Quiňo, et. al. v.

COMELEC

G.R. No. 197466

Villarama, Jr.,J.

FACTS:
Joel Quiňo and Ritchie Wagas both ran for mayor in Compostella, Cebu during the May
2010 elections. The case at bar presents a petition for certiorari, filed by Wagas, seeking to annul the
resolutions dated January 12, 2011 and June 13, 2011, and to sustain the proclamation by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBOC), wherein the petitioners were declared as duly-elected officials of
Compostella.
In the canvassing, it was recorded that Quiňo received 11,719 votes, and Wagas received 9,336 votes.
Quiňo and other winners were proclaimed by the MBOC on May 11, 2010. Wagas filed a series of petitions
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaue and COMELEC. He claimed that the proclamation should be
annulled because it was discovered that audit/print logs of the consolidating machine of MBOC did not
reflect at least 14 clustered precincts, and yet it still generated the Certificate of Canvass and Statement of
Votes. Case in point, in Cluster Precinct No. 19, Wagas received 700 votes but the Statement of Votes
reflected only 10 votes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the discrepancy in the number of votes should lead to the annulment ofthe proclamation
of winners
HELD:
The Court decided to dismiss the case because it was already moot. There is no justiciable controversy
in cases that are considered moot and academic. The petitioneris also not entitled to any relief
due to the dismissal of the case.

G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER,

G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having
allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that
he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the
petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec,
contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
 Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a
Filipino citizen.

Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate”
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take
cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth,
provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines."

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870.
In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954
was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being
so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American

citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s
birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the
allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74 of the Omnibus Election Code

Penera vs. COMELEC GR 181613 September 11, 2009 & November 25, 2009 Premature
Campaigning
NOVEMBER 23, 2017

FACTS:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica
during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the
Regional Election Director, Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against
Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to
her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political
activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period.

Rosalinda A. Penera’s filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11

September 2009.The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the
Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24
July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for
the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor
should succeed Penera.

ISSUE:

Is Penera guilty of premature campaigning? May premature campaigning be committed by

a person who is not a candidate?

RULING:

No to both. Under the assailed September 11, 2009 Decision, a candidate may already be
liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even
before the start of the campaign period. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature
campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision
considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already “candidate” even before
the start of the campaign period.

Now the Court holds that the assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the
law. In Lanot v. COMELEC,it held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period. Lanot was decided on the ground that one
who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period.

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second
sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. In RA 9369,
Congress inserted the word “only” so that the first proviso now reads:

x x x Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that
election offenses can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of the campaign
period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election
offenses cannot be so committed.

In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any
election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be
committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for
premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the
assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.

ELECTION LAW: MIRIAM DEFENSOR–SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)
MIRIAM DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)

Facts:

The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992
election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment
of the 29th of August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the
revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision
process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.

The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and
protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her
election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the
30th of June in the year 1995.

Held:

YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or
considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as
Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.

The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest
involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the
aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the
all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.

Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if
after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to
present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a
manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

Case Digest: P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005

Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., protestant, vs. Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, protestee.
_____________________________________________________________________________

Facts: GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President of the Philippines.
Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed an election protest
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. However, the protestant died in the course of his
medical treatment at St. Luke’s Hospital. Now, the widow of FPJ, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe
submitted a manifestation with urgent petition/motion to intervene as a substitute for
deceased protestant FPJ.

Issue: Whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter’s protest case.

Ruling: No. The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a public office is personal
and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to
the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all
authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution and intervention is allowed
but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited
or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein
movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus,
given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant’s widow is not a real
party in interest to this election protest.

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men
and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme
Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.

Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a
violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution.
The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is,
the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than
out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on
the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force
to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not
tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

Case Digest #2-2 | GR No. 189698 | Quinto and Tolentino vs COMELEC

FACTS:

The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of

RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679

that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

BACKGROUND:

Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA

9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as

unconstitutional.

Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.

The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election

Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public appointive

office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and

officers and employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon

filling of his certificate of candidacy“

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the

Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal

protection clause of the constitution.

HELD:

The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third

paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the

COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.

RULING:

These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits

civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political

campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and

employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable.

The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to

reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that

make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from the other.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privelege,

as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit

legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which

it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that

all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges

conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not enfringed by legislation

which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class and reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those

who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials.

Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive

officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA
and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the
cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law”
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH)
Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their
vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who
voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,”
while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.
 ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question,
hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of
a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally

imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence
of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the
scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely
into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

 The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the

controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had
by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of
government before a court may come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium,
had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening
the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of
this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC

suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position
that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither
do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in
this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,

being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin
is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject

matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has
used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged
act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it passconstitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of
the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their
private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection
of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding
upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech
solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes
any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

 With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . .
to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals
whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create
without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;

2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.