Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Copyrighted Material
Copyrighted Material
began in July 1982, when the Ways and Means Commirtec voted on two
conserutive days to debate procedural issues relating to a Senate-initiated
taX increase (H.R. 4961 ) in cxeattive session. The following year it became
clear that the committee was breaking with a decade· long practice of open
markups when sessions in July and October to draft additional revenue·
raising provisions (H .R. 41 70) were dosed to the public. Since 1983. all
major ux legislation has been drafted in closed ses.~ion. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to isolate the effects of closing markup sessions. However, in·
'
impossibl~ to
.. .
isolate the effects of closing markup sessions. However, in-
terviews with committee members suggest that the rerum to closed sessions
may have reduced the influence of particular interests and dicntdc groups
in committee decisioslmak.ing and may have al~o encouraged members to
take a broader view of the issues at stake in recent tax legislation.8
First, committee members stated that the presence ar markups of rep-
rc:scnrat:ivc.~ of clientele groups and constituency interests v.-ould make it
difficult for them ro support measures that might impose costS on their
own constituencies or groups that had provided support in past elections.
These comments confirm that the pull of the electoral connection is an
important inBuencc on members' behavior. Said one committee member,
on the difficulty of writing tax legislation in public sessions: "You're not
going to solve problems in front of an audience. We're politicians and part
of that is a public posture that's required of us."' A S«ond member was
more explicit:
Say you've got a special problem in your district and those people
that support you arc sitting out thCTC in ffont. When you're mark·
ing up a biU, all you're going ro talk about is yuur interest at home.
You're not going to talk about your interest in the context of a biU as
weighed agairu1: other competing interests and seek a reasonable solu-
tion. You're going to take a hard line for what your people want.
In a scenario that was repeated a number of times in othe.r interviews,
another member explained the different environment that exists when de·
liberations are shielded &om direct public observation:
A memlxr can enter a mild prorest about the defeat of an amendment
he might otherwise feel compelled co support.... Then, when the
markup is over, the member can go out into the hall and say to the
lobbyist, "I worked to get your amendment adopted but I just got
outvoted.''
Although many issues are resoh·cd by recorded votes in closed mark-
ups (forty-eight recorded votes on substantive issues wc:re taken during the
Ways and Means markup of tax reform legislation in 1985), the committee
has often made decisions in dosed sessions through informal agreement, a
show of hands, or voice votes. As one member pointed out, even with
Tbe Polirits ofTnx Refonn • 145
closed sessions: "Sometimes '"'c don't want to take a recorded vote when
there arc a lor oflobbyists out there."
An example from the Wa)'S and Means Committee tax refonn markup
illuscrarcs the importance to members of avoiding recorded votes on-and
hence individual responsibility for- certain types of provisions. Ways and
Means Committee Democrats had agreed in the final stage.~ of the markup
to eliminate part of a tax preference strongly supported by organized labor
(exemption of employee fringe benefits) on the condition that no recorded
vote would be taken on the issue. When Republicans, frustrated by their
limited influence on the biU's development, refused ro cooperate and de-
manded a recorded vote on the issue, Democrats ba.Uc:ed at eliminating the
labor-supported preference, deciding instead to set the top corporate rate a
percentage point higher to pick up the revenue needed to maintain revenue
neutrality.9
Titc: ability to resolve issues in dosed sessions allows members to avoid
some of the direct responsibility for imposing costs on constituency inter-
ests or group allies, as was almost inevitable with rax rcfonn.10 To usc the
fonnularion developed by R. Kent Weaver, dosed meetings are in part a
mechanism for blame avoidance on issues that may have negative consc:-
quenc:cs for committee members' constituencies. 11
According to some members, a dosed deliberative process, by weaken-
ing the pull of particularistic interests, encourages members to consider
broader issues that may be at stake in committee bills. One member ob-
served that he and his colleagues tend ro be much more "outspoken" about
"what is right for the country" in closed sessions. Said another on the
effectS of closing markups: "We don't think so much about the posturing,
about satisfying someone sirting there watching you, as the needs of other
members and what wr: perceive to be important." Finally, one senior Repub-
lican stated directly: "I think without the dosed markups [Rostcnkowski]
... couldn'r have passed the rax rc:fonn act."
The return to closed committee deliberations is one factor mar helps
explain the outcome on tax refonn. Closed markups aUowcd members to
avoid individual responsibility (and thus individual blame) for eliminating
some of the rax preferences important ro clientele groups, and thus helped
avoid individual responsibility (and thus individ ual blame) for eliminating
some of the tax preferences important to clientele groups, and thus helped
shift the focus of the comminec's deliberations from protecting parochial
interests to achieving broader objectives through ta"t reform.
A second factor that has incrc:ascd the auronomy of the Ways and
Means Commincc during the 1980s has been the acceptance in the House
of more rest:riccive procedures for considering tax legislation on the House
floor. After decades of debating tax legislacion under closed rules prohibit-
ing amendments not approved by the Ways and Means Committee, rhe
House acted between 1973 and 1975 ro alter this practice in order ro allow
broader participation in tax dc.cisionma.lcing. Ll However, after a single case
Copyrighted Material
Copyrighted Material
Chapter7
I. Joint Committcx on Taxation, Enimlltt41 Rnenue /ifftcU ofthe Prttidtnt's TtU
!Ufumt I'rop<l$al, p. 15.
2. Verdier, "Tax Rcfonn Aa of 1986." Sec also "The: President, Congress, and
Tax Rc:fonn."
3. Aaron. "The Impossible Dream," p. 6.
4. Witte, Politics ofthe Fetkrlli In""'" TtU, pp. 385- 86. Witte was hardly alone:
in this view. Sc::c, for example, Davies, United Stllla T11.-ca IUUi TtU Policj, chap. 14;
King, "Tax Expcndirurcs and Systematic Public Policy," pp. 29-30; and Conablc,
OJrram:s tu~d the I , _ TtU, p. xii.
5. The most imporcmt of the broader con.stii.UCilcics, according to Witte, has
been the middle class. Wine argues that a major f.K:tor contributing to the tax
reduction bias since World W;tr 11 has been me goal of maintaining a stable tax
burden on the middle class during period& of inllation. Politics of t!Je Fuleral lnamu:
nx. chaps. 4-12.
6. Ibid.
7. For an analysis of the cnaamc:nt of tax refonn that identifies some similar
causal faaors and offers a broader focus than the analysis of Ways and Means
Committcx politics in this chaprer, sex Conlan, Beam, and WrightsOn, TIUing
Clx!iu:1.
8. On members' views of the effects of open markups, sex also Rudder, "Com·
mittec Rcfonn," pp. 124- 26.
9. Birnbaum and Murray, Slxmlmm 111 Gu«i Gult.h, pp. 148-51.
10. Concerning the: consequences of closed sessions for tax bills prior ro 1985,
one Ways and Means member noted: " I think dosed meetings were especially effec·
rive: in dc:vcloping the: '83 and '84 tax bills, in rc:moving exemptions, and [inJ
refusing to accept amendment& that v.'OU.ld have lost money for the: Trc:asury."
11. Weavc:r, Auttmlllli& (;qpnnmmr, chap. 2.
12. Sex Manley, Poli1ia of Fimma . 220- 33; Rudder, "Committee Reform,"
...Rudder, had the greatest whole House.... .
impact on the commit- tee's and Means does, bt
operation: 1. Sec:,...-~---------------"-'~,.;-•s;'~~..__.__..,_
... freshman Dem< ... according to Rudder, had the greatest impact on the commit- tee's
William Lehman of operation: 1. Secret ballot selection of committee chairmen instead
observed: "It is n< of complete reliance on the ...
_,e.. __ : .. .. · · - - _ .... -
~ --=
-= -"'--------,.-------,.--,--.,.---,rr-,.--
spc:Ued trouble for Ways and Means.
Ln addition ro this long-simmering discontent over policy ourcomes,
Ways and Means also began to come under fire during the 1970s for "the
mechanics" of how it operated. Restricting participation in policy formula·
rion for major economic and social welfare issues to a carefully selected
group of senior members clashed with the new participatory ethic in the
ousc. said one mcmocr who joined the committee after it was cxp
in 1974: "This comrnirtcc operated in secret for so long and played it so
safe, it became a joke."57 In part, demand~ for broader panicipation in
•ssues an lCcl oy ays an cans were also ffie proo uct olfni.S6'3tion
among liberals over policy outcomes. A common theme among liberal re-
formers was that majorities in fact might ha,re existed in the House for new
policy initiativcs- inc.luding rax reform and national health insurance-but
they were stymied by institutional arrangementS that gave advantages ro
supporters and beneficiaries of the status quo. Charles A. Vanik (D-Ohio),
the member who introduced the caucus measure to expand the size of Ways
and Means, afterward explained the desirability of such a change in these
tt'mlS: "In the past, the commirtcc has operated as a brake, preventing
legislation from coming to the Roor and burying the impetus for change
such as tax reform." 58
One member who was a senior Ways and Means Democrat at the time
Banking and Currency, W. R. Poage of Agriculture. and f. Edward Hebert
of Armed Services.
While the Bolling committee was careful tO maintain extensive records
of its work on committee reform, there is remarkably little in the publjc
record related co the restructuring of the Ways and Means Committee un-
dertaken by the Democratic caucus in December 1974. In contraSt to the
revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910, \VC have almost nothing in the
way of publiC Oct>itc iliat offers a bill of partiCUlars in support of dlange,
because the procedural majority that enacted the reforms worked behind
dosed doors in the Democratic caucus. Even so it seems clear from ocher
evidence that the primary rallying points for the sweeping changes en-
acted in 1974 \VCrc impatience among Democratic liberals with the com-