I.
Warrantless Arrest The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
A. When allowed?
1.) Consent or waiver
i. People vs. Omaweng
The appellants are now precluded from assailing the warrantless
search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by
their actuation during the search and seizure. The appellants never
protested when SPO3 Jesus Faller, after identifying himself as a police
officer, opened the tin can loaded in the appellants' vehicle and found
eight (8) bundles. 25 And when Faller opened one of the bundles, it
smelled of marijuana. 26 The NBI later confirmed the eight (8) bundles
to be positive for marijuana. 27 Again, the appellants did not raise any
protest when they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle,
were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent
prosecution. We have ruled in a long line of cases 28 that:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made
on his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining
thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631).
The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right,
be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
The appellants effectively waived their constitutional right against the
search and seizure in question by their voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty
upon arraignment and by participating in the trial.
ii. Veroy vs. Layague
Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had
permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their
residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the
presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not
include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside
the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal
search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they are
inadmissible in evidence against them.
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution).
However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a
valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized
exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a
search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view
(People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA
122]).
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for
searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being
used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While
Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the
house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were
not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a
search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but
rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same.
Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house
but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the
circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time
to procure a search warrant but did not.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, (Guazon v. De
Villa, supra.; People v. Aminnudin, G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1988
[163 SCRA 402]; Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987 [151
SCRA 279]), warrantless searches were declared illegal because the
officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a
search Warrant. The objects seized, being products of illegal
searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions
subsequently instituted against the accused-appellants (People v.
Cendana, G.R. No. 84715, October 17, 1990 [190 SCRA 538]).
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum
prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects
of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because
they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the
rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the
articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected
1
by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence
against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal
possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690
[1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant,
still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there
must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or
voluntariness there is no crime.
iii. People vs. Damaso
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the
person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized
to do so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695).
In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house
at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper,
allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). We
Find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was
indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper,
that the appellant had given her authority to open his house in his
absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco
has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion
into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality.
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare,
still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing
the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230,
235). As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was
illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded
urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a
search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they
came to the house of the appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records),
does not grant them the license to go inside his house.
2. Search incidental to lawful arrest
i. People vs. Kalubiran
The accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of
the entrapment and so came under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, authorizing a warrantless arrest of any person actually
committing a crime. The search was made as an incident of a lawful
arrest and so was also lawful under Section 12 of Rule 116. In addition
to the aforecited Rules, there is abundant jurisprudence justifying
warrantless searches and seizures under the conditions established
in this case.
ii. Espano vs. CA
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable
searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense.11 It may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and
Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under
the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The
warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten
cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police
officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover,
it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
2
 iii. People vs. Tangliben
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant
is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at
the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the
exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and
is consequently valid.
3. Moving Vehicle
i. People vs. Mago
In this case, an information was received to the effect that a certain
shipment of personal effects, allegedly declared mis-declared and
undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs
zone of the port of Manila. Hence, on the following day on the
expected arrival of the trucks, the goods were seized without a
warrant. The court ruled that but even if there was a search, there is
still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed
under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Thus, it has been held that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between
a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship,
motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.
ii. Asuncion vs. CA
Well-entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and
seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent
judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the
fundamental law of the land8 ordains it.
However, the rule that search and seizure must be supported by a
valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving vehicle is one of
the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that
no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of
probable cause.9
The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the fact
that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle —
petitioner's vehicle was "flagged down" by the apprehending officers
upon identification. Therefore, the police authorities were justified in
searching the petitioner's automobile without a warrant since the
situation demanded immediate action.
The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to
search the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu
was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search and the
petitioner himself freely gave his consent to said search, the prohibited
drugs found as a result were admissible in evidence.
3
4. Emergency Circumstances
i. People vs. De Gracia
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales
Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. 15 The raid
was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was
being used as headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was
a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance
team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.
When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof
refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby
compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales
Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or
arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered
firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably
explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that
time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of
the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack
by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that
the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives,
taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their
action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from
the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5,
1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could
lawfully be dispensed with.
5. Airport/Seaport search
i. Saluday vs. People (IMPORTANT)
In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force
Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus
No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation
where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further,
SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally
intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and
physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where
passengers may further be required to open their bags and luggages.
Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding the
necessity for a warrant.
As regards the warrantless inspection of petitioner's bag, the OSG
argues that petitioner consented to the search) thereby making the
seized items admissible in evidence.43 Petitioner contends otherwise
and insists that his failure to object cannot be construed as an implied
waiver.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right, which may be waived. 44 However, to
be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.45 Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given:
a. the age of the consenting party;
b. whether he or she was in a public or secluded
location;
c. whether he or she objected to the search or passively
looked on;
d. his or her education and intelligence;
e. the presence of coercive police procedures;
f. the belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found;
g. the nature of the police questioning;
4
 h. the environment in which the questioning took place;
and
i. the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.
Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court lays down the
following guidelines.
Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be
subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport security
protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines
can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In
lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required instead to
open their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection must
be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object,
he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.
While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or
the security personnel of the bus owner in the following three
instances.
First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband
or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be
stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or
her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land
upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles
carried by a passenger onboard.
Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective
passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected
to the same routine inspection by government agents or private
security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the
terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and
pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these
passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal.
Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or police
checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine
inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggages.
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects
prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while
in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as
a valid reasonable search.
First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and
must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched,
minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public
embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule.
Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive
such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In
all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons
with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be
protected.
Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring
public safety.
Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts
must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to
ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of
others may be put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court
takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminals,
just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.
Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly
accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise
covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these
guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself
while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the
intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional
guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned
cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for
private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired
by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can
5
no longer be flagged down by any other person unti1 the
passengers on board alight from the vehicle.
B. Incidents that mat led to warrantless arrest
1. Plain View
i. People vs. Musa
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's
lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control.40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object.45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following
limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course
of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.46
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain
view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object
where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the
"plain view" of the object.47 Stated differently, it must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person
searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money
which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole
house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was,
therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant
as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one
portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag.
Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk
to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw
the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to
room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.
ii. Padilla vs. CA
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears
that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and
ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it
is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which
is concealed. 51 The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an
M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of
the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively,
when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same
justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which
was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual
glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the
driver's seat. 52 Thus it has been held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal
offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal
offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the
guilty person and the taking of the, corpus delicti. 53
6
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found
in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant. 54
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted
magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the
police. 55 This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right
against the alleged search and seizure 56, and that his failure to quash
the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. 57
iii. People vs. Pasudag
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required
before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the person, house,
papers or effects of any individual.22 The Constitution provides that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." 23 Any evidence
obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible.24
In the case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to
secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired
as to who owned the house.25 He was acquainted with marijuana
plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the backyard
of the house were marijuana plants.26 Time was not of the essence to
uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three months old 27 and
there was no sufficient reason to believe that they would be uprooteds
on that same day.
iv. People vs. Valdez
The search and seizure conducted without the requisite judicial
warrant is illegal and void ab initio. The prosecution's evidence clearly
established that the police conducted a search of accused's backyard
garden without a warrant; they had sufficient time to obtain a search
warrant; they failed to secure one. There was no showing of urgency
or necessity for the warrantless search, or the immediate seizure of
the marijuana plants.
v. People vs Compacion
As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
without a warrant.34 It is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.35 Thus, the
following elements must be present before the doctrine may be
applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of
evidence without further search.36
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into
accused-appellant's premises without the latter's consent. It is
undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the
residence of accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that
he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came
in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his
premises on July 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence
against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant
but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents,
therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants inadvertently
when they conducted a surveillance and barged into accused-
appellant's residence.
It was not even apparent to the members of the composite team
whether the plants involved herein were indeed marijuana plants. After
said plants were uprooted, SPO1 Linda had to conduct a field test on
said plants by using a Narcotics Drug Identification Kit to determine if
the same were indeed marijuana plants.38 Later, Senior Inspector
Villavicencio, a forensic chemist, had to conduct three (3) qualitative
examinations to determine if the plants were indeed marijuana.39
Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of an unreasonable
search and seizure, the same is tainted and illegal and should
therefore be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
7
2. Checkpoint (visual search vs. extensive search)
i. Caballes vs. CA
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down
because the police officers who were on routine patrol became
suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered
with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon.
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any
confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying
stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained
their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure.
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search"
without warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been
declared to be not illegal per se,21 for as long as it is warranted by the
exigencies of public order22 and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists.23 A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it
may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's
right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally
permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1)
where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds;24 (2) simply looks into a
vehicle;25 (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's
doors;26 (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search;27 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a
visual search or visual inspection;28 and (6) where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area.
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar.
The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual
inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the
vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they
were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple
routine check.
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable
or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.31
ii. People vs. Libano
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable
cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting
surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance
yielded the information that once a month, appellant and her co-
accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of
October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be
transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were
intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a
suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in
bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was,
both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless
search and seizure of appellant’s bag was not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was
committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or
transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A.
No. 6425.
3. Stop and Frisk
i. Terry vs. Ohio
In this case, two men repeatedly walked past a store window and
returned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a third man.
This aroused the suspicion of a police officer. To the experienced
officer, the behaviour of the men indicated that they were sizing up the
store for an armed robbery. When the police officer approached the
men and asked them for their names, they mumbled a reply.
8
Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around and
frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to
the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution for the
offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search
and seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court held that
"a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable
for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime
to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine
his identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more
information.
ii. Posadas vs. CA
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at
military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar,
there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a
probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner
acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there
was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal
in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to
inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in
the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a
search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be
useless, futile and much too late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the
exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been
violated.
II. Drug, Alcohol and Blood tests
Note: In relation to election – May be allows in Local Government, as
the qualifications are provided by the congress. However, it is not
allowed under National Government, as the qualifications are
specifically provided in the Constitution.
i. SJS vs Dangerous Drug Board
The court held that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
The court also stated that it is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.
The right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.
In relation to the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the
waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to
the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the
parental authority of school authorities.
Schools may also refuse admission to students who refuse to undergo
certain conditions for their enrollment, and one of which can be a
random drug testing.
A random drug testing of students in schools is not only acceptable
but may even be necessary in the safety and interest of the student
population.
In applying the reasonableness test, the act of the school in
implementing an administrative search in the form of a random drug
testing is a swift and informal disciplinary procedure. It does not need
probable cause to issue a random drug testing.
Therefore, schools are allowed to conduct random drug testing as
outlined in their school policy, provided that the measures taken are
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reasonable, fair and ensures to protect the well-being of students who
take the drug testing.

ii. Lucas vs Lucas

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a
court may order a compulsory blood test.

We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may
issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the
action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing.

Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.

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Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a
DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court
may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the
DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to
establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be
corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

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