel Abendan, who [had] left Pardo in 1984 and x x x resided
in Davao since then. Several criminal cases pending against him in the different branches of the
Regional Trial Courts in Cebu City and Mandaue City, are all fabricated charges. Upon learning
that he [was] a suspect in the Bulacao shooting incident, he wrote to the President of the
Philippines, requesting that he be allowed to surrender in Manila, not in Cebu City, for fear that he
might be salvaged. The Office of the President referred his letter to the PNP headquarters in Camp
Crame for comment (Exh. '4', '4-A'). He was surprised why Pedro Cañeda and Carmelita Cañeda
identified him as one of the assailants, when he does not know them and he has no quarrel with
them. He only knows their mother. He knew that Sta. Lucia Realty and Aznar Realty corporations
were interested in buying the land of the farmers. He also knew that these realtors were offering
incentives to those who [could] help them in acquiring the farmlands. But he did not work for them,
contrary to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It is neither true that he worked with
Dadong Racaza in negotiating for the farmlands. He came to know Dadong Racaza for the first
time when the latter testified in Court. He heard the name of Dadong Racaza because his aunt told
him that Dadong Racaza and his group were the ones who paid the farmers in order to leave their
lands. In fact, the house and farm of his aunt [were] paid by Dadong Racaza. He is a resident of
Candulawan, Talisay, which is more than a kilometer away [from] Caduldulan, and can be reached
in half an hour by walking. On cross-examination, he declared that after the incident on June 7,
1993, he went in hiding until he was arrested in Liloan, Cebu[; and] on July 30, 1995. From June 8,
1993 to July 30, 1995, he had three hiding places, namely: Poblacion, Consolacion, Cebu,
Barangay Tayud and Barangay Bagong Daan, both in Liloan, Cebu. Co-accused Primitivo Abendan
is his relative, because their grandfathers are brothers. On the day of the incident on June 7, 1993,
he ha[d] not seen Primitivo Abendan and Julian Padigos.
"Letecia Luga testified that Mario Abendan [was] her relative, so [was] deceased Samuel Tardin.
When she was young, Olimpia Cañeda and her daughter Carmelita Cañeda were her neighbors in
Caduldulan. In 1986, she got married and transferred her residence to Poblacion Occidental,
Consolacion, Cebu. One week before June 7, 1993, Mario Abendan stayed in her house. [O]n the
evening of June 7, 1993, [he] had a drinking spree with her husband, Rodolfo[;] a neighbor Loloy[;]
and Arturo, owner of the lot on which her house [was] constructed. The drinking stopped at 11:00
P.M. and Mario went to sleep. On that evening, Mario Abendan never left her house. The following
morning, June 8, 1993, she awakened Mario Abendan because the radio broadcast news that there
was a killing incident in Bulacao, Pardo, and Mario Abendan was mentioned as the author thereof.
The next day, June 9, 1993, Leizel Amancia, sister of Mario arrived and informed them that there
was a massacre in Pardo and Mario Abendan was mentioned as the one responsible. Two days after
the incident, she went to Pardo and told Mario Abendan's relatives that Mario Abendan [was]
innocent because he was in her house at the time of the massacre. She did not bother to tell police
authorities of the innocence of Mario Abendan because the policemen knew it. After June 7, 1993,
she knew Mario Abendan became a fugitive. She also knew that there was a fifty thousand pesos
reward for his capture. Mario Abendan left her house at the end of June 1993. She attended the
wake of deceased Samuel Tardin but she did not approach the relatives because at that time, they
were in grief and anger. From the conversation among relatives in the vigil, she learned that Samuel
Tardin was shot by Mario Abendan. She was requested by the sister of Mario Abendan to testify,
but at that time she was still in the family way, so she told them that she [would] go to the court
later.
"Conrado Racaza came to Court by virtue of a subpoena issued at the instance of the counsel for
Mario Abendan. He is a realty agent of Vista Grande and not of Sta. Lucia or Aznar Realty
Corporation. He does not know accused Mario Abendan, Julian Padigos and Primitivo Abendan. It
is not true that he negotiated the purchase of the land of Olimpia Cañeda. He is not a negotiator.
The negotiator of the land in the mountain barangay of Pardo is Bencio Ibrado. As a realty agent,
however, if there are lots to be sold, he will give it to Sta. Lucia. He has not met Carmelita Cañeda
or Pedro Cañeda. On cross-examination, he came to court to clear his name because he was
mentioned in connection with the death of Olimpia Cañeda [and] Samuel Tardin and the wounding
of Carmelita Cañeda. The first time he knew that his name was entangled with the Bulacao
shooting, was his receipt of a subpoena from the court. He den[ied] the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses that he was seen with the herein accused in the mountain barangay. He does not know the
Cañedas, so he has no misunderstading with them. He believes that the reason why the Cañedas
stated that he was seen together with Mario Abendan, Primitivo Abendan and Julian Padigos,
roaming around during the bulldozing of the famers' lands, was because the Cañedas want[ed] to
ruin his name.
"For accused Julian Padigos and Primitivo Abendan, the testimonies of Teofila Torregosa and
Aniceto Castañares, gave out the following facts:
"Teofila Torregosa is the owner of a rattan factory in Candulawan, Talisay, Cebu. She has been
operating it since 1974. Aniceto Castañares, a factory worker of Teofila Torregosa, [has known] his
co-worker, Primitivo Abendan and Julian Padigos since childhood. On June 7, 1993, her workers
 were Primitivo Abendan, Julian Padigos, Aniceto Castañares, Eduardo Castañares, Adriano The Court erred in giving undue credence to a testimony which can best be described as an
Llamedo, Jacinta Amancia and Jolot Abadiez. Her workers reported on that day at 8:00 A.M., took afterthought, having been given only after almost three years from the time of the incident.
their lunch at 12:00 noon and went back to work at 1:00 P.M. Due to a rush order for rattan chairs,
the workers continued working overtime until 11:00 A.M. of June 8, 1993. On that morning, she
"III
heard from the radio that there was a shooting in Bulacao, Pardo, killing Olimpia Cañeda, Samuel
Tardin and wounding Carmelita Cañeda. The news report did not mention the names of Primitivo
Abendan and Julian Padigos. The year 1994 passed by and she did not hear Primitivo Abendan and The Court erred in finding Primitivo Abendan guilty, in the process contradicting its own
Julian Padigos implicated in the shooting. However, on August 23, 1995, Primitivo Abendan and observations in the decision."13
Julian Padigos received a subpoena from the prosecutor's office. She voluntarily submitted herself
to be a witness because at the time of the shooting incident in Caduldulan, Primitivo Abendan and
Like Mario Abendan, Appellant Julian Padigos presents a lone error:
Julian Padigos were working in her factory in Candulawan. On cross-examination, [she said that]
she is just a sub-contractor, so her factory is nameless. Her workers are not listed with the Social
Security System. She has no books of accounts nor ledgers. She did not keep a list of her "The prosecution failed to establish [the] guilt of [the] accused."14
employees and they don't have daily time records. She has not filed income tax returns for her
business. She does not issue B.I.R. accredited receipts in her business transactions. Her factory does
not have documents showing payments of her workers because they are paid according to the In summary, the main issue in this case is whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellants
volume of their accomplished work or 'pakyaw' basis. She does not have [a] payroll but she kept an beyond reasonable doubt. In addition, the Court will also resolve whether conspiracy and treachery have been
individual list of the volume of work each laborer ha[s] finished and [been] paid [for]. All the lists, duly proven.
however, were lost when her home was destroyed by a strong typhoon. From her factory in
Candulawan to Caduldulan by walking, will entail thirty (30) minutes. She has no paper or The Court's Ruling
documentary proof to show that Primitivo Abendan and Julian Padigos worked in her factory on
June 7, 1993 from 8:00 A.M. until 1:00 o'clock dawn of June 8, 1993, because anyway, she was
there herself supervising her laborers during the said period. During the overtime work of the rush The appeal has no merit.
orders, she did not allow any of her workers to leave until the forty ordered chairs were finished.
The finished chairs were delivered to the store of her customer in Carbon market area, but she Main Issue
forgot the name of her regular customer and the name of her customer's store."11
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Ruling of the Trial Court
All three appellants contend that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. We are not
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It appreciated the qualifying persuaded.
circumstance of treachery in the killing of Samuel Tardin, who was asleep when he was fatally shot; in the
killing of Olimpia Cañeda, who was held by Mario Abendan and who had pleaded for her life when she was
fatally shot; as well as in the shooting of Carmelita Cañeda, who had then been fleeing from the scene. To prove appellants' guilt, the prosecution presented Carmelita who positively and consistently identified the
three appellants as the persons who had entered their house on the night of June 7, 1993, armed with guns. She
testified as follows:
The trial court also found the existence of conspiracy among accused-appellants. It thus considered the act of
each accused as the act of all.
"Q Now at about 10:30 in that evening, was there any un[us]ual incident that you noticed?
A Yes, there was.
Assignment of Errors Q What was that incident about?
A There was a person outside asking for 'Maayong gabii Nang' (Good evening Nang) and [he]
In his brief, Appellant Mario Abendan ascribes to the RTC a single alleged error: simultaneously forced open the GI sheet door.
Q And what happened to that east door?
A It inclined and opened.
"Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime charged Q And then what happened next?
ha[d] been proven beyond reasonable doubt."12 A Mario went inside and shot Samuel Tardin.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the alleged errors imputed to the trial court by Appellant Primitivo Abendan are the Q If this Mario Abendan i[s] in the courtroom, will you please point to him?
following: A Yes.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to Mario Abendan.
"I COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. ROSITO:
The Court erred in ignoring the implied admission by Eyewitness Pedro Cañeda that accused
Q Now how many times did Mario Abendan sho[o]t Samuel Tardin?
Primitivo Abendan was not one of the armed men who entered the residence of the Canedas on that
A Twice. He shot Samuel Tardin twice.
fateful night of June 7, 1993.
Q Now was Samuel Tardin hit by the two gun[s]hots from Mario Abendan?
A Yes.
"II Q Using your body as point of reference, which part of the body of Samuel Tardin was hit?
A Right forehead and on the right side of the chin.
Q Now when Mario Abendan shot Samuel Tardin[,] what happened next?
 A He held my mother and said 'Nang isog kaayo ka Nang ha' (Nang You are very brave Nang It has been consistently held by this Court that "positive identification, where categorical and consistent and
ha). without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
Q And then what about you, what did you do, if any? denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
A I r[a]n away. undeserving of weight in law."17
Q Now before you [ran away] from Mario Abendan, did you notice anybody else inside the
room?
In the present case, Mario has been positively and categorically identified as the person who had shot Samuel
A Yes, there was.
and Olimpia. As against this positive identification, Mario's alibi, which was supported only by a relative,
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who?
cannot prevail. Alibi becomes unworthy of credit when it is established mainly by the accused himself and his
A Yes.
relative, and not by credible persons.18
Q Who are they?
A Tibong, Julian Padigos and there was another man [whose name] I do not know x x x.
Q You know Tibong very well? The denial and alibi of Primitivo and Julian cannot be given weight either. Like Mario, they were positively
A Yes. identified as having been at the Cañeda residence on the night of June 7, 1993 -- at the time Olimpia, Samuel
Q What is his real name, if you know? and Carmelita were shot.
A Abendan.
xxx xxx xxx
Primitivo's contention that Pedro impliedly admitted that the former was not one of the armed men who had
Q Now you said you r[a]n towards where did you run?
entered the Cañeda residence on the night of June 7, 1993, has no merit. An examination of the records
A Through the other door sir across the door where Mario and his companions entered.
indicates no such implied admission. Pedro's positive and categorical identification and naming of Mario as
Q When you r[a]n, did you hear any words uttered by anyone?
one of the three malefactors did not rule out Primitivo and Julian as the two other malefactors. The testimony
A I heard someone said do not run.
of Pedro merely indicated that he did not know the identities of the other malefactors. He stated:
Q Who said that, if you know?
A Julian.
Q So when you r[a]n towards the other door, where did you go? Q Now, you mentioned of three men in front of the door of your mother's house. Now, can you
A Towards the fence of our cow. name or can you give us the names of these three persons, if you know?
Q How far was that fence of your cattle from that house?
A About three armslength, my armsleng[th].
Q When you r[a]n to the fence of the cattle, what happened? A I noticed very well Mario Abendan.19
A When Julian said do not run, I turned around and then I heard a gunburst and I was hit on my
thigh. It was Carmelita who, aside from corroborating Pedro's testimony on the identity of Mario as one of the
INTERPRETER: assailants, also positively and categorically identified Primitivo and Julian as the other malefactors.
Witness pointing to her right thigh.
COURT: (TO WITNESS)
Q Where? In an effort to persuade us to give weight to their alibis, appellants contend that the trial court erred in
INTERPRETER: according credibility to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. We are not persuaded. Well-settled is the rule
Witness exhibiting her scar on the right thigh. that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of
COURT: (TO WITNESS) witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
Q Can you tell the court who fired that shot? overlooked or the significance of which has been misapprehended or misinterpreted. 20 The reason for this is
A Julian Padigos."15 that the trial court was in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
After Julian and Primitivo were arrested and brought to court, Carmelita further testified as follows: observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 21 In the case before us, we find no cogent
"Q Carmelita Cañeda, do you know the person of Tibong Abendan? reason to disturb the trial court's findings and assessment as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
A Yes, I know him.
Q Why do you know him? Furthermore, as pointed out by the RTC, the defense has not shown any plausible reason why Carmelita and
A Because he was there present when the incident happened. Pedro would testify falsely against the accused. Where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the
xxx xxx xxx prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony
Q Now if you see that person of Tibong Abendan, will you be able to identify him? is thus entitled to full faith and credit.22
A Yes, I can.
Q Will you please look around the courtroom if you see the person of Tibong Abendan?
A Yes, he is there. Delay in Reporting
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person[;] when asked for his name, he g[a]ve his name as Carmelita's delay in reporting the identities of Julian and Primitivo did not affect her credibility. Delay in
Primitivo Abendan. making a criminal accusation will not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is
Q Now this Primitivo Abendan, also known as Tibong Abendan, at the time when you said that satisfactorily explained.23 In the present case, Carmelita explained that it took her some time to report the
he was present when the incident took place, what exactly was he doing at that time? incident because, out of fear for her life, she was hiding and moving from place to place. 24 Since appellants
A He was together with Mario Abendan. He was watching the surroundings and he was remained at large for some time, she had every reason to be afraid. Her failure to immediately reveal to the
bringing with him a firearm at that time. authorities the assailants' identities did not affect, much less impair, her credibility. The initial reluctance to
Q What else was he doing, if any? volunteer information about a criminal case or the unwillingness to be involved in a criminal investigation due
A He was bringing with him a firearm and he was looking at us very fiercely. 16 to fear of reprisal is common and has been judicially declared to have no effect on credibility. 25

On the other hand, to substantiate their claim of innocence, appellants simply denied that they had anything to Treachery
do with the deaths of Olimpia Cañeda and Samuel Tardin. They presented alibis to prove that at the time the
victims were killed, they were not at the scene of the crime but somewhere else.
Although appellants have not questioned the presence of treachery, the Court will nonetheless discuss it, so as
not to leave any doubt on whether it was properly appreciated by the trial court.
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED with the sole modification
that in Criminal Case No. CBU-34692, appellants are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Costs
against appellants.

"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."

For treachery to exist, two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives
the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption
of the means of execution.26

In the instant cases, both conditions were present. Guns and nocturnity were deliberately employed by
appellants to obviate any opportunity for the victims to defend themselves. Appellants arrived at the Cañeda
residence in the middle of the night, each armed with a gun. As can be expected, the victims were fast asleep.
Appellants' arrival was sudden and unexpected. Without much ado they forced open the door and broke in.
Immediately upon entering, Mario shot the still sleeping Samuel. He then grasped Olimpia, who had just
awakened, and shot her. In the meantime, Carmelita was able to run towards the other door, but was shot by
Julian Padigos. None of the victims had any opportunity to defend themselves against the gun-bearing men,
who had acted swiftly and surprisingly.

The deliberateness of the means employed to kill the victims is evident from appellants' act of purposely going
to the Cañeda residence and breaking down their door in the middle of the night, already fully armed and
without any provocation.

Carmelita's flight will not negate treachery. From the time appellants started their aggression by forcing open
the door of the Cañeda house, treachery was already evident. Settled is the rule that in order to appreciate
treachery in a continuous aggression, the same must be shown to be present at the inception of the attack. The
existence or non-existence of treachery is not dependent on the success of the assault. 27 What is decisive is that
the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to retaliate or resort to self-defense. 28 In this case,
there is no question that Carmelita had no opportunity to defend herself.

Conspiracy

We now go to the criminal participation of Primitivo and Julian. True, neither of them personally shot Olimpia
or Samuel. This fact, however, will not free them from liability for the murders. In conspiracy, it is not
necessary to show that all the conspirators actually attacked and killed the victim. What is important is that all
participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a
common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim.29

The records show that Primitivo and Julian, both armed, went with Mario to the house of the Cañedas late in
the night on June 7, 1993. After Mario forced the door open Julian went inside with him, while Primitivo acted
as lookout. When Mario shot Samuel and thereafter grasped Olimpia, his two companions stood by him. When
Carmelita, an occupant of the house, fled from them, Julian ran after and shot her, following the command for
him to do so.30 After the shooting of Olimpia, they all left the house together. 31 These acts show their unity of
purpose, and joint design to kill the victims, following a consciously adopted plan. Conspiracy having been
established, the act of one is considered the act of all.32

Proper Penalty for Frustrated Murder

There is, however, a need to modify the penalty imposed on appellants for frustrated murder in Criminal Case
No. CBU-34692. In cases such as this, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Since there are no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the maximum specific penalty should be within the medium period
of reclusion temporal. The minimum specific penalty should be taken from the range one degree lower than
the penalty prescribed by law, or prision mayor.
 G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996 II. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime in the
imposition of the maximum penalty against the accused-appellant. 9
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. NILO SOLAYAO, accused-appellant. This court, in the case of People v. Lualhati10 ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession of
firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the
subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
ROMERO, J.:
corresponding license or permit to possess the same.

Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran,
In assigning the first error, accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the
Branch 16, with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition 1 defined and penalized
subject firearm in evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained
under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
that the search made on his person violated his constitutional right to be secure in his person and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Not only was the search made without a warrant
The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose Niño, narrated that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of but it did not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
July 9, 1992, with CAFGU members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio Cenining, he went to Barangay Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides, inter alia:
Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by
their intelligence officer to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his
barangays of Caibiran. 2
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of Police Officer Niño proceeded to Barangay Onion where
they met the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became
Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is inadmissible in
suspicious when they observed that the latter were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was
evidence for being "the fruit of the poisonous
wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Accused-appellant's companions, upon seeing the
tree." 11 As such, the prosecution's case must necessarily fail and the accused-appellant acquitted.
government agents, fled. 3

Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et al. 12 where this
Police Officer Niño told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after
Court declared: ". . . emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be
which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a
incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.
49-inch long homemade firearm locally know as "latong." When he asked accused-appellant who
Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any
belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an arrest effected based on evidence produced by
intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon,
the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law."
SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran
who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm. 4
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's arguments are hardy
tenable. He and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Niño's group, as
Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that
well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit 13 and that upon
this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still
espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were
wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed that he was not aware that there was a shotgun concealed
precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons were roaming around the
inside the coconut leaves since they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed
barangays of Caibiran. 14
that this was the third torch handed to him after the others had been used up. 5 Accused-appellant's
claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano that he indeed received a torch from Hermogenes
Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun wrapped in coconut leaves. 6 The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals 15 where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified themselves and
apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was
On August 25, 1994, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearm
actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just
under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and imposed upon him the penalty of
suspended that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were.
imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. The trial court,
The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant."
having found no mitigating but one aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced accused-
appellant to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by
law. 7 It found that accused-appellant did not contest the fact that SPO3 Niño confiscated the This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case brought about by the
firearm from him and that he had no permit or license to possess the same. It hardly found credible suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was
accused-appellant's submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by accident and that probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made.
upon reaching Barangay Onion, he followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio
Sevillano, Willie Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not know his
In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified
companions. 8
himself as a government agents. 16 The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report
Accused-appellant comes to this Court on appeal and assigns the following errors: that there were armed men roaming in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was
understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known
that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
I. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged it. Familiar instance of this is
without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant the case of a person prosecuted for doing an act or carrying on a business, such as, the
when his companions filed upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the sale of liquor without a license. How could the prosecution aver the want of a license if
government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first. it had acquired no knowledge of that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence
or non-existence of such license can, with more facility, be adduced by the defendant, it
is nevertheless, encumber upon the party alleging the want of the license to prove the
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
allegation. Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly
seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm
within the control or knowledge of the accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part
as evidence.
of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him." (6 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 8).
As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second element, that is,
the absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm, this Court agrees with the Office
Finally, the precedents cited above have been crystallized as the present governing case law on this
of the Solicitor General which pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-
question. As this Court summed up the doctrine in People v. Macagaling: 20
appellant lacked the necessary permit or license to possess the subject firearm. 17

Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of
the offense of illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an offense
must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 18
In People v. Tiozon, 19 this Court said:
We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of the
prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offense as alleged against the accused in
an information, which allegations must perforce include any negative element provided
by the law to integrate that offense. We have reiterated quite recently the fundamental
mandate that since the prosecution must allege all the elements of the offense charged,
then it must prove by the requisite quantum of evidence all the elements it has thus
alleged.

It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758 could In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that accused-
be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal appellant admitted before Police Officer Niño at the time that he was accosted that he did not have
possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm, any authority or license to carry the subject firearm when he was asked if he had one. 21 In other
but we are of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of words, the prosecution relied on accused-appellant's admission to prove the second element.
the Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the
offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the
Is this admission sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged," the
possession of firearm which is that accused-appellant does not have the corresponding license?
burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm used by
Corollary to the above question is whether an admission by the accused-appellant can take the place
appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.
of any evidentiary means establishing beyond reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in
the pleading and which forms an essential ingredient of the crime charged.
It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the
offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant in
This Court answers both questions in the negative. By its very nature, an "admission is the mere
Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now G.R. No. 27681) specifically alleged
acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstance from which guilt may be inferred, tending to
that he had no "license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein.
incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt." 22 In other words, it is a
Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative
"statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of
fact but to prove it. This view is supported by similar adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria,
other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize
17 Phil. 303, the accused was charged with "having criminally inscribed himself as a
conviction." 23 From the above principles, this Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is
voter knowing that he had none of the qualifications required to be a voter. It was there
insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged.
held that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a voter was an essential element
of the crime charged and should be proved by the prosecution. In another case (People
vs. Quebral. 68 Phil. 564) where the accused was charged with illegal practice of Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4 of
medicine because he had diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain diseases suffered Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court which states:
by certain patients from whom he received monetary compensation, without having
previously obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Medical
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other
Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of the Administrative Code, this Court held that
proceedings in the same case does not require proof.
if the subject of the negative averment like, for instance, the act of voting without the
qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient of the offense charged, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the same, although in view of the difficulty of Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond
proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such circumstance, need only reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even establish
establish a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us, a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the
both appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case fact of absence or lack of a license.
upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. Former Chief
Justice Moral upholds this view as follows:
This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the prosecution was able
to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the possession of
The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of the appellant, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to possess the same, such
fact alleged, should not relieve the party making the averment of the burden of proving fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other
it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be assumed to have acquired some words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or
permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification from the
government agency concerned." 24
Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends upon
the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of
each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative." 25
In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police
that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber would have sufficed for
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm.
In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to discuss the second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant Nilo Solayao is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and ordered
immediately released unless there are other legal grounds for his continued detention, with cost de
oficio.
G.R. No. 110107 January 26, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. DOLORES LORENZO Y CORSINO, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
For having allegedly killed her husband on 30 July 1990, accused-appellant Dolores Lorenzo y Corsino, a
policewoman, was charged with the crime of parricide in an information 1 filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, on 30 March 1992. The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2060-
92-TUG and raffled to Branch 5. The accusatory portion thereof reads as follows:
That on or about July 30, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, PO1
Dolores C. Lorenzo, armed with a bolo and a fan knife, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and with treachery did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, stab, hack and chop one, Agapito Lorenzo, her own husband, inflicting
upon him several injuries on the different parts of his body which caused his death.
That in the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was
present.
After due trial, the trial court promulgated on 24 February 1993 2 its judgment finding the appellant guilty of
the crime of parricide and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00.
At the trial, the prosecution presented barangay captain Isabelo Liban and SPO1 Jose Eclipse as its witnesses.
The defense presented the appellant herself and Romeo Racheta. The versions of both the prosecution and the
defense are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The prosecution's evidence tells the following story:
Agapito Lorenzo and accused Dolores Lorenzo were spouses
residing in Looban, Barangay 12, Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Among their neighbors are Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban,
Romeo Racheta and Robert Santos.
In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Jose Eclipse of the
Tuguegarao PNP Station was in Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan
because that was his post for the night. At about a little past 10:00
o'clock that evening, a tricycle driver went to Policeman Eclipse
and reported to him a stabbing incident in said Barangay 12;
Policeman Eclipse rushed to the reported crime scene. On his
way, he met PO1 Dolores Lorenzo, a policewoman of his own
Station who immediately surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo
and a fan knife and told him, "I killed my husband".
The two proceeded to where the victim was. In front of the store
of Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban, Policeman Eclipse saw
Agapito sprawled on the ground with blood all over his body.
Policeman Eclipse called for Barangay Captain Liban to come out
of his house. In the presence and within the hearing of said
barangay official, Policewoman Lorenzo again said, "I'm
surrendering because I killed my husband".
Policeman Eclipse ordered somebody to get a tricycle to bring the
lifeless body of Agapito Lorenzo to a funeral parlor while he and
Policewoman Lorenzo went to the Tuguegarao PNP Station.
 Policeman Eclipse turned over Policewoman Lorenzo together of the Constitution.5 The appellant was neither under police custody nor under investigation in connection with
with the bolo and knife to the Desk Officer, SPO3 Urbano the killing of her husband.
Aquino. Eclipse then orally made his report to the Desk Officer
which was noted down in the Police Blotter.
The trial court rejected the story of the defense and characterized it as "palpably a put-up scenario . . . . [A]
story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality, controverts logic and assails common sense." 6
The defense painted another picture of the incident. It's theory is
that it was not Policewoman Lorenzo but a certain Robert Santos
First, accused Policewoman Lorenzo testified that it is not true that she confessed to
who killed Agapito. Here is the defense's version of the incident.
Policeman Eclipse in the presence of Barangay Captain Liban that she killed her
husband. If her denial is true, why did she not correct or even protest when Policeman
In the afternoon of July 30, 1990, Agapito Lorenzo and his Eclipse reported to the Desk Officer that she confessed having killed her husband? Why
neighbor Robert Santos were in the former's house passing the did she not even try to correct the entry in the police blotter containing said inculpatory
time over a bottle of beer grande. When Policewoman Lorenzo report? On the contrary, by some inexplicable quirk, she even let the cat out when she
arrived home from work, Agapito, in the presence of Robert presented in evidence Exhibit "1".
Santos, met her with the following intemperate questions: "Your
mother's cunt, why do you arrive only now? Where did you come
Second, accused put forth the theory of her defense: it was not she but Robert Santos
from? To avoid further scandal, Policewoman Lorenzo just keep
who did her husband in. This theory is shot. If this is true, why did she not tell it to
quiet, went to change her clothes and proceeded to the kitchen to
Policeman Eclipse and Barangay Captain Liban at the scene of the crime? Why did she
prepare supper. Finding nothing to cook, she asked permission
withhold such a very vital information when she was brought to the Tuguegarao PNP
from her husband to go to market.
Station shortly after the incident? But the biggest "why" is: Why did not the accused,
wife of the slain man and policewoman at that, file a criminal case against Robert
Policewoman went to market and then immediately went back Santos?
home to cook what she bought. While cooking in the kitchen, she
heard a heated exchange of words between Robert Santos and her
The accused's explanation was: she was still uncomposed when she turned over the
husband in the sala of their house pertaining to some bullets and a
knife and bolo to Policeman Eclipse and even when she was in the police station. She
hand grenade which the latter gave Robert Santos.
did not also file a case against Robert Santos because she found herself the suspect and
later on the accused.
Policewoman Lorenzo went to the sala to pacify the quarelling
men only to meet Robert Santos running out of the house with a
These reasons do not cut ice. They are for the birds. No one with an ordinary
bolo and being chased by Agapito Lorenzo who was holding a
intelligence would buy such reasons.
knife in his hand and whose clothes were splattered with blood.
When Agapito overtook Robert, a struggle for the possession of
the bolo ensued between the two men. Third, the accused never filed a counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation of
this case. Not that a counter-affidavit is obligatory but that it afforded the accused the
best opportunity to explain her innocence and to identify the "real killer" of her husband.
While wrestling, Agapito dropped his knife. Policewoman
Why did she not grab this chance — as normal people in the same situation — would
Lorenzo picked it up and tried to stab Robert with it but she was
have done?
so overwhelmed by nervousness that she collapsed into
unconsciousness. Seconds later on, she regained consciousness
and found herself beside her dying husband. Fourth, accused version is simply implausible. According to Policewoman Lorenzo,
when she saw her husband Agapito chasing Robert out of the house, Agapito's clothes
were already bloodied. Since there is no proof at all that Robert ever sustained any
Policewoman Lorenzo stood and picked up the knife and bolo. It
wound, the implication is that Agapito was already hacked and stabbed by Robert inside
was at this precise time when Policeman Eclipse arrived at the
the former's house.
scene of the incident.

Policewoman Lorenzo gave the knife and bolo to Policeman
Eclipse. The Policeman invited her to go with him to the
Tuguegarao PNP Station. She obliged. When the two arrived at
the police station, Policeman Eclipse, in the presence of
Policewoman Lorenzo, reported to the Desk Officer that the latter
killed her husband. Since the policewoman had not yet fully
recovered her composure, she did not say anything.3
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found nothing on
record which showed that their impartiality had been vitiated or compromised or that they had any motive to
falsely impute upon the appellant the commission of the crime. It further declared that when the appellant
surrendered the knife and bolo to SPO1 Eclipse and volunteered the information that she killed her husband,
she made an extrajudicial confession and nothing more was needed to prove her culpability. 4 The trial court
held that the confession was admissible for it was not made in violation of paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III
It is therefore, difficult to believe that Agapito who already sustained several wounds
could chase Robert — and even harder to imagine that he wrestled with Robert for the
possession of the latter's bolo. But why, it may be asked, should Agapito still try to
divest Robert of his bolo when he (Agapito) was holding a knife which he could have
easily used against the latter during the alleged clinching between the two?
Finally, it is very unnatural for "assailant" Robert to have left his bolo before running
away from the scene of the crime. This is a concoction to provide an explanation for the
possession of the accused of a knife and a bolo.
Fifth, the version of accused and her witness Romeo Racheta are even at variance at a
very vital point. Thus, Policewoman Lorenzo said that when Agapito was able to
overtake Robert in front of the store of Barangay Captain Liban, the two struggled for
the possession of the bolo of Robert. Witness Racheta however said that when Agapito
 chased Robert, he caught up with him when he was already cornered. When Robert
could no longer run anywhere else, he turned around, faced Agapito and hacked and
stabbed him many times. Such inconsistency in the version of the two defense witnesses
cannot but heighten one's conviction that the defense theory is a conjured one.7
The appellant appealed from the judgment to this Court and in her brief8 contends that the trial court erred in:
I. . . . GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES ISABELO LIBAN AND SPO1 JOSE ECLIPSE.
II. . . . NOT HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED WAS NOT PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT."9
She discusses these jointly and, in support thereof, she asseverates that the testimonies of Liban and Eclipse
are inconsistent on material points, for while Liban declared in court and stated in his sworn statement that he
(Liban) came out of his house and heard the appellant confess to Eclipse that she killed her husband, Eclipse
testified that Liban did not come out of his house. One of them, she continues, did not tell the truth and argues
that a testimony on her alleged confession, which would be devoid of any evidentiary value without
corroboration.
She pleads that this Court discredit both Liban and Eclipse because the testimony of Liban was improbable
while that of Eclipse "was not so firm and resolute as to what was actually allegedly told him by the accused."
At one time, while testifying, he declared that the appellant told him that she "accidentally injured her
husband," but on another, he testified that the appellant told him that she "killed her husband." 10 Also, as
shown in the entry in the police blotter, 11 Eclipse was reported to have disclosed that the appellant "voluntarily
surrendered and asked him to bring her to the police station because she allegedly killed her husband named
Agapito Lorenzo, Jr. together with Robert Santos who first stabbed him"; yet, in his testimony in court he
pinned down only the appellant and mentioned nothing about Santos. Furthermore, she charges the prosecution
with suppression of evidence in not presenting as a witness another police officer who Eclipse said
accompanied him to the scene of the crime and who used a vehicle which they rode in going to the police
station. 12
Meeting squarely the ratiocinations of the trial court in describing the story of the defense as a "probably put-
up scenario," the appellant asserts that it was error for the trial court to hold her failure to correct the entry in
the police blotter against her since there is nothing in the records which clearly shows that she heard Eclipse
making the report to the desk officer and that she saw the entry. The appellant also contends that the trial court
erred when it made capital of her alleged failure to file a criminal complaint against Robert Santos since it was
the police's duty to arrest and prosecute Robert Santos, Eclipse having known of Robert Santos' killing of her
husband. Besides, she was in detention all throughout and suffering from trauma. She avers that the trial court
erred when it held against her the failure to file her counter-affidavit, since that was not obligatory and her
non-filing was in accord with her constitutional right to remain silent. Finally, she contends that the
conclusions drawn by the trial court in its evaluation of her testimony and that of her witnesses are mere
speculations.
The appellee agrees with the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court and prays that the challenged
decision be affirmed.
The pith of the assigned errors and the focus of the appellant's arguments is the issue of the witnesses'
credibility. It is a well-entrenched rule that when such is the issue, appellate courts will generally not disturb
the findings of the trial court considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless
certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case. 13 The trial court has the singular opportunity to observe and consider certain potent aids in understanding
and weighing the testimony of witnesses, such as the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice of the
witnesses while they are on the witness stand. As these are not incorporated into the record, the appellate court
cannot avail of them and must therefore rely on the good judgment of the trial court. 14 The appellant has not
convinced us that the trial court plainly overlooked proved facts or circumstances which, if considered, may
affect the result of this case. We thus accept its assessment of the evidence as correct and consider it binding,
there being no showing that it was reached arbitrarily. 15 Our own evaluation thereof yields no cause for the
application of the exception to the settled rule.
We agree with the trial court that prosecution witness SPO1 Jose Eclipse told the truth when he declared under
oath that the appellant surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife and told him that she killed her
husband. Eclipse happened to be on his way to the scene of the stabbing incident which was reported to him by
a tricycle driver while he was in the performance of his official duty at his assigned post in Barangay Balzain,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Eclipse and the appellant both belonged to the same police unit, the PNP at the
Tuguegarao station. There is nothing in the records, and more specifically in the cross-examination of Eclipse
and the direct examination of the appellant, which suggests, even remotely, that Eclipse had any improper
motive to implicate a fellow police officer in the commission of a serious crime or the slightest bias against the
appellant which would blemish his objectivity and truthfulness.
If there was any bias, it should have been, logically, in favor of the appellant because of esprit de corps.
Eclipse did not allow that sentiment to compromise his official and public duty as a peace officer. It is settled
that the absence of evidence as to an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none
existed and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit, for, indeed, if an accused had nothing to do
with the crime, it would be against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the
presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness to falsely testify against the accused. 16
The appellant's emphasis on the inconsistency in the testimony of Eclipse as to what she actually told him, i.e.,
that she "injured" her husband or "killed" him, is misplaced; the latter word was used when the court asked
him for the precise term used by the appellant. 17
Nor is there merit to the claim that Isabelo Liban's testimony must corroborate Eclipse's testimony or the
confession of the appellant since without such corroboration Eclipse's testimony would have no probative
value. This theory could only be a product of a misunderstanding of Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. — An extrajudicial
confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
Note that what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the person to
whom the confession is made, and the corroborative evidence required is not the testimony of another person
who heard the confession but the evidence of corpus delicti. Except when expressly required by law, 18 the
testimony of a single person, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. 19 In determining the value and credibility of evidence,
witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.20
As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant herself does not question its presence because
she knows that it has been overwhelmingly established in this case. Corpus delicti is the body (material
substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains
of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is
made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for example a man has died or a building
has been burned, and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act. Section 3, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court does not mean that every element of the crime charged must be clearly established by
independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that there should be some evidence tending
to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession. Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a
species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other evidence
sufficient to justify conviction independently of such confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence need
not, independently of the confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. 21
Since the corroboration of Isabelo Liban's testimony was unnecessary, we need not discuss its intrinsic merits,
more especially on its alleged inconsistencies vis-a-vis the testimony of Eclipse which inconsistencies we,
nevertheless, find to be on minor matters. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses; on
the contrary, they even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility because they erase any suspicion
of rehearsed testimony. 22
The claim of suppression of evidence has no merit. The testimony of the other policeman whom Eclipse
requested to get a vehicle could only be corroborative in some respects but not of the fact of the surrender of
the blood-stained bolo and fan knife and of the appellant's telling Eclipse that she killed her husband since it
was explicitly shown that he was with Eclipse at the precise time of the surrender. The prosecutor and the
defense counsel asked no further questions of Eclipse to elicit more on the presence of the other policeman. In
any event, even if the latter were present, his testimony would only be corroborative. Furthermore, it has never
been shown that the said policeman was not available to the defense. The presumption laid down in Section
3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does
not apply when the testimony of the witness not produced would only be corroborative, or when the said
witness is available to the defense because then the evidence would have the same weight against one party as
against the other. 23
We do not, however, agree with the trial court's characterization of the appellant's declaration that she killed
her husband as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. It is clear from Sections 26 and 33, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court that there is a distinction between an admission and a confession. These sections
reads as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or admission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.
In a confession. there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or
of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 24 Wharton 25 defines confession as
follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of
his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct
or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other
facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself
is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate
fact of guilt.
26
Underhill distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:
A confession is defined as an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged or of the
facts which constitute the crime; but it is an admission and not a confession if the facts
acknowledged raise an inference of guilt only when considered with other facts.
While Wigmore 27 says:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the
accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged
or of some essential part of it. 28
Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible against the appellant and, having
been duly proved, together with the other facts and circumstances, the burden of the evidence was shifted to
the appellant to disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the admission or, admitting it, to prove that she
was not guilty of killing her husband. As earlier shown, the trial court characterized her story as "palpably a
put-up scenario
. . . . [A] story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality, controverts logic and assails common sense."
The five reasons enumerated by it to support this conclusion are founded on or are inferred from facts duly
established by the prosecution or are otherwise solidly based on common experience, logic, and common
sense.
The trial court had stated that if indeed the appellant never confessed to Eclipse that she killed her husband,
she should have protested when Eclipse reported to the desk officer that she had confessed to the killing of her
husband or she should have attempted to correct the entry in the police blotter containing this inculpatory
report. The appellant demonstrated her penchant for falsehood when, in order to refute this statement, she
asserted in her brief that nothing in the record clearly shows that she heard Eclipse making the report and that
she read the entry in the police blotter. She conveniently forgot that on cross-examination she admitted having
heard Eclipse making the report but claiming that she did not protest because she was not in her right senses
and was in a state of shock at the time. Thus:
Prosecutor Saguncio:
Q Did the desk officer ever talk to you?
A No, sir.
Q So it was only PFC Eclipse who talked to the desk officer?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Within your hearing and you heard PFC Eclipse talked to the
desk officer?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And what did PFC Eclipse report to the desk officer?
A The one that is appearing in the excerpt of the police blotter, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Q When you said that you heard Pat. Eclipse reported to the desk
officer you meant to say that you heard him telling the police
officer that you killed your husband Agapito Lorenzo, Jr. together
with Robert Santos who first stabbed him, is that not so?
A Yes, sir.
Court:
Proceed.
Pros. Saguncio:
Q You heard this and you did not make any comment?
A Yes, sir, but because at this time I was not in my right senses
because I was then shocked at that time. 29
The appellant's failure to assert, at any part of the entire event, from the time she went with Eclipse to the
police station up to the time she was committed to jail and even thereafter until she took the witness stand, that
it was not she who killed her husband only serves to reinforce and strengthen this Court's respect for the trial
court's finding that her story that "it was not she but Robert Santos who did her husband in, "is shot." We find
it incredible that a peace officer and a wife of the victim would not forthwith denounce or reveal the identity of
the assailant if it were true that it was not she who killed her husband. This Court has held that the testimony of
the accused is not credible where he has adopted an attitude of indifference relative to the crime he is accused
of and where he failed to inform the police authorities and the fiscal during the investigation that it was not he
but somebody else who committed the murder. 30
Even granting for the sake of argument that the appellant only surrendered a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife
but did not admit that she killed her husband, we find in this case several circumstances whose concordant
combination and cumulative effect 31 point to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty party.
These circumstances are the following:
 1. A tricycle driver reported to Eclipse a stabbing incident and the latter immediately
proceeded to where it took place;

2. Eclipse met the appellant who had with her a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife;

3. The appellant surrendered to Eclipse the blood-stained bolo and the fan knife;

4. The appellant's husband lay dead nearby with nine chop wounds, thirteen stab
wounds, and nine incised wounds on different parts of his body, with abrasions and
multiple contusions as well;32

5. Eclipse accompanied the appellant to the police station and, in her presence, the
former reported to the desk officer that she surrendered to him and told him that she had
killed her husband; the desk officer then entered this report in the police blotter;

6. Although the appellant heard the report, she did not protest to Eclipse or except to the
report; and

7. The appellant never asked the police authorities to investigate Robert Santos for his
complicity in the killing of her husband; despite the unhampered opportunities for her to
denounce Santos as the alleged killer of her husband, she implicated Santos only when
she testified on 21 January 1993, 33 or after the lapse of nearly two and one-half years
after the incident.

These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
points to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The requirements then of Section 4,
Rule 133 34 of the Rules of Court on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict the appellant are
present.35

To be appreciated in the appellant's favor, however, is the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The
penalty for parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death, which are
both indivisible penalties. In the light of the mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty which should be
imposed upon the appellant should be reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Rule 3, Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The challenged decision is then in accordance with the facts and the applicable laws.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in
Criminal Case No. 2060-92-TUG is AFFIRMED.