Emotivism & Expressivism

Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (1984)

Chapter 5, s. 6

Expressivism is the view that a moral utterance does not express a belief about something, but
expresses or evinces a certain attitude towards it

i.e. saying that a statement is true = endorsing it; saying that X causes Y = offering X as an instrument
or recipe for obtaining Y; saying that a statement is probable = expressing guarded assent to it
(Blackburn, 1984, p.168)

One advantage of expressivism: avoids the undesirable consequence of subjectivism that ‘X is good’
and ‘X is bad’ need not be contradictory, as for the subjectivist both of these statements can be true
at the same time. [cf difference between having a certain attitude (expressivist) and saying that one
has a certain attitude (emotivist)

Blackburn believes that expressivism needs to explain more than crude versions of it do. For
instance, expressivism often views the projection of moral values onto the world as a mistake.
Indeed, we commonly take moral values to be true or false, but this is merely ‘gilding and staining all
natural objects with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment’ (Hume, quoted in Blackburn,
p.171). Therefore, the expressivist holds that, in using moral language, we claim more than is really
contained in moral utterances (cf Mackie’s error theory, Ayer’s ‘Critique of Ethics and Theology’).
Blackburn believes that this claim needs elucidating. Are we really mistaken? If so, why? Does this
mean that we would give up our claims to moral cognitivism if we were aware of the true origins of
our moral practices?

Blackburn argues that there is no mistake, that ‘even on anti-realist grounds there is nothing
improper, nothing “diseased” in projected predicates’ (p.171), and call this reconciliation quasi-
realism.

[Frege-Geach Objection: in logic, the soundness of an argument depends on the truth value of the
premises. But if a moral statement is not truth-apt, it can never be used in a logical argument (an
attitude cannot have any implications). It seems that the expressivist cannot accept the validity of
the argument: (1) If torturing a cat is bad, then getting your little brother to do it is bad. (2) Torturing
the cat is bad. (3) Therefore, getting your little brother to torture the cat is bad.

Blackburn’s solution: moral sensibility – ‘a moral sensibility (...) is defined by a function from input of
belief to output of attitude’ (p.192).

The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman (1977), Chap 3

Moral judgements = expression of emotions, attitudes, feelings, norms, values (not belief/fact).
Judgement is not about approval or disapproval, it is merely an expression of it: ‘To value something
is to be in an emotional state, not in a cognitive state’ (p.28).

Note: this does not mean that moral language is dispensable: emotivism is a form of moderate
nihilism.

Open question argument: emotivists believe that to say a natural characteristic C is wrong will
always be an open question, because such a statement is an expression of emotion (argument
implies that values are not universal)