PLDT VS.

NLRC

TOPIC: Social Justice- not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is

committed by the underprivileged

“…separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in

those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other
than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character”

FACTS: Marilyn Abucay has been an employee of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT) for ten years when it was discovered that she accepted
“bribes” from certain customers in order to facilitate the phone connections of said
customers. PLDT terminated her employment. A labor case was filed by Abucay. The
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) found the dismissal to be valid but
nevertheless, the NLRC ordered PLDT to pay Abucay separation pay equivalent to one
month pay for every year of service.
PLDT assailed the said decision. PLDT averred that separation pay is only available in
cases where the employee has been illegally dismissed and reinstatement is no longer
possible. PLDT further argued that to award Abucay separation pay is tantamount to
rewarding her misdeeds.
The Solicitor General, arguing for the NLRC, cited numerous previous cases where
separation pay has been awarded by the Supreme Court even if the employee’s dismissal
were due to just and authorized causes.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abucay is entitled to separation pay.
HELD: No. In this case, the Supreme Court finally set the rules as to when
separation pay is proper in cases where the employee is dismissed for valid reasons.
As a rule, and under the Labor Code, a person dismissed for just and authorized causes is
not entitled to separation pay. However, based on equity, an exception can be made if the
employee is dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his
moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual
intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a
fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation
pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social
justice.
In the case at bar, the reason for Abucay’s dismissal is due to her acceptance of a “bribe”
which is dishonesty and is immoral. The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more
than a decade, if it is to be considered at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a
regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened instead of betraying during all
of her 10 years of service with the company. The court also made a pronouncement:

Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only
when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice
cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an
impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do
so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because
they happen to be poor.
ESPINA VS. ZAMORA

TOPIC: Economy

Sections 9, 19, and 20 are not self-executing provisions, thus, not judicially
demandable.

FACTS: The case deals with question of constitutionality of RA 8762 “Retail Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000”, signed by President Erap Estrada on March 07, 2000.

RA 8762 expressly repealed RA 1180 which absolutely prohibits foreign

nationals from engaging in retail business in the Philippines. RA 8762 allows the said foreign
trade placing them under 4 categories. The petitioners filed a case challenging the
constitutionality of RA 8762 as it is a clear violation of Section 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the
Constitution. The presence of foreign nationals would result in alien control and monopoly of
retail trade.

The respondents contended that the Constitution mandates the mere regulation
but not the prohibition of foreign investments in the country.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8762 is unconstitutional

HELD: No, RA 8762 is not unconstitutional.

Section 9, 19, and 20 of Article II are not self-executing by nature, thus, are not
judicially demandable. The said sections highlight the necessity of having a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs. However, the
objective of the provisions is to simply prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our
economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
With the assailed provision, Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kind of retail
business which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.

The Legislative acknowledges that indeed it is integral to primarily promote the

welfare of Filipino investors as mandated by the Constitution. Nonetheless, it is equally
important that holistic economic growth must be assured for the overall development of our
country’s trade industry. This can be done by allowing entry of foreign investors that will be
allowed to engage in business regulated by the provisions of RA 8762.
NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE

TOPIC: Separation of Powers

FACTS:

- Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land
Registration. By the terms of section 2 of RA 1151, the said Commissioner is declared
"entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the
Court of First Instance."

- On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee asked Noblejas to explain in writing why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for "approving or recommending approval of
subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess
of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered that, as he enjoyed the rank,
privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could
only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First
Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme
Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and
Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

- On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary,
"by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists
against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was
"hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."

- On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his
letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and
praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that
petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the
petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act
and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public
officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the
judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of
powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated
by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws
of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

HELD: It is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land
Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary.

Petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by
implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or
removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed
by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the
same privileges.
 Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor
General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the
Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the
Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the
process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

Such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it
granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. Where the
legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First
Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal
language.

If the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or
"rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the
Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court,
then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental
doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of
supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of
the Chief Executive over such officials.

Decision: Writs denied, petition dismissed