G.R. No.
L-5932 February 27, 1912 in the city of Manila, having a large circulation throughout the
DEAN C. WORCESTER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN OCAMPO, TEODORO M. KALAW, LOPE K. SANTOS,
FIDEL A. REYES, FAUSTINO AGUILAR, ET AL.,defendants-
appellants.
Felipe Agoncillo for appellants.
W. A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 23rd day of January, 1909, the plaintiff commenced an action
against the defendants in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila, for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an
alleged libelous publication. The complaint was in the following
language:
COMPLAINT.
I.
That the plaintiff as well as the defendants are residents of the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands.
II.
That for a long time before the 30th of October, 1908, the
defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos,
Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete , Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto,
and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the owners, directors, writers
(redactores), editors (editores) and administrators of a certain daily
newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang,"
which newspaper during all the time mentioned in this complaint was
published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages
Philippine Islands.
III.
That for a long time the defendants have been maliciously
persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last
on the 30th of October, 1908, with the malicious intention of injuring
the plaintiff, who on said date was, and still is a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior in the
Government of the Philippines, they attacked the honesty and reviled
the fame of the plaintiff, not only as a private person but also as an
official of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and with the
object of exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the
public, printed, wrote (redactaron), and published in said newspaper
in its ordinary number of the 30th of October, 1908, a malicious
defamation and false libel which was injurious (injurioso) to the
plaintiff, said libel reading as follows:
"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.
"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour,
others to be eaten and devoured.
"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to
rebel against an order of things which makes them the prey and food
of the insatiable voracity of the former. At times they have been
fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and devourers, but in the
majority of cases they did not obtain but a change of name or
plumage.
"The situation is the same in all the spheres of creation: the relation
between the ones and the others is that dictated by the appetite and
the power to satisfy it at the fellow-creatures' expense.
"Among men it is very easy to observe the development of this daily
phenomenon. And for some psychological reason the nations who
believe themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and most
harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the lion, or the eagle, or
the serpent. Some have done so by a secret impulse of affinity and
others in the nature of simulation, of infatuated vanity, making
themselves appear that which they are not nor ever can be.
"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has
found the most adepts. And men, collectively and individually, have
desired to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird in order to
triumph in the plundering of their fellow-men.
"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics
of the vulture, the owl and the vampire.
"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the
skulls of the Igorots and study and civilize them and to espy in his
flight, with the eye of the bird of prey, where are the large deposits of
gold, the prey concealed amidst the lonely mountains, to appropriate
them to himself afterwards, thanks to legal facilities made and
unmade at will, but always for his own benefit.
"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances, an illegal slaughtering of
diseased cattle in order to derive benefit from the infected and putrid
meat which he himself was obliged to condemn by virtue of his
official position.
"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the
scientist who consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of
science, when his whole scientific labor is confined o dissecting
insects and importing fish eggs, as if the fish eggs of this country
were less nourishing and less savory, so as to make it worth the
while replacing them with species coming from other climes.
"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in
Mindoro, in Mindanao, and in other virgin regions of the Archipelago,
with the money of the people, and under the pretext of the public
good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the object is to possess all the
data and the key to the national wealth for his essentially personal
benefit, as is shown by the acquisition of immense properties
registered under he names of others.
"Promoting, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city
of worthless land at fabulous prices which the city fathers dare not
refuse, from fear of displeasing the one who is behind the motion,
and which they do not refuse for their own good.
"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in-land, with the
prospects of enormous profits, at the expense of the blood of the
people.
"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an
eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who gorges himself on
the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a petulent
omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim
until he leaves it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and their aim are
never thwarted.
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the booty and the plunder. Others are too weak to
raise a voice of protest. And others die in the disconsolating
destruction of their own energies and interests.
"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."
IV.
That the plaintiff was, on the date of said publication, and still is, well
known to the officials of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
and to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to public in
general, personally as well as a member of the Civil Commission of
the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior, and the defamation
and libel, and the words, terms and language used in said
defamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with the
intention of indicating the said plaintiff, and that should be
understood, as in effect they were understood, by the public officials
of the Government and the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in
general, as referring to the plaintiff, by reason of the publicly known
fact that said plaintiff in compliance with his duties in his position as
such member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as such
Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, ascended on a
previous occasion the mountains of the Province of Benguet to study
the native tribe known as Igorot, residing in said region; by reason of
the publicly known fact that in the said mountains of Benguet there
exist large deposits of gold, and for the reason that, as member of
the Civil Commission of the Philippines, which is the legislative body
of the Philippine Islands, the plaintiff takes part in the enactment and
repealing of laws in said Islands; by reason furthermore of the fact,
publicly known, that the plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of
the Philippine Islands, has had under his direction and control the
enforcement of the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances
of the city of Manila relating to the slaughtering of cattle; by reason
furthermore of the fact, publicly known that said plaintiff, as such
Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, had under his
direction and control the Bureau of Science of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and he is generally known as a man devoted to
the study of science; by reason furthermore of the publicly known
fact that the said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the
Philippine Islands, at a previous time, caused the importation into the
Philippine Islands of fish eggs for the purpose of supplying the
mountain streams of the Philippine Islands with fish-hatcheries; by
reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as
such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has journeyed
to and explored the Islands of Mindoro, Mindanao, and other regions
of the Philippine Archipelago; by reason furthermore of the publicly
known fact that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the
Philippine Islands, at one time investigated and prepared a report for
the Civil Commission of the Philippines in regard to a certain
proposition for the purchase of a parcel of land for the city of Manila;
by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as
member of said Civil Commission of the Philippines together with the
other members of said legislative body, once opened negotiations
with a certain firm engaged in the hotel business in regard to the
location of a prospective hotel on one of the filled-in lands of the city
of Manila.
That said defendants charged said plaintiff with the prostitution of his
office as member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as
Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with
wasting public funds for the purpose of promoting his personal
welfare; with the violation of the laws of the Philippine Islands and
the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in illegal
combinations for the purpose of robbing the people; with the object
of gain for himself and for others; and lastly with being "a bird of
prey;" and that said defamation should be understood, as in effect it
was understood, by the public officials of the Government and the
people of the Philippine Islands in general, as charging the said
plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things above specified; all of
which allegations relating to the character and conduct of the said
plaintiff, as above stated, were and are false and without any
foundation whatsoever.
That said defamation and libel were published by the defendants
under a heading in large and showy type, and every effort made by
said defendants to see that said defamation and libel should attract
the attention of the public and be read by all the subscribers to said
newspaper and the readers of the same.
V.
Besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the
plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing the said libel, did so with the
malicious intention of inciting the Filipino people to believe that the
plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the
position which he held, and for this reason to oppose his
administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the Interior,
and in this way they endeavored to create enormous difficulties for
him in the performance of his official duties, and to make him so
unpopular that he would have to resign his office as member of the
Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior.
In fact said defendants, by means of said libel and other false
statements in said mentioned newspaper, have been deliberately
trying to destroy the confidence of the public in the plaintiff and to
incite the people to place obstacles in his way in the performance of
his official duties, in consequence of which the plaintiff has met with
a great many difficulties which have increased to a great extent his
labors as a public official in every one of the Departments.
VI.
And for all these reasons the plaintiff alleges: That he has been
damaged and is entitled to an indemnity for the additional work to
which he has been put, by the said defendants, in the compliance of
his duties, both in the past and the future, as well as for the injuries
to his reputation and feelings, in the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000) Philippine currency, and besides this said amount he is
entitled to collect from the defendants the additional sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, in the way of punitive
damages, as a warning to the defendants.
Wherefore the plaintiff files this complaint, praying the court:
(1) That the defendants be summoned according to law.
(2) That judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay the
damages as above stated, and the costs of the action.
On the 23d of February, 1909, the defendants presented the
following demurrer to the said complaint:
DEMURRER.
Now come the defendants, through their undersigned attorney, and
demur to the complaint filed herein, upon the following grounds:
First, That the complaint is vague and unintelligible.
Second. That the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a
cause or right of action.
Third. That there is another action pending between the plaintiff and
several of the defendants for the same cause; and
Fourth. That some of the defendants have been erroneously
included therein.
Therefore, they respectfully ask the court to dismiss the complaint,
with costs against the plaintiff.
On the 27th of February, 1909, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier,
judge, overruled said demurrer in the following decision, to which the
defendants duly excepted:
ORDER.
The defendant demur upon several grounds:
(1) The first ground is that the complaint is vague and unintelligible
and this is directed principally to paragraph 2, in which it is alleged
that the defendants were "dueños, directores, redactores", etc., but it
is not alleged that they were such simultaneously. If this were the
sole averment of the defendants' connection with the alleged libel,
the objection might be well taken, but paragraph 3 of the complaint
alleges that the defendants "imprimieron, redactaron y publicaron",
etc., the article complained of. Under section 2 of Act 277 "every
person" who "publishes or procures to be published any belief is
made responsible. (Cf. U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep., 752.) We think,
therefore, that the connection of the defendants with the publication
complained of is sufficiently charged.
(2) It is also claimed that the facts alleged are not sufficient to state a
cause of action and it is urged in support of this that the article
complained of and which is copied in the complaint, fails to mention
the plaintiff or to show on its face that it refers to him. It is, however,
specifically alleged in paragraph 4 that the article was intended to
refer to the plaintiff and was so understood by the public, and this
allegation is admitted by the demurrer. Under the rule announced
in Causin vs. Jakosalem (5 Phil. Rep., 155), where the words
complained of do refer to the plaintiff "an action for libel may be
maintained even though the defamatory publication does not refer to
the plaintiff by name."
(3) It is further argued that there is another action pending between
the parties for the same cause. This, it is true, is made a ground for
demurrer by the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 91 (3), but like all
grounds therein mentioned, it must "appear upon the face" of the
pleading objected to, and where it does not so appear "the objection
can only be taken by answer." (Code C. P., sec. 92.) There is no
averment in the complaint which indicates that there is no another
action pending.
The fourth ground of the demurrer is not one recognized by law
(Code C. P., sec. 91) nor do we find anything in Sanidad vs.
Cabotaje (5 Phil. Rep., 204) which would necessitate any change in
the views already expressed.
The demurrer is, therefore, overruled and defendants are given the
usual five days to answer.
On the 15th day of November, 1909, the defendants presented their
amended answer, which was as follows:
ANSWER.
The defendants in the above-entitled cause, through their
undersigned attorney, by their answer to the complaint, state:
That the defendants deny generally the allegation of the complaint.
As a special defense, the defendants allege:
First. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to institute this action, as
it clearly appears from the allegations of the complaint and which the
defendants hereby deny.
Second. That the facts are set out as constituting cause of action in
the complaint, are insufficient to constitute such cause of action in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
Third. That the said complaint is manifestly improper, for the reason
that there is now pending in the Court of First Instance of this city a
criminal cause, No. 4295, for the crime of libel against the
defendants herein, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A.
Reyes, both actions, criminal and civil, being based upon the same
facts which the plaintiffs herein, who is also a party to the said
criminal action, now alleges as the basis of his action.
Fourth. That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been
extinguished for the reason that plaintiff did not expressly reserve the
right to enforce the same in the aforesaid cause 4295, for the crime
of libel, after the said criminal cause had been finally disposed of.
Fifth. That the defendants, Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar,
Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose,
Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were
erroneously included in the complaint for the simple reason that the
first two were acquitted in said criminal cause No. 4295, for libel, the
third was used as a witness for the prosecution in the said criminal
cause, and the others have no interest, either directly or indirectly, in
the newspaper "El Renacimiento" in which it is alleged by the plaintiff
the editorial, which is the basis of the complaint, and which it is
claimed to be libelous, was published.
Wherefore the defendants pray that they be acquitted of the
complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the
arguments if the respective attorneys, the Honorable James C.
Jenkins, judge, on the 14th of January, 1910, rendered the following
decision:
DECISION.
This is a civil action sounding in damages to the amount of P100,000
for an alleged libel of the plaintiff by the defendants.
The plaintiff is the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, a member of the
Civil Commission of the Philippine Islands, and Secretary of the
Interior of Insular Government. The defendants are twelve persons
designated by name in the complaint and alleged therein to be the
owners, directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores), and
administrators of a certain daily newspaper known as "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which defendants, as well as
the plaintiff, are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
It is further alleged in the complaint that for a long time prior to the
30th of October, 1908, the defendants were the owners, directors,
writers, editors, and administrators of said daily newspaper, and that
said newspaper, during all the time mentioned in the complaint, was
published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages
in the city of Manila, having a large circulation throughout the
Philippine Islands.
It is also alleged that for a long time the defendants had been
maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper,
until at last, on said date, with the malicious intention of injuring the
plaintiff who then was still is a member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines and Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the
Philippines, they attacked the integrity and reviled the reputation of
the plaintiff, not only as a private citizen, but also as an official of the
Government of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of exposing
him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote,
printed, and published in said newspaper in its ordinary number of
the said 30th of October, 1908, a malicious defamation and false
libel, which was injurious to the plaintiff, said libel, as translated from
the Spanish, reading as follows:
"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.
"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour,
others to be eaten and devoured.
"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to
rebel against an order of things which makes them the prey and food
of the insatiable voracity of the former. At times they have been
fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and devourers, but in a majority
of cases they do not obtain anything but a change of name or
plumage.
"The situation is the same in all spheres of creation; the relation
between the ones and the others is that dictated by the appetite and
the power to satisfy it at the fellow-creature's expense.
"Among men it is easy to observe the development of this daily
phenomenon. And for some psychological reason the nations who
believe themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and most
harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the lion, or the eagle, or
the serpent. Some have done so by a secret impulse of affinity and
others in the nature of simulation, of infatuated vanity, making
themselves appear that which they are not nor ever will be.
"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has
found the most adepts. And men, collectively and individually, have
desired to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird in order to
triumph in the plundering if their fellow-men.
"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics
of the vulture, the owl and the vampire.
"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the
skulls of the Igorots and study and civilize them, and to espy in his
flight with the eye of the bird of prey, where are the large deposits of
gold, the prey concealed amongst the lonely mountains, to
appropriate them to himself afterwards, thanks to legal facilities
made and unmade at will, but always for his own benefit.
"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances an illegal slaughtering of
diseased cattle in order to derive benefit from the infected and putrid
meat which he himself was obliged to condemn by virtue of his
official position.
"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the
scientist who consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of
science, when his whole scientific labor is confined to dissecting
insects and importing fish eggs, as if the fish eggs of this country
were less nourishing and savory, so as to make it worth the while
replacing them with species coming from other climes.
"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in
Mindanao, in Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of the archipelago,
with the money of the people, and under the pretext of the public
good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the object is to possess all the
data and the key to the national wealth for his essentially personal
benefit, as is shown by the acquisition of immense properties
registered under the names of others.
"Promoting through secret agents and partners, the sale of the city
worthless land at fabulous prices which the city fathers dare not
refuse from fear of displeasing the one who is behind the motion, and
which they do not refuse to their own good.
"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in lands, with the
prospects of enormous profits, at the expense of the blood of the
people.
"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an
eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who gorges himself on
the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a petulant
omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim
until he leaves it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and aim are never
thwarted.
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the body and plunder, Others are too weak to raise a
voice to protest. And others die in the disconsolating destruction of
their own energies and interests.
"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."
It is alleged, among other things, in paragraph four of the complaint,
that the plaintiff was on the date of said publication, and still is, well
known to the officials of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
and to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to the public
generally, personally as well as a member of the Civil Commission of
the Philippines and as a Secretary of the Interior; and the defamation
and libel, and the words, terms, and language used in said
defamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with the
intention of indicating the said plaintiff, and that they should be
understood, as in fact they were understood, by the public officials of
the Government and the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in
general, as referring to the plaintiff. (Here follow the reasons for
saying the editorial referred to plaintiff and why the public understood
it as referring to him.)
The said defendants charged plaintiff with the prostitution of his office
as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as
Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with
wasting public funds for the purpose of promoting his personal
welfare; and with the violation of the laws of the Philippine Islands
and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in illegal
combination of the purpose of robbing the people, with the object of
gain for himself and for others; and lastly, with being a bird of prey,
and that said defamation should be understood, as in effect it was
understood by the public officials of the Government and the people
of the Philippine Islands in general, as charging the said plaintiff with
the conduct, actions and things above specified; all of which
allegations relating to the character and conduct of the said plaintiff,
as above stated, were and are false and without any foundation
whatever. That said defamation and libel were published by the
defendants under a heading in large and showy type, and every
effort was made by said defendant to see that said defamation and
libel should attract the attention of the public and be read by all the
subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the same.
In paragraph five of the complaint it is further alleged that, besides
assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said
defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with the malicious
intention of inciting the Filipino to believe that the plaintiff was a vile
despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held,
and for this reason to oppose of his administration of the office in his
charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored
to create enormous difficulties for him in the performance of his
official duties, and to make him so unpopular that he would have to
resign his office as a member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines and Secretary of the Interior. In fact, said defendants, by
means of said libel and other false statements in said mentioned
newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence
of the public in the plaintiff, and to in incite the people to place
obstacles in his way in the performance of his official duties, in
consequence of which said plaintiff has met with a great many
difficulties which have increased to a great extent his labors as a
public official in every one of the Departments.
And the allegations end with paragraph six, in which the plaintiff
states that for all these reasons has been damaged and is entitled to
an indemnity for the additional work to which he has been put by said
defendants in compliance with his duties, both in the past and in the
future, as well as for the injuries to his reputation and feelings, in the
sum, of P50,000, and that besides this said amount he is entitled to
collect from the defendants the additional sum of fifty thousand
pesos in the way of punitive damages, as a warning to the
defendants.
The complaint concludes with a prayer, among other things, that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay the damages
as above stated and the costs of the action; and is dated and signed,
Manila, P.I., January 23, 1909, Hartigan and Rohde, Kincaid and
Hurd, attorneys for plaintiff.
A demurrer to this complaint was filed by the defendants, through
their attorney, Sr. Felipe Agoncillo, which demurrer was heretofore
heard and overruled by the Court, and the defendants required to
answer. Accordingly, the defendants within the prescribed time, filed
their answer; and on November 16, 1909, through their attorney, filed
and amended answer, which is as follows (after stating the case):
The defendants in the above-entitled action, through their
undersigned attorney, answering the complaint, state: That they
make a general denial of the allegations in the complaint, and as a
special defense allege:
"(1) That the plaintiff lacks the necessary personality to institute the
complaint in question, as evidently appears from the allegations in
the same, and which the defendants deny;
"(2) That the facts set forth as a cause of action in the complaint are
insufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants;
"(3) That the said complaint is in every sense contrary to law,
criminal case No. 4295, for libel, against the defendants Martin
Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, in the Court of First
Instance of this city, being still pending, inasmuch as both causes,
criminal and civil, are based upon the same facts which the plaintiff,
who is also interested in said criminal cause, considers a cause of
action;
"(4) That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been
destroyed as a consequence of the fact that the plaintiff did not
expressly reserve his right to the same in the said mentioned cause
No. 4295 for libel, in order to exercise it after the termination of said
criminal cause:
"(5) That the defendants Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio
G. Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo
Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit have been
erroneously included in the complaint, for the simple reason that the
first two were acquitted in said cause No. 4295 for libel, the third was
used as a witness by the prosecution in the same cause, and the
latter ones have no interest, directly or indirectly, in the newspaper
"El Renacimiento," in which the plaintiff presumes, was published the
editorial which forms the basis of the complaint, and which is said to
be libelous; and concluding with a prayer to the court to dismiss the
case, with cost against the plaintiff."
The second paragraph of this "special defense" is nothing other than
a general demurrer to the complaint, which has been overruled, as
already stated.
The first paragraph is not clearly stated, but the court construes it as
meaning a simple denial that the plaintiff is the person referred to in
the alleged libelous article "Birds of Prey," which issue is sufficiently
raised by the general denial of the allegations in the complaint.
The third paragraph is not a valid defense in law, for the simple
reason that section 11 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission,
under which this suit is brought, especially provides for a separate
civil action for damages, as well as for a criminal prosecution. (See
Mr. Justice Johnson's recent decision.) This third paragraph is
therefore without merit; and the same may be said of the fourth
paragraph thereof. As to paragraph five, it contains no material
averment which could not have been set up and insisted upon under
the general issue.
One part if this so-called special defense is therefore a demurrer
already and adjudicated, another part is covered by the general
issue, and the residue is without merit as a legal defense, and might
have been stricken out. The defense is therefore tantamount to the
general issue only, there being no special plea that these charges
are true, nor any plea of justification.
The trial of this case on its merits began November 16, and ended
December 10, 1909, and the proceedings and evidence introduced
are to be found in the exhibits and stenographic notes taken by the
court's official reporter. At the trial Judge Kincaid said Major Hartigan
appeared for the plaintiff and Señores Agoncillo, Cruz Herrera, and
Ferrer for the defendants.
After hearing the testimony and arguments of counsel and a due
consideration of the case, the court finds the following facts
established by the admissions and a decided preponderance of the
evidence:
That the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio
M. Cansipit, seven in number, are the proprietors and owners of the
said daily newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling
Pagsilang," and that "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," are
one and the same newspaper, owned, managed, printed and
published by the same persons; that Teodoro M. Kalaw and Lope K.
Santos were the editors in chief of directors of this paper on the 30th
of October, 1908, and that said nine defendants named were the
owners, editors, proprietors, managers and publishers of said
newspaper on said 30th of October, 1908, for a long time prior
thereto, and during all the time mentioned in the complaint.
As to the defendants, Reyes, Aguilar, and Liquete, they appear from
the evidence to have been editors of said paper, but in subordinate
position to the chief editors or directors, Kalaw and Santos, and to
have acted under the direction of their latter two defendants.
The court further finds that every essential or material allegation of
the complaint is true substantially as therein stated, with the
exception noted to Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, and Leoncio G.
Liquete, and as may be hereinafter indicated. The case is therefore
dismissed as to these three defendants.
The only serious contention of the defense is (1) that the editorial
"Birds of Prey" does not refer to a determinate person; and (2) that,
conceding that it does refer to the plaintiff, none of the defendants,
except Teodoro M. Kalaw, is responsible for the writing, printing, or
publication of the alleged libelous article of the damages to the
plaintiff resulting therefrom.
In the opinion of the court this article so indubitably refers to the
plaintiff, and was so easily and well understood by the readers of
said paper as indicating the plaintiff, that it would be an act of
superrogation to elaborately discuss the evidence adduced in
support of or against the proposition. It is as clear to the court from
the evidence adduced as the noonday sun, that the plaintiff is the
identical and only person meant and referred to in said article "Birds
and Prey;" and it requires no argument to prove that it does mean
and refer to him and was so intended by the writer, and therefore by
said nine defendants, and could not have been otherwise understood
by any intelligent reader or subscriber of said paper, in view of the
reasons assigned in the complaint, which reasons are clearly
disclosed and fully established by the evidence. And it may be added
that much valuable time was needlessly consumed by the defense at
trial in an effort to establish the contrary.
It seems to the court a reflection upon the intelligence of the
subscribers and readers of "El Renacimiento" to contend that this
editorial was not well understood by them as referring to the plaintiff,
and as fully as if his name had been mentioned in every paragraph
thereof. And assuredly the omission of his name from the editorial
has made the libel less hurtful and disastrous in its results to the
reputation and feelings of the plaintiff.
Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that
none of the twelve defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento"
and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of them had originally
contributed their money as a partriotic donation to the Filipino people,
and that Martin Ocampo simply held the money and property of the
paper as trustees for this people, and that the paper was being
devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo
and Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends, but had not
done so.
This proposition in the light of evidence is so preposterous as to
entitle it to little, if any, serious consideration. To ask the court to
believe it is tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason and
common sense. That those seven defendants named contributed
their respective sums of money, as shown by the evidence, to the
foundation of said newspaper in 1901 for their own personal benefit
and profit is fully and unmistakably established. It is equally well
established that Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner,
but that he has been and is still the administrator or business
manager of said newspaper, and that the other six persons named
are shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof, and were
such on said 30th of October, 1908.
Arcadio Arellano testified positively that Galo Lichauco was one of
the seven founders, and that Lichauco contributed P1,000. Martin
Ocampo testified that Galo Lichauco promised to contribute an
amount which he (the witness) did not remember but that Lichauco
did not keep his promise. (See pp. 107, 108, and 231 of the
evidence.)
The other evidence and circumstances strongly corroborate Arcadio
Arellano, and the court is constrained to believe that Arellano told the
truth and Ocampo did not. See Exhibit B-J, a copy of "El
Renacimiento" containing the article "Infamy Among Comrades,"
page 87 of the evidence, in which there was published that these
seven persons named are the shareholders of the paper.
Furthermore, Galo Lichauco failed to appear and testify, so as to
enlighten the court as to which witness, Arellano or Ocampo, told the
truth, or whether chief editor Kalaw had his authority to publish in
said paper, as he did in November 22, 1907, that he, Galo Lichauco,
was one of the shareholders. The presumptions are therefore against
Galo Lichauco. See S.S. Co. vs. Brancroft-Whitney Co. (36 C. C. A.,
136 and 153).
It also appears from the evidence that Teodoro M. Kalaw was the
chief editor or director of the Spanish section of said paper, and that
Lope K. Santos was the chief editor or director of the Tagalog section
on said 30th of October, 1908, and that the Spanish and Tagalog
sections are, and then were, one and the same newspaper, but
printed and published in different languages.
It is alleged that said newspaper has a large circulation throughout
the Philippine Islands, and was published and circulated daily in the
Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila. Not only are
these allegations true, but it is also true that said newspaper has a
daily circulation and subscribers in other parts of the world, notably in
the United States and Spain; and it has subscribers numbering in
toto not less than 5,200, and a daily issue of 6,000 copies.
It is also true as alleged, and the court so finds that since the year
1906 to said 30th of October, 1908, these nine defendants had been
maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in their said
newspapers, until at last, on said 30th of October, 1908 with the
malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff, who on said date was and
still is a member of the Civil Commission and Secretary of the Interior
in the Government of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of
exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they
wrote, printed, and published in their said newspaper, in its ordinary
number of said 30th of October, 1908, the malicious defamation and
false libel of and concerning the plaintiff, entitled and herein alluded
to as the editorial "Birds of Prey," which libel was and is highly
injurious to the plaintiff and from which the plaintiff has sustained
serious damage.
This editorial, when properly interpreted and read between the lines,
means, besides other things, and was intended by the writer to mean
and be understood by the readers thereof as meaning substantially
the following:
That the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, was born on the surface of the
globe to eat and devour, like a bird of prey, and that others, born to
be eaten and devoured, are the prey and the food of the insatiable
voracity of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff had a desire to copy and
imitate the most rapacious bird, the eagle, in order to triumph in
plundering his fellowman; that the plaintiff besides being an eagle,
has the characteristics of the vulture, the owl, and the vampire.
That the plaintiff ascended the mountains of Benguet to classify and
measure the skulls of the Igorots, and study and civilize them and to
espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of prey the large deposits of
gold-the prey concealed amidst the mountains-and to appropriate
them to himself afterwards, and that to this end the plaintiff had the
legal facilities, made and unmade at his own will, and that this is
always done for his own benefit.
That the plaintiff authorized, inspite of laws and ordinances, the
illegal slaughtering is diseased cattle in order to derive benefit from
the infected and putrid meant which he himself was obliged to
condemn by virtue of his official position; that while the plaintiff
presents himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the
scientist who consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of
science, his whole scientific labor is confined to dissecting insects
and importing fish eggs.
That although the plaintiff gave an admirable impulse to the
discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindanao and Mindoro, and in other
virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the money of the people,
under the pretext of the public good, as a strict matter of truth his
object was to possess all the data and the key to the national wealth
for his essentially personal benefit, and that this is shown by his
acquisition of immense properties registered under the names of
others.
That the plaintiff promoted, through secret agents and partners, the
sale to the city of Manila of worthless land at fabulous prices, which
the city fathers dared not refuse from fear of displeasing the plaintiff,
who was behind the project, and which they did not refuse for their
own good; that the plaintiff favored concessions for hotels in Manila
on filled-in land; with the prospect of enormous profits, at the
expense of the blood of the people.
That such are the characteristics of the plaintiff, who is at the same
time an eagle that surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges his
self on deed and rotten meats, an owl that affects a petulant
omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until
he leaves it bloodless. And this libelous article concludes with the
asseveration in substance that the plaintiff has been "weighed in the
balance and found wanting" — "Mane, Tecel, Phares."
That this editorial is malicious and injurious goes without saying.
Almost every line thereof teems with malevolence, ill will, and wanton
and reckless disregard of the rights and feelings of the plaintiff; and
from the very nature and the number of the charges therein
contained the editorial is necessarily very damaging to the plaintiff.
That this editorial, published as it was by the nine defendants, tends
to impeach the honesty and reputation of the plaintiff and publishes
his alleged defects, and thereby exposes him to public hatred,
contempt, and ridicule is clearly seen by a bare reading of the
editorial.
It suffices to say that not a line is to be found in all the evidence in
support of these malicious, defamatory and injurious charges against
the plaintiff; and there was at the trial no pretense whatever by the
defendants that any of them are true, nor the slightest evidence
introduced to show the truth of a solitary charge; nor is there any
plea of justification or that the charges are true, much less evidence
to sustain a plea.
In the opinion of the court "Birds of Prey," when read and considered
in its relation to and connection with the other articles libelous and
defamatory in nature, published of and concerning the plaintiff by
these nine defendants anterior and subsequent to the publication of
this article, and having reference to the same subject matter as
shown by the evidence, is one of the worst libels of record. It is safe
to say that in all the court reports to the Philippine Islands, or of
Spain, or the United States, there is not to be found a libel case in
which there is a more striking exemplification of the spirit of hatred,
bad faith, evil motive, mischievous intent, actual malice, nefarious
purpose, base malignity, or gross malevolence.
It is proper to observe also that since the beginning of this attack on
the plaintiff in the year 1906 down almost to the present time, so far
from there being any apology, retraction, or effort to repair the injury
already done as far as lay in the power of the defendants, the
persecution, wrong, and tortious injury to the plaintiff had been
steadily kept up and persisted in, without the slightest abatement of
the malevolent spirit.
There has been neither retraction, apology, nor reparation; per
contra, the libel has been repeated, reiterated, and accentuated, and
widely and extensively propagated by these nine defendants through
the columns of their said paper and otherwise; and it appears from
the evidence that especial effort has been made by these same
defendants to give as much publicity as possible to the libelous and
defamatory words used of and concerning the plaintiff in said
editorial.
Through their instrumentality and persistency in asserting and
reasserting its truth, this diabolical libel has been spread broadcast
over the Philippine Islands and to other parts of the world. In said
criminal case No. 4295 some of these nine defendants pleaded the
truth of the charges; and in Exhibit A-Q is to be found this language:
"The defense will adduce its evidence demonstrating the truth of
every one of the facts published."
In their said paper of the 11th of January, 1909, there is published
statement:
"The brief period of time allowed us by the court, at the request of the
counsel, to gather evidence which we are to adduce in our effort to
demonstrate the truth of the accusation that we have formulated in
the article which is the subject of the agitation against us, having
expired, the trial of the case against our director had been resumed."
(See pp. 63 and 67 of the evidence.)
And about the same time they also declared in their said paper that
"there is more graft than fish in the rivers of Benguet." And this in the
year of our Lord 1909! the persecution having begun in 1905; thus
indicating that there is to be no "let-up" or cessation of the hostile
attitude toward the plaintiff or the vilification of his name and assaults
upon his character, much less a retraction or an apology, unless
drastic means and measures are made use of to the end that there
may be no further propagation of the libel, or asseveration, or
reiteration of its truth.
This article "Birds of Prey" charges the plaintiff with malfeasance in
office and criminal acts, and is therefore libelous per se. It in
substance charges the plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippine Islands and
Secretary of the Interior of said Islands for personal ends. It is
charged also substantially that plaintiff in his official capacity wasted
the public funds for the purpose of promoting his own personal
welfare, and that he violated the laws of the Philippine Islands and
the ordinances of the city of Manila.
In its essence he is charged with taking part in illegal combinations
for the purpose of robbing the people with the object of gain for
himself and for others; with being a bird of prey, a vulture (buzzard),
an owl, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim (meaning
the people) until he leaves it bloodless, that is to say, robs the
people, until he leaves them wretched and poverty-stricken, deprived
of all worldly possessions; and lastly, that he, the plaintiff, like
Belshazzar, has been weighed in the balance and found wanting as
a high Government functionary; all of which charges are false and
malicious and without and foundation whatever in fact, as the
evidence fully demonstrates.
It is also a matter of fact, and the court so finds, that said defamation
was written and published that it might be understood, and it was
understood, by the public officials of the Government and the people
of the Philippine Islands in general, and wherever else said
newspaper may have circulated and been read, as charging the
plaintiff with the tortious and criminal acts and conduct charged in
said editorial as hereinbefore specified and interpreted.
The court finds it also true that, besides assailing the integrity and
reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said nine defendants, in
publishing said libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting the
Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff was despotic and corrupt
and unworthy of the position which he held, and for this reason to
oppose his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of
the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous
difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and to
make him so unpopular that he would have to resign his office as a
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of
the Interior.
It is also true that the said nine defendants, by means of said libel,
and other like false statements in their said newspaper, have been
deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the public in the
plaintiff and to incite the people to place obstacles in his way in the
performance of his official duties, in consequence of which the
plaintiff has met with many difficulties which have greatly increased
his labors as a public official.
It further appears from the evidence that not only has an effort been
made by these nine defendants to give as much publicity as possible
to the charges, but in order that said defamation should attract the
attention of the public, they published the same under a heading in
large, bold and showy type, so that it might be easily seen and read
by all the subscribers and readers of said paper.
In full view of all the evidence, therefore, it is clearly seen that every
essential allegation of the complaint is true substantially as therein
claimed, and that the whole of the said editorial relating to the
misconduct and bad character of the plaintiff is false and without the
slightest foundation in fact. Not a scintilla of evidence was introduced
in support of any injurious charge made therein against the plaintiff,
to say nothing of the plaintiff's evidence that each and every charge
of malfeasance therein contained is false, and without reference to
whether a failure to plead the truth admits the falsity of the charge.
The evidence shows no "special" or "actual pecuniary damage," and
none is alleged in the complaint. Two other kinds of damages,
however are claimed, to wit, general damages for injuries to the
feelings and reputation of the plaintiff and additional work to which he
has been put by the conduct of the defendants, which are laid in the
sum of P50,000, and "punitive," exemplary, or vindictive damages,
"as a warning to the defendants," or as expressed in Act 277 of the
Philippine Commission, as a just punishment to the libelers and an
example to others," which are laid in the same sum of P50,000.
The nine defendants being liable to the plaintiff for damages, the
next question to be decided is what amount of damages should be
awarded the plaintiff for the injury to his reputation and feelings and
his being a proper case for punitive damages, the further question is,
what sum shall be awarded as a just punishment to these nine
libelers and as an example to others. In neither of these cases is
there any precise measure of damages.
In determining the amount to be awarded in the first instance it is
proper to consider the previous character, influence, reputation,
standing, official position, hope of advancement, prospect of
promotion, and social status of the plaintiff and his family, and all the
circumstances connected with the case.
The plaintiff is a man in the prime of life, holding, as he has held for
the last ten years an important, responsible, lucrative, high and
exalted position of trust and honor in the service of the Government
of the United States, in the Philippine Islands, without a blotch on his
family escutcheon, so far as the evidence shows, and with an
untarnished reputation as a man, as a citizen, and as a Government
official.
He is a man of honesty, integrity, and high social position; a man of
learning, famous as a scientist, and scientific achievements and
scholarly attainments, a man of industrious habits, genuine worth,
and intellectual force. He has read, studied, traveled and learned
much, and is an author of merit and distinction. He was for a long
while a professor in one of the largest and most renowned
institutions of learning in the world; he is a man of vast experience,
broad and liberal views, and an extensive acquaintanceship, not only
in the Philippine Islands, but in the United States and other countries
of the world. He was well and favorably received by the people
wherever he journeyed previous to this atrocious libel upon his
integrity and reputation.
He has discharged the duties of his lofty official position in a manner
that reflects credit upon himself as well as the Government which he
represents, and apparently with entire satisfaction to all of his
superiors in office and the people generally; and but for this
pernicious, outrageous, and highly reprehensible assault upon his
good name, fame and reputation, there were prospects of promotion
to higher honors. And so far as his personal and private record is
concerned it was without a blemish anterior to the time when these
unfounded and dastardly aspersions were cast upon it by these nine
defendants.
Indeed, it is only necessary to advert to the testimony of the defense
itself to ascertain that the plaintiff is an honorable man, and without a
stain upon his character, officially or otherwise. It would be
interesting to note here in parallel columns and compare the charges
made in "Birds of Prey" and the testimony of one of the witnesses for
the defendants.
Felipe Buencamino, an intelligent witness for the defense, in his
testimony (p. 240) when asked the question, Do you know Mr.
Worcester?" he answers, "Yes, sir: I know him as an honorable man.
I also know him as an honest, honorable public official." In answer to
another question he says, "As I have said, I know Mr. Worcester as a
private citizen and as a public official, and my opinion of him is that of
honorable man and an upright official." And no other witness testified
anything to the contrary.
"A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches and loving
favor rather than silver of gold."
"Who steals my purse steals trash;
xxx xxx xxx
But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed."
The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional
right as the possession of life, liberty or property. It is one of those
rights necessary to human society that underlie the whole scheme of
human civilization.
"The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest
rewards of a well-spent life vouchsafed to man in this existence. The
hope of it is the inspiration of youth, and their possession the solace
of later years. A man of affairs, a business man, who has been seen
and known of his fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many
years, and who has developed a great character and an
unblemished reputation, has secured a possession more useful, and
more valuable than lands, or houses, or silver, or gold . . .
"The law recognizes the value of such a reputation, and constantly
strives to give redress for its injury. It imposes upon him who attacks
it by slanderous words, or libelous publication, a liability to make full
compensation for the damage to the reputation, for the shame and
obloquy, and for the injury to the feelings of the owner, which are
caused by the publication of the slander or the libel.
"It goes further. If the words are spoken, or the publication is made,
with the intent to injure the victim, or with the criminal indifference to
civil obligation, it imposes such damages as a jury (in this case the
judge), in view of all the circumstances of the particular case adjudge
that the wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public, to deter
others from committing like offenses, and as a punishment for the
infliction of the injury.
"In the ordinary acceptance of the term, malice signifies ill will, evil
intent, or hatred, while it is legal signification is defined to be "a
wrongful act done intentionally, without legal justification." (36 C. C.
A., 475.)
Surely in the case at bar there was a wrongful or tortious act done
intentionally and without the semblance of justification or excuse, or
proof that the libelous charges against the plaintiff were "published
and good motives and justifiable ends."
But the Legislature and the highest judicial authority of these Islands
have spoken in no uncertain words with regard to the rights of the
plaintiff in this case; and we need not necessarily turn to the law of
libel elsewhere, or the decision of the courts in other jurisdictions to
ascertain or determine his rights.
In sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Libel Law (Act 277, Philippine
Commission) is to be found the law of these Islands especially
applicable to this case. Section 1 thereof defines libel. Section 2
provides that every person who willfully and with a malicious intent to
injure another publishes, or procures to be published, any libel shall
be punished as therein provided. Section 3 provides that an injurious
publication is presumed to have been malicious if no justifiable
motive for making it is shown. Section 4 provides, among other
things, that in all criminal prosecutions the truth may be given in
evidence; but to establish this defense, not only must the truth of the
matter charged as libelous be proven, but also that it was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends; and the presumptions,
rules of evidence, and special defenses are equally applicable in civil
and criminal actions, according to section 11 of said Act.
Section 6 is as follows:
"Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial
publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained
in any part of such book or number of each newspaper or serial as
fully as if he were the author of the same."
And section 11 provides as follows:
"In addition to such criminal action, any person libeled as
hereinbefore set forth shall have a right to a civil action against the
person libeling him for damages sustained by reason of such libel,
and the person so libeled shall be entitled to recover in such civil
action not only the actual pecuniary damages sustained by him, but
also damages for injury to his feelings and reputation, and in addition
such punitive damages as the court may think will be a just
punishment to the libeler and an example to others. Suit may be
brought in any Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the
parties. The presumptions, rules or evidence and special defenses
provided for in this chapter for criminal prosecutions shall be equally
applicable in civil actions under this section."
"The proprietor of a printing plant is responsible for publishing a libel.
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United
States, the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable
for the same." (Mr. Justice Torres, in U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep.,
757.) But said section 6 plainly fixes the liability of editors and
proprietors of newspapers, and is clear enough for all the purposes
of this case.
Mr. Justice Carson (5 Phil. Rep. 1551), speaking for our Supreme
Court, says:
"When there is an averment in the complaint that the defamatory
words used refer to the plaintiff, and it is proven that the words do in
fact refer to him and are capable of bearing such special application,
an action for libel may be maintained even though the defamatory
publication does not refer to the plaintiff by name."
And Mr. Justice Willard (12 Phil. Rep., 4282), for the same high
authority, says:
"In an action for libel damages for injury to feelings and reputation
may be recovered though no actual pecuniary damages are proven.
"Punitive damages cannot be recovered unless the tort is aggravated
by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression."
That is to say, if there is evil motive, or actual malice or deliberate
violence, or oppression then punitive damages, or "smart money,"
may be recovered.
And Justice Carson (U.S. vs. Sedano, 14 Phil., Rep., 338), also says:
"Actual or express malice of an alleged libelous publication may be
inferred from the style and tone of the publication.
"The publication of falsehood and calumny against public officers
and candidates for public office is specially reprehensible and is an
offense most dangerous to the people and to the public welfare.
"The interest of society require that immunity should be granted to
the discussion of public affairs, and that all acts and matters of a
public nature may be freely published with fitting comments and
strictures; but they do not require that the right to criticise public
officers shall embrace the right to base such criticism under false
statements of fact, or attack the private character of the officer, or to
falsely impute to him malfeasance or misconduct in office."
And there are almost numberless English and American authorities
in perfect harmony with these decisions of our Supreme Court too
numerous indeed to be cited here; and it is not necessary.
Among the leading cases, however, in the United States, is that
of Scott vs. Donald (165 U.S., 58) and cases therein cited. In this
case the court says: "Damages have been defined to be the
compensation which law will allow for an injury done, and are said to
be exemplary and allowable in excess of the actual loss when the
tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or
oppression," which is in entire harmony with Justice Willard's
decision hereinbefore cited.
And quoting from the decision in Day vs. Woodworth (13 Howard,
371) the same high court says:
"In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and
malicious, or gross or outrageous, courts permit juries (here the
court) to add to the measured compensation of the plaintiff which he
would have been entitled to recover, had the injury been inflicted
without design or intention, something further by way of punishment
or example, which has sometimes been called "smart money." "
It thus clearly appears that the facts established in the case at bar
are more than sufficient to bring it within the rule of law here laid
down by the highest judicial authority.
Section 11 of the Libel Law expressly allows general damages; and
Mr. Justice Willard, in Macleod vs. Philippine Publishing
Company,3 says:
"The general damages which are allowed in actions of libel are not
for mental suffering alone, but they are allowed for injury to
the standing and reputation of the person libeled, and the common
law of England and America presumed that such damages
existed without proof thereof from the mere fact of publication of the
libel."
In Day vs. Woodworth, the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized the power of a jury in certain actions in tort to assess
against the tort feasor punitive damages. Where the injury has been
inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of
contumely, or indignity, the judge or jury, as the case may be, is not
limited to the ascertainment of a simple compensation for the wrong
committed against the aggrieved person.
"The public position of the plaintiff, as an officer of the Government,
and the evil example of libels, are considerations with the jury (here
the judge) for increasing damages." (Tillotson vs. Cheetham, 3
Johns, 56.)
"The character, condition and influence of the plaintiff are relevant on
the matter of the extent of damages." (Littlejohn vs. Greely, 22 How.
Prac., 345; 13 Abb. Prac., 41, 311.)
"Where the publication is libelous, the law presumes that it was
made with malice — technical, legal malice, but not malice in fact —
and the amount of damages depends in a large degree upon the
motives which actuated the defendants in its publication; and in such
cases the law leaves it to the jury (here the judge) to find a return
such damages as they think right and just, by a sound, temperate,
deliberate, and reasonable exercise of their functions as jurymen."
(Erber vs. Dun. (C. C.) 12 Fed., 526.)
"Actions of libel, so far as they involve questions of exemplary
damages, and the law of principal and agent, are controlled by the
same rules as are other actions of tort. The right of a plaintiff to
recover exemplary damages exists wherever a tortious injury has
been inflicted recklessly or wantonly, and it is not limited to cases
where the injury resulted from personal malice or recklessness of the
defendant. It follows that the owner of a newspaper is as responsible
for all the acts of omission and commission of those he employs to
edit it and manage its affairs, as he would be if personally managing
the same.' (Malloy vs. Bennett, (C. C.) 15 Fed., 371.)
"The fact that a publication, libelous per se, was made without any
attempt to ascertain its correctness is sufficient to justify a finding
that defendant committed libel client with a wanton indifference, and
with actual malice sufficient to sustain exemplary damages." (Van
Ingen vs. Star Co., 1 App. Div., 429, 37 N.Y., 114.)
"The court is not authorized to set aside a verdict for $45,000 in an
action for libel, where it appears that plaintiff was persistently
persecuted in the columns of defendant's newspaper, and that he
and his family were held up to public contempt and ridicule, and
defendants withdraw from the case after failing to establish a plea of
justification." (Smith vs. Times Co., (Com. p. 1) 4 Pa. Dist. Rep.,
399.)
"In considering the amount with the defendant shall pay, on this
account (exemplary damages) the turpitude of his conduct and his
financial ability are only considered; and such consideration is not in
view of the injury or distress of the plaintiff, but in behalf of the public;
the wrongful act is regarded as an indication of the actor's vicious
mind — an overt deed of vindictive or wanton wrong, offensive and
dangerous to the public good. This is the view of those damages
which generally prevails." (Sutherland on Damages, vol. 2, p. 1092.
title Exemplary Damages.)
"Punitive damages are recoverable not to compensate the plaintiff,
but solely to punish the defendant. This legal motive would suffer
defeat if punitive damages could not be given for a malicious attack
on a reputation too well established to receive substantial injury at
the hands of a libeler." (Judge Bond in Ferguson vs. Pub. Co., 72
Mo. App., 462.)
It may be suggested that the reputation of the plaintiff in this case is
too well established to be seriously affected by the defamatory words
used of and concerning him in "Birds of Prey," but it would not be
proper to gravely consider this suggestion.
The conditions in these Islands are peculiar. The minds, thoughts,
and opinions of the people are easily molded, and the public is
credulous and perhaps frequently too ready to believe anything that
may be said in derogation of an American official, especially when it
is published and vouched for by the editorial and business
management and proprietors if a newspaper of the prominence,
pretensions, circulation and influence if "El Renacimiento," which
paper is everlastingly proclaiming in its columns that it is being
conducted and published solely in the interests of the Filipino people
— pro bono publico. There is stronger disposition to give credence to
what is said in a newspaper here in the Islands the elsewhere, and
when abuse, vilification, and defamation are persistently practiced for
a period of several years, without modification or retraction, but with
renewed emphasis, the people naturally come to believe in its verity
and authenticity.
It is apparent from the evidence that as an effect of the persecution
of the plaintiff by "El Renacimiento" and the libel published in its
columns, the minds of the major part of the Filipino people have been
poisoned and prejudiced against the plaintiff to such an extent that
he is regarded by these people as odious, dishonest, unscrupulous
and tyrannical.
It may be that his reputation has not suffered so severely with those
of his own race, but when it is considered that his vocation has
tenfold more to do with the Filipinos than with his own people, that
his official duties place him in constant contact with them, and that
his success in his chosen career is largely dependent upon their
good will and support, it is manifest that the damage to his reputation
has been very great and that a large sum of money should be
awarded to indemnify him, as far as money can indemnify, for the
loss of his good name with the Filipino people.
The plaintiff came to the Philippine Islands when a young man, full of
hope and ambition. Since his arrival he has devoted himself
incessantly and indefatigably to the uplifting of the inhabitants of the
Archipelago and to the faithful performance, as far as he was able, of
the pledges and promises of the Government to the Filipino people.
The duties of his particular office were such as brought him in more
immediate and constant contract with the people than any other
official of the same category in these Islands.
It is clearly shown that the plaintiff faithfully endeavored to perform,
and did efficiently perform, all of these duties, doing everything that
he could in an unselfish and disinterested manner of the welfare and
development of the country and its people, knowing full well that his
career, as well as his advancement, depended largely upon the good
will of these people, and that by incurring their censure or
displeasure he would have little hope of success in his chosen work.
Imagine, therefore, the chagrin, disappointment, mortification, mental
suffering, and distress, and perturbation of spirit that would
necessarily be occasioned him when he discovered that through the
nefarious, studied, and practiced persecution of the paper in
question, these high hopes were blasted, and that, instead of having
gained the respect and gratitude of the people for the assiduous
labors devoted to their uplifting, they had been made to believe that,
instead of being a benefactor, he was a vampire that was sucking
their life blood, a corrupt politician who was squandering the money
wrung from the people by means of taxation, in schemes for his own
personal aggrandizement and enrichment.
That instead of developing the mineral wealth of the Islands he was
taking up all the rich veins and appropriating them in the names of
subservient tools, to his own personal use, benefit and profit. That
instead of protecting the people from disease, he was, by means of
infected meat and for his own personal gain, spreading contagion
among them.
That he united in his person all the bad qualities of the vulture, the
eagle, and the vampire; that, in short, he was a "bird of prey," with all
that is implied in that term in its worst acceptation; that he was a
corrupt tyrant, who never lost an opportunity to do the people hurt;
that instead of wishing them well and seeking their advancement, he
was their enemy, who never lost an opportunity to degrade and
humiliate them; that instead of preferring them for office and
positions of official trust, he treated them with all sorts of contempt
and indifference.
It is difficult to appreciate the feelings of a refined soul in its
contemplation of a result so disastrous, so unjust, and so unmerited.
It is furthermore shown that when the plaintiff came to these Islands
a young scientist he had already won fame in his own country; that
he is a fellow of the important scientific associations in the world. His
election as a fellow or member of these scientific bodies shows that
his labors in the Philippines were the object of solicitude by the
prominent scientific and learned men not only of his own race, but in
many other civilized countries of the world. Important results were
evidently expected of him by them, and it can not be doubted that
they expected of him of life honestly devoted to the conscientious
discharge of his duties as a trusted public functionary of the
American Government in the Philippine Islands.
And yet he is falsely denounced in the columns of said newspaper to
his fellows of these societies as a man who is so absolutely corrupt,
so inordinately selfish and avaricious that he has not considered for a
moment the duties incumbent upon him; that he has been oblivious
to every obligation of trust and confidence, and that he is unworthy of
the respect of honest men.
One witness testified that he read this libel in the public library of the
city of Boston. It is furthermore shown that copies of this paper went
to Spain, England, and to different parts of the United States; and
inasmuch as the plaintiff is a man of prominence in the scientific
world, it is to be inferred that his fellows became more or less aware
of these heinous charges.
Thus we find that the plaintiff is here confronted with disappointed
ambition and frustrated hopes, and placed in the humiliating attitude
of having to explain to his fellows that the charges are untrue, of
adducing evidence to clear himself, perhaps never with complete
success, of the stain that has been cast upon his reputation by the
libelous and defamatory declarations contained in "Birds of Prey."
In view of the foregoing findings of fact and circumstances of the
case and the law applicable thereto,
It is the opinion of the court, and the court so finds, that the plaintiff
has sustained damages on account of wounded feelings and mental
suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of
thirty-five thousand (P35,000) pesos, and that he is entitled to
recover this sum of the nine defendants named, as being responsible
for having written, printed, and published said libel; and that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover of them the further sum of twenty-five
thousand (P25,000) pesos, as punitive damages, which the court
thinks will be a just punishment to these nine libelers and an example
to others.
Wherefore, it is so ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff, Dean C.
Worcester, have and recover of the defendants, Martin Ocampo,
Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano,
Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
Cansipit, jointly and severally, the sum of sixty thousand (P60,000)
pesos, and the costs of suit, for which execution may issue.
It is ordered. At Manila, P.I., this 14th day of January , 1910.
From said decision the defendants appealed and made the following
assignments of error in this court:
I.
The court erred in overruling our motions for suspension of this case,
in its present state, until final judgment should be rendered in
criminal case No. 4295 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
pending appeal in the Honorable Supreme Court, for libel based also
on the editorial, "Birds of Prey."
II.
The court erred in admitting as evidence mere opinion adduced by
counsel for the plaintiff with the intention of demonstrating to whom
the editorial, alleged to the libelous, refers.
III.
The court erred in giving greater preponderance to the opinions of
the witnesses for the plaintiff than to the expert testimony of the
defense.
IV.
The court erred in declaring the editorial on which the complaint is
based to be libelous per se and to refer necessarily to the plaintiff,
Dean C. Worcester.
V.
The court erred in declaring the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M.
Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco to be owners of "El Renacimiento."
VI.
The court erred in not admitting Exhibits 1 and 3 presented by
counsel for the defendants.
VII.
The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendants.
VIII.
The court erred in sentencing the defendants jointly "and severally"
to pay to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, the sum of P60,000.
IX.
The court erred in not ordering that execution of the judgment to be
confined to the business known as "El Renacimiento" and to the
defendant Teodoro M. Kalaw, without extending to property of the
alleged owners of said newspaper which was not invested therein by
them at its establishment.
X.
The court erred in granting damages to the plaintiff by virtue of the
judgment rendered against the defendants.
XI.
The court, finally, erred in granting to the plaintiff punitive damages
against the alleged owners of "El Renacimiento," admitting the
hypothesis that said editorial is libelous per se and refers to the
Honorable Dean C. Worcester.
The theory of the defendants, under the first assignment of error, is
that the civil action could not proceed until the termination of the
criminal action, relying upon the provisions of the Penal Code in
support of such theory. This court, however, has decided in the case
of Ocampo et al. vs. Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681) that a judgment in a
criminal prosecution for libel, under the provisions of Act 277 of the
Civil commission, constitutes no bar or estoppel in a civil action
based upon the same acts or transactions. The reason most often
given for this doctrine is that the two proceedings are not between
the same parties. Different rule as to the competency of witnesses
and the weight of evidence necessary to the findings in the two
proceedings always exist. As between civil and criminal actions
under said Act (No. 277) a judgment in one is no bar or estoppel to
the prosecution of the other. A judgment in a criminal cause, under
said Act, can not be pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil action.
(Stone vs. U.S., 167 U.S., 178; Boyd vs. U.S., 616 U. S., 616, 634;
Lee vs. U.S., 150 U.S., 476, 480; U.S. vs. Jaedicke, 73 Fed. Rep.,
100; U.S. vs.Schneider, 35 Fed. Rep., 107; Chamberlain vs. Pierson,
87 Fed. Rep., 420; Steel vs. Cazeaux, 8 Martin (La.), 318, 13
American Decisions, 288; Betts vs. New Hartford, 25 Conn., 185.)
In a criminal action for libel the State must prove its case by evidence
which shows the guilt of the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt,
while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his
cause by a preponderance of evidence only. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins
(supra); Reilly vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306; Sloane vs. Gilbert, 27
American decisions, 708; Cooley on Torts, sec. 208; Greenleaf on
Evidence, 426; Wigmore on Evidence, secs. 2497, 2498.)
With reference to the second assignment of error above noted, we
find that this court has already decided the question raised thereby,
in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1).
During the trial of the cause the plaintiff called several witnesses for
the purpose of showing that the statements made in said alleged
libelous editorial were intended to apply to the Honorable Dean C.
Worcester, Secretary of the Interior. The defendants duly objected to
these questions and excepted to the ruling of the court admitting
them.
In the case of Russell vs. Kelley (44 Cal., 641, 642) the same
question was raised and the court, in its decision, said:
The rule laid down in 2 Stockey on Slander (p. 51) is that the
application of the slanderous words to the plaintiff and the extrinsic
matters alleged in the declaration may be shown by the testimony of
witnesses who knew the parties and circumstances and who can
state their judgment and opinion upon the application and meaning
of the terms used by the defendant. It is said that where the words
are ambiguous on the face of the libel, to whom it was intended to be
applied, the judgment and opinion of witnesses, who from their
knowledge of the parties and circumstances are able to form a
conclusion as to the defendant's intention and application of the
libel is evidence for the information of the jury.
Mr. Odgers, in his work on Libel and Slander (p. 567), says:
The plaintiff may also call at the trial his friends or others acquainted
with the circumstances, to state that, in reading the libel, they at once
concluded it was aimed at the plaintiff. It is not necessary that all the
world should understand the libel. It is sufficient if those who know
the plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant. (See also
Falkard's Stockey on Libel and Slander, 4th English edition, 589.)
The correctness of this rule is not only established by the weight of
authority but is supported by every consideration of justice and
sound policy. The lower court committed no error in admitting the
opinion of witnesses offered during the trial of the cause. One's
reputation is the sum or composite of the impressions spontaneously
made by him from time to time, and in one way or another, upon his
neighbors and acquaintances. The effect of a libelous publication
upon the understanding of such persons, involving necessarily the
identity of the person libeled is of the very essence of the wrong. The
issue in a libel case concerns not only the sense of the publication,
but, in a measure its effect upon a reader acquainted with the person
referred to. The correctness of the opinion of the witnesses as to the
identity of the person meant in the libelous publication may always
be tested by cross-examination. (Enquirer Co. vs. Johnston, 72 Fed.
Rep., 443; 2nd Greenleaf on Evidence, 417; Nelson vs. Barchenius,
52 Ill., 236; Smith vs.Miles, 15 Vt., 245; Miller vs. Butler, 6 Cushing
(Mass.), 71.)
It is true that some of the courts have established a different rule. We
think, however, that a large preponderance of the decisions of the
supreme courts of the different States is in favor of the doctrine
which we have announced here.
We are of the opinion that assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, and 7 may
fairly be considered together, the question being whether or not the
evidence adduced during the trial of the cause in the lower court
shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the said editorial
was libelous in its character. Here again we find that this question
has been passed upon by this court in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo
et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1), and we deem it unnecessary to discuss this
question again, for the reason that the evidence adduced in the
present cause was practically the same, or at least to the same
effect, as the evidence adduced in the cause of U.S. vs. Ocampo et
al. It is sufficient here to say that the evidence adduced during the
trial of the present cause shows, by a large preponderance of the
evidence, that said editorial was one of the most pernicious and
malicious libels upon a just, upright and honorable official, which the
courts have ever been called upon to consider. There is not a
scintilla of evidence in the entire record, notwithstanding the fact that
the defendants from time to time attempted to make a show of
proving the truthfulness of the statements made in said editorial,
which in any way reflects upon the character and high ideals of Mr.
Dean C. Worcester, in the administration of his department of the
Government.
With reference to the fifth assignment of error, to wit: That the court
erred in holding that the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma,
Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit,
and Galo Lichauco, were the proprietors of "El Renacimiento," the
lower court said:
Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that
none of the twelve defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento"
and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of them had originally
contributed their money as a patriotic donation to the Filipino people,
and that Martin Ocampo simply held the money and property of the
paper as trustee for this people, and that the paper was being
devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo
Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends but had not
done so.
"This proposition," said the lower court, "in the light of the evidence,
is so preposterous as to entitle it to little, if any, serious
consideration. To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to asking
the court to stultify reason and common sense. That those seven
defendants named contributed their respective sums of money, as
shown by the evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper in 1901,
for their own personal benefit and profit, is fully and unmistakably
established. It is equally well established that Martin Ocampo is and
was, not only a part owner, but that he has been and is still the
administrator or business manager of said newspaper, and that the
other six persons named are shareholders, part owners and
proprietors thereof and were such on the said 30th of October,
1908."
Examining the evidence adduced during the cause in the lower court,
we find, sometime before the commencement of the present action
and before any question was raised with reference to who were the
owners of the said newspaper, that the defendant, Arcadio Arellano,
in the case of United States vs. Jose Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338),
testified upon that question as follows:
Q. Who are the proprietors of "El Renacimiento"?
A. I, Martin Ocampo, Gregorio Mariano (Cansipit), Mr. Barretto,
and Galo Lichauco.
Q. Who else?
A. No one else.
Q. And Rafael Palma — is not so?
A. No, sir; Manuel Palma, the brother of Rafael Palma.
During the trial of the present cause, Arcadio Arellano testified that
his declarations in other cause were true.
It also appears from the record (Exhibit B-J) that in the month of
November, 1907, long before the commencement of the present
action, "El Renacimiento," in reply to an article which was published
in "El Comercio," published the following statement:
They (it) say (s) that this enterprise" (evidently meaning the
publication of "El Renacimiento") "is sustained by Federal money;
that we are inspired by Federal personages. We declare that this,
besides being false, is calumnious. The shareholders of this
company are persons well known by the public, and never at any
moment of their lives have they acted with masks on--those masks
for which "El Comercio" seems to have so great an affection. They
are, as the public knows: Señores Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma,
Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and
Gregorio Cansipit.
Arcadio Arellano also testified during the trial of the present cause
that he contributed P750 to the establishment of "El Renacimiento;"
that Martin Ocampo contributed the sum of P500; that Mariano
Cansipit, Felipe Barretto and Angel Jose contributed the sum of
P250 or P500 each; that Galo Lichauco contributed the sum of
P1,000 and that Manuel Palma contributed P3,000.
During the trial of the present cause Arcadio Arellano, Martin
Ocampo, and Angel Jose testified as witnesses, relating to the
ownership of the newspaper called "El Renacimiento." They testified
that whatever money they gave for the purpose of establishing said
newspaper, was given as a donation, and that they were neither the
owners nor coowners of said periodical. The defendants, Manuel
Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, did
not testify as witnesses during the trial of the cause in the lower
court. No reason is given for their failure to appear and give
testimony in their own behalf. The record does not disclose whether
or not the declarations of Arcadio Arellano, in the case of U.
S. vs. Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338) at the time they were made, were
called to the attention of Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe
Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, as well as the reply to "El
Comercio," above noted. Proof of said declarations and publication
was adduced during the trial of the cause in the present case, and
the attorney of these particular defendants well knew the purpose
and effect of such evidence, if not disputed; but, notwithstanding the
fact that said declarations and publication were presented in
evidence, and notwithstanding the fact that the attorney for the
defendants knew of the purpose of such proof, the defendants,
Palma, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit, were not called as
witnesses for the purpose of rebutting the same. It is a well settled
rule of evidence, that when the circumstances in proof tend to fix the
liability on a party who has it in his power to offer evidence of all the
facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the
circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such
proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of
rebutting would support the inferences against him, and the court is
justified in acting upon that conclusion. (Railway Company vs. Ellis,
C. C. A. Reports, vol. 4, p. 454; Commonwealth vs. Webster, 5 Cush.
(Mass.), 295; People vs.McWhorter 4 Barb. (N. Y.), 438.)
Lord Mansfield, in the case of Blatch vs. Archer (Cowper, 63, 65)
said:
It is certainly a maxim that all the evidence is to be weighed
according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have
produced, and in the power of the other side to have contradicted.
Mr. Starkey, in his valuable work on evidence (vol. 1, p. 64), lays
down the rule that:
The conduct of a party in omitting to produce evidence in elucidation
of the subject matter in dispute, which is within his power and which
rests peculiarly within his own knowledge, frequently offers occasion
for presumptions against him, since it raises the strong suspicion that
such evidence, if adduced, would operate to his prejudice. (Pacific
Coast et al. Co. vs. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 36 C. C. A. Reports, 136,
153.)
At the time of the said declarations of Arcadio Arellano in the case of
Sedano and at the time of the said publication in reply to "El
Comercio," there was no reason for stating anything except the
truth: neither does there seem to have been any reason for
publishing the fact that the defendants were the owners of "El
Renacimiento" unless it was true.
At the time there seemed to be no reason to have it appear that they
were donors and public benefactors only. They seemed to be proud
of the fact that they were the owners. The editors, publishers, and
managers of "El Renacimiento," at the time the reply to "El
Comercio" was published, seemed to be anxious to announce to the
public who its owners were. It ("El Renacimiento") had not then
realized that it belonged to no one; that it had been born into the
community without percentage; that it had been created a terrible
machine for the purpose of destroying the good character and
reputation of men without having any one to respond for its malicious
damage occasioned to honorable men; that it was a cast-off, without
a past or the hope of a future; that it was liable to be kicked and
buffetted about the persecuted and destroyed without any one to
protect it; that its former friends and creators had scattered hither
and thither and had disappeared like feathers before a cyclone,
declaring, under oath, that they did not know their offspring and were
not willing to recognize it in public. It seems to have been a Moses
found in the bulrushes, destined by its creators to be a great good
among the Filipino people, in teaching them to respect the rights of
persons and property; but, unlike its Biblical prototype, it became, by
reason of its lack of parentage, an engine of destruction let loose in
the State, to enter the private abode of lawabiding citizens and to
take from them their honor and reputation, which neither it nor the
State could restore. To rob a man of his wealth is to rob him of trash,
but to take from him his good name and reputation is to rob him of
that which does not make the robber richer and leaves the person
robbed poor indeed.
The appellants tried to make it appear that the money which they
gave for the establishment of "El Renacimiento" was a pure
donation. They claim that it was a donation to the Filipino people.
They do not state, however, or attempt to show what particular
persons were to manage, control, and direct the enterprise for which
the donation was made. A donation must be made to definite
persons or associations. A donation to an indefinite person or
association is an anomaly in law, and we do not believe, in view of all
of the facts, that it was in fact made. A donation must be made to
some definite person or association and the donee must be some
ascertained or ascertainable person or association.
A donation may be made for the benefit of the public, but it must be
made, in the very nature of things, to some definite person or
association. A donation made to no person or association could not
be regarded as a donation in law. It could not be more than an
abandonment of property. Of course where a donation is in fact
made, without reservation to a particular person or association, the
donor is no longer the owner of the thing donated nor responsible, in
any way, for its use, provided that the object, for which the donation
was made, was legal. A person does not become an owner or part
owner of a church, for example, to the construction of which he has
made a donation; neither is he responsible for the use to which said
edifice may be applied. No one disputes the fact that donations may
be made for the public use, but they must be made to definite
persons or associations, to be administered in accordance with the
purpose of the gift.
We can not believe, in the light of the whole record, that the
defendants and appellants, at the time they presented the defense
that they were donors simply and not owners, had a reasonable
hope that their declarations as to said donation, given in the manner
alleged, would be believed by the court.
After a careful examination of the evidence brought to this court and
taking into consideration the failure of the other defendants to testify,
we are of the opinion that a preponderance of such evidence shows
that the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio
M. Cansipit, were the coowners of the newspaper known as "El
Renacimiento," at the time of the publication of the said alleged libel.
With reference to the sixth assignment of error above noted, to wit:
That the lower court committed an error in not admitting in evidence
the judgment of acquittal of the defendant, Lope K. Santos, rendered
in the criminal cause, we are of the opinion that the refusal to admit
said evidence in the civil cause was not an error. The fact that the
evidence in the criminal cause was insufficient to show that Lope K.
Santos was guilty of the crime charged, in no way barred the right of
the person injured by said alleged libel to maintain the present civil
action against him. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins, 14 Phil. Rep., 681.) The
criminal action had to be sustained by evidence showing the
culpability of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, while in the
civil action it is sufficient to show that the defendants injured the
plaintiff by the alleged libelous publication, by a preponderance of
the evidence only. (Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 426; Cooley on
Torts, 208; Reilley vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306; Sloane vs. Gilbert, 23
Am. Dec., 708.)
In the case of Steel vs. Cazeaux (8 Martin, La., 318; 13 American
Decisions, 288), the supreme court of Louisiana said:
A judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution can not be given in
evidence in a civil action.
In the case of Betts et al. vs. New Hartford (25 Conn., 180) Mr.
Justice Ellsworth said (in a case where a judgment in a criminal case
was offered in evidence):
A conviction in a criminal case is not evidence of facts upon which
the judgment was rendered, when those facts come up in a civil
case, for this evidence would not be material; and so the law is
perfectly well settled. (1 Greenleaf on Evidence, secs. 536, 524; 1
Phillips on Evidence, 231; Hutchinson vs. Bank of Wheeling, 41 Pa.
St., 42; Beausoleil vs. Brown, 12 La. Ann., 543; McDonald vs. Stark,
176 Ill., 456, 468.)
While we believe that the lower court committed no error in refusing
to admit the sentence acquitting Lope K. Santos in the criminal case,
we are of the opinion, after a careful examination of the record
brought to this court, that it is insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos
was responsible, in any way, for the publication of the alleged libel,
and without discussing the question whether or not the so-called
Tagalog edition of "El Renacimiento" and "El Renacimiento"
constituted one and the same newspaper, we find that the evidence
is insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos is responsible in damages,
in any way, for the publication of the said alleged libel.
The appellants discussed the eight and ninth assignments of error
together, and claim that the lower court committed an error in
rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants
and in allowing an execution against the individual property of said
owners, and cite provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes in
support of their contention. The difficulty in the contention of the
appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present
action is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each
joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he
participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. The
defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of
the tort. They might have been sued jointly and severally, as they
were. (Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (English Common Law Reports),
558.) If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person
injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or
one of them separately, because the tort is in its nature a separate
act of each individual. (1 Chiddey, Common Law Pleadings, 86.) It is
not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act,
for, to give an example, in a case of assault and battery committed
by various persons, under the common law all are principals. So also
is the person who counsels, aids or assists in any way he
commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided or
assisted or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was
as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort.
(Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.)
It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint tort feasors are all
the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or
who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are
each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner
as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. (Cooley on
Torts, 133; Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 Ill., 313 (63 Am. Dec., 312 and
note); Berry vs. Fletch, 1st Dill., 67; Smithwick vs. Ward, 7 Jones L.
64; Smith vs. Felt, 50 Barb. (N. Y.), 612; Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W.
Va., 90; Lewis vs. Johns, 34 Cal., 269.)
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they
commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or any number less
than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and all
together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for
one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act
are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him
that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with
that of the others. (Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1 Campbell (English
Reports), 343; Pitcher vs. Bailey, 8 East, 171; Booth vs. Hodgson, 6
Term Reports, 405; Vose vs. Grant, 15 Mass., 505;
Acheson vs. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1; Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann., 449;
Murphy vs. Wilson, 44 Mo., 313; Bishop vs. Ealey, 9 Johnson (N. Y.),
294.)
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be
apportioned among them, except among themselves. They can no
insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an
aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount.
(Pardrige vs. Brady, 7 Ill. App., 639; Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind., 417;
Lee vs. Black, 27 Ark., 337; Bevins vs. McElroy, 52 Am. Dec., 258.)
A payment in full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors,
of course satisfies any claim which might exist against the others.
There can be but one satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort
feasors by agreement, generally operates to discharge all.
(Wright vs. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson
(N.Y.), 290; Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs. Ashmead, 31
Conn., 447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt., 387; Turner vs.Hitchcock, 20
Iowa, 310; Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)
Of course the courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged
joint tort feasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts
may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of
the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are
charged jointly and severally. (Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2 Johnson
(N. Y.), 382; Drake vs. Barrymore, 14 Johnson, 166;
Owens vs. Derby, 3 Ill., 126.)
This same principle is recognized by Act 277 of the Philippine
Commission. Section 6 provides that:
Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is chargeable with the
publication of any words in any part . . . or number of each
newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same.
In our opinion the lower court committed no error in rendering a joint
and several judgment against the defendants and allowing an
execution against their individual property. The provisions of the Civil
and Commercial Codes cited by the defendants and appellants have
no application whatever to the question presented in the present
case.
The tenth assignment of error above noted relates solely to the
amount of damages suffered on account of wounded feelings,
mental suffering and injury to the good name and reputation of Mr.
Worcester, by reason of the alleged libelous publication. The lower
court found that the damages thus suffered by Mr. Worcester
amounted to P35,000. This assignment of error presents a most
difficult question. The amount of damages resulting from a libelous
publication to a man's good name and reputation is difficult of
ascertainment. It is nor difficult to realize that the damage thus done
is great and almost immeasurable. The specific amount the damages
to be awarded must depend upon the facts in each case and the
sound discretion of the court. No fixed or precise rules can be laid
down governing the amount of damages in cases of libel. It is difficult
to include all of the facts and conditions which enter into the measure
of such damages. A man's good name and reputation are worth
more to him than all the wealth which he can accumulate during a
lifetime of industrious labor. To have them destroyed may be
eminently of more damage to him personally than the destruction of
his physical wealth. The loss is immeasurable. No amount of money
can compensate him for his loss. Notwithstanding the great loss
which he, from his standpoint, sustains, the courts must have some
tangible basis upon which to estimate such damages.
In discussing the elements of damages in a case of libel, the
Honorable James C. Jenkins, who tried the present case in the court
below, correctly said that, "The enjoyment of a private reputation is
as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or
property. It is one of those rights necessary to human society, that
underlie the whole scheme of human civilization. The respect and
esteem of his fellows are among the highest rewards of a wellspent
life vouchsafed to man in this existence. The hope of it is the
inspiration of youth and its possession is a solace in later years. A
man of affairs, a business man, who has been seen known by his
fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many years, and who has
developed a great character and an unblemished reputation, has
secured a possession more useful and more valuable than lands or
houses or silver or gold. The law recognizes the value of such a
reputation and constantly strives to give redress for its injury. It
imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous words or libelous
publications, the liability to make full compensation for the damage to
the reputation, for the shame, obloquy and for the injury to the
feelings of its owner, which are caused by the publication of the
slander or libel. The law goes further. If the words are spoken or the
publication is made with the intent to injure the victim or with criminal
indifference to civil obligation, it imposes such damages as the jury,
in view of all the circumstances of the particular case, adjudge that
the wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public and to deter
others from doing likewise, and for punishment for the infliction of the
injury."
As was said above, the damages suffered by Mr. Worcester to his
good name and reputation are most difficult of ascertainment. The
attorney for the appellants, in his brief, lends the court but little
assistance in reaching a conclusion upon this question. The
appellants leaves the whole question to the discretion of the court,
without any argument whatever.
After a careful examination, we are of the opinion that part of the
judgment of the lower court relating to the damages suffered by the
Honorable Dean C. Worcester, should be modified, and that a
judgment should be rendered in favor of Mr. Dean C. Worcester and
against the defendants, jointly and severally, for the sum of P15,000,
with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d of January, 1909.
With reference to the eleventh assignment of error above noted, to
wit: That the court erred in imposing punitive damages upon the
defendants, we are of the opinion, after a careful examination of the
evidence, and in view of all of the facts and circumstances and the
malice connected with the publication of said editorial and the
subsequent publications with relation to said editorial, that the lower
court, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 277 of the Philippine
Commission, was justified in imposing punitive damages upon the
defendants.
Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in an action for libel, to
render a judgment for punitive damages, in an amount which the
court may think will be a just punishment to the libeler and an
example to others.
Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel may always be
recovered if the defendant or defendants are actuated by malice. In
the present case there was not the slightest effort on the part of the
defendants to show the existence of probable cause or foundation
whatever for the facts contained in said editorial. Malice, hatred, and
ill will against the plaintiff are seen throughout the record. The said
editorial not only attempted to paint the plaintiff as a villain, but upon
every occasion, the defendants resorted to ridicule of the severest
kind.
Here again we find difficulty in arriving at a conclusion relating to the
damages which should be imposed upon the defendants for the
purpose of punishment. Upon this question the courts must be
governed in each case by the evidence, the circumstances and their
sound discretion. Taking into consideration the fact that some of the
defendants have been prosecuted criminally and have been
sentenced, and considering that fact as a part of the punitive
damages, we have arrived at the conclusion that the judgment of the
lower court should be modified, and that a judgment should be
rendered against the defendants, jointly and severally, and in favor of
the plaintiff, the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, in the sum of
P10,000, as punitive damages, with interest at 6 per cent from the
23d day of January, 1909.
Therefore, after a full consideration of all the facts contained in the
record and the errors assigned by the appellants in this court, we are
of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court should be
modified and that a judgment should be rendered in favor of Dean C.
Worcester and against the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M.
Kalaw, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and severally, for
the sum of P25,000 with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d of
January, 1909, with costs, and that a judgment should be entered
absolving Lope K. Santos from any liability under said complaint. So
ordered.
Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-9010 March 28, 1914
J. H. CHAPMAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JAMES M. UNDERWOOD, defendant-appellee.
Wolfson & Wolfson for appellant.
Bruce, Lawrence, Ross & Block for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
At the time the accident occurred, which is the basis of this action,
there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran,
with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other.
One of these switches was located at the scene of the accident.
The plaintiff had been visiting his friend, a man by the name of
Creveling, in front of whose house the accident happened. He
desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Santa
Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by Creveling that the car was
approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed from
the gate into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the
car. The car was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or
the rear flatform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but,
seeing that he could not reached it without extra exertion, stopped
beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to
come abreast of him in order to board. While in this position he was
struck from behind and run over by the defendant's automobile.
The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his
automobile driven by his chauffeur, a competent driver. A street car
bound from Manila to Santa Ana being immediately in front of him,
he followed along behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the
accident the street car which was following took the switch — that is,
went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of
the main track. Thereupon the defendant no longer followed that the
street car nor went to the left, but either kept straight ahead on the
main street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the plaintiff
intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite
direction to that in which the defendant was going. When the front of
the "San Marcelino" car, the one the plaintiff attempted to board, was
almost in front of the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver
suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff, as
above described.
The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.
A careful examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that
the defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and
over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong
side. The plaintiff, in common out to board the car, was not obliged,
for his own protection, to observe whether a car was coming upon
him from his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming
from the right. He knew that, according to the law of the road, no
automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his
side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his
right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass
upon that side of the street car.
The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his
driver, under the facts and circumstances of this case. As we have
said in the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the driver
does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code
for whose acts the defendant would be responsible.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present
at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver,
the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the
negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as
to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his
automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a
violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has
had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.
The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up to
Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any
effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to
do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for
the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand,
if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner
having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its
continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner
of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The
act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for
such a length a time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his
driver's act his own.
In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from
the time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the
commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the
defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it
appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out
to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident
was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the
negligence of the driver.
Whether or not the owner of an automobile driven by a competent
driver, would be responsible, whether present or not, for the
negligent acts of his driver when the automobile was a part of a
business enterprise, and was being driven at the time of the accident
in furtherance of the owner's business, we do not now decide.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the
Minors, EPHRAIM CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE
CAEDO, suing through their father, MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as
guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for plaintiffs-appellants.
De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso and Divino for defendants-
appellants
MAKALINTAL, J.:
As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo
and several members of his family were injured they filed this suit for
recovery of damages from the defendants. The judgment, rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-
2952), contains the following disposition:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and
Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs Marcial
Caedo, et al., the sum of P1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000.00
for moral damages; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costs against the defendants. The
counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby
ordered dismissed, for lack of merits.
On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an
additional award of P3,705.11 in favor of the plaintiffs for the damage
sustained by their car in the accident.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the
case to us in view of the total amount of the plaintiffs' claim.
There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was
responsible for the accident? and (2) if it was defendant Rafael
Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable
with him? On the first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo
negligent; and on the second, held his employer solidarily liable with
him.
The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958
on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San
Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from
his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was
scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were
Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction
was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at
the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack
for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly
moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the
absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and
the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers).
Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of
the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a
certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by
means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the
right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he
saw it in front of him, only eight meters away. This is the first clear
indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided with two
lights, one on each side, and they should have given him sufficient
warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not
notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial,
the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he
had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights
for a considerable while.
In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the
opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping
altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to
the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right
rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching
it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other
lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo
had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed,
judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that
the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a
gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with
the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a
risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite
obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per
hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to
apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters
in front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the
presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the
clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its
rear bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and
wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation,
tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the
right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene
show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder
of the road at the moment of impact.
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to
Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the
damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or
not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the
driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by
the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding two months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise
held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of
due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the
first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman vs.
Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:
... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the
negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as
to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his
automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a
violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has
had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.
The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up
the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any
effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to
do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for
the results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other hand,
if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner
having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its
continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner
of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The
act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for
such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his
driver act his own.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent
superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that
ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if
he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo
had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been
employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for
over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of
traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him
at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the
latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the
driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of
the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that
such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was
not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open,
and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the
car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on
the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the
presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters
behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute
negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he
did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's
sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the
fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction.
The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity
for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver
accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if
he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man
nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or
not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to
prevent the misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code
is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held
to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional
drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and
instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they
are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the
rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the
different situations that are continually encountered on the road.
What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the
part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to
handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an
old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain
measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in
the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle.
The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his
omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him
he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception
is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver
that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear
to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to
require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of
professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies,
have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with MARCIAL T. CAEDO:
Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The next question refers to the sums
adjudged by the trial court as damages. The award of P48,000 by A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions, chest
way of moral damages is itemized as follows: wall, anterior;
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to 5th inclusive. Third rib has a
double fracture; Subparieto-plaural hematoma; Basal disc
1. Marcial Caedo P 20,000.00
atelectasis, lung, right lower lobe, secondary;
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull.
2. Juana S. Caedo 15,000.00
JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:

3. Ephraim Caedo 3,000.00 A. Abrasions, multiple:

(1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4)
knees.
4. Eileen Caedo 4,000.00
B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal;
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement.
5. Rose Elaine Caedo 3,000.00 D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx right, big toe.
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III and V right.
F. Concussion, cerebral.
6. Merilyn Caedo 3,000.00
EPHRAIM CAEDO:
Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should
have granted them also actual or compensatory damages, A. Abrasions, multiple:
aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they sustained. Defendants, (1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital
on the other hand maintain that the amounts awarded as moral
EILEEN CAEDO:
damages are excessive and should be reduced. We find no
justification for either side. The amount of actual damages suffered A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral
by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their injuries, other than aspect.
expenses for medical treatment, has not been shown by the B. Abrasions, multiple:
evidence. Actual damages, to be compensable, must be proven. (1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle finger; (2) Knee, anterior,
Pain and suffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation, and bilateral; (3) shin, lower 1/3.
constitute a proper ground for granting moral, not actual, damages,
as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code. ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:

The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following: A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3)
nasolabial region; (4) leg, lower third, anterior.
MARILYN CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower 1/3 right; (2) arm, lower third
C. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right.
(See Exhibits D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, and D- 5)
It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-
mentioned injuries, the amounts of moral damages granted by the
trial court are not excessive.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense
of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and
is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with
costs against the latter.
G.R. No. L-62988 February 28, 1985
FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and ROBERTO R.
LUNA, JR., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE E. DELA
ROSA and LUIS DELA ROSA, respondents.
Ezequiel S. Consulta for petitioners.
David M. Castro for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the defunct Court of Appeals.
The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a
vehicular collision. The collision took place on January 18, 1970, at
the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business
executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13
years who had no driver's license.
In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna
against Luis dela Rosa and his father Jose dela Rosa, the Court of
First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 81078, rendered the
following judgment:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the
defendants Luis dela Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to pay, jointly and
severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net
earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages,
and P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship, with legal interest
from the date of this decision; plus attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. (Record on Appeal, p. 35.)
The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals which in a
decision dated May 22, 1979, affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
(Rollo, p. 48.) However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by
the defendants-appellants, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution
dated June 19, 1981, modified its judgment thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered in this case is hereby modified
insofar as the judgment ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and
severally, the sum of P 1,650,000.00 to plaintiffs with legal interest
from July 5, 1973, is concerned. In lieu thereof, defendants are
hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of Four
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00) as unearned net
earnings of Roberto R. Luna, with legal interest thereon from the
date of the filing of the complaint until the whole amount shall have
been totally paid.
The rest of the other dispositions in the judgment a quo stand. (Rollo,
pp. 33-34.)
Both parties filed separate petitions for review of the appellate court's
decision.
In G.R. No. 57362, the petition for review of Jose and Luis dela Rosa
was denied for lack of merit on October 5, 1981. Subsequently, they
informed that the decision sought to be reviewed was not yet final
because the Lunas had a pending motion for reconsideration. For
prematurity, this Court set aside all previous resolutions. On
February 16, 1983, acting upon the motion and manifestation of the
petitioners, they were required to file an amended petition within
thirty days from notice. On June 20, 1983, this Court resolved: "For
failure of the petitioners to file an amended petition as required, this
case is hereby DISMISSED and the dismissal is final."
The instant case — G.R. No. 62988 — is the separate appeal of the
Lunas. Their petition contains the following prayer:
1. That the petition be given due course;
2. That after notice and hearing, judgment be rendered, setting aside
or modifying the RESOLUTION of respondent Court of Appeals
dated June 19, 1981, attached as Annex "A" to the petition, only
insofar as it reduced the unearned net earnings to P450,000.00, s•
as to affirm the trial court's finding as to the unearned net earnings of
the deceased in the amount of P1,650,000.00;
3. Ordering that the award of attorney's fees shall also be with
interest, at the legal rate. (Rollo, p. 27.)
On June 27, 1983, the petition was given due course. (Rollo, pp.
122-123.)
In the light of the foregoing, the resolution stated:
It thus appears that the questions in esse are with respect to the
award for unearned net earnings — should the award be
P450,000.00 only or should it be P1,650,000.00 as originally
adjudged; and whether the award for attorney's fees shall also be
with interest at the legal rate.
The Court takes notice that the wrongful death occurred as early as
January 18, 1970, and that until now the process of litigation is not
yet over. In the meantime the value of the Philippine peso has been
seriously eroded so that the heirs of the deceased may ultimately
have a greatly depreciated judgment. In the interest of justice, the
private respondents are hereby ordered to PAY to the petitioners
within thirty (30) days from notice the following amounts adjudged
against them: P450,000.00 for unearned net earnings of the
deceased; (P12,000.00 as compensatory damages; P50,000.00 for
the loss of his companionship with legal interest from July 3, 1973;
and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Still to be resolved shall be the following: whether the award for
unearned net earnings shall be increased to P1,650,000.00; and
whether the award for attorney's fees shall also be with interest at
the legal rate. The costs will be adjudged as a matter of course.
(Rollo, p. 123.)
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when
required to explain they said that they had no cash money.
Accordingly, this Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of
execution but the attempt of the special sheriff to enter the private
respondent's premises so that he could make an inventory of
personal properties was thwarted by guards and this Court had to
direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to assist in enforcing
the writ of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal amount.
In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two
children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually
employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly enough to support
his family. He has no assets of his own as yet." (Rollo, p. 208.)
1. On the amount of the award.
The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a)
that the deceased Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more
years; and (b) that his annual net income was P55,000.00, computed
at P75,000.00 annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal
expenses.
This is what the trial court said on Luna's life expectancy:
According to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at age 33
the life expectancy of Roberto Luna was 33.4 years, and under the
Commissioner Standard Ordinary, used by our domestic insurance
companies since 1968 for policies above P5,000.00 his life
expectancy was 38.51 years. Dr. Vicente Campa, medical director of
San Miguel Corporation, testified that he was the regular physician of
Roberto Luna since his marriage to Felina Rodriguez in 1957. He
said that except for a slight anemia which he had ten years earlier,
Roberto Luna was of good health. Allowing for this condition, he
could reasonably expect to have a life expectancy of 30 years.
(Record on Appeal, p. 33.)
The Court of Appeals in sustaining the trial court's conclusion said:
We have not been persuaded to disturb the conclusion that the
deceased had a life expectancy of thirty years. At the time of Luna's
death, he was only thirty-three years old and in the best of health.
With his almost perfect physical condition and his sound mind, the
expectation that he could have lived for another thirty years is
reasonable, considering that with his educational attainment, his
social and financial standing, he had the means of staying fit and
preserving his health and well-being. That he could have lived at
least until the age of sixty-three years is an assessment which is
more on the conservative side in view of the testimony of Dr. Vicente
Campa that the general life expectancy nowadays had gone up to
seventy years. (Rollo, p. 45.)
The Court of Appeals likewise sustained the trial court in respect of
Luna's annual income and expense. This is what the trial court said:
Roberto Luna was 33 years old when he died, and was survived by
his wife Felina Rodriguez-Luna, and two children, Roberto Jr., 13
years, and Jose, 12 years. His wife was 35 years old at the time. He
declared a gross income of P16,900.00 for 1967 (Exhibit I),
P29,700,000 for 1968 (Exhibit H) and P45,117.69 for 1969 (Exhibit
G). He had investments in various corporations amounting to
P136,116.00 (Exhibits K, M, M-1, N, N-1 to N-3, O, O-1, P, Q and R)
and was the president and general manager of Rodlum Inc.; general
manager of Esso Greenhills Service Center; Assistant manager of
Jose Rodriguez Lanuza Sons; director of Steadfast Investment
Corporation; chairman and treasurer of Greenhills Industrial
Corporation; vice-president of Oasis, Inc.; director of Nation Savings
Association; director of Arlun Taxi; and treasurer of National
Association of Retired Civil Employees.
... . His income tax returns show an increase in his income in the
short period of three years. It is reasonable to expect that it would
still go higher for the next fifteen years and reach a minimum of
P75,000.00 a year. The potential increase in the earning capacity of
a deceased person is recognized by the Supreme Court. ... the court
believes that the expected gross earnings of Roberto Luna should be
fixed in the sum of P75,000.00 a year for the period of his life
expectancy of 30 years, but deducting his personal expenses which,
because of his business and social standing the court in the amount
of P20,000.00 a year, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. (Record on Appeal, pp. 32-34.)
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the
Court of Appeals took into account the fact "that the deceased
Roberto R. Luna had been engaged in car racing as a sport, having
participated in tournaments both here and abroad;" it said that Luna's
habit and manner of life should be "one of the factors affecting the
value of mortality table in actions for damages;" and, consequently,
concluded that Luna could not have lived beyond 43 years. The
result was that the 30-year life expectancy of Luna was reduced to
10 years only.
Further on the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals ruled
in respect of Luna's annual personal expenses:
... . Considering the escalating price of automobile gas which is a key
expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing, We should
increase that amount to P30,000.00 as the would be personal
expenses of the deceased per annum. (Rollo, p. 33.)
The Court of Appeals then determined the amount of the award thus:
P75,000.00 annual gross income less P30,000.00 annual personal
expenses leaves P45,000.00 multiplied by 10 years of life
expectancy and the product is P450,000.00.
The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when by its
resolution of June 19, 1981, it reduced Luna's life expectancy from
30 to 10 Years and increased his annual personal expenses from
P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. We sustain the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to
10 years said that his habit and manner of life should be taken into
account, i.e. that he had been engaged in car racing as a sport both
here and abroad - a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten
his life expectancy. That Luna had engaged in car racing is not
based on any evidence on record. That Luna was engaged in go-kart
racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be
categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low
slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedalled
four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the Court of
Appeals to have disturbed the determination of the trial court which it
had previously affirmed.
Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net
annual income of the deceased by increasing his annual personal
expenses but without at the same time increasing his annual gross
income. It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses
should increase because of the "escalating price of gas which is a
key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing" [a statement
which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to
suppose that his income would also increase considering the
manifold sources thereof.
In short, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.
2. Attorney's fees — with or without interest at the legal rate.
The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the petitioners in the sum
of P50,000.00. This award was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
its decision of May 22, 1979. The resolution of June 19, 1981,
reaffirmed the award. The two decisions as well as the resolution do
not provide for interest at the legal rate to be tacked to the award.
The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's fees be with
interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint.
There is merit in this prayer. The attorney's fees were awarded in the
concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the
circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the
discretion of the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As with the other
damages awarded, the interest should accrue only from the date of
the trial court's decision.
The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, L-24803, May
26,1977; 77 SCRA 98, where it was held that Article 2180 of the Civil
Code applied to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation
by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but since Reginald had attained
age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become merely
subsidiary to that of his son. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa, is
now married and of legal age and that as a matter of equity the
liability of his father should be subsidiary only.
We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case
because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is
abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he
does not have any property either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In
fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 19,
1981, is hereby set aside; its decision dated May 22, 1979, is
reinstated with the sole modification that the award for attorney's
fees shall earn interest at the legal rate from July 5, 1973, the date of
the trial court's decision. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957
SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.
Magno T. Bueser for appellant.
Alver Law Offices and Edon B. Brion and Vencedor A. Alimario for
appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double
homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro
Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial,
Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina,
reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages
against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of
the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the
decision. Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he committed
the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action
against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for
damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her
son Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set up the defense that if any one
should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante
Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident,
the former was not under the control, supervision and custody, of the
latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a
consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages
claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that
the appeal only involves questions of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts
Organization and a student of the Bilintawak Elementary School
situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949
he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon
instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante,
with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to
run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his
left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two
of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperiña, died as a
consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante,
was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that
his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when
his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon
instruction of his teacher.
The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin
Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son
Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña
caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code,
paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is
enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with
them.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the
damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante
because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which
resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then
living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed,
the civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the
lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted,
"teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and
trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil
Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557).
Here Dante capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary
School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the
parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante
boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the
accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the
head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held
liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a
student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over
them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them
in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them
the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and
155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage(Article
1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to
prove.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense
that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and
the costs of action.
G.R. No. L-14414 April 27, 1960
SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
JOSE BALCE, defendant-appellee.
Marciano C. Dating, Jr. for appellants.
Severino Balce for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On February 5, 1957, plaintiffs brought this action against defendant
before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte to recover the
sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest thereon from July 18, 1952,
plus attorney' fees and other incidental expenses.
Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which
plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here apply for the
reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases.
After trial, the court sustained the theory of defendant and dismissed
the complaint with costs. Hence the present appeal.
Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died single
from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of
defendant. At the time, Gumersindo Balce was also Single, a minor
below 18 years of age, and was living with defendant. As a result of
Carlos Salen's death, Gumersindo Balce accused and convicted of
homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the heirs of
the deceased an indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00. Upon
petition of plaintiff, the only heirs of the deceased, a writ of execution
was issued for the payment of the indemnity but it was returned
unsatisfied because Gumersindo Balce was insolvent and had no
property in his name. Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon
defendant, father of Gumersindo, the payment of the indemnity the
latter has failed to pay, but defendant refused, thus causing plaintiffs
to institute the present action.
The question for determination is whether appellee can be held
subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity of P2,000.00 which his son was
sentenced to pay in the criminal case filed against him.
In holding that the civil liability of the son of appellee arises from his
criminal liability and, therefore, the subsidiary liability of appellee
must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
and not under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which only applies
to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts, the trial court made the
following observation:
The law provides that a person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable (Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code). But there is no law
which holds the father either primarily or subsidiarily liable for the
civiliability inccured by the son who is a minor of 8 years. Under Art.
101 of the Penal Code, the father is civilly liable for the acts
committed by his son if the latter is an imbecile, or insane, or under 9
years of age or over 9 but under 15, who has acted without
discernment. Under Art. 102, only in keepers and tavern-keepers are
held subsidiarily liable and under Art. 103 of the same Penal Code,
the subsidiary liability established in Art. 102 shall apply only to
"employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices or employees in the discharge of their duties." By the
principle of exclusio unus exclusio ulterius, the defendant in this case
cannot be held subsidiary liable for the civil liability of Gumersindo
Balce who has been convicted of homicide for the killing of the
plaintiff's son Carlos Salen.
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, relied by the plaintiff's, is not applicable
to the case at bar. It applies to obligations which arise from quasi-
delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses. Civil
liability arising from criminal negligence or offenses is governed by
the provisions of the Penal Code and civil liability arising from civil
negligence is governed by the provision of the Civil Code. The
obligation imposed by Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code expressly
refers to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts. And obligations
arising from quasi-delict (Commissioner's note). And according to
Art. 2177, the 'responsibility for fault of negligence under Art. 2176 is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liabilty arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. . . .
While we agree with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability arising
from a crime shall be governed by the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, we disagree with the contention that the subsidiary
liability of persons for acts of those who are under their custody
should likewise be governed by the same Code even in the absence
of any provision governing the case, for that would leave the
transgression of certain right without any punishment or sanction in
the law. Such would be the case if we would uphold the theory of
appellee as sustained by the trial court.
It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is
made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter
is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, over 9 but under 15
years of age, who act without discernment, unless it appears that
there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who
commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from
criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal
Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to
attach certain civil liability to the person who has the deliquent minor
under his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with
discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the
Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he
stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law
which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the
minor children who lived in their company." To hold that this
provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which
arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother
may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the Revised Penal
Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as
may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which
cover equal or identical cases.
A case in point is Exconde vs. Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, the facts of
which are as follows:
Dante Capuno, a minor of 15 years of age, lives in the company of
his father, Delfin Capuno. He is a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School in the City of San Pablo and a member of the Boy
Scout Organization of his school. On Marcy 31, 1949, on the
occasion of a certain parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in the City of
San Pablo, Dante Capuno was one of those instructed by the City
School Supervisor to join the parade. From the school, Dante
Capuno, together with other students, boarded a jeep. When the
jeep started to run, Dante Capuno took hold of the wheel and drove it
while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the
jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amando Ticson and
Isidro Caperina died as a consequence. The corresponding criminal
action for double homicide through reckless imprudence was
instituted against Dante Capuno. During the trial, Sabina Exconde,
as mother of the deceased Isidro Caperina, reserved her right to
bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. Dante
Capuno was found guilty of the criminal offense charged against him.
In line with said reservation of Sabina Exconde, the corresponding
civil action for damages was filed against Delfin Capuno, Dante
Capuno and others.
In holding Delfin Capuno jointly and severally liable with his minor
son Dante Capuno arising from the criminal act committed by the
latter, this Court made the following ruling:
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over
them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them in proportion to their
means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and
punish them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code).
The only way by which they can relieved themselves of this liability is
if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish
Civil Code.) This defendants failed to prove.
Another case in point is Araneta vs. Arreglado 104 Phil., 524; 55 Off.
Gaz. [9] 1961. The facts of this case are as follows:
On March 7, 1951, while plaintiff Benjamin Araneta was talking with
the other students of the Ateneo de Manila while seated atop a low
ruined wall bordering the Ateneo grounds along Dakota Street, in the
City of Manila, Dario Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo,
chanced to pass by. Those on the wall called Dario and conversed
with him, and in the course of their talk, twitted him on his leaving the
Ateneo and enrolling in the De La Salle College. Apparently,
Arreglado resented the banter and suddenly pulling from his pocket a
Japanese Luger pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan
Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw,
causing him to drop backward, bleeding profusely. Helped by his
friends, the injured lad was taken first to the school infirmary and
later to the Singian Hospital, where he lay hovering between life and
death for three days. The vigor of youth came to his rescue; he
rallied and after sometime finally recovered, the gunshot would left
him with a degenerative injury to the jawbone (mandible) and a scar
in the lower portion of the face, where the bullet had plowed through.
The behavior of Benjamin was likewise affected, he becoming
inhibited and morose after leaving the hospital.
Dario Arreglado was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded
guilty, but in view of his youth, he being only 14 years of age, the
court suspended the proceedings as prescribed by Article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thereafter, an action was instituted by Araneta
and his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife, and their son Dario,
to recover material, moral and exemplary damages. The court of first
instance, after trial, sentenced the Arreglados to pay P3,943.00 as
damages and attorney's fees. From this decision, the Araneta
appealed in view of the meager amount of indemnity awarded. This
Court affirmed the decision but increased the indemnity to
P18,000.00. This is a typical case of parental subsidiary liability
arising from the criminal act of a minor son.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. Judgement is
hereby rendered ordering appellee to pay appellants the sum of
P2,000.00, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint,
and the costs.
G.R. No. L-14409 October 31, 1961
AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner,
vs.
ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Feliciano C. Tumale and Roberto R. Reverente for
petitioner.
Valerio V. Rovira for respondents.
PAREDES, J.:
For serious physical injuries sustained by Pepito Cadano, son of
plaintiff-appellee Elpidio Cadano, two separate actions were
instituted, Civil Case No. 583, filed on October 1, 1954, for damages
against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico Fuellas, who
caused the injuries, and Criminal Case No. 1765, against Rico
Fuellas, filed on November 11, 1954, for serious physical injuries.
They were tried jointly. On May 18, 1956, a judgment of conviction in
the criminal case was rendered, finding Rico Fuellas guilty of the
offense charged. No pronouncement as to his civil liability was made,
the trial judge having ruled that the same "shall be determined in
Civil Case No. 583 of this Court." On May 25, 1956, the same court,
rendered judgment in the civil case making defendant therein, now
appellant Agapito Fuellas, liable under Art. 2180 of the new Civil
Code for the following damages: —
For medicine, etc. P1,000.00
For moral damages 6,000.00
As exemplary damages 2,000.00
As attorney's fees 600.00
Total P9,600.00
with 6% annual interest thereon until paid. The Court of Appeals
modified the judgment by reducing the moral damages to P3,000.00.
An appeal was taken to this tribunal solely on questions of law.
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito
Fuellas, were both 13 years old, on September 16, 1954. They were
classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan City. In the
afternoon of September 16, 1954, while Pepito was studying his
lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto
Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito.
When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who
returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of
Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated
Rico and Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with
Pepito following. When Pepito had just gone down of the
schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in an angry mood. Angelito
Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his
hand to Rico. Instead of accepting the proffer to shake hands, Rico
held Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of
balance and pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side
with his right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left
side. While Rico was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out "My
arm is broken." Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was helped
by others to go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the
Lanao General Hospital for treatment (Exh. 4). An X-Ray taken
showed that there was a complete fracture of the radius and ulna of
the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting (Exhs. A, B and
D). On November 20, 1954, more than a month after Pepito's release
from the hospital, the plaster cast was removed. And up to the last
day of hearing of the case, the right forearm of Pepito was seen to be
shorter than the left forearm, still in bandage and could not be fully
used.
It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate
injury caused by his son; that the said court held the petitioner liable
pursuant to par. 2 of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in connection with
Art. 2176 of the same Code; that according to the last article, the act
of the minor must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present;
and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-
appellant's minor son, but deliberate intent, the above mentioned
articles are not applicable, for the existence of deliberate intent in the
commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in
its commission. Appellant, therefore, submits that the appellate Court
erred in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act
of his minor son.
The above-mentioned provisions of the Civil Code states: —
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this chapter. (Article 2176)
The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
xxx xxx xxx (Article 2180).
In the case of Araneta vs. Arreglado, G.R. No. L-11394, prom.
September 9, 1958, Benjamin Araneta was talking with other
students of the Ateneo de Manila, seated atop a low ruined wall.
Dario Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by.
The boys twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the
De la Salle College. Arreglado, resenting the banter, pulled a
Japanese luger pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan
Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw.
Dario was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded guilty. But in
view of his youth, he being only 14 years of age, the Court
suspended the proceedings (Art. 80 of the Revised Penal Code).
Thereafter, action was instituted by Araneta and his father against
Juan Arreglado, his wife and their son Dario to recover material,
moral and exemplary damages. The Court of First Instance
sentenced the Arreglados to pay P3,943.00 as damages and
attorney's fees. The Aranetas appealed in view of the meager
amount of indemnity awarded. This tribunal affirmed the decision but
increased the indemnity to P18,000.00. This decision was predicated
upon the fact that Arreglado's father had acted negligently in allowing
his son to have access to the pistol used to injure Benjamin. And this
was the logical consequence of the case, considering the fact that
the civil law liability under Article 2180 is not respondeat superior but
the relationship of pater familias which bases the liability of the father
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his minor son
(Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison, 55 Phil. 23), and that if an injury is
caused by the fault or negligence of his minor son, the law presumes
that there was negligence on the part of his father (Bahia vs. Litonjua
y Leynes, 30 Phil., 625).
In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., G.R. No. L-10132,
prom. June 29, 1957), holding the defendants jointly and severally
liable with his minor son Dante for damages, arising from the criminal
act committed by the latter, this tribunal gave the following reasons
for the rule: —
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over
them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them in proportion to their
means", while on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and
punish them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code).
The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is
if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish
Civil Code). This, defendants failed to prove.
And a noted Spanish commentator said: —
Since children and wards do not yet have the capacity to govern
themselves, the law imposes upon the parents and guardians the
duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts of their children and
wards in order that damages to third persons due to the ignorance,
lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards may be
avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with this duty,
they should suffer the consequences of their abandonment or
negligence by repairing the damage caused" (12 Manresa, 649-650).
(See also Arts. 311 and 316, Civil Code).
It is further argued that the only way by which a father can be made
responsible for the criminal act of his son committed with deliberate
intent and with discernment, is an action based on the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability of the parents; that the
minor Fuellas having been convicted of serious physical injuries at
the age of 13, the provisions of par. 3 of Art. 12, Revised Penal
Code, could have been applied, but having acted with discernment,
Art. 101 of the same Code can not include him. And as par. 2, of Art.
101, states that "the exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Art.
11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced subject to the following rules: First, in cases of
subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts
committed by an imbecile or insane person and by a person under
nine years of age or by one over nine but under fifteen years of
age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part," the
appellant concluded that this provision covers only a situation where
a minor under 15 but over 9 years old commits a criminal act "without
discernment."
In the recent case of Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, G.R. No.
L-14414, April 27, 1960; 57 Off. Gaz. No. 37, p. 6603, September 11,
1961, the defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo
Balce, below 18 years of age who was living with him. Gumersindo
was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen, minor
son of plaintiffs. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
case, stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant
arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art. 2180 of the
new Civil Code. In reversing the decision, this tribunal held: —
It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is
made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter
is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under
15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that
there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who
commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from
criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal
Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to
attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent
minor under his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who
acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which
reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents
should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the
general law which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company." To hold that this provision
does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations
which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act
where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.
Verily, the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is
subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be
gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal
or identical cases.
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on
the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties,
independently of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or
negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present
case was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art.
2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore
stated, any discussion as to the minor's criminal responsibility is of
no moment.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the decision appealed
from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. 34840 September 23, 1931
NARCISO GUTIERREZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ, MARIA V. DE GUTIERREZ, MANUEL
GUTIERREZ, ABELARDO VELASCO, and SATURNINO
CORTEZ, defendants-appellants.
L.D. Lockwood for appellants Velasco and Cortez.
San Agustin and Roxas for other appellants.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance
of Manila against the five defendants, to recover damages in the
amount of P10,000, for physical injuries suffered as a result of an
automobile accident. On judgment being rendered as prayed for by
the plaintiff, both sets of defendants appealed.
On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private
ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon
bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Piñas,
Province of Rizal. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo
Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was
being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and
was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel
Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car,
but the mother, together will several other members of the Gutierrez
family, seven in all, were accommodated therein. A passenger in the
autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez, was en route from San
Pablo, Laguna, to Manila. The collision between the bus and the
automobile resulted in Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fracture right leg
which required medical attendance for a considerable period of time,
and which even at the date of the trial appears not to have healed
properly.
It is conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and
simple. The difference between the parties is that, while the plaintiff
blames both sets of defendants, the owner of the passenger truck
blames the automobile, and the owner of the automobile, in turn,
blames the truck. We have given close attention to these highly
debatable points, and having done so, a majority of the court are of
the opinion that the findings of the trial judge on all controversial
questions of fact find sufficient support in the record, and so should
be maintained. With this general statement set down, we turn to
consider the respective legal obligations of the defendants.
In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as concerns
the Gutierrez family, it may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was
in incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of
speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his
head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. The
guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a
license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the
acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor or
the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor.
We are dealing with the civil law liability of parties for obligations
which arise from fault or negligence. At the same time, we believe
that, as has been done in other cases, we can take cognizance of
the common law rule on the same subject. In the United States, it is
uniformly held that the head of a house, the owner of an automobile,
who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its
negligent operation by one of his children, whom he designates or
permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being used at the
time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's
family than the child driving it. The theory of the law is that the
running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the
family is within the scope of the owner's business, so that he is liable
for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master
and servant. (Huddy On Automobiles, 6th ed., sec. 660; Missell vs.
Hayes [1914], 91 Atl., 322.) The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the
owner of the truck, and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a
different basis, namely, that of contract which, we think, has been
sufficiently demonstrated by the allegations of the complaint, not
controverted, and the evidence. The reason for this conclusion
reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the
truck on the bridge, the speed in operating the machine, and the lack
of care employed by the chauffeur. While these facts are not as
clearly evidenced as are those which convict the other defendant, we
nevertheless hesitate to disregard the points emphasized by the trial
judge. In its broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers
approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions, with neither
being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other, with
the inevitable result of a collision and an accident.
reasonable. The difficulty in approximating the damages by monetary
compensation is well elucidated by the divergence of opinion among
the members of the court, three of whom have inclined to the view
that P3,000 would be amply sufficient, while a fourth member has
argued that P7,500 would be none too much.
In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment appealed
from will be modified, and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor
against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, and
Saturnino Cortez, jointly and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and
the costs of both instances.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and
Imperial, JJ., concur.

The defendants Velasco and Cortez further contend that there

existed contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, consisting [G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]
principally of his keeping his foot outside the truck, which occasioned
his injury. In this connection, it is sufficient to state that, aside from CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON.
the fact that the defense of contributory negligence was not pleaded, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and
the evidence bearing out this theory of the case is contradictory in SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.
the extreme and leads us far afield into speculative matters.
Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.
The last subject for consideration relates to the amount of the award.
The appellee suggests that the amount could justly be raised to Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.
P16,517, but naturally is not serious in asking for this sum, since no
appeal was taken by him from the judgment. The other parties unite
in challenging the award of P10,000, as excessive. All facts
considered, including actual expenditures and damages for the injury
to the leg of the plaintiff, which may cause him permanent lameness, SYLLABUS
in connection with other adjudications of this court, lead us to
conclude that a total sum for the plaintiff of P5,000 would be fair and
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL REGALADO, J.:
LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED
BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. — The parents are and
should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is
authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven
sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by
that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of
prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched.
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under,
families through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition
or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment;
should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended
and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age
judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.
who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years
of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof
2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of
were alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us
such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his
seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court
death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and
promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the
Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve
following decretal portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the
mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s
the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family
complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby
friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this
rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to
civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
plaintiffs the following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental
authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
modified.

3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.

However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed."

DECISION 1

Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that
respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong
who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from
which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year
commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while
petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18
and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also
died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong
and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie
Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly
found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and
second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann
with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal,
prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In order to
avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou
Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets,
Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a
single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and
Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi,
which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom
and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances
surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the
contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn
from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports,
documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter,
submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the
aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to
commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise
distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and
contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have
displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics
informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have
caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any
witness and thereby avoid identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case
No. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the
court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the
evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of
sufficient merit." 2
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court
dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside
and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees
who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for
resolution the following issues in this case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court
in accordance with established decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly
interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for
vicarious liability. 3

In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police
Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on
some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound
was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue
emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of
gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the
bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only
circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of
whether it was suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of
contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance
wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body of
deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor,
considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours
from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not
categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at
the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will
also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a
paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder
residue on Wendell’s hands was forever lost when Wendell was
hastily buried.cralawnad
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy
on the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident
or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the
record of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral
Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table
and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed,
but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he admitted
that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he see
whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on
the head which he examined because the deceased was inside the
morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that
as far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and
the exit of the wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi
shot himself. 6
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the
head of the victim and that he found no burning or singeing of the
hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which
are general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct
examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these
clarification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that
there would be no black residue or tattooing that could result from
these guns because they are what we call clean?
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is
smokeless, those indications that you said may not rule out the
possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a
smokeless powder.
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that
you have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the
trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact
that the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the victim
himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above
the right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on
your oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the
trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or the
manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim." 7
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found
at the scene of the crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie
Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch
prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of
entrance located at the right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy
report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion
collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward,
located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5
cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward,
upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a
punch-in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial
cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the brain tissues,
fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound,
irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0
cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory
meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
x x x
"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around
the gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging,
singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot
wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying
tissue, are absent." 10
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was
made of record, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following
the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of
the wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please
indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been possible for
Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm’s length.
ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by
extending his right arm almost straight towards his head." 11
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence
to the testimonies of defendants’ witnesses Lydia Ang and James
Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment across the
street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house
adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a
"shadow" of a person at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing
shots therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where
she was staying faces the gas station; that it is the second
apartment; that from her window she can see directly the gate of the
Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the
gas station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the
Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans, she called the police station but
the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James
Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate
towards his rooftop. 13
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top
of the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone
regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house
with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiong’s
house; and he further gave the following answers to these
questions:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in relation to your
house?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court
that the same do not inspire credence as to the reliability and
accuracy of the witnesses’ observations, since the visual perceptions
of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in
relation to the house of herein private respondents. On the other
hand, witness Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without
contradiction that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for
Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when Manolo
climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong
house, he heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds
later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from the
fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. 15
Manolo’s direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the
fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as
the "shadow" of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated
pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann.
It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any
suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged
"John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious theory that
Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the
overwhelming evidence — testimonial, documentary and pictorial —
the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie
Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas
for a reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a
good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the
crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence
on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety
deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these
petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is
always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They
have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She
admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in
the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain
serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the
diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun
away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the
keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he
had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent
and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction
and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their
duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their
son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only
at the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he
was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the
safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children
who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as
being drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible
explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten
dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright what
clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in
possession of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding
petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the start of this opinion,
respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on the
part of petitioners and had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children
who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace
of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising
the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his
reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann
Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live
in their company.’
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from
having access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety
deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the
natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living
in their company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-
appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases,
prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409,
Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held that:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.’
‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of
their minor children who acted with discernment is determined under
the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which
arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother
may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent.’ (3 SCRA 361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees,
Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil
gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should
that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor
when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with
said gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion
Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said hereunder.chanrobles law library
gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent
. . ." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the
parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being
x x x subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look
considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which
warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings
that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their
"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this
minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor
Court holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein
be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the
plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint because as preponderantly shown by
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the
evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the
other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son
and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial
from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-
defense.
appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have
not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their
learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the
minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
crime had been committed." (Emphases ours.) 19
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said
code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners
persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor
should be held liable for the civil liability based on what appears from
and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are
all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We take
solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not
this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination
subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that"
therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of
of a good father of a family to prevent damages."cralaw virtua1aw
petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20
library
which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for
damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies
the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts
committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary.
and criminal offenses," followed by an extended quotation ostensibly
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — law."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor

children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has,
aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil
number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno,
liability for acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age,
Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24
or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill,
without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person
Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was
issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their
no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21
minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with
discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under
situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In
the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes
both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability
committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and
should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180
also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part,
of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and
that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the
civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond
not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act
for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in
involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where
both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall
the damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however,
respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of
there are unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable
insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of
inconsistency in the Court’s determination of whether the liability of
minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor
the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their
causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be
minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
answerable with his own property in an action against him where a
guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double
minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of
homicide through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and
severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his
father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore,
primary liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on
the parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty of
frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil
Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for
damages arising from the conviction of his son, who was over 15 but
less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time,
disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as
already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but
supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the
parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical
injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in
Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged
solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for homicide
by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is
likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code.
Finally, in Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide
charge due to "lack of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that
while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary
liability for damages, since the son, "although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity" the father was
only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides
for subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages under the
compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations
engaged in industry; 29 and principals, accomplices and accessories
for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other classes.
30
Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its
decision in the present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that
Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A
careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in
its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it
attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of said case
which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization
does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In
fact, after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and
Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court
concluded its decision in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on
the basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties, independent
of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under
Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or
negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the
reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to
the minor’s criminal responsibility is of no moment."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that
the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children
under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is
premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years
of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted
without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but
under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or
over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be
effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code
which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her
death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is
now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by
minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180
and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann
Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by
Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable
for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding
modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the
bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its
findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite
diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with
costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC
Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and
CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of
age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo,
Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses
Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he
was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for
damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto
Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from
criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas
and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto
Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted
on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed
Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption,
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to
the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting
parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was
filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was
then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint,
ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7
December 1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or on 14
December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January
1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that
notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least
three (3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice
shall state the time and place of hearing — both motions were
denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April
1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June
1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling
that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
ending 22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision
dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6
June 1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that
petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend
that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the
action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto
Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1)
whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to
appeal, may still file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the
Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners'
appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects
of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted
child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet
lodged with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental
motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having
complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section
4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro
forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary
period to appeal: the trial court held that the motions, not having
contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless
pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As
in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the service
of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place
of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant.
Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served, the
Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules
to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as
having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion
(and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in
the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for
appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon
where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on
their merits. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very
rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure
not override, substantial justice. if d technical and rigid enforcement
of the rules is made their aim would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action
on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code
provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article
2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed
negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not
only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed
by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their
parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious
liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad
Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence,
whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect
— and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to
cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed
is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to
extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so
as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons
whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others
who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over
them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected
to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined
exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly
imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may
consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or
in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of
one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons
of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the
person made liable for their conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor
children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental
authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law
assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the
child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other
words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed
parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such
authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and
the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air
rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent
Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would
thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of
the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that
because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in
favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the
latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for
adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle.
The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any
parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement
agency and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied
that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the
child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that the
best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree
of adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective he date the
original petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which
the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should
be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where
the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been
dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code,
the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the
relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living
with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly
insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act,
shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held
liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts
or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
companyand under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting
happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to
the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or
physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where
such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage
in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold
that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented
(since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with
the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious
liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction
on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could
have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at
the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the
conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally
granted unless and until the adopting parents are given by the
courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to
assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal
union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be
vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested
in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before
the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting
parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period.
In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun
or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in
any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural
parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for
damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial
court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed
before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is
REMANDED to that court for further proceedings consistent with this
Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision
is immediately executory.
G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father
ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.
Rodolfo J. Herman for plaintiffs-appellees.
Luis G. Torres and Abraham E. Tionko for defendant-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs
and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which
certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were
classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod
City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with
three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises.
While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband,
an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair.
Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and,
evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that
precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the
object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the
injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10,
the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the
incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for
treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20
and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of
twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of
P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa
Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of
their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's
father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual
damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an
act of his minor child which causes damage to another under the
specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil
Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the
fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there
being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act
or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible,
the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the
different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the
mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this
vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or
negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima
facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical
inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180,
which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the
burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the
exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent
prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor
child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his
immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously
calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all
the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL QUISUMBING, JR., ET
implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every AL., respondents.
individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such
diligence the damage could have been prevented. Abad Santos and Pablo for petitioner.
Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for respondents.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred
that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the LABRADOR, J.:
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, which
exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage,
condemned petitioner to pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 for
or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school,
medical expenses, for a physical injury caused by the son of
where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the
petitioner, Augusto Mercado, on a classmate, Manuel Quisumbing,
right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the
Jr., both pupils of the Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon
teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was
City. The case had originated in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at
Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, presiding, which dismissed the complaint
play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special
filed by Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and his father against petitioner,
reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
father of the above-mentioned Mercado. The facts found by the
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character
Court of Appeals are as follows:
which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the
blame could be attributed to her parents. Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-
plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy
Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L.
for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated
Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were
to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction
classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City.
enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good
A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be described
conscience.
as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the
right cheek with a piece of razor.

xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. L-14342 May 30, 1960
The facts of record clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who
CIRIACO L. MERCADO, petitioner, started the aggression. Undeniably, the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto
vs. Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn Benedicto lent
it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the "pitogo"
belonged to Augusto, because right after Benedicto gave it to him,
Benedicto ran away to get a basketball with which they could play.
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the "pitogo"
belonged to Augusto. He thought it was the "pitogo" of Benedicto P.
Lim, so that when Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo" from
Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better
at putting the chain into the holes of the "pitogo". However, Augusto
resented Manuel, Jr.'s remark and he aggresively pushed the latter.
The fight started then. After Augusto gave successive blows to
Manuel, Jr., and the latter was clutching his stomach which bore the
brunt of Augusto's anger, Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a
helpless position, cut him on the right check with a piece of razor.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the doctor who treated Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., Antonio B.
Past, testified for plaintiffs-appellants, he did not declare as to the
amount of fees he collected from plaintiff-appellants for the treatment
of Manuel, Jr. the child was not even hospitalized for the wound. We
believe that the sum of P50.00 is a fair approximation of the medical
expenses incurred by plaintiffs-appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
The damages specified in paragraphs C and D of the aforequoted
portion of plaintiffs-appellant's complaint come under the class of
moral damages. The evidence of record shows that the child suffered
moral damages by reason of the wound inflicted by Augusto
Mercado. Though such kind of damages cannot be fully appreciated
in terms of money, we believe that the sum of P2,000.00 would fully
compensate the child.
As second cause of action, plaintiffs-appellants pray for P5,000.00
covering the moral damages they allegedly suffered due to their
son's being wounded; and the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The facts of record do not warrant the granting of moral damages to
plaintiffs-appellants Manuel Quisumbing and Ana Pineda. "In law
mental anguish is restricted, as a rule, to such mental pain or
suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as
distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the
accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering of
which arises from a contemplation of wrong committed on the person
of another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot
recover for mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the
other's suffering. Nor can a parent recover for mental distress and
anxiety on account of physical injury sustained by a child or for
anxiety for the safety of his child placed in peril by the negligence of
another." (15 Am. Jur. 597). Plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to
attorney's fees, it not appearing that defendant-appellee had
wantonly disregarded their claim for damages.
In the first, second and third assignments of error, counsel for
petitioner argues that since the incident of the inflicting of the wound
on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time),
through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teacher or head
of the school should be held responsible instead of the latter. This
precise question was brought before this Court in Exconde vs.
Capuno and Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, but we held, through Mr.
Justice Bautista:
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted,
"teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and
trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil
Law, 1953 Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557)
The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which
petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying
should be made liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their
custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the
pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the
control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would
pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the
responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not
appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during
school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after
school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of
Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article,
which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused
by their minor children. The claim of petitioner that responsibility
should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without
merit.
We next come to the claim of petitioner that the moral damages fixed
at P2,000 are excessive. We note that the wound caused to
respondent was inflicted in the course of an ordinary or common fight
between boys in a grade school. The Court of Appeals fixed the
medical expenses incurred in treating and curing the wound at P50.
Said court stated that the wound did not even require hospitalization.
Neither was Mercado found guilty of any offense nor the scar in
Quisumbing's face pronounced to have caused a deformity, unlike
the case of Araneta, et al. vs. Arreglado, et al., 104 Phil., 529; 55 Off.
Gaz. (9) 1561. Petitioner's counsel argues that if death call for
P3,000 to P6,000, certainly the incised wound could cause mental
pain and suffering to the tune of P2,000.
In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court pronounces that
the child Quisumbing suffered moral damages "by reason of the
wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado." While moral damages
included physical suffering, which must have been caused to the
wounded boy Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil Code), the decision of the
court below does not declare that any of the cases specified in Article
2219 of the Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered,
has attended or occasioned the physical injury. The only possible
circumstance in the case at bar in which moral damages are
recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been
committed.
It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever
presented. The offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years old and it
does not appear that he had acted with discernment when he
inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto
Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical
injuries, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if
we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-
delict when it imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by
said court indicate that Augusto's resentment, which motivated the
assault, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to
intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo
from Renato." This is, according to the decision appealed from, the
reason why Mercado was incensed and pushed Quisumbing who, in
turn, also pushed Mercado. It is, therefore, apparent that the
proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was
Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with
Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179,
Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we
find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown to
have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not
justified.
For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and the petitioner is declared exempt or free from
the payment of moral damages. The award of P50 for medical
expenses, however, is hereby affirmed. Without costs.
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P.
PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner
and President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades,
known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute"
(M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M.
QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.
Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .
Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .
Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee Daffon. .
TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. .
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son,
Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the
Manila Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on
May 19, 1966, the action below for damages arising from the death
on March 10, 1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student,
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said
Institute. .
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant
Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to
his action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the
institute;1 the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof;
the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which
the deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow
student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical
Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it
was duly incorporated."
The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus
narrated by the trial court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and
the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the
afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they,
together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the
laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes
were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working
on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at
them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like
a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on
the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the
face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc
retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him
and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block
which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and
fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so
he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained
consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing is the substance of the
testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident."
The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the
incident, as testified to by the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a
classmate of the protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who
"has no motive or reason to testify one way or another in favor of any
party" and rejected the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon
denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased. .
With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila
Police Department who performed the autopsy re "Cause of death:
shock due to traumatic fracture of theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion
of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and
slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his testimony that
these internal injuries of the deceased were caused "probably by
strong fist blows," the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for
the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.3 It held that
"(T)he act, therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased
strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his internal organs
and caused his death falls within the purview of this article of the
Code."4
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other
defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:
... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 2180. ... .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not applicable to
the case at bar, since this contemplates the situation where the
control or influence of the teachers and heads of school
establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes
those of the parents.
CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE
CONSTRUED: — The clause "so long as they remain in their
custody" contained in Article 2180 of the new civil code contemplated
a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such
that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. In those circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil as well as the responsibilities for
their sort would pass from the father and mother to the teachers.
(Ciriaco L. Mercado, Petitioner vs. the Court of Appeals, Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-14862, May 30,
1960).5
There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with
his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. These
defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the
defendant Daffon.
Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:
1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as
heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P6,000.00 for the death
of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory
expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss
of earning power, considering that the deceased was only between
sixteen and seventeen years, and in good health when he died, and
(e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action. .
2. Absolving the other defendants. .
3. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the
factual findings of the trial court, which are now beyond review, the
trial court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of
holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with
defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a result of their
son's death. The Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be
meritorious. .
1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the
ground that the provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which
expressly hold "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades ... liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody," are not
applicable to to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence that the
accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal fistblows]6 lived and boarded
with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the school. These
defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the
defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's
dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals,7 that "(I)t would seem that
the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that
the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of
the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and
mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of
the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the
pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to
their homes with their parents after school is over." This dictum had
been made in rejecting therein petitioner father's contention that his
minor son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon
City [which was not a party to the case] should be held responsible,
rather than him as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00
adjudged against him for the physical injury inflicted by his son on a
classmate. [A cut on the right cheek with a piece of razor which costs
only P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat and cure, since the
wound left no scar.] The moral damages award was after all set
aside by the Court on the ground that none of the specific cases
provided in Article 2219, Civil Code, for awarding moral damages
had been established, petitioner's son being only nine years old and
not having been shown to have "acted with discernment" in inflicting
the injuries on his classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the
earlier case of Exconde vs. Capuno,8 where the only issue involved
as expressly stated in the decision, was whether the therein
defendant-father could be civilly liable for damages resulting from a
death caused in a motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly and
negligently by his minor son, (which issue was resolved adversely
against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that
"It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado. .
2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials
and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of
schools under Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their
pupils and students against fellow students on the school premises.
Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not
involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic
incident. There is no question, either, that the school involved is a
non-academic school,9 the Manila Technical Institute being
admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head
and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton
and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and severally for
damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son
at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No
liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the
school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly
liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant.
While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading improperly
defendant Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower court
found that it had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and
therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been
brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so,
notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to
plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly manifested and made
of record that "defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered
owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a
corporation and is not owned by any individual person."10
3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the
tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in
their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils
and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child."11 This is
expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil
Code.12 In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the
protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their
obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper
supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they
are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to
take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their
custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be
anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may
inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. .
4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his
dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of
negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that
the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the
exercise of their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the child
under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while
under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not
supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction." The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or
negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited
article.14
5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-
school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under
Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal
fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated
above, the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in
the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or
student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the
school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta
in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. .
6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-
charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally
liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's
having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased Dominador
Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the
protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants
but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over
the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their
students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other
parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of
Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light
of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants
failed to prove such exemption from liability. .
7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of their son should be increased to
P12,000.00 as set by the Court in People vs. Pantoja,15 and
observed in all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The
Court, in Pantoja, after noting the decline in the purchasing power of
the Philippine peso, had expressed its "considered opinion that the
amount of award of compensatory damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court thereby
adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206, Civil Code,
from the old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which
amount is to be awarded "even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances" pursuant to the express provisions of said
codal article. .
8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court
should have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal
interest on the total damages awarded, besides increasing the award
of attorney's fees all concern matters that are left by law to the
discretion of the trial court and the Court has not been shown any
error or abuse in the exercise of such discretion on the part of the
trial court.16 Decisive here is the touchstone provision of Article 2231,
Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence." No gross
negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to
warrant the imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of interest
and increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been shown in
this appeal any compelling reason to disturb such finding. .
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to
provide as follows: .
1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton
and Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and severallyto pay plaintiffs as
heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the
death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d)
P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for
attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both instances; 2.
absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .
Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. .
Dizon, J., took no part. .
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: .
I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee but would like to
clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that
the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180
should be limited to pupils who are minors (below the age of
majority) is not in accord with the plain text of the law. Article 2180 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect: .
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. .
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company. .
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company. .
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions. .
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry. .
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what
is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damages.
Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility
prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority, the article
expressly so provides, as in the case of the parents and of the
guardians. It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to
similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of
persons enumerated in the article, it would have expressly so stated.
The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be
not restricted to the case of persons under age. Further, it is not
without significance that the teachers and heads of scholarly
establishments are not grouped with parents and guardians but
ranged with owners and managers of enterprises, employers and the
state, as to whom no reason is discernible to imply that they should
answer only for minors. .
Giorgi, in his well-known "Teoria de las Obligaciones en el Derecho
Moderno", Volume 5, page 404, No. 272 (Sp. Ed.), after noting the
split among commentators on the point it issue, observes with
considerable cogency that —
272. Ante esta variedad de opiniones, ninguna de las cuales se
funds en argumentos merecedores de seria ponderacion, no es facil
tomar un partido. Esto no obstante, debiendo manisfestar nuestra
opinion, nos acercamos a la de los que no estiman necesaria la
menor edad del discipulo o del aprendiz; porque si el aforismo ubi
voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit, no es siempre argumento seguro para
interpreter la ley, es infalible cuanto se refiere a una misma
disposicion relative a varios casos. Y tal es el art. 1.153. Lo que haya
establecido important poco si, elevandones a los principios de razon,
puede dudarse de la oportunidad de semajante diferencia; porque la
voluntad cierta del legislador prevalece in iure condito a cualquier
otra consideracion. Por otra parte, si bien se considera, no puede
parecer extrano o absurdo el suponer que un discipulo y un
aprendiz, aunque mayores de edad, acepten voluntariamente la
entera vigilancia de su preceptor mientras dura la educacion. Ni
parece dudoso desde el momento que los artesanos y los
preceptores deben, al par de los padres, responder civilmente de los
daños comitidos por sus discipulos, aun cuando estos esten faltos
de discernimiento.
Similarly, Planiol-Ripert, in their "Droit Civil Pratique," Volume VI, No.
635 (Spanish version), say that —
635. Personas de quien responde. — Si bien la responsibilidad del
maestro es originalmente una estension de la de los padres (1), el
art. 1384 no especifica que los alumnos y aprendices han de ser
menores de edad, por lo que la presuncion de culpa funcionara aun
cuando sean mayores (2); pero, la vigilancia no tendra que ser
ejercida en iguales terminos. Aun respecto a los menores variara
segun la edad, extremo que tendra que ternese en ceunta a los fines
de apreciar si el maestro ha podido impedir el acto nocivo o no. .
I submit, finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their
authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law
upon the latter reaching majority age, the authority and custodial
supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter. A
student over twenty-one, by enrolling and attending a school, places
himself under the custodial supervision and disciplinary authority of
the school authorities, which is the basis of the latter's correlative
responsibility for his torts, committed while under such authority. Of
course, the teachers' control is not as plenary as when the student is
a minor; but that circumstance can only affect the decree of the
responsibility but cannot negate the existence thereof. It is only a
factor to be appreciated in determining whether or not the defendant
has exercised due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury, as
prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 2180. .
Barredo, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see no reason to depart
from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. Court of
Appeals, 108 Phil. 414, where the clause "so long as they remain in
their custody" used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code was construed
as referring to a "situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the (latter's) control, direction and influence on the
pupil supersedes those of the parents." I think it is highly unrealistic
and conducive to unjust results, considering the size of the
enrollment in many of our educational institutions, academic and
non-academic, as well as the temper, attitudes and often destructive
activism of the students, to hold their teachers and/or the
administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed
by them. When even the school authorities find themselves
besieged, beleaguered and attacked, and unable to impose the
traditional disciplinary measures formerly recognized as available to
them, such as suspension or outright expulsion of the offending
students, it flies in the face of logic and reality to consider such
students, merely from the fact of enrollment and class attendance, as
"in the custody" of the teachers or school heads within the meaning
of the statute, and to hold the latter liable unless they can prove that
they have exercised "all the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damage." Article 2180, if applied as appellants construe it,
would be bad law. It would demand responsibility without
commensurate authority, rendering teachers and school heads open
to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. Present
conditions being what they are, I believe the restrictive interpretation
of the aforesaid provision enunciated in Mercado should be
maintained. .
With particular reference to the case at bar, one other factor
constrains me to dissent. The opinion of the majority states: "Here,
the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not
involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic
incident." This statement is of course in accordance with Article
2180, which says that "the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company." Note that for parental
responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their
company. If, as stated also in the opinion of the majority, "the
rationale of (the) liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious
acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their
custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and
students, in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the child," then it stands to reason
that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" as used
in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with
the phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to
parents; and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages
caused by their children who are no longer minors, so should
teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious
acts of their students in the same age category. I find no justification,
either in the law itself or in justice and equity, to make a substitute
parent liable where the real parent would be free from liability. .
Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA,
JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A.
AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA,
VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A.
AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-
RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON
thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR
GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward
to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage
and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high
school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16,
1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him
that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the
auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo,
ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only
seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence
. 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a
civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The
complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable
to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral
expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees
.3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was
reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved .4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent
court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were
not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the
semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of
the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the
necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San
Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was
shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and
consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he
was then under the custody of the private respondents. The private
respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school
only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was
no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the
petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which
they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one
of the private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that
on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated
from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him
without making a report to the principal or taking any further action
.6 As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter
fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was
the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that
their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by
Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that
the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both
parties in support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of
this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection
with the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v.
Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v.
Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better
resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy
boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it
turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante
was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
separate civil action flied against them, his father was held solidarily
liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of
the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June
29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a
party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and
trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and
Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school
authorities who should be held liable Liability under this rule, he said,
was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of
arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of establishments
of arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an
elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during
recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the
parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for damages. Through
Justice Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school
itself had also not been sued that the school was not liable because
it was not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the custody
requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation
where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the
parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other
members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May
30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old
student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of
the Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer — who was
already of age — was not boarding in the school, the head thereof
and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The
Court declared through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students)
remain in their custody" — means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the
pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as
well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have
been set aside by the present decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting
opinion, that even students already of age were covered by the
provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and
subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three others,11 Justice
Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado
and submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed by
students not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco
parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes'
dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school
involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the
applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will
have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under
Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and
trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein
have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180
covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts
and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be
"in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come
to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply
to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school
is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of
arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in
general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis"teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students"
and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code
to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there between them insofar as concerns the
proper supervision and vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously
contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of
watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third
Persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and
Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the
old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify
"teachers" but only "heads of establishments." The phrase is only an
updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos"
used in the Italian and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of
negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child
under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while
under his custody, for the very reason/that the parent is not
supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and
the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the
teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The
suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision
would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and
trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if
that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability
would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other
circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the
academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the
head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be
exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of
their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible
reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is
academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the
school is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of
the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the
school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be
able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an
academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held
liable if the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the
academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by
his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable
where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the
case of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule
also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the
teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically
the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage
over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old
schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly
instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head
of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and so came under his constant control,
supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic
school was not as involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly
dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then
(as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of
the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of
his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view
of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent
increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the
direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article
2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the
provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and
original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges
in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the
necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the
students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the
student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as
contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the
petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that
while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does
not mean that the student must be boarding with the school
authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time
of the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that
such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the
start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the
time before or after such period, such as the period of registration,
and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in
the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether
the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline
of the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that
before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself
under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended
upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be
certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as
submission of reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During
such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of
the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from
observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises
in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more
than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and
friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he
is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who
must answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that
the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody.
The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal,
or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the
pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned.
It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be
physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not
connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the
influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a
result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student,
the teacher and not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort
was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its
authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this
article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the
school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its
teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle
of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability
by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head
of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that
he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by
Article 2180, which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
Persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held
liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the
parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher
is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school
although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article
2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by
Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school
may be unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the
increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause
violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid
fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the
present ruling, it is not the school that will be held directly liable.
Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it is
sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of
its head or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting
the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in
the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and
regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost
all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the
assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher
physically enforce those rules upon the students. Ms should bolster
the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent
any injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would
otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage
caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises
and presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is
disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of
responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child
is not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more
obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is
greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such
dependence includes the child's support and sustenance whereas
submission to the teacher's influence, besides being coterminous
with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of the
students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more las
discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a
greater accountability than the teacher for the tort committed by the
child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for
the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is
already of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor — then
there should all the more be justification to require from the school
authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable
diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no
longer liable for the student's acts because he has reached majority
age and so is no longer under the former's control, there is then all
the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility
for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the
following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the
custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It
was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously
observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in
the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have
also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot
be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general
authority over the student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular
classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline.
The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-
charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics
report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent
Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is
no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations
of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when
the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he
was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And
while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the
teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the
tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by
his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary,
the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of
boys who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one
of the students and returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While
this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the
shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated
and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because
only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice.
Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the
other private respondents for none of them has been found to have
been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been
remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record
and in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on
Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium
of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we
deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son
under the tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their
grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered
G.R. No. L-54357 April 25, 1988
REYNALDO PASCO, assisted by his father PEDRO
PASCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH V, STA.
MARIA and ARANETA UNIVERSITY, respondents.
Ponciano G. Hernandez for petitioner.
Marcelo C. Aniana for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
The sole question of law raised by petitioner in this case is whether
the provision of the penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which states:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
is equally applicable to academic institutions.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner,
together with two companions, while walking inside the campus of
the private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in
said university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim
students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group
were also students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was
subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was
hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where
he underwent surgery to save his life.
On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco,
filed a complaint for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and
herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta University which was
docketed as Civil Case No. SM-1027. Said school was impleaded as
a party defendant based on the aforementioned provision of the Civil
Code.
On October 26, 1979, respondent school filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the following grounds:
a. The penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
under which it was sued applies only to vocational schools and not to
academic institutions;
b. That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the civil liability
in this case arises from a criminal action which the defendant
university has not committed;
c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been made by the
plaintiff, hence, it would be premature to bring an action for damages
against defendant University. (Rollo, p. 96)
On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order * granting said
Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of
Dismissal but the motion was likewise denied on the ground that
there is no sufficient justification to disturb its ruling. Hence, this
instant Petition for certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440, praying
that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order of May
12, 1980 dismissing the complaint as against respondent school and
the order of July 17, 1980 denying the reconsideration of the
questioned order of dismissal, with costs against respondent school.
We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to
educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for
the issue in this petition is actually whether or not, under the article,
the school or the university itself (as distinguished from
the teachers or heads) is liable. We find the answer in the negative,
for surely the provision concerned speaks only of
"teachers or heads."
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J. and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be construed as the basis for
the liability of the school as the employer for the failure of its teachers
or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute
parents. Herrera, J. concurring (Amadora et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., G.R. No. L-47745, citing Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts &
Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201).
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Sarmiento in his dissent.
As stated by him, my view is that while the educational institution is
not directly liable, yet the school, as the employer, may be held liable
for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their
mandatory legal duties as substitute parents (Article 2180, Civil
Code). The school, however, may exculpate itself from liability by
proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family.
Melencio-Herrera, J., dissent.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be construed as the basis for
the liability of the school as the employer for the failure of its teachers
or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute
parents. Herrera, J. concurring (Amadora et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., G.R. No. L-47745, citing Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts &
Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201).
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Sarmiento in his dissent.
As stated by him, my view is that while the educational institution is
not directly liable, yet the school, as the employer, may be held liable
for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their
mandatory legal duties as substitute parents (Article 2180, Civil
Code). The school, however, may exculpate itself from liability by
proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family.
Melencio-Herrera, J., dissent.
G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Buenaventura C. Evangelista for petitioners.
Modesto V. Cabanela for respondent Edgardo Aquino.
Manuel P. Pastor for respondent Mauro Soriano.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 36390-R entitled
"Federico Ylarde, et al. vs. Edgardo Aquino, et al.," a case which
originated from the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, We are
again caned upon determine the responsibility of the principals and
teachers towards their students or pupils.
In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the
Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in
Tayug, Pangasinan-Private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a
teacher therein. At that time, the school was fittered with several
concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that
was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were
serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the name
of Sergio Banez started burying them one by one as early as 1962.
In fact, he was able to bury ten of these blocks all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino
gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class
dismissal on October 7, 1963. Being their teacher-in-charge, he
ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make
a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left
unfinished. The following day, also after classes, private respondent
Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the
digging. These four pupils — Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara,
Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one
meter and forty centimeters deep. At this point, private respondent
Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the
pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete
block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the
hole. Then, said private respondent left the children to level the loose
soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was
about thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted to borrow from
Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some
rope. Before leaving. , private respondent Aquino allegedly told the
children "not to touch the stone."
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four
kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit.
Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top
of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening.
Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on
time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught him
before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing
position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained the following injuries:
1. Contusion with hematoma, left inguinal region and suprapubic
region.
2. Contusion with ecchymosis entire scrotal region.
3. Lacerated wound, left lateral aspect of penile skin with phimosis
4. Abrasion, gluteal region, bilateral.
5. Intraperitoneal and extrapertitoneal extravasation of blood and
urine about 2 liters.
6. Fracture, simple, symphesis pubis
7. Ruptured (macerated) urinary bladder with body of bladder almost
entirely separated from its neck.
REMARKS:
1. Above were incurred by crushing injury.
2. Prognosis very poor.
(Sgd.) MELQUIADES A. BRAVO
Physician on Duty. 1
Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.
Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages
against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower
court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the
digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work
Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his
own reckless imprudence. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the lower
court.
Petitioners base their action against private respondent Aquino on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code for his alleged negligence that caused
their son's death while the complaint against respondent Soriano as
the head of school is founded on Article 2180 of the same Code.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180 states:
Art. 2180. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. 3
The issue to be resolved is whether or not under the cited provisions,
both private respondents can be held liable for damages.
As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made
responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an
academic school and not a school of arts and trades. This is in line
with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 4 wherein this Court
thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school
who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This
Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the
head of the school who can be held liable. In the same case, We
explained:
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come
to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply
to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school
is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of
arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in
general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students'
and 'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word
"apprentices."
Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, We rule that private
respondent Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason
that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of
arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent
Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction
regarding the digging.
From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent
Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the
teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his
supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary
precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. However, as
earlier pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of private
respondent Aquino on Article 2176 which is separate and distinct
from that provided for in Article 2180.
With this in mind, the question We need to answer is this: Were there
acts and omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino
amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to
the death of his pupil Ylarde? Our answer is in the affirmative. He is
liable for damages.
From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that private
respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he:
(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and
instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation
near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very
hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit
even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block
was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any
pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to
level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the
huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he
would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the
children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils
in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death
of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the
children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just
had to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their
playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were
facing three of them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped
on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose
from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the stone
would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate
child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the
natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of private
respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have
died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private
respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils
concerned to real danger.
We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries
which resulted in the death of the child Ylarde were caused by his
own reckless imprudence, It should be remembered that he was only
ten years old at the time of the incident, As such, he is expected to
be playful and daring. His actuations were natural to a boy his age.
Going back to the facts, it was not only him but the three of them who
jumped into the hole while the remaining boy jumped on the block.
From this, it is clear that he only did what any other ten-year old child
would do in the same situation.
In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the
lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be
the case. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with
the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor
should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his
conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of
persons of his age and experience. 5 The standard of conduct to
which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of
care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity,
discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar
circumstances. 6 Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child
Ylarde with reckless imprudence.
The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can
pass as part of their Work Education. A single glance at the picture
showing the excavation and the huge concrete block 7 would reveal a
dangerous site requiring the attendance of strong, mature laborers
and not ten-year old grade-four pupils. We cannot comprehend why
the lower court saw it otherwise when private respondent Aquino
himself admitted that there were no instructions from the principal
requiring what the pupils were told to do. Nor was there any showing
that it was included in the lesson plan for their Work Education. Even
the Court of Appeals made mention of the fact that respondent
Aquino decided all by himself to help his co-teacher Banez bury the
concrete remnants of the old school shop. 8 Furthermore, the
excavation should not be placed in the category of school gardening,
planting trees, and the like as these undertakings do not expose the
children to any risk that could result in death or physical injuries.
The contention that private respondent Aquino exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person is certainly without cogent basis.
A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing
children to an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by
themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human
being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the
stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge
concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to the
children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his
pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all
harm in his company.
We close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious
person would have acted in all contrast to the way private
respondent Aquino did. Were it not for his gross negligence, the
unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the child Ylarde
would probably be alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his
failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard,
Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
GRANTED and the questioned judgment of the respondent court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby
rendered ordering private respondent Edagardo Aquino to pay
petitioners the following:
(1) Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde P30,000.00
(2) Exemplary damages 10,000.00
(3) Moral damages 20,000.00
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988
BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES
FOUNDATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B.
CASTRO, DIOMEDES B. CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and
RODOLFO B. CASTRO., respondents.
Edilberto B. Tenefrancia for petitioners.
Leonardo L. Cocjin Jr. for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of
the
decision 1 of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 7
December 1984, in AC-G.R. No. CV 69876, in so far as it affirmed
the decision 2 of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (hereinafter
referred to as the Trial Court), which held, among others, petitioners
solidarily hable with Jimmy B. Abon, under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code.
The relevant facts, as found by the Trial Court and adopted by
reference by the respondent Court, are:
... Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic
institution ... [However], it is also an institution of arts and trade. It
has so advertised itself, as its own evidence shows. Its brochure
(Exh. 2) shows that BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational
department offer Communication, Broadcast and Teletype
Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and
Automotive Mechanics courses... these courses divest BCF of the
nature or character of being purely or exclusively an academic
institution. 3
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio
Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit,
which is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. 4 The ROTC Unit, by way of accommodation to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), pursuant to Department
Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the Department of Education and
Culture, 5 is provided by the BCF an office and an armory located at
the basement of its main building. 6
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as
its duly appointed armorer. 7 As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B.
Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an
employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, 8 as
well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of
the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent
Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee
(officer) of the AFP. 9 Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student
of the BCF. 10
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF,
Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of
Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the
armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. 11 As a result, Napoleon Castro
died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the
crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP. 12
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages,
impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant
Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF),
Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D.
Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of
BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defendants.
After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1) sentencing
defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges
Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as
heirs of Napoleon Castro: a) P12,000.00 for the death of Napoleon
Castro, (b) P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity
of the deceased, (c) P5,000.00 as moral damages, (d) P6,000.00 as
actual damages, and (e) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs; (2)
absolving the other defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants'
counterclaim for lack of merit. 13 On appeal by petitioners, the
respondent Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial
Court. The modification consisted in reducing the award for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00
by way of temperate damages, and increasing the indemnity for the
death of Napoleon Castro from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
The central issue in this case is whether or not petitioners can be
held solidarity hable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of
Jimmy B. Abon.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for
"damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is
that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the
latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student]
and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the [student]." 14 Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180
— 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they
are at attendance in the school, including recess time." 15
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was stin in the
protective and supervisory custody of the Baguio Colleges
Foundation when he shot Napoleon Castro, the respondent Court
ruled that:
it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at
the time of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the
evening; but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and
property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been
attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was
just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval
is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and
envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the
school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is
embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates
a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to
leave the school premises, or the area within which the school
activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include
dismissal. 18 Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending
school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the
school, as contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon
cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or
in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically,
therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be
held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from
his acts.
Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto
B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B.
Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well
guarded." 19 Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was
under the custody of the school when he committed the act for which
the petitioners are sought to be held liable, this circumstance shows
that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the armorywith
definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when
he shot Napoleon Castro.
Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code, a school which offers both academic and technical/vocational
courses cannot be held liable for a tort committed by a student
enrolled only in its academic program; however, considering that
Jimmy B. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot
Napoleon Castro, the Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon such
other issue. 20
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in
so far as it holds petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for
his tortious act in the killing of Napoleon Castro. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS.
FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN
ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO
AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION
and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.
Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.
Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby affirmed, with
the following modifications: (1) Exemplary damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 are hereby awarded to plaintiffs, in addition to the actual
damages of P30,000.00, moral damages of P20,000.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 awarded to plaintiffs in
the decision under appeal; (2) St. Francis High School, represented
by the Spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, and
Benjamin Illumin, are hereby held jointly and severally liable with
defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria
Cadis for the payment to plaintiffs of the abovementioned actual
damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
and for costs; and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are
hereby absolved from liability, and the case against them, together
with their respective counterclaims, is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)
The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman
student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join
a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan
Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses
Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice,
did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to
the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back
home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the
teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were
in the water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning.
Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but
in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was
recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was
brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt.
Cannel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as Civil
Case No. 8834, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII of Lucena
City, against the St. Francis High School, represented by the
spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin
(its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas,
Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for
Damages which respondents allegedly incurred from the death of
their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo. Contending that the death
of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the
proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their
son's drowning, respondents prayed of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against
petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and
Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay respondents
the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as moral
damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The
court a quo reasoned:
Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this Court believes
that the defendant teachers namely: Connie Arquio, Luisito Vinas,
Tirso de Chaves, Yoly Jaro, Nida Aragones and Patria Cadiz had
failed to exercise the diligence required of them by law under the
circumstances to guard against the harm they had foreseen. (pp.
2930, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida
Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident had already
occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their
liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late, they were remiss
in their duty to safeguard the students. (p. 30, Rollo)
The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old), were
easily attracted to the sea without aforethought of the dangers it
offers. Yet, the precautions and reminders allegedly performed by
the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of the standard required
by law under the circumstances. While the defendants-teachers
admitted that some parts of the sea where the picnic was held are
deep, the supposed lifeguards of the children did not even actually
go to the water to test the depth of the particular area where the
children would swim. And indeed the fears of the plaintiffs that the
picnic area was dangerous was confirmed by the fact that three
persons during the picnic got drowned at the same time. Had the
defendant teachers made an actual and physical observation of the
water before they allowed the students to swim, they could have
found out that the area where the children were swimming was
indeed dangerous. And not only that, the male teachers who
according to the female teachers were there to supervise the children
to ensure their safety were not even at the area where the children
were swimming. They were somewhere and as testified to by
plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking spree. (pp. 55-
56, Rollo)
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St.
Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the
court a quo:
As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find sufficient
evidence showing that the picnic was a school sanctioned one.
Similarly no evidence has been shown to hold defendants Benjamin
Illumin and Aurora Cadorna responsible for the death of Ferdinand
Castillo together with the other defendant teachers. It has been
sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to
the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the other hand, defendant
Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she
was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio
to supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs. (p.
30, Rollo)
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Respondents-spouses assigned the following errors committed by
the trial court:
1. The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St. Francis
High School and its administrator/principal Benjamin Illumin as
equally liable not only for its approved co-curricular activities but also
for those which they unreasonably failed to exercise control and
supervision like the holding of picnic in the dangerous water of
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St. Francis High School
and principal Benjamin Illumin as jointly and solidarily liable with their
co-defendants-teachers Rosario Lacandula, et als., for the tragic
death of Ferdinand Castillo in a picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya,
Quezon, last March 20, 1982.
3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for actual
and moral damages for the untimely and tragic death of Ferdinand
Castillo in favor of plaintiffs-appellants against all the defendants.
(pp. 56-57, Rollo)
The Court of Appeals ruled:
We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.
Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a school-
sponsored activity, nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid that the same
was held under the supervision of the teachers employed by the said
school, particularly the teacher in charge of Class I-C to whom the
victim belonged, and those whom she invited to help her in
supervising the class during the picnic. Considering that the court a
quo found negligence on the part of the six defendants-teachers
who, as such, were charged with the supervision of the children
during the picnic, the St. Francis High School and the school
principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable under Article 2176 taken
together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. They cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that the
picnic was not an "extra-curricular activity of the St. Francis High
School." We find from the evidence that, as claimed by plaintiffs-
appellants, the school principal had knowledge of the picnic even
from its planning stage and had even been invited to attend the
affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition against undertaking
the picnic, nor did he prescribe any precautionary measures to be
adopted during the picnic. At the least, We must find that the school
and the responsible school officials, particularly the principal,
Benjamin Illumin, had acquiesced to the holding of the picnic.
Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant
school principal must be found jointly and severally liable with the
defendants-teachers for the damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a
result of the death of their son. It is the rule that in cases where the
above-cited provisions find application, the negligence of the
employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a
presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager
of the establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School
and its principal); and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may
be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the owner
and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and/or supervision of the employee or
employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the
defendants-teachers). The record does not disclose such evidence
as would serve to overcome the aforesaid presumption and absolve
the St. Francis High School and its principal from liability under the
above-cited provisions.
As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-appellants,
while We cannot but commiserate with the plaintiffs for the tragedy
that befell them in the untimely death of their son Ferdinand Castillo
and understand their suffering as parents, especially the victim's
mother who, according to appellants, suffered a nervous breakdown
as a result of the tragedy, We find that the amounts fixed by the
court a quo as actual damages and moral damages (P30,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively) are reasonable and are those which are
sustained by the evidence and the law.
However, We believe that exemplary or corrective damages in the
amount of P20,000.00 may and should be, as it is hereby, imposed
in the present case by way of example of correction for the public
good, pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)
On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following errors
committed by the trial court:
1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chavez,
Luisito Vinas, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and Patria Cadiz guilty of
negligence and jointly and severally liable for damages such finding
not being supported by facts and evidence.
2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendants.
(p. 59, Rollo)
On this score, respondent Court ruled:
The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the
parents of the victim Ferdinand Castillo, were not able to prove by
their evidence that they did not give their son consent to join the
picnic in question. However, We agree with the trial court in its
finding that whether or not the victim's parents had given such
permission to their son was immaterial to the determination of the
existence of liability on the part of the defendants for the damage
incurred by the plaintiffs-appellants as a result of the death of their
son. What is material to such a determination is whether or not there
was negligence on the part of defendants vis-a-visthe supervision of
the victim's group during the picnic; and, as correctly found by the
trial court, an affirmative reply to this question has been satisfactorily
established by the evidence, as already pointed out.
However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two of the
defendants-teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, are concerned.
As to them, the trial court found:
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida
Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident had already
occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their
liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late, they were remiss
in their duty to safeguard the students.
The evidence shows that these two defendants had satisfactorily
explained why they were late in going to the picnic site, namely, that
they had to attend to the entrance examination being conducted by
the school which is part of their duty as teachers thereof. Since they
were not at the picnic site during the occurrence in question, it
cannot be said that they had any participation in the negligence
attributable to the other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise
diligence in the supervision of the children during the picnic and
which failure resulted in the drowning of plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may
not attribute any act or omission to the two teachers, Yoly Jaro and
Nida Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury caused to the
plaintiffs because of the death of their son resulting from his
drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they must be absolved from any
liability.
As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-appellants, We
agree with the court a quo that the counterclaim must be dismissed
for lack of merit. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)
Hence, this petition.
The issues presented by petitioners are:
A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the
defendants which will warrant the award of damages to the plaintiffs;
B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil
Code is applicable to the case at bar;
C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is
proper under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar. (pp. 81-
82, Rollo)
In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
The petition is impressed with merit.
If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their
own negligence or the negligence of people under them. In the
instant case however, as will be shown hereunder, petitioners are
neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of
those under them.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence.
Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.
At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of
the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion.
Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores
Q Now, when your son asked you for money to buy food, did you not
ask him where he will bring this?
A I asked him where he was going, he answered, I am going to the
picnic, and when I asked him where, he did not answer, sir.
Q And after giving the money, you did not tell him anything more?
A No more, sir.
Q And after that you just learned that your son join the picnic?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you came to know of it after the news that your son was
drowned in the picnic came to you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of
March 20, 1982, you did not know that your son join the picnic?
A No, sir, I did not know.
Q Did you not look for your son during that time?
A I am too busy with my profession, that is why I was not able, sir.
Q You did not ask your wife?
A I did not, sir.
Q And neither did your wife tell you that your son join the picnic?
A Later on after 12:00, sir.
Q And during that time you were too busy that you did not inquire
whether your son have joined that picnic?
A Yes, sir.
(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984 witness Romulo Castillo)
The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic
even without knowing where it will be held, is a sign of consent for
his son to join the same. Furthermore.
Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:
Q How did you conduct this mental and physical examination?
A I have interviewed several persons and the patient herself She
even felt guilty about the death of her son because she cooked
adobo for him so he could join the excursion where her son died of
drowning.
Q Why were you able to say she was feeling guilty because she was
the one who personally cooked the adobo for her son?
A It was during the interview that I had gathered it from the patient
herself. She was very sorry had she not allowed her son to join the
excursion her son would have not drowned. I don't know if she
actually permitted her son although she said she cooked adobo so
he could join. (Emphasis Supplied) (TSN, p. 19, hearing of April 30,
1984, Dr. Lazaro — witness).
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article
2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the
death of respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held
liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee
was in the performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual
performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not
within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly
while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair,
a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened
while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School
were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from
the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic
is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an
extra-curricular activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by
petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the
students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner
show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The
application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither
is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings
of respondent Court on this score, employers wig forever be exposed
to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the
misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or
omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their
duties.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-
teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-
spouses.
Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where
Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all
the students who joined the picnic.
In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito
Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have
knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even
respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants
(petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the
defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also
show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly
possible to save the child.
Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination,
Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand Castillo, you approached
the boy and claim also having applied first aid on him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while you were applying the so called first aid, the children
were covering you up or were surrounding you?
A Yes, sir.
Q You were rattled at that time, is it not?
A No, sir.
Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful condition?
A Yes, sir.
Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to your
application of first aid?
A Yes, sir.
Q You have never been disturbed, "nababahala" in the process of
your application of the first aid on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?
A No, sir, because we were attending to the application of first aid
that we were doing, sir.
Q After you have applied back to back pressure and which you
claimed the boy did not respond, were you not disturb anyway?
A I was disturbed during that time, sir.
Q For how many minutes have you applied the back to back
pressure?
A From 9 to 11 times, sir.
Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of your
body on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please describe how you applied a single act of back to
back pressure?
A This has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards, then
the face was a little bit facing right and doing it by massaging the
back of the child, sir." (TSN, pp. 32-35, hearing of July 30, 1984)
Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to the
child?
A Myself, sir.
Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?
A The first step that I took, with the help of Mr. Luisito Vinas, was I
applied back to back pressure and took notice of the condition of the
child. We placed the feet in a higher position, that of the head of the
child, sir.
Q After you have placed the boy in that particular position, where the
feet were on a higher level than that of the head, what did you do
next?
A The first thing that we did, particularly myself, was that after putting
the child in that position, I applied the back to back pressure and
started to massage from the waistline up, but I noticed that the boy
was not responding, sir.
Q For how long did you apply this back to back pressure on the boy?
A About 10 seconds, sir.
Q What about Mr. Vinas?
A Almost the same a little longer, for 15 seconds, sir.
Q After you noticed that the boy was not responding, what did you
do?
A When we noticed that the boy was not responding, we changed
the position of the boy by placing the child facing upwards laying on
the sand then we applied the mouth to mouth resuscitation, sir. (pp.
92-93, Rollo)
With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be
awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not
fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.
Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act or omission.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not
guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be
assessed against them.
While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to
their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners
were already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence
of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But
in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had
exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or
exemplary damages becomes baseless.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated
November 19, 1987, finding petitioners herein guilty of negligence
and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the
respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the
petitioners herein are concerned, but the portion of the said decision
dismissing their counterclaim, there being no merit, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN
D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D.
BAUTISTA, respondents.
Balgos and Perez for petitioners.
Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of
Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of
the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina
Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its
corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in
the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that
his assailants were not members of the school's academic
community but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school
authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-
President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro
Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of
Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents)
sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to
their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack
on the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano
terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning
from his position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit
dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of
action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect
that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit
of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention
and thru an order dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to
dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt
with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed
the trial court's disposition before the respondent appellate court
which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial
court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court
resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court
primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent
portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption
from the old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and
learned authorities on its meaning should give way to present day
changes. The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic.
In fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a rule of conduct
in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its
capacity to meet the new challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article
2180 cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old
case of Exconde vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of
Appeals; 3hence, the ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply
to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff
liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the
last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the
diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the
merits of the case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion
to dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint
should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the
premises of the appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this
doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and,
more recently, in Amadora vs.Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it
had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the
damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the
acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier
indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the
PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material
facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not
necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there
is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its
part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools
and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other
hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and
other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the
air or where there looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual
relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-
delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France
vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded
damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard
the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to
the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising
from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the
view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S.
Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918,
this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of
contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of
juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking,
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual
liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same
act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted
the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on
Human Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which
emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private
respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had
a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public
embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the
Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the
latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act
which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of
Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a
quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is,
as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista
had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine.
And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the
test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material
only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista.
In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to
the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under
the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the
obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school,
like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students
against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student
communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there
have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to
other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of
schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the
same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry
out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should
this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the
breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its
negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree
of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance
of the private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the
material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make
such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered
to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992
MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by his judicial guardian
VIRGINIA C. SOLIMAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding Judge of Branch LXI,
Regional Trial Court of Region III, Angeles City, and the
REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, represented by its
President, respondents.
Mariano Y. Navarro for Republic Central Colleges.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for
damages against private respondent Republic Central Colleges
("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and one Jimmy B.
Solomon, a security guard, as defendants. The complaint alleged
that:
. . . on 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof, while the plaintiff was
in the campus ground and premises of the defendant, REPUBLIC
CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was and is still a regular enrolled
student of said school taking his morning classes, the defendant,
JIMMY B. SOLOMON, who was on said date and hour in the
premises of said school performing his duties and obligations as a
duly appointed security guard under the employment, supervision
and control of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY,
INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without any provocation, in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with
intent to kill, attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the
abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver, a deadly weapon, which
ordinarily such wound sustained would have caused plaintiff's death
were it not for the timely medical assistance given to him. The
plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center,
Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff may not be
able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the
performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four
months before his wounds would be completely healed. 1
Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending
that the complaint stated no cause of action against it. Private
respondent argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries
sustained by petitioner student for the reason that private respondent
school was not the employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy
Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of
Solomon. Private respondent school further argued that Article 2180,
7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph
holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or
apprentice of the school.
In an order dated 29 November 1983, respondent Judge granted
private respondent school's motion to dismiss, holding that security
guard Jimmy Solomon was not an employee of the school which
accordingly could not be held liable for his acts or omissions.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, without success.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is contended that
respondent trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when
he refused to apply the provisions of Article 2180, as well as those of
Articles 349, 350 and 352, of the Civil Code and granted the school's
motion to dismiss.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for
damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists
not only for one's own act or omission, but also for acts or omissions
of a person for whom one is by law responsible. Among the persons
held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person
are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils, their students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
xxx xxx xxx
The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding the
Colleges liable for the alleged wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy
B. Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr. Private respondent
school was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of
Jimmy Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school
was the client or customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is
settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and (2) Teachers and professors;
assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is
the employer of such guards or watchmen. 2 Liability for illegal or xxx xxx xxx
harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the
(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices;
employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such
agency. 3 As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency xxx xxx xxx
has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or
watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise
to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded
from the client whose premises or property are protected by the xxx xxx xxx
security guards. The fact that a client company may give instructions
Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and
or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself,
student are fixed by government regulations and those of each
render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards
school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be
concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those
countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best
instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests
potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student.
commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the
security agency. There being no employer-employee relationship In Palisoc v. Brillantes, 4 invoked by petitioner, the Court held the
between the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the
impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of security "Manila Technical Institute," Quezon Blvd., Manila, responsible in
guard Solomon. damages for the death of Dominador Palisoc, a student of Institute,
which resulted from fist blows delivered by Virgilio L. Daffon, another
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or
student of the Institute. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc
student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an
v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article
employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted
2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely different from the
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available
facts existing in the instant case.
for imposing liability upon the Republic Central Colleges for the acts
or omissions of Jimmy Solomon. Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made
responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or
The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked
person subject to such substitute parental authority. In the instant
by petitioner are as follows:
case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon who committed allegedly
Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student
authority: or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no
substitute parental authority over Solomon.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, within the confines of its limited logic, i.e., treating the
petitioner's claim as one based wholly and exclusively on Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial judge was
correct. Does it follow, however, that respondent Colleges could not
be held liable upon any other basis in law, for or in respect of the
injury sustained by petitioner, so as to entitle respondent school to
dismissal of petitioner's complaint in respect of itself?
The very recent case of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) v. Court of Appeals, 5 requires us to give a
negative answer to that question.
In PSBA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not
applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an
outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any
custody or control or supervision. At the same time, however, the
Court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be
established between a school which accepts students for enrollment,
on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the other
hand, which contract results in obligations for both parties:
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there
is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an education that
would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and
skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand,
the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and
other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the
air or where there looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. 6
In that case, the Court was careful to point out that:
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is,
as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista
had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine.
And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the
test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material
only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista.
In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to
the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under
the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the
obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school,
like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students
against allrisks. This is specially true in the populous student
communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there
have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to
other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of
schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the
same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry
out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should
this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the
breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its
negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree
of diligence which is required by the nature of obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of person, time and place. 7
In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to
dismiss the complaint against it, and both the Court of Appeals and
this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar, the
court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondent
Colleges, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was
based, and could have been based, only on Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly
tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a
contractual, or other legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in
serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause
of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to
dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed
petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex
contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.
In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this Court,
and in order to avoid a possible substantial miscarriage of justice,
and putting aside technical considerations, we consider that
respondent trial judge committed serious error correctible by this
Court in the instant case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT DUE COURSE to
the Petition, to TREAT the comment of respondent Colleges as its
answer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated 29
November 1983. This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for
further proceedings consistent with this Resolution.
[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002]
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS
and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II,
JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals as well as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding
petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted in
the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public
schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin
Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed
on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents,
James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered in the following manner:
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered
to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the
following sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of
life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages
incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral
damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr.
and Guada Daniel are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the
amount of damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of
principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the
commission of the tort and who was under special parental authority
of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the
above-stated damages, same being adjudged against defendants St.
Marys Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any
liability. His counterclaim not being in order as earlier discussed in
this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206).
From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995,
defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted
an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning
group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high
school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then
15 years old and a student of the same school.Allegedly, the latter
drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned
turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from
the accident.[2]
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals.[3]
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
reducing the actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming
the decision a quo, in toto.[4]
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion
for reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion.[5]
Hence, this appeal.[6]
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable
for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of
moral damages against the petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of
the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in
allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the
minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have
special parental authority over a minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators
and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies
to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of
the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the
pupils and students outside the school premises whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers.[9]
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is
a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction,
or custody.[10]
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the
act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.[11]
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must
be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between
the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence
of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words,
the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For,
negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.[12]
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of
petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and
Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the
cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the
recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep
of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses
Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not
dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated
that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering
wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that
the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the
respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those
given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article
shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts
or omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the
minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was
driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive
the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of
the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents
primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the
injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.[13]
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys
Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the
accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from
such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable
for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the
trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful
act or omission.[14]In this case, the proximate cause of the accident
was not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident,
the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death
indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the
grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception rather
than the rule.[15] The power of the court to award attorneys fees
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and
equitable justification.[16] Thus, the grant of attorneys fees against the
petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the
vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact
admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the
latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or
streets.[17] Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by
petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident
occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle
who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19] The Court
remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of
defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX
PANGALANGAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J.
BALINGIT and FERNANDO PINEDA, defendants-appellees.
Angel A. Sison for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fidel Zosimo U. Canilao for defendants-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed
on pure questions of law from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac, dismissing their complaint against Archimedes J. Balingit.
The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the manager
of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando
Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in an action based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is not the manager of an
establishment contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code (Civil
Case No. 3865).
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and
Pangalangan against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and
Pineda, it was alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove
recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.,
along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck
bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping,
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could
not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of
earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer
was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the
ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of
action against him. As already stated, the lower court dismissed the
action as to Balingit. The bus company and its driver appealed.
The Civil Code provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether
the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise" (dueños o directores de un
establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil Code,
formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the manager of a
corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly
resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of
a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180
that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in
the sense of "employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-
delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident
already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as
an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los efectos de la
responsabilidad subsidiaria establecida en el num 3.0 del (art.) 1903,
el director de un periodico explotado por una sociedad, porque
cualquiera que sea su jerarquia y aunque Ileve la direccion de
determinadas convicciones politicas no por eso deja de estar
subordinado a la superior autoridad de la Empresa" (Decision of
Spanish Supreme Court dated December 6, 1912 cited in 12
Manresa, Codigo Civil Español 5th Ed. 662; 1913 Enciclopedia
Juridica Española 992).
The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a
new factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They
argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business
conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of
P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid
P10,000 on their subscription, while the other incorporators, namely,
Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid
P250.25 and P25, respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be
pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his
wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality.
We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not
raised in the lower court. The case has to be decided on the basis of
the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc. has a personality separate and distinct
from that of the Balingit spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this
appeal, is one which was raised in the lower court and which is within
the issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules of Court).
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is
decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted
to change his theory on appeal because, to permit him to do so,
could be unfair to the adverse party (2 Moran's Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p. 505).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs
against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. and ROGACIONES
MANILHIG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF
THE LATE RAMON ACUESTA, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The petitioners interposed this appeal by way of a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the 31 January 1995
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41140[1] affirming the 22 January 1993[2] Decision of Branch 31 of the
Regional Trial Court, Calbayog City, in Civil Case No. 373, which
ordered the petitioners to pay the private respondents damages as a
result of a vehicular accident.
Civil Case No. 373 was an action against herein petitioners for
damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A. Acuesta,
namely, Gregorio O. Acuesta; Julio O. Acuesta; Ramon O. Acuesta,
Jr.; Baltazar O. Acuesta; Rufino O. Acuesta; Maximo O. Acuesta;
Neri O. Acuesta; Iluminada O. Acuesta; Rosario Acuesta-Sanz; and
Pamfilo O. Acuesta. Atty. Julio O. Acuesta also appeared as counsel
for the plaintiffs (herein private respondents).[3] The private
respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross
negligence, recklessness, violation of traffic rules and regulations,
abandonment of victim, and attempt to escape from a crime.
To support their allegations, the private respondents presented eight
witnesses. On 10 February 1992, after the cross-examination of the
last witness, the private respondents counsel made a reservation to
present a ninth witness. The case was then set for continuation of
the trial on 30 and 31 March 1992. Because of the non-appearance
of the petitioners counsel, the 30 March 1992 hearing was
cancelled. The next day, private respondents counsel manifested
that he would no longer present the ninth witness. He thereafter
made an oral offer of evidence and rested the case. The trial court
summarized private respondents evidence in this wise:
[I]n the early morning of March 24, 1990, about 6:00 o'clock, the
victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle (Exhibit
O), along the Gomez Street of Calbayog City. The Gomez Street is
along the side of Nijaga Park. On the Magsaysay Blvd., also in
Calbayog City, defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc.
(Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. 4025 with plate No. EVA-725 driven
by defendant Rogasiones Manilhig y Dolira was being pushed by
some persons in order to start its engine. The Magsaysay Blvd. runs
perpendicular to Gomez St. and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was
heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street. Some of
the persons who were pushing the bus were on its back, while the
others were on the sides. As the bus was pushed, its engine started
thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at
the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle
was directly in front of the said bus. As the engine of the Philtranco
bus started abruptly and suddenly, its running motion was also
enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby the subject bus
bumped on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell
and, thereafter, was run over by the said bus. The bus did not stop
although it had already bumped and ran [sic] over the victim; instead,
it proceeded running towards the direction of the Rosales Bridge
which is located at one side of the Nijaga Park and towards one end
of the Gomez St., to which direction the victim was then heading
when he was riding on his bicycle. P/Sgt. Yabao who was then
jogging thru the Gomez Street and was heading and meeting the
victim Ramon A. Acuesta as the latter was riding on his bicycle, saw
when the Philtranco bus was being pushed by some passengers,
when its engine abruptly started and when the said bus bumped and
ran over the victim. He approached the bus driver defendant Manilhig
herein and signalled to him to stop, but the latter did not listen. So
the police officer jumped into the bus and introducing himself to the
driver defendant as policeman, ordered the latter to stop. The said
defendant driver stopped the Philtranco bus near the Nijaga Park
and Sgt. Yabao thereafter, told the driver to proceed to the Police
Headquarter which was only 100 meters away from Nijaga Park
because he was apprehensive that the said driver might be harmed
by the relatives of the victim who might come to the scene of the
accident. Then Sgt. Yabao cordoned the scene where the vehicular
accident occurred and had P/Cpl. Bartolome Bagot, the Traffic
Investigator, conduct an investigation and make a sketch of the crime
scene. Sgt. Yambao Yabao was only about 20 meters away when he
saw the bus of defendant Philtranco bumped [sic] and [sic] ran over
the victim. From the place where the victim was actually bumped by
the bus, the said vehicle still had run to a distance of about 15
meters away.[4]
For their part, the petitioners filed an Answer[5] wherein they alleged
that petitioner Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees, including
petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had
undergone months of rigid training before he was hired. Petitioner
Manilhig had always been a prudent professional driver, religiously
observing traffic rules and regulations. In driving Philtranco's buses,
he exercised the diligence of a very cautious person.
As might be expected, the petitioners had a different version of the
incident. They alleged that in the morning of 24 March 1990,
Manilhig, in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City, warmed up
the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper
of Calbayog. While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along
Gomez Street, the victim, who was biking towards the same direction
as the bus, suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the
center of the road. The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that
even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn, the
victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus. It was
neither willful nor deliberate on Manilhig's part to proceed with the
trip after his bus bumped the victim, the truth being that when he
looked at his rear-view window, he saw people crowding around the
victim, with others running after his bus. Fearing that he might be
mobbed, he moved away from the scene of the accident and
intended to report the incident to the police. After a man boarded his
bus and introduced himself as a policeman, Manilhig gave himself up
to the custody of the police and reported the accident in question.
The petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the
victim in overtaking two tricycles, without taking precautions such as
seeing first that the road was clear, which caused the death of the
victim. The latter did not even give any signal of his intention to
overtake. The petitioners then counterclaimed for P50,000 as and for
attorney's fees; P1 million as moral damages; and P50,000 for
litigation expenses.
However, the petitioners were not able to present their evidence, as
they were deemed to have waived that right by the failure of their
counsel to appear at the scheduled hearings on 30 and 31 March
1992. The trial court then issued an Order[6] declaring the case
submitted for decision. Motions for the reconsideration of the said
Order were both denied.
On 22 January 1992, the trial court handed down a decision ordering
the petitioners to jointly and severally pay the private respondents
the following amounts:
1) P55, 615.72 as actual damages;
2) P200,000 as death indemnity for the death of the victim Ramon A.
Acuesta;
3) P1 million as moral damages;
4) P500,000 by way of exemplary damages;
5) P50,000 as attorneys fees; and
6) the costs of suit.[7]
Unsatisfied with the judgment, the petitioners appealed to the Court
of Appeals imputing upon the trial court the following errors:
(1) in preventing or barring them from presenting their evidence;
(2) in finding that petitioner Manilhig was at fault;
(3) in not finding that Ramon was the one at fault and his own fault
caused, or at least contributed to, his unfortunate accident;
(4) in awarding damages to the private respondents; and
(5) in finding that petitioner Philtranco was solidarily liable with
Manilhig for damages.[8]
In its decision of 31 January 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. It held that the petitioners were not denied
due process, as they were given an opportunity to present their
defense. The records show that they were notified of the assignment
of the case for 30 and 31 March 1992. Yet, their counsel did not
appear on the said dates. Neither did he file a motion for
postponement of the hearings, nor did he appeal from the denial of
the motions for reconsideration of the 31 March 1992 Order of the
trial court. The petitioners have thereby waived their right to present
evidence. Their expectation that they would have to object yet to a
formal offer of evidence by the private respondents was misplaced,
for it was within the sound discretion of the court to allow oral offer of
evidence.
As to the second and third assigned errors, the respondent court
disposed as follows:
... We cannot help but accord with the lower court's finding on
appellant Manilhig's fault. First, it is not disputed that the bus driven
by appellant Manilhig was being pushed at the time of the
unfortunate happening. It is of common knowledge and experience
that when a vehicle is pushed to a jump-start, its initial movement is
far from slow. Rather, its movement is abrupt and jerky and it takes a
while before the vehicle attains normal speed. The lower court had
thus enough basis to conclude, as it did, that the bumping of the
victim was due to appellant Manilhig's actionable negligence and
inattention. Prudence should have dictated against jump-starting the
bus in a busy section of the city. Militating further against appellants'
posture was the fact that the precarious pushing of subject bus to a
jumpstart was done where the bus had to take a left turn, thereby
making the move too risky to take. The possibility that pedestrians on
Gomez Street, where the bus turned left and the victim was biking,
would be unaware of a vehicle being pushed to a jumpstart, was too
obvious to be overlooked. Verily, contrary to their bare arguments,
there was gross negligence on the part of appellants.
The doctrine of last clear chance theorized upon by appellants, is
inapplicable under the premises because the victim, who was
bumped from behind, obviously, did not of course anticipate a
Philtranco bus being pushed from a perpendicular street.
The respondent court sustained the awards of moral and exemplary
damages and of attorneys fees, for they are warranted under Articles
2206, 2231, and 2208(1), respectively, of the Civil Code. Anent the
solidary liability of petitioner Philtranco, the same finds support in
Articles 2180 and 2194 of the said Code. The defense that Philtranco
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees crumbles in the face of the gross
negligence of its driver, which caused the untimely death of the
victim.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners
came to us claiming that the Court of Appeals gravely erred
I
...IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO
PRESENT THEIR EVIDENCE, AND THAT PETITIONERS WERE
NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS.
II
...IN APPLYING ART. 2194, INSTEAD OF ART. 2180, OF THE
CIVIL CODE, AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER PHILTRANCO
CAN NOT INVOKE THE DEFENSE OF DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
FATHER OF A FAMILY.
III
...IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS AND/OR IN NOT
FINDING THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES
EXCESSIVE.
We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda after due consideration
of the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the petition, the
comment thereon by the private respondents, and the reply to the
comment filed by the petitioners. The petitioners filed their
memorandum in due time; while the private respondents filed theirs
only on 3 January 1997, after their counsel was fined in the amount
of P1,000 for failure to submit the required memorandum.
The first imputed error is without merit. The petitioners and their
counsel, Atty. Jose Buban, were duly notified in open court of the
order of the trial court of 10 February 1992 setting the case for
hearing on 30 and 31 March 1992.[9] On both dates neither the
petitioners nor their counsel appeared. In his motion for
reconsideration,[10] Atty. Buban gave the following reasons for his
failure to appear on the said hearings:
1. That when this case was called on March 27, 1992, counsel was
very much indisposed due to the rigors of a very hectic campaign as
he is a candidate for City Councilor of Tacloban; he wanted to leave
for Calbayog City, but he was seized with slight fever on the morning
of said date; but then, during the last hearing, counsel was made to
understand that plaintiffs would formally offer their exhibits in writing,
for which reason, counsel for defendants waited for a copy of said
formal offer, but counsel did not receive any copy as counsel for
plaintiffs opted to formally offer their exhibits orally in open court;
2. That counsel for defendants, in good faith believed that he would
be given reasonable time within which to comment on the formal
offer in writing, only to know that counsel for plaintiffs orally offered
their exhibits in open court and that the same were admitted by the
Honorable Court; and that when this case was called on March 30
and 31, 1992, the undersigned counsel honestly believed that said
schedule would be cancelled, pending on the submission of the
comments made by the defendants on the formal offer; but it was not
so, as the exhibits were admitted in open court.[11]
In its order of 26 May 1992, the trial court denied the motion, finding
it to be "devoid of meritorious basis," as Atty. Buban could have filed
a motion for postponement.[12] Atty. Buban then filed a motion to
reconsider[13] the order of denial, which was likewise denied by the
trial court in its order of 12 August 1992.[14]Nothing more was done
by the petitioners after receipt of the order of 12 August 1992. A
perusal of the first and second motions for reconsideration discloses
absence of any claim that the petitioners have meritorious
defenses. Clearly, therefore, the trial court committed no error in
declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis of private
respondent's evidence.
The second imputed error is without merit either.
Civil Case No. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-
delict[15] under Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code against
petitioner Manilhig and his employer, petitioner Philtranco,
respectively. These articles pertinently provide:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
...
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
...
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of
a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco,[16] for damages
arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint
and several or solidary with the driver.[17] As to solidarity, Article 2194
expressly provides:
ART. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only
recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover
what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or
negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-
delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents
or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
There is, however, merit in the third imputed error.
The trial court erroneously fixed the "death indemnity"
at P200,000. The private respondents defended the award in their
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration by saying that "[i]n the
case of Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 110,
our Supreme Court held that the award of damages for death is
computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased." In
that case, the "death indemnity" was computed by multiplying the
victim's gross annual income by his life expectancy, less his yearly
living expenses. Clearly then, the "death indemnity" referred to was
the additional indemnity for the loss of earning capacity mentioned in
Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, and not the basic indemnity for
death mentioned in the first paragraph thereof. This article provides
as follows:
ART. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances.In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
of not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the
court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
We concur with petitioners view that the trial court intended the
award of "P200,000.00 as death indemnity" not as compensation for
loss of earning capacity.Even if the trial court intended the award as
indemnity for loss of earning capacity, the same must be struck out
for lack of basis. There is no evidence on the victim's earning
capacity and life expectancy.
Only indemnity for death under the opening paragraph of Article
2206 is due, the amount of which has been fixed by current
jurisprudence at P50,000.[18]
The award of P1 million for moral damages to the heirs of Ramon
Acuesta has no sufficient basis and is excessive and
unreasonable. This was based solely on the testimony of one of the
heirs, Atty. Julio Acuesta, contained in his "Direct Testimony... As
Plaintiff, conducted by Himself,"[19] to wit:
Q. What was your feeling or reaction as a result of the death of your
father Ramon A. Acuesta?
A. We, the family members, have suffered much from wounded
feelings, moral shock, mental anguish, sleepless nights, to which we
are entitled to moral damages at the reasonable amount of ONE
MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS or at the sound discretion of this
Hon. Court."
Since the other heirs of the deceased did not take the witness stand,
the trial court had no basis for its award of moral damages to those
who did not testify thereon.
Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at
the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to allow the
former to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the
defendant's culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to
the suffering inflicted.[20] In light of the circumstances in this case, an
award of P50,000 for moral damages is in order.
The award of P500,000 for exemplary damages is also excessive. In
quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be awarded if the party at
fault acted with gross negligence.[21] The Court of Appeals found that
there was gross negligence on the part of petitioner
Manilhig.[22] Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated, or
compensatory damages. Considering its purpose, it must be fair and
reasonable in every case and should not be awarded to unjustly
enrich a prevailing party. In the instant case, an award of P50,000 for
the purpose would be adequate, fair, and reasonable.
Finally, the award of P50,000 for attorney's fees must be
reduced. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered
as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate.[23] Stated otherwise, the grant of
attorney's fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the
rule, as counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in
a suit.[24] Such attorney's fees can be awarded in the cases
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, and in all cases it must
be reasonable. In the instant case, the counsel for the plaintiffs is
himself a co-plaintiff; it is then unlikely that he demanded from his
brothers and sisters P100,000 as attorney's fees as alleged in the
complaint and testified to by him.[25] He did not present any written
contract for his fees. He is, however, entitled to a reasonable amount
for attorney's fees, considering that exemplary damages are
awarded. Among the instances mentioned in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code when attorney's fees may be recovered is "(1) when exemplary
damages are awarded." Under the circumstances in this case, an
award of P25,000 for attorney's fees is reasonable.
The petitioners did not contest the award for actual damages fixed by
the trial court. Hence, such award shall stand.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby partly granted
and the challenged decision of CA-G.R. CV No. 41140 is
AFFIRMED, subject to modifications as to the damages awarded,
which are reduced as follows:
(a) Death indemnity, from P200,000 to P50,000;
(b) Moral damages, from P1 million to P50,000;
(c) Exemplary damages, from P500,000 to P50,000; and
(d) Attorney's fees, from P50,000 to P25,000.
No pronouncements as to costs in this instance.
[G.R. No. 132266. December 21, 1999]
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU
DOCTORS HOSPITAL, INC., respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation
by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo
So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea
Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of
traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He
was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Upon
the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant
Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux
Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad
drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going
around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of
the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to
Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad
collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad
stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands
Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors
Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of
Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever
hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez
may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the
accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present
action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and
Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez,
against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In
the same action, Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid
balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.[1]
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa
Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and
petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to
pay jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts
of P8,000.00 for burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of
earning capacity; and (2) Cebu Doctors Hospital, the sum
of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and hospital bills at 3% monthly
interest from 27 July 1989 until fully paid, plus the costs of litigation. [2]
CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
In its decision[3] of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held
that the liability of the latter is only vicarious and not solidary with the
former. It reduced the award of damages representing loss of
earning capacity from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80; and the interest
on the hospital and medical bills, from 3% per month to 12% per
annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid.
Upon CASTILEXs motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
modified its decision by (1) reducing the award of moral damages
from P50,000 to P30,000 in view of the deceaseds contributory
negligence; (b) deleting the award of attorneys fees for lack of
evidence; and (c) reducing the interest on hospital and medical bills
to 6% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid.[4]
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court
of Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case the fifth paragraph of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth paragraph
thereof; (2) that as a managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to
have been always acting within the scope of his assigned task even
outside office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to him by
petitioner; and (3) ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that
the employee was not acting within the scope of his assigned task.
Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of
petitioner which holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of
the deceased.
On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their
sons death was caused by the negligence of petitioners employee
who was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his
way home from overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is
thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent death of their son
on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth
paragraph of Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape
liability therefor. They moreover argue that the Court of Appeals
erred in reducing the amount of compensatory damages when the
award made by the trial court was borne both by evidence adduced
during the trial regarding deceaseds wages and by jurisprudence on
life expectancy. Moreover, they point out that the petition is
procedurally not acceptable on the following grounds: (1) lack of an
explanation for serving the petition upon the Court of Appeals by
registered mail, as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack of a statement of the dates of the
expiration of the original reglementary period and of the filing of the
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.
For its part, respondent Cebu Doctors Hospital maintains that
petitioner CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and
subsequent death of Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on
his way home from taking snacks after doing overtime work for
petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD was not
working anymore the inescapable fact remains that said employee
would not have been situated at such time and place had he not
been required by petitioner to do overtime work. Moreover, since
petitioner adopted the evidence adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the
latters employer, inveigle itself from the ambit of liability, and is thus
estopped by the records of the case, which it failed to refute.
We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents
regarding some alleged procedural lapses in the petition.
Private respondents contention of petitioners violation of Section 11
of Rule 13 and Section 4 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure holds no water.
Section 11 of Rule 13 provides:
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. -- Whenever
practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall
be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from
the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written
explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A
violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court
of Appeals was done by registered mail is found on Page 28 of the
petition. Thus, there has been compliance with the aforequoted
provision.
As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under
Section 4 of Rule 45, the same is unfounded. The material dates
required to be stated in the petition are the following: (1) the date of
receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the
petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the
denial of the motion. Contrary to private respondents claim, the
petition need not indicate the dates of the expiration of the original
reglementary period and the filing of a motion for extension of time to
file the petition. At any rate, aside from the material dates required
under Section 4 of Rule 45, petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the
first page of the petition the date it filed the motion for extension of
time to file the petition.
Now on the merits of the case.
The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner
CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not
vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by
ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code should only apply to instances where the employer
is not engaged in business or industry.Since it is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not
covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should
apply.
Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The
phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean
that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any
business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee
who is acting within the scope of his assigned task.[5]
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine
what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth
paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether
or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph
covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of
the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth
paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within
the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the
former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts
of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business
or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope
of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service
of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For,
admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform
functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which,
nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the
employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck
operators[6] and banks.[7] The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be
faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code to this case.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in
any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts
committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But
it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once
this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that
the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when
the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the
employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.[8]
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner
CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was
acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact,
which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the
affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and
even finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions
such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises,
or conjectures.[9] Such exception obtain in the present case to
warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals
that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within
the scope of his duties as a manager.
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing
acts within the range of his employment, we shall first take up the
other reason invoked by the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner
CASTILEX vicariously liable for ABADs negligence, i.e., that the
petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD was not acting within
the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle
mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not
incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for
petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope
of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove this
negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The Court has
consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom
rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the defendant is
under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[10]
Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have
sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks.
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the
time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle,
registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the
restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his
friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner.
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the
complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an
employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a
motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the
employees action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each
state of facts.[11]
In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[12] this
Court had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the
employees assigned tasks includes any act done by an employee in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that
the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the
scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and
circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service
vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said
vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the
course or scope of his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the
employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an
employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle:
I. Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in
going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning
to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special business
benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employers
vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce
his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties
supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of
his employment while so driving the vehicle.[13]
II. Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily
a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his
services to his employer.Hence, in the absence of some special
benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the
services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is
not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses
his employers motor vehicle.[14]
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some
special benefit from having the employee drive home in the
employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the
employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his
actual duties. Where the employees duties require him to circulate in
a general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and
from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer
furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have
frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving
commission rule, under which it can be found that the employee
continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches
home. However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within
the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his
employers vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence
where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct
route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of
his own.
III. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the
latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not
liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the
period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates
that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee
for personal as well as business purposes and there is some
incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employees
personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and
he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is
normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his
employment, and the employer is not liable for the employees
negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. [15]
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our
jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not
on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault
or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in
American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer
as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his
employers business or within the scope of his assigned task.[16]
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime
work at the petitioners office, which was located in Cabangcalan,
Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldies Restaurant in Fuente
Osmea, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from
petitioners place of business.[17] A witness for the private absolved of any liability for the damages caused by its employee,
respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmea is a Jose Benjamin Abad.
lively place even at dawn because Goldies Restaurant and Back
Street were still open and people were drinking thereat.Moreover, SO ORDERED.
prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.[18]

At the Goldies Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat
with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992
incident in question occurred.That same witness for the private
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,
respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD
vs.
was with a woman in his car, who then shouted: Daddy,
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P.
Daddy![19]This woman could not have been ABADs daughter, for
SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.
Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN,
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or SR., respondents.
was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the
Bedona & Bedona Law Office for petitioner.
time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of
28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs Rhodora G. Kapunan for private respondents.
working day had ended; his overtime work had already been
completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was
known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and
addicts, had no connection to petitioners business; neither had it any GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle
The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek
even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of
reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court on October 16,
the perks attached to his position.
1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 477)
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the reviewing the appellate court's conclusion that there exists an
scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and its co-
duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a defendant Funtecha. The Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable
family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter
equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.[20] directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a
working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an
and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the employee of the petitioner.
modification that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be
The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in
the present case call for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the petitioner. The
private respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party
shall have recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for
whom, at the time of the incident, the servant was performing an act
in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner.
Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy
ride without the knowledge of the school authorities.
After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found by the
trial court and the appellate court, the Court reconsiders its decision.
We reinstate the Court of Appeals' decision penned by the late
Justice Desiderio Jurado and concurred in by Justices Jose C.
Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon. Applying Civil Code provisions,
the appellate court affirmed the trial court decision which ordered the
payment of the P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance
Corporation policy, P10,000.00 moral damages, P4,000.00 litigation
and actual expenses, and P3,000.00 attorney's fees.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-
time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to
the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school
premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver,
Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter
was on his way home one late afternoon. It is significant to note that
the place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school
president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where
Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer
Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving
down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that
the road was clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79) According to
Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit
them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon
swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped against
the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep
swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was
walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit
him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to
the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas
City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security
guard of the petitioner-school. He further said that there was no
specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving the students
home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and
then drive home using the same vehicle.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president
where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the
interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive
home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the
morning of the next school day.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president
had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said
purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the school president also
had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license
and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was
not in his classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction
of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride.
Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a
"frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep
was intended by the petitioner school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas,
Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577, 80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association
of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co.,
Inc. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel
was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it
was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause
"within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an
employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if
somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit
from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer
is determined by answering the question of whether or not the
servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of his master's business. (Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 NW
643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937])
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor
Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of
administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on
conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides
guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor
Secretary shall be exercised; on what records should be kept;
maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of
working scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the
employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive
labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is
concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the
substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and
so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the
decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person
during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and
against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer.
It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by
the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee
and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on
labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor
cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the
substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an
extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless
imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by
a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over (him)." (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes,
30 Phil. 624 [1915])
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an
official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner
may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the
benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the
school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties
does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either
in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised
the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees
Funtecha and Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees and
the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his
employees. (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix
Construction, v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 [1987])
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the
necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act
indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth
such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees
from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or
prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from
authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle.
Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed
sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by
persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury
arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the
vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 772 [1918]). In
the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its
employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or
omissions of its employees. (Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976];
Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran Bus Liner v.
Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]; Franco v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989]; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v.
Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is, under
Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have
recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are
paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan
Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case for damages.
This is quite understandable considering that as far as the injured
pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was
Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was
one authorized by the school to drive. The plaintiff and his heirs
should not now be left to suffer without simultaneous recourse
against the petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a janitor
doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short while. For the
purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances,
it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were
able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship
between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha
was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his own
but in furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of
responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily
demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
October 16, 1990 is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
respondent appellate court affirming the trial court decision is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 119121. August 14, 1998]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, Fifteenth Division and PHESCO
INCORPORATED, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the
National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi city bound for Iligan
city. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks with
plate no. RFT-9-6-673 driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a
head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw.The incident resulted in the
death of three (3) persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as
physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.
On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the victims filed a complaint for
damages against National Power Corporation (NPC) and PHESCO
Incorporated (PHESCO) before the then Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte, Marawi City. When defendant PHESCO filed its
answer to the complaint it contended that it was not the owner of the
dump truck which collided with the Toyota Tamaraw but
NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC
with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the
latters projects. On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and
countered that the driver of the dump truck was the employee of
PHESCO.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision dated July
25, 1988 absolving NPC of any liability. The dispositive portion
reads:
Consequently, in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering PHESCO, Inc. and Gavino Ilumba upon
receipt hereof:
1. To pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs thru the Dansalan College
the sum of P954,154.55 representing the actual or compensatory
damages incurred by the plaintiffs; and
2. To pay the sum of P50,000.00 representing Attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied, PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on
November 10, 1994 reversed the trial courts judgment. We quote the
pertinent portion of the decision:
A labor only contractor is considered merely as an agent of the
employer (Deferia vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 194
SCRA 525). A finding that a contractor is a labor only contractor is
equivalent to a finding that there is an employer-employee
relationship between the owner of the project and the employees of
the labor only contractor (Industrial Timer Corporation vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 202 SCRA 465). So, even if Phesco
hired driver Gavino Ilumba, as Phesco is admittedly a labor only
contractor of Napocor, the statute itself establishes an employer-
employee relationship between the employer (Napocor) and the
employee (driver Ilumba) of the labor only contractor (Phesco). (Ecal
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 195 SCRA 224).
Consequently, we hold Phesco not liable for the tort of driver Gavino
Ilumba, as there was no employment relationship between Phesco
and driver Gavino Ilumba.Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to
hold the employer liable for torts committed by his employees within
the scope of their assigned task, there must exist an employer-
employee relationship. (Martin vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 591).
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the appealed decision. In lieu thereof,
the Court renders judgment sentencing defendant National Power
Corporation to pay plaintiffs the sum of P174,889.20 plus P20,000.00
as attorneys fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.
Chagrined by the sudden turnaround, NPC filed a motion for
reconsideration of said decision which was, however, denied on
February 9, 1995.[1] Hence, this petition.
The principal query to be resolved is, as between NPC and
PHESCO, who is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dumptruck
which figured in the accident and which should, therefore, would be
liable for damages to the victims. Specifically, NPC assigns the sole
error that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FINDING THAT
PETITIONER NPC AS THE EMPLOYER OF THE DRIVER GAVINO
ILUMBA, AND CONSEQUENTLY, SENTENCING IT TO PAY THE
ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY
COMPLAINANTS, IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW OR WITH
THE APPLICABLE RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.[2]
As earlier stated, NPC denies that the driver of the dump truck was
its employee. It alleges that it did not have the power of selection and
dismissal nor the power of control over Ilumba.[3] PHESCO,
meanwhile, argues that it merely acted as a recruiter of the
necessary workers for and in behalf of NPC.[4]
Before we decide who is the employer of Ilumba, it is evidently
necessary to ascertain the contractual relationship between NPC and
PHESCO. Was the relationship one of employer and job
(independent) contractor or one of employer and labor only
contractor?
Job (independent) contracting is present if the following conditions
are met: (a) the contractor carries on an independent business and
undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own
responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the
control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters
connected with the performance of the work except to the result
thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments
in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and
other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his
business.[5] Absent these requisites, what exists is a labor only
contract under which the person acting as contractor is considered
merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is
responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same
extent as if they had been directly employed by him.[6] Taking into
consideration the above distinction and the provisions of the
Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC,
we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only
contracting.
It must be noted that under the Memorandum, NPC had mandate to
approve the critical path network and rate of expenditure to be
undertaken by PHESCO.[7] Likewise, the manning schedule and pay
scale of the workers hired by PHESCO were subject to confirmation
by NPC.[8] Then too, it cannot be ignored that if PHESCO enters into
any sub-contract or lease, again NPCs concurrence is
needed.[9] Another consideration is that even in the procurement of
tools and equipment that will be used by PHESCO, NPCs favorable
recommendation is still necessary before these tools and equipment
can be purchased.[10] Notably, it is NPC that will provide the money
or funding that will be used by PHESCO to undertake the
project.[11] Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the project being
undertaken by PHESCO, i.e., construction of power energy facilities,
is related to NPCs principal business of power generation. In sum,
NPCs control over PHESCO in matters concerning the performance
of the latters work is evident. It is enough that NPC has the right to
wield such power to be considered as the employer.[12]
Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that PHESCO was
engaged in labor-only contracting vis--vis NPC and as such, it is
considered merely an agent of the latter. In labor-only contracting, an
employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and
the employees of the labor-only contractor is created.Accordingly,
the principal employer is responsible to the employees of the labor-
only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by
the principal employer.[13] Since PHESCO is only a labor-only
contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC, including the driver of the
ill-fated truck, should be considered as employees of NPC.[14] After
all, it is axiomatic that any person (the principal employer) who enters
into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the performance of
a specified work or for the supply of manpower, assumes
responsibility over the employees of the latter.[15]
However, NPC maintains that even assuming that a labor only
contract exists between it and PHESCO, its liability will not extend to
third persons who are injured due to the tortious acts of the
employee of the labor-only contractor.[16] Stated otherwise, its liability
shall only be limited to violations of the Labor Code and not quasi-
delicts.
To bolster its position, NPC cites Section 9(b), Rule VII, Book III of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which reads:
(b) Labor only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and
the person acting as contractor shall be considered merely as an
agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the
workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly
employed by him.
In other words, NPC posits the theory that its liability is limited only to
compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working
conditions, rest periods, and wages and shall not extend to liabilities
suffered by third parties, viz.:
Consequently, the responsibilities of the employer contemplated in a
labor only contract, should, consistent with the terms expressed in
the rule, be restricted to the workers. The same can not be expanded
to cover liabilities for damages to third persons resulting from the
employees tortious acts under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[17]
The reliance is misplaced. It bears stressing that the action was
premised on the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict
against both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not
the Labor Code which is the applicable law in resolving this case.
To be sure, the pronouncement of this Court in Filamer Christian
Institute v. IAC,[18] is most instructive:
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged
employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury
caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-
employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the
implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An
implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a
shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil
Code.
Corollarily from the above doctrine, the ruling in Cuison v. Norton &
Harrison Co.,[19] finds applicability in the instant case, viz.:
It is well to repeat that under the civil law an employer is only liable
for the negligence of his employees in the discharge of their
respective duties. The defense of independent contractor would be a
valid one in the Philippines just as it would be in the United
States. Here Ora was a contractor, but it does not necessarily follow
that he was an independent contractor. The reason for this distinction
is that the employer retained the power of directing and controlling
the work. The chauffeur and the two persons on the truck were the
employees of Ora, the contractor, but Ora, the contractor, was an
employee of Norton & Harrison Co., charged with the duty of
directing the loading and transportation of the lumber. And it was the
negligence in loading the lumber and the use of minors on the truck
which caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the facts and the
law, Ora was not an independent contractor, but was the servant of
the defendant, and for his negligence defendant was responsible.
Given the above considerations, it is apparent that Article 2180 of the
Civil Code and not the Labor Code will determine the liability of NPC
in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person for any
negligent act of the employees of the labor only contractor. This is
consistent with the ruling that a finding that a contractor was a labor-
only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the
labor-only contractor, including the latters workers.[20]
With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article
2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
In this regard, NPCs liability is direct, primary and solidary with
PHESCO and the driver.[21] Of course, NPC, if the judgment for
damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse against PHESCO and
the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the
action.[22]
Finally, NPC, even if it truly believed that it was not the employer of
the driver, could still have disclaimed any liability had it raised the
defense of due diligence in the selection or supervision of PHESCO
and Ilumba.[23] However, for some reason or another, NPC did not
invoke said defense. Hence, by opting not to present any evidence
that it exercised due diligence in the supervision of the activities of
PHESCO and Ilumba, NPC has foreclosed its right to interpose the
same on appeal in conformity with the rule that points of law,
theories, issues of facts and arguments not raised in the proceedings
below cannot be ventilated for the first time on
appeal.[24] Consequently, its liability stands.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 10, 1994 and its accompanying
resolution dated February 9, 1995 are AFFIRMED without prejudice
to the right of NPC to demand from PHESCO and Ilumba
reimbursement of the damages it would be adjudged to pay to
complainants. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003]
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO
ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late
NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY
AGENCY, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and
10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled
Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo
Roman, et. al., which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating
Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on
account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the
evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT
station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the
fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT
tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between
the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who,
between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on
the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was
struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent
Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for
damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the
Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against
Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in
its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and
Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending
that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his
assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its
decision; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin
ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the
following:
a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of
P50,000.00;
b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
d) Costs of suit.
The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are
dismissed for lack of merit.
The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise
dismissed.[1]
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the
appellate court promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating
Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and,
instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable
thusly:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by
exonerating the appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor
Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby
directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the
following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.[2]
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not
have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore
had already existed when the victim entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting
the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability,
the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency
to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that
Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely
established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having
been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated
at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their
failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the
application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in
its resolution of 10 October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part
of the appellate court; viz:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY
DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL
COURT
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA.[3]
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the
evidence and the factual findings of the trial court by holding them
liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of
negligence on the part of a common carrier was not
overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins assault upon
Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a
stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA
would add that the appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked
basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of
Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court,
contended that a contract of carriage was deemed created from the
moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and
protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court
had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad
in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common
carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened
with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers.[4] The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common
carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by
a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances.[5]Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to
its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip
but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where
they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.[6] The
statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its
employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees
through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission.[7] In case of such death or injury, a
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and[8] by
simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still
establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and
the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure.[9]In the absence of satisfactory
explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the
presumption would be that it has been at fault,[10] an exception from
the general rule that negligence must be proved. [11]
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that
contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to
ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common
carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could
only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176[12] and related
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,[13] of the Civil Code. The
premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on
the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the
employer can then be made liable on the basis of the
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision
of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by
showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a
showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the
common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on
the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the
other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194[14] of the Civil Code can well
apply.[15] In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
where tort is that which breaches the contract.[16] Stated differently,
when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract
existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.[17]
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and
heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the
factual finding of the Court of Appeals that there is nothing to link
(Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the
negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x
x. This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial
justification in our own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman
himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be
absolved from liability.Needless to say, the contractual tie between
the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the
latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own
fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is
untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of
the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[18] It is an
established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages.[19]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of
nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is
absolved from liability. No costs.
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO,
ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH
TURLA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41, promulgated
on 3 April 1984, which set aside its previous Decision dated 29
November 1983 reversing the Decision of the trial court which
dismissed petitioners' complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil
Case No. 4478 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Pampanga entitled "Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh,
Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs.
Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and
Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo,"
respectively, and granted the private respondents' counterclaim for
moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as
a result of a vehicular accident which led to the deaths of Jose Koh,
Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc and caused physical injuries to
George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli
Koh McKee.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh
McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the deceased Kim Koh McKee,
were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while petitioner Carmen
Dayrit Koh and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the
wife and children, respectively, of the late Jose Koh, were the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477. Upon the other hand, private
respondents are the owners of the cargo truck which figured in the
mishap; a certain Ruben Galang was the driver of the truck at the
time of the accident.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in
Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City
and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place
between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No.
RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private respondents, and driven
by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850
Pampanga '76 driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the
deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and
physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother
of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc,
on the other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim.
At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida
Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of the car while
Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded
with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos,
was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other
hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the
northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern
approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right
side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving
back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other
side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the
left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to
return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the
truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the
opposite lane, on the said bridge.
The incident was immediately reported to the police station in
Angeles City; consequently, a team of police officers was forthwith
dispatched to conduct an on the spot investigation. In the
sketch 1 prepared by the investigating officers, the bridge is
described to be sixty (60) "footsteps" long and fourteen (14)
"footsteps" wide — seven (7) "footsteps" from the center line to the
inner edge of the side walk on both sides. 2 Pulong Pulo Bridge,
which spans a dry brook, is made of concrete with soft shoulders and
concrete railings on both sides about three (3) feet high.
The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear
portion of the cargo truck was two (2) "footsteps" from the edge of
the right sidewalk, while its left front portion was touching the center
line of the bridge, with the smashed front side of the car resting on its
front bumper. The truck was about sixteen (16) "footsteps" away
from the northern end of the bridge while the car was about thirty-six
(36) "footsteps" from the opposite end. Skid marks produced by the
right front tire of the truck measured nine (9) "footsteps", while skid
marks produced by the left front tire measured five (5) "footsteps."
The two (2) rear tires of the truck, however, produced no skid marks.
In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after
the accident, Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30)
miles (48 kilometers) per hour.
As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No.
4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then
Court of First Instance of Pampanga and were raffled to Branch III
and Branch V of the said court, respectively. In the first, herein
petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the award of P12,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral
damages, P60,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for
litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for burial expenses, P3,650.00 for the
burial lot and P9,500.00 for the tomb, plus attorney's fees. 3 In the
second case, petitioners in G.R. No. 68102 prayed for the following:
(a) in connection with the death of Kim McKee, the sum of
P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for funeral services,
P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the tomb, P50,000.00
as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P2,000.00 as miscellaneous damages; (b) in the case of Araceli Koh
McKee, in connection with the serious physical injuries suffered, the
sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P12,000.00 for loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for the
hospitalization expenses up to the date of the filing of the complaint;
and (c) with respect to George McKee, Jr., in connection with the
serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following
medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center, P3,500.00
payable to the St. Francis Medical Center, P5,175.00 payable to the
Clark Air Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to
P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney's fees amounting
to 25% of the total award plus traveling and hotel expenses, with
costs. 4
On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the
crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide
and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial
court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751 and was raffled to
Branch V of the court, the same Branch where Civil Case No. 4478
was assigned. 5
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private
respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded
and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and,
as counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as attorney's
fees, P20,000.00 as actual and liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as
moral damages and P30,000.00 as business losses. 6 In Civil Case
No. 4478, private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds of pendency of another action (Civil Case No. 4477) and
failure to implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck
driver; they also filed a motion to consolidate the case with Civil Case
No. 4477 pending before Branch III of the same court, which was
opposed by the plaintiffs. 7 Both motions were denied by Branch V,
then presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong. Thereupon, private
respondents filed their Answer with Counter-claim 8 wherein they
alleged that Jose Koh was the person "at fault having approached
the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang, . . . which was on the
right lane going towards Manila and at a moderate speed observing
all traffic rules and regulations applicable under the circumstances
then prevailing;" in their counterclaim, they prayed for an award of
damages as may be determined by the court after due hearing, and
the sums of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as
expenses of litigation.
Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both cases.
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478
filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the testimonies of
witnesses taken during the hearing of Criminal Case No. 3751, which
private respondents opposed and which the court
denied. 9 Petitioners subsequently moved to reconsider the order
denying the motion for consolidation, 10 which Judge Capulong
granted in the Order of 5 September 1978; he then directed that Civil
Case No. 4478 be consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch
III of the court then presided over by Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr.
Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No.
3751.
In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli Koh
McKee, Fernando Nuñag, Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel,
Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh, 11 and offered
several documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private
respondents presented as witnesses Ruben Galang, Zenaida
Soliman, Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit. 12
In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses Mrs.
Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuñag, Dr. Ramon
Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr. Hector,
Ulanday, Pfc. Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel,
Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, and offered
several documentary exhibits. 13 Upon the other hand, the defense
presented the accused Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida
Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offered documentary exhibits. 14
On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the
accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal case. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged in the information and after applying the
provisions of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and
indeterminate sentence law, this Court, imposes upon said accused
Ruben Galang the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as maximum; the accused is further sentenced to pay
and indemnify the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00
as indemnity for her death; to reimburse the heirs of Loida Bondoc
the amount of P2,000.00 representing the funeral expenses; to pay
the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P20,000.00 representing
her loss of income; to indemnify and pay the heirs of the deceased
Jose Koh the value of the car in the amount of P53,910.95, and to
pay the costs. 15
The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17 November
1980; on the same day, counsel for petitioners filed with Branch III of
the court — where the two (2) civil cases were pending — a
manifestation to that effect and attached thereto a copy of the
decision. 16
Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two
(2) civil cases on 12 November 1980 and awarded the private
respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's
fees. 17 The dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be in favor
of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, these cases are hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against the plaintiffs. The defendants
had proven their counter-claim, thru evidences (sic) presented and
unrebutted. Hence, they are hereby awarded moral and exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus attorney's fee of
P15,000.00 and litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual
damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants is (sic) hereby
dismissing for lack of proof to that effect (sic). 18
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the petitioners
on 28 November 1980 and was received on 2 December 1980. 19
Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the
Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg.
24764-CR and was assigned to the court's Third Division. Plaintiffs in
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed the 12
November 1980 decision to the appellate court. The appeals were
docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R,
respectively, and were assigned to the Fourth Civil Cases Division.
On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its
decision 20 in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming the conviction of
Galang. 21 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay Aming
pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa rin ang
pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the
respondent Court in its Kapasiyahan promulgated on 25 November
1982. 22 A petition for its review 23 was filed with this Court; said
petition was subsequently denied. A motion for its reconsideration
was denied with finality in the Resolution of 20 April 1983. 24
On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the
Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its consolidated decision
in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041, 25 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed and
set aside and another one is rendered, ordering defendants-
appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants as follows:
For the death of Jose Koh:
P 50,000.00 as moral damages
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 16,000.00 for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and U-1)
P 4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9, tsn April 19, 1979)
P 950.00 for the casket (Exh. M)
P 375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the death of Kim Koh McKee:
P 50,000.00 as moral damages
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot (Exh. M)
P 950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)
P 375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh McKee:
P 25,000.00 as moral damages
P 672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E)
P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic (Exhs. D, D-1 and
D-2)
P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. B and B-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh McKee:
P 25,000.00 as moral damages
P 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G and
G-1)
P 75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G-2 and G-3)
P 428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh. F)
P 114.20 to Muñoz Clinic (Exh. MM)
For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh McKee:
P 10,000.00 as moral damages
P 1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L and L-1)
P 321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)
In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case
No. 4477 and another P10,000.00; as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case
No. 4478.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 26
The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's
findings that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless
imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further
said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants
(private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and
supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants
did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the
said employee.27 This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based on
the following findings of fact:
In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions, the
determinative issue in this appeal is posited in the fourth assigned
error as follows:
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER OF
THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN SWITCHED
ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE TO THE
RIGHT.
Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness Araceli Koh McKee
testified thus:
Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?
A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross
the right lane on the right side of the highway going to San
Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid
the two (2) boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to
the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck, he
switched on the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to
give us the right of way to come back to our right lane.
Q Did the truck slow down?
A No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
Q What happened after that?
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right
lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes
and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. (tsn, pp. 5-
6, July 22, 1977); or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused,
Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed before the actual impact of
collision (sic) as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know
(sic)?
A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could
have got (sic) back to our right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir.
(tsn. pp. 33-34 July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases)
(pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief).
Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to Our satisfaction
by the following facts and circumstances:
1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio Tanhueco,
declared that the truck stopped only when it had already collided with
the car:
xxx xxx xxx
Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in the
criminal case:
xxx xxx xxx
Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness
because he was one of the first to arrive at the scene of the accident.
As a matter of fact, he brought one of the injured passengers to the
hospital.
We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants'
witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger of the truck, and Roman
Dayrit, who supposedly lived across the street.
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary
course of events people usually take the side of the person with
whom they are associated at the time of the accident, because, as a
general rule, they do not wish to be identified with the person who
was at fault. Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously created
among the several persons within the same group (People vs.
Vivencio, CA-G.R. No. 00310-CR, Jan. 31, 1962).
With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting (sic) that he is an
accommodation witness. He did not go to the succor of the injured
persons. He said he wanted to call the police authorities about the
mishap, but his phone had no dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may, the
trial court in the criminal case acted correctly in refusing to believe
Dayrit.
2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the claim that
Galang stopped his truck at a safe distance from the car, according
to plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants' Brief). This contention of appellants
was completely passed sub-silencio or was not refuted by appellees
in their brief. Exhibit 2 is one of the exhibits not included in the
record. According to the Table of Contents submitted by the court
below, said Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendants-appellees. In
this light, it is not far-fetched to surmise that Galang's claim that he
stopped was an eleventh-hour desperate attempt to exculpate
himself from imprisonment and damages.
3. Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the car about 10
meters away:
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q Do I understand from your testimony that inspite of the fact that
you admitted that the road is straight and you may be able to (sic)
see 500-1000 meters away from you any vehicle, you first saw that
car only about ten (10) meters away from you for the first time?
xxx xxx xxx
A I noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10) meters away.
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q So, for clarification, you clarify and state under your oath that you
have (sic) not noticed it before that ten (10) meters? (Tsn. 3 to 5,
Sept. 18, 1979). (p. 16, Appellants' Brief)
Galang's testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's statement that
Galang stopped only because of the impact. At ten (10) meters
away, with the truck running at 30 miles per hour, as revealed in
Galang's affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief), it is well-nigh
impossible to avoid a collision on a bridge.
5. Galang's truck stopped because of the collision, and not because
he waited for Jose Koh to return to his proper lane. The police
investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nuñag, stated that he found skid
marks under the truck but there were not (sic) skid marks behind the
truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1978). The presence of skid marks
show (sic) that the truck was speeding. Since the skid marks were
found under the truck and none were found at the rear of the truck,
the reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks under the truck
were caused by the truck's front wheels when the trucks (sic)
suddenly stopped seconds before the mishap in an endeavor to
avoid the same. But, as aforesaid, Galang saw the car at barely 10
meters away, a very short distance to avoid a collision, and in his
futile endeavor to avoid the collision he abruptly stepped on his
brakes but the smashup happened just the same.
For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the law
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants in the selection
of their driver or in the supervision over him. Appellees did not allege
such defense of having exercised the duties of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees in their
answers. They did not even adduce evidence that they did in fact
have methods of selection and programs of supervision. The
inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the proximate cause of
the mishap. If Galang's attention was on the highway, he would have
sighted the car earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters.
He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop when a collision
was already inevitable, because at the time that he entered the
bridge his attention was not riveted to the road in front of him.
On the question of damages, the claims of appellants were amply
proven, but the items must be reduced. 28
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the
facts was subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of
which the respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3 April
1984, 29 reconsidered and set aside its 29 November 1983 decision
and affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment of 12 November 1980.
A motion to reconsider this Resolution was denied by the respondent
Court on 4 July 1984.30
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners allege that respondent Court:
I COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITED
. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR WHEN
IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELY BASING IT
FROM (sic) A MERE "PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY DISREGARDING
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER'S ADMISSIONS AND
CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELY COMMITTED THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic), FURTHER, IT
ALSO DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND FOUND
IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S
RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B, PETITION) ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED ON SPECULATIONS,
CONJECTURES AND WITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN THE
EVIDENCE.
II
. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IN
EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, "IT
CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE FINDINGS OF GUILT IN
THE CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK
INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED.
III
. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND MADE A MISLEADING PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD:
"IT IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
(APPELLEES WRONGLY MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO
PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
IV
. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR;
ANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THESE
CASES.
V
. . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY
TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS, SPECIALLY
THEY (sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
VI
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED
DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHEN SAID
AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN THE RECORDS,
AND SAID AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED BY LAW AND THE
CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
VII
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDING
DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES. 31
In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private
respondents to Comment on the petition. 32 After the said
Comment 33 was filed, petitioners submitted a Reply 34 thereto; this
Court then gave due course to the instant petitions and required
petitioners to file their Brief, 35 which they accordingly complied with.
There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task of
dissecting the arguments and counter-arguments, some
observations on the procedural vicissitudes of these cases are in
order.
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of civil
liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of Criminal Case No.
3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with Civil
Case No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch III of the trial court. The
records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it
may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made, to
consolidate Criminal Case No. 3751 with the civil cases, or vice-
versa. The parties may have then believed, and understandably so,
since by then no specific provision of law or ruling of this Court
expressly allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil
action, authorized under Article 33 in relation to Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, such as the civil cases in this case, cannot be
consolidated with the criminal case. Indeed, such consolidation could
have been farthest from their minds as Article 33 itself expressly
provides that the "civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." Be that as it may, there was then no legal impediment
against such consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court,
which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression
and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to simplify the
work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least expense
to the parties litigants, 36 would have easily sustained a
consolidation, thereby preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous,
spectacle of two (2) judges appreciating, according to their
respective orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the
same facts differently, and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions.
Such was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully,
happen anymore. In the recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court or
Appeals, 37 this Court held that the present provisions of Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent
civil action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles
32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action subject,
however, to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered
in that criminal case.
Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case No.
3751 finding Galang guilty of reckless imprudence, although already
final by virtue of the denial by no less than this Court of his last
attempt to set aside the respondent Court's affirmance of the verdict
of conviction, has no relevance or importance to this case.
As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the responsibility arising from
fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
And, as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, "in the case of independent civil actions under the new
Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or
conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action." 39 In Salta
vs. De Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima, 40 this Court stated:
. . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions
mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed
separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless
of the result of the criminal case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal
case, to be filed separately and to proceed independently even
during the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to
make the court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect
whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be so because the
offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other
offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a
separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their
respective juridical cause or basis of action . . . .
What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the
decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal
is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. It would
have been entirely different if the petitioners' cause of action was for
damages arising from a delict, in which case private respondents'
liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment
of conviction in the criminal case against Galang would have been
conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private
respondents. 41
And now to the merits of the petition.
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal issue
raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Court's findings in
its challenged resolution are supported by evidence or are based on
mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts.
Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution
of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on
these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding
on this Court. 42
The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions. Findings of
facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside
when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the
trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led
to a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment. 43 The
same is true where the appellate court's conclusions are grounded
entirely on conjectures, speculations and surmises 44 or where the
conclusions of the lower courts are based on a misapprehension of
facts. 45
It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case qualifies as
one of the aforementioned exceptions as the findings and
conclusions of the trial court and the respondent Court in its
challenged resolution are not supported by the evidence, are based
on an misapprehension of facts and the inferences made therefrom
are manifestly mistaken. The respondent Court's decision of 29
November 1983 makes the correct findings of fact.
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact
that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the
collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the
driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this
presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded
that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as
the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car
swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern
end of the bridge, two (2) boys darted across the road from the right
sidewalk into the lane of the car. As testified to by petitioner Araceli
Koh McKee:
Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?
A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross
the right lane on the right side of the highway going to San
Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid
the two (2) boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to
the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck, he
switched on the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to
give us the right of way to come back to our right lane.
Q Did the truck slow down?
A No sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
Q What happened after that?
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right
lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes
and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. 46
Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross
examination. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was
necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a
greater peril — death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can
hardly be classified as negligent.
Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 47 thus:
. . . Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black's Law Dictionary,
Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." (Cooley on
Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)
In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more than seventy
years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e held:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in
effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamiliasof the Roman
law. . . .
In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 48 We held:
. . . Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It
is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (citing
Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894).
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and
the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could
be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the
car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural
course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane
would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move
to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover,
under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time
to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence." 49
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of
the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in
the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test,
therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it
cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the
collision. Proximate cause has been defined as:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. 50
Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of
Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events,
it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and
deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event,
the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of
the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not
have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency
signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an
opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down
and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper
precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck
driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver's
negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road
is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the
truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and
truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to
spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could
have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding
himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car
instead of meeting it head-on.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself
said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour
along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a
bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the
Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot
give credence to private respondents' claim that there was an error in
the translation by the investigating officer of the truck driver's
response in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in
kilometers per hour or miles per hour. The law presumes that official
duty has been regularly performed; 53 unless there is proof to the
contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant case, private
respondents' claim is based on mere conjecture.
The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established through
the earlier quoted testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which
was duly corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an
impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused,
Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed before the actual impact of
collision as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know?
A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could
have got (sic) back to our right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir.
(tsn, pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit; "O" in these Civil Cases)
(pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief)54
while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:
Q When you saw the truck, how was it moving?
A It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, sir.
Q Immediately after you saw this truck, do you know what
happened?
A I saw the truck and a car collided (sic), sir, and I went to the place
to help the victims. (tsn. 28, April 19, 1979)
xxx xxx xxx
Q From the time you saw the truck to the time of the impact, will you
tell us if the said truck ever stopped?
A I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic) already collided with the car
and it was already motionless. (tsn. 31, April 19, 1979; Emphasis
Supplied). (p. 27, Appellants' Brief). 55
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in
failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to
avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting
accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear
chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the
law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to
avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof.56
In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 57 We held:
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance."
The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant
where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care
and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the
doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own
acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results,
the injured person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the doctrine is
usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity
of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is
held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been
grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the
plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been
aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am.
Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).
In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa, 58 We ruled:
The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this Court in the
case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in
this wise:
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty
of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made
liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the
prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918);
Glan People's Lumber and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No.
70493, May, 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the defendant
in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes
the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes
between the accident and the more remote negligence of the
plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v.
Smith, supra].
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose
of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense
to defeat claim (sic) for damages.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now
rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert
ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate
cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private
respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and
primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they
are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That
presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de
jure. 59 Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Article
2180 reads as follows:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees. 60 The answers of the
private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not
interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29
November 1983 in reversing the decision of the trial court which
dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed Resolution
of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.
In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity for death
must, however, be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE
while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-
41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for
death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the
death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.
Costs against private respondents. driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her
restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street,
Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a
companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila.
Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with
her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and
vs. that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked
COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency
COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents. lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk.
She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly
bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li
G.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996 and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of
RICHARD LI, petitioner,
the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the
vs.
ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left
COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES
leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin
VALENZUELA, respondents.
and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the
DECISION UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a
"traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She
KAPUNAN, J.: was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually
fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were
Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover damages by paid by defendants from the car insurance.
petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the early In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of
morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the trial court are P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and
succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals below: other medical and related expenses amounting to a total of
P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for
serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his
way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining,
Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He
morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of
Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was
suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with
a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with
"full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the
right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped
plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in
color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area
was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion
of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a standstill
diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta
Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's
witness that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the
right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants
counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or
negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the
vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three cars involved in
the accident, testified that the plaintiff's car was "near the sidewalk";
this witness did not remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiff's
car were on, and did not notice if there was an early warning device;
there was a street light at the corner of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman,
about 100 meters away. It was not mostly dark, i.e. "things can be
seen" (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after
plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the trunk compartment,
defendant's car came approaching very fast ten meters from the
scene; the car was "zigzagging". The rear left side of plaintiff's car
was bumped by the front right portion of defendant's car; as a
consequence, the plaintiff's car swerved to the right and hit the
parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was thrown to the windshield of
defendant's car, which was destroyed, and landed under the car. He
stated that defendant was under the influence of liquor as he could
"smell it very well" (pp. 43, 79, tsn, June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and
found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise
held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally
liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered the
defendants to jointly and severally pay the following amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the miscellaneous
expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits because of
the stoppage of plaintiff's Bistro La Conga restaurant three (3) weeks
after the accident on June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month, as
unrealized profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant,
from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment and (c) P30,000.00,
a month for unrealized profits in plaintiff's two (2) beauty salons from
July, 1990 until the date of this decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney's fees; and
6. Costs.
As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus
Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing testimony in
Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to
show that the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of
glass/debris from the parties' cars, appeared to be at the center of
the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial court denied the motion.
Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of
Appeals. In a Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of
Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the evidence of
record for the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly
parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by
defendant's car."1 Dismissing the defendants' argument that the
plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the center of the road,
the respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to
prove that the car was at or near center of the right lane was never
presented during the trial of the case.2 The respondent court
furthermore observed that:
Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55
km./hour is self serving; it was not corroborated. It was in fact
contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that he was
outside his beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after A. Lake
Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990 when his attention was
caught by a beautiful lady (referring to the plaintiff) alighting from her
car and opening the trunk compartment; he noticed the car of
Richard Li "approaching very fast ten (10) meters away from the
scene"; defendant's car was zigzagging", although there were no
holes and hazards on the street, and "bumped the leg of the plaintiff"
who was thrown against the windshield of defendant's care, causing
its destruction. He came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was pulled
out from under defendant's car and was able to say "hurting words"
to Richard Li because he noticed that the latter was under the
influence of liquor, because he "could smell it very well" (p.
36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991). He knew that plaintiff owned a
beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970's, but did not know either plaintiff
or defendant Li before the accident.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its
decision, however, absolved the Li's employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes
Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to
P500,000.00. Finding justification for exemplary damages, the
respondent court allowed an award of P50,000.00 for the same, in
addition to costs, attorney's fees and the other damages. The Court
of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the defendants' counterclaims.3
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by
filing two separate petitions before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No.
117944, contends that he should not be held liable for damages
because the proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the
event that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence ought to
be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
assails the respondent court's decision insofar as it absolves
Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car
driven by Richard Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the
actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court.4
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby
consolidated.
It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No. 117944
raises no substantial questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts to
have this Court review are factual findings of the trial court, as
sustained by the Court of Appeals finding Richard Li grossly
negligent in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in
the early morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a
general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such
factual findings unless the findings of fact of the said court are
palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the
judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.5
In the first place, Valenzuela's version of the incident was fully
corroborated by an uninterested witness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the
owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of
the accident. On trial, he testified that he observed a car being driven
at a "very fast" speed, racing towards the general direction of
Araneta Avenue.6 Rodriguez further added that he was standing in
front of his establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the scene
of the accident, when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her
against the windshield of the defendant's Mitsubishi Lancer, from
where she eventually fell under the defendant's car. Spontaneously
reacting to the incident, he crossed the street, noting that a man
reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted from the offending
vehicle in order to survey the incident.7 Equally important, Rodriguez
declared that he observed Valenzuela's car parked parallel and very
near the sidewalk,8 contrary to Li's allegation that Valenzuela's car
was close to the center of the right lane. We agree that as between
Li's "self-serving" asseverations and the observations of a witness
who did not even know the accident victim personally and who
immediately gave a statement of the incident similar to his testimony
to the investigator immediately after the incident, the latter's
testimony deserves greater weight. As the court emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of the
transcript, We are not prepared to set aside the trial court's reliance
on the testimony of Rodriguez negating defendant's assertion that he
was driving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez drives only a
motorcycle, his perception of speed is not necessarily impaired. He
was subjected to cross-examination and no attempt was made to
question .his competence or the accuracy of his statement that
defendant was driving "very fast". This was the same statement he
gave to the police investigator after the incident, as told to a
newspaper report (Exh. "P"). We see no compelling basis for
disregarding his testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez' testimony are not borne
out by an examination of the testimony. Rodriguez testified that the
scene of the accident was across the street where his beerhouse is
located about ten to twenty feet away (pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17,
1991). He did not state that the accident transpired immediately in
front of his establishment. The ownership of the Lambingan se
Kambingan is not material; the business is registered in the name of
his mother, but he explained that he owns the establishment (p. 5,
tsn, June 20, 1991). Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on
his side of Aurora Boulevard were on the night the accident
transpired (p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to the testimony of
Pfc. Ramos that there was a streetlight at the corner of Aurora
Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 20, 1991).
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that there
was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain has stopped and he
was outside his establishment at the time the accident transpired (pp.
64-65, tsn, June 17, 1991). This was consistent with plaintiff's
testimony that it was no longer raining when she left Bistro La Conga
(pp. 10-11, tsn, April 29, 1991). It was defendant Li who stated that it
was raining all the way in an attempt to explain why he was travelling
at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn, Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of
Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he arrived at the scene only in
response to a telephone call after the accident had transpired (pp. 9-
10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no substantial inconsistencies in
Rodriguez's testimony that would impair the essential integrity of his
testimony or reflect on his honesty. We are compelled to affirm the
trial court's acceptance of the testimony of said eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note
that Li's testimony was peppered with so many inconsistencies
leading us to conclude that his version of the accident was merely
adroitly crafted to provide a version, obviously self-serving, which
would exculpate him from any and all liability in the incident. Against
Valenzuela's corroborated claims, his allegations were neither
backed up by other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the
course of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at a speed of
55 kph. when "out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in
front of him, which was (the) plaintiff's car". He alleged that upon
seeing this sudden "apparition" he put on his brakes to no avail as
the road was slippery.9
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's
disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The average
motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the
brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light
rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a
principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would
have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road
if he were alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions.
Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological
"fight or flight" 10 mechanisms are at work, provided such
mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion,
drowsiness, etc.11 Li's failure to react in a manner which would have
avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or
both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed
as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of
alcohol.12 Either factor working independently would have diminished
his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would have
slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a
situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court
noted (quoted with approval by respondent court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan
Police immediately after the incident, he said that while driving along
Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in
front of him which was plaintiff's car, indicating, again, thereby that,
indeed, he was driving very fast, oblivious of his surroundings and
the road ahead of him, because if he was not, then he could not
have missed noticing at a still far distance the parked car of the
plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk which had its emergency
lights on, thereby avoiding forcefully bumping at the plaintiff who was
then standing at the left rear edge of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police, he
put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiff's car in front of him, but
that it failed as the road was wet and slippery, this goes to show
again, that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed, running very fast.
For, were it otherwise, he could have easily completely stopped his
car, thereby avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff, notwithstanding
that the road was wet and slippery. Verily, since, if, indeed, he was
running slow, as he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour,
then, inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided
hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at
the proper time and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his testimony,
which is contrary to what he told the police immediately after the
accident and is, therefore, more believable, that he did not actually
step on his brakes but simply swerved a little to the right when he
saw the on-coming car with glaring headlights, from the opposite
direction, in order to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the car of
the plaintiff which was properly parked at the right beside the
sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to
the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car,
considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double lane avenue separated at
the center by a dotted white paint, and there is plenty of space for
both cars, since her car was running at the right lane going towards
Manila on the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to
Cubao.13
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his
company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for us to
determine is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of
contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora
Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is a no parking zone.
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of
contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.14 Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to
which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have
conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point
of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor
who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the
standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no
such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when
placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require
the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.15
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court
of Appeals,16 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation
of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.17
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular
accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two children
suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc Kee vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,18 that the driver therein, Jose Koh, "adopted the best
means possible in the given situation" to avoid hitting the children.
Using the "emergency rule" the Court concluded that Koh, in spite of
the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the collision with an
oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence.19
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective
thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening
situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in
such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the
event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all
nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly
crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping
at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a
hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire
boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or
alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be
hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply
because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone)
because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety
and to other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon
reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St.,
noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other
motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation. As
narrated by respondent court: "She stopped at a lighted place where
there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit
help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear
right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home she parked
along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona
Car."20 In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the
investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuela's
car was parked very close to the sidewalk.21 The sketch which he
prepared after the incident showed Valenzuela's car partly straddling
the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists
passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself
corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.22
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the
standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be
considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances
which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower
extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a
sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was
evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was
the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. "Negligence, as it is
commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of
harm to others."23 It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.24 We stressed, in Corliss
vs. Manila Railroad Company,25 that negligence is the want of care
required by the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court
below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his
Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast
speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a
drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial
evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of liquor.
Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with
changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As
Presser and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile
must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles and
persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at intersections, such
as one who sees a child on the curb may be required to anticipate its
sudden dash into the street, and his failure to act properly when they
appear may be found to amount to negligence.26
Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting
him on the night of the accident was clearly of his own making.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Li's employer. In denying liability on the part of
Alexander Commercial, the respondent court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's testimony, that the visit
was in connection with official matters. His functions as assistant
manager sometimes required him to perform work outside the office
as he has to visit buyers and company clients, but he admitted that
on the night of the accident he came from BF Homes Paranaque he
did not have "business from the company" (pp. 25-26, ten, Sept. 23,
1991). The use of the company car was partly required by the nature
of his work, but the privilege of using it for non-official business is a
"benefit", apparently referring to the fringe benefits attaching to his
position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their respective duties, the basis of
which liability is not respondeat superior, but the relationship of pater
familias, which theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on
his own negligence and not on that of his servant (Cuison v. Norton
and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before an employer may be held
liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the
actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties (Francis High
School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341). In defining an
employer's liability for the acts done within the scope of the
employee's assigned tasks, the Supreme Court has held that this
includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests
of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damage (Filamer Christian Institute vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 212 SCRA 637). An employer is
expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline
called for in the performance of any act "indispensable to the
business and beneficial to their employer" (at p. 645).
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial court's
finding that since defendant Li was authorized by the company to
use the company car "either officially or socially or even bring it
home", he can be considered as using the company car in the
service of his employer or on the occasion of his functions. Driving
the company car was not among his functions as assistant manager;
using it for non-official purposes would appear to be a fringe benefit,
one of the perks attached to his position. But to impose liability upon
the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted,
there must be a showing that the damage was caused by their
employees in the service of the employer or on the occasion of their
functions. There is no evidence that Richard Li was at the time of the
accident performing any act in furtherance of the company's
business or its interests, or at least for its benefit. The imposition of
solidary liability against defendant Alexander Commercial
Corporation must therefore fail.27
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question
is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the
master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in
which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point, however, that
our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus
pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, 28 we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused
by the accident of June 24, 1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals29 upon
which respondent court has placed undue reliance, dealt with the
subject of a school and its teacher's supervision of students during
an extracurricular activity. These cases now fall under the provision
on special parental authority found in Art. 218 of the Family Code
which generally encompasses all authorized school activities,
whether inside or outside school premises.
Second, the employer's primary liability under the concept of pater
familias embodied by Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil
Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His liability is relieved
on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once
evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the
required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the
employer's burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision,
however, depends on the circumstances of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised
diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the
latter's assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability
imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the
employee's private activities or during the performance of tasks
either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee's
tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different character,
involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their
employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their
employees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either
wholly owned and maintained by the company itself or are subject to
various plans through which employees eventually acquire their
vehicles after a given period of service, or after paying a token
amount. Many companies provide liberal "car plans" to enable their
managerial or other employees of rank to purchase cars, which,
given the cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be
able to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains
the car up to the point of turnover of ownership to the employee; in
the second example, the car is really owned and maintained by the
employee himself. In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are
companies totally absolved of responsibility when an accident
involving a company-issued car occurs during private use after
normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars
under the first plan, require rigorous tests of road worthiness from
their agents prior to turning over the car (subject of company
maintenance) to their representatives. In other words, like a good
father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they
are satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full
use of the said company car for company or private purposes will not
be a threat or menace to himself, the company or to others. When a
company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its
employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father,
satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and
responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are
given the privilege of using a company-issued car. For large
companies other than those cited in the example of the preceding
paragraph, the privilege serves important business purposes either
related to the image of success an entity intends to present to its
clients and to the public in general, or - for practical and utilitarian
reasons - to enable its managerial and other employees of rank or its
sales agents to reach clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a
company car serves both purposes. Since important business
transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of
situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the
unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the
business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private
purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial
employee or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a
company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering
the company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the public
to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it
entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to
use the company issue capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted
that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to
scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often
to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and
contacting and meeting with company clients. 30 These meetings,
clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a
managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his
company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as
well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by
Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the
corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful entity,
increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated
meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a
convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on the night
of the accident because he was coming from a social visit with an
officemate in Paranaque was a bare allegation which was never
corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving.
Assuming he really came from his officemate's place, the same could
give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from
a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and
other work related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our
satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were
made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to
determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to
whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car.31 Not having
been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be
jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained
by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages
awarded by the respondent court, except as to the amount of moral
damages. In the case of moral damages, while the said damages are
not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the
award should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering
inflicted. In the instant case we are of the opinion that the reduction
in moral damages from an amount of P1,000,000.00 to P800,000,00
by the Court of Appeals was not justified considering the nature of
the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a
traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh
just above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be
deprived of the full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even
with the use of state of the art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the
period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will be
required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and months
of physical and occupational rehabilitation and therapy. During her
lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to be replaced and re-
adjusted to changes in the size of her lower limb effected by the
biological changes of middle-age, menopause and aging. Assuming
she reaches menopause, for example, the prosthetic will have to be
adjusted to respond to the changes in bone resulting from a
precipitate decrease in calcium levels observed in the bones of all
post-menopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her
would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be
permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes
which her body would normally undergo through the years. The
replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding
adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these
adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the
nature of the resulting damage because it would be highly
speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage
and injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of
the human body. A prosthetic device, however technologically
advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of functional
restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory
functions are forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness,
psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court's
discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00
granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and
nature of the injury - physical and psychological - suffered by
Valenzuela as a result of Li's grossly negligent driving of his
Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court.
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-
appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant..
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum
of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting
the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead
of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time
when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one
days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666,
instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial
court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to
the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of
the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision
was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering
judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the
record, are as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the
plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of
Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of
ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he
was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the
General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of
turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it
would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the
ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and
unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into
the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or
horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six
feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely
injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very
same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was
suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the
same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from
his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull
and that the grey matter and brain was had suffered material injury.
At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for
performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular
that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live. His right
leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer
skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the
would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most
serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr.
Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an
inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and
painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed
a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The
patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes
and in his mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed
when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when
he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the
plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was
excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been
discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable
depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he
had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best
constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a
half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had
lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer,
as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach
the highest parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of
his work as a contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he had
formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated
from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of
his leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract
he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court
to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the
negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are
drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded
for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for
the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from
pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which would
justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the
record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services
as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however,
limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the
plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there
was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was
wholly incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he
remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while
the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not
prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the
amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his
part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by
an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises
whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting
therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of
the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said
Islands to appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the
Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting
from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and
thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it
possible to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the
claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General
recommended that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing
Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in
order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine
Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the
Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital,
and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-
General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to
appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to
defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its
immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If
only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new
cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's
liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be
sued by an individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the
instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the
Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its
part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and
render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the
Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital
and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the
two questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was
passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have
"decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the
chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and
we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff
as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the
Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look
elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled
after the Federal and State Governments in the United States," we
may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in
determining the purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts
committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when
expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The
Government," says Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee
to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs,
since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive
of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491,
citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers
vs. States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to
recover damages from the state for personal injuries received on
account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state
institution created by the legislature for the purpose of improving
agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate information
calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to
advance by such means the material interests of the state, being
objects similar to those sought by the public school system. In
passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts
of its officers or agents, the court said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by
reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of
powers by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall.,
269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440;
Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs.
State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep.,
203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to
sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or
contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from
suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any
cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided
April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this
suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the
town of Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such
court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for
the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he
may now have with the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorized
officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George
Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the Bark
River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of
Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark
River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha,
Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature
admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers,
and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private
parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do,
more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives
authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's
controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper
or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit
shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the
amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act
opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the
absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had
intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to
declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so
important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in
express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass.,
28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of
1893, relied upon and considered, are as follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or
for negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of
examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions
herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the
courts of this state of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same
to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to
such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases,
arising under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute
did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where
none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to
enforce such liability as would have existed if the statute had not
been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep.,
158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior
court "jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth, whether at
law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here
mentioned. In construing this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co.
vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against
the state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but
only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized
existing liabilities can be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal
claims had, by the terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of
claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals
such as the plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It
must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries
arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of
some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will
now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for
the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph
5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph
said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person
causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is
evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or
omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of
the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of
its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service
serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its
operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations
of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a
case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January
7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the
obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the
first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down
that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the
persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following
articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation
upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority
over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in
consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or
negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to
proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article
1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the
persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and
among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a
subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father
in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an
establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it
acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and
only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of
this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general
principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is
occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault
or negligence are made by branches of the central administration
acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an
external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive
powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said
to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official,
acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the
collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the
property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the
case wherein it acts through a special agent(and a special agent, in
the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation
of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes
the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated
by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904;
98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and
the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of
May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited
to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by
a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with
some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where
the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official
charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held
to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in
sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an
official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous
interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of
the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur.
Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the
Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur
of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be
reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government
intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above
set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent
acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by
appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to
determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with
the courts.
G.R. No. L-1120 August 31, 1948
INOCENCIO ROSETE, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Quijano, Rosete and Tizon for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor
Manuel Tomacruz for respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor denying the
claim of Inocencio Rosete and others against the Government in the
amount of P35,376, for damages caused to buildings belonging to
the claimant, which according to the appellant's claim were
destroyed by fire that came from the contiguous warehouse of the
Emergency Control Administration, ECA, located at No. 2262
Azcarraga, due to the negligence of a certain Jose Frayno y Panlilio
in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter near a five gallon drum into
which gasoline was being drained, and of the officers of the said
ECA, which is an office or agency of the Government, in storing
gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of Ordinances
of the City of Manila.
It is not necessary for us to pass upon the facts alleged by the
appellant, but only on the question whether, assuming them to be
true, the Insular Auditor erred in denying or dismissing the
appellant's claim.
The claimant contends that the Auditor General erred in not finding
that the government agency or instrumentality known as the
Emergency Control Administration of the officers thereof, were guilty
of negligence in storing a highly combustible and inflammable
substance in its warehouse on bodega in Manila in violation of City
Ordinances, and therefore the government is liable for the damages
sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of the Civil Code, which
in its pertinent part reads as follows:
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is
enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions but also for
those persons for whom another is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
The state is liable in the scene when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom it properly pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
In the case of Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (34
Phil., 311), this Court held the following:
. . . Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which cast the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable."
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph
said:
"That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person
causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is
evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or
omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of
the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of the public service and the appointment of
its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service
serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its
operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations
of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a
case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of Spain,
January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.).
xxx xxx xxx
"That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the
case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in
the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation
of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes
the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated
by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904;
98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.).
"That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and
the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of
May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited
to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by
a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with
some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where
the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official
charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held
to the proper responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so
deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of
damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has
by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of article 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code.' (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911;
122 Jur. Civ., 146.)"
There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to
the Emergency Control Administration or its officers, was done by an
special agent, because the officers of the Emergency Control
Administration did not act as special agents of the government within
the above defined meaning of that word in article 1903 of the Civil
Code in storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA, the government is
not responsible for the damages caused through such negligence.
The case of Marine Trading vs. Government, 39 Phil., 29, cited by
the appellant, is inapplicable, because the plaintiff in that case
recovered under the special provisions of articles 862, 827, 828 and
830 of the Code of Commerce and the Philippine Marine Regulations
of the Collector of Customs, regarding collision of vessels, and not
on the ground of tort in general provided for in article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
Act No. 327, in authorizing the filing of claims against the
Government with the Insular Auditor, and appeal by the private
persons or entities from the latter's decision to the Supreme Court,
does not make any and all claims against the Government allowable,
and the latter responsible for all claims which may be filed with the
Insular Auditor under the provisions of said Act.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
G.R. No. L-9596 February 11, 1916
MARCOS MENDOZA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO DE LEON, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Luis Morales for appellant.
Hugo Sansano for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an action for damages against the individual members of the
municipal council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the
revocation of the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to
the plaintiff under the provisions of Act No. 1643 of the Philippine
Commission. After use of a little more than one year, the plaintiff was
forcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted by the
herein defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to
another person.
Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal
Code have both governmental and corporate or business functions.
Of the first class are the adoption of regulation against fire and
disease, preservation of the public peace, maintenance of municipal
prisons, establishment of primary schools and post-offices, etc. Of
the latter class are the establishment of municipal waterworks for the
use of the inhabitants, the construction and maintenance of
municipal slaughterhouses, markets, stables, bathing
establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries. Act No. 1643
provides that the use of each fishery, fish-breeding ground, ferry,
stable, market, and slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or
township shall be let to the highest bidder annually or for such longer
period not exceeding five years as may have been previously
approved by the provincial board of the province in which the
municipality or township is located.
The two fold character of the powers of a municipality under our
Municipal Code (Act No. 82) is so apparent and its private or
corporate powers so numerous and important that we find no
difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the general principles
governing the liability of such entities to applicable to it. The
distinction between governmental powers on the one hand, and
corporate or proprietary or business powers on the other, as the
latter class is variously described in the reported cases, has been
long recognized in the United States and there is no dissent from the
doctrine.
In Wilcox vs. City of Rochester (190 N. Y., 137), it was said:
The broad general doctrine of the Maxmilian case (Maxmilian vs.
Mayor, etc., New York, 62 N. Y. 160), which is certainly not now
open to question in the courts of this State, is that "two kinds of
duties are imposed on municipal corporations, the one governmental
and a branch of the general administration of the state, the
other quasi private or corporate;" and "that in the exercise of the
latter duties the municipality is liable for the acts of its officers and
agents, while in the former it is not." (Cullen, J., in Lefrois vs. Co. of
Monroe, 162 N. Y., 563, 567.)
The Maxmilian case is quoted with approval in Bond vs. Royston
(130 Ga., 646).
In Co. Comm's of Anne Arundel Co. vs. Duckett (20 Md., 468, 476;
83 Am. Dec., 557), it was said:
With regard to the liability of a public municipal corporation for the
acts of its officers, the distinction is between an exercise of those
legislative powers which it holds for public purposes, and as part of
the government of the country, and those private franchise which
belong to it, as a creation of the law; within the sphere of the former,
it enjoys, the exemption of the government, from responsibility for its
own acts, and for the acts of those who are independent corporate
officers, deriving their rights and duties from the sovereign power.
But in regard to the latter, it is responsible for the acts of those who
are in law its agents, though they may not be appointed by itself.
This case was quoted with approval in Trammell vs. Russellville (34
Ark., 105; 36 Am. Rep., 1); and in McIlhenney vs. Wilmington (127 N.
C., 146; 50 L. R. A. 470).
In Cummings vs. Lobsitz (42 Okla., 704; L. R. A., N. S., 1915 B, p.
415), it was said:
A distinction is made between the liability of a municipal corporation
for the acts of its officers in the exercise of powers which it
possesses for public purpose and which it holds as agent of the
state, and those powers which embrace private or corporate duties
and are exercised for the advantage of the municipality and its
inhabitants. When the acts of its officers come within the powers
which it has as agent of the state, it is exempt from liability for its own
acts and the acts of its officers; if the acts of the officer or agent of
the city are for the special benefits of the corporation in its private or
corporate interest, such officer is deemed the agent or servant of the
city, but where the act is not in relation to a private or corporate
interest of the municipality, but for the benefit of the public at large,
such acts by the agents and servants are deemed to be acts by
public or state officers, and for the public benefit.
The distinction is also recognized by Dillon in his work on Municipal
Corporations (5th ed.) section 38 and 39.
As is indicated in some of the above quoted cases, the municipality
is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents in the performance of
its governmental functions. Governmental affairs do not lose their
governmental character by being delegated to the municipal
governments. Nor of the municipality which, for convenience the
state allows the municipality to select, change their character. To
preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of the community
and so on to administer government, whether it be done by the
central government itself or is shifted to a local organization. And the
state being immune for injuries suffered by private individuals in the
administration of strictly governmental functions, like immunity is
enjoyed by the municipality in the performance of the same duties,
unless it is expressly made liable by statute.
The state cannot, without its consent expressed through legislation,
be sued for injuries resulting from an act done in the exercise of its
lawful governmental powers and pertaining to the administration of
government. ... Municipal corporations are agents of the state in the
exercise of certain governmental powers. The preservation of the
health and peace of its inhabitants and fire protection afforded the
property owner, are governmental functions. (Burke vs. City of South
Omaha, 79 Neb., 793.)
In Nicholson vs. Detroit (129 Mich., 246; 56 L. R. A., 601), it was
said:
It is the well-settled rule that the state is not liable to private persons
who suffer injuries through the negligence of its officers — and the
rule extends to township and cities — while in the performance of
state functions, imposed upon them by law. This subject is fully
discussed in Detroit vs. Blackeby (21 Mich., 84; 4 Am. Rep., 450). It
was there held that cities are governmental agencies, and that their
"officers are in no such sense municipal agents; that their negligence
is the neglect of the municipality; nor will their misconduct be
chargeable against them, unless act complained of the either
authorized or ratified." And in a large number of cases it has been
held that there is no such liability on the part of such governmental
agency unless it has been imposed by statute, and in such case it is
necessarily limited by the statute.
In Claussen vs. City of Luverne (103 Minn., 491; 15 L. R. A., N. S.,
698), it was said:
It is elementary that neither the state nor any of the subdivisions, like
a municipality, through which it operates, is liable for torts committed
by public officers, save in definitely excepted classes of cases. The
exemption is based upon the sovereign character of the state and its
agencies, and upon the absence of obligation, and not on the ground
that no means for remedy have been provided. "The government,"
said Mr. Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since
that would involve in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public
interest." (U.S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat., 720; 6 L. ed., 199; Beers vs.
Arkansas, 20 How., 527; 15 L. ed., 991.) This general exemption has
been applied to municipal corporations in so far as the acts
complained of were, in the language of the memorandum of the trial
court, "done in exercising powers for the public at large as a
governing agency." While so acting, the city cannot be held liable for
misfeasance; and ... the rule of respondeat superior has no
application.
Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the
performance of governmental duties which are in their nature
legislative, or quasi judicial, liable for the consequences of their
official acts, unless it be shown that they act willfully and maliciously,
and with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff. If
they exercise their honest judgment in the performance of their
duties, their errors cannot be charged against them. (People vs. May,
251 Ill., 54; Salt Lake County vs. Clinton [Utah, 1911], 117 Pac.,
1075; Comanche County vs. Burks (Tex. Civ. App., 1914), 166 S.
W., 470; Monnier vs. Godbold, 116 La., 165; 5 L. R. A., N. S., 463;
Ray vs. Dodd, 132 Mo. App., 444; Johnson vs. Marsh, 82 N. J. L.M,
4; Gregory vs. Brooks, 37 Conn., 3645; Lecourt vs. Gaster, 50 La.
Ann., 521.) So it may be said that in so far as its governmental
functions are concerned, a municipality is not liable at all, unless
expressly made so by statute; nor are its officers, so long as they
perform their duties honestly and in good faith. The most common
illustration of both phrases of this rule is the action for false
imprisonment so often brought either against a municipality or a
municipal police officer. (Bartlett vs. City of Columbus, 101 Ga., 300;
44 L. R. A., 795; Peter vs. City of Lindborg, 40 Kan., 654.) So, in
Field vs. City of Des Moines (39 Iowa, 575), it was held that a
municipality, acting under authority given it by the central
government to destroy houses in the path of a conflagration, was not
liable in damages in the absence of a statute expressly making it so.
From what has already been said, it should be clear that a
municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance
of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the
administration of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a
private corporation or individual so far as its liability to third persons
on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into,
may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts
of its officers or agents within the scope of their employment in
precisely the same manner and to the same extent as those of
private corporations or individuals. As to such matters the principles
of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that the
municipality is made liable to suits in the courts.
Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in
tort. In a previous chapter we have considered at length the authority
of such corporations to make contracts, the mode of exercising, and
the effect of transcending the power. This leaves but little to add in
this place respecting their liability in actions ex contractu. Upon an
authorized contract — that is, upon a contract within the scope of the
charter or legislative powers of the corporation and duly made by the
proper officers or agents — they are liable in the same manner and
to the same extent as private corporations or natural persons. (Dillon
on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., sec. 1610.)
The same author says in section 1647:
The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must
answer civilly of the negligence or want of skill of his agent or servant
in the course or line of his employment, by which another, who is free
from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations, under the
conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law,
and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the
requisite elements of liability coexist. To create such liability, it is
fundamentally necessary that the act done which is injurious to
others must be within the scope of the corporate powers as
prescribed by charter or positive enactment (the extent of which
powers all persons are bound, at their peril, know); in other words, it
must not be ultra vires in the sense that it is not within the power or
authority of the corporation to act in reference to it under any
circumstances. If the act complained of necessarily lies wholly
outside of the general or special powers of the corporation as
conferred in its charter or by statute, the corporation can in no event
be liable to an action for damages, whether it directly commanded
the performance of the act whether it be done by its officers without
its express command; for a corporation cannot of course be impliedly
liable to a greater extent than it could make itself by express
corporate vote or action.
It often happens that the same agent or agency has both a
governmental and a corporate character. Such, for instance, are a
municipal water system designed both for protection against fire (a
governmental function) and to supply water to the inhabitants for
profit (a corporate function) (Omaha Water Co. vs. Omaha, 12
L.R.A., N. S., 736l 77 C.C.A., 267; 147 Fed., 1; Judson vs. Borough
of Winsted, 80 Conn., 3841 15 L. R. A., N. S., 91); a municipal light
plant both for lighting the streets (a governmental function) and for
furnishing light to the inhabitants at a profit (a corporate function)
(Fisher vs. NewBern, 140 N. C., 506; 111 Am. St. Rep., 857); an
agent who is at the same time a police officer and a caretaker of a
municipal toll bridge (Woodhull vs. Mayor, etc., of New York, 150 N.
Y., 450). It is, also, sometimes the case that considerable difficulty is
experienced in determining whether a particular municipal duty is
governmental or corporate.
But questions such as these do not arise in the case at bar. Here is it
clear that the leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a
specified period of time is not a governmental but a corporate
function. Such a lease, when validly entered into, constitutes a
contract with the lessee which the municipality is bound to respect.
The matter is thus summed up by Dillon on Municipal Corporations
(5th ed., sec. 1306):
Ordinances made by municipalities under charter or legislative
authority, containing grants to water and light companies and other
public service corporations of the right to use the streets for pipes,
mains, etc., upon the condition of the performance of service by the
grantee, are, after acceptance and performance by the grantee,
contracts protected by the prohibition of the Federal Constitution
against the enactment of any State law impairing the obligation of
contracts.
Again, this author, adopting the language of the court in In re Fay (15
Pick. [Mass.], 243), says, in section 277:
If a municipal corporation, seized of a ferry, lease the same, through
the agency of the mayor and aldermen, with a covenant of quiet
enjoyment, this covenant will not restrain in them by statute, to
license another ferry over the same waters, if in their judgment
(which cannot be reviewed by the courts) the public necessity and
convenience require it. On such a covenant the city may be liable to
the covenantees; but the powers vested in the city officers as
trustees for the public cannot be thus abrogated. If, however, city in
its corporate capacity is the legal owner of an exclusive franchise, its
grantees or lessees would hold it, notwithstanding any license to
others, whether granted by the mayor and aldermen or any other
tribunal.
It seems clear, therefore, that under the provisions of Municipal Code
and Act No. 1634, above referred to, the plaintiff had a vested right
to the exclusive operation of the ferry in question for the period of his
lease. Were the municipality a party to this action, it would be patent
that a judgment for damages against it for the rescission of the
contract would be proper. This, be it said, is the usual method of
exacting damages, either ex contractu or ex delictoarising from the
exercise of corporate powers of municipalities. But the present action
is against the members of the municipal council personally, and the
question arises: Are they liable? In administering the patrimonial
property of municipalities, the municipal council occupies, for most
purposes, the position of a board of directors of a private corporation.
In disposing of the local public utilities, if the term may be used, such
as the fishing and ferry rights, etc., they must exercise considerable
judgment. It required some considerable amount of business acumen
to compel performance on the part of lessees of these privileges in
accordance with the terms of their leases and in a manner which will
not cause the property to deteriorate. Questions must continually
arise which are not expressly provided for in contracts and which
must be settled, if possible, in a manner that will preserve the just
claims of the municipality. Indeed, it is not at all improbable that on
occasion the councilors may have reason to believe that a particular
contract has been rescinded by the other party or has never been
legally entered into, in both of which cases, decisive steps must be
taken to safeguard the interest of the municipality. Thus,
in Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan (21 Phil. Rep., 184), the
lessee of a municipal fishery was evicted for failing to pay his
quarterly rents. The municipal authorities rightly held that the contract
was rescinded but forcibly evicted the lessee instead of resorting to
the courts. Hence, in an action by the municipality against the lessee
and his bondsmen to recover rent arrears, damages were allowed
the lessee on his counterclaim for the loss caused by the forcible
eviction. Nevertheless, we do not think the councilors could have
been held personally liable for their error in resorting to forcible
eviction of the lessee. Theirs was an error of judgment, and honest
mistake on their part as to the rights of the municipality in the
premises. We think the rule of personal liability should be with
municipal councilors in such matters as it is with the directors or
managers of an ordinary private corporation.
Under the rule that directors are not liable for mistakes of judgment, it
follows naturally that they are not liable for the mismanagement of
the corporate affairs where such mismanagement is a mistake of
judgment. The wisdom of this rule is not only approved by common
experience but by law writers and all courts. A rule so rigid as to hold
directors personally liable for honest mistakes in corporate
management would deter all prudent business men from accepting
such positions. The remedy of stockholders in all such cases is by a
change in the directory. ... The rule is that courts will not interfere
even in the doubtful cases. But directors and managing officers may
be liable for mismanagement to warrant the interposition of a court
either as against the contemplated action of the directors, or a
majority of the stockholders, or to give relief by way of damages after
the action as been taken; a case must be made out which plainly
shows that such action is so far opposed to the true interests of the
corporation itself as to lead to clear inference that no one thus acting
could have been influenced by any honest desire to secure such
interests, but that he must have acted with an intent to subserve
some outside purpose, regardless of the consequences to the
corporation, and in a manner inconsistent with its interests.
(Thompson on Corporations, sec. 1298.)
In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence that there was
any justifiable reason for forcibly evicting the plaintiff from the ferry
which he had leased. On the contrary, the defendant councilors
attempted to justify their action on the ground that the ferry which he
was operating was not the one leased to him; this, in spite of the fact
that the vice-president had personally placed him in possession of it
more than a year before, and the fact that he had operated this ferry
for over year, evidently with the knowledge of the defendants. The
evidence is so clear that the ferry of which the plaintiff was
dispossessed was the one which he leased that no reasonable man
would entertain any doubt whatever upon the question. Hence, we
cannot say that in rescinding the contract with the plaintiff, thereby
making the municipality liable to an action for damages for no valid
reason at all, the defendant councilors were honestly acting for the
interests of the municipality. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained
by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry
privilege in question. In reaching this conclusion, we have not failed
to take into consideration the rule enunciated in Dennison vs. The
Moro Province (R.G. No. 8173, March 28, 1914; not reported), nor
the distinction made by the courts in the United States between the
liability of a municipal corporation, made such acceptance of a village
or city charter, and the involuntary quasi corporations known as
counties, towns, school districts, and especially the townships of
New England. Upon the question of the amount of damages
sustained, we accept the findings of the lower court.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed,
with cost. So ordered.
G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045 February 27, 1991
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA
FONTANILLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant,
vs.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA
FONTANILLA, appellees.
RESOLUTION
PARAS, J.:
In its Motion for Reconsideration1 of the Court's Second Division
decision in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045, the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA, for brevity), through the Solicitor
General, maintains that, on the strength of Presidential Decree No.
552 (which amended certain provisions of Republic Act 3601, the law
creating the NIA) and the case of Angat River Irrigation System, et al.
vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et al., 102 Phil. 790 "the NIA does
not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an
agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and
is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia,
who was not its special agent."
Although the majority opinion in the cited case of Angat System
declares that the Angat System (like the NIA) exercised a
governmental function because the nature of the powers and
functions of said agency does not show that it was intended to "bring
to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit,"
there is a strong dissenting opinion penned by then Associate
Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and concurred in
by then Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes which held the contrary view
that the Angat River System is a government entity exercising
proprietary functions. To buttress said stand, the former Chief Justice
cited some authorities which will be useful in the proper resolution of
this case.
Quoting from said dissenting opinion which cited McQuillin's The Law
of Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., Vol. 18, pp. 423424:
In undertaking to supply water at price, municipality is not performing
governmental function but is engaged in trade, and is liable first as
private company would be for any negligence in laying out of its
pipes, in keeping them in repair, or in furnishing potable water
through them. Harvard Furniture Co., Inc. vs. City of Cambridge, 320
Mass. 227, 68 N.E. (2d) 684.
Municipality in contracting to provide water supply acts under its
proprietary power and not under its legislative, public or
governmental powers. Farmers' State Bank vs. Conrad, 100 Mont.
415,47 P. (2d) 853.
In this connection, the opinion is that irrigation districts in the United
States are basically identical to our irrigation systems under Act No.
2152. Because of such similarity, it is found appropriate to consider
certain doctrines from American jurisprudence, which are as follows,
to wit:
An irrigation district is a public quasi corporation, organized,
however, to conduct a business for the private benefit of the owners
of land within its limits. They are members of the corporation, control
its affairs, and alone are benefited by its operations. It is, in the
administration of its business, the owner of its system in a proprietary
rather than a public capacity, and must assume and bear the
burdens of proprietary ownership. (Nampa vs. Nampa & M. Irrig.
Dist. 19 Idaho, 779,115 Pac. 979)
. . . the plaintiff sought damages for injuries to crops on his land
during 1923, 1924, 1925, and 1926, caused by water seeping,
percolating, and escaping from the defendant's canal. The defendant
contended that irrigation districts were agencies of the state, and
were, therefore, not liable for the negligent construction or operation
of their canals or ditches. The court, after a careful review of the
authorities defining an irrigation district, conceded that such a quasi
public corporation possessed some governmental powers and
exercised some governmental functions, but held that the
construction and operation of its irrigation canals and ditches was a
proprietary rather than a governmental function, and hence the
district was responsible in damages for the negligent construction or
operation of its canal system. (69 A.L.R., p. 1233)
It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of
government have been classified into governmental or constituent
and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of
sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes
merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as
optional. The Solicitor General argues that the reasons presented by
P.D. 552 for the existence of the NIA (the WHEREAS clauses of said
decree) indubitably reveal that the responsibility vested in said
agency concerns public welfare and public benefit, and is therefore
an exercise of sovereignty. On the contrary, We agree with the
former Chief Justice Concepcion in saying that the same purpose
such as public benefit and public welfare may be found in the
operation of certain enterprises (those engaged in the supply of
electric power, or in supplying telegraphic, telephonic, and radio
communication, or in the production and distribution of prime
necessities, etc.) yet it is certain that the functions performed by such
enterprises are basically proprietary in nature. Thus, as held in
Holderbaum vs. Hidalgo County Water Improvement District (297
S.W. 865, aff'd in 11 S.W. [2d] 506) — cited in the dissenting opinion
by Justice Concepcion:
. . . Primarily, a water improvement district is in no better position
than a city is when exercising its purely local powers and duties. Its
general purposes are not essentially public in their nature, but are
only incidentally so; those purposes may be likened to those of a city
which is operating a waterworks system, or an irrigation system. . . .
A water improvement district can do nothing, it has and furnishes no
facilities, for the administration of the sovereign government. Its
officers have no power or authority to exercise any of the functions of
the general government, or to enforce any of the laws of the state or
any of its other subdivisions, or collect taxes other than those
assessed by the district. They have no more power or authority than
that of the officers of a private corporation organized for like
purposes. As a practical matter, the primary objects and purposes of
such district are of a purely local nature, for the district is created and
operated for the sole benefit of its own members, and an analysis of
those objects and purposes discloses that they directly benefit only
the landowners who reside within and whose lands form a part of the
district, to the exclusion of all other residents therein. It is true, of
course, that the state and the general public are greatly benefited by
the proper operation of the district, and to that extent its objects and
accomplishments are public in their nature, but this characteristic is
only incidental to the primary and chief object of the corporation,
which is the irrigation of lands forming a part of the district. It is
obvious, then, that the purposes and duties of such districts do not
come within the definition of public rights, purposes, and duties which
would entitle the district to the exemption raised by the common law
as a protection to corporations having a purely public purpose and
performing essentially public duties.
Of equal importance is the case of National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11
SCRA 766, which propounds the thesis that "the NAWASA is not an
agency performing governmental functions; rather it performs
proprietary functions . . . ." The functions of providing water supply
and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of
government even though the service rendered caters to the
community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of
society. The business of furnishing water supply and sewerage
service, as held in the case of Metropolitan Water District vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., 91 Phil. 840, "may for all practical
purposes be likened to an industry engaged in by coal companies,
gas companies, power plants, ice plants, and the like." Withal, it has
been enunciated that "although the State may regulate the service
and rates of water plants owned and operated by municipalities, such
property is not employed for governmental purposes and in the
ownership and operation thereof the municipality acts in its
proprietary capacity, free from legislative interference." (1 McQuillin,
p. 683)
Like the NAWASA, the National Irrigation Administration was not
created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that
the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at
promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make
the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation.
NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving,
rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the
Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects."
Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely
benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are
only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the
irrigation of lands.
We must not lose sight of the fact that the NIA is a government
agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct
from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created
which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . .
which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It
shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall
have representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its
business. (Emphasis for emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:
(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all
irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration, such
fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the
cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover the
cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent
consistent with government policy; to recover funds or portions
thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of
communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special
fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred
liens first, upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised
thereon, which liens shall have preference over all other liens except
for taxes on the land, and such preferred liens shall not be removed
until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is
levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the
satisfaction thereof. . . .
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in
court. Thus,
b) . . . Judicial actions for the collection of unpaid irrigation fees or
charges, drainage fees or other charges which the National Irrigation
Administration is authorized to impose and collect, shall henceforth
be governed by the provisions of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines for similar actions, the provisions of other laws to the
contrary notwithstanding.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
All actions for the recovery of compensation and damages against
the National Irrigation Administration under paragraphs (1), (2), and
(3) hereof, shall be filed with a competent court within five (5) years
from the date of entry of the land or destruction of the improvements
or crops, after which period, the right of possession and/or ownership
of the National Irrigation Administration shall be considered vested
and absolute. All other actions for the recovery of compensation and
damages to private property and improvements occasioned by the
construction, operation and maintenance of irrigation facilities and
other hydraulic structures under the administration of the National
Irrigation Administration, which have accrued ten (10) or more years
prior to the approval of this decree are deemed to have prescribed
and are barred forever.
It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be
exercised by a Board of Directors. To quote Section 2, subsection (f):
(f) . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly
necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above
powers and objectives, including the power to establish and maintain
subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. (Emphasis supplied).
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, We conclude that the
National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a
juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is
not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for
the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its
special agent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26,
1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R.
No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Fernan, C.J. and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur in the
result.
, J., concur in the result and in Mr. Justice Feliciano's concurrence.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I agree with the result reached by my distinguished brother in the
Court, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, both in the Decision of the
Court's Second Division dated 1 December 1989 (179 SCRA 685
[1989]) and in the present Resolution on the motion for
reconsideration, which has been referred to the Court En Banc.
I agree, in other words, that the National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) is liable for the acts of its employee Hugo Garcia which
resulted in injury to the spouses Jose Fontanilla and Virginia
Fontanilla. However, I reach this result through a slightly different
route which is traced below.
In the original decision of the Court's Second Division, it is stated
that:
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the
Government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental"
in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the
other hand, a service which night as well be provided by a private
corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the
function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be
liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.
The original Decision and the Resolution on the motion for
reconsideration hold that the NIA is "an agency of the government
exercising proprietary functions."
I would respectfully submit that the liability of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government for torts of its employees under
Article 2180, 6th paragraph, of the Civil Code is not contingent upon
the technical characterization of the functions or activities carried out
by that agency or instrumentality as "governmental," on the one
hand, or "proprietary," upon the other.
In the first place, it is merely commonplace to note that governments
in our day and age do not restrict themselves to the original basic
and primitive functions of repelling invasion by a foreign enemy,
maintaining peace and order in society and protecting the physical
integrity or the food supplies of its citizens or inhabitants, but instead
assumed and carry out all kinds of activities which they may
determine to redound to the general interest and benefit of the
population. Thus, the classical laissez-faire concept of a state, which
prevailed during the 19th century, has today been replaced by the
concept of the welfare state. Moreover, activities which in other
states more economically advanced than our own have been
undertaken by private enterprise, are here still being carried out by
the Government or, more generally, the public sector in view of the
inadequacy of private capital and private entrepreneurial spirit.
Secondly, under Section 2(l) of Article IX of the Constitution, whether
or not a government owned or controlled corporation or entity forms
part of the Government and is embraced within the civil service
depends, not upon the "governmental," as distinguished from
"proprietary," nature of the activities performed by such entity or
corporation, but rather upon whether or not the corporation or entity
is possessed of an "original charter." Thus, it appears to me that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution had given up the notion of trying to
distinguish between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions for
purposes of determining whether employees of a particular agency
or instrumentality should be governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations or, alternatively, by the Labor Code and its Implementing
Regulations administered by the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides in part as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or entity.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what
is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
My basic submission that the term "State" as used above properly
refers to the "Government of the Republic of the Philippines." This
latter term is defined in Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987 in the following manner:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to
the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of
government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including save
as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through
which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether
pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal
or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.
(Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the term "State" as used in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code refers to that juridical person that is constituted b the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and logically does not
include agencies, instrumentalities or other entities which their
enabling laws have invested with juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of the Republic of the Philippines.
It should be noted in this connection, that in Merritt v. Government of
the Philippine Islands (34 Phil. 311 [1960]), the Court said:
It is therefore evident that the State (the Government of the
Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903 [of the Civil Code of Spain of
1889] and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent. (Emphasis supplied; parentheses in
the original; 34 Phil. at 323)
Clearly, Mr. Justice Trent considered "the State" and "the
Government of the Philippine Islands" as equivalent terms. The
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated 7 January 1898 which
the Court in Merritt cited, read in part as follows:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages, which a third person
causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is
evidenced by the same Law 3, title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or
omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows
therefrom that the State, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individual in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of
the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the State in the
organization of branches of the public service and in the appointment
of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service
serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its
operation. Between these latter and the State, therefore, no relations
of a Private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a
case where the state acts as a [juridical] person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligation (Emphases and brackets supplied)
The term "juridical" person was translated (by Mr. Justice Trent?)
as "judicial" person. This appears plain error for the judgment of 7
January 1898 in fact read:
. . . entre los cuales y el Estado, por tanto, no pueden surgir
relaciones de orden privado regidas por el derecho civil, salvo el
caso de que el mismo Estado obre como persona juridica capaz de
adquirir derechos y contraer obligaciones:
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied; 83 Jurisprudencia Civil 36 [1898])
Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain itself recognized
that between private persons and the State, relations of a private
nature governed by the Civil Code can arise where the State acts as
or through the medium of a separate juridical person that is capable
of acquiring lights and entering into obligations.
In the present case, there is no question that the NIA has juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines which owns all NIA's capital and assets.
In other words, the NIA is not part of the "State" or of the
"Government of the Republic of the Philippines"; it follows, I
respectfully submit, that the NIA should not be regarded as part of
the State for purposes of application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
What I have outlined above is in fact very close to the position taken
by Mr. Justice Paras in the Resolution on the motion for
reconsideration. For he has rightly stressed that the NIA has clearly
been invested with a distinct legal personality and thus with capacity
to sue and be sued. Judicial actions may be brought by the NIA for
the collection of unpaid irrigation fees, drainage fees or other
charges which the NIA is authorized to impose and collect, under the
provisions of the Rules of Court. Correlatively, actions against the
NIA for the recovery of compensation and damages are expressly
allowed and prescribe in either five (5) or ten (10) years depending
upon the subject matter thereof. The State itself has determined, in
other words, that the NIA shall not be covered by the general
immunity from suit without its consent pertaining to the State.
Finally, the Resolution underscores the fact that under Section 2(f) of
the NIA charter, the NIA is generally authorized "to exercise all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they
are not inconsistent with the provisions of [the NIA charter]." Since
the NIA has been vested with an the powers of a corporate person, it
seems only reasonable to believe that it is at the same time
subjected to all the ordinary liabilities of a corporate person: one of
those liabilities is the vicarious liability of an employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, 6th paragraph, for injurious acts done by its
employees within the scope of their assigned tasks.
I suggest then that the investing of an agency or instrumentality of
the Government with separate juridical personality is not a matter of
"form" as suggested by my equally distinguished brother in the Court,
Mr. Justice Padilla, in his dissenting opinion. The effect of the
foregoing provisions of its charter may be seen to be clearly a matter
of "substance": to render the NIA both suable and liable on the same
causes of action which may be asserted against any corporate entity
that is a separate juridical person.
It seems also relevant to point out that the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH), the agency or instrumentality involved in
the Merritt case, did not (in contrast with the NIA) have legal
personality separate and distinct from that of the Philippine
Government at the time that Merritt was decided. The PGH was
established under Act No. 1688 of the Philippine Commission as a
division of the Bureau of Health, a non-incorporated entity. Later, it
was removed from the administrative jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Health and made into an independent bureau under the supervision
of the Department of the Interior. Still later, the PGH was placed
under the Department of Instruction and subsequently, under the
Office of the President. In 1947, by virtue of Executive Order No. 94,
the PGH was made a part of the University of the Philippines, itself a
separate corporate entity. Clearly, therefore, at the time Merritt was
decided, the PGH was part and parcel of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines as defined by the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917.
For all the foregoing, I vote to DENY the motion for reconsideration
and to AFFIRM the Decision dated 1 December 1989 in G.R. Nos.
55963 and 61045.
Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
On 1 December 1989, this Court, through its Second Division,
rendered a decision declaring petitioner National Irrigation
Administration (NIA, for brevity) a government agency performing
proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable
for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, caused by
the fault and/or negligence of NIA's driver employee Hugo Garcia;
and NIA was ordered to pay petitioner spouses Fontanilla, the
victim's parents, the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of the
victim; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses;
P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.
Assailing the said decision of this Court, NIA filed the present Motion
for Reconsideration, alleging that NIA does not perform solely or
primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government
tasked with governmental functions; thus, it may not be held liable for
damages for injuries caused by its employee to a third
person. Citing PD 552, NIA argues that its functions and
responsibilities directly concern public benefit and public welfare.
To start with, NIA is an agency of the government with an original
charter.1 Section 1 of Republic Act 3601 provides:
Sec. 1. Name and domicile. –– A body corporate is hereby created
which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration,
hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be organized
immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal
seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives
in all provinces for the proper conduct of its business.
NIA's said charter confers upon it a separate juridical personality to
exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law,
insofar as they are not inconsistent with said charter.2
Under PD 552 amending NIA's original charter, it is made clear that
said agency was created primarily for the purpose of undertaking
integrated irrigation projects, by the construction of multiple-purpose
water resource projects to increase agricultural production for the
financial upliftment of the people. In relation to its purpose, NIA has
the power and authority to undertake concomitant projects, such as,
flood control, drainage, land reclamation, hydraulic power
development, domestic water supply, road or highway construction,
reforestation and projects to maintain ecological balance, in
coordination with other agencies concerned. Thus —
WHEREAS, the enunciation policy is for a comprehensive
development, utilization and conservation of water resources of the
Philippines, and in pursuit of its policy, one of the primary objectives
of the National Irrigation Administration is to effectuate an economic
means of achieving the optimal and diversified utilization and control
of water by undertaking integrated litigation projects.
WHEREAS, the National Irrigation Administration assumes as its
primary responsibility, the implementation of the irrigation integrated
program of the government and the attainment of the "Irrigation Age",
as envisioned under Republic Act No. 3601;
WHEREAS, an effective means of implementing multiple-purpose
projects in line with program-oriented and comprehensive water
resources development necessitates broader powers and authority of
the NIA to undertake concomitant projects such as flood control,
drainage, land reclamation, hydraulic power development, domestic
water supply, road or highway construction, reforestation, and
projects to maintain ecological balance, in coordination with the
agencies concerned;
WHEREAS, the construction of multiple-purpose water resources
projects involves substantial investment of government funds to
increase agricultural production for the financial upliftment of the
People for them to be able to assume and comply with their
obligations and responsibilities to the government.
NIA is thus maintained and operated by the government in the
performance of its governmental function of providing the Filipino
people, particularly, the farmers nationwide, improved irrigation
systems to increase the country's agricultural production. Only the
government has the capacity and facilities to successfully undertake
a project or venture of such magnitude. That the NIA is empowered
to charge minimal fees from all the beneficiaries of the irrigation
systems that it establishes and operates, does not change the nature
of the function or purpose for which it was created. The fees that are
collected by NIA are used to cover the cost of operation,
maintenance, insurance, cost of construction, and the rehabilitation
of irrigation systems.3 Such monetary charges do not constitute
monetary gain or profit to NIA, but are merely reimbursements of the
operational cost of the agency's projects.
It cannot be denied that public service is the thrust in the creation of
NIA in contrast to a business venture or proprietary enterprise for
monetary gain. That the NIA is also empowered to enter into
transactions in order to acquire real and personal properties,
appurtenant rights, easements, privileges in the development of its
projects4and enter into other business transactions, does not mean
that it performs proprietary functions, for it is expressly provided in its
charter that the business transactions it may enter into are only those
which are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to
the attain-judgment of its purposes and objectives.5
Furthermore, the fact that its charter treats the NIA as incorporated
under the Corporation Law, and confers upon it a separate juridical
personality, is not the test in determining whether it is performing a
governmental or proprietary function. The spirit, intent or purpose
behind its creation determines its true character. It has been held
that were the nature of the duties imposed on an agency and
performed by it does not reveal that it was intended to bring any
special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit to the government, said
agency is deemed to be exercising a governmental function.6
After having established that the NIA is a government agency, with
an original charter, possessed of juridical personality under the
Corporation Law, and performing governmental functions, it is
equally important to determine whether (1) the sovereign immunity of
the state from suit is enjoyed, or has been waived by NIA and (2) the
NIA is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its
employees.
For incorporated agencies of the government, the test of its suability
is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter
says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is
performing.7 The charter of the NIA provides that it may sue and be
sued, thus, consent of the state for NIA to be sued has been
given,8 so that the rule, on immunity from suit normally extended to
government agencies performing governmental functions is no
longer available to NIA. By waiving that immunity from suit in its
charter, it would appear that NIA has opened itself to suits based on
causes of action arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts,
and even quasi-delicts.
But to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing; to say that it
is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees, is
still another thing.
As discussed in the now assailed decision, pursuant to the provisions
of substantive law on quasi-delict, whoever by his act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage caused.9 The obligation imposed by
the foregoing rule is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible,
such that an employer is held liable for damages caused by its
employees who were acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks.10
But the state or a government agency performing governmental
functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees only
when it acts through a special agent.11
This is not the first time this Court is confronted with a situation akin
to the one at bar. In Merritt vs. Government of the Phil. Islands,12 the
plaintiff was hit by an ambulance of the Philippine General Hospital,
while operated by its regular driver. Since the Philippine government
was immune from suit, Act No. 2457 was approved by the Philippine
legislature which authorized Merritt to sue the Philippine government
in the CFI in order to fix the responsibility for the collision and to
determine the amount or extent of the damages.
In due course, it was determined that the ambulance operated by the
General Hospital's regular driver was responsible for the mishap.
The damages sustained by Merritt as a result of the accident was
likewise quantified by the trial court and ultimately increased by the
Supreme Court.
But then the crucial question remained thus —
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its
immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If
only the former, then it cannot be held that no Act created any new
cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's
liability to any case not previously recognized.
The Court answered its own query thus —
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts
committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when
expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The
Government," says Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee
to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs,
since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive
of the public interest. (Claussen vs. City of Luverne 103 Minn
491 citing U.S. vs. Kirkpatrick 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L.Ed., 199; and Beers
vs. State, 20 How., 527; 15 L.Ed., 991.)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . we will now examine the substantive law touching the
defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and
employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The Supreme Court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph
said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person
causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is
evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or
omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of
the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state organization of
branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents;
on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible
on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general
weal and that of private persons interested in its operation. Between
these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature
governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state
acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting
obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1988; 83 Jur. Civ.
24.)
The dispositive part of the Merritt decision states:
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be
reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government
intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above
set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent
acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by
appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to
determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with
the courts.
This Court in the now assailed decision found that NIA was negligent
in the supervision of its driver Hugo Garcia who bumped petitioner-
spouses' son, causing the death of the latter —
It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the
Marikina National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an
urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50
meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that
driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the
fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as
above-described and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry
to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not
stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their
normal and initial reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for
the reason that they were traveling at a high speed within the city
limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to
caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed
limit within the City. Under the situation, such negligence is further
aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even
checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object
it bumped, thus showing imprudence and recklessness on the part of
both the driver and the supervisor in the
group.13
There is thus no doubt that NIA should be held responsible for the
negligent acts of its regular driver, resulting in the death of petitioner-
spouses' son, except that under Article 2180, par. 6 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the state is not liable for tort save
when it acts through a special agent, and Hugo Garcia was not a
special agent but NIA's regular driver.
Under the circumstances, and in order not to perpetuate a cruel
injustice, I believe that this Court, while granting the Solicitor
General's motion for reconsideration, should recommend to
Congress the enactment of the appropriate legislation to compensate
the petitioner-spouses, parents of the victim Francisco Fontanilla,
and to appropriate the necessary funds therefor, which could be
equal to the amount of damages already determined by this Court.
During the deliberations of this case, it was suggested that the term
"State" as used in Article 2180, par. 6 of the Civil Code14 could be
limited to the State proper and not construed to include incorporated
entities even if performing governmental functions, such as the NIA.
The intended effect of this suggestion would be to render only the
State, meaning, the government of the Republic of the Philippines
and its unincorporated agencies, such as government bureaus,
exempt from liability for tort committed by their officials and
employees, except their special agents, but incorporated
governmental entities, even if performing governmental (as
distinguished from business functions) will be liable for the tort
committed by their officials and employees.
I am of the considered opinion that the aforestated suggestion is
untenable because it would lay stress on formrather than substance.
To me, the test should still be whether the governmental entity
performs governmental and, therefore, sovereign functions,
regardless of whether it is incorporated or not. If the government
agency performs governmental and, therefore, sovereign functions,
such as the NIA, it is within the context of the term "State" as used in
Art. 2180, par. 6 of the Civil Code and may not, as a consequence,
be held liable for tort committed by its officials and employees,
except when they are "special agents."
From the ruling of this Court in Manila Hotel Employees Asso.
vs. Manila Hotel,15 which states that by "engaging in a particular
business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government
divests itself pro hoc vice of its sovereign character, so as to render
the corporation subject to the rules governing private corporations," it
can be reasonably inferred that it is the business character of the
corporation and not its corporate form which divests it of the
immunity (and, similarly, exemption from liability for tort committed by
its employees) which its owner-sovereign enjoys. In the case
of Prisco vs.
CIR,16 the suability and liability under labor laws of the Price
Stabilization Corporation was based not really on its corporate form
but on its abdication of sovereign prerogatives by its descent to the
level of an ordinary business operation.17
In an advisory opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan
with respect to the creation of the state housing authority, it was held
that a state agency intended to take measures to promote
construction of housing, performs a proper governmental function,
and that the grant of corporate powers to such an agency makes it a
quasi-corporation only but it remains an instrumentality of the state.
Such quasi-corporations are described as bodies of citizens who
have no personal nor private interests to be subserved, but are
simply required by the state to do some public work. The state
merely clothes one of its agencies or instrumentalities with such
corporate powers. It is neither a private corporation but a class of
artificial entity.18 The NIA qualifies as a quasi-corporation, retaining at
all times the attributes and prerogatives of the sovereign State which
entirely owns and operates it.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, I vote to GRANT the Motion for
Reconsideration and to SET ASIDE the decision of this Court dated
1 December 1989, subject to the recommendation to Congress as
earlier stated.
G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,
vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at
the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a
"loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down
town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a
jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the
curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an
uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos
Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking
his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left
eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several
persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole.
One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital,
where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In
addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico
suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg
and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella
region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-
tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further
medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor
P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which was,
subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila,
its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of
police. As stated in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with
approval by the Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public
accountant, a businessman and a professor at the University of the
East. He held responsible positions in various business firms like the
Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver
Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation.
He was also associated with several civic organizations such as the
Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines,
Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the
incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary
occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about
P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he
was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates
and friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under
constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since
he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has
obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and
documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the
City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition
of a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets,
Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was covered on the same
day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the same catch basin was
reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was
replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer
never received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in question
was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has
always been a policy of the said office, which is charged with the
duty of installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of
Manila, that whenever a report is received from whatever source of
the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately attended to,
either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the
catchbasin with steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron
business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was
rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in
court resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent
such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout
of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks
with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter;
and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to
time whenever funds were available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the theory of the
defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which
was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is
governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of
Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons
or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board,
or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or
any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for
the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the
latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended
exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general
law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we
think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code
a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the
provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes
a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for:
"damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of"
city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law
or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal
Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section
4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of
the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based
upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is
decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for
damages: 1) because the accident involving him took place in a
national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been
negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation
of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged
in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his
injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is
"under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the
amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good
condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes
thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned"
who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by
law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue
was and is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national
highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised,
therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the
trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much
less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a
motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary
for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads
or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over
said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a
national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract
from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic
Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the
following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying
out, construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of
streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks,
cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning,
and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the
inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the
same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building
and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and
under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires
therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters
therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other
public places; to provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same
and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the
construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are
viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, not subject to our review.
hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using
the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby
to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is so
vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city; ordered.1äwphï1.ñët
to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . .
to provide for and change the location, grade, and crossing of
railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to
conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad
companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide G.R. No. L-20322 May 29, 1968
suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and
to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the streets and vs.
adjacent property shall not be obstructed. HON. PERFECTO R. PALACIO, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur,
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic MACARIO M. OFILADA, as ex-officio Sheriff of Manila, and
Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon ILDEFONSO ORTIZ, respondents.
which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or
appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and Luis Contreras for respondents.
streets within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No.
113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, REYES, J.B.L., J.:
concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (in
Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and
CA-G.R. No. 30915), dismissing the original action for certiorari and
improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid
prohibition filed with said Court by herein petitioner Republic of the
provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway
Philippines, to restrain the enforcement of a writ of execution (issued
District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision
by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No.
of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from
4886) on the trust fund in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit
such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the
with the Philippine National Bank.
Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."
There is no controversy as to the following facts:
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue
is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether On April 2, 1960, Ildefonso Ortiz instituted in the Court of First
the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance Instance of Camarines Sur Civil Case No. 4886, against the
of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the
Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., a corporation with principal
place of business in Libmanan, Camarines Sur, and the Irrigation
Service Unit, an office or agency under the Department of Public
Works and Communications, to recover possession, with damages,
of a 958 square meter-lot located in Handong, San Juan, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered
and occupied, at the instance of its co-defendant. For failure to
appear and answer the complaint, therein defendant Irrigation
Service Unit was declared in default.
On June 3, 1960, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, moved for the dismissal of the complaint, claiming
that defendant Irrigation Service Unit has no juridical personality to
sue and be sued. By order of June 11, 1960, this motion was denied,
on the ground that the said defendant although a mere agency of the
Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in the private business of
selling irrigation pumps and construction materials on installment
plan. The Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order was also denied on July 19, 1960. No appeal
appears to have been taken.
On January 29, 1962, the Solicitor General was served with copy of
the writ of execution issued by the court against the defendants in
the above-mentioned civil case; and, on February 16, 1962, an order
of garnishment was served by the Sheriff of Manila against the
deposits and/or pump irrigation trust fund in the account of the
Irrigation Service Unit at the Philippine National Bank, Manila, to
cover the sum of P14,874.40.1
On March 8, 1962, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, filed with the lower court an urgent motion to lift the
order of garnishment, for the reason that the funds subject matter
thereof are public funds and exempt from attachment or execution.
Upon denial of this motion, as well as of the motion for
reconsideration of said denial, the Solicitor General commenced the
present certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the Court of
Appeals.1ªvvphi1.nêt
In its decision of August 21, 1962, the appellate court sustained the
propriety of the disputed garnishment-order, and dismissed the
Government's petition, on the basis of the finding by the trial court
that the Irrigation Service Unit, "formerly an office under the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources created by virtue
of a 'Memorandum of Agreement on the Irrigation Pump Program of
the Philippines', signed by the Chairman of the PHILCUSA (now
NEC), Chief of the MSA Mission (now AID) and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and presently under the
Department of Public Works and Communications to which it was
transferred", is engaged in a private business of purchase and sale
of irrigation pumps and systems. Consequently, according to the
Court of Appeals, and following the ruling in the case of National
Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, et al., L-5122, April 30, 1952 (91
Phil. 203), by thus engaging in private business, the Government,
through the Irrigation Service Unit, had actually consented to the suit.
Hence, the present petition for review filed by the Republic of the
Philippines.
The issue presented by this case is whether or not the pump
irrigation trust fund, deposited with the Philippine National Bank in
the account of the Irrigation Service Unit, may be garnished to satisfy
a money-judgment against the latter. This issue in turn calls for a
determination of the nature of said trust fund, i.e., whether it is a fund
belonging to the National Government (which was not a party to Civil
Case No. 4886), as maintained by herein petitioner, or purely the
proceeds of a private venture by the government, as claimed by the
respondents.
For a better understanding of the nature, function and operation of
the Irrigation Service Unit (ISU) which is necessary for the proper
resolution of the issue herein involved, it is worthwhile to recall that
this office was originally created under the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources by virtue of a Memorandum Agreement
between the governments of the Philippines and the United States,
dated August 13, 1952. It was later transferred to the Department of
Public Works and Communications as an office directly under the
Office of the Secretary, "to prosecute to completion the rehabilitation
of pump systems transferred from the former Irrigation Pump
Administration of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources,2 including the settlement of the obligations of said
administration." The budgetary requirements to carry out the
objectives of the project were to be financed by withdrawals from the
Counterpart Fund-Special Account. (Memorandum Agreement of
June, 1954.)
This Counterpart Fund-Special Account referred to above was
established in the Central Bank by the Government of the Philippines
and made up of deposits in pesos commensurate with the indicated
dollar cost to the Government of the United States of economic and
technical assistance made available to the Philippines, pursuant to
the Bilateral Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States of April 27, 1951; of deposits accruing to it (Philippine
government) from the sale of commodities or services supplied under
the Agreement or otherwise accruing to it as a result of the import of
such commodities or service; and of any advance deposits which the
Philippine government may make in the Special Account (Sec. 1,
paragraphs 2[a], [b] and [c], Annex to Memo. Agreement of April 27,
1951). Later, on the basis of a supplemental agreement (No. 2,
Counterpart Project No. 409 — Pump Irrigation), the Pump Irrigation
Trust Fund was established in the Philippine National Bank, to which
all authorized releases to the ISU3 from the Counterpart Fund —
Special Account, to finance the peso-cost of the Irrigation Pump
Project, were transferred. This is the fund on which the disputed writ
of execution for money judgment rendered against the ISU, is being
enforced.
A reading of the records and documents submitted to the Court of
Appeals will readily show that the sales of irrigation pumps to farmers
by ISU are governed by the terms of the Supplemental Agreement
No. 2 to Counterpart Project No. 409 (signed by representatives of
the Philippine and U. S. governments) hereunder copied in full:
C. Disposition of Proceeds from Payments under Contracts of Sale
1. Under the Guiding Principles of the Irrigation Pump Project, pumps
are sold to farmers' associations under conditional sales contracts.
Periodic payments to ISU by each association are required. The total
payment required under the contract is stated in the contract and is
equal to the sum of (a) the landed cost of equipment at the
installation site, (b) the cost of installation and construction including
survey and design, (c) the cost of fuel and oil financed for the first
crop season, if any, (d) ten per cent of the total of a and b to cover
the cost of administration, technical assistance furnished by the ISU,
inspection and collection, and (e) the compensating use tax to the
Philippine Government. Interest is also payable under each contract
at the rate of six percent per annum on any unpaid balance of the
total amount of the contract.
2. All principal and interest payments received by the ISU from
farmers' associations shall be deposited immediately in the Trust
Fund. The separate account established by the project agreement for
Counterpart Project 409, entitled "Irrigation Pump Sales Proceeds
Account" is hereby abolished and any deposits therein will be
immediately transferred to the Trust Fund.
3. Whenever the total value of all deposits made to the Trust Fund
from contract principal and interest payments exceeds the value of
total releases made to the Trust Fund from the Counterpart Fund-
Special Account, these excess deposits shall be transferred from the
Trust Fund to the Counter Fund-Special Account. Such transfers
shall be considered as "proceeds of sale" and "advance deposits" as
provided in Annex Section 1, (b) and (c) of the Bilateral Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America.
It was also provided therein that the payments by the farmers'
associations on conditional sales agreements specified in paragraph
C-2, above, will be considered in the preparation, and shall form part,
of the ISU annual budget, which will finance the costs of supply and
equipment purchases, the installation and construction of pump
units, and the operating expenses of ISU for which appropriated
funds are not available. (Para. B-1).
It is clear from the foregoing that the ISU is not only an office in the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, created to promote a
specific economic policy of said government, but also that its activity
(of selling irrigation pumps to farmers on installment basis) is not
intended to earn profit or financial gain to its operator. The mere fact
that interests are being collected on the balance of the unpaid cost of
the purchased pumps does not convert this economic project of the
government into a corporate activity. As previously pointed out, the
installment payments and interests receivable from the farmers are
to be used to replenish the counterpart funds utilized in furtherance
of the operation of the project.
Although evidently acknowledging the nature of the Pump Irrigation
Trust Fund as a public fund, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
sustained the garnishment order, on the ground that the ISU, by
engaging in the private business of purchasing and selling irrigation
pumps on installment basis, has waived its governmental immunity
and, by implication, consented to the suit.
It is apparent that this decision of the Court of Appeals suffers from
the erroneous assumption that because the State has waived its
immunity, its property and funds become liable to seizure under the
legal process. This emphatically is not the law (Merritt vs. Insular
Government, 34 Phil. 311).
Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed,
the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered.
Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the
state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment
or not, and execution can not issue on a judgment against the state.
Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy
judgments recovered, and only convey implication that the legislature
will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the
satisfaction thereof. (49 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, pp. 312-320.)
Judgments against a state, in cases where it has consented to be
sued, generally operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's
claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise they can not be
enforced by processes of law; and it is for the legislature to provide
for their payment in such manner as it sees fit. (59 C.J. sec. 501, p.
331; 81 C.J.S., sec. 232, p. 1343.)
It needs no stressing that to allow the levying under execution of the
ISU funds would amount to diverting them from the purpose originally
contemplated by the P.I.U.S. Bilateral Agreement, and would amount
to a disbursement without any proper appropriation as required by
law.
A second infirmity of the decision under appeal originates from its
ignoring the fact that the initial complaint against the Irrigation
Service Unit was that it had induced the Handong Irrigation
Association, Inc., to invade and occupy the land of the plaintiff
Ildefonso Ortiz. The ISU liability thus arose from tort and not from
contract; and it is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied
in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is
liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially
commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such
agent's regular duties (Merritt vs. Insular Government, supra; Rosete
vs. Auditor General, 81 Phil. 453). There being no proof that the
making of the tortious inducement was authorized, neither the State
nor its funds can be made liable therefor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is
reversed and set aside, and the order of garnishment issued by the
Sheriff of Manila on the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of
the Irrigation Service Unit, with the Philippine National Bank, is
hereby declared null and void. The writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is made permanent. No costs.
G.R. No. L-25172 May 24, 1974
LUIS MA. ARANETA, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO R. DE JOYA, respondent.
Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for petitioner.
Jose F. Espinosa for respondent.
CASTRO, J.:p
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
34277-R ordering Luis Ma. Araneta (hereinafter referred to as the
petitioner) to indemnify Antonio R. de Joya (hereinafter referred to as
the respondent) for one-third of the sum of P5,043.20 which the latter
was adjudged to pay the Ace Advertising Agency, Inc., the plaintiff in
the recovery suit below.
Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager
of the Ace Advertising, proposed to the board of directors 1 that an
employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up
special studies in television. The board, however, failed to act on the
proposal. Nevertheless, in September 1953 the respondent sent
Taylor abroad. J. Antonio Araneta, a company director, inquired
about the trip and was assured by the respondent that Taylor's
expenses would be defrayed not by the company but by other
parties. This was thereafter confirmed by the respondent in a
memorandum.
While abroad, from September 1, 1953 to March 15, 1954, Taylor
continued to receive his salaries. The items corresponding to his
salaries appeared in vouchers prepared upon the orders of, and
approved by, the respondent and were included in the semi-monthly
payroll checks for the employees of the corporation. The petitioner
signed three of these checks on November 27, December 15 and
December 29, 1953. The others were signed by either the
respondent, or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part
of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for
delivery in the United States. The Ace Advertising disbursed
P5,043.20, all told, on account of Taylor's travel and studies.
On August 23, 1954 the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the
court of first instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery
of the total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip was made
without its knowledge, authority or ratification. The respondent, in his
answer, denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless
ratified by the company's board of directors, and that in any event
under the by-laws he had the discretion, as general manager, to
authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit..
A 3rd-party complaint was also filed by the respondent against
Vicente Araneta, the petitioner and Ricardo Taylor. The respondent
proved that Vicente Araneta, as treasurer of the firm, signed a check
representing the company's share of the transportation expense of
Taylor to the United States, and that a series of payroll checks from
September 15, 1953 to December 31, 1953, inclusive, which
included the salaries of Taylor, was signed by Vicente Araneta and
the petitioner who is a vice-president of the company. Both Aranetas
disowned any personal liability, claiming that they signed the checks
in good faith as they were approved by the respondent..
On April 13, 1964 the trial court rendered judgment ordering the
respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5,043.20 with
interest at the legal rate from August 23, 1954 until full payment,"
and dismissing the 3rd-party complaint.
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on August
2, 1965, rendered a decision affirming the trial court's judgment in
favor of the Ace Advertising but reversing the dismissal of the 3rd-
party complaint. The appellate court found as a fact that Taylor's trip
had been neither authorized nor ratified by the company.
The appellate court's full statement of its categorical and unequivocal
findings of fact on the nature and extent of the participation of the
petitioner as well as Vicente Araneta is hereunder quoted:
The evidence not only is clear, but is even not disputed at all by
Vicente and Luis Araneta who neither of them took the witness stand
to refute appellant's evidence, that as to Vicente it was to him that
appellant first broached the subject-matter of sending Taylor to
America, that Vicente Araneta evinced unusual interest, and went to
the extent of entrusting Taylor with letters for delivery to certain
principals of Gregorio Araneta, Inc. in the United States, and he even
signed the check for P105.20 to cover expenses for his tax
clearance, documentary stamps and passport fees, in connection
with the trip, on 8 September, 1953, and then on 5 October, 1953,
still another check for P868.00 which was half the amount for his
plane ticket; and as to Luis Araneta, it not at all being disputed that
when Taylor was already in America, his salaries while abroad were
paid on vouchers and checks signed either by him or by Vicente, or
by appellant himself; because of all these, the conclusion is forced
upon this Court that it could not but have been but that both Vicente
and Luis were informed and gave their approval to Taylor's trip, and
to the payment of his trip expenses and salaries during his absence,
from corporate funds; if this was the case as it was, there can be no
question but that they two were also privy to the unauthorized
disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant; what
had happened was in truth and in fact a venture by them given their
stamp of approval; and as it was an unauthorized act of expenditure
of corporate funds, and it was these three without whose acts the
same could not have happened, the juridical situation was a simple
quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation, for which
solidary liability should have been imposed upon all in the first place,
Art. 2194, New Civil Code; and only De Joya having been sued and
made liable by the corporation, it was the right of the latter to ask that
his two joint tortfeasors be made to shoulder their proportional
responsibility. (emphasis supplied)
The basic legal issue is whether the petitioner is guilty of a quasi-
delict as held below.
It is our view, and we so hold, that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals should be upheld. The petitioner's assertion that he signed
the questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been
substantiated, he in particular not having testified or offered
testimony to prove such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite of his
being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising, the
petitioner remained passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay
abroad, concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate
funds for the latter. This plus the fact that he even approved thrice
payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary, demonstrate quite
distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly,
to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. The fact that he
was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no
moment. The existence of a contract between the parties, as has
been repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the
commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent
recovery of damages.2
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, at
petitioner's cost.

G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980
FELIX LANUZO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SY BON PING and SALVADOR MENDOZA, defendants-appellants.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Appeal certified to Us by the Court of Appeals 1 as it involves pure
legal questions.
On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages was instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Civil Case No. 6847)
by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and operator
of a freight truck bearing Plate No. T-57266, and his driver, Salvador
Mendoza. As alleged therein, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of
July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along
the national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines
Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, we rammed into the
residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and
store were completely razed to the ground causing damage to
plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred that by
reason thereof he became destitute as he lost his means of
livelihood from the store which used to give him a monthly income of
P300.00.
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action,
Criminal Case No. 4250 for Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal Court of Nabua,
Camarines Sur, between the same parties for the same cause.
Plaintiff opposed the dismissal stressing that he had made an
express reservation in the criminal case to institute a civil action for
damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit.
The lower Court denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
On August 13, 1970, the trial Court rendered a default judgment in
plaintiff's favor, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (a) ordering the
defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P13,000.00 as
damages, resulting to the loss of the store including the merchandise
for sale therein, the residential house of mixed materials, furnitures,
clothing and households fixtures; (b) ordering the said defendants to
pay jointly and severally P300.00 monthly from July 24, 1969 which
represents plaintiff's monthly income from his store until the whole
amount of P13,000.00 is fully paid; and (c) for attorney's fees an
amount equivalent to 20% of the total amount claimed by the plaintiff,
plus the costs of this suit.
Defendants' "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial and To
Set Aside Order of Default" was denied.
Upon elevation by the defendants of the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. No. 48399-R) they urged that the civil action was
prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, section 3, providing in part
that "after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action." Additionally, they contended that even assuming
their liability, the lower Court nevertheless committed an error in
holding them jointly and severally liable.
On February 20, 1980, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this
instance on pure questions of law.
We start from the fundamental premise, clearly enunciated as early
as the case of Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 2 that:
A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and
the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa-extracontractual. The
same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or
create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual under
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose
which remedy to enforce.
Plaintiff's reservation before the Municipal Court in the criminal case
of his right to institute a civil action separately is quoted hereunder in
full:
UNDERSIGNED offended party in the above-entitled case before
this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
1. That this action which was commenced by the Chief of Police
included in the complaint the claim of the undersigned for civil
liability;
2. That the undersigned is reserving his right to institute the civil
action for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 6847 of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur, against accused herein and his
employer;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that reservation be made of
record therein and that the civil aspect of the above-entitled case be
not included herein.
xxx xxx xxx 3
The terms of plaintiff's reservation clearly and unmistakably make out
a case for quasi-delict. This is also evident from the recitals in
plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-employee relationship
between the appellants, alleging that damages to the house and
store were caused by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the
truck "recklessly, with gross negligence and imprudence, without
observance of traffic rules and regulations and without regard to the
safety of persons and property", and praying that appellants be held
jointly and solidarity liable for damages. These are, basically, what
should be alleged in actions based on quasi-delict. 4
As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim
for damages on quasi-delict, he is not barred from proceeding with
this independent civil suit. The institution of a criminal action cannot
have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on quasi-
delict. 5 And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed
independently and regardless of the result of the criminal
case, 6 except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or commission of the defendant. 7
The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the institution of the
criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not the civil action
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
We come now to the subject of liability of the appellants herein. For
his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and
operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily
liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the
liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under
Article 2180 of the same Code, which explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal
presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of this
employee, 8 he is likewise responsible for the damages caused by
the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his
liability is primary and solidary.
... What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted provision
(Article 2180, Civil Code) is that the employee (driver) has, by his
negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to make the employer,
likewise, responsible for the tortious act of the employee, and his
liability is, as earlier observed, primary and solidary 9
But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for
damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his
employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will have to pay
the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim. 10
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed. Costs
against defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27730 January 21, 1974
PRIMA MALIPOL, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of her
minor children, LYDIA MALIJAN, JOSEFINA MALIJAN, TEODORA
MALIJAN, and SEBASTIAN MALIJAN, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. LILY
LIM TAN and ERNESTO LABSAN, Defendants-Appellants.
Edgardo Moncada for plaintiffs-appellees.
Achacoso, Ocampo and Simbulan for defendants-appellants.
ZALDIVAR, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
Appeal on questions of law from the decision dated July 1, 1966, a
judgment by default, and from the order dated October 10, 1966, of
the Court of First Instance of Batangas in its Civil Case No. 1732
which denied defendants-appellants' motion to lift the order of default
and for a new trial and which considered the judgment by default as
standing with full force and
effect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the evening of February 6, 1965, at about 8:35 o'clock, Pantaleon
Malijan, who was walking with his companion Leonardo Amante on
the shoulder of the road in Barrio San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas,
was hit by a gasoline tanker and was thrown to the ground. While he
was sprawling on the ground Malijan was run over by the tanker's
right wheel that got detached from its axle. Malijan's companion, with
the aid of the barrio captain, brought Malijan to the San Pablo City
Hospital where he died that same night, the cause of death being
"possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicular
accident."chanrobles virtual law library
The gasoline tanker with Plate No. T-52573, series of 1964, driven at
the time of the accident by herein appellant Ernesto Labsan, was
being used in connection with the gasoline business of the owner,
the herein appellant Lily Lim
Tan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Representations and demands for payment of damage having been
ignored by appellants, appellees filed on May 18, 1966 a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying that appellants be
condemned to pay, jointly and severally, the damages as specified in
said complaint. The appellees are the mother and the minor brothers
and sisters of the deceased Pantaleon
Malijan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellants were duly served with summons on May 19, 1966, but
they failed to file their answer within the reglementary period. Upon
appellees' motion of June 8, 1966 the trial court, in an order dated
June 10, 1966, declare the appellants in default, and appellees were
permitted to present their evidence in the absence of the appellants.
The trial court rendered a decision, dated July 1, 1966, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the averments in the complaint as supported
by the evidence to be reasonable and justified, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The
defendant driver, Ernesto Labsan, is ordered (1) to pay the sum of
P2,100.00 to the plaintiffs for expenses for hospitalization, medical
treatment, vigil and burial of Pantaleon Malijan; (2) to pay to the
plaintiffs the sum of P6,000.00 for the death of said victim; (3) to pay
to the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 for the loss of earnings of said
deceased for a period of five years; (4) to pay to the plaintiffs the
sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages; (5) to pay to the plaintiffs the
sum of P2,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for incidental and
litigation expenses; and (6) to pay the costs of the suit. Should
Ernesto Labsan not be able to pay the foregoing damages, they shall
be paid for by defendant Lily Lim Tan, who by law, being the owner
and operator of the gasoline tanker that featured in the accident, is
subsidiarily liable.
Copy of the decision was received by the appellees August on 23,
1966.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A motion for execution was filed on August 26, 1966 by appellees
but the trial court held its resolution in abeyance until September 22,
1966 when the judgment would become
final.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On September 21, 1966 appellants filed a verified motion to lift the
order of default and for a new trial, alleging that they were deprived
of their day in court when the order of default was issued and a
decision rendered after; that they had good and valid defenses,
namely: (a) that the accident which gave rise to the case was due to
force majeure; (b) that appellant Ernesto Labsan was without fault in
the accident that gave rise to the case; and (c) that appellant Lily Lim
Tan had exercised the due diligence required of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. Finding said motion to be without merit,
the trial court denied the same on October 10, 1966. Hence, this
appeal wherein appellants made assignment of errors, as follows:
(a) The trial court erred in finding that appellants took the
complaint for granted by reason of the fact that appellants referred to
their lawyer the complaint for answer only after the lapse of eleven
(11) days from receipt thereof ;chanrobles virtual law library
(b) The trial court erred in not holding that the mistake
committed by the late Atty. Daniel Chavez in giving the wrong date of
receipt by appellants of the summons and the complaint to Atty.
Romulo R. de Castro on June 10, 1966 due to the abnormal mental
condition of the late Atty. Daniel Chavez on June 10, 1966 which
thereafter resulted in the commission of suicide by the latter on June
17, 1966, constitutes the mistake and accident in law which warrant
the relief from default and the granting of the new trial;chanrobles
virtual law library
(c) The trial court erred in not holding that the fact that
appellants, through Atty. Romulo R. de Castro, filed on June 10,
1966 a motion for extension of time to file answer, and thereafter
actually did file their answer to the complaint on June 20, 1966
wherein they alleged good, valid and meritorious defenses against
the claim of plaintiffs in the complaint, should warrant favorable
consideration of appellants' motion to lift order of default and for new
trial; andchanrobles virtual law library
(d) The trial court erred in not holding that the fact that
appellants' motion to lift order of default and for new trial.
1. In support of their first assignment of error, counsel for
appellants contends that the finding of the trial court, that the
appellants took the complaint for granted when they referred the
complaint to their lawyer only on the eleventh day after receipt
thereof, was unwarranted, because appellants had 15 days from
receipt of the summons and complaint to answer and their lawyer,
the late Atty. Daniel Chavez, after the complaint was referred to him
on the eleventh day, had still four days to file the answer, which he
could very well do inasmuch as he was well acquainted with the facts
because he was the lawyer of appellant Ernesto Labsan in Criminal
Case No. 2200 of Court of First Instance of Batangas for homicide
thru reckless imprudence - which case arose from the very accident
subject of appellees' complaint; that appellant Lily Lim Tan,
furthermore, had instructed her employee, Eleuterio Dizon, to
handcarry the summons and to deliver it to nobody except to Atty.
Chavez; that Atty. Chavez, in a distance telephone conversation with
appellant Lily Lim Tan, assured the latter that he would attend to the
complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We do not find merit in the contention of counsel for appellants. It is
within the sound discretion of the court to set aside an order of
default and to permit a defendant to file his answer and to be heard
on the merits even after the reglementary period for the filing of the
answer has expired, but it is not error, or an abuse of discretion, on
the part of the court to refuse to set aside its order of default and to
refuse to accept the answer where it finds no justifiable reason for
the delay in the filing of the answer. In the motions for
reconsideration of an order of default, the moving party has the
burden of showing such diligence as would justify his being excused
from not filing the answer with the reglementary period as provided
by the Rules of Court, otherwise these guidelines for an orderly and
expeditious procedure would be rendered meaningless. 1 Unless it is
shown clearly that a party has justifiable reason for the delay the
court will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor.
2chanrobles virtual law library
In the instant case, We agree with the trial court that appellants have
not shown that they exercised such diligence as an ordinary prudent
person would exercise, to have the answer filed within the
reglementary period. Appellant Lily Lim Tan admitted in her affidavit
3 that she received the summons and copy of the complaint on May
19, 1966, and that having read the complaint she found out that she
was being sued, together with her driver, for damages in connection
with the accident of February 6, 1965 at Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The
damages asked in the complaint amounts to P36,600.00. The
summons required them to answer the complaint within 15 days from
receipt thereof, and warned them that should they fail to answer
within said period the plaintiffs would take judgment against them for
the relief demanded in the complaint. The damages demanded was
not a negligible sum, and appellant Lily Lim Tan, who is a business
woman, should have considered the matter a serious one. Ordinary
prudence would dictate that she should concern herself about the
matter, that she should refer said complaint with the least possible
delay to her lawyer. But, for reasons she did not explain, she referred
the complaint to her lawyer only after the lapse of ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, i.e., on May 30, 1966. She should have considered
that four days might not be sufficient time for her lawyer to prepare
and file the answer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Appellants, however, contend that their lawyer, Atty. Chavez, could
very well prepare the answer within the remaining four days of the
reglementary period, for he was conversant with the facts of the
case. Be that as it may, the fact was that Atty. Chavez failed to file
the answer. Because Atty. Chavez assured her, in their long distance
telephone conversation that he would take care the complaint,
appellant Lily Lim Tan took for granted that the answer would be filed
on time. Said appellant should have checked before the expiration of
the period for filing the answer whether the complaint was really
taken care of, or not. But this, appellant Lily Lim Tan failed to do, and
this is another instance showing her lack of concern over the
complaint. There was, therefore, no showing of due diligence on the
part of appellants which would excuse their failure to file their answer
on time. There is no showing either that the other appellant, Ernesto
Labsan, had taken any step to have an answer filed in his behalf -
evidently he was relying on his
employer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. In support of the second assignment of error, appellants
contend that the facts show that on June 10, 1966, Atty. Chavez,
who was then acting strangely, endorsed the summons and
complaint to Atty. Romulo R. de Castro; that upon inquiry by Atty. de
Castro from Atty. Chavez the latter informed him that the summons
was served on appellants on May 30, 1966; that appellant Lily Lim
Tan, who was assured by Atty. Chavez in their long distance
telephone conversation that the complaint would be attended to,
could not, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, have foreseen, and
avoided, the circumstance that at the time she referred the summons
to Atty. Chavez, the latter was already in an abnormal condition
which later resulted in his committing suicide on June 17, 1966; that
it was Atty. Chavez's abnormal condition and his having given to
Atty. de Castro the wrong date of the receipt of the summons by the
appellees that caused the delay in the filing of the answer; that said
circumstances constituted mistake and accident which entitled
appellants to relief from default and a grant of new
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellants' contention that the delay in filing the answer was due to
mistake and accident is
untenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The mistake, according to appellants, consisted in Atty. Chavez's
having told Atty. de Castro on June 10, 1966 that appellants received
the summons and complaint on May 30, 1966. Even if Atty. Chavez
had told Atty. de Castro the correct date, that is, that appellants
received the summons on May 19, 1966, the answer could not have
been filed on time by Atty. de Castro, because the reglementary
period for filing the answer expired on June 3, 1966, and it was
already June 10, 1966, when the complaint was endorsed by Atty.
Chavez to Atty. de Castro.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The accident, according to appellants' counsel, consisted in Atty.
Chavez's being in an abnormal condition at the time the complaint
was given to him on May 30, 1966. This claim of appellants is not
supported by the record.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The record does not show that Atty. Chavez was suffering from an
abnormal mind on May 30, 1966. His actuations on May 30 were
those that could be expected of a normal person. Atty. Chavez asked
the employee of appellant Lily Lim Tan about the date when his
employer received the summons and complaint, and because the
employee could not give him the desired information Atty. Chavez
placed a long distance telephone call to appellant Lily Lim Tan to ask
about said date. This action of Atty. Chavez showed that he was very
much aware that the reglementary period within which the answer
should be filed was to be computed from the date of the receipt of
the summons and the complaint. It also showed that Atty. Chavez
knew the easiest and the most practical means to get the information
that he needed - that was by a long distance telephone call to his
client, Lily Lim Tan. These actuations of Atty. Chavez showed that he
knew the importance of the matter at hand, and he was exercising
the ordinary and reasonable care over the interests of his client.
These specific actions of Atty. Chavez indicated that as of May 30,
1966 he had a sound mind.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
It is claimed by appellants that on June 10, 1966 Atty. Chavez
endorsed the complaint to Atty. de Castro, and told the latter that the
summons and complaint were received by the appellants on May 30,
1966. It is further claimed by appellants that this information given by
Atty. Chavez - that the summons and complaint were received by the
appellants on May 30, 1966 - was the mistake that caused the delay
of the filing of the answer. But it should be noted that on June 10,
1966 when Atty. Chavez endorsed the complaint to Atty. de Castro
and informed the latter that the summons and complaint were
received by the appellants on May 30, 1966, the period within which
the answer should be filed had already expired - the expiry date
being June 3, 1966. There is no showing that between May 30, when
Atty. Chavez received the summons and complaint from the
employee of Lily Lim Tan, and June 3, 1973 Atty. Chavez was
incapacitated to file the answer. And so it is clear that before the
case was endorsed to Atty. de Castro, the appellants were already in
default. The failure to file the answer on time may well be attributed
to the mistake or "negligence of Atty. Chavez. The appellants are
bound by the mistakes, and may suffer by the negligence, of their
lawyer. In fact, on June 8, 1966, or two days before Atty. Chavez
endorsed the case to Atty. de Castro, the appellees had filed a
motion in court to declare the defendants (now the appellants) in
default. The moves taken by Atty. de Castro - in filing a motion for
extension of time to file an answer on June 10, 1966, and in finally
filing an answer on June 20, 1966 - were already
late.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The fact that Atty. Chavez committed suicide on June 17, 1966 does
not necessarily prove that he was abnormal, incompetent or insane
on May 30, 1966. Although there is a judicial declaration that a sane
man would not commit suicide, cognizance is nevertheless taken of
the fact that circumstances at some given time may impel a person
to commit suicide. 4 The probative value of suicide in determining the
sanity of a person is dependent on the factual situation in each case.
Such matters as the reasons for the act of self-destruction, the
circumstances indicating the person's state of mind at the time, and
other pertinent facts must be considered. The appellants had not
indicated to the trial court any circumstance from which the trial court
could form an opinion of the mental condition of Atty. Chavez before
he committed suicide. The trial court, therefore, did not err when it
did not favorably consider the claim of the appellant that their failure
to file their answer to the complaint was due to accident or mistake,
as contemplated in Section 3 of Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
3. In support of the third assignment of error, appellants argue
that acting on the wrong information given by Atty. Chavez, Atty.
Romulo de Castro filed on June 10, 1966 a motion for an extension
of 20 days within which to file an answer and that he did file the
answer with good, valid and meritorious defenses on June 20, 1966;
that on June 27, 1966 when appellees were allowed to present their
evidence ex-parte, the motion for extension of time and the answer
already formed part of the records of the case; that inasmuch as the
late filing of the answer was due to accident and mistake, and
appellants had good, valid, and meritorious defenses, the motion to
lift the order of default and for new trial should have been favorably
considered by the court. 5chanrobles virtual law library
Let it be noted that the lower court rendered its decision on July 1,
1966, and the appellees received notice of said decision on August
23, 1966. The decision would have become final on September 22,
1966. On September 21, 1966 the appellants filed their motion to lift
the order of default and for new trial. The motion of the appellants
therefore, was in the nature of a motion for a new trial based on
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence under paragraph
(a) of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 2 of
said Rule 37 the moving party must show that he has a meritorious
defense. The facts constituting the movant's good and substantial
defense, which he may prove if the petition were granted, must be
shown in the affidavit which should accompany the motion for a new
trial. 6 In the instant case, the motion to lift the order of default and
for new trial as well as the affidavit of merits accompanying the
motion did not contain clear statements of the facts constituting a
good and valid defense which the appellants might prove if they were
given a chance to introduce evidence. The allegations in the motion
that defendants have good and valid defenses, namely: that the
accident which gave rise to the case was force majeure; that
defendant Ernesto Labsan is absolutely without fault in the accident
that gave rise to the case; and that defendant Lily Lim Tan has
exercised due diligence required of a good father of a family to
prevent damage 7, are mere conclusions which did not provide the
court with any basis for determining the nature and merit of the
probable defense. An affidavit of merit should state facts, and not
mere opinion or conclusions of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Hence the trial court correctly denied the motion to set aside order of
default and for new trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
We must, however, point out a flaw in the decision of the lower court.
It is stated in the decision appealed from that the driver, Ernesto
Labsan, was primarily liable for the payment of damages adjudged
therein, and the appellant Lily Lim Tan, being the owner and operator
of the gasoline tanker that figured in the accident, is subsidiarily
liable, that is, liable only in case Ernesto Labsan was not able to pay.
This is not correct. The action in the instant case was brought not to
demand civil liability arising from a crime. The complaint makes no
mention of a crime having been committed, much less of the driver
Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of a crime. But there is an
allegation in the complaint that Ernesto Labsan was the authorized
driver of the truck that figured in the accident, which truck was
operated by appellant Lily Lim Tan in connection with her gasoline
business. The prayer in the complaint, furthermore, sought to hold
appellants jointly and solidarily liable for damages. The instant
action, therefore, was based, as the complaint shows, on quasi
delict. 8 Under Article 218 of the Civil Code, which treats of quasi
delicts, the liability of the owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary and
direct, not subsidiary. 9 The employer, however, can demand from
his employee reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his
liability. 10 The employer, appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held
primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in
the decision of the lower court. This is, of course, without prejudice to
the right of appellant Lily Lim Tan to demand from her co-appellant
Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the damages that she would have
to pay to appellees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, dated July 1, 1966, as modified in accordance with the
observations We made in the preceding paragraph, and the order,
dated October 10, 1966, denying appellants' motion for the lifting of
the order of default and for new trial, in Civil Case No. 1732, are
affirmed. Costs against defendants-
appellees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is so ordered.
G.R. Nos. L-21477-81 April 29, 1966
FRANCISCA VILUAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PATRICIO HUFANA and GREGORIO
HUFANA, respondents.
Jose A. Solomon, for petitioner.
Lourdes M. Garcia, for respondents.
REGALA, J.:
Seven persons were killed and thirteen others were injured in
Bangar, La Union, on February 16, 1958, when a passenger bus on
which they were riding caught fire after hitting a post and crashing
against a tree. The bus, owned by petitioner and driven by
Hermenegildo Aquino, came from San Fernando, La Union and was
on its way to Candon, Ilocos Sur.
It appears that, as the bus neared the gate of the Gabaldon school
building in the municipality of Bangar, another passenger bus owned
by Patricio Hufana and driven by Gregorio Hufana tried to overtake it
but that instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of his bus
and raced with the overtaking bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a
result of which it hit a post, crashed against a tree and then burst into
flames.
Among those who perished were Timoteo Mapanao, Francisca
Lacsamana, Narcisa Mendoza and Gregorio Sibayan, whose heirs
sued petitioner and the latter's driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, for
damages for breach of contract of carriage. Carolina Sabado, one of
those injured, also sued petitioner and the driver for damages. The
complaints were filed in the Court of First Instance of La Union.
In their answer, petitioner and her driver blamed respondent
Gregorio Hufana for the accident. With leave of court, they filed third
party complaints against Hufana and the latter's employer, Patricio
Hufana.
After trial, the court found that the accident was due to the concurrent
negligence of the drivers of the two buses and held both, together
with their respective employers, jointly and severally liable for
damages.
The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered,
declaring the plaintiff's entitled to damages to be paid jointly and
severally by the defendants and third-party defendants as follows:
(1) For plaintiff Juliana C. Vda. de Mapanao for the death of her son
Timoteo Mapanao, the sum of P5,000.00 for actual damages,
P1,000.00 as moral damages and P250.00 as attorney's fees;
(2) For plaintiff Leon Lacsamana for the death of his daughter
Francisca Lacsamana, the sum of P4,000.00 as actual damages,
P1,000.00 as moral damages and P250.00 as attorney's fees;
(3) For plaintiffs Juan Mendoza and Magdalena Mendoza for the
death of their mother Narcisa Mendoza, the sum of P4,000.00 for
actual damages, P1,000.00 for moral damages and P250.00 as
attorney's fees;
(4) For plaintiffs Agustina Sabado, Quintin Sibayan, Julita Sibayan,
Primitivo Sibayan and Avelina Sibayan, the sum of P4,000.00 for
actual damages, P1,500.00 for moral damages and P250.00 as
attorney's fees;
(5) For the injured passenger Carolina Sabado, P649.00 for actual
damages, P1,000.00 for moral damages and P250.00 for attorney's
fees.
All such amounts awarded as damages shall bear interest at the
legal rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from the date of this
decision until the same shall have been duly paid in full.
Defendants and third-party defendants are further ordered to pay
proportionate costs."
Both petitioner and her driver and the respondents herein appealed
to the Court of Appeals. While affirming the finding that the accident
was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of both the
Viluan and the Hufana buses, the Court of Appeals differed with the
trial court in the assessment of liabilities of the parties. In its view
only petitioner Francisca Viluan, as operator of the bus, is liable for
breach of contract of carriage. The driver, Hermenegildo Aquino,
cannot be made jointly and severally liable with petitioner because
he is merely the latter's employee and is in no way a party to the
contract of carriage. The court added, however —
Hermenegildo Aquino is not entirely free from liability. He may be
held liable, criminally and civilly, under the Revised Penal Code
(Articles 100 and 103), but not in a civil suit for damages predicated
upon a breach of contract, such as this one (Aguas, et al. vs. Vargas,
et al., CA-G.R. No. 27161-R, Jan. 22, 1963). Furthermore, the
common carrier, Francisca Viluan could recover from Aquino any
damages that she might have suffered by reason of the latter's
negligence.
Neither may respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana be
held liable in the opinion of the appellate court because the plaintiffs
did not amend complaints in the main action so as to assert a claim
against the respondents as third party defendants.
The appellate court likewise disallowed the award of moral damages
for P1,000.00 to Carolina Sabado, there being no showing that the
common carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith in the performance of
her obligation. Accordingly, it rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we hereby find defendant-
appellant Francisca Viluan solely liable to the plaintiffs-appellees for
the damages and attorney's fees awarded to them by the court below
and further declare null and void the lower court's award of moral
damages in the amount of P1,000.00 in favor of plaintiff Carolina
Sabado. Thus modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all
other respects, with costs in this instance against defendant-
appellant Francisca Viluan.
From this judgment petitioner brought this appeal. In brief, her
position is that since the proximate cause of the accident was found
to be the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the two buses, then
she and respondent Patricio and Gregorio Hufana should have been
held equally liable to the plaintiffs in the damage suits. The fact that
the respondents were not sued as principal defendants but were
brought into the cases as third party defendants should not preclude
a finding of their liability.
We agree with petitioner's contention. To begin with, the Court of
Appeals' ruling is based on section 5 of Rule 12 of the former Rules
of Court, 1 which was adopted from Rule 14-a of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. While the latter provision has indeed been held to
preclude a judgment in favor of a plaintiff and against a third party
defendant where the plaintiff has not amended his complaint to
assert a claim against a third party defendant, 2 yet, as held in
subsequent decisions, this rule applies only to cases where the third
party defendant is brought in on an allegation of liability to the
defendants. The rule does not apply where a third-party defendant is
impleaded on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiffs, in which
case no amendment of the plaintiffs complaint is necessary. 3 As
explained in the Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. vs. U. S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 52 F. Supp. 177 (1943):
From the sources of Rule 14 and the decisions herein cited, it is clear
that this rule, like the admiralty rule, "covers two distinct subjects, the
addition of parties defendant to the main cause of action, and the
bringing in of a third party for a defendant's remedy over." x x x
If the third party complaint alleges facts showing a third party's direct
liability to plaintiff on the claim set out in plaintiff's petition, then third
party "shall" make his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his
counterclaims against plaintiff as provided in Rule 13. In the case of
alleged direct liability, no amendment is necessary or required. The
subject-matter of the claim is contained in plaintiff's complaint, the
ground of third party's liability on that claim is alleged in third party
complaint, and third party's defense to set up in his an to plaintiff's
complaint. At that point and without amendment, the plaintiff and
third party are at issue as to their rights respecting the claim.
The provision in the rule that, "The third-party defendant may assert
any defenses which the third-party plaintiff may assert to the
plaintiff's claim," applies to the other subject, namely, the alleged
liability of third party defendant. The next sentence in the rule, "The
third-party defendant is bound by the adjudication of the third party
plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff, as well as of his own to the plaintiff or
to the third-party plaintiff," applies to both subjects. If third party is
brought in as liable only to defendant and judgment is rendered
adjudicating plaintiff's right to recover against defendant and
defendant's rights to recover against third party, he is bound by both
adjudications. That part of the sentence refers to the second subject.
If third party is brought in as liable to plaintiff, then third party is
bound by the adjudication as between him and plaintiff. That refers to
the first subject. If third party is brought in as liable to plaintiff and
also over to defendant, then third party is bound by both
adjudications. The next sentence in the rule, "The plaintiff may
amend his pleadings to assert against the third-party defendant any
claim which the plaintiff might have asserted against the third-party
defendant had he been joined originally as a defendant," refers to the
second subject, that is, to bringing in third party as liable to
defendant only, and does not apply to the alleged liability of third
party directly to plaintiff."
In this case the third-party complaints filed by petitioner and her
driver charged respondents with direct liability to the plaintiffs. It was
contended that the accident was due "to the fault, negligence,
carelessness and imprudence of the third party defendant Gregorio
Hufana" and, in petitioner's motion for leave to file a third party
complaint, it was stated that "Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana
were not made parties to this action, although the defendants are
entitled to indemnity and/or subrogation against them in respect of
plaintiff's claim."

It should make no difference therefore whether the respondents were

brought in as principal defendants or as third-party defendants. As
Chief Justice Moran points out, since the liability of the third-party
defendant is already asserted in the third-party complaint, the
amendment of the complaint to assert such liability is merely a matter
of form, to insist on which would not be in keeping with the liberal
spirit of the Rules of Court. 4

Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner

springs from contract while that of respondents arises from quasi-
delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez,
56 Phil. 177,5 that in case of injury to a passenger due to the
negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the
driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two
vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some members
of the Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances
they are liable on quasi-delict.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in the

sense that petitioner as well as respondents Patricio Hufana and
Gregorio Hufana are jointly and severally liable for the damages
awarded by the trial court. The disallowance of moral damages in the
amount of P1,000.00 is correct and should be affirmed. No costs.