 JURISDICTION

1. ECHEGARAY VS SECRETARY (301 SCRA 19)

2. SARMIENTO VS SARATAN 2/5/2007
3. PILAPIL VS HEIRS OF BRIONES 2/5/2007
4. TIJAM VS SIBONGHANOY 4/15/1968
5. LAPANDAY CASE 449 SCRA 240
6. RODRIGUEZ VS ALICPALA 6/25/1954
7. ADDITION HILLLS VS MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES AND HOLDIONGS INC 4/18/2012
8. SC ADMIN CIRCULAR 09-94 JUNE 14,1994
9. RUSSEL VS VESTIL 304 SCRA 739
10. CRUZ VS TAN 87 PHIL 627
11. GOMEZ VS MONTALABA 3/14/2008

 RULE 1
12. MANCHESTER CASE OVERTURNED AND REVERSED BY SUN INSURANCE CASE

FACTS:

Originally, this was a case of an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order. In the present case the damages were not specifically stated in the prayer but was
alleged in the body of the complaint which assessed 78.75 million as damages suffered by the petitioner. The
amount of the docket fee paid was only 410.00. With leave of court the petitioner then amended the complaint with
the inclusion of additional co-plaintiffs and by eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint thereby reducing the amount of damages to 10 million pesos only.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the case when the correct and proper docket fee has
not been paid.
2. Whether or not the case has commenced by filing a case with insufficient docket fee.
RULING:

No.

The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only 410.00 as docket fee. Neither can
the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. The basis of assessment of the docket fee
should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint. All
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment
of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court.”

As provided for in section 5, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court:

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 Section 5. Commencement of action. — A civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in
court. If an additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action is commenced with regard to him
on the dated of the filing of such later pleading, irrespective of whether the motion for its admission, if
necessary, is denied by the court. (6a)

Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00
as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For any legal
purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order
admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and
void.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with
this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. (COMPARE WITH THE
PREVAILING DOCTRINE IN THE CASE OF SUN INSURANCE VS ASUNCION).

13. SUN INSURANCE VS ASUNCION ((PLS CHECK REGALADO’S BOOK FOR THE CITATION)

Facts:

SUN INSURANCE filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the
judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared
in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. Meanwhile, the Respondent
Manuel Tiong also filed a case against Sun Insurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, seeking the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages,
attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were not specifically stated in the
prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that it would amount to about P50M. In the
body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer,
the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On
January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be
awarded no less than P10, 000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the
amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44, 601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the
private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less
than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of
P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private
respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent
court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and
during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private
respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62, 132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a
total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and
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supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must
pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.

Issue:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the insufficient payment of docket fees.

Ruling:

YES.
The ruling in the Manchester Development Corporation vs CA states: "The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the
amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed."

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud
the government of the docket fee due it are obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the
filing of the second amended complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case was decided by this Court
on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court
a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted
inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester,
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private
respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change for
stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not
be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment
of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

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 14. HEIRS OF REYNOSO VS CA 604 SCRA 1 7/10/11

Facts:

In 1979, Ruben Reinoso was a passenger in a jeepney owned by Tapales which was traversing through E.
Rodriguez Ave. The said jeepney collided with a truck owned by Guballa which resulted to the instantaneous death
of Ruben Reinoso. His heirs filed the instant case for Damages against Tapales and Guballa. In 1988, the RTC found
the Truck liable and held its owner liable for damages sustained by the Heirs of Reinoso and the jeepney owner.
The case was litigated before the RTC which rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners and against Guballa. .
In 1994, CA motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees pursuant to the
1987 Manchester ruling. Reinoso’s defense: Manchester should not be made to apply retroactively to their case
as the case was filed prior to the promulgation of Manchester ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not the dismissal made by the Court of Appeals was proper due to the nonpayment of docket fees.
Ruling:

No.

The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. In Manchester v. Court
of Appeal sit was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. Thus, in the more
recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros, the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to
defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying
additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and
not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several instances,
allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees in order to afford the parties the opportunity to
fully ventilate their cases on the merits. In the case of La Salette College v. Pilotin, the Court stated:

Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize
that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period
allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction
with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great
deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.

While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for
resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, for it is far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a
primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice.

In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC and said trial court had already rendered
a decision. While it was at that level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was only the
CA which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.

Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules so that the petitioners would be
able to fully and finally prosecute their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to secure justice on a
technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims

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of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of
justice.

The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said
ruling could be applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the recency then of
the ruling.

 RULE 2
15. AMONOY VS GUTIERREZ 2/15/2001

Facts:

This case had its roots in Special Proceedings No. 3103 of Branch I of the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos, involving six (6) parcels of land. Amonoy was the counsel of Francisca
Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. On 12 January 1965, the Project of Partition
submitted was approved and two (2) of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda.
The attorney’s fees charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965 Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy
to secure the payment of his attorneys fees. But it was only on 6 August 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the
claims settled and the properties adjudicated, that the estate was declared closed and terminated. Subsequently,
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Fornilda passed away and among the heirs of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-
appellant Angela Gutierrez.

Because his attorney’s fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid, Amonoy filed for their foreclosure and
judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured by
the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorneys fees. Failing in that,
the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction.

They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots were foreclosed and on 23 March 1973 the auction sale was
held where Amonoy was the highest bidder at P23,760.00. On 2 May 1973 his bid was judicially confirmed. A
deficiency was claimed and to satisfy it another execution sale was conducted, and again the highest bidder was
Amonoy at P12,137.50.

Included in those sold was the lot on which the Gutierrez spouses had their house.

More than a year after the Decision the said decedent’s heirs filed before the CFI a suit for the annulment and the
case was dismissed by the CFI and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the CFI issued a Writ of
Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On Amonoy’s motion were
issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of the Gutierrez spouses but a
temporary restraining order was granted by the SC on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the petitioners
houses.

But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the Decision, respondents house had already been destroyed,
supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.

Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against
petitioner before the RTC and dismissed respondents suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower courts ruling and
ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was also denied.
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Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the petitioner [was] liable to the respondents for
damages.

Ruling:

Yes. . Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.

Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents house. He
maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.

True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents house on May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of
Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the
demolition of respondents house, was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986 and was served on petitioner
himself on June 4, 1986.

Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. The SC agreed with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the
demolition of respondent’s house well until the middle of 1987. This is clear from Respondent Angela Gutierrezs
testimony.

Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of
the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he
not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit
before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had
been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to
proceed with the demolition.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct
set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

Clearly then, the demolition of respondents house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse
but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Courts Order and
wittingly caused the destruction of respondent’s house.

Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right.
Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when
damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated.

In the ultimate analysis, petitioner’s liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to

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 16. NALA VS CABANSAG 6/13/2008

Doctrine:
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury.

Facts:
Artemio Cabansag bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio and Felisa Gomez, part of a 400-
square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October, 1991, he received a demand letter from
Atty. Alexander demanding payment for rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is
owned by Purisima Nala; failing which, civil and criminal charges will be brought against him. This demand letter
was followed by another demand letter. According to Cabansag, the demand letter caused him damages prompting
him to file a complaint for damages against Nala and Atty. Alexander. In their defense, Atty. Alexander alleged that
he merely acted in behalf of his client Nala, who contested the ownership of the lot by Cabansag. Purisima alleged
that the lot was part of an 800-sq. meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio, which was divided into two
parts. The 400-square meter lot was conveyed to the spouses Gomez by virtue of a fictitious deed of sale, with the
agreement that it will be held in trust by the Gomezes in behalf of their (Eulogio and Purisima) children. Cabansag
is only renting the property which he occupies. She only learned of the deed of sale by the Gomez spouses to
Artemio when the latter filed the case for damages against her and Atty. Alexander.

The RTC ruled in favour of Cabansag and held Atty. Alexander and Nala liable for damages, which the Court of
Appeals affirmed. The heirs of Nala thereafter file a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent has basis for his claim for damages. (Cause of action)

Ruling:
No. Preliminarily, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular provision of law
under which it held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on the allegations in respondent's
complaint, it may be gathered that the basis for his claim for damages is Article 19 of the Civil Code, which
provides:

“Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also
in the performance of one’s duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with

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negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring
another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not
be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.

In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur:
(a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.

It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed,
and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote
bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a
breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice
connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm.

In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in
bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground for Nala’s
actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was
illegally occupying the same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by
Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed the case
for damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the
property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith.
Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or malice could not be attributed to petitioner since Nala
was only trying to protect their interests over the property.

Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado’s acts were done with the sole intention of
prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless
nights when he received the demand letters; however, there is a material distinction between damages and injury.
Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters. She had to
take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent.
One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent
should be borne solely by him.”

17. MARISCAL VS CA 311 SCRA 511

Doctrine:
It is a rule that for litis pendencia to be invoked as ground for the abatement or dismissal of an action, the
concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
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A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the plaintiff in a case. To
interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a complaint against the same person or party
would be splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by the Rules.

Facts:
Private respondent Bella Catalan filed a complaint against petitioner Rogelio Mariscal before the RTC of Iloilo for
the annulment of their marriage on the ground that it was void ab initio for having been solemnized without a valid
marriage license and being bigamous. She also sought to recover from Mariscal a sum of money she allegedly sent
to him while she was working as a nurse in the United States to buy properties as investment for their future life
together. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 20983.Previously, Catalan also filed criminal complaints against
Mariscal for bigamy and perjury before the Iloilo court. Mariscal filed his own complaint against Catalan before the
RTC of Digos seeking likewise the annulment of the same marriage on the ground that he was forced to marry her
at gunpoint and that they had no valid license. Mariscal likewise prayed for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2996.

In view of Civil Case No. 20983 which she earlier instituted in the RTC Iloilo, Catalan moved for the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 2996 invoking litis pendencia. But the RTC of Digos denied the motion to dismiss as well as the
subsequent motion for reconsideration of Catalan.On appeal, the RTC of Digos was reversed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the separate case filed by Mariscal constitutes a splitting a cause of action which can be dismissed
on the ground of litis pendentia.

Ruling:
Yes. It is a rule that for litis pendencia to be invoked as ground for the abatement or dismissal of an action, the
concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

It is quite evident that the first two (2) requisites are present. The parties involved in Civil Case No. 20983 (RTC-
Iloilo) are the very same protagonists in Civil Case No. 2996 (RTC-Digos). The actions in both fora are based on the
same set of facts that gave rise to the uniformity of the principal reliefs sought, more particularly, the ultimate
dissolution of their marriage.

The third requisite is the bone of contention. Mariscal contends that there can be no res judicata between the two
(2) simultaneous civil actions because of the different grounds for the nullification of their marriage respectively
invoked by them. According to him, the judgment in one case will not abate the second because the basis for
annulment in the former would not have even been traversed or passed upon in the latter.

Indeed, the RTC-Iloilo's refusal to declare the nullity of or annul the marriage would mean only that herein private
respondent shall have failed to prove her claims in Civil Case No. 20983 that there was no marriage license and
that the petitioner deceitfully failed to disclose a prior marriage. However, the RTC-Iloilo's refusal would not
constitute a ruling on whether the petitioner himself had been forced into the marriage through force, duress,
intimidation, and threats, since these grounds are pleaded in Civil Case No. 2996 before the RTC-Davao del Sur x x x
x

Respondent CA's error, therefore, was essentially its failure to consider the consequences of the various possible
judgments that could be rendered by the two trial courts in the two civil cases below. The possible judgments in
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one of the civil cases below will not necessarily bar the other.

Petitioner Mariscal does not convince. In litis pendencia what is essential is the identity and similarity of the issues
under consideration. In his effort to have the case resolved in a different venue, petitioner has resorted to nit-
picking and in the process has lost track of the real issue besetting the two (2) actions which is simply the
nullification of a marriage contracted by the parties on 4 April 1988.

In addition to specific denials, affirmative and special defenses wherein Mariscal questioned the jurisdiction of the
RTC of Iloilo over the nature of the action and that there was pending between the same parties for the same cause
Civil Case No. 2996 in the RTC of Digos, he also presented a compulsory counterclaim in his answer. Therein he
alleged that by reason of the complaint filed by Catalan in gross and evident bad faith, malice and harassment, he
suffered anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation, mental torture and sleepless nights thus entitling him
to moral damages of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages of P500,000.00 as well as attorney's fees of 35% of the
amount of damages and value of the property or money involved but in no case less than P500,000.00, plus initial
litigation costs of P30,000.00.[10]

A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the plaintiff in a case.
To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a complaint against the same person
or party would be splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by the Rules. Indeed the Court is puzzled no
end why Mariscal literally shied away from the RTC of Iloilo where he could have just as well ventilated his
affirmative and special defenses and litigated his compulsory counterclaim in that court and thus avoided
this duplicity of suits which is the matrix upon which litis pendencia is laid.

A supervening development further dramatizes the puerile, if not needless, efforts of Mariscal to derail the action
pending before the RTC of Iloilo. In her Rejoinder Bella Catalan informed the Court that on 2 October 1996 the RTC
of Iloilo through Judge David A. Alfeche rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 20983 nullifying her marriage to
Mariscal on the ground that it was bigamous. Catalan was awarded P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000 as
exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Her claim for reimbursement of US$32,000.00 was however
rejected as the evidence presented in support thereof was considered hearsay. With this turn of events, any
subsequent ruling by the RTC of Digos (were it allowed to proceed) which deviates from the ruling of the RTC of
Iloilo, a co-equal and coordinate court, could only lead to absurd, if not chaotic, consequences. Indeed, this case
underscores the importance of res judicata or bar by prior judgment as a stabilizing factor in our judicial system. It
forecloses not only matters squarely raised and litigated but all such matters which could have been raised in the
litigation but were not.

18. LARENA VS VILLANUEVA 53 PHIL 923

Doctrine:
When a contract of lease provides for the payment of the rent in separate installments, each installment may be
considered an independent cause of action, but in an action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent, the
installments due at the time the action was brought must be included in the complaint, and failure to do so
constitutes a bar to a subsequent action for such overdue rent.

The principle is well established that a party will not be permitted to split a cause of action and make it the basis of
several suits, but that rule applies only to cases where the cause is in existence at the time the action is brought.

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Facts:
This is a sequel to case G. R. No. 21706, Josefina Rubio de Larena vs. Hermenegildo Villanueva, decided on March
26, 1924. In that case, the lease of the Tacgajan Sugar Plantation was rescinded and the defendant-lessee was
ordered to pay the unpaid balance of the rent for the agricultural year 1920-1922 with interest from August 26,
1922, rent for the agricultural year 1921-1923 and delivery of possession of the leased land to the plaintiff.

A writ of execution was issued, but before levy was made, the parties came to an agreement under which the
money judgment was to be satisfied. This agreement was embodied in a document executed by the plaintiff. In the
meantime, the defendant had harvested the sugarcane crop produced in the agricultural year 1922-1924, and after
having satisfied the aforesaid money judgment, he also continued in possession of the plantation long enough to
appropriate to himself the ratoon cane crop. Plaintiff then brought the present action.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

The defendant, in bad faith, continued in possession of the leased land during the agricultural year 1922-1924 and
appropriated to himself the cane harvest and refused to pay the total value of 1,679.02 piculs sold by him.The
plaintiff, therefore, asks judgment for the sum of P21,827.26.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

The defendant failed to comply with his obligation under the contract of lease of the Tacgajan Hacienda, which is to
return the tools, agricultural implements, draft animals, and other effects enumerated in the inventory. The
plaintiff, asks judgment for the sum of P3,596 plus P500 in damages.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

The defendant illegally made the harvest of sugar cane in 1924 and 1925 and sold by him for his own benefit at the
price of P13 per picul. The plaintiff asks judgment for the sum of P20,962.25.

The defendant was absolved from liability on the second cause of action. The court found that the weight of the
evidence showed that the missing draft animals died from rinderpest and that the other personal property was
turned over to the provincial sheriff for delivery to the plaintiff before the writ of execution was returned to the
court. If so, the action would lie against the sheriff rather than against the defendant.

Issue:

Whether or not the first and third cause of action be considered res judicata.

Ruling:
No. As to the first cause of action the defendant argues that it was included in the prayer of an amended
complaint filed in case G. R. No. 21706 and that, although no express determination thereof was made in the
decision of the case, it must, nevertheless, be regarded as res judicata. That such is not the case is very clear. The
Code of Civil Procedure says:

That only is deemed to have been so adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Sec. 307, Code of Civil
Proc.)

But the defendant maintains that the plaintiff having had an opportunity to ventilate the matter in the former case,
she cannot now enforce the same cause of action in the present case. Properly speaking, this argument does not

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involve the doctrine of res judicata but rests on the well-known an, in American law, firmly established principle
that a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action an make it the basis for several suits. But that
is not this case. The rule is well established that when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in
separate installments, each installment is an independent cause of action, though it has been held and is
good law, that in an action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent, the installments due at the time the
action brought must be included in the complaint and that failure to do so will constitute a bar to a
subsequent action for the payment of that rent. The aforesaid action, G. R. No. 21706, was brought on August
23, 1922, the plaintiff demanding payment of the rent in addition to the rescission of the lease. On July 27, 1923,
the plaintiff filed a motion for an amendment to paragraph 6 of the complaint.

The plaintiff also amended the prayer of the complaint by asking judgment for rent for years subsequent to 1922.
The motion was granted, and the case came up for trial on July 30, 1923, and on September 8, 1923, the trial court
rendered its decision giving judgment for rent up to and including the rent for the agricultural year ending in 1923.
The lease did not provide for payment of rent in advance or at any definite time, and it appears plainly from the
record that the rent for an agricultural year was not considered due until the end of the corresponding year. It
follows that the rent for the agricultural year 1922-1924 has not become due at time of the trial of the case and that
consequently the trial court could not render judgment therefore. The action referred to is, therefore, no bar to the
first cause of action in the present litigation.

The defendant places much weigh upon the document of September 30, 1924, hereinbefore quoted. The document
speaks for itself, and it will be readily seen that it is merely a receipt for the satisfaction of the money judgment in
the case G. R. No. L-21706 and has nothing to with the present case.

The only question in regard to the first cause of action relates to the amount of the damages. The plaintiff contends
that the defendant was a possessor in bad faith, and therefore, must pay the value of the fruits of the land in
accordance with article 455 of the Civil Code. Under the circumstances of the case, we cannot so hold. The
defendant held possession under the contract of lease until said contract was rescinded. The contract contained no
special provision for the procedure in effecting the rescission, and it follows that it could only be accompanied by a
final judgment of the court. The judgment in case G. R. No. L-210706 did not become final until March 27, 192,
when our decision on appeal was rendered. As that must have been close to the end of the harvest and milling of
the sugar crop for the period to which the first cause of action refers, we do not think that the defendant should be
required to pay more than the amount of the stipulated rent for the period, i. e., the sum of P8,000 with interest
rent for that period, i. e., the sum of P8,000 with interest. (Lerma vs. De la Cruz, 7 Phil., 581.)

The action for terminating the lease was brought under article 1124 of the Civil Code, as it may, perhaps, be said
that properly speaking, the subject matter of the action was a resolution of the contract an not a rescission. That
may be true, but it is a distinction without a difference; in their case a judicial declaration would be necessary for
the cancellation of the contract in the absence of a special agreement.

Very little need be said in regard to the third cause of action. It relates to a period subsequent to the complete
termination of the lease by final judicial order. The defendant had then no right whatever to the possession of the
land or to the fruits thereof, and in removing the fruits, he acted in bad faith. This being the case, he must pay for
the fruits received by him, less the necessary expenses of production. (Arts. 455 and 453 of the Civil Code.) As his
bad faith commence long before the fruits in question were produced, he is not entitled to any part of the net
proceeds of the crop. The evidence shows that the net ratoon crop of the year 1924-1925 was 1,613.25 piculs of
sugar, and according to the defendant's own statement, the market value of the sugar was in the neighborhood of

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P11 per picul and the costs of production about P4.50. The net result is that under the third cause of action, the
defendant must pay to the plaintiff the sum of P10,486.13 with interest.

For the reason stated, the judgment of the court below is affirmed in regard to the second cause of action. It is
reversed as to the first and third causes of action, and it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff have and recover from
the defendant the sum of P18,486.13 with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from April 13, 1925, the date
of the filing of the complaint. No costs will be allowed.

19. BLOSSOM VS MANILA GAS 55PHIL 225

Doctrine:
As a general rule a contract to do several things at several times in its nature, so as to authorize successive actions;
and a judgment recovered for a single breach of a continuing contract or covenant is no bar to a suit for a
subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract is entire, and the breach total, there can be only
one action, and plaintiff must therein recover all his damages.

An unqualified and positive refusal to perform a contract, though the performance thereof is not yet due, may, if
the renunciation goes to the whole contract, be treated as a complete breach which will entitle the injured party to
bring his action at once.

Facts:
Blossom & Co. (plaintiff) and Manila Gas Corporations (defendant) entered into a contract. The contract provided
for the delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of specified amounts of water gas tar. 1 ton of gas was priced
at Php65. It was agreed that the price would prevail only so long as the raw materials (coal and crude oil) used by
the defendants in the manufacture of gas should cost the same price as that prevailing at the time of the contract. In
the event of an increase or decrease in the cost of raw materials, there would be a corresponding increase or
decrease in the price of tar.

The contract was later amended to extend the period for ten years. In consideration of the modification, the
plaintiff agreed to purchase from the defendant a certain piece of land lying adjacent to its plant. The defendant
sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff which in turn executed a mortgage to secure the payment of the balance
of the purchase price.

Around 4 years from the execution of the contract, plaintiff filed an action against the defendant to obtain specific
performance and recovery of damages. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached the contract by ceasing to
deliver any coal and water gas tar solely because of the increase in price of tar products and its desire to secure
better prices than what the plaintiff paid.

CFI Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court granted the recovery for damages but refused to order the
defendants to resume delivery but left it with its remedy for damages against the defendants for any subsequent
breach of contract. Later, plaintiff filed another action for damages on the ground that the defendant breached the
contract once more after refusal to perform its obligation under the same contract.

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages.

Ruling:
Yes. Plaintiff must stand or fall on its own pleadings, and tested by that rule it must be admitted that the plaintiff's
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original cause of action, in which it recovered judgment for damages, was founded on the ten-year contract, and
that the damages which it then recovered were recovered for a breach of that contract.

Both actions are founded on one and the same contract. By the terms of the original contract of September 10,
1018, the defendant was to sell and the plaintiff was to purchase three tons of water gas tar per month from
September to January 1, 1919, and twenty tons of water gas tar per month after January 1, 1919, one-half ton of
coal gas tar per month from September to January 1, 1919, and six tons of coal gas tar per month after January 1,
1919. That from and after January 1, 1919, plaintiff would take at least the quantities specified in the contract of
September 10, 1918, and that at its option, it would have the right to take the total output of water gas tar of
defendant's plant and 50 per cent of the gross output of its coal gas tar, and upon giving ninety days' notice, it
would have the right to the entire output of coal gas tar, except such as the defendant might need for its own use.
That is to say, the contract provided for the delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of the specified amounts
of the different tars as ordered and requested by the plaintiff. In other words, under plaintiff's own theory, the
defendant was to make deliveries from month to month of the tars during the period of ten years, and it is alleged
in both complaints that the defendant broke its contract, and in bad faith refused to make any more deliveries.

In 34 Corpus Juris, p. 839, it is said:

As a general rule a contract to do several things at several times in its nature, so as to authorize successive
actions; and a judgment recovered for a single breach of a continuing contract or covenant is no bar to a
suit for a subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract is entire, and the breach total,
there can be only one action, and plaintiff must therein recover all his damages.

In the case of Rhoelm vs, Horst, 178 U. U., 1; 44 Law. ed., 953, that court said:

An unqualified and positive refusal to perform a contract, though the performance thereof is not yet due,
may, if the renunciation goes to the whole contract, be treated as a complete breach which will entitle the
injured party to bring his action at once.

15 Ruling Case Law, 966, 967, sec. 441 says:

Similarly if there is a breach by the vendor of a contract for the sale of goods to be delivered and paid for in
installments, and the vendee maintains an action therefor and recovers damages, he cannot maintain a
subsequent action to recover for the failure to deliver later installments.

In Pakas vs. Hollingshead, 184 N. Y., 211; 77 N. E., 40; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1024, the syllabus says:

Upon refusal, by the seller, after partial performance, longer to comply with his contract to sell and deliver a
quantity of articles in installments the buyer cannot keep the contract in force and maintain actions for breaches as
they occur but must recover all his damages in one suit.

And on page 1044 of its opinion, the court say:

The learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the former judgment did not constitute a bar to the present
action but that the plaintiff had the right to elect to waive or disregard the breach, keep the contract in force, and
maintain successive actions for time to time as the installments of goods were to be delivered, however numerous
these actions might be. It is said that this contention is supported in reason and justice, and has the sanction of
authority at least in other jurisdictions. We do not think that the contention can be maintained. There is not as it
seems to us any judicial authority in this state that gives it any substantial support. On the contrary, we think that
the cases, so far as we have been able to examine them, are all the other way, and are to the effect that, inasmuch as
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there was a total breach of the contract by the defendant's refusal to deliver, the plaintiff cannot split up his
demand and maintain successive actions, but must either recover all his damages in the first suit or wait until the
contract matured or the time for the delivery of all the goods had arrived. In other words, there can be but one
action for damages for a total breach of an entire contract to deliver goods, and the fact that they were to be
delivered in installment from time to time does not change the general rule.

 RULE 3

20. KILOSBAYAN VS MORATO 316 PHIL 652

FACTS:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery
equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal
annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own
personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for
P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of
Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is
violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can
no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the
Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the
Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners
do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:

NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from
re actually involved. LAW OF
THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan
vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but
the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and
determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially
unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with,
but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to
make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous

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decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law
and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are
REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

21. RAMOS VS REYES ET AL G.R. 180771 4/21/2015

FACTS:

petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging that they
stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in a
representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations." 1
They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as basis for their claim.

As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to
build awareness among the affected residents of Tanon Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in
light of the government's failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust. 4

Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court will have the
opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction." 5

The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the environment and to continue to define
environmental rights in the context of actual cases is commendable.

The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural rights for animals through
their allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are asked to accept the premises that (a) they were
chosen by the Resident Marine Mammals of Tanon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a representative group of all the
species of the Resident Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to communicate with them; and (d) they received clear
consent from their animal principals that they would wish to use human legal institutions to pursue their interests.
Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge through judicial notice that the interests that they, the human petitioners,
assert are identical to what the Resident Marine Mammals would assert had they been humans and the legal
strategies that they invoked are the strategies that they agree with.

In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a relationship of is can be the occasion
for abuse.

ISSUES:

1. WON petitioners Resident Marine Mammals are the real party in interest in this case.
2. WON Pres. Gloria M. Arroyo be impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner.

RULING:

1. NO
2. NO

II

Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:

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SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized
by law may be parties in a civil action.

The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be authorized by
statute to be parties in a civil action.

ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than simply construe, the
provisions of the Rules of Court as well as substantive law to accommodate Resident Marine Mammals or
animals. This we cannot do.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real party in interest:

SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)6

A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case is a real party in interest.7 When a
case is brought to the courts, the real party in interest must show that another party's act or omission has caused a
direct injury, making his or her interest both material and based on an enforceable legal right.8

Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in representation of the real party in interest, as
defined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative
or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express rust, a guardian, an
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract
involves things belonging to the principal.(3a)9

These requirements should apply even in cases involving the environment, which means that for the
Petition of the human petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident Marine Mammals are
real parties in interest; and (b) that the human petitioners are authorized by law or the Rules to act in a
representative capacity.

The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species
inhabiting Tanon Strait."12 While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue of whether animals have
legal standing before courts has been the subject of academic discourse in light of the emergence of animal
and environmental rights.

In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue
and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about animals.
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Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we, as humans, may feel
the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best interests and can,
therefore, speak for them before the courts. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the
suffering of animals and that we know what remedy they need in the face of an injury.

What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is the principle of human stewardship over
the environment in a citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. A citizen suit allows any
Filipino to act as a representative of a party who has enforceable rights under environmental laws before
Philippine courts, and is defined in Section 5: .

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn,
may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the
court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for,
requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from
notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.

There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign representation on
behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy. There is no
way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let alone present that they would wish to use our court
system, which is designed to ensure that humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a
viable ecology for themselves, which of course includes compassion for all living things.

It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only
when a) there is a clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely
upon an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the
population represented or those that are yet to be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such
standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is
necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together.23 (Emphasis
in the original)

The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under this
rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of
minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not
real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.

In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits for others. Uninterested persons will
argue for the persons they represent, and the court will decide based on their evidence and arguments. Any
decision by the court will be binding upon the beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the future
generations. The court's decision will be res judicata upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented.25

The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to
diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party in interest"
to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially
result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is
impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury
inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of
guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational,
scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of those they represent.

III

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In G.R. No. 180771, apart from adjudicating unto themselves the status of "legal guardians" of whales, dolphins,
porpoises, and other cetacean species, human petitioners also impleaded Former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as "unwilling co-petitioner" for "her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to
protect Tañon Strait."28

No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her consent. In our
jurisdiction, only when there is a party that should have been a necessary party but was unwilling to join would
there be an allegation as to why that party has been omitted. In Rule 3, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:

SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a
necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted.
Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted
necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.

The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the
claim against such party.

The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment
rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.29

A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be obtained should be impleaded
as a defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:

SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he
may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. 30

The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the action but who do not
consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through summons or other court processes. Petitioners.
should not take it upon themselves to simply imp lead any party who does not consent as a petitioner. This places
the unwilling co-petitioner at the risk of being denied due process.

Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a co-equal
constitutional department, we cannot assume that the President needs to enforce policy directions by
suing his or her alter-egos. The procedural situation caused by petitioners may have gained public
attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the contemptuous. The Former President's name should be
stricken out of the title of this case.

The rest of the issues are on CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS. Not anymore related to the Rules of Court.

22. OPOSA VS FACTORAN

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

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 2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a
clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme
Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.

23. IMPERIAL VS JAUCION 4/14/2004

FACTS:

The facts of the case are not so relevant. The issue of the non-inclusion of the husband is only incidental.

Petitioner obtained six (6) separate loans amounting to P 320,000.00 from the respondent. In the written
agreement, they agreed upon the 16% interest per month plus penalty charge of 5% per month and the 25%
attorney’s fee, failure to pay the said loans on the stipulated date.

Petitioner executed six (6) separate promissory notes and issued several checks as guarantee for payment.
When the said loans become overdue and unpaid, especially when the petitioner’s checks issued were dishonored,
respondent made repeated oral and written demands for payment.

Page 20 of 82
 The petitioner was able to pay only P 116,540.00 as found by the RTC. Although she alleged that she had already
paid the amount of P 441,780.00 and the excess of P 121,780.00 is more than the interest that could be legally
charged, the Court affirms the findings of RTC that petitioner is still indebted to the respondent.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

The non-inclusion of the husband of the petitioner at the time the case was filed should have dismissed this
case.[8]

ISSUE: WON the case will be dismissed for non-inclusion of the husband

RULING:

NO.

Fifth Issue:

Non-Inclusion of Petitioners Husband

Petitioner contends that the case against her should have been dismissed, because her husband was not
included in the proceedings before the RTC.

We are not persuaded. The husbands non-joinder does not warrant dismissal, as it is merely a formal
requirement that may be cured by amendment.[20] Since petitioner alleges that her husband has already passed
away, such an amendment has thus become moot.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

24. BULIGBULIG KITA KAMAG-ANAK VS SULPICIO 5/19/1989

Facts:
The petitioners seek the issuance by this Court of the writ of certiorari for the nullification of the Order of the
respondent Regional Trial Court dated June 29, 1988, rendered in Civil Case No. 88-43718, which, on the avowed
authority of this Court's Resolution dated March 3, 1988 in Administrative Matter No. 88-1-646-0, ruled (1) that said
petitioners could not maintain a class action in accordance with Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court — although
they could joi9n together in one suit pursuant to the joinder of parties rule in Section 6 of the same Rule 3, and (2)
requiring them within thirty days "to comply with the filing fee or paupers litigants requirements provided for
under Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court."

UNSIGNED RESOLUTION:
At all events, a class suit is out of the question for the reasons already made clear in the Resolution of March 3,
1988. The petitioners would be well advised to consider seriously joining in a common suit, or in several common
suits in different venues, under the provisions of Section 6 of Rule 3, Rules of Court.

From another aspect, the simplificatory alternatives offered by the rule on consolidation of actions (Section 1, Rule
31, Rules of Court) should also in great part relieve petitioners' apprehensions about the difficulties and
Page 21 of 82
complications attendant upon hundreds of individual cases being brought in numerous courts throughout the
country. As held in Salazar v. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 64 Phil. 785, 791-792:

There are three ways of consolidating actions or special proceedings where the questions at issue
and the parties in interest are the same. The first consists in recasting the cases already constituted,
conducting only one hearing and rendering only one decision; the second takes place when the
existing cases are consolidated, only one hearing held and only one decision rendered; and the third
takes place when, without recasting or consolidating the cases, the principal one is heard, the
hearing on the others being suspended until judgment has been rendered in the first case. The
court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may adopt any of these three forms of consolidation
whenever in its opinion the proceeding is beneficial to and convenient for the parties. The power so
exercised is discretionary. ...

Clearly, it is not only within the power of the litigants to seek, but also within the competence of the courts
involved to adopt motu proprio, any of the three indicated modes of consolidating the trial and disposition of the
actions, howsoever numerous, brought within each particular venue for the recovery of damages in consequence of
a single event, in this case the Doña Paz maritime disaster.

25. NAPERE VS BARBARONA JANUARY 31

Facts:
During the pendency of the case against Juan Napare, the latter died. Counsel informed the court but it failed to
substitute the name of the heirs of Juan Napere (herein petitioner). RTC rendered decision against the estate of
Juan Napere. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC decision is void for lack of jurisdiction over the heirs of Juan Napere

Ruling:
The petition must fail.
When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such death, the Rules require the
substitution of the deceased party by his legal representative or heirs. In such case, counsel is obliged to inform the
court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latter’s legal representative.

The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages is an action that survives the death of the
defendant. Notably, the counsel of Juan Napere complied with his duty to inform the court of his client’s death and
the names and addresses of the heirs. The trial court, however, failed to order the substitution of the heirs.
Nonetheless, despite this oversight, we hold that the proceedings conducted and the judgment rendered by the
trial court are valid.

The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of
the death of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment
rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party.5 The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case subsists
despite the death of the party.

Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The
party alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.6

Page 22 of 82
 Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due
process.7The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party’s right to due process.8 It was designed to
ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate.9 Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the
right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected
by the decision rendered therein.10 Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is
not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting
judgment therein.11

Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the
case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased.12 In such case, there is really no violation of the right to due
process. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence
available in support of one’s defense.13 When due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or
heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the
validity of a promulgated decision.14

In light of these pronouncements, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court and the judgment
rendered therein because the petitioner, who was, in fact, a co-defendant of the deceased, actively participated in
the case. The records show that the counsel of Juan Napere and petitioner continued to represent them even after
Juan’s death. Hence, through counsel, petitioner was able to adequately defend herself and the deceased in the
proceedings below. Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied
petitioner.

26. TOKIO VS MARINE INSURANCE CO. VS VALDEZ 1/28/2008

Facts:
Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Incorporated (Tokio Marine), petitioner in these cases, is a domestic
corporation engaged in the insurance business. The individual petitioners are its corporate officers, except Antonio
B. Lapid, one of Tokio Marine's consultants.

Jorge Valdez, respondent in these cases, was a former unit manager of Tokio Marine pursuant to a Unit
Management Contract entered into between them on August 16, 1977.

On October 15, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Manila a complaint for damages
against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91356. He alleged therein that petitioners violated the terms of
the Unit Management Contract by refusing to pay him, among others, his "commissions," and bonuses. Respondent
prayed for the following reliefs: a) actual damages in the total amount of P71,866,205.67 and the corresponding
interests; b) moral damages of P10,000,000.00; c) exemplary damages amounting to P10,000,000.00; d) attorney's
fees corresponding to 30% of the said amounts; and e) costs of the suit.

Eventually, respondent filed with the trial court an "Urgent Ex Parte Motion For Authority To Litigate As Indigent
Plaintiff."
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for failure to file the required docket fees.

Issue: Whether or not complaint should be dismissed for failure to pay docket fees.

Ruling:
It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed
docket fee.3 As we held in Magaspi v. Ramolete,4 the correct docket fees must be paid before courts can act on a
Page 23 of 82
petition or complaint. The exception to the rule on payment of docket fees is provided in Section 21, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:

SEC. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if
the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees and of transcripts
of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other
lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the
case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the
trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a
person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and
collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall
issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

The guidelines for determining whether a party qualifies as an indigent litigant are provided for in Section 19, Rule
141,5 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - INDIGENT LITIGANT (A) WHOSE GROSS
INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE
MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH A
FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent unless the
court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned nor they own any real property with the fair
value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the
litigant's affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of the litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the
complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal
liability may have been incurred.

For purposes of a suit in forma pauperis, an indigent litigant is not really a pauper, but is properly a person who is
an indigent although not a public charge, meaning that he has no property or income sufficient for his support
aside from his labor, even if he is self-supporting when able to work and in employment.6 The term "immediate
family" includes those members of the same household who are bound together by ties of relationship but does not
include those who are living apart from the particular household of which the individual is a member. 7

In the instant cases, petitioners maintain that respondent's ex parte motion to litigate as an indigent is defective
since it was not accompanied or supported by the affidavits of his children, the immediate members of his family.
The argument lacks merit. Section 19 clearly states that it is the litigant alone who shall execute the
affidavit.The Rule does not require that all members of the litigant's immediate family must likewise execute
sworn statements in support of the petition. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Petitioners next argue that respondent's ex parte motion is not supported by sufficient evidence to show his
indigent status.8 Suffice it to state that this Court is, first and foremost, a court of law. It is not its function to
analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of factual determination. 9 Thus, petitioners
cannot now ask us to review the evidence anew.

Page 24 of 82
 27. ALGURA VS CITY OF NAGA 10/20/2006

Facts:
On September 1, 1999, spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint dated
August 30, 19994 for damages against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal
demolition of their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their
boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly.

Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants. Finding that
petitioners' motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious, Executive Judge Jose T. Atienza of the Naga City
RTC, in the September 1, 1999 Order,8 granted petitioners' plea for exemption from filing fees.

Respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing Fees. The Naga City RTC issued an
Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for
exemption from payment of legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the
Revised Rules of Court—directing them to pay the requisite filing fees.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who qualify for exemption from paying filing
fees.

Ruling:
Yes. It is undisputed that the Complaint (Civil Case No. 99-4403) was filed on September 1, 1999. However, the
Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and July 17, 2000 Orders, incorrectly applied Rule 141, Section 18 on Legal
Fees when the applicable rules at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party which took effect on July 1,
1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper Litigants which became effective on July 19, 1984 up to February 28,
2000.

The old Section 16, Rule 141 requires applicants to file an ex-parte motion to litigate as a pauper litigant by
submitting an affidavit that they do not have a gross income of PhP 2,000.00 a month or PhP 24,000.00 a year for
those residing in Metro Manila and PhP 1,500.00 a month or PhP 18,000.00 a year for those residing outside Metro
Manila or those who do not own real property with an assessed value of not more than PhP 24,000.00 or not more
than PhP 18,000.00 as the case may be. Thus, there are two requirements: a) income requirement—the applicants
should not have a gross monthly income of more than PhP 1,500.00, and b) property requirement––they should
not own property with an assessed value of not more than PhP 18,000.00.

In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura and neighbor Erlinda
Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner Antonio F. Algura showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00, 21 and a
Certification of the Naga City assessor stating that petitioners do not have property declared in their names for
taxation.22 Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real property as shown by the Certification of the Naga City
assessor and so the property requirement is met. However with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that
the gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of
Lorencita Algura when combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule
141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement was not satisfied. The trial court was therefore correct in
disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants although the court should have applied Rule 141, Section 16
which was in effect at the time of the filing of the application on September 1, 1999. Even if Rule 141, Section 18
(which superseded Rule 141, Section 16 on March 1, 2000) were applied, still the application could not have been
granted as the combined PhP 13,474.00 income of petitioners was beyond the PhP 3,000.00 monthly income
threshold.

Page 25 of 82
Unrelenting, petitioners however argue in their Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000 Order
disqualifying them as indigent litigants23 that the rules have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3, Section 21 of the
1997 Rules of Civil procedure which authorizes parties to litigate their action as indigents if the court is satisfied
that the party is "one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities
for himself and his family." The trial court did not give credence to this view of petitioners and simply applied Rule
141 but ignored Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party.

The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate as indigent litigants
brings to the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to apply both Rule 141, Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21
on such applications or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16 and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having
been superseded by Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal Fees.

The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141, Section 18 on March
1, 2000 and subsequently amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which is now the present rule) are
still valid and enforceable rules on indigent litigants.

For one, the history of the two seemingly conflicting rules readily reveals that it was not the intent of the Court to
consider the old Section 22 of Rule 3, which took effect on January 1, 1994 to have been amended and superseded
by Rule 141, Section 16, which took effect on July 19, 1984 through A.M. No. 83-6-389-0. If that is the case, then the
Supreme Court, upon the recommendation of the Committee on the Revision on Rules, could have already deleted
Section 22 from Rule 3 when it amended Rules 1 to 71 and approved the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took
effect on July 1, 1997. The fact that Section 22 which became Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigant was retained in
the rules of procedure, even elaborating on the meaning of an indigent party, and was also strengthened by the
addition of a third paragraph on the right to contest the grant of authority to litigate only goes to show that there
was no intent at all to consider said rule as expunged from the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent litigants was amended twice: first on March 1, 2000 and the second on August
16, 2004; and yet, despite these two amendments, there was no attempt to delete Section 21 from said Rule 3. This
clearly evinces the desire of the Court to maintain the two (2) rules on indigent litigants to cover applications to
litigate as an indigent litigant.

Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly amended by Section 18 and later
Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can and should be harmonized.
The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle that when
conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize them. Hence, "every statute [or
rule] must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes [or rules] as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence."25

In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible with
each other. When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and
supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the income and
property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141—that is, the applicant's gross income and that
of the applicant's immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee;
and the applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more than Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (PhP 300,000.00). If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the
authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing to
enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has "no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter
and basic necessities for himself and his family." In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing
evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the
application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse
party may later still contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court,
possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court

Page 26 of 82
determines after hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or
property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment
is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be
made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule 3, Section 21 does not clearly
draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption. Knowing that the litigants may abuse the grant of authority,
the trial court must use sound discretion and scrutinize evidence strictly in granting exemptions, aware that the
applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under Rule 141. The trial court must also guard against abuse and
misuse of the privilege to litigate as an indigent litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which would
otherwise be regulated by a legal fee requirement.

Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after their affidavits
and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income
and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial
court should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to
show that they didn't have property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for
them and their family.27 In that hearing, the respondents would have had the right to also present evidence to
refute the allegations and evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to litigate as indigent litigants.
Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether
petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards set in Rule 3, Section 21.

Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and
property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other
hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied
outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound
discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.

 RULE 4

28. EL HOGAR VS SEVA 57 PHIL 873 (not assigned)

29. MIJARES VS PICCIO 101 PHIL 142

Principle: Rule 2, section 5, "Subject to rules regarding venue and joinder of parties, a party may in one complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party claim state, in the alternative or otherwise, as many different causes of
action as he may have against an opposing party."cha

Facts:

Pastora Alvarez Guanzon filed a complaint in the CFI of Cebu against her husband Jose M. Guanzon containing two
causes of action: one for the annulment of a deed of sale in favor of Sulpicia Guanzon of certain real properties
situated in the province of Negros Occidental, and the annulment of a deed of donation inter-vivos in favor of Joven
Salvador Guanzon of another set of real properties situated in the province of Cebu; and another for the separation
of their conjugal properties which include both real and personal acquired during marriage rary chanrobles virtual
law library

On October 19, 1955, plaintiff filed a motion to bring into the case Sulpicia Guanzon and her husband Vicente
Mijares as parties defendants alleging that their presence there in is indispensable. This motion was granted and

Page 27 of 82
said defendants were duly summoned in accordance with law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

On January 17, 1956, new defendants Sulpicia Guanzon and Vicente Mijares filed a motion to dismiss based on
three grounds to wit: (1) that venue is improperly laid, (2) that their is a misjoinder of cause, of action and of and
(3) that the court has no jurisdiction of said defendants. The court denied the same holding that the action is in
personam as it does affect title to real property, that there is no misjoinder of causes of action, and that it has
jurisdiction over the persons of the movants. The movants filed a motion for the reconsideration which was denied
hence this petition for prohibition and certiorari seeking to set aside the two orders adverted
to.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Issue: Whether there was misjoinder of causes of action.

Held:

Yes. There is a misjoinder of causes of action in the present case not only as regards venue but also as regards the
defendants. With regard to the first, it should be noted that the first cause of action stated in the complaint refers to
the annulment of a deed of sale real properties situated in the province of Negros Occidental, and of a deed of
donation inter vivos of another set of real properties situated in the province of Cebu. They refer to two different
transactions which properties situated in two different provinces. The venue has therefore been improperly laid as
regards the properties in Negros Occidental. With regard to the second, it also appears that the deed sale which is
sought to be annulled was made in favor of Sulpicia Guanzon whereas the deed of donation was made in favor of
Joven Salvador Guanzon, and there is nothing from which it maybe inferred that the two defendants have a
common interest that maybe joined in one cause of action on the contrary their interest is distinct and separate.
They cannot therefore be joined in one cause of action.

In the light of the above considerations, it may be stated that the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners in so far as
the cause of action involving the annulment of the deed of sale covering the properties in Negros Occidental is well
taken and should have by the lower court.

30. AUCTION IN MALINTA INC. VS LUYABAN 2/2/2007

Principle:

GR - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Exception : When the parties before filing of the action agreed on an exclusive venue.

Facts:

The facts show that on October 24, 2001, respondent, a resident of Magsaysay, Tabuk, Kalinga, filed with the
Kalinga RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner Auction in Malinta, Inc., a corporation with business
address at Malinta, Valenzuela City, and engaged in public auction of heavy equipments, trucks, and assorted
machineries. Respondent was declared the highest bidder for a wheel loader T.C.M. 75B, series no. 3309.
Respondent tendered the payment for the said item but petitioner could no longer produce the loader. It offered a

Page 28 of 82
replacement but failed to deliver the same up to the filing of the complaint. Hence, respondent instituted this case
to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. It argued that the correct venue is the RTC of
Valenzuela City pursuant to the stipulation in the Bidders Application and Registration Bidding Agreement which
states that:

ALL COURT LITIGATION PROCEDURES SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN THE APPROPRIATE COURTS

OF VALENZUELA CITY, METRO MANILA.

RTC Kalinga held that the clear intention of the parties was to limit the venue to the proper court
of ValenzuelaCity and thus dismissed respondents complaint on the ground of improper venue.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the Resolution of the Kalinga RTC
and reinstated the complaint.

ISSUE : Whether the stipulation in the parties Bidders Application and Registration Bidding Agreement
effectively limited the venue of the instant case exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City.

Held: NO.

The general rule on the venue of personal actions, as in the instant case for damages is embodied in Section
2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. It provides:

Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.

The aforequoted rule, however, finds no application where the parties, before the filing of the action, have
validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. But the mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to
preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. It must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as exclusively and waiving for this purpose any other venue, shall
only preceding the designation of venue, to the exclusion of the other courts, or words of similar import,
the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place.

This has been the rule since the 1969 case of Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco. It was held therein that the
clause [t]he parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila, does not preclude the filing of suits in the
court which has jurisdiction over the place of residence of the plaintiff or the defendant. The plain meaning of the
Page 29 of 82
said provision is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila considering that there are no qualifying or
restrictive words which would indicate that Manila, and Manila alone, is the agreed venue. It simply is permissive
and the parties did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2 of Rule
4 of the Rules of Court.

The Polytrade doctrine was further applied in the case of Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, which analyzed the various jurisprudence rendered after the Polytrade case. In Unimasters, we held that a
stipulation stating that [a]ll suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon
City, is only permissive and does not limit the venue to the Quezon City courts. As explained in the said case:

In other words, unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting
language, that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and exclusively at a
definite place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be
regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or complementary of said rule. The
fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of the venues mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a
place for their actions different from those specified by said rule, does not, without more, suffice to
characterize the agreement as a restrictive one. There must, to repeat, be accompanying language
clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be
litigated only at the place named by them, regardless of the general precepts of Rule 4; and any
doubt or uncertainty as to the parties intentions must be resolved against giving their agreement a
restrictive or mandatory aspect. Any other rule would permit of individual, subjective judicial
interpretations without stable standards, which could well result in precedents in hopeless
inconsistency.[17]

In the instant case, the stipulation in the parties agreement, i.e., all Court litigation procedures shall be
conducted in the appropriate Courts of Valenzuela City, Metro Manila, evidently lacks the restrictive and qualifying
words that will limit venue exclusively to the RTC of Valenzuela City. Hence, the Valenzuela courts should only be
considered as an additional choice of venue to those mentioned under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court. Accordingly, the present case for damages may be filed with the (a) RTC of Valenzuela City as stipulated in
the bidding agreement; (b) RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga which has jurisdiction over the residence of respondent
(plaintiff); or with the (c) RTC of Valenzuela City which has jurisdiction over the business address of petitioner
(defendant). The filing of the complaint in the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, is therefore proper, respondent
being a resident of Tabuk, Kalinga.

 RULE 6

31. GUEVARRA VS EALA 8/6/2007

Principle:
A denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which
are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. A negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of

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some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts
alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

Facts:

On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on
Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000 when his then
fiancée Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom
he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had
been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read “I love you,” “I miss you,” or
“Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning
of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that
she slept at her parent’s house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001 complainant
went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and the respondent celebrating with her family
and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident,
Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten
letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw respondent’s car and that of
Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street, New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001,
Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002
together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant. Respondent contends, in his Comment on the
present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against him.

ISSUE: Whether the answers of herein respondent constitute an admission.

HELD:

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through
counsel made the following statements to wit: Respondent specifically denies having [ever]
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the
truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate
members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the
respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene
is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . .

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed
a special relationship between him and complainants wife, Irene, [which]taken together
with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-1)
sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene
which resulted in the birth of the child Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it
should be noted that complainants wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was
the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with
Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation
regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not

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 categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene.
What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and known
only to the immediate members of their respective families.

A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge of Irenes daughter Samantha
Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as
the childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired information on DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate with her signature on the Marriage
Certificate shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

32. SALUDAGA VS FEU 4/30/2008

Principle:

The third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a third party who is neither a party nor
privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of
court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party
defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the
plaintiffs claim. The third-party complaint is actually independent of and separate and distinct from
the plaintiffs complaint. Were it not for this provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed
independently and separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-
party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-party defendant or so to speak, to litigate
his separate cause of action in respect of plaintiffs claim against a third-party in the original and
principal case with the object of avoiding circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law
suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation the entire subject matter arising from one
particular set of facts.[

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) when
he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the school premises. He was
rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the wound he sustained. Meanwhile,
Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually
released considering that no formal complaint was filed against him.

Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they breached
their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to
learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and Management
Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within its
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premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxys President, to indemnify them for whatever would be
adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any; and to pay attorneys fees and cost of the suit. On the other hand, Galaxy
and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP General Insurance. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision
REVERSING AND SETTING the decision of the RTC. The complaint filed by Joseph Saludaga against appellant Far
Eastern University and its President is DISMISSED. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied;
hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether FEU’s third party claim against Galaxy is proper.

HELD:
Yes.

The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby a third party who is neither a
party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with
leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party
defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the
plaintiffs claim. The third-party complaint is actually independent of and separate and distinct from
the plaintiffs complaint. Were it not for this provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed
independently and separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-
party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-party defendant or so to speak, to litigate
his separate cause of action in respect of plaintiffs claim against a third-party in the original and
principal case with the object of avoiding circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law
suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation the entire subject matter arising from one
particular set of facts.[33]

Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective claims and defenses in the course of the trial
of petitioners complaint. Evidence duly supports the findings of the trial court that Galaxy is negligent not only in
the selection of its employees but also in their supervision. Indeed, no administrative sanction was imposed against
Rosete despite the shooting incident; moreover, he was even allowed to go on leave of absence which led
eventually to his disappearance. Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioners condition or extend the necessary
assistance, other than the P5,000.00 initially given to petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to make good their
pledge to reimburse petitioners medical expenses.

For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualified security guard,
which resulted to the latters breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU
for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.

33. TAYERO VS MENCOZA 4/12/2005

34. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE VS UCPB GEN. INSURANCE COMPANY 7/4/2008

Page 33 of 82
  RULE 7
35. PACQUING VS COCA-COLA 1/31/2008
36. CAGAYAN VALLEY CORP VS CIR 2/13/2008
37. PCI TRAVEL VS NLRC 10/31/2008
38. VALLACAR TRANSIT INC VS CATUBIG 5/30/2011

 RULE 8
39. CAPITAL MOTORS INC VS YABUT 32 SCRA 1

 RULE 9
40. CATON VS PALANCA JR. 9/7/2008
41. GOMEZ VS MONTALVAN 3/14/2008
42. HEIRS OF MAGUIAT ET AL VS CA 8/20/2008

43. LIM TANHO VS RAMOLETE 8/29/1975

Facts:
 Plaintiff brought suit against several defendants for accounting of real and personal properties as well as
for the recovery of the same with damages.
 Some of the defendants did not appear at the pretrial and were declared in default.
 After the trial started, the court on motion of the plaintiff, dismissed the case as against the non-defaulted
defendants, received evidence ex parte and rendered decision.
 Actions taken by the court were contested in a certiorari.

Held:

Paragraph c of section 3, Rule 9 provides;

c) Effect of partial default—when a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against
several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all
upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.

In all instances where a common cause of action is alleged against several defendants, some of whom answer and
the others do not, the latter or those in default acquire a vested right not only to own the defense interposed in the
answer of their co- defendant or co-defendants not in default but also to expect a result of the litigation totally
common with them in kind and in amount whether favorable or unfavorable.

Since the singleness of the cause of action also inevitably implies that all the defendants are indispensable parties,
the court's power to act is integral and cannot be split such that it cannot relieve any of them and at the same time
render judgment against the rest.

Considering the tenor of the section in question, it is to be assumed that when any defendant allows himself to be
declared in default knowing that his defendant has already answered, he does so trusting in the assurance implicit
in the rule that his default is in essence a mere formality that deprives him of no more than the right to take part in
the trial and that the court would deem anything done by or for the answering defendant as done by or for him.
The presumption is that otherwise he would not -have seen to that he would not be in default.

Of course, he has to suffer the consequences of whatever the answering defendant may do or fail to do, regardless
of possible adverse consequences, but if the complaint has to be dismissed in so far as the answering defendant is
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concerned it becomes his inalienable right that the same be dismissed also as to him. drawal must be deemed to be
a confession of weakness as to all.

 RULE 10
44. SWAGMAN VS CA 4/8/2005

Facts:

 Swagman Hotel through its representatives obtained a loan from Neal Christian a loan payable after 3 years
and with interest per annum payable every 3 mos.
 After a year, Swagman suffered business reverses prompting it to renegotiate the terms of the loan with
Christian.
 It was agreed that Christian waives the payment of interest and that the principal loan shall be paid every
month instead of quarterly.
 Barely 2 years after however, Christian sent a letter informing the corporation that he is terminating the
loans and demanding the total amount of the loan and unpaid interests.
 Neal filed a complaint for sum of money and damages.
 Swagman answered that the complaint is dismissible for lack of cause of action since the loan is not yet due
and demandable.
 RTC held in favor of Christian stating that although there was no cause of action at the filing of the
complaint, the debt has already matured during the days the hearings were held thus making it due as of
date.

Issue:

Whether or not a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of a
cause of action during the pendency of the case.

Held:

Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to
maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. Such an
action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court upon
proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The underlying reason for this rule is that a person should not be
summoned before the public tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature.

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It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps, no exception, either at law or in equity, that to recover at all there
must be some cause of action at the commencement of the suit.

45. SANTI VS CLARAVAL G.R. 173915 2/22/2010

Facts:
 April 2004, private Kalashian filed before RTC Baguio a complaint for damages against petitioners Irene
Sante and Reynaldo Sante.
 Respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police station in Pangasinan and in the presence of other
police officers uttered the words “how many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss Bert? You
fucking bitch!”. Bert refers to a friend of respondent and one of her hired security guards and a suspect in
the killing of petitioner’s close relative.
 Petitioner also allegedly went around Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the
suspect in the aforesaid killing.
 Thus respondent prayed for the ff:
1) Moral damages 300,000.00
2) Exemplary damages 50,000.00
3) Atty’s fees 50,000.00
4) Litigation expenses 20,000.00
 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of jurisdiction claiming that the MTCC instead of RTC
should take cognizance on the ground that exemplary damages should not be included in computing the
total claim thus the amount of moral damages is the basis.
 Trial court denied the motion.
 Respondent filed an amended complaint increasing the claim for moral damages to 1million.
 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss which was denied.
 Petitioner filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA.
 CA ruled in favor of petitioners stating MTCC had jurisdiction over the case considering that the demand for
moral damages is 300,000 and the demand for exemplary is merely incidental.

Issue:
Whether or not RTC acquired jurisdiction.
Whether or not RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint.

Held:

On the issue of jurisdiction:

It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action. It is clear, based on the
allegations of the complaint, that respondents main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being
claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or
consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.

The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all
kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for
damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.

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Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling
that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

On the issue of amending the complaint:

Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the
RTCs order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the
pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle
that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the
purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the
original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right.

46. GUMABONG VS VARALIT 77 SCRA 25 (not found)

47. PARAMOUNT INSURANCE VS A.C. ORDONEZ8/26/2008

Facts:

 Petitioner Paramount is the subrogee of Maximo Mata, the registered owner of a Honda City sedan involved
in a vehicular accident with a truck mixer owned by respondent corporation and driven by respondent
Franklin A. Suspine.
 Petitioner filed before the MTC of Makati City, a complaint for damages against respondents.
 Based on the Sheriff’s Return of Service, summons remained unserved on respondent Suspine, while it was
served on respondent corporation and received by Samuel D. Marcoleta of its Receiving Section.

Issue:

Whether summons were properly served upon respondent corporation.

Held:

The petition lacks merit.

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on
the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

Section 11, Rule 14 sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers who can receive summons on behalf of a
corporation. Service of summons to someone other than the corporation’s president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, and in-house counsel, is not valid.

The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to receive summons for a domestic corporation or
partnership is limited and more clearly specified in the new rule.

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Thus, the service of summons to respondent corporation’s Receiving Section employee Samuel D. Marcoleta is
defective and not binding to said corporation.

48. MERCADER VS DBP 332 SCRA 82

PRINCIPLE:

If a party presents evidence on a matter not at issue in the pleadings, the other may object to such evidence. The
court may sustain the objection and exclude the evidence. However, the same rule likewise allows the court, in the
interest of substantial justice, to direct an amendment to the pleadings so the pleadings may conform to the
evidence. This is true despite the objection to the evidence. The evidence will then be admitted after the
amendments are made

FACTS:

On 6 January 1976, spouses Mercader executed a contract of lease with the Manreals for a period of twenty years
and four months over the portion of Lot No. 2985. The TCT was not annotated with the lease contract because
Manreal’s failed to deliver such TCT to the former despite repeated requests. However, Manreals assured the
Mercaders not to worry since nothing will go wrong. Believing in the Manreals’ assurances, Mercader introduced
several improvements thereon. Subsequently, Mercaders discovered that the reason why the Manreals failed to
deliver the TCT of Lot No. 2985 was because they offered said lot including the improvements introduced by the
Mercaders thereon as "collateral" for a P150,000 deep-sea fishing loan with the DBP. Since the Manreals defaulted
in the payment of their obligation to the DBP, and that the latter had taken steps to foreclose Lot No. 2985
including all the improvements thereon. MERCADERs prayed for the DBP to "respect their interests by excluding
these from the foreclosure proceedings and also prayed for the annotation of their interests in the TCT of Lot No.
2985.

During the pre-trial stage DBP offered MERCADERs three options: 1.) Sale 2.) Lease-Purchase 3.) Lease.
MERCADERs chose Lease-Purchase. However, the counsel of defendant manifested that it was only a proposal. The
trial court ordered the Manreals dropped from the case. On 6 September 1988, the trial court order and resolved in
favor of the MERCADERs on the ground that the "DBP had unnecessarily and unjustifiably made Mercader
understand that his second option [lease-purchase] would be more or less approved, except that the approval will
come from Manila. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in treating the lease-purchase
option as a controversial issue considering that it was outside the parties' pleadings. The Court of Appeals,
reversed the appealed judgment.

(During the trial, Mercader offered evidence on an issue not alleged in the pleadings. DBP objected to the
introduction of such evidence.)

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC may admit the evidence

SC RULING:

Yes.

Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. -- When issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to
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be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and
the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party
to meet such evidence.

This provision envisions two scenarios -- first, when evidence is introduced on an issue not alleged in the
pleadings and no objection was interjected and second, when evidence is offered again, on an issue not
alleged in the pleadings but this time an objection was interpolated. We are concerned with the second
scenario. In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, the Court held that "when evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the
pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party, where the latter fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the
court may grant him a continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence. Of course, the
court, before allowing the evidence, as a matter of formality, should allow an amendment of the pleading, xxx And,
furthermore, where the failure to order an amendment does not appear to have caused surprise or prejudice to the
objecting party, it may be allowed as a harmless error. Well-known is the rule that departures from procedure may
be forgiven where they do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties.

In the case at bar, DBP would not be prejudiced by the incorporation of the lease-purchase option as one of the
controverted issues. Moreover, it had been afforded ample opportunity to refute and object to the evidence
germane thereto, thus, the rudiments of fair play had been properly observed.

When evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection
of the adverse party, where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice
him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a continuance to enable him to meet
the new situation created by the evidence. Of course, the court, before allowing the evidence, as a matter of
formality, should allow an amendment of the pleading.

 RULE 12
49. NEYPES CASE

PRINCIPLE:

Fresh period rule:

 To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule
45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.

 A party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC’s decision or file
it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed
petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy
of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
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reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal
and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in
an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed
the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were
well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that
the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February
12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order”
appealable under the Rules.

ISSUES:

(1) What final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.

(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

SC RULING:

(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the final order.

In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly
dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When
the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received
another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise
dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15
days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC
reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered
the order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues
involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated
July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

(2) YES.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

Page 40 of 82
  RULE 14
50. SAGANA VS FRANCISCO 602 SCRA 184

PRINCIPLE:

 The diligent efforts exerted by the sheriff to locate the respondent were determined, not only based on the
sheriff's return, but also on the process server's notation and case records.

 Jurisprudence has long established that for substituted service of summons to be valid, the following must
be demonstrated: (a) that personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) that
efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient
age and discretion residing at the party's residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's
office or regular place of business. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these
circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer's return.

FACTS:

Petioner filed a Complaint, before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to recover damages alleging that on
November 1992, respondent with intent to kill him and without justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting him
on the right thigh.

On January 31, 1995, Process Server attempted to personally serve summons at respondent’s address at No. 36
Sampaguita Street, Baesa Q.C., but was unsuccessful. In his Servers Return, he stated that the occupant in that
house refused to give his identity and that respondent is unknown at said residence. The Trial Court also
attempted to serve summons to the respondent’s office through registered mail, however, respondent failed to pick
up summons.

(To make it short… sige lang og wala sa balay ang defendant)

ISSUE:

Whether the substituted service of summons was validly made upon respondent through his brother.

SC RULING:

Yes.

Jurisprudence has long established that for substituted service of summons to be valid, the following must be
demonstrated: (a) that personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) that efforts were
exerted to locate the party; and (c) that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing at the party's residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's office or regular place of
business. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of
service or in the officer's return.

In this case, personal service of summons was twice attempted by the trial court, although unsuccessfully. In the
first attempt, the resident of the house refused to receive the summons; worse, he would not even give his name. In
the second attempt, respondent’s own brother refused to sign for receipt of the summons, and then later claimed
that he never received a copy, despite his participation in the proceedings. The trial court also thrice attempted to
contact the respondent through his place of work, but to no avail. These diligent efforts to locate the respondent
were noted in the first sheriff's return, the process server's notation, as well as the records of the case.

Clearly, personal service of summons was made impossible by the acts of the respondent in refusing to reveal his
whereabouts, and by the act of his brother in claiming that respondent no longer lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., yet
Page 41 of 82
failing to disclose his brother's location. We also note that it was the trial court which directed that the second
service of summons be made within seven days; thus, the reasonable time was prescribed by the trial court itself.

Undeniably, no Sheriff’s Return was prepared by process server Jarvis Iconar; the only record of the second service
of summons was Mr. Iconar’s handwritten notation in the summons itself. However, the information required by
law and prevailing jurisprudence, that is, that personal service was impossible because of the claim that
respondent no longer lived at the stated address, that efforts were exerted to locate the respondent through the
multiple attempts to serve summons, and that summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion,
were already in the records of the trial court.

Moreover, we find the claim that respondent moved out of their residence in March 1993 without informing his
brother or parents his whereabouts, despite regular calls and letters, simply incredulous. What makes this version
of events even more implausible is respondent’s admission that he received a copy of the trial court's Decision of
20 September 1999 that was sent to No. 36 Sampaguita Street. Respondent even filed a Notice of Appeal
coincidentally indicating that his address was No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City. He also received a copy of
the appellate court’s order for preliminary conference that was sent to said address. These were never denied by
respondent, despite being given every opportunity to do so. Respondent also wishes us to believe that it was pure
chance that he and his brother were assisted by the same lawyer, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, and yet it never
occurred to respondent’s own brother or lawyer to inform him about the receipt of summons. All these militate
against respondent’s self-serving declaration that he did not reside at No. 36 Sampaguita St. Indeed, there was no
proof presented as to when respondent left and then returned to his original home, if he actually did leave his
home.

Although, in general, the statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully
and that any substituted service other than that authorized by Rules is considered ineffective. The Supreme Court
ruled that strict application of the Rules is not warranted to this case as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of laws
as well as do injustice to the parties waiting almost 15 years for resolution of this case.

The respondents actively attempt to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to give their identity,
rebuffing requests to sign for or receive documents or eluding the officers of court. Respondent tried to avoid the
service of summons, prompting the court to declare that sheriff must be resourceful, but sheriffs cannot be faulted
of the respondent themselves engage in deception to thwart the orderly administration of justice.

51. ATKINS KROLL AND CO VS DOMINGO

FACTS:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by Atkins, Kroll & Company, Inc., against
Santiago Domingo, for the purpose of enforcing recognition of its alleged right of ownership over lot No. thirty-
eight (38) of the cadastral plan of the Zamboanga townsite, expediente No. 7880, and to recover possession of the
same from the defendant, and at the same time to secure a partition of lots Nos. 36 and 55 in the same plan,
according to the proportional interests pertaining to the plaintiff and defendant as joint owners thereof.

HISTORY OF THE TITLE:

Buenaventura Domingo (OWNER OF THE ESTATE) died intestate on October 21, 1912, leaving a widow and a
number of children and grandchildren as heirs. One of his sons, namely, Santiago Domingo, the defendant in this
case, qualified on October 29, 1914, as administrator of his estate.

The share of Santiago Domingo so far as affects lots Nos. 36 and 55, has remained undisturbed and said interest is
still vested in him. It is different with lot No. 38, for on February 17, 1922, the said Santiago Domingo sold his
Page 42 of 82
entire interest in lot No. 38, "with all the improvements existing thereon," by contract of sale with pacto de
retro to one Ong Kong. The interest thus sold was subject to repurchase within the period of one year, but
redemption was never effected; and on February 17, 1923, the property was duly consolidated in Ong Kong. On
February 19, 1923, Ong Kong sold his entire interest in the lot and improvements thereon to the present plaintiff,
Atkins, Kroll & Co.

DEFENDANT’S ASSERTION:

BUILDINGS were not included since they were built by him with his own money and with the consent of his
father.

ISSUE:

WON improvements in the lots sold were included in the sale

RULING:

YES.

It is to be noted that defendant had previously filed a notice of lispendens setting forth his claim of ownership as to
the improvements in question, and referring to the controversy planted in his explanatory report in the
administration proceedings. Notice of said lis pendens was noted on the back of the corresponding certificates of
title. Upon the date stated the plaintiff had already acquired a mortgage upon the interest of Zoila Domingo
in the estate of her grandfather, Buenaventura Domingo; and by the foreclosure of that mortgage all of her
interest in lots Nos. 36 and 38 became vested in the plaintiff as purchaser. The remaining interests
acquired by the plaintiff in the same properties appear to have been acquired by it after the notice of lis
pendens was filed.

As will be seen, the filing of the lis pendens was intended to affect third persons with notice of the claim which the
defendant had asserted in his explanatory report in the proceedings over the state of Buenaventura Domingo. But
it will be remembered that the efforts of the defendant to get his claim recognized in those proceedings completely
failed of effect. For this reason the lis pendens must be considered to have lost its efficacy. The effect of notice by lis
pendens is, of course, to charge the stranger with notice of the particular litigation referred to in the notice, and, if
the notice is effective, the stranger who acquires the property affected by the lis pendens takes subject to the
eventuality of the litigation. But when the adverse right fails in such litigation, the lis pendens becomes innocuous.

It should be noted that the defendant, supposing his claim to have been made in good faith, might have protected it,
at any time before the property had passed into the hands of a third person, by a proceeding under section 112 of
Act No. 496. Said section declares that any person may at any time apply by petition to the court, where "new
interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate," and procure such interests to be
noted. Such a petition must be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was
entered. (Sec. 112, par. 2, Act No. 496.)

In Blass vs. De la Cruz and Melendres (37 Phil., 1), this court held that the registration of land in the name of a
particular person vests in him not only the title to the land but also the title to the improvements thereon, unless
special reservation is noted with respect to the improvements. In that case the improvements which became the
subject of controversy had been placed on the land before it was registered and the decree of registration was res
judicata as to the improvements. In the case before us the buildings which are the subject of controversy were
placed on the land after the decree of registration. This circumstance made a proceeding under section 12 of Act
No. 496 all the more necessary in order to protect the new interest thus created. So far as registered land is
concerned, the right recognized in article 361 and related provisions of the Civil Code is subject to the contingency
that it shall be noted in the registered title before the property passes into the hand of a purchaser for value.
Page 43 of 82
The considerations so far adduced apply alike to the improvements on lots Nos. 36 and 38, but there is another
circumstance which is fatal to the defendant's claim to any of the improvements on lot No. 38. This is found in the
fact that he sold his interest in said lot, including the improvements, to Ong Kong, the plaintiff's predecessor in
interest. It is evident that the defendant is estopped by his own deed from claiming any interest in the buildings on
this lot, whatever might have been the law governing his claim to the buildings on the other lot.

From what has been said it is evidence that the trial court was in error in declaring the defendant to be the owner
of the buildings on lots Nos. 36 and 38 and in failing to require the defendant to account; and in order to clarify the
situation we declare: (1) That the ownership of the lots Nos. 36, 38, and 55, is as stated in the Torrens certificates
of title Nos. 3433, 3843, and 3435 (Exhibits A, B, and C of the plaintiff); (2) that the plaintiff is entitled to
possession of lot No. 38 and that partition must be made of lots Nos. 36 and 55 in the manner provided by law; (3)
the plaintiff is further entitled to recover of the defendant such portion of the defendant and which shall have been
paid by the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff shall also recover of the defendant such portion of the rents of said properties
as correspond to the interests of the plaintiff since its acquisition of the same.

The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion,
without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

52. MANOTOK VS CA 5PHIL 454

Facts:

Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons addressed to petitioner at Alexandra
Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.

The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker
of petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier. When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court
declared her in default. Petitioner, filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court
over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons.

Trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss and relied on the presumption that the sheriff’s substituted
service was made in the regular performance of official duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of proof
to the contrary.

Issue: Whether or not the Substituted service was valid.

Held:

NO.

Requirements for Substituted Service, Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to this
case can be broken down to the following requirements: (1)Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service (2)Specific
Details in the Return (3)A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion (4)A Competent Person in Charge

A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious
efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return
why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or
unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of “on many occasions several attempts were made to serve

Page 44 of 82
the summons . . . personally,” “at reasonable hours during the day,” and “to no avail for the reason that the said
defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises.”

Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant
through more direct means. Respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the
requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the
proceedings held before the trial court perforce must be annulled.

53. YUK LING ONG VS CO G.R. 206653 2/24/2015

Facts:

Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent Benjamin Co (respondent), a
Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate Church.

Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) directing her to appear before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to
cancellation proceedings. Reportedly, her marriage with respondent was nullified by the court.

When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the following documents: (1)
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0177; (2) petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306; (3) Decision, dated December 11, 2002, in Civil Case No.
02-0306 of the RTC, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio; and (4) their
marriage contract with the subject decision annotated thereon. The above documents showed that respondent
filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC docketed as Civil
Case No. CV-01-0177. Respondent stated that petitioner’s address was 600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila. Respondent
filed another petition for declaration of Nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC, docketed
as Civil Case No. 02-0306. Respondent indicated that petitioner’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa
Garden Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons. In his Server’s Return, process server
Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy of the petition was
effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on petitioner. The said documents were received
by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security officer.

On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 finding respondent’s marriage with
petitioner as void ab initio. It stated that summons was served on petitioner on August 1, 2002, but she failed to file
her responsive pleading within the reglementary period. The public prosecutor also stated that there were no
indicative facts to manifest collusion. Thus, the RTC concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated.

Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA claiming that she was never
notified of the cases filed against her. She prayed that the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306, be nullified on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner alleged that jurisdiction over her person was not
acquired in Civil Case No. 02-0306 because of an invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient
explanation, showing impossibility of personal service, was stated before resorting to substituted service of
summons; third, the alleged substituted service was made on a security guard of their townhouse and not on a
member of her household; and fourth, she was not psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
obligations.

Page 45 of 82
Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The CA rendered the assailed decision finding the petition for annulment of
judgment to be devoid of merit. It held that there was no sufficient proof to establish that respondent employed
fraud to insure petitioner’s non-participation in the trial of Civil Case No. CV-01-0177.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 02-0306 validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.

Ruling:

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the
subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of
summons or other processes on the petitioner.

In the present case, petitioner contends that there was lack of jurisdiction over her person because there was an
invalid substituted service of summons. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court,
jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which state:

Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided
in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the rigorous requirements of a substituted
service of summons, to wit: xxx
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

xxx

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons
within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts"
means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts
made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the
attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house
of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify
substituted service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

Page 46 of 82
 xxx

The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the
recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and
his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be
clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the case at bench, the summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was issued on July 29, 2002. In his server’s return, the
process server resorted to substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server
immediately opted for substituted service of summons after only two (2) days from the issuance of the summons.
The server’s return stated the following:

SERVER’S RETURN
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with copy of petition, were effected to respondent, Yuk Ling H. Ong, at the Unit
B-2, No. 23 Sta. Rosa St., Manresa Garden Homes, Manresa Garden City, Quezon City, after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The said
documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.

Therefore, respectfully returning to Court, original copy of summons, Duly Served, this 2nd day of August, 2002.

RODOLFO P. TORRES, JR.

Process Server

The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally
serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was effected after
several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made
to perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made; and
the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to
locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner,
though futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted service.

The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It
simply stated that the summons was received "by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security
Officer thereat." It did not expound on the competence of the security officer to receive the summons.

Also, aside from the server’s return, respondent failed to indicate any portion of the records which would describe
the specific attempts to personally serve the summons. Respondent did not even claim that petitioner made any
voluntary appearance and actively participated in Civil Case No. 02-0306.

The case of Robinson v. Miralles, cited by the CA, is not applicable. In that case, the return described in thorough
detail how the security guard refused the sheriff’s entry despite several attempts. The defendant in the said case
specifically instructed the guard to prevent anybody to proceed to her residence. In the present case, the
attempts made by the process server were stated in a broad and ambiguous statement.

Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is not inclined to uphold the CA's
denial of the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because there
was an invalid substituted service of summons. Accordingly, the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 must be
declared null and void.

The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address "[t]he numerous claims of
irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special
civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal
expenses."

Page 47 of 82
 54. BELEN VS CHAVEZ

FACTS:

Spouses Pacleb (private respondents) filed an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment against spouses
Belen (petitioners). The complaint alleged that the Pacleb secured a judgment by default rendered by Judge John
W. Green of the Superior Court of the State of California, which ordered the spouses Belen to pay $56,204.69
representing loan repayment and share in the profits plus interest and costs of suit. The summons was served on
the Belen’s address in Laguna, as was alleged in the complaint, and received by Marcelo M. Belen.

1. Spouses Belen filed an answer alleging that they were actually residents of California and that their liability
had already been extinguished via a release abstract judgment issued in the collection case abroad.
2. For failure to attend the pre-trial conference, the RTC ordered the ex parte presentation of evidence for
Pacleb.
3. Belen subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss citing the judgment of dismissal issued by the Superior Court
of California; however the MTD was dismissed for failure to submit a copy of the judgment of dismissal
4. Spouses Pacleb, for their part, filed for the amendment of the complaint, stating that they withdrew the
complaint (in California) because of the prohibitive cost of litigation.
5. For failure of spouses Belen to appear in the rescheduled pre-trial conference, RTC declared Belen in
default and allowed the presentation of ex parte evidence. In the meantime, the counsel (Alcantara) of
petitioners died without the RTC being informed of such fact. The RTC ruled against Belen and ordered
them to pay Pacleb
6. A copy of the decision was sent to Atty. Alcantara but was returned with the notation “addressee deceased.”
A copy of the same was then sent to the last known address of spouses Belen in Laguna. Atty. Culvera, the
new counsel of spouses Belen, filed a motion to quash the Writ of Execution as well as a notice of appeal.
The RTC denied the same.
7. Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 65) alleging that CA committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to quash the writ of execution and notice of appeal despite
sufficient legal bases in support thereof.

ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners through either the proper service of
summons or the appearance of Atty. Alcantara on behalf of petitioners

HELD:

Yes. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction
over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. As a rule, if defendants have not been
summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and
void. To be bound by a decision, a party should first be subject to the court’s jurisdiction.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can
be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Sec 7, Rule 14 ROC. If he cannot be personally
served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Sec 8 of said
Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1)
substituted service set forth in Sec 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by
publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Page 48 of 82
In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself
to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is physically present in
the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore
cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An exception was laid down in Gemperle v.
Schenker wherein a non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who was a resident of the
Philippines and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him;
moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case.

CAB: the records of the case reveal that spouses Belen were permanent residents of California. It has been
consistently maintained that they were not physically resent in the Philippines. Therefore, the service of summons
in the petitioners’ address in Laguna was defective and did not serve to vest in court jurisdiction over their person.
Nevertheless, the CA correctly concluded that the appearance of Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous
pleadings were sufficient to vest such jurisdiction. By supplying the court with various documents that could only
have been supplied by spouses Belen, implied authorization could be gleaned from such. In sum, there was
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC.

The running of the fifteen-day period for appeal did not commence upon the service of the RTC decision at the
address on record of Atty. Alcantara or at the Laguna address. It is deemed served on petitioners only upon its
receipt by Atty. Culvera on 29 December 2003. Therefore, the filing of the Notice of Appeal on 06 January 2004 is
within the reglementary period and should be given due course.

55. ROBINSON VS MIRALLES 510 SCRA 678

Facts:

On August 25, 2000, Celita Miralles, respondent, filed with the said court a complaint for sum of money against
Remelita Robinson, petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-0372. Respondent alleged that petitioner borrowed
from her US$20,054.00 as shown by a Memorandum of Agreement they both executed on January 12, 2000.

Summons was served on petitioner at her given address. However, per return of service of Sheriff Maximo Potente
dated March 5, 2001, petitioner no longer resides at such address.

On July 20, 2001, the trial court issued an alias summons to be served at No. 19 Baguio St., Alabang Hills,
Muntinlupa City, petitioner’s new address.

Again, the summons could not be served on petitioner. Sheriff Potente explained that:

The Security Guard assigned at the gate of Alabang Hills refused to let me go inside the subdivision so that I
could effect the service of the summons to the defendant in this case. The security guard alleged that the
defendant had given them instructions not to let anybody proceed to her house if she is not around. I
explained to the Security Guard that I am a sheriff serving the summons to the defendant, and if the
defendant is not around, summons can be received by any person of suitable age and discretion living in
the same house. Despite of all the explanation, the security guard by the name of A.H. Geroche still refused
to let me go inside the subdivision and served (sic) the summons to the defendant. The same thing
happened when I attempted to serve the summons previously.

Therefore, the summons was served by leaving a copy thereof together with the copy of the complaint to
the security guard by the name of A.H. Geroche, who refused to affix his signature on the original copy
thereof, so he will be the one to give the same to the defendant.
Page 49 of 82
Eventually, respondent filed a motion to declare petitioner in default for her failure to file an answer seasonably
despite service of summons.

On February 28, 2003, the trial court granted respondent’s motion declaring petitioner in default and allowing
respondent to present her evidence ex parte and render judgment thereby.

On September 26, 2003, petitioner filed with the trial court a petition for relief from the judgment by default. She
claimed that summons was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
her and that all its proceedings are void.

Issue:

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the trial court correctly ruled that a substituted service of summons
upon petitioner has been validly effected.

Ruling:

Yes. Summons has been validly effected.

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her.3 In a civil action,
service of summons is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.4 Any
judgment without such service, in the absence of a valid waiver, is null and void.5 Where the action is in personam
and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted
service in the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, 6 thus:

SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by
leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.

Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over substituted service, the latter mode of
service being a method extraordinary in character.7 For substituted service to be justified, the following
circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was
impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of
sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s
office or place of business.8 Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds. 9
(Requisites for a valid substituted service of summon)

We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully
and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. 10 However, we frown
upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that
governs.

In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The
latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed to her residence whenever she
is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons upon
petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor did she deny having received the
summons through the security guard.
Page 50 of 82
Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the
trial court that summons has been properly served upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over
her.

56. PARAMOUNT CORP. VS A.C. ORDONEZ 8/6/2008

Principle:

Section 11, Rule 14 sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers who can receive summons on behalf of a
corporation. Service of summons to someone other than the corporation’s president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, and in-house counsel, is not valid.

Facts:

On February 22, 2000, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, a complaint for damages
against respondents. Based on the Sheriff’s Return of Service, summons remained unserved on respondent
Suspine,5 while it was served on respondent corporation and received by Samuel D. Marcoleta of its Receiving
Section on April 3, 2000.6

On May 19, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default; however, on June 28, 2000,
respondent corporation filed an Omnibus Motion (And Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default) alleging that summons was improperly served upon it because it was made to a secretarial staff who was
unfamiliar with court processes; and that the summons was received by Mr. Armando C. Ordoñez, President and
General Manager of respondent corporation only on June 24, 2000. Respondent corporation asked for an extension
of 15 days within which to file an Answer.

Issue:

Whether there was proper service of summons to respondent

Ruling: NO.

The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to receive summons for a domestic corporation or
partnership is limited and more clearly specified in the new rule. The phrase ‘agent, or any of its directors’ has
been conspicuously deleted. Moreover, the argument of substantial compliance is no longer compelling. We have
ruled that the new rule, as opposed to Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court, is restricted, limited and
exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of
Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have done so in clear and
concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is required.9

Thus, the service of summons to respondent corporation’s Receiving Section through Samuel D. Marcoleta is
defective and not binding to said corporation.

Page 51 of 82
 57. CATHAY METAL CORP VS LAGUNA WEST MULTIPURPOSE INC. G.R. 172204 7/2/2014

Principle:

The Rules of Court governs court procedures, including the rules on service of notices and summons. The
Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under the Rules of Court. Rule 14,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons
for juridical entities. These persons are the juridical entity’s president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

FACTS:

On September 15, 2000, petitioner filed a consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse claims on its
transfer certificates of title with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City. It served a copy of the petition by
registered mail to respondent's alleged official address at “Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna.” The petition was
returned to sender because respondent could not be found at that address. The postman issued a certification
stating that the reason for the return was that the “cooperative [was] not existing.” Petitioner allegedly attempted
to serve the petition upon respondent personally. However, this service failed for the same reason.

Upon petitioner's motion, the Regional Trial Court issued an order allowing petitioner’s substituted service,
apparently by registered mail. Petitioner was later allowed to present its evidence ex parte.

Upon learning that a case involving its adverse claim was pending, respondent, through Mr. Orlando dela Peña,
filed a manifestation and motion, alleging that respondent never received a copy of the summons and the
petition. It moved for the service of the summons and for a copy of the petition to be sent to No. 160, Narra Avenue,
Looc, Calamba, Laguna.

Issue: Whether the respondent was validly served with summons.

HELD:

The respondent was not validly served with summons or notice of the hearing.

The petitioner is mistaken in relying upon the provisions of the cooperative code. The promulgation of the Rules of
Procedure is among the powers vested only in this court. This means that on matters relating to procedures in
court, it shall be the Rules of Procedure that will govern. Proper court procedures shall be determined by the Rules
as promulgated by this court.

Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or special proceeding is court procedure.
Hence, it shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure.

The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to cooperatives’ activities as administered by the
Cooperative Development Authority. However, they are not procedural rules that will govern court processes. A
Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an official address to which all notices and
communications shall be sent cannot take the place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning a
court proceeding.

Page 52 of 82
This is not to say that the notices cannot be sent to cooperatives in accordance with the Cooperative Code. Notices
may be sent to a cooperative’s official address. However, service of notices sent to the official address in
accordance with the Cooperative Code may not be used as a defense for violations of procedures, specially when
such violation affects another party’s rights.

58. A.M. 11-3-6-SC (AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12)

AM No. 11-3-6-SC; new rule on service of summons on foreign juridical entities.

AM. No. 11-3-6-SC

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 •

OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE UPON
FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY
Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is hereby amended to read
as follows:

"SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. —

When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which
has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made
on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that
purpose, or, i f there be no such agent, on the government
official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers
or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in

the Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave
of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the
following means:

a) B y personal service coursed through the

appropriate court in the foreign country with the
assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs;

b) B y publication once in a newspaper of general

circulation in the country where the defendant may be
found and by serving a copy of the summons and the
court order by-registered mail at the last known address
of the defendant;

c) B y facsimile or any recognized electronic

means that could generate proof of service; or

d) B y such other means as the court may in its

discretion direct."

This rule shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Page 53 of 82
 59. GLOBAL BUSINESS CORP VS SURECOFF G.R. 173463 10/13/2010

Principle:
In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country to the jurisdiction of our courts, it must
acquire a license from the Securities and Exchange Commission and appoint an agent for service of process.
Without such license, it cannot institute a suit in the Philippines.

The exception to this rule is the doctrine of estoppel. Global is estopped from challenging Surecomps capacity to
sue.

FACTS:
On March 29, 1999, respondent Surecomp Software, B.V. (Surecomp), a foreign corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Netherlands, entered into a software license agreement with Asian Bank Corporation
(ABC), a domestic corporation, for the use of its IMEX Software System (System) in the banks computer system for
a period of twenty (20) years. In July 2000, ABC merged with petitioner Global Business Holdings, Inc. (Global),
with Global as the surviving corporation. When Global took over the operations of ABC, it found the System
unworkable for its operations, and informed Surecomp of its decision to discontinue with the agreement and to
stop further payments thereon. Consequently, for failure of Global to pay its obligations under the agreement
despite demands, Surecomp filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1278. In its complaint, Surecomp alleged that it is a
foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines and is suing on an isolated transaction. Pursuant to the
agreement, it installed the System in ABCs computers for a consideration of US$298,000.00 as license fee. ABC also
undertook to pay Surecomp professional services, which included on-site support and development of interfaces,
and annual maintenance fees for five (5) subsequent anniversaries, and committed to purchase one (1) or two (2)
Remote Access solutions at discounted prices. In a separate transaction, ABC requested Surecomp to purchase on
its behalf a software called MF Cobol Runtime with a promise to reimburse its cost. Notwithstanding the delivery of
the product and the services provided, Global failed to pay and comply with its obligations under the agreement.
Thus, Surecomp demanded payment of actual damages amounting to US$319,955.00 and an additional amount of
US$227,610.00 for Globals unilateral pretermination of the agreement, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
costs of suit. Instead of filing an answer, Global filed a motion to dismiss based on two grounds: (1) that Surecomp
had no capacity to sue because it was doing business in the Philippines without a license; and (2) that the claim on
which the action was founded was unenforceable under the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether Surecomp had capacity to sue

HELD:

Yes, Global is estopped from questioning the capacity of Surecomp.

Page 54 of 82
The determination of a corporations capacity is a factual question that requires the elicitation of a preponderant
set of facts. As a rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations doing business in the Philippines cannot file
suits in the Philippines. This is mandated under Section 133 of the Corporation Code, which reads:

Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the
Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or
intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines,
but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative
tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

A corporation has a legal status only within the state or territory in which it was organized. For this reason, a
corporation organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the Philippines. In order to subject a
foreign corporation doing business in the country to the jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from
the Securities and Exchange Commission and appoint an agent for service of process. Without such license, it
cannot institute a suit in the Philippines.

The exception to this rule is the doctrine of estoppel. Global is estopped from challenging Surecomps capacity to
sue.

A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without license may sue in Philippine courts a Filipino
citizen or a Philippine entity that had contracted with and benefited from it. A party is estopped from challenging
the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. The
principle is applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its
noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract.

Due to Globals merger with ABC and because it is the surviving corporation, it is as if it was the one which entered
into contract with Surecomp. In the merger of two existing corporations, one of the corporations survives and
continues the business, while the other is dissolved, and all its rights, properties, and liabilities are acquired by the
surviving corporation. This is particularly true in this case. Based on the findings of fact of the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, under the terms of the merger or consolidation, Global assumed all the liabilities and obligations of ABC as
if it had incurred such liabilities or obligations itself. In the same way, Global also has the right to exercise all
defenses, rights, privileges, and counter-claims of every kind and nature which ABC may have or invoke under the
law. These findings of fact were never contested by Global in any of its pleadings filed before this Court.

60. CARRIAGA JR. VS MALAYA 143 SCRA 441

DOCTRINE:
Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper: (1) when the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
Page 55 of 82
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such an action
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and
(4) when defendant non-resident’s property has been attached within the Philippines. In any of such four cases, the
service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways: (1) by personal
service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant; and (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

FACTS:
Ana Almonte Cariaga Soon filed in her behalf and in behalf of her minor daughter Carolina, an action for (1)
Annulment of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Property, (2) Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT), (3) Recovery of Real Property with damages.All defendants in that action filed an Answer with counterclaim
except for Jose and Marieta Carriaga who were both residing abroad and were not served with summons. Upon
motion of Ana, the lower court granted them leave to effectuate extra-territorial service of summons to Jose and
Marieta pursuant to Secs. 7, 17 & 18 of Rule 14, Rules of Court. Hence, summons with copies of the complaint were
served to Jose and Marieta by registered mail abroad. The defendants filed a motion to set aside the said summons
and to declare the service of summons abroad by registered mail as null and void, it being allegedly irregular and
unauthorized, to which motion plaintiffs filed their opposition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the service of summons by registered mail upon defendants is one which is contemplated within
the principles laid down in the provisions of Secs. 17, 7 and 22, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:
Yes.
Section 17. Extraterritorial service. —When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under Section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall
be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60)
days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.

Sec. 7. Personal service of summons. The summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant
in person, or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.

Sec. 22.Proof of service by registered mail-service by registered mail under this rule may be proved by a
certificate of the sheriff or affidavit of the person especially authorized by the court, showing that a copy of the
summons and papers attached thereto, inclosed in an envelope and addressed to the defendant, with postage
prepaid, has been mailed, to which certificate or affidavit the registry receipt and return card shall be attached.

Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper: (1) when the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief
Page 56 of 82
demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; and (4) when defendant non-resident’s property has been attached within
the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court).

In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three
ways: (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time
as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail
to the last known address of the defendant; and (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. The
third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was substantially complied with in this case.

There is no question that the requirement of due process has been met as shown by the fact that defendants
actually received the summonses and copies of the complaint and as evidenced by the Registry Return Cards
marked as Annex A-1 (page 56-Record) and Annex B-1. Whatever defect there may have been in the service of
summons was aptly corrected by the court a quo in its assailed order dated January 16, 1978, which gave said
defendants ninety (90) days from receipt of order within which to file their responsive pleadings. Defendants have
no reason to complain that they were unaware of the action filed against them or claim that they were denied due
process.

The case of Habana v. Vamenta, et al, L-27091, June 30, 1970, or 33 SCRA 569, cited by the petitioners in support of
their claim has no bearing in the case at bar since in said case service of summons was never made, even if
defendant knew of the case against him, while in the case under consideration, service of summons was made upon
them (although claimed erroneously by them as defective).

61. SAHAGUN VS CA G.R. 78328 6/3/1991 (SEC. 15)

DOCTRINE:
In a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant is not essential. The service of
summons by publication is required "merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process"

FACTS:
It was alleged that petitioner's spouse, Abel Sahagun (Alias Abelardo), manager of Rallye
Motor Co., Inc. (Rallye), made it appear that his company had sold a motor vehicle to Salazar who issued a
promissory note for the price and executed as security a chattel mortgage on
said vehicle in favor of Rallye. Rallye, through Abel, assigned the note and the chattel to Filinvest for valuable
consideration. When the note matured, Salazar failed to pay, compelling Filinvest to sue. However, Filinvest found
that the mortgaged car had not been delivered to Salazar by Abel. A writ of attachment was issued and levied on a
house and lot in Las Pinas, registered in Abel's name. Petitioner (Carmelita) and her children had been
continuously residing in said house and claims ownership, having allegedly paid for it with her own earnings.

The TC denied the respondent's motion to declare Abel in default but directed it to "take
steps to effect service of summons and complaint upon defendant, whose whereabouts
in the US was unknown. The TC later dismissed the complaint of Filinvest for failure to serve
summons extra-territorially upon Abel despite said order. Filinvest filed an MR praying that
said order be reconsidered and set aside and that Abel be declared in default and to deny
petitioner's motion for leave. TC granted petitioner time to file intervention and denied
the motion to declare Abel in default. Petitioner intervened, questioning the jurisdiction of the TC. Petitioner was

Page 57 of 82
declared in default for failure to appear, as was Abel for failing to answer the complaint. The court rendered
judgment against Abel.

Petitioner elevated the case to the IAC, which granted her petition for certiorari with prohibition and set aside the
TC's aforesaid decision, ruling that petitioner was deprived of opportunity to present evidence (including evidence
she and Abel had been living separately since 1970). Filinvest filed a petition for review with the SC which was
denied. Filinvest filed a motion for leave to serve summons by publication on Abel, which the court granted, stating
that pursuant to Sec.17, Rule 14, "the summons be effected out of the Phils. by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Phils., to which this matter may be assigned after due raffle, for 3 successive days. Said
defendant was ordered to file his answer in Court within a reasonable time (not less than 60 days after notice);
that the CoC send copies of the summons and the Order by registered mail to last known address of said defendant
in Las Pinas. Plaintiff is ordered to implead Rallye as co-defendant within 1 month from notice."

Filinvest filed an amended complaint, this time impleading petitioner and Rallye as additional defendants.
Respondent court admitted the amended complaint and directed service of summons and the complaint upon Abel
at a different last known address in Antipolo. Summons was supposedly served on Abel through publication in the
Manila Evening Post according to the affidavit of publication of its president, with a confusing entry in the notice of
order which stated the Las Pinas address, contradicting the Antipolo address stated by the TC. Petitioner filed her
answer to the amended complaint. Abel and Rallye filed no answer, so Filinvest filed a motion to declare them in
default which respondent Judge Madayag of the RTC of Makati granted, but not as to Rallye since summons had not
been served upon it. Petitioner went on certiorari to the CA, assailing as grave abuse of discretion the declaration
of default of Abel; CA dismissed the petition and a subsequent MR, hence this petiton.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court acquired jurisdiction over Abel by the publication of summons in the Manila
Evening Post.

RULING:
Yes. There is no question that the facts of the present case warrant extraterritorial service of summons as
authorized by Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Admittedly, one of the defendants, Abel Sahagun, has left
the Philippines and has been residing somewhere in the United States. Per the certification of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation dated July 22, 1983, Abel Sahagun left on April 23, 1978 hence he was a nonresident
defendant at the time private respondent brought suit in the court below. Also, since the suit involves real property
wherein said defendant ostensibly has an interest and which property has in fact been attached at the instance of
private respondent, the court a quo correctly ordered service of summons on said defendant out of the Philippines,
adopting for such service one of the modes authorized by the aforecited provision of the Rules, that is, "by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order."

It was posited during the deliberations on this case that such publication of summons in a local newspaper, as
sanctioned by the trial court, was wrong and that the publication should have been made in a newspaper published
in the state and county of the United States where Abel Sahagun now allegedly resides. Such publication in a
foreign newspaper, it is claimed, would most likely give notice to the person to be served, although it is also
conceded that such condition has not been incorporated in Section 17 of Rule 14. We believe, however, that such a
sweepimg doctrine would virtually unsettle a long standing interpretation of the aforesaid rule on extraterritorial
service of summons by publication, as well as its implementation sanctioned by the practice followed in this
jurisdiction.

Page 58 of 82
In De Midgely vs. Ferandos, etc., et al.,we adverted to the disquisition in Perkins vs. Dizon, etc., et al.in this wise:

This Court clarified that in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant is
not essential. The service of summons by publication is required "merely to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of due process". The judgment of the court in the case would settle the title to the shares of stock
and to that extent it partakes of the nature of a judgment in rem. Consequently, the lower court had jurisdiction to
try the case even if it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Idonah Slade Perkins. The judgment would
be confined to the res. No personal judgment could be rendered against the non-resident.

What further compounds the difficulty in the proposed requirement for foreign publication of the summons in the
case at bar is the fact that it does not appear in what state or county of the United States the defendant Abel
Sahagun presently resides. Necessarily, if the trial court should be required to resort to publication in a foreign
newspaper it must have at hand not only the name and availability of such newspaper or periodical but also the
laws and rules governing the publication of judicial processes and notices in said place. Here, we only have a
defendant in the United States to contend with, but we can very well anticipate the plethora of problems that
would arise if the same question on nonresident defendants is replicated in the other countries of the world. In this
jurisdiction, at least, we have the corresponding regulatory guidelines in Presidential Decree No. 1079.

In fine. while there is no prohibition against availing of a foreign newspaper in extraterritorial service of summons,
neither should such publication in a local newspaper of general circulation be altogether interdicted since, after all,
the rule specifically authorizes the same to be made in such places and for such time as the court concerned may
order. If it is felt that adjective policy would be better served by denying such discretion to the trial court, then the
corresponding amendment of the present rule would be indicated but subject to empirical proof of the necessity
for and the wisdom of such a change.

Accordingly, for the nonce, the matter should continue to be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court in
each particular case since it has the facts before it, and we should interfere only in the exercise of our corrective
power over an error or abuse in its actuations in a specific case. Undeniably, some controversies may present
factual features which would justify resort to local publication of summons. There is the possibility of debtors
escaping the jurisdiction of our courts through the simple expedient of seeking a foreign refuge, probably with
their subsequent whereabouts unknown or unascertainable. For that matter, it is on that very rationale that
summons by publication is authorized whenever the address of a defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained
by diligent even if he is in the Philippines.

We repeat, service of summons on a nonresident defendant who is not found in the country is required, not for
purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the requirements of fair
play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the
Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident,
and that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, if he be so minded. The only relief that
may be granted in such an action against such a nonresident defendant, who does not choose to submit himself to
the jurisdiction of the Philippine court, is limited to the res.

However, despite our holding that publication in the Philippines is sufficient, the service of summons in this case is
still defective, there being no showing that copies of the summons and the amended complaint were duly served at
the defendant's last known correct address by registered mail, as a complement to the publication and in
compliance with the order of the lower court dated January 10, 1986,as hereinbefore noted. The failure to strictly

Page 59 of 82
comply correctly with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the summons and the order
for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.As held by to Court:

It is the duty of the court to require the fullest compliance with all the requirements of the statute permitting
service by publication. Where service is obtained by publication, the entire proceeding should be closely
scrutinized by the courts and a strict compliance with every condition of law should be exacted. Otherwise great
abuses may occur, and the rights of persons and property may be made to depend upon the elastic conscience of
interested parties rather than enlightened judgment of the court or judge.

The foregoing notwithstanding, we are not inclined to order the dismissal of the case below for non-compliance by
private respondent of the trial court's order of January 10, 1986. The attachment of property registered in the
name of defendant Abel Sahagun justifies summons by publication and, although that ownership appears to be
disputed and should precisely be a priority concern of the trial court to resolve, nonetheless a prima facie
justification for extraterritorial service of summons on said nonresident defendant clearly exists. The erroneous
transmission of copies of the summons and the complaint to what appears as an incorrect last known address of
said defendant is a matter which the trial court can more readily ascertain and remedy.

It also bears mention that even if said nonresident defendant should ultimately be declared in default, his interest
can be duly represented by the non-defaulting defendant since a common cause of action appears to be involved,
which fact may be more adequately determined at the trial, and the success of the latter in the suit shall inure to
the benefit of the former.

62. CITIZENS INSURANCE VS HERRERA 36 SCRA 669(SEC. 15)

DOCTRINE:
It is well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam, personal service of
summons, within the forum is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who
does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot
— consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights — confer upon the court jurisdiction over said
defendants.

‘Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and. when the proceeding is strictly
in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the
state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute
compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. . . .

FACTS:
Citizens Surety and Insurance Co. alleged that at the request of Santiago Dacanay, it issued 2 surety bonds to
guarantee payment of P5K promissory notes in favor Gregorio Fajardo and Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co
respectively. As security, Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed an Indemnity Agreement to jointly indemnify
Citizens for losses, costs and expenses (with 12% annual interest) and a Real estate mortgage over a parcel of land
in Baguio. The Dacanays failed to pay the promissory notes compelling Citizens to pay. The Dacanays failed to
reimburse Citizens however, forcing the latter to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and file a case
to recover the unsatisfied balance.

At petitioner’s request, the respondent Judge caused summons to be made by publication in the Philippines Herald.
But despite such publication and deposit of copy with the Manila post office, the defendant did not appear within
Page 60 of 82
60 days from the last publication. Plaintiff sought the defendants to be declared in default, but the Judge eventually
dismissed the case, the suit being in personam and the defendants not having appeared.

ISSUE:
Whether or not summons made by publication is sufficient for the court to acquire jurisdiction.

RULING:
No. We agree with respondent Judge that the action of plaintiff petitioner, being in personam, the Court could not
validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant, absent a personal service of summons within the forum.
We have explicitly so ruled in Pantaleon v. Asunción, 105 Phil. 765, pointing out without such personal service, any
judgment on a non-appearing defendant would be violative of due process. In the aforecited case this Court,
through Justice Roberto Concepción, now Chief Justice, ruled as follows:

"Apart from the foregoing, it is well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in
personam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum is essential to the acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority
of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot — consistently with the due process clause in the Bill
of Rights — confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.

‘Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and when the proceeding is strictly
in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the
state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute
compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. . . .

‘Although a state legislature has more control over the form of service on its own residents than nonresidents, it
has been held that in actions in personam . . . service by publication on resident defendants, who are personally
within the state and can be found therein is not "due process of law," and a statute allowing it is unconstitutional.’
(16A C.J.S., pp. 786, 789; Emphasis ours.)"

The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of the
resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57, section 1(f), in
which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by
publication may then accordingly be deemed valid and effective.

But because debtors who abscond and conceal themselves are also quite adept at concealing their properties, the
dismissal of the case below by respondent Judge should be set aside and the case held pending in the court’s
archives, until petitioner as plaintiff succeeds in determining the whereabouts of the defendants’ person or
properties and causes valid summons to be served personally or by publication as the case may be. In this manner,
the tolling of the period of prescription for as long as the debtor remains in hiding would properly be a matter of
court records and he cannot emerge after a sufficient lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to profit from his
own misdeed and claim prescription of his just debt.

63. HABANA VS VAMENTA 33 SCRA 96(SEC. 15)

DOCTRINE:
A party cannot be permitted to urge one ground at a time and indulge in "piece-meal and endless litigation", and
Page 61 of 82
"by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties and their
privies."

FACTS:
This case is a sequel of Habaña vs. Imbo, decided by the Court on March 31, 1964. In the first case, the court upheld
the sale of 2 parcels of land to spouses Habana on June 28, 1955. The new action seeks to question again the
validity of the sale previously made.

Pedro Teves and Maria Pastor were husband and wife, residing in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental. When Maria
Pastor died, she was survived by her husband Pedro and three children, namely: Concepcion, Jose (deceased) and
Asuncion, (also deceased), who was survived by her husband Luciano Imbo and her children named Jesusa, Jose,
Maria, Remedios, Corazon, Mariano, and Luciano, Jr. Pedro and Concepcion were co-administrators of the estate.

Pedro Teves died, leaving a will, which was admitted to probate. In his will, he partitioned and divided in his will
most of the real properties among his heirs, giving the two lots in question to Concepcion as her share. Concepcion
sold the 2 lots to spouses Habana. The sale was questioned by Imbo, but SC upheld the sale. Same respondent Jose
T. Imbo and his six brothers and sisters, joined by Ariston Teves and others, alleging themselves to be "legitimated
children of Pedro Teves filed an entirely new and separate complaint against petitioners and Concepcion Teves as
defendants, likewise questioning anew the validity of the sale. This action was taken cognizance of by the same
respondent court. Petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint for being barred by res judicata and the
conclusiveness of this Court's judgment of March 31, 1964 and for lack of cause of action was denied by respondent
court.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the court may take cognizance of the new action filed by respondents.
2) Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction over the respondents who have not been impleaded in the case
and were not served with summons.

RULING:
1) No. Respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the new and separate complaint filed by respondents seeking anew to nullify the sale of the two lots in question
notwithstanding that a re-litigation of the same question is already barred by this Court's judgment of March
31,1964. There could be no such further proceedings. This Court, in upholding the validity of the sale of the said
lots to petitioners, remanded the case to respondent court, with express instructions "to sell other undisposed or
unencumbered properties of any of the heirs, should there be any obligation of the estate still unpaid."This Court
then unequivocably ruled that "(T)he executor of the will and all other heirs of the late Pedro Teves should be
precluded from questioning the validity of the sale of the lots in question in favor of (petitioners); rather, they
should comply with the lawful provisions of the will of the testator. Also since the lots in question were partitioned
by will to Concepcion Teves, she became the absolute owner thereof by operation of law from the death of her
parents, free to sell the same to petitioners, more so, when the sale was expressly recognized by herself and her
co-heirs, as held by this Court in the 1964 judgment.

All these allegations and contentions of respondents and the co-plaintiffs are now barred by res judicata which has
set the controversy at rest. A party cannot be permitted to urge one
ground at a time and indulge in "piece-meal and endless litigation", and "by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties and their privies." As reaffirmed
Page 62 of 82
by the Court in the recent case of Zambales Academy, Inc. vs. Villanueva, respondents "should finally realize that
public policy and sound practice enshrine the fundamental principle of res judicata that parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, as the very object for which courts were constituted was to
put an end to controversies. Thus, the provisions of Rule 39, section 49 (b) that the effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, is
'with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.'"
The corollary principle of res judicata that courts of the present day are not concerned so much with the form of
actions as with their 'substance' and that 'despite a difference in the form of the action nevertheless the doctrine of
res judicata would be applied "where it appeared that the parties in the two suit were in truth 'litigating for the
same thing,' has just as long been enunciated by this Court."

2) Yes. We noted that petitioners committed a procedural error in not having formally impleaded in this action as
respondents plaintiffs in Civil Case 4390 below, namely, the six brothers and sisters of respondent Jose T. Imbo and
the widow of the testator's second marriage and their six alleged "legitimated children." This might have been a
serious error resulting in further delay in the disposition of this case, since said plaintiffs as indispensable parties
would have needed to be formally impleaded herein and the corresponding summons issued to them. At any rate,
the defect has been cured by the voluntary appearance herein of said plaintiffs through their counsel, Atty.
Luz A. Teves, plaintiffs' counsel of record in the case below and who filed the answer and memorandum in
lieu of oral argument as "counsel for respondent Mariano Teves and counsel for plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
4390." The answer to the petition thus filed by Atty. Teves is further verified by Mariano T. Imbo, one of the
plaintiffs. Furthermore, by the very nature of the issues, even if said plaintiffs had not thus appeared in this case,
the Court's pronouncement as to their action below being barred by res judicata, since copies of the pleadings
therein were annexed to the petition, would not be affected

64. VALMONTE VS CA 252SCRA 96(SEC. 15)

65. SANTOS VS PNOC 9/23/2008(SEC. 14)
66. MONTEFALCON VS VASQUEZ JUNE 17, 2008(SEC. 16)

 RULE 13
67. PLDT VS NLRC G.R. 60050 3/26/1984

 RULE 14

68. NEYPES CASE

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed
petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy
of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal
and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
Page 63 of 82
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in
an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed
the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were
well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that
the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February
12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order”
appealable under the Rules.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period to appeal, the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion for
Reconsideration.

(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:

(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. In the
case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed
his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus
motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order,
this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for
having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the
dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the
trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was
reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered the order denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying
their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal
in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is
not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days
from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days
from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Page 64 of 82
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period
from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18,
1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the
trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments
of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC’s
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule
41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh
appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

NOTE:

The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is
likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.

69. SAGANA VS GRANCISCO 602 SCRA 184

Facts:

Petioner filed a Complaint, before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to recover damages alleging that on
November 20,1992, respondent with intent to kill him and without justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting
him on the right thigh. On January 31, 1995, Process Server Manuel Panlasigue attempted to personally serve
summons at respondents address at No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Baesa Q.C., but was unsuccessful. In his Servers
Return, he stated that the occupant in that house refused to give his identity and that respondent is unknown at
said residence.

The Trial Court also attempted to serve summons to the respondents office through registered mail, however,
respondent failed to pick up summons. The case was dismissed by the Trial Court on account of petitioners lack of
interest to prosecute that he did not take action since the filing of the Servers Return. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, contended that he exerted efforts to locate the respondent, it was confirmed that respondent
indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Bausa, Q.C. Trial Court granted the Motion with a condition upon the
service of summon on the respondent within 10 days from the receipt of the Order. On August 25, 1995, Process
Server Jarvis Iconar tried to serve summons at respondents address but no avail.In his handwritten annotation, he
stated that respondents brother, Michael Francisco, told him that respondent no longer lived at the said address,
however, Iconar left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Respondent in Default for failure off respondent to file Answer despite the
service of summons. Trial Court declared that the summons was validly served to respondent, declared that
respondent in default and allowed petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Michael Francisco, through his
lawyer filed a Manifestation and Motion, he denied that he received the summons and he was authorized to receive
on behalf of his brother. He prayed his name to be stricken off the records as having received the copy of summons.

Page 65 of 82
In his Affidavit of Merit, he asserted that he was 19 y/o, and respondent had left the house since 1993 and
respondent would only write or call them without informing his whereabouts.

On the other hand, petitioner attached in his Rejoinder, the Affidavit prepared by respondent dated December 23,
1992, where declared he was a resident of No. 36 SampaguitaSt. Bausa Q.C. and the lawyer who notarized the
affidavit was the same lawyer who represented his brother. Trial Court denied the Manifestation and Motion for
lack of merit, it rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioner, ordered Respondent to pay the damages.
Respondent received the copy of the Trial Court s Decision, he then filed a Notice of Appeal to Court of Appeals.
The appellate court directed the parties to file respective briefs, a copy of which was sent by respondent at No. 36
Sampaguita St. BausaQ.C. Respondent prayed that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the person,
despite the irregularity of the substituted service of summons by the court Process Server and in awarding of
damages to petitioner. Court of Appeals rendered decision granting the Appeal of respondent and setting aside the
decision of the trial court for the irregularity of the service of summons. Petitioner filed Petition for Review on
Certiorari to Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the substituted service of summons was validly made upon respondent through his brother.

Held:

The Petition for Review on Certiorari was granted, Court of Appeals decision was reversed and set aside, and the
Trial Court decision was reinstated and affirmed. Although, in general, the statutory requirement of substituted
service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully and that any substituted service other than that authorized by
Rules is considered ineffective. The Supreme Court ruled that strict application of the Rules is not warranted to this
case as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of laws as well as do injustice to the parties waiting almost 15 years for
resolution of this case. The respondents actively attempt to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to
give their identity, rebuffing requests to sign for or receive documents or eluding the officers of court. Respondent
tried to avoid the service of summons, prompting the court to declare that sheriff must be resourceful, but sheriffs
cannot be faulted of the respondent themselves engage in deception to thwart the orderly administration of justice.

70. ATKINS KROLL & CO VS. DOMINGO

FACTS:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by Atkins, Kroll & Company, Inc., against
Santiago Domingo, for the purpose of enforcing recognition of its alleged right of ownership over lot No. thirty-
eight (38) of the cadastral plan of the Zamboanga townsite, expediente No. 7880, and to recover possession of the
same from the defendant, and at the same time to secure a partition of lots Nos. 36 and 55 in the same plan,
according to the proportional interests pertaining to the plaintiff and defendant as joint owners thereof.

HISTORY OF THE TITLE:

Buenaventura Domingo (OWNER OF THE ESTATE) died intestate on October 21, 1912, leaving a widow and a
number of children and grandchildren as heirs. One of his sons, namely, Santiago Domingo, the defendant in this
case, qualified on October 29, 1914, as administrator of his estate.

Page 66 of 82
The share of Santiago Domingo so far as affects lots Nos. 36 and 55, has remained undisturbed and said interest is
still vested in him. It is different with lot No. 38, for on February 17, 1922, the said Santiago Domingo sold his
entire interest in lot No. 38, "with all the improvements existing thereon," by contract of sale with pacto de
retro to one Ong Kong. The interest thus sold was subject to repurchase within the period of one year, but
redemption was never effected; and on February 17, 1923, the property was duly consolidated in Ong Kong. On
February 19, 1923, Ong Kong sold his entire interest in the lot and improvements thereon to the present plaintiff,
Atkins, Kroll & Co.

DEFENDANT’S ASSERTION:

BUILDINGS were not included since they were built by him with his own money and with the consent of his
father.

ISSUE:

WON improvements in the lots sold were included in the sale

RULING:

YES.

It is to be noted that defendant had previously filed a notice of lispendens setting forth his claim of ownership as to
the improvements in question, and referring to the controversy planted in his explanatory report in the
administration proceedings. Notice of said lis pendens was noted on the back of the corresponding certificates of
title. Upon the date stated the plaintiff had already acquired a mortgage upon the interest of Zoila Domingo
in the estate of her grandfather, Buenaventura Domingo; and by the foreclosure of that mortgage all of her
interest in lots Nos. 36 and 38 became vested in the plaintiff as purchaser. The remaining interests
acquired by the plaintiff in the same properties appear to have been acquired by it after the notice of lis
pendens was filed.

As will be seen, the filing of the lis pendens was intended to affect third persons with notice of the claim which the
defendant had asserted in his explanatory report in the proceedings over the state of Buenaventura Domingo. But
it will be remembered that the efforts of the defendant to get his claim recognized in those proceedings completely
failed of effect. For this reason the lis pendens must be considered to have lost its efficacy. The effect of notice by lis
pendens is, of course, to charge the stranger with notice of the particular litigation referred to in the notice, and, if
the notice is effective, the stranger who acquires the property affected by the lis pendens takes subject to the
eventuality of the litigation. But when the adverse right fails in such litigation, the lis pendens becomes innocuous.

It should be noted that the defendant, supposing his claim to have been made in good faith, might have protected it,
at any time before the property had passed into the hands of a third person, by a proceeding under section 112 of
Act No. 496. Said section declares that any person may at any time apply by petition to the court, where "new
interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate," and procure such interests to be
noted. Such a petition must be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was
entered. (Sec. 112, par. 2, Act No. 496.)

In Blass vs. De la Cruz and Melendres (37 Phil., 1), this court held that the registration of land in the name of a
particular person vests in him not only the title to the land but also the title to the improvements thereon, unless
special reservation is noted with respect to the improvements. In that case the improvements which became the
subject of controversy had been placed on the land before it was registered and the decree of registration was res
judicata as to the improvements. In the case before us the buildings which are the subject of controversy were
placed on the land after the decree of registration. This circumstance made a proceeding under section 12 of Act

Page 67 of 82
No. 496 all the more necessary in order to protect the new interest thus created. So far as registered land is
concerned, the right recognized in article 361 and related provisions of the Civil Code is subject to the contingency
that it shall be noted in the registered title before the property passes into the hand of a purchaser for value.

The considerations so far adduced apply alike to the improvements on lots Nos. 36 and 38, but there is another
circumstance which is fatal to the defendant's claim to any of the improvements on lot No. 38. This is found in the
fact that he sold his interest in said lot, including the improvements, to Ong Kong, the plaintiff's predecessor in
interest. It is evident that the defendant is estopped by his own deed from claiming any interest in the buildings on
this lot, whatever might have been the law governing his claim to the buildings on the other lot.

From what has been said it is evidence that the trial court was in error in declaring the defendant to be the owner
of the buildings on lots Nos. 36 and 38 and in failing to require the defendant to account; and in order to clarify the
situation we declare: (1) That the ownership of the lots Nos. 36, 38, and 55, is as stated in the Torrens certificates
of title Nos. 3433, 3843, and 3435 (Exhibits A, B, and C of the plaintiff); (2) that the plaintiff is entitled to
possession of lot No. 38 and that partition must be made of lots Nos. 36 and 55 in the manner provided by law; (3)
the plaintiff is further entitled to recover of the defendant such portion of the defendant and which shall have been
paid by the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff shall also recover of the defendant such portion of the rents of said properties
as correspond to the interests of the plaintiff since its acquisition of the same.

The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion,
without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

71. MANOTOK VS CA 5 PHIL 454

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled,
"motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States,
"relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due
hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the
then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave
to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration
Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him
bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from
exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the
business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.

Page 68 of 82
 72. YUK LING ONG VS CS CO G.R. 206653
73. BELEN VS CHAVEZ
74. ROBINSON VS MIRALLES 510 SCRA 678
75. PARAMOUNT CORP VS A.C.A. ORDONEZ AUGUST , 2008

76. CATHAY METAL CORP VS LAGUNA WEST MULTIPURPOSE INC G.R. 172204 JULY 2, 2014
77. GLOBAL BUSINESS CORP VS SURECOFF G.R. 173463 OCTOVER 13, 2010
78. SAHAGUN VS CA G.R. 78328 JUNE 3, 1991
79. CITIZENS INSURANCE VS HERRERA 36 SCRA 669

80. SABANA VS VAMENTA 33 SCRA 98

81. VALMONTE VS CA 252 SCRA 86
82. SANTOS VS PNOC 9/23/2008
83. MONTEFALCON VS VASZUEZ JUNE 17,2008

 RULE 16
84. ZULUETA VS PAN AMERICAN JANUARY 8,1973

FACTS:

Spouses Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta, with their daughter boarded a PANAM plane from Honolulu to
Manila, the first leg of which was Wake Island. While on stopover, Mr. Zulueta found the need to relieve himself and
after finding the terminal’s comfort rooms full, he walked down the beach to do his business. Meanwhile, the flight
was called and Mr. Zulueta’s absence was noticed. Heading towards the ram, plaintiff remarked, “You people
almost made me miss your flight. You have a defective announcing system and I was not paged.”

Instead of allowing plaintiff to board the plane, however, the airport manager stopped plaintiff and asked him to
surrender his baggages for inspection. Refusing to comply with the order, plaintiff was not allowed to board the
plane. His wife and daughter were able to proceed but were instructed to leave their baggages behind.

Plaintiff instituted present petition for recovery of damages against respondents for breach of contract. The
defendants, however, maintain that plaintiff’s reason for going to the beach was not to relieve himself but because
he had a quarrel with his wife.

ISSUE: WON payment of the wife for suit against both spouses would result in the dismissal of the case.

RULING:

NO.

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The payment is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount
due) from the defendant, with or without its compromise agreement with Mrs. Zulueta. What is ineffective is the
compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership is concerned. Mrs. Zulueta's motion was for the
dismissal of the case insofar as she was concerned, and the defense cited in support thereof Article 113 of said
Code, pursuant to which "(t)he husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife except: ... (2) If they have
in fact been separated for at least one year." This provision, We held, however, refers to suits in which the wife is
the principal or real party in interest, not to the case at bar, "in which the husband is the main party in interest,
both as the person principally aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal partnership ... he having acted in this
capacity in entering into the contract of carriage with PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the
contract, with funds of the conjugal partnership," to which the amounts recoverable for breach of said contract,
accordingly, belong. The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an in accident of the humiliation to which
her husband had been subjected. The Court ordered that said sum of P50,00 paid by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be
deducted from the aggregate award in favor of the plaintiffs herein for the simple reason that upon liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, as provided by law, said amount would have to be reckoned with, either as part of her
share in the partnership, or as part of the support which might have been or may be due to her as wife of Rafael
Zulueta. It would surely be inane to sentence the defendant to pay the P700,000 due to the plaintiffs and to direct
Mrs. Zulueta to return said P50,000 to the defendant.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public policy, she is not allowed by law to waive her
share in the conjugal partnership, before the dissolution thereof. 17 She cannot even acquire any property by
gratuitous title, without the husband's consent, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and
collateral relatives within the fourth degree. 18

85. TAMBUNTING VS ONG 8/11/1950

86. FRANCISCO VS VDA DE BLAS 93 PHIL 1

FACTS:

The appellant Luis Francisco is the registered owner of a parcel of land, identified as Cadastral Lot No. 2464-A,
situated in Caloocan, Rizal. The lot is adjoined on the North by land registered in the name of Manuel Syjuco and
Martin Syjuco and on the South by land registered in the name of Maxima Vda. de Blas, on the South is Cadastral
Lot No. 2466, registered in the name of Jose Apolonio.

On June 27, 1950, Manuel Syjuco and Martin Syjuco brought an action against Luis Francisco in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 287) to recover a strip of land measuring 10 meters by 1 meter, alleged to be
portion of the plaintiff's lot and illegally occupied by the defendant. On February 22 of the following year Maxima
Vda. de Blas, on her part, filed a similar action in the same court (Civil Case No. 1372) against the same defendant
Luis Francisco to recover another strip of land with the area of 12.85 square meters alleged to be apart of this
plaintiff's lot and illegally occupied by the defendant.

The defendant Jose Apolonio filed his answer alleging that the changes in the technical description of his lot were
in accordance with the result of the lawful survey conducted with the acquiescence of plaintiff or his predecessors
in the interest and made the basis of the court order for the issuance of a new title in place of the old one. But the
other defendants instead of answering, moved for the dismissal of the complaint as to them, each alleging
pendency of another action between the same parties and for the same cause. Sustaining the motion, the court
ordered the complaint dismissed as to these defendant Jose Apolonio. From the order of dismissal plaintiff has
appealed to this Court, alleging that, as between the present case and the two actions pending against him, there
was no identity of parties, cause of action and relief.

Page 70 of 82
ISSUE:

WON the action may be dismissed.

RULING:

In order that a motion to dismiss may prosper on the grounds that there is already a pending action between the
same parties, the facts must be such that the judgement in one case would constitute res judicata for the second.
There must, therefore, be identity of parties, identity of causes of action and identity of reliefs. There can be no
question that in the case before us there is, is to the Syjuco brothers and Maxima Vda. de Blas, identity of parties,
but there is also identity causes of action and reliefs?

In the determination of this question, we should bear in mind that, as said in 30 Am. Jur., 919, "the application of
the doctrine of res judicata to identical causes of action does not depend upon the identity or differences in the
forms of the two actions. A judgement upon the merits bars a subsequent suit upon the same cause, though
brought in the different form of action, and a party therefore, cannot be varying the form of action or adopting a
different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action
shall not be twice litigated."

Now, it appears that in the two prior actions against the petitioner Luis Francisco the issue involved is, in the final
analysis, that of ownership. Who is the owner of the strips of land adjoining that of the petitioner, one on the North
and one on the South? The relies is necessarily a declaration of ownership. In bringing the third action, petitioner
claims that his is an action "to quiet title" and therefore, the cause of action is different. But an examination of the
complaint filed by him shows that the issue in so far as the two adjoining owners the Syjucos and the Blas, are
concerned, is that of ownership, i.e., ownership over the disputed strips of land. In his complaint, precisely
petitioner alleges that these adjoining owners, in claiming ownership over the strips of land aforementioned, have
cast a cloud upon his own title, and hence his action "to quiet title." But that could consists precisely in the claim of
ownership asserted by the said adjoining owners, an issue already raised in the two prior cases. In other words, in
so far as these adjoining owners are concerned, the issue of ownership over the strips of land in question has
already been raised by them in the two pending cases, and now in this third case the same issue is raised in the
herein petitioner.

Ostensibly the third action asks for a judgment "to quiet title." But it is obvious that, at bottom, this relief depends
upon the resolution of the question of ownership already raised in the two prior actions.

Our conclusion therefore, is that there is in the three cases identity of parties, cause of action and relief, so that a
decision in the first two would be res judicata for the third.

87. SEA LAND SERVICE ING VS CA 327 SCRA 135

FACTS:

Petitioner Sea-Land Services, Inc. and private respondent A.P. Moller/Maersk Line (hereinafter referred to as
"AMML"), both carriers of cargo in containerships as well as common carriers, entered into a contract entitled, "Co-
operation in the Pacific", a vessel sharing agreement whereby they mutually agreed to purchase, share and
exchange needed space for cargo in their respective containerships. During the lifetime of the said Agreement, or
on 18 May 1991, Florex International, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Florex") delivered to private respondent
AMML cargo of various foodstuffs, with Oakland, California as port of discharge and San Francisco as place of
delivery.

Page 71 of 82
The consignee refused to pay for the cargo, alleging that delivery thereof was delayed. Thus, on June 26, 1992,
Florex filed a complaint against respondent Maersk-Tabacalera Shipping Agency (Filipinas), Inc. for
reimbursement of the value of the cargo and other charges.

On January 1, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third Party Complaint[6] on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction, the amount of damages not having been specified therein. Petitioner
also prayed either for dismissal or suspension of the Third Party Complaint on the ground that there exists an
arbitration agreement between it and respondent AMML. On September 27, 1993, the lower court issued an Order
denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the lower
court in its August 22, 1994 Order.

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[7] with the Court of Appeals on November 23, 1994.On
September 29, 1995, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari. With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition for review,
raising the following issues

ISSUE:

WON the third party complaint filed should have been dismissed.

RULING:

YES.

In the light of the Agreement clauses aforequoted, it is clear that arbitration is the mode provided by which
respondent AMML as Principal Carrier can seek damages and/or indemnity from petitioner, as Containership
Operator. Stated differently, respondent AMML is barred from taking judicial action against petitioner by the clear
terms of their Agreement.

As the Principal Carrier with which Florex directly dealt with, respondent AMML can and should be held
accountable by Florex in the event that it has a valid claim against the former. Pursuant to Clause 16.3 of the
Agreement, respondent AMML, when faced with such a suit "shall use all reasonable endeavours to defend" itself
or "settle such suits for as low a figure as reasonably possible". In turn, respondent AMML can seek damages
and/or indemnity from petitioner as Containership Operator for whatever final judgment may be adjudged against
it under the Complaint of Florex. The crucial point is that collection of said damages and/or indemnity from
petitioner should be by arbitration.

All told, when the text of a contract is explicit and leaves no doubt as to its intention, the court may not read into it
any other intention that would contradict its plain import. [11] Arbitration being the mode of settlement between the
parties expressly provided for by their Agreement, the Third Party Complaint should have been dismissed.

88. RIOFERIO VS CA JANUARY 13,2004

89. DELA SALA VS SARANATI 110 SCRA 255

 RULE 17
90. DAEL VS BELTRAN 4/13/2008
91. ORTIGAS CO VS VELASCO 234 SCRA 455

Page 72 of 82
  RULE 23
92. PAJARILLAGA VS CA OCTOBER 31, 2008

FACTS:
1. Private respondent Thomas T. Kalangeg filed with the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province, Branch 36, a complaint
for a sum of money with damages against petitioner Isidro T. Pajarillaga.
2. On March 10, 1997, private respondent presented his first witness. At the next scheduled hearing on
August 8, 1997, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared despite notice. Upon private respondent’s
motion, the trial court allowed him to present his remaining two witnesses subject to petitioner’s cross-
examination on the next scheduled hearing on September 2, 1997. But when the case was called on that
date, petitioner and his counsel were again absent. Upon private respondent’s motion, the trial court
declared petitioner to have waived his right of cross-examination and allowed private respondent to make
a formal offer of evidence, which the trial court admitted.
3. The trial court scheduled petitioner’s presentation of evidence but the petitioner moved to reset the
hearing. The TC granted the motion.
4. Five days before the scheduled hearing, the petitioner filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Take the
Deposition of the Defendant Upon Written Interrogatories
a. Petitioner resides in Manila which is more than four hundred (400) kilometers from Bontoc,
Mt. Province;
b. Petitioner is suffering from an illness which prohibits him from doing strenuous activities.
5. Private respondent opposed the motion.
6. On December 15, 1997, neither petitioner nor his counsel again appeared. Nonetheless, the trial court reset
the case to January 12, 1998 for the presentation of petitioner’s evidence.
7. In an Order dated January 29, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion. Petitioner’s MR: denied.
8. CA affirmed.
a. Denial of petitioner’s motion was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion since the trial court
gave petitioner full opportunity to present his evidence.
b. Petitioner’s motion came much too late in the proceedings since private respondent has already
rested his case
c. The medical certificate which petitioner submitted to validate his allegation of illness merely
contained a remark that the “patient is advised to avoid strenuous activity.” It did not state that the
travel from Manila to Mt. Province for the scheduled hearings was too strenuous to endanger
petitioner’s health.
The threats to petitioner’s life by private respondent’s relatives were belatedly alleged only in his motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the taking of petitioner’s deposition by written interrogatories is proper and should have
been granted by the court.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:
 Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for
the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual
basis during the preparation for trial. It should be allowed absent any showing that taking it would
prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make
discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged,
and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure from the
accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could
be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of
the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an
answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists.
Page 73 of 82
  There is nothing in the Rules of Court or in jurisprudence which restricts a deposition to the sole function
of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may
be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no
prohibition exists against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. There can be no valid objection to
allowing them during the process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of
fact have become numerous or complicated.
 There is really nothing objectionable, per se, with petitioner availing of this discovery measure after private
respondent has rested his case and prior to petitioner’s presentation of evidence. To reiterate, depositions
may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. But when
viewed vis the several postponements made by petitioner for the initial presentation of his evidence, his
timing is suspect.
 The records show that petitioner stopped attending the hearings after private respondent presented his
first witness. Petitioner offered no excuse for his and his counsel’s absences. Moreover, the trial court has
set four (4) hearing dates for the initial presentation of his evidence. But he merely moved for its resetting
without invoking the grounds.
 Petitioner has not sufficiently shown an “exceptional” or “unusual” case for us to grant leave and reverse
the trial and appellate courts.

o Under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, depositions may be used for the trial or for the
hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under the following
 (c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is
out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering
the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that
such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and
with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open
court, to allow the deposition to be used.
 Petitioner’s claim of illness: the medical certificate submitted by petitioner merely contained a remark that
the “patient is advised to avoid strenuous activity.” It was not alleged that the travel from Manila to Mt.
Province for the scheduled hearings was too strenuous to endanger petitioner’s health.
While the rules on discovery are liberally constructed so as to ascertain truth and to expedite the disposal of cases,
the trial court may disallow a deposition if there are valid reasons for so ruling.

93. SAN LUIS VS ROJAS 3/3/2008

FACTS:

 Berdex International, Inc. (private respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC) a
complaint[3] for a sum of money against petitioner.
 Berdex is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the United States of America with
principal office in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
 Petitioner filed his Answer contending that: he is a businessman engaged in the trading of seafoods.
 The pre-trial conference was terminated on January 11, 2002 and the case was subsequently set for trial.
 Private respondent filed a MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written
Interrogatories) alleging that initial presentation of its evidence is set on May 3, 2002; that however, all of
its witnesses are Americans who reside or hold office in the USA; that one of the witnesses is already of
advanced age and travel to the Philippines may be extremely difficult if not dangerous; and there is a
perceived danger to them in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2002; that written
Page 74 of 82
 interrogatories are ideal in this case since the factual issues are already very few; that such mode of
deposition-taking will save precious judicial and government time and will prevent needless delays in the
case.
 In his Opposition and Comment, petitioner contends: Taking the deposition through written interrogatories
would deprive the court of the opportunity to observe the general bearing and demeanor of
witnesses. Petitioner's right to cross-examine the witnesses will be prejudiced, since he will be limited to
cross-interrogatories which will severely limit not only the scope but the spontaneity of his cross-
examination. The claim that travel to the Philippines would be dangerous for the witnesses who are all
Americans is frivolous, since respondent has not presented evidence that the US government has
prohibited its citizens from traveling to the Philippines; and if ever there was such prohibition, it was not
binding on our own legal system. Old age was not a valid reason.
 The RTC granted private respondent's Motion, as it found the same appropriate and sanctioned by the rules
on deposition-taking.
 The CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether sec 1, Rule 23 of the ROC allows a non-resident foreign corporation the privilege of having
all its witnesses, all of whom are foreigners, to testify through deposition upon written interrogatories taken
outside the Philippines to prove an oral contract.

HELD:

YES.

Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, which substantially reproduced Section 1, Rule 24 of the old
Rules, provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. - By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained
over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has
been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by
depositions upon oral examination or written interrogatories.

Unequivocally, the rule does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition. The fact that
private respondent is a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial. The rule clearly provides that the
testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories, at the
instance of any party. Depositions serve as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to the issues of the case. The
evident purpose is to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent the said trials from being carried out in the
dark.

94. FORTUNE CORP VS CA

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the respondent CA affirming the decision of the RTC of San Pablo
City disallowing the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito A. Teope who was the chairman of the Board Directors
of private respondent. An action for breach of contract was filed by the petitioner against the private respondent

Page 75 of 82
and after the latter filed its answer petitioner served them with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the
ROC. The pre-trial was scheduled for January 9, February 12 and April 22, 1992.

On March 26, 1992, petitioner served the private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination
notifying the latter that petitioner would take the deposition of the chairman in accordance with Section 15, Rule
24. Private Respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not to Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff’s Notice
to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination alleging that: a) petitioner has previously availed of one mode of
discovery, b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition, c)
such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent, d) deponent
has no intention of leaving the country, e)the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required
during the trial on the merits.

Trial court ruled that the deposition should not be taken on the grounds that the deposition of Juanito A. Teope
appears unwarranted since the proposed deponent had already responded to the written interrogatories of the
plaintiff and has signified his availability to testify in court. The petitioner filed an original action for certiorari
before the SC and was referred to the CA for further adjudication on the merits. CA ruled dismissing the petition
holding that the RTC has jurisdiction to direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if there are
valid reasons for the ruling. This is provided for in Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24 of the ROC which imply that the
right of the party to take depositions as means of discovery is not absolute. They reasoned that: a)proposed
deponent had earlier responded to the written interrogatories; b)deponent had signified his availability to testify
in court; c)to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory question.

With the denial of the petitioner’s MFR the instant petition was filed with the SC.

RULING:

The SC discussed that the finer attributed of the rules of discovery would contribute immensely to the attainment
of the judiciary’s primordial goal of expediting the disposition of cases. The deposition-discovery procedure was
designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue
formulation and face revelation theretofore performes primarily by the pleadings. The various modes or
instruments of discovery are meant to serve 1) as a device, along with the pre trial hearing under Rule 20, to
narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties and 2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to
those issues. The evident purpose is to enable the parties consistent with recognized privileges to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the
dark. To this end , the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when
the interrogated party is called as witness to testify orally at trial.

I. Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon
motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown,
the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the deposition shall not be taken.
This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken and this grant
connotes the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is well settled, however, that the discretion
conferred by law is not unlimited: that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or oppressively, but in a
reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.

Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to
trial. 11 This is because, like other discovery orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and
not appealable, 12 considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of
it. However, such rules are subject to the exception that discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court
or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not conform to
essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for
which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion. It is our
considered opinion that on the bases of circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, and which will hereinafter be
Page 76 of 82
discussed, certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court. SC ruled that certiorari
may be availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court.

II. It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of discovery would be untrammeled and efficacious, Rule 29
imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to comply with or respond to the modes of discovery, such as
dismissing his action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient
party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established
in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out his pleadings or parts thereof; or staying further proceedings.
Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause shown that the court may order
that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of
judicial discretion. The requirement, however, that good cause be shown for a protective order puts the burden on
the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reasons for the order. A particular and specific
demonstration of facts, as distinguished from conclusory statements, is required to establish good cause for the
issuance of a protective order. 16 What constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind of protective
order that is sought.

The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved does not justify prohibiting the taking
of the deposition, nor that whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product doctrine," nor that
privileged information or trade secrets will be sought in the course of the examination, nor that all the transactions
were either conducted or confirmed in writing. 18 In the present case, private respondent failed to sufficiently
establish that there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken.

1. On the question of whether an oral deposition might be taken after service of interrogatories, the courts took a
relatively liberal view. In Howard v. States Marine Corp., the first case in which this question was raised, Judge
Hilbert said that:
"Where it develops that examination by interrogatories has been inadequate, the court unquestionably has, and in
a proper case should exercise, discretion to permit an oral examination. But it should be made to clearly appear
that the relevant subject matter will not involve the interrogation of the witness with respect to those particulars
upon which he was examined by interrogatories." It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the present
Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of other
discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress
the other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable to resort to both interrogatories and depositions
in one or the other sequence.

2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the
court's order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the
grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial. 25 But the same reason cannot be
successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.

The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost
freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. Regardless of the development
of devices for pre-trial fact investigation, our legal system is now thoroughly committed to the notion that on the
trial itself the adducing of facts by viva voce testimony of witnesses — whose demeanor and manner are subject to
the observation of the judge — is superior to the use of written statements of the same witnesses. Preference for
oral testimony has dictated most of the limitations on the use of depositions as evidence. And since their use as
evidence was originally conceived as the sole function of depositions proper, the limitations on their taking
dovetailed with the limitations on their use. But under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves
the double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a method of
presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the

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taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral
testimony wherever practicable.

3. The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were taken, the court could not
observe the behavior of the deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the
taking of a deposition becomes apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said
objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that
petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting
aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the
following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be
examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of
such motion has been served to the other party.

4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the
proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the
following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be
examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of
such motion has been served to the other party. Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is to be taken is not
a valid objection to the taking of his deposition. 32 No doubt, private respondent and its representative who is to
be examined will be inconvenienced — as are all parties when required to submit to examination — but this is no
ground for denial of the deposition-discovery process.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in issuing an order that the deposition shall not be taken in this case, and that respondent court erred in
affirming the same.

 RULE 26
95. DUQUE VS CA G.R. 125 383 7/2/2002

Facts:
Petitioners Duque and Valenzuela separately filed a complaint against respondent spouses Enrico and Edna
Bonifacio alleging that respondents spouses Enrico and Edna Bonifacio negotiated with her certain checks in
exchange for cash but upon presentation of the checks on their respective dates of maturity, the same were
dishonored; that notwithstanding repeated demands, respondents refused and continued to refuse to honor said
checks or replace it with cash.

In their Answers, the respondent spouses specifically denied petitioners' allegations in the complaints. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a Request for Admission and furnished to counsel for respondent spouses specifically requesting
the admission of three things: (1) that respondent spouses negotiated with petitioners for valuable consideration
certain checks; (2) that respondent Edna Bonifacio executed promissory notes in favor of petitioners
acknowledging therein her indebtedness to them in the amount of P270,000.00 and P432,000.00; and (3) that
petitioners sent demand letters on November 28, 1987 which respondent spouses allegedly received on December
5, 1987.

For failure of the respondent spouses to respond to the aforementioned request, the Regional Trial Court held that
there was an implied admission by the respondent spouses of the allegations in the request for admission.
Thereafter, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated and set aside the decision of the trial court ruling that the matters of which
admission by the respondent spouses was being sought in the petitioners' separate requests for admission
Page 78 of 82
pertained to those already denied by the former in their respective Answers to the two Complaints filed against
them. The appellate court also held that there was no service of the request for admission on respondent spouses
as required by the Rule. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
(1) whether or not the failure of the private respondents to respond to the request for admission by the
petitioners is tantamount to an implied admission under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.
(2) whether or not there was personal service of the request on private respondents.

Held:

First Issue:
The prevailing rule in 1988 at the time when the request for admission was made is Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides:

"Sec. 1. Request for admission — At any time after issues have been joined, a party may serve upon any other party
20 a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and
exhibited with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the
documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.
"Sec. 2. Implied admission — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted
unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof, or
within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed
serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which
an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters.

"Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter requested shall be promptly submitted to
the court for resolution."
This particular Rule seeks to obtain admissions from the adverse party regarding the genuineness of relevant
documents or relevant matters of fact through requests for admissions to enable a party to discover the evidence
of the adverse side thereby facilitating an amicable settlement of the case or expediting the trial of the same.
However, if the request for admission only serves to delay the proceeding by abetting redundancy in the pleadings,
the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.

In the present case, petitioners requested the admission of three things: first, that respondents negotiated with the
plaintiffs for valuable consideration the checks annexed to the respective complaints; second, that defendant Edna
N. Bonifacio signed separate promissory notes, both dated November 23, 1987 acknowledging that she is indebted
to plaintiff Fortunata Duque in the sum of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00) and to plaintiff
Marcosa Valenzuela in the sum of Four Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00); and third, that the
plaintiffs in the two (2) cases sent letters of demand commonly dated November 28, 1987 which the latter received
on December 5, 1987. The first matter sought to be admitted by the petitioners pertains to the checks supposedly
negotiated by the respondents to the plaintiffs. As correctly observed by the appellate court, these are the same
checks referred to and annexed in the Complaint, to wit: . . . . The corresponding denial thereof by the respondents
in their Answer reads: . . . Clearly therefrom, to require an admission on this point even though it was already
denied in the Answer would be superfluous.

As expounded by this Court in Po vs. Court of Appeals: "A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact
already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a
second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to
merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant
evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to

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establish said party's cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the
Court of Appeals, 'pointless, useless' and 'a mere redundancy.'

Second Issue:

On the second matter requested, petitioners sought the admission of respondents that Edna Bonifacio executed
promissory notes in favor of the petitioners acknowledging therein her indebtedness to them in the amount of Two
Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00) and Four Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00).
The appellate court held that the allegation of the private respondents in their Answers that "they do not owe that
much" is sufficient and does not necessitate a reply to the admission. To this we disagree. The request for
admission pertains to promissory notes while the allegation quoted by the appellate court simply refers to the
amount allegedly owed by the respondents, not to the promissory notes which in the first place were not
mentioned in the Complaint of petitioners.

However, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the observations of the Court of Appeals that the request for
admission regarding the alleged promissory notes is defective for failure of petitioners to attach copies of said
notes to the request for admission; and that private respondents were not previously furnished copies of the same.

Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements under Section 1 of Rule 26 which provides that a party may
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and
relevant document described in and exhibited with the request; and that copies of the documents should be
delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished. Except for the bare allegation of the
petitioners that they also furnished private respondents said promissory notes, their requests do not show that
there was indeed such previous or simultaneous service of the said documents on the petitioners.

The petitioners claim that respondents were personally served requests for admission as required by the Rules;
and that granting that they were not, service on the counsel would be sufficient. Records show that only the
counsel of the respondents, Atty. H.G. Domingo, Jr. was furnished copies of the requests. This is not sufficient
compliance with the Rules. As elucidated by the Court in the Briboneria case: "The general rule as provided for
under Section 2 of Rule 27 ( now Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules of Court is that all notices must be served upon
counsel and not upon the party. This is so because the attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is the one
responsible for the conduct of the case in all its procedural aspects; hence, notice to counsel is notice to party. The
purpose of the rule is obviously to maintain a uniform procedure calculated to place in competent hands the
orderly prosecution of a party's case.

However, the general rule cannot apply where the law expressly provides that notice must be served upon a
definite person. In such cases, service must be made directly upon the person mentioned in the law and upon no
other in order that the notice be valid." Consequently, the requests for admission made by the petitioners were not
validly served and therefore, private respondents cannot be deemed to have admitted the truth of the matters
upon which admissions were requested. Thus, the summary judgment rendered by the RTC has no legal basis to
support it.

 RULE 27
96. SOLIDBANK VS GATEWAY CORP 4/30/2008

 RULE 35

97. PUYAT VS SABARTE 11/26/2001

98. GARCIA VS LLAMAS 12/8/2003

99. CALUBAKIB VS REPUBLIC JUNE 22,2011

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 RULE 36

100. GO TANG CO VS CHAN SENG 46 PHIL 542

101. PNB VS MANILA OIL REFINING & CO. 43 PHIL 444

102. MUNICIPALITY OF BINAN VS GARCIA 180 SCRA 785

 RULE 40

103. FONTANER VS BONSOPRE 11/25/1986

 RULE 43

104. VILLANUEVA VS OPLE 475 SCRA 539

105. SALVADOR VS MAPA 11/28/2009

 RULE 45

106. FIVE STAR MARKETING VS BOOC 535 SCRA 28

107. NEYPES VS CA G.R. 141524

108. FAR EAST CORP VS CA 131 SCRA 642

109. VIRON VS CA G.R. 117020 4/4/2003

110. COCA COLA PHILS VS GARCIA 1/31/2008

111. MARICALO MINING VS REMINGON 2/11/2008

112. PEOPLE VS WEBB

 RULE 47

113. BENATIRO VS CUYOS 7/30/2008

114. ANCHETA VS ANCHETA G.R. 145370 3/4/2004

115. ANTONINO VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI G.R. 185663 7/20/2012

116. LIZNAG VS CA 291 SCRA 301

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 RULE 50

117. MELENCIO VS SB G.R. 159684 6/12/2008

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