REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 87
ROSARIO, BATANGAS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Criminal Case No. 2015- 1780

to 1783
Plaintiff,

-versus-

RANDY CAIGA y BAGON,

Accused.

X------------------------------------------------X

MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT NOs. 602(15) and 603 (15)

AND TO SUPPRESS ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE

ACCUSED, by the undersigned counsel, most respectfully moves to

quash Search Warrant Nos. 602(15) and 603(15) for lack of legal basis and to
suppress illegally seized evidence, and further avers THAT:

PREFATORY STATEMENT

So jealously guarded is the fundamental dictum that search

and seizure must be done through a valid and enforceable judicial
warrant, otherwise they become unreasonable and susceptible to
challenge that search and seizure warrant. Commenting on the
importance of upholding such inviolable right, the Supreme Court
in the case of People vs. Argawanon1, solicitously held:

“This constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton

and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen
as to his persons, papers and effects. The right of a person to be
secured against unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one.
A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must be
strictly construed. We cannot liberally consider arrests or
seizures without warrant or extent their application beyond the
cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do so would

1
215 SCRA 652

1
 infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often
violated and yet, so deserving full protection and vindication”.

For a search and seizure to be reasonable, the same must be

effected by a means of a valid search warrant. In a long line of
decisions, the Supreme Court declared invalid search warrants
issued in utter disregard of the aforementioned constitutional
injunction. 2

Specifically observing the dangers borne by permutation of

applying for search warrants in a court less conspicuous and far
removed from the territory where the alleged offense was
committed, or where articles sought to be seized are found, Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in his dissent in the case of Malaloan
vs. Court of Appeals3, prophetically stated:

“The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a

court from issuing a search warrant in connection with a crime
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction should not be
construed as a grant of blanket authority to any court of justice
in the country to issue a search warrant in connection with a
crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority
view suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-
Tawi, Basilan or Batanes can validly entertain an application
for a search warrant and issue one in connection with a crime
committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all courts in the
Philippines, including the municipal trial courts, can validly issue
a search warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere
in the Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the
Philippines have, for purposes of issuing a search warrant,
jurisdiction over the entire archipelago.

I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search

warrant is but an incident to a main case and involves the
exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction therefore, the authority to
issue it must necessarily be co-extensive with court’s territorial
jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an exception to
the statutory provisions defining territorial jurisdiction of the
various courts of the country, which would amount to judicial
legislation.”

What hitherto had been a voice raised in dissent is now a

core principle of the present rules on search and seizure,
particularly with respect to the proper courts where applications for
search warrant should be filed. A perfunctory review of the rules
thus promulgated would have prevented the erroneous issuance of
the contested search warrants here.
2
Lim vs. Ponce De Leon, 66 SCRA 301 (1975)
3
GR No. 104897, 06 May 1994 232 SCRA 249, 256

2
 Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees the right of persons to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and search warrants constitute a limitation on
this right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be construed strictly against state authorities who
would be enforcing the said warrants. 4

The instant case has brought to bear a gross and shameless

fishing expedition against the accused, whose right to be secured in
his property was unabashedly trampled upon on the juvenile
strength of an improperly issued search warrant.

It is in light of procedural rules anchored on well settled

constitutional pronouncements that accused moves for the quashal
of the subject search warrant in this case.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On June 26, 2015, the elements of the Philippine National Police of Padre
Garcia, Batangas, led by PO3 Celester Diola Delgado applied for, and was
subsequently issued Search Warrant Nos. 602(15) and 603 (15), by Honorable
Judge Agripino G. Morga, Executive Judge of Branches 29-32, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Laguna, to be implemented in the residence
of above-named ACCUSED, RANDY CAIGA y BAGON, located in
Barangay Sabang, Ibaan, Batangas, for an alleged violation of Republic Act
10591 (SW 602 (15) and Violation of Republic Act 9165 (SW 603(15) as follows:

“It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned that after examining

under oath by searching questions and answers upon witness, there exists a
probable cause for violation of RA 10591 which has been committed and there
is a good sufficient reason to believe that RANDY CAIGA y BAGON
has possession and control of the following: Caliber 5.56 mm (M16 Rifle),
Caliber .45 Pistol, Caliber 9 mm Pistol, Caliber 38 Revolver, Shotgun and
ammunitions, which he is keeping and concealing in his house at Brgy.
Sabang, Ibaan, Batangas xxx (Emphases supplied)

“It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned that after examining

under oath by searching questions and answers upon witness, there exists a
probable cause for violation of RA 10591 which has been committed and there
is a good sufficient reason to believe that RANDY CAIGA y BAGON
has possession and control of the following: undetermined volume/quantity of
metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia in using/sniffing
shabu, which he is keeping and concealing in his house at Brgy. Sabang,
Ibaan, Batangas xxx (Emphases supplied)

4
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and Petron Corporation vs. Romars International Gases
Corporation Gr No. 189669, February 26, 2015

3
 In the morning of 27 June 2015, the above search warrants were
implemented which resulted in the confiscation of the following, as stated in the
subsequent Informations filed against herein ACCUSED, dated 7 July 2015:

Criminal Case No. 2015-780

Xxxxx one (1) opaque container labeled Johnsons

Baby powder referred to as Specimen “A” (RBC-22),
one (1) self sealing transparent plastic sachet referred
to as Specimen “B” (RBC-23) each containing dried
marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 5.00
grams, two (2) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets
referred to as Specimens “D-1” and “D-2” ( RBC-35
and RBC-36) each containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride commonly known as shabu having a
total weight of 1.12 grams. xxxxxxxx

Criminal Case No. 2015-1781

Xxxx one (1) improvised water pipe referred to as

Specimen “C” (RBC-24 containing traces of white
crystalline substance xxxx

Criminal Case No. 2015-1782

Xxxxxxx one (1) caliber .38 revolver (Smith and

Wesson) without serial number loaded with Six (6)
rounds of live ammunition, ten (10) rounds of live
ammunition for caliber .38, one (1) live ammunition
for caliber 5.56, one (1) live ammunition for caliber
.22, one (1) live ammunition for 12 Gauge shotgun
and an improvised 12 Guage Shotgun (sumpak);

Criminal Case No. 2015-1783

Xxxxxx one (1) hand grenade xxx

ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT SEARCH WARRANT NOs. 602 (15) and

603(15) ISSUED BY HON. JUDGE AGRIPINO MORGA,
EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

4
 BRANCHES 29-32 OF SAN PABLO CITY, LAGUNA IS
WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE ITEMS CONFISCATED BY

VIRTUE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEARCH
WARRANT Nos. 602 (15) and 603 (15) BE SUPPRESED FOR
BEING ILLEGALLY SEIZED

ARGUMENTS/ DISCUSSIONS

The RTC Branches 29-32 of San

Pablo City, Laguna has no territorial
jurisdiction over the place where the
alleged crime was committed

According to Sec. 2, Rule 126, Rules on Criminal

Procedure, “an application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following:

a. Any court within whose territorial

jurisdiction a crime was committed; (Emphases
supplied)

In the present case, the search warrant was obtained from

the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna, which clearly
does not have jurisdiction over Sabang, Ibaan, Batangas, where
ACCUSED resides, and where the violation of RA 9165 was
allegedly committed. Thus, the issuance of the subject search
warrant was clearly in violation of the above-mentioned rule which
provides that a search warrant should first be obtained from any
court which has territorial jurisdiction over the crime.

The aforecited rule vests in court where the criminal action

is pending exclusive and primary jurisdiction to resolve applications
for the issuance of search warrants. This conforms with the
principle that where the court acquires jurisdiction over a particular
case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including the
issuance of ancillary writs and processes.

Perusing the face of the contested search warrant, the

offenses hurled against the accused were allegedly committed in
Sabang, Ibaan, Batangas. The place of the commission of the
offense being Sabang, Ibaan, Batangas, the RTC Branch 29-32
clearly has no jurisdiction to entertain any application for, much
less issue, the Search Warrant.

5
There are no compelling reasons to warrant
deviation from the Rule

The same Rule however, provides another venue where such

search warrant may be validly obtained, in that:

“b. For compelling reasons stated in the

application, any court within the judicial region where the
crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime
is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.” xxx

By way of exception, an application for search warrant may

be filed with another court within the judicial region, but only for
extreme and compelling reasons which the applicant should prove
to the satisfaction of that court.

As aforementioned, the application for a search warrant may

be filed in a court other than the court having territorial jurisdiction
over the place where the crime was committed, only if the applicant
can show compelling reasons therefor. Such compelling reason
must be stated in the application and must be of such nature as to
make it extremely necessary to depart from the established
jurisdictional rule.

Thus, the application must advance reasons of such grave

importance that would compel a judge, free from biases and
preconceptions, to apply the exception, rather than the general rule,
namely that for a particular case only, the application may be filed
in the court not having primary jurisdiction.

It becomes all too clear here that no extreme and compelling

reason whatsoever had been advanced by the applicant and his
witness that would justify the filing of the application with RTC
Branches 29-32 of San Pablo City, Laguna.

The application of the search warrant in the said court

merely parroted the very ethereal proposition that filing the same
with the proper court would lead to a “frustration of justice.” How
the filing of the application with the proper court, in this case would
be Rosario Municipal Trial Court or RTC Branch 87, Rosario,
Batangas, will lead to a frustration of justice, is so difficult to
fathom that all is left to clairvoyance of the Executive Judge issuing
the Search warrants. This, is to accused’s mind, is sorely insufficient
to justify a deviation from the established rule.

Thus, with all due respect, in the absence of any extreme and
compelling reason, the issuance of a search warrant by a court not

6
 having exclusive and primary jurisdiction is unjustifiable and
arbitrary, therefor invalid.

It is therefore clear from the foregoing underscored Rule, that the present
case does not fall within the ambit thereof, for the following reasons:

(1) The applications for search warrant for violation of RA

10591and RA 9165, dated 23 June 2015, signed by PO3 Celester
Delgado, copy of which are hereto attached as ANNEX “1” and
“2”, simply states that:

“xxx the compelling why this application for Search Warrant

is being applied to this Honorable Court is that there is an
information that subject person has a relative working in the
government. Likewise, he has connection to elected local officials
on our municipality.xxxxx

A cursory perusal of the foregoing statement, does not

necessarily categorize such reasoning as a valid compelling
reason, as contemplated by the foregoing rules, which warrants
the PNP elements of the Municipality of Ibaan, Batangas, to
obtain the subject search warrant from the Regional Trial Court
of San Pablo City, Laguna, which does not have territorial
jurisdiction over Barangay Sabang, Ibaan, Batangas, where the
crime was allegedly committed; and

(2) Neither does the following reasoning provided by the same PNP
elements of Ibaan, Batangas during the hearing for the
application of the subject warrant, constitute a valid compelling
reason as provided by law:

“Court: xxx So bakit naman dito kayo nag-aapply ng

search warrant gaong pwde naming sa
husgado ng Batangas kayo mag-aaply, malapit
pa kayo?

A: Sir, kung sa Batangas po kasi kami mag-

aapply ng search warrant kung saan duon
din po nakatira an gaming subject ay
possible pong magkaleakage an gaming
apply Sir.” (Emphases supplied)

Court: At bakit mo nasabi yan, Sir?

Witness: Marami po kasi siyang kilala, Sir at ayon

din po sa aming ankalap na impormasyon,
itong aming subject ay may kamag-anak
na nagtatrabaho sa gobyerno at may
koneksyon din sa local authorities sa

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 kanilang bayan, Sir. At for confidentiality
purposes din po kaya minabuti naming dito na
mag-apply, Sir. (emphasis supplied)

(see page 2 & 3 of Transcript of Stenographic Notes,

attached hereto as ANNEX “3”)

If the same line of reasoning were to be

believed, then the rule that search warrants must first
be obtained from the court which has territorial
jurisdiction over the place where the crime was
committed as provided under Section 2 (a) of Rule
126 would have been easily obliterated, and the
procedure for obtaining search warrants would have
been easily subjected to arbitrary and whimsical
abuses.

The rule on search warrant admits an exception

in paragraph (b) of Section 2, Rule 126 by stating that
“for compelling reasons stated in the application
for search warrant, it may be filed with any Court
in the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced”. However, in the light of the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals 5,
the reason cited by the apprehending officers in their
application for search warrant cannot be considered
as compelling reason as contemplated in the Rules.
The compelling reason contemplated by the Rules to
justify the obtention of a Search warrant in a Court
having no territorial jurisdiction over the place of
commission of the crime refers to the consideration
of urgency, subject, time and place. Thus:

“This should not, however, mean that a Court whose

territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be
searched cannot issue a warrant therefore, where the
obtention is necessitated and justified by compelling
considerations of urgency, subject, time and place.
x x x (emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, in the case of Nestor Ilano vs.

Court of Appeals6 the Supreme Court stated again:
“we ruled that when necessitated and justified by
compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time
and place, a court may issue search warrant covering
a place outside its territorial jurisdiction.”

5
232 SCRA 249
6
GR No. 109560, May 26, 1995

8
 It is the belief of the Accused that the
application of the search warrant does not fall within
the exception provided for there being no showing
that there were any compelling reasons which would
justify the application and issuance of the search
warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction. Hence,
there was no justification for the application of the
search warrant before a court having no territorial
jurisdiction over the place to be searched, in this case,
the residence of the Accused in San Roque, Rosario,
Batangas.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the search warrant against the above-named accused

was OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF SAN PABLO,
LAGUNA, hence the same was obtained CONTRARY TO
LAW.

Search Warrant Nos. 602(15) and 603(15) are null and void
per se because its application was filed before, and its issuance were
caused by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29-32, San Pablo City,
Laguna sans any compelling reasons, a Court which has no
territorial jurisdiction over Sabang, Ibaan, Batangas where accused
was allegedly concealing and/or keeping the alleged unlicensed
firearms/shabu/paraphernalia. Consequently, the prohibited items
allegedly seized from the residence of the accused pursuant to the
search warrant cannot be used and admitted against him as stated
in Paragraph 2, Section 3 of Article II of the Constitution in relation
to Section 2 of said article which states that “any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding”.

Clearly, the items allegedly obtained by the searching and

apprehending officers pursuant thereto, are but “fruits of the
poisonous tree”, which are inadmissible in evidence and cannot
be made the basis of the filing of the instant case in Court.
Consequently, there is no evidence and corpus delicti to support
the prosecution’s claim that the accused illegally kept and had its
custody illegal items, there is no probable cause to hold the accused
for trial for violations of Section 11 and 12 of Republic Act No.
9165, Violation of Rep. Act No. 10591 and Violation of Section 3
of PD No. 1866 as amended by Rep. Act No. 8294 and Rep Act
No. 9516

As such, the pieces of evidence obtained by virtue of the

service of such search warrant ought to be suppressed and

9
 excluded from the records of the case for being illegally seized
and inadmissible in evidence. The Supreme Court, in the case of
People of the Philippines v. Arnel Alicando y Briones7, has
explained the doctrine of “the fruit of the poisonous tree”, to wit:

“We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our

jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known
as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United
States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown
to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
" fruit ") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally
seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally
seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the
principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to
gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints
all evidence subsequently obtained.”

Clearly, the search warrant was not lawfully obtained for

failing to observe the precepts set forth by law and decisions of the
Supreme Court. In lieu of the same, any evidence obtained from
the service of said search warrant would fall under the doctrine “the
fruit of the poisonous tree”, hence, should be SUPPRESSED AND
EXCLUDED from the records of the case.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused, through

counsel, hereby prays that the Search Warrant Nos. 602 (15) and
603 (15) issued by Honorable Judge Agripino G. Morga, Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court, San Pablo City, be QUASHED and
the items/objects seized under its purported authority which he is
keeping and concealing in his house located at the above
mentioned premises, be SUPPRESSED AND EXCLUDED
from evidence, for being illegally seized and thus, must be
considered inadmissible in evidence.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.

Rosario, Batangas, 29 August 2018.

7
G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995.

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 RON JAYSON M. GARCIA
Roll No. 61184
IBP No. 1065674/01-03-2018/Batangas
PTR No. 21580392/01-03-2018, Rosario, Batangas
MCLE V-0022359/06-16-2016/ Pasig City
2nd Flr. ABS&S Bldg. Carandang St.
Poblacion D, Rosario, Batangas
Email Address:patrongarcia@yahoo.com
Tel No. 043-740-4749

REQUEST and NOTICE OF HEARING

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor

Hall of Justice
Rosario, Batangas

The Clerk of Court

RTC – Branch 87
Rosario, Batangas

Greetings:

Please submit the foregoing motion for the kind consideration and
approval of the Honorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof without
further arguments.

RON JAYSON M. GARCIA

Copy furnished:

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor

Hall of Justice
Rosario, Batangas

11