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ARTICLE VII: Executive
Department
Sec. 1: President “The
executive power shall be
vested in the President of the
Philippines.” Sec. 2:
Qualifications Natural-born
citizen...
BILL OF RIGHTS: Rights of an
Accused
RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED
Before Criminal Prosecution:
(before arraignment) Right to
due process ( Sec. 14(1) )
Custodial rights ( Sec. 12 ) ...
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The Law PH
ARTICLE VI: Legislative Department (Part 1)
(0
Sec. 1: One Congress, Two Houses
) Sec. 1: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by
the provision on initiative and referendum.
POWERS:
Legislative
Republican Systems:
1. Original – possessed by the sovereign people
2. Derivative – that which is delegated by the sovereign people to the legislative bodies and is
subordinate to the original power of the people; vested in Congress
Power according to its application:
1. Constituent – power to amend the Constitution
2. Ordinary – power to pass ordinary laws
Non-legislative
) NOTA BENE:
Powers of Congress may be inherent (like the determination of its rules of proceedings and discipline of its
members) or implied (like the power to punish for contempt in legislative investigations).
The people, through amendatory process, can exercise constituent power, and, through initiative and
referendum, legislative power.
Allowable Delegation of Legislative Power
To the President (See ABAKADA Guro case)
To Administrative Agencies: 2 Tests of Valid Delegation; Subordinate Legislation
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)
What must be examined to determine if rule passed the tests of valid delegation
) Echegaray vs. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, Oct. 12, 1998
There is no undue delegation of legislative power in RA 8177 to the Sec. of Justice and the Dir. Of
Bureau of Corrections, but Sec. 19 of the Rules and Regulations to implement RA 8177 is invalid.
Empowering the Sec. of Justice in conjunction with the Sec. of Health and the Dir. Of the Bureau
of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of
delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.
xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must
be set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate – and (b)
fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out
the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map
out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. RA 8177 specifically
requires that “[t]he death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person
under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution.” Further, “[t]he Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the
lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict.”
The legislature also mandated that “all personnel involved in the administration of lethal
injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task.” The Court cannot see that any
useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the
definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already
imposed by the Courts. In this sense, RA 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion
by the administrative officials concerned is…canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Sec. of Justice
and the Dir. Of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where
standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though
general, are capable of reasonable application.
xxx
A careful reading of RA 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power
from the Sec. of Justice to the Dir. Of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under
the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Dept.
of Justice. Further, the Dept. of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the
“administration of the correctional system.” Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is
that the Sec. of Justice should supervise the Dir. Of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the
Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the Dept. of Health.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement RA 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be
overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Sec. 19 of the implementing rules...
xxx
Thus, the Court finds in the first paragraph of Sec. 19 of the implementing rules a veritable
vacuum. The Sec. of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
execution procedure to the Dir. Of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of
review and approval thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Dept. of Justice, the Bureau of
Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Sec. of Justice as the rule-making authority under RA 8177. Such
apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
To People (See Santiago and Lambino cases)
Sec. 2: Composition of Senate
24 Senators
Sec. 3: Qualifications of Senators
1. Natural-born citizen
2. 35 years old
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter
5. 2-year residency
Sec. 4: Term of Office
6 yrs.
COMMENCE: noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election (unless otherwise
provided by law)
RE-ELECTION: no Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
Sec. 5: Composition of the House of Representatives
(1)not more than 250 members, UNLESS otherwise provided by law; and (2) party-list members
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT: contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory (city: 250,000 pop.)
VACANCY: holding of special election is discretionary on House concerned (Sec. 9)
Congress has power of reapportionment of legislative districts
) Montejo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought
about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts
of the province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen’s vote in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at
this time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue
involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner’s remedy lies with
Congress. Sec. 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to
reapportion, thus: “Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. In
Macias v. COMELEC, we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable
question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot
itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent
COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of
the province of Leyte.
Congress may increase its present composition
) Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, Dec. 8, 1994
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Art. VI, Sec.
5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The
Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, “unless otherwise provided by law.” The inescapable import of the latter
clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by RA 7675 is not unconstitutional.
xxx
As to the contention that Sec. 49 of RA 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners
overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
the assailed law, including Sec. 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.
xxx
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on RA 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is
bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was
only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said
plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioner’s additional argument that the subject law has resulted in “gerrymandering,”
which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not
worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep.
Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former
San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which development
could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
Party-list System: Inviolable parameters to determine the winners; Computation
) Veterans Federation Party vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 136781, Oct. 6, 2000
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and RA 7941
mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation – the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold – only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit – each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and two additional
seats.
Fourth, proportional representation – the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes.”
The Party-list System, Explained
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government –
the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral
party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election
of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of
Representatives as regular members. In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House – one
for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative. xxx
xxx
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the “selection or election” of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statute’s policy
declaration, the State shall “promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members
of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.”
Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation is Mandatory
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving
at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise “twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.” We thus translate this
legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list
seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during
the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all
the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is “No.”
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.”
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up
has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by
which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election
must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat
in the House of Representatives.
xxx
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the
equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down
only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-
list representatives.
xxx
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in
Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
“mathematical impossibility,” suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust
or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. Xxx
The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. xxx
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative
state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the
mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation
or circumvention.
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a
multiparty system of representation. xxx
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to
three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the
two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-
representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership,
would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld
the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA
7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified
parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on
this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively
referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their
respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then
determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or
guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two
percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the
three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
The Formula
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as
well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes
cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order
to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that
to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two
additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the
same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party.
Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats
has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first
one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two
reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2)
the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a
fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent
allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary
because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages
obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that a fractional membership cannot
be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's
fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.”
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given
by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party,
it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for
computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be
entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without
a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first
party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four
percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the
total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the
highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to
which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in
the House of Representatives.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula:
No. of votes for concerned party
--------------------------------------- x No. of additional seats allocated for first party
No. of votes for first party
xxx
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of
votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero
additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole
number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers
and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in
the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining
absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum
of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party
may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself
has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
) )
NOTA BENE: In a later decision (Banat vs. COMELEC), SC has struck down in part the "two percent threshold"
so that now, the way to allocate seats for party-list representatives is as follows:
Step One. Parties, organizations and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes garnered
Step Two. Those receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat
Step Three. Those garnering sufficient number of votes according to the ranking in Step One, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
Step Four. Each party, organization or coalition shall not be entitled to more than 3 seats.
Computing additional seats for party-list other than first party: use the number of additional seats
allotted for first party as multiplier
) CIBAC vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 172103, April 13, 2007
Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner’s case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not
entitled to an additional seat. Party-list Canvass Report No. 20 contained in the petition shows
that the first party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a total of
1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was
proclaimed that the first party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats based
on June 2, 2004 Resolution NO. NBC 04-004 of the COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans
formula would therefore lead us to the following result:
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional Additional
––––––––––––– x seats allocated to = Seats for
No. of votes of the first party concerned
first party (Emphasis supplied.) party
Applying this formula, the result is as follows:
495,190
–––––––– x 2 =
1,203,305
0.41152493 x 2 = 0.82304986
This is a far cry from the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the
multiplier “allotted seats for the first party,” viz:
Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party x Allotted Seats
____________________ for First Party
Votes Cast for First Party
Applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula to CIBAC, it yields the following
result:
Additional seats = 495,190 x 3 = 1.2345
________
1,203,305
Unfortunately, it is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong
Bayani and Bayan Muna formula that petitioner alleges.
Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one (1), then it did not
obtain or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in
Veterans that “in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary.”
Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat.
Are people entitled to know the nominees of party-list organizations?
) BA-RA 7941 vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007
The Right to Information
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the
citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a
corresponding duty on the party of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the
essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Without a government’s acceptance of the
limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an
acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill
of Rights becomes sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his
right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen by the
simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus
standi are ordinarily unavailing.
Right to Information Limited to Matters of Public Concern
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of
access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people’s right to
know is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving
“public interest” and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the
need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking
and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security.
The terms “public concerns” and “public interest” have eluded precise definition. But both terms
embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on
a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as
sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of
candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and
interest.
Disclosure of Party-list Group Nominees not an Exception
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse
of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the
party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: “[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall
not be shown on the certified list” is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the
requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is
limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same
provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the
prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there
is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even
publishing through mediums other than the “Certified List” the names of the party-list nominees.
The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute
bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the
Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A.
No. 7941.
People’s Right to Elect based on Informed Judgment
The Comelec’s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a
point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it
were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to
information. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,
would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed
about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of
blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the
1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo, has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election. So it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose
and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.
Sec. 6: Qualifications of Member of House of Representatives
1. Natural-born citizen
2. 25 years old
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter of the district in which he shall be elected (except party-list
representatives)
5. Resident of at least one year of such district
Sec. 7: Term of Office of House of Representatives
3 years