G.R. Nos.
L-33138-39 June 27, 1975 Jean Elizondo, and causing serious physical injuries to
BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, INC.
and ANDRES I. ILAGAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SOTERO CARDEMA,
EUFROCINA ALCALDE CARDEMA, MELQUISEDEC P.
ELIZONDO and MAXIMA T. ALCALDE, respondents.
Domingo E. de Lara and Associates for petitioners.
Manuel S. Gerong for private respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
For a collision caused by the negligence of now petitioner
Andres I. Ilagan, a driver of petitioner Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company, Inc., a suit was brought and
damages awarded to private respondents,1 both by the
lower court and thereafter respondent Court of Appeals.
Hence this appeal by certiorari. The facts as set forth in a
well-written decision by Justice Jose N. Leuterio of
respondent Court would leave no doubt as to the reckless
manner in which the bus was driven. The law as is but
proper and just exacts responsibility for the injury inflicted.
There is, however, an effort to avoid the consequences of
such culpable conduct by the invocation of Corpus v.
Paje.2 It does not suffice. It has the appearance of a mere
afterthought, a last-ditch attempt to escape liability.
Moreover, it is not applicable, even on the assumption that
it is doctrinal, which is not the case. No persuasiveness
attaches to such a plea, when it is considered further that
the opinion of Justice Capistrano is misread. There is
another objection based on the amount of damages
awarded. It is equally unavailing. The appealed decision is
in conformity with law. There is no choice but to affirm.
The appealed decision starts with this statement of the case:
"Civil Cases Nos. B-390 and B-391 of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna are for the recovery of actual,
compensatory, and moral damages, with attorney's fees,
arising from a vehicular accident. It is alleged in both
complaints that the accident was due to the notorious
negligence of the defendant driver, Andres I. Ilagan, who
drove the bus of his co-defendant, Batangas Transportation
Company, now BLTBCo, without regard to existing traffic
rules and regulations, and without due attention to the
welfare and safety of his passengers and those of oncoming
vehicles, resulting in the death of the owner — driver of the
Chevrolet car, Ricardo de los Reyes, and his companion,
Eufrocina Alcalde Cardema. The serious physical injuries
suffered by Eufrocina Alcalde Cardema is the subject of the
complaint in Civil Case No. B-390, and the death of Jean
Elizondo in Civil Case No. B-391. The defenses in both
cases are that there was no negligence on the part of the
driver defendant, Andres I. Ilagan, in driving and operating
the Batangas Transportation Co. bus bearing plate No.
5716; that Ilagan had driven the bus in a careful and prudent
manner, and the accident was beyond his control and was
unforeseen despite the observation of extraordinary
diligence; that the accident was due to the negligence of
Ricardo de los Reyes, or was fortuitous in character; and
that defendant company had exercised and continues to
exercise extraordinary diligence in the management,
supervision and operation of its vehicles and personnel,
including its drivers, in order to avoid injury to persons and
to prevent accidents, as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard for all the circumstances. The two
cases, having arisen from the same incident, were tried
jointly by agreement of the parties."3 Then comes that
portion dealing with the facts: "On February 18, 1963,
Ricardo de los Reyes left Calamba, Laguna, at about 5
o'clock in the-morning, driving his Chevrolet car bearing
Plate No. 7188 bound for Manila. Seated on the front seat
beside him was his son, Eduardo de los Reyes, and directly
behind Ricardo was Eufrocina Alcalde Cardema, a cousin of
Ricardo's wife. On the right of Eufrocina was her niece, Jean
Elizondo, and on the latter's right was Ursula Bayan. When
he reached the Manila South Super Highway, about 500
meters from the Air Force Station, in a straight and level
road, BTCO bus No. 316, bearing Plate No. 5716, driven by
the defendant, Andres I. Ilagan and coming from the
opposite direction on its way to Lemery, suddenly overtook
a big cargo truck. In so doing, the bus took the left or the
lane on which De los Reyes was travelling. Ricardo de los
Reyes swerved to the right to avoid the bus but it was too
late. The bus was running so fast that notwithstanding that
the Chevrolet car was almost touching the shoulder of the
road, the bus hit the car on the left front side up to the driver's
door. The bus continued travelling to the left and landed in
an oblique but upright position on a canal about 30 feet from
the point of impact after narrowly missing an electric post.
The car landed on the shoulder of the road about 15 feet
from the point of impact. The point of impact was fixed by
Policeman Guadarama at about the middle of the left lane,
where he found earth and broken glasses. Ricardo de los
Reyes, Eufrocina Alcalde Cardema, and Jean Elizondo
were brought to the Philippine General Hospital. Ricardo de
los Reyes died before he could be brought to the operating
room. Jean Elizondo was dead upon arrival to the
PGH."4 The reckless manner in which petitioner Ilagan was
driving was clearly set forth by Justice Leuterio in his opinion
thus: "By the appellants own admission, he was travelling on
the inner lane of the highway going south. It does not appear
that there were vehicles towards his right. Under the
circumstances, he would ordinarily be travelling on the
middle of the right lane and not close to the center line. That
he was travelling close to the center line corroborates the
evidence for the plaintiffs that he overtook a big cargo truck,
and consequently took the left lane going south or the right
lane going north, or the lane of De los Reyes, who was
travelling north. To overtake the cargo truck, Ilagan had to
run faster than the cargo truck, so that Ilagan's testimony
that he was running only at about 40 kms. per hour at the
time of the accident obviously cannot be true. At that hour in
the morning at about 6.00 o'clock, and this is supported by
the evidence, there were very few vehicles travelling on the
Super Highway. The cargo truck certainly must be travelling
at least 40 kms. if not more than 40 kms. per hour. To
overtake the cargo truck, the appellant must have to run not
less than 60 kms. per hour. Hence, the testimonies of
Cardema and Villas that the bus was running fast. The
testimonies of Viñas and Cardema that the bus suddenly
swerved to the left is further corroborated by Ilagan's
testimony that he did not see the rut. He did not see the rut
because he was following the cargo truck and was running
fast. His attention at that time was focused on the cargo
truck and the left lane. And further proving that the appellant
was running at a high speed was the fact that after the
impact, his bus ran for another 30 feet and would have ran
farther had it not fallen into the canal. In suddenly overtaking
the big cargo truck, Ilagan had acted with reckless
imprudence, for he should have seen, and must have seen
the Chevrolet car coming from the opposite direction. It is
reckless imprudence to overtake a vehicle and take the left
lane when another vehicle is coming from the opposite
direction. Due regard for the safety of his passengers and
other vehicles demand that a driver should not overtake
another vehicle and take the left lane unless the road is clear
and overtaking can be done safely. This precaution Ilagan
had failed to take. Instead, he recklessly and imprudently
took the left lane without regard to oncoming vehicles. This
imprudence resulted in death to two persons and serious
physical injuries to Eufrocina. To say that the accident was
due to the negligence of Ricardo de los Reyes, who under
the doctrine of the last clear chance, should have avoided
the accident, or, that at least De los Reyes was guilty of
contributory negligence, is to add insult to injury, and to
desecrate the memory of one who can no longer defend
himself. De los Reyes was in his proper lane and where he
had a right to be. Nevertheless, he did what he could do
under the circumstances to avoid the accident. He swerved
to the right to avoid the onrushing bus, but the appellant was
running so fast and his act was so sudden that all his efforts
to avoid the bus were rendered futile. We cannot understand
how de los Reyes could be charged with negligence, or even
contributory negligence, when there is absolutely no
evidence that de los Reyes, who was where he had a right
to be, had seen the bus in time to avoid the accident.
Contributory negligence cannot be presumed, and the
appellants are as much duty-bound to prove this defense as
it was the duty of the plaintiffs to prove defendant's
negligence. By the way, there is absolutely no evidence in
the record that de los Reyes was trying to overtake another
vehicle before the accident."5
With such undisputable facts, it is difficult to imagine an
instance of a clearer case of liability rightfully imposed by
law on the parties responsible for the injury afflicted. Even
petitioners could not possibly be unaware till such indeed
should be the case. That may explain why stress is laid in
their brief on a procedural objection invoking Corpus v.
Paje.6 To repeat, it is impressed with futility. Nor is there any
validity to the contention finding fault with the award of
damages.
1. The principal reliance of petitioners is on that portion of
the opinion of Justice Capistrano in Corpus v. Paje which
reads thus: "As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence
is not one to the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the
Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for damages
that may be instituted in connection with said offense.
Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal
of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil
liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding
that the injured party reserved his right to institute a separate
civil action (Chantangeo vs. Abarao, supra). In the language
of the Rules of Court (Rule 111 Sec. 3) the extinction of the
criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground
that the criminal act charged against him did not exist,
necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages
based upon the same
act,"7 From which, they would infer that "the criminal action
against petitioner Ilagan must first be resolved by
respondent Court of Appeals and, until final resolution
thereon, it is premature to proceed in the two civil cases."8
Petitioners would make much of the above-cited portion of
the opinion of Justice Capistrano. That is to rely on a frail
reed, to clutch at straws. As pointed out in the brief for
private respondents, such an objection was never raised in
the lower court as well as in the Court of Appeals and
therefore came too late. Moreover, the facts are dissimilar,
and therefore its ruling cannot control. It cannot escape
attention likewise that less than a majority of the Court gave
their approval to the opinion penned by Justice Capistrano.
The most serious objection though is that the interpretation
sought to be fastened by petitioners, considering that as
pointed out in the appealed decision this is an action based
on culpa aquiliana, is its disregard of codal provisions as well
as of an impressive number of pronouncements of this
Tribunal.
It is undoubted that it is only when this case was elevated to
this Court in this appeal by certiorari that the opinion of
Justice Capistrano in Corpus v. Pale was invoked. It is well-
settled that for an error to be imputed to a lower court or to
the Court of Appeals, there must be a showing that there
was a disregard by it of a rule or principle of law seasonably
raised. In an attempt to evade the applicability of this norm,
petitioners, in their reply brief, could only allege that such
decision "did not come to the attention of many legal
practitioners until the full text thereof was reproduced in the
Supreme Courts Reports, Annotated." 9 If that were so, such
negligence should not prejudice private
respondents. Corpus v. Paje was decided on July 31, 1969.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on
November 19, 1970. There was thus a period of one year
and four months within which such a point could be pressed.
What is more, there was likewise the additional time for filing
a motion for reconsideration where this issue could be
submitted for resolution. Petitioners did neither; they only
have themselves then to blame. There is no reason why this
Court should depart from its constant holding that a question
of law save in very exceptional circumstances cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. 10
Petitioners, moreover, ignored the crucial distinction that is
readily discernible between the facts in Corpus v. Pajeand
the facts in the present case. As was pointed out in the
opinion of Justice Capistrano, the civil action for damages
was made to rest "upon the same criminal negligence" of
which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the
criminal action. From the opening paragraph of the opinion
of the Court of Appeals, now sought to be reviewed, it is
quite apparent that the liability of petitioners was not
predicated on criminal negligence but rather on a quasi-
delict which, as is clearly pointed out by the Civil Code, is an
independent source of obligation. 11 The accident in Corpus
occurred on December 23, 1956 and the civil action was not
instituted until November 21, 1961 during the pendency of
the appeal in a criminal case in the Court of Appeals. On the
other hand, in this case, it was only a matter of months, the
mishap having taken place on February 18, 1963 and the
case being filed in July of the same year, when the civil
action precisely to hold petitioners liable for the quasi-delict
was filed by private respondent. As a matter of fact, in
Corpus, the civil complaint was dismissed by the lower court
precisely on the ground that the action based upon the
quasi-delict had prescribed. 12 That certainly cannot be said
of the present litigation. From the beginning both parties
were fully aware that it was the negligence of petitioner
Ilagan as driver of petitioner Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company, Inc. that gave rise to the civil suit. It does not
admit of doubt therefore that the invocation of Corpus v.
Paje is misplaced considering the dissimilarity in the facts of
the case and the equally relevant consideration that the
portion of the ponencia of Justice Capistrano, insofar as it
could be made to lend support to petitioner's plea, is not
doctrinal in character lacking one vote for it to be the
expression of the opinion of this Court. 13
Nor is this all. It is to misread the opinion of Justice
Capistrano in Paje if it is made to yield a significance that
would under the circumstances of this case reduce to a
barren form of words the jural concept of a quasi-delict as
an independent source of obligation. The law is anything but
that. The Civil Code speaks unequivocally to the contrary.
Article 2176 provides: "Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no existing contractual relations
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter." 14 The liability of an
employer is made clear, under Article 2180 in this wise:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though; the former are not
engaged in any business or industry." 15 So it was under the
former Civil Code, although there is a slight difference in
phraseology. 16 What is more, there is this new provision in
Article 2177: "Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant." 17 This Court in
appropriate cases has given force and effectivity to the
mandates thus so clearly expressed. That was the tenor of
decisions when the former Civil Code was still operative,
starting from Donaldson, Sim and Co. v, Smith, Bell and
Co. 18 promulgated in 1902. Then, in 1907 in the leading
case of Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 19 Manresa
was quoted to the effect that culpa or negligence or culpa
aquiliana is an independent source of obligation between
two persons not so formerly bound by any juridical tie. The
civil liability that may arise according to Justice Tracey in his
opinion "was not intended to be merged in the criminal ... .
Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or
omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek
out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must
be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil
right." 20 As was well put by Justice Torres in Novo v.
Ainsworth, 21 decided in 1913: "This liability is contracted
without agreement or consent of the person found liable, on
the principle that in all cases where harm, loss, or damage
has been caused to a person or to his rights by an act or
omission, the aggrieved party is entitled to be indemnified ...
." 22 Justice Fisher in another leading case, Cangco v.
Manila Railroad Co. 23 turned once more to Manresa's
formulation of the basic doctrine that "liability arising from
extracontractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act
or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere
negligence or inattention, has caused damage to
another." 24 As correctly stressed by Justice Street, what
was set forth in Article 1902 of the former Civil Code is a
"general doctrine of jurisprudence." 25
The first assigned error relying on the rather forced
interpretation accorded certain passages in Corpus v.
Paje is thus clearly bereft of any persuasive force.
2. It is not too far-fetched to impute to petitioners an
awareness that to deny liability under the circumstances
would be an indefensible posture, devoid of support in law
no less than in morals. That may explain why in the next two
errors assigned, what is sought is merely to minimize the
amount of the damages for which they were held liable by
the Court of Appeals. In their second and third assignment
of errors, they would seek a reduction of P4,988.84 found by
both the lower court and the Court of Appeals as actual
hospital expenses incurred by private respondent Eufrocina
Alcalde Cardema and of P8,000.00 for the loss of earnings
of the deceased daughter, Jean Elizondo, of private
respondents Melquisedec P. Elizondo and Maxima T.
Alcalde. Reference to the appealed decision should readily
make obvious that no such errors were committed. Thus:
"We have examined the damages awarded by the Court a
quo and we find them to be moderate and reasonable. The
award of P4,988.84 for the hospitalization of Eutrocina
Alcalde Cardema is supported by the statement of account
of the Manila Railroad Hospital. It was certified to by
Eufrocina Cardema and by the supervising auditor of the
MRR Hospital. The fees of Dr. Alcantara of P3,000.00 is
reasonable and moderate considering that he had
performed two operations, and Eufrocina was under the
care of Dr. Alcantara for 72 days in the hospital and even
after her discharge from the hospital, she had to report for
follow-up examination. There is even the probability of
another operation should there be a tissue reaction. The
award of P3,000.00 for reduction of income of Eufrocina
Cardema is also reasonable because as a result of the
injuries which she had suffered and because of the
operations, Eufrocina Cardema can no longer engage in her
former occupation of maintaining a boarding house. The
award of P4,000.00 moral damages is reasonable
considering the serious injuries that she had suffered
consisting of broken bones, the operations that she
underwent, and her physical pain and suffering. The award
of the attorney's fees of P1,000.00 is likewise moderate
because she was forced to litigate to enforce her claim. The
award of P8,000.00 for the death of Jean Elizondo is even
below the amount now allowed for death due to the act of
the defendant. At the time of her death, Jean Elizondo was
18 years old, a bright student, and was in the second year
college taking up chemical engineering. Obviously, if she
had lived, she would have finished her course and would
have earned much more than P8,000.00. Moral damages
awarded at P6,000.00 is likewise reasonable. One would
never know the pain, the sleepless nights, the torment that
one suffers for the loss of a child in the prime of life.
Certainly, the amount of P6,000.00 cannot assuage the loss
of a daughter. Attorney's fees in the amount of P2,000.00
likewise is reasonable, defendant company having forced
plaintiff to litigate. We also take into consideration that the
defendant is a big corporation operating hundreds of
vehicles. Certainly the amount awarded is not incompatible
with the resources of the appellant company. It is after all a
part of the overhead expenses of the defendant." 26 It may
be added that the finding as to the amount of P4,988.84 for
the hospitalization expenses is essentially one of fact and is
not to be disturbed on appeal. It ill behooves petitioners to
complain about the "speculative" character of the amount of
P8,000.00 for the death of Jean Elizondo. The victim of their
misdeed was at the threshold of youth, a lass of eighteen,
then in the second year of a chemical engineering course,
and in the language of the decision, "a bright
student." 1äwphï1.ñët 27 If any body could complain then, it
is her parents. What was awarded, as noted by Justice
Leuterio, was admittedly less than that allowed by law.
There ought to be a realization even on the part of
petitioners that what was said by Justice Malcolm in Bernal
v. House 28 is more than just mere rhetoric. As was so vividly
put by him, "there is not enough money in the entire world to
compensate a mother for the death of her child." 29 In the
traditional legal parlance, to quote Chief Justice
Concepcion, "life expectancy is not only relevant, but, also,
an important element in fixing the amount recoverable ...
. 30 It would be then to disregard what has been so constantly
and uninterruptedly adhered to if petitioners would have
their way. To allow such a thing to happen would be a grave
disservice to the law. 31
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 19,
1970 is affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
11 "According to Article 1157 of the Civil Code, "obligations arise from
law; contracts; quasi-contracts; acts or omissions punished by law; and
quasi-delicts."
12 When therefore four Justices of the Court, Justice Dizon, the then
Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal, Justices Sanchez and
Teehankee concurred in the result, it may be assumed that their
concurrence was based on the same ground as that of prescription. Two
other Justices, J. B. L. Reyes and Zaldivar, did not take part.
13 The then Chief Justice Concepcion and Justice Castro Fernando and
Barredo concurred in the opinion of Justice Capistrano.
16 According to Article 1902 of the former Civil Code. "Any person who
by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage done." Article insofar as
pertinent was worded thus: "Owners or directors of an establishment or
business are equally liable for any damages caused by their employees
while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on
occasion of the performance of their duties."
G.R. No. L-40486 August 29, 1975
PAULINO PADUA and LUCENA BEBIN PADUA, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
GREGORIO N. ROBLES and BAY TAXI CAB, defendants-
appellees.
Alberto R. de Joya for plaintiffs-appellants.
Cardenas & Peralta Law Office for defendants-appellees.
CASTRO, J.:
Resolving this appeal by the spouses Paulino and Lucena
Bebin Padua, we set aside the order dated October 25, 1972
of the Court of First Instance of Zambales dismissing their
complaint, in civil case 1079-O, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
In the early morning of New Year's Day of 1969 a taxicab
(bearing 1968 plate no. TX-9395 and driven by Romeo N.
Punzalan but operated by the Bay Taxi Cab owned by
Gregorio N. Robles) struck ten-year old Normandy Padua
on the national road in barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. The
impact hurled Normandy about forty meters away from the
point where the taxicab struck him, as a result of which he
died.
Subsequently, Normandy's parents (Paulino and Lucena
Bebin Padua), by complaint filed with the Court of First
Instance of Zambales (civil case 427-O), sought damages
from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab; likewise, the city
Fiscal of Olongapo, by information filed with the same court
(criminal case 1158-O), charged Punzalan with homicide
through reckless imprudence.
On October 27, 1969 the court a quo, in civil case 427-O,
adjudged for the Paduas as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendant Romeo
Punzalan to pay the plaintiffs the sums of
P12,000.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages, and
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;
and dismissing the complaint insofar as the
Bay Taxicab Company is concerned. With
costs against the defendant Romeo
Punzalan. (Emphasis supplied)
Almost a year later, on October 5, 1970, the court a quo, in
criminal case 1158-O, convicted Punzalan, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence, as defined
and penalized under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, attended by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional, as minimum,
to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay
the cost. The civil liability of the accused
has already been determined and
assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled
Paulino Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan,
et al.' (Emphasis supplied)
After the judgment in civil case 427-O became final, the
Paduas sought execution thereof. This proved futile; the
corresponding court officer returned the writ of execution
unsatisfied.
Unable to collect the amount of P27,000 awarded in their
favor, the Paduas instituted action in the same court against
Gregorio N. Robles to enforce the latter's subsidiary
responsibility under the provisions of article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. Robles filed a motion to dismiss based
on (1) bar of the cause of action by a prior judgment and (2)
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
Thereafter, the court a quo, in an order dated October 25,
1972, granted Robles' motion to dismiss on the ground that
the Paduas' complaint states no cause of action. This order
the Paduas questioned in the Court of Appeals which, by
resolution dated March 5, 1975, certified the case to this
Court for the reason that the appeal involves only questions
of law.
The Paduas predicate their appeal on eighteen errors
allegedly committed by the court a quo. These assigned
errors, however, raise only one substantial issue: whether
the judgment dated October 5, 1970 in criminal case 1158-
O includes a determination and adjudication of Punzalan's
civil liability arising from his criminal act upon which Robles'
subsidiary civil responsibility may be based.
The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested
by its substance rather than its form. In construing a
judgment, its legal effects including such effects that
necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than
the language used govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and
consequences must be ascertained like any other written
instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intention of the
court as gathered from every part thereof, including the
situation to which it applies and the attendant
circumstances.
It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the
judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal
portion, easily results in the same conclusion reached by the
court a quo: that the said judgment no civil liability arising
from the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a
careful study of the judgment in question, the situation to
which it applies, and the attendant circumstances, would
yield the conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary,
recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil
liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and
awarded the corresponding indemnity therefor.
Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In
negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs) has the
option between an action for enforcement of civil liability
based on culpa criminal under article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based
on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code. The
action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems
simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless
expressly waived or reserved for a separate application by
the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however,
precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent
act or omission.
In the case at bar, the Court finds it immaterial that the
Paduas chose, in the first instance, an action for recovery of
damages based on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176,
2177, and 2180 of the Civil Code, which action proved
ineffectual. The Court also takes note of the absence of any
inconsistency between the aforementioned action priorly
availed of by the Paduas and their subsequent application
for enforcement of civil liability arising from the offense
committed by Punzalan and consequently, for exaction of
Robles' subsidiary responsibility. Allowance of the latter
application involves no violation of the proscription against
double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or
omission. For, as hereinbefore stated, the corresponding
officer of the court a quo returned unsatisfied the writ of
execution issued against Punzalan to satisfy the amount of
indemnity awarded to the Paduas in civil case 427-O. Article
2177 of the Civil Code forbids actual double recovery of
damages for the same negligent act or omission. Finally, the
Court notes that the same judge * tried, heard, and
determined both civil case 427-O and criminal case 115-O.
Knowledge of an familiarity with all the facts and
circumstances relevant and relative to the civil liability of
Punzalan may thus be readily attributed to the judge when
he rendered judgment in the criminal action.
In view of the above considerations, it cannot reasonably be
contended that the court a quo intended, in its judgment in
criminal case 1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the
Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which
Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary award of the
corresponding indemnity therefor. Surely, it cannot be said
that the court intended the statement in the decretal portion
of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the
determination and assessment of Punzalan's civil liability in
civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or "gobbledygook" and to
be absolutely of no meaning and effect whatever. The
substance of such statement, taken in the light of the
situation to which it applies and the attendant
circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the intention of
the court to accord affirmation to the Paduas' right to the civil
liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in
criminal case 1158-O. Indeed, by including such statement
in the decretal portion of the said judgment, the court
intended to adopt the same adjudication and award it made
in civil case 427-O as Punzalan's civil liability in criminal
case 1158-O.
There is indeed much to be desired in the formulation by
Judge Amores of that part of the decretal portion of the
judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the civil liability
of Punzalan resulting from his criminal conviction. The judge
could have been forthright and direct instead of circuitous
and ambiguous. But, as we have explained, the statement
on the civil liability of Punzalan must surely have a meaning
and even if the statement were reasonably susceptible of
two or more interpretations, that which achieves moral
justice should be adopted, eschewing the other
interpretations which in effect would negate moral justice.
It is not amiss at this juncture to emphasize to all magistrates
in all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of
care should be exercise in the formulation of the dispositive
portion of a decision, because it is this portion that is to be
executed once the decision becomes final. The adjudication
of the rights and obligations of the parties, and the
dispositions made as well as the directions and instructions
given by the court in the premises in conformity with the
body of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly
and unequivocally, leaving absolutely no room for dispute,
debate or interpretation.
We therefore hold that the Paduas' complaint in civil case
1079-O states a cause of action against Robles whose
concommitant subsidiary responsibility, per the judgment in
criminal case 1158-O, subsists.
ACCORDINGLY, the order a quo dated October 25, 1972
dismissing the complaint in civil case 1079-O is set aside,
and this case is hereby remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings conformably with this decision and with
law. No pronouncement as to costs.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The clarity and lucidity with which Justice Castro spelled out
the decisive issue and how to resolve it to achieve the
desirable goal of moral justice in adjudication compels
concurrence. I do so. What is more, there is to my mind a
distinct advance in the juridical frontiers in the mode in which
the novel question raised was settled. If the trend manifest
in the view taken by the Court would thereafter be followed,
then the protective ramparts the law throws ground victims
of vehicular accidents, unfortunately of rather frequent
occurrence here, will be further strengthened. That
dissipates whatever doubts I may have originally felt in view
of certain traditional procedural concepts about the
correctness of the decision reached. It is true this is one of
those hard cases which, if an old law is to be believed, may
result in bad law. It need not be so, of course, as pointed out
with great persuasiveness in the 1971 inaugural lecture at
Oxford given by Professor Ronald Dworkin, the successor
in the chair of jurisprudence to one of the most eminent men
in the field H.L.A. Hart.1 The more accurate way of viewing
the matter is that whenever there is an apparent gap in the
law and settled principles of adjudication may not clearly
indicate the answer, then a judge may rely either on an
argument of policy or an argument of principle, the former
having kinship with the sociological school of jurisprudence
and the latter with the analytical. As I hope I may be able to
indicate in this brief concurrence, the decision reached by
us is in consonance with either approach. With the natural
law thinking manifest in the opinion of the Court, witness its
stress on moral justice, I am comforted by the reflection that
the procedural barrier is not insurmountable, the decision
reached deriving support from the viewpoint of law as logic,
justice, or social control.
1. Dworkin identifies a matter of principle from the standpoint
of a right either granted or recognized by law. As was so
clearly pointed out in the opinion of Justice Castro: "It would
appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in
criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal portion, easily
results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo:
that the said judgment assessed no civil liability arising from
the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful
study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it
applies, and the attendant circumstances, would yield the
conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized
the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising
from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the
corresponding indemnity therefor."2 There is much to be
said therefor for the view expressed therein that "it cannot
reasonably be contended that the court a quo intended, in
its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to omit recognition of
the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the
offense of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the
corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor.
Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the
statement in the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal
case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment
of Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure
jargon or 'gobbledygook' and to be absolutely of no meaning
and effect whatsoever. The substance of such statement,
taken in the light of the situation to which it applies and the
attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the
intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Padua's
right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against
Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O."3 Whatever misgivings
therefore may be felt because in the civil case No. 427-O the
complaint against Bay Taxi Cab Co. is dismissed, do not
suffice, to my mind, to render nugatory the admitted
subsidiary liability arising from a decision in criminal case
No. 1158-O which is necessarily attendant upon the
conviction of the driver, Romeo N. Punzalan. Such a
difficulty could have been avoided had greater care been
exercised by the lower court, but precisely recourse may be
had to our corrective powers to avoid a right granted in law
from being rendered illusory in fact.
2. There is thus the strongest policy consideration that
buttresses the conclusion reached by us. It would conduce
to less respect for the law as an agency of social control if
there be recognition in the codes of the right of next kin to
damages arising from the tragic occurrence of young lives
being snuffed out due to reckless driving on the part of what
had been accurately described as dealers of death on the
road and then by lack of care on the part of a judge assure
that it is nothing more than a barren form of words. This is
what Dean Pound referred to as law in books as
distinguished from law in action. To recall an expression
from Justice Jackson, it is comparable to a munificent
bequest in a pauper's will. It is less than realistic to assert
that anyway the guilty driver can be made to pay. The
obvious answer is:' With what?"
This is not to deny that a previous judgment that certainly
lends itself to ambiguity considering the facts disclosed and
found by the trial court does interpose juristic difficulty to the
imposition of liability on the offending taxicab company.
There can be no blinking the fact though that if it did not
place such vehicles on the road driven in such a reckless
and culpable manner resulting in a ten-year old boy being
hurled about forty meters away from the point of impact, this
tragedy could have been avoided. To say now that doubts
engendered by the previous ruling in the culpa aquiliana suit
could nullify what the law decrees as to the subsidiary
liability of the employer in the criminal case finding the
accused guilty would be fraught with pernicious
consequences. The party just as much responsible for the
mishap, with his operation of the transportation service,
would be absolved from liability. It need not be so, but
certainly for entrepreneurs more enterprising than careful,
not excessively concerned with the safety of the traveling
public, it could be a green light for less vigilance over the
conduct of their drivers. The resulting injury to public safety
is not hard to imagine. Moreover, from the standpoint of the
feelings of the bereaved parents, and this is just as important
a policy consideration, I feel that no avenue should be left
unexplored to mitigate the harshness of fate. To paraphrase
Justice Malcolm, there is not enough money in the entire
world to compensate the parents for the loss of their
child.4 To repeat, the decision reached has my full
concurrence.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
On strictly legal considerations, it would seem possible to
dismiss the petition for review in this case. But there are
certain considerations of equity and substantial justice
obviously underlying the cause of petitioners which I find
difficult to ignore. It would be unfair and unjust to deprive
said petitioners of their right to damages for the death of their
child unquestionably caused by the fault of respondent's
employee merely because the dispositive portion of the
decision of Judge Amores in the criminal case appears to be
rather equivocal on its face as to respondent's liability
therefor, albeit under the incontrovertible facts extant in the
record such liability is indisputable in law and the language
of Judge Amores' judgment does not anyway exonerate
either respondent's driver or private respondent, and what is
more, does not exclude the idea that, as explained in the
able main opinion of Mr. Justice Castro, the judge intended
to merely adopt and incorporate in said judgment the
assessment of amount of damages which said judge himself
had already made in the civil case he had previously
decided. It is on these fundamental considerations that I
base my concurrence in the judgment in this case.
As I have already indicated, from the standpoint of strict
adjective law, the petition should be dismissed because in
truth, there is yet no showing that any attempt has been
made by petitioners to have the judgment in the criminal
cases, assuming it includes an imposition of civil liability
upon the accused driver, Romeo N. Punzalan, executed.
What appears in the record is that it was the writ of execution
issued against said Punzalan in the previous civil case that
was returned unsatisfied. Of course, this point is highly
technical, because all that has to be done is for petitioners
to have another execution in the criminal case, which it can
even now be forseen will have exactly the same result. I am
therefore agreeable as a matter of equity that the Court hold
that for all legal intents and purposes, We may consider the
return of insolvency of Punzalan in the civil case as in effect
the return in the criminal case, since equity considers as
done what ought to have been done when otherwise
injustice would result. And so, the paramount question
arises, was there any civil liability to impose in the criminal
judgment of Judge Amores? As related in the main opinion,
the judgment of October 27, 1969 in the civil case ordered
Punzalan "to pay plaintiffs (herein petitioners) the sums of
P12,000.00 as actual damages P5,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees,"
although absolving at the same time the herein private
respondent, and then, on October 5, 1970, the judgment in
the criminal case was as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence, as defined
and penalized under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, attended by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional, as minimum,
to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the
costs. The civil liability of the accused has
already been determined and assessed in
Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled 'Paulino
Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al.
(Emphasis supplied)
Succintly, the decisive issue presented to Us now is whether
this judgment just transcribed imposes upon Punzalan a civil
liability by adoption by reference of the civil liability already
a judged in the civil case or it exonerates him from any civil
liability arising from the offense of which he has been found
guilty inasmuch as he was already found civilly liable in the
civil case. It must be admitted in candor that both
constructions are literally tenable, with the particularity,
however, that the first interpretation, if adopted could not
involve the assumption that the judge committed a grievous
and palpable error of law whereas the second would
necessarily mean that he did.
It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the
citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent act such as that
committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate
and independent kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil liability
arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability
arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana.
These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each other
that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration
from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be
prosecuted separately and independently of each other,
although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery
of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission,
which means that should there be varying amounts awarded
in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect,
only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has
already been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the
other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be
entitled in the second case only to the excess over the one
fixed in the first case, but if he has already been paid a
bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore
in the second case. Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as
Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay the herein
petitioners the amounts above-stated, in the subsequent
criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher
amount.
Now, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person
criminally liable is also civilly liable, hence, the judgment in
the criminal case is supposed to include the imposition of
civil liability, unless the basis therefor has been shown not
to exist, which is not the case here. And since the judgment
in question says that "the civil liability of the accused has
already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No.
427-O entitled Paulino Padua et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan et
al.," it is but logical to conclude that the meaning of such
statement is that the same amounts of damages fixed in the
previous case were being awarded to the offended party in
the criminal case. Otherwise, We would have to indulge in
the assumption that Judge Amores committed the grievous
and palpable error of law of exonerating Punzalan of all civil
liabilities in the criminal case just because he had already
been sentenced to pay damages in the civil case. I am not
ready to accept such assumption. The law and
jurisprudence on the matter are so clear and well-settled that
I refuse to believe that a judge of the experience of Judge
Amores would not be cognizant thereof. Besides, Judge
Amores knew or ought to have known that having absolved
herein respondent in the civil case, the only possible
recourse has left to petitioners to recover from said
respondent damages for the death of their child caused by
the indisputable negligence of his employee Punzalan is in
the form of the subsidiary liability of the employer under the
Penal Code. Indeed, I cannot believe that Judge Amores
intended to allow respondent to escape liability altogether, it
being evident under the circumstances which he himself has
found in both cases, civil and criminal, that Punzalan, their
employee, had cause the death of the ten-year-old child of
petitioners thru reckless imprudence and that in such a
situation in the law exacts liability from both the employee
and the employer. What is more, I consider it but equitable
to hold that the rather equivocal phraseology of the decision
of Judge Amores should be read in the sense it was
understood by the petitioners, who in the faith and reliance
that the law had been complied with by Judge Amores and
that he had accordingly awarded them in the criminal case
the civil liability that by law goes with it, did not anymore
move for clarification or reconsideration nor appeal from
said decision. My understanding is that the filing of the
subject civil action by petitioners proceeded from that
assumption, namely, that Punzalan has been found civilly
liable for the same amounts adjudged in the civil case and,
therefore, respondent is subsidiarily liable therefor in the
face of Punzalan's insolvency.
Accordingly, I concur in that the order of dismissal of
respondent judge should be set aside and that petitioners'
action should be tried on the merits.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The clarity and lucidity with which Justice Castro spelled out
the decisive issue and how to resolve it to achieve the
desirable goal of moral justice in adjudication compels
concurrence. I do so. What is more, there is to my mind a
distinct advance in the juridical frontiers in the mode in which
the novel question raised was settled. If the trend manifest
in the view taken by the Court would thereafter be followed,
then the protective ramparts the law throws ground victims
of vehicular accidents, unfortunately of rather frequent
occurrence here, will be further strengthened. That
dissipates whatever doubts I may have originally felt in view
of certain traditional procedural concepts about the
correctness of the decision reached. It is true this is one of
those hard cases which, if an old law is to be believed, may
result in bad law. It need not be so, of course, as pointed out
with great persuasiveness in the 1971 inaugural lecture at
Oxford given by Professor Ronald Dworkin, the successor
in the chair of jurisprudence to one of the most eminent men
in the field H.L.A. Hart.1 The more accurate way of viewing
the matter is that whenever there is an apparent gap in the
law and settled principles of adjudication may not clearly
indicate the answer, then a judge may rely either on an
argument of policy or an argument of principle, the former
having kinship with the sociological school of jurisprudence
and the latter with the analytical. As I hope I may be able to
indicate in this brief concurrence, the decision reached by
us is in consonance with either approach. With the natural
law thinking manifest in the opinion of the Court, witness its
stress on moral justice, I am comforted by the reflection that
the procedural barrier is not insurmountable, the decision
reached deriving support from the viewpoint of law as logic,
justice, or social control.
1. Dworkin identifies a matter of principle from the standpoint
of a right either granted or recognized by law. As was so
clearly pointed out in the opinion of Justice Castro: "It would
appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in
criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal portion, easily
results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo:
that the said judgment assessed no civil liability arising from
the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful
study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it
applies, and the attendant circumstances, would yield the
conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized
the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising
from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the
corresponding indemnity therefor."2 There is much to be
said therefor for the view expressed therein that "it cannot
reasonably be contended that the court a quo intended, in
its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to omit recognition of
the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the
offense of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the
corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor.
Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the
statement in the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal
case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment
of Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure
jargon or 'gobbledygook' and to be absolutely of no meaning
and effect whatsoever. The substance of such statement,
taken in the light of the situation to which it applies and the
attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the
intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Padua's
right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against
Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O."3 Whatever misgivings
therefore may be felt because in the civil case No. 427-O the
complaint against Bay Taxi Cab Co. is dismissed, do not
suffice, to my mind, to render nugatory the admitted
subsidiary liability arising from a decision in criminal case
No. 1158-O which is necessarily attendant upon the
conviction of the driver, Romeo N. Punzalan. Such a
difficulty could have been avoided had greater care been
exercised by the lower court, but precisely recourse may be
had to our corrective powers to avoid a right granted in law
from being rendered illusory in fact.
2. There is thus the strongest policy consideration that
buttresses the conclusion reached by us. It would conduce
to less respect for the law as an agency of social control if
there be recognition in the codes of the right of next kin to
damages arising from the tragic occurrence of young lives
being snuffed out due to reckless driving on the part of what
had been accurately described as dealers of death on the
road and then by lack of care on the part of a judge assure
that it is nothing more than a barren form of words. This is
what Dean Pound referred to as law in books as
distinguished from law in action. To recall an expression
from Justice Jackson, it is comparable to a munificent
bequest in a pauper's will. It is less than realistic to assert
that anyway the guilty driver can be made to pay. The
obvious answer is:' With what?"
This is not to deny that a previous judgment that certainly
lends itself to ambiguity considering the facts disclosed and
found by the trial court does interpose juristic difficulty to the
imposition of liability on the offending taxicab company.
There can be no blinking the fact though that if it did not
place such vehicles on the road driven in such a reckless
and culpable manner resulting in a ten-year old boy being
hurled about forty meters away from the point of impact, this
tragedy could have been avoided. To say now that doubts
engendered by the previous ruling in the culpa aquiliana suit
could nullify what the law decrees as to the subsidiary
liability of the employer in the criminal case finding the
accused guilty would be fraught with pernicious
consequences. The party just as much responsible for the
mishap, with his operation of the transportation service,
would be absolved from liability. It need not be so, but
certainly for entrepreneurs more enterprising than careful,
not excessively concerned with the safety of the traveling
public, it could be a green light for less vigilance over the
conduct of their drivers. The resulting injury to public safety
is not hard to imagine. Moreover, from the standpoint of the
feelings of the bereaved parents, and this is just as important
a policy consideration, I feel that no avenue should be left
unexplored to mitigate the harshness of fate. To paraphrase
Justice Malcolm, there is not enough money in the entire
world to compensate the parents for the loss of their
child.4 To repeat, the decision reached has my full
concurrence.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
On strictly legal considerations, it would seem possible to
dismiss the petition for review in this case. But there are
certain considerations of equity and substantial justice
obviously underlying the cause of petitioners which I find
difficult to ignore. It would be unfair and unjust to deprive
said petitioners of their right to damages for the death of their
child unquestionably caused by the fault of respondent's
employee merely because the dispositive portion of the
decision of Judge Amores in the criminal case appears to be
rather equivocal on its face as to respondent's liability
therefor, albeit under the incontrovertible facts extant in the
record such liability is indisputable in law and the language
of Judge Amores' judgment does not anyway exonerate
either respondent's driver or private respondent, and what is
more, does not exclude the idea that, as explained in the
able main opinion of Mr. Justice Castro, the judge intended
to merely adopt and incorporate in said judgment the
assessment of amount of damages which said judge himself
had already made in the civil case he had previously
decided. It is on these fundamental considerations that I
base my concurrence in the judgment in this case.
As I have already indicated, from the standpoint of strict
adjective law, the petition should be dismissed because in
truth, there is yet no showing that any attempt has been
made by petitioners to have the judgment in the criminal
cases, assuming it includes an imposition of civil liability
upon the accused driver, Romeo N. Punzalan, executed.
What appears in the record is that it was the writ of execution
issued against said Punzalan in the previous civil case that
was returned unsatisfied. Of course, this point is highly
technical, because all that has to be done is for petitioners
to have another execution in the criminal case, which it can
even now be forseen will have exactly the same result. I am
therefore agreeable as a matter of equity that the Court hold
that for all legal intents and purposes, We may consider the
return of insolvency of Punzalan in the civil case as in effect
the return in the criminal case, since equity considers as
done what ought to have been done when otherwise
injustice would result. And so, the paramount question
arises, was there any civil liability to impose in the criminal
judgment of Judge Amores? As related in the main opinion,
the judgment of October 27, 1969 in the civil case ordered
Punzalan "to pay plaintiffs (herein petitioners) the sums of
P12,000.00 as actual damages P5,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees,"
although absolving at the same time the herein private
respondent, and then, on October 5, 1970, the judgment in
the criminal case was as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence, as defined
and penalized under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, attended by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
 DAY of prision correccional, as minimum,
to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the
costs. The civil liability of the accused has
already been determined and assessed in
Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled 'Paulino
Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al.
(Emphasis supplied)
Succintly, the decisive issue presented to Us now is whether
this judgment just transcribed imposes upon Punzalan a civil
liability by adoption by reference of the civil liability already
a judged in the civil case or it exonerates him from any civil
liability arising from the offense of which he has been found
guilty inasmuch as he was already found civilly liable in the
civil case. It must be admitted in candor that both
constructions are literally tenable, with the particularity,
however, that the first interpretation, if adopted could not
involve the assumption that the judge committed a grievous
and palpable error of law whereas the second would
necessarily mean that he did.
It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the
citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent act such as that
committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate
and independent kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil liability
arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability
arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana.
These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each other
that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration
from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be
prosecuted separately and independently of each other,
although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery
of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission,
which means that should there be varying amounts awarded
in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect,
only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has
already been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the
other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be
entitled in the second case only to the excess over the one
fixed in the first case, but if he has already been paid a
bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore
in the second case. Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as
Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay the herein
petitioners the amounts above-stated, in the subsequent
criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher
amount.
Now, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person
criminally liable is also civilly liable, hence, the judgment in
the criminal case is supposed to include the imposition of
civil liability, unless the basis therefor has been shown not
to exist, which is not the case here. And since the judgment
in question says that "the civil liability of the accused has
already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No.
427-O entitled Paulino Padua et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan et
al.," it is but logical to conclude that the meaning of such
statement is that the same amounts of damages fixed in the
previous case were being awarded to the offended party in
the criminal case. Otherwise, We would have to indulge in
the assumption that Judge Amores committed the grievous
and palpable error of law of exonerating Punzalan of all civil
liabilities in the criminal case just because he had already
been sentenced to pay damages in the civil case. I am not
ready to accept such assumption. The law and
jurisprudence on the matter are so clear and well-settled that
I refuse to believe that a judge of the experience of Judge
Amores would not be cognizant thereof. Besides, Judge
Amores knew or ought to have known that having absolved
herein respondent in the civil case, the only possible
recourse has left to petitioners to recover from said
respondent damages for the death of their child caused by
the indisputable negligence of his employee Punzalan is in
the form of the subsidiary liability of the employer under the
Penal Code. Indeed, I cannot believe that Judge Amores
intended to allow respondent to escape liability altogether, it
being evident under the circumstances which he himself has
found in both cases, civil and criminal, that Punzalan, their
employee, had cause the death of the ten-year-old child of
petitioners thru reckless imprudence and that in such a
situation in the law exacts liability from both the employee
and the employer. What is more, I consider it but equitable
to hold that the rather equivocal phraseology of the decision
of Judge Amores should be read in the sense it was
understood by the petitioners, who in the faith and reliance
that the law had been complied with by Judge Amores and
that he had accordingly awarded them in the criminal case
the civil liability that by law goes with it, did not anymore
move for clarification or reconsideration nor appeal from
said decision. My understanding is that the filing of the
subject civil action by petitioners proceeded from that
assumption, namely, that Punzalan has been found civilly
liable for the same amounts adjudged in the civil case and,
therefore, respondent is subsidiarily liable therefor in the
face of Punzalan's insolvency.
Accordingly, I concur in that the order of dismissal of
respondent judge should be set aside and that petitioners'
action should be tried on the merits.
[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO
CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE
LAROYA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
Resolution[1] dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the
petition for certiorari and the Resolution[2] dated August 24,
2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in
Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore
Laroya (Laroya for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner
Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by
petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity),
figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of
Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against
Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the
other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case
against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No.
2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was
then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant
in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on
the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of
the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the
Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and
Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action
which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The
MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of
May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court
(Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28,
1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal
issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the
case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an
appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil
action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the
premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case,
such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of
discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in the
Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each
one of them may think and believe that the accident was
caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party,
believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a
criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second
party. On the other hand, the second party, together with his
operator, believing themselves to be the real aggrieved
parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private complainant in
the criminal case.[4]
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a
pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly
file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil
action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No.
2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-
shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple
case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a
complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil favorable judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is present when in
action at the proper time. They contend that an action on the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties,
quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the rights of action and reliefs sought.[9] However, there is no
crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the
case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action
the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence
independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out
resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal
that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the
Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for
independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also
damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although
Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a
these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they
party in the criminal case.
have different causes of action. The criminal case is based
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code
fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable
Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These
forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when articles on culpa aquiliana read:
they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya
argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal. the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
the petition raises the legal question of whether there is
Chapter.
forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the
independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
Nature of the Order of Dismissal preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court
act or omission of the defendant.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state
in its order of dismissal[5] that the dismissal was with
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles
prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint,
has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of
unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with
another. Either the private complainant or the accused can
prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with
file a separate civil action under these articles. There is
prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the
nothing in the law or rules that state only the private
MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a
complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
dismissal without prejudice.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity)
an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy
expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in
of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under
a separate civil action, to wit:
Rule 65.Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the
judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
x.
65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition
for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may
ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause
Forum-Shopping
of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal
action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there
can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate
civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as amended in 1988,
allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of
the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the
right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party
reserved the civil action before the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the
same act or omission were deemed impliedly instituted in
the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the recovery
of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-
delict, and the recovery of damages for violation of Articles
32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for
quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to
reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such
action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly
instituted in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules provided as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others.
The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil
actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the accused.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended
on December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this
rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is
deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action
to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All
the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be
filed separately and prosecuted independently even without
any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a
reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right
to file a separate and independent civil action based on
these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on
the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code
continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the
Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil
action deemed instituted in the criminal action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still
given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal
action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also,
the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he
files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If
the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed
separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil
action may be consolidated with the criminal action. The
consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil
actions arising from the same act or omission filed under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules,
a separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action,
could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in
the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed
before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil
action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the
criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil
action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not
apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed
independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the
criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil
action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action
has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found before
judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until
final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of
the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action
in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by
the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and
civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of
the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be
instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not
change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover
damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action.Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also
prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal
action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-
delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and
Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the criminal
case, can file a separate civil action against the offended
party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules provides as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In
the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offendedparty. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart
in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the offended
party to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of
the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the
criminal action can file an independent civil action for quasi-
delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111
expressly states that the offended party may bring such an
action but the offended party may not recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended
party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling
in Cabaero vs. Cantos[12] where the Court held that the
accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action
for quasi-delictagainst the private complainant in the
criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case
filed his Answer with Counterclaim for malicious
prosecution. At that time the Court noted the absence of
clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly
instituted civil actions and the necessary consequences
and implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the
trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the
case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The
Court further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil
case against the offended party after the criminal case is
terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which
may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-
claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil
aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings
and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was
incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address
the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the
accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the
same provision states that any cause of action which could
have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil
action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file
his counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall
proceed independently of the criminal action, even as the
civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal
action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the
independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal
action but may be filed separately by the offended party
even without reservation. The commencement of the
criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under these articles of the Civil
Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111
refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such
civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of
the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for
the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where
the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed
instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without
violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can
proceed simultaneously and independently of each
other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal
action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The
only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no
reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent,
necessitating the filing of another case against his employer
or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-
delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the
criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6,
Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate
civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the
accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the
civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal
case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately
his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused
does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to
run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has
a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same
way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which
is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the
accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal
case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed
separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order
of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the
ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the
decision of the trial court in the criminal case may vary with
the decision of the trial court in the independent civil
action. This possibility has always been recognized ever
since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an
independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code,
expressly provides that the independent civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs.
Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than
this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the
said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether
it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.
More than half a century has passed since the Civil
Code introduced the concept of a civil action separate and
independent from the criminal action although arising from
the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to
encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions
of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other
the civil action for quasi-delict.The fear of conflicting and
irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In
any event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of
Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC
issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or
before the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect
considering the well-settled rule that -
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws
are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[14]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28,
1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C
(99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U.
CARBONEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
FELICIANO, J:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30
a.m. — private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his
way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal,
Makati — from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss,
the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the
cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot
or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car
and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his
home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street,
when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed.
He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw
a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from
his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the
name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"),
was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street
(i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same
direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding),
facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked
askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as
to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the
dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that
evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U.
Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his
employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried
out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he
tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it
was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a
result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical
injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal
and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent
manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck
entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and
Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate
cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the
influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a
curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had
exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the
dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and
against Phoenix and Carbonel and ordered the latter:
(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P
15,000.00 for hospital bills and the replacement of the lost
dentures of plaintiff;
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P
1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected income for plaintiff brought
about the accident in controversy and which is the result of
the negligence of the defendants;
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P
10,000. as moral damages for the unexpected and sudden
withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime career as a marketing
man; mental anguish, wounded feeling, serious anxiety,
social humiliation, besmirched reputation, feeling of
economic insecurity, and the untold sorrows and frustration
in life experienced by plaintiff and his family since the
accident in controversy up to the present time;
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P
10,000.00 as damages for the wanton disregard of
defendants to settle amicably this case with the plaintiff
before the filing of this case in court for a smaller amount.
(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P
4,500.00 due as and for attorney's fees; and
(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied)
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate
Appellate Court. That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed
the decision of the trial court but modified the award of
damages to the following extent:
1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was
reduced to P6,460.71, the latter being the only amount that
the appellate court found the plaintiff to have proved as
actually sustained by him;
2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income
was reduced to P100,000.00, basically because Dionisio
had voluntarily resigned his job such that, in the opinion of
the appellate court, his loss of income "was not solely
attributable to the accident in question;" and
3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held
by the appellate court as excessive and unconscionable and
hence reduced to P50,000.00.
The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs remained
untouched.
This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now
before us on a petition for review.
Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly
explicit findings of fact relating to the manner in which the
dump truck was parked along General Lacuna Street on the
basis of which both courts drew the inference that there was
negligence on the part of Carbonel, the dump truck driver,
and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident and Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that both
courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel
and Phoenix that the true legal and proximate cause of the
accident was not the way in which the dump truck had been
parked but rather the reckless way in which Dionisio had
driven his car that night when he smashed into the dump
truck. The Intermediate Appellate Court in its questioned
decision casually conceded that Dionisio was "in some way,
negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of
Dionisio's negligence and made no further mention of it. We
have examined the record both before the trial court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court and we find that both parties
had placed into the record sufficient evidence on the basis
of which the trial court and the appellate court could have
and should have made findings of fact relating to the alleged
reckless manner in which Dionisio drove his car that night.
The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there
was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was
parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's
recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause
determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained.
The need to administer substantial justice as between the
parties in this case, without having to remand it back to the
trial court after eleven years, compels us to address directly
the contention put forward by the petitioners and to examine
for ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged
negligence which must bear upon the liability, or extent of
liability, of Phoenix and Carbonel.
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a)
whether or not private respondent Dionisio had a curfew
pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b) whether
Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision
with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely
turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump
truck or whether those headlights accidentally
malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d)
whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that
no curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio
immediately after the accident nor was any found in his car.
Phoenix's evidence here consisted of the testimony of
Patrolman Cuyno who had taken Dionisio, unconscious, to
the Makati Medical Center for emergency treatment
immediately after the accident. At the Makati Medical
Center, a nurse took off Dionisio's clothes and examined
them along with the contents of pockets together with
Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not
able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he
offered the explanation that his family may have misplaced
his curfew pass. He also offered a certification (dated two
years after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N.
Libarnes of the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to
have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and
Metro Manila. This certification was to the effect that private
respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This
certification did not, however, specify any pass serial
number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed
curfew pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was
unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the
night of the accident and that the preponderance of
evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that
night. The relevance of possession or non-possession of a
curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the
other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home
and whether he had indeed purposely put out his headlights
before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly
arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling
after the onset of curfew without a valid curfew pass.
On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was
speeding home that night — both the trial court and the
appellate court were completely silent.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of
Patrolman Cuyno who was at the scene of the accident
almost immediately after it occurred, the police station
where he was based being barely 200 meters away.
Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at
the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was
"moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio,
on the other hand, claimed that he was travelling at a
moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour and had just
crossed the intersection of General Santos and General
Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his
headlights failed just before the collision took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's
testimony was hearsay and did not fag within any of the
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he
testified to were not acquired by him through official
information and had not been given by the informants
pursuant to any duty to do so. Private respondent's objection
fails to take account of the fact that the testimony of
Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records
exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as part of the res
gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the
hearsay rule consists of excited utterances made on the
occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in
nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective
thought processes of the observer and hence made as a
spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not
the result of reflective thought. 6
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and
suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of
night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke
spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from
observers who happened to be around at that time. The
testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as
part of the res gestae and should have been considered by
the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should have been
ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it could
not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise
velocity at winch Dionisio was travelling just before impact
with the Phoenix dump truck.
A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off
his headlights, or whether his headlights accidentally
malfunctioned, just moments before the accident. The
Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the
headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the
intersection but was non-committal as to why they did so. It
is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off
his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as
not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which
he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from
the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a
more credible explanation than that offered by private
respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his headlights on but
that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he
succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split
seconds before contact with the dump truck.
A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was
intoxicated at the time of the accident. The evidence here
consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect
that private respondent Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time
he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the
Makati Medical Center in an unconscious condition. 7This
testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the admission
of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before
dinner with his boss that night. We do not believe that this
evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily
under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a
motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. 8 There
simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he
had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical
faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are
also aware that "one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect
different people differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances
outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was
negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home
that night and driving faster than he should have been.
Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets
and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew
and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and
the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries
was the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner
Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between
petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the
accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is
quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of
Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's
negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and
that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an
"efficient intervening cause and that consequently Dionisio's
negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate
cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of
Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn
from a reading of some of the older cases in various
jurisdictions in the United States but we are unable to
persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity
for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United
States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition"
which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already
been "almost entirely discredited." Professors and Keeton
make this quite clear:
Cause and condition. Many courts have
sought to distinguish between the active
"cause" of the harm and the existing
"conditions" upon which that cause
operated. If the defendant has created only
a passive static condition which made the
damage possible, the defendant is said not
to be liable. But so far as the fact of
causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played
an important part in producing the result it
is quite impossible to distinguish between
active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case,
the latter are the result of other active
forces which have gone before. The
defendant who spills gasoline about the
premises creates a "condition," but the act
may be culpable because of the danger of
fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the
condition has done quite as much to bring
about the fire as the spark; and since that
is the very risk which the defendant has
created, the defendant will not escape
responsibility. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the
"condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a
trench in the highway may still be liable to
another who fans into it a month
afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely
discredited. So far as it has any validity at
all, it must refer to the type of case where
the forces set in operation by the defendant
have come to rest in a position of apparent
safety, and some new force intervenes. But
even in such cases, it is not the distinction
between "cause" and "condition" which is
important but the nature of the risk and the
character of the intervening cause. 9
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far
from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the
dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been
parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General
Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck
driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's
negligence, although later in point of time than the truck
driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was
not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the
Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more
than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck
driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the
petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent
Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon
them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's
negligence was not of an independent and overpowering
nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact
between the improper parking of the dump truck and the
accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is
helpful to quote once more from Professor and Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening
cause is one which in ordinary human experience is
reasonably to be anticipated or one which the
defendant has reason to anticipate under the
particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligence among other reasons, because of failure
to guard against it; or the defendant may be
negligent only for that reason. Thus one who sets a
fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary,
usual and customary wind arising later wig spread it
beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore
to take precautions to prevent that event. The
person who leaves the combustible or explosive
material exposed in a public place may foresee the
risk of fire from some independent source. ... In all
of these cases there is an intervening cause
combining with the defendant's conduct to produce
the result and in each case the defendant's
negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff
against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from
liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and
important part of the risk, to which the defendant
has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.
Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope
original risk, and hence of the defendant's
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed
that intervening causes which fall fairly in this
category will not supersede the defendant's
responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be
required to anticipate the usual weather of the
vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such
as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog or even
lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on the
road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle
or a train will run into it; ...
The risk created by the defendant may include the
intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others.
... [The standard of reasonable conduct may require
the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that
occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary
incidents of human life, and therefore to be
anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who blocks the
sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street
where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of
heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run
down by a car, even though the car is negligently
driven; and one who parks an automobile on the
highway without lights at night is not relieved of
responsibility when another negligently drives into
it. --- 10
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
"only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may
recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last
clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that
while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private
respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding
the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having
failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own
injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common
law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs.
Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what
extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the
common law was to mitigate the harshness of another
common law doctrine or rule that of contributory
negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory
negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who
was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was
relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant. 13 The common law notion of
last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a
plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
and failed to do so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has
to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by
the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance"
that may be extracted from its common law matrix and
utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law
jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article
2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine
whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's — was
the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not
simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or
physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms
like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative
location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the
relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more
fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act
or omission of each party and the character and gravity of
the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and
therefore his employer) should be absolved from
responsibility for his own prior negligence because the
unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence
which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely
created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission.
To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out
the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond
for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or
omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks
and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among
the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-
position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a
presumption of negligence on the part of his employer
Phoenix 16in supervising its employees properly and
adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found,
correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to
overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance
that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump
truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early
the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show
any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in
which the dump truck is parked when away from company
premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on
the part of Phoenix.
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account
the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio
on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the
other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of substantial
justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a
20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the
respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00
as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees
and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio;
only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners
Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor
to the former. The award of exemplary damages and
attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the
petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement
from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing
the reduced award of damages made by the respondent
appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate
court is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of
compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral
damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20%
of such amount. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
8 Compare Wright v. Manila Railroad Co.,
28 Phil. 116 (1914), where it was held,
among others, that "[m]ere intoxication is
not negligence, nor does the mere fact of
intoxication establish a want of ordinary
care. It is but a circumstance to be
considered with the other evidence tending
to prove negligence. " Id, at 125.
16 Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 202 (1979);
Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 (1976); and
Saludares v. Martinez, 29 SCRA 745
(1969).
17 See Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Co., 7 Phil. 359, 370375 (1907), where the
Court allocated the damages on a 50-50
basis between plaintiff and defendant
applying the notion of comparative
negligence or proportional damages. Cf.
Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light
Co., 16 Phil. 8 at 29 (1910).
18 Lanuzo v. Ping, 100 SCRA 205 (1980).