Moot

Labour Law Class Moot – 2018
BEFORE THE HON’BLE
HIGH COURT OF INDIA
Mohan Lal…………………………….................................................................PETITIONER
v.
Madan Mohan Verma.................…………...................................................RESPONDENT
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON‟BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION
JUSTICES OF THE HIGH COURT OF INDIA
UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Table of Contents.........................................................................................................1
2. List of Abbreviations....................................................................................................2
3. Index of Authorities.....................................................................................................3
4. Statement of Jurisdiction.............................................................................................5
5. Statement of Facts........................................................................................................6
6. Statement of Issues.......................................................................................................7
7. Summary of Arguments...............................................................................................8
8. Arguments Advanced...................................................................................................9
 Whether employee can claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act ?...................................................9
9. Prayer..........................................................................................................................10
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
¶ Para
¶¶ Paras
AIR All Indian Reporters
All Allahabad
Art. Article
Cal Calcutta
CITES Convention of International trade in endangered species of wild

fauna and flora 1975
CMS Convention of Migratory Species 1983
Del Delhi
Ed. Edition
ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

1966
ILO International Labour Organisation
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
u/a Under Article

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
BOOKS:
1. Banerjee, Digest of Land Acquisition & Compensation cases, 2nd Edition 1997, Ashoka
Law House.
2. Basu D.D, Constitution of India, 14th edition 2009, LexisNexis, Butterworths Wadhwa
Publication Nagpur.
3. Behura N.K. Panigrahi Nilakantha, Tribals and the Indian Constitution, Edition 2006,
Rawat Publications.
4. Desai . A. Ashok, Environmental Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition 2002, Modern Law House.
5. Dhirajlal&Ratanlal, The Law of Torts.26th edition 2012, LexisNexis Butterworths
Wadhwa.
LEGAL DATABASE:
1. Manupatra
2. SCC Online
3. West Law
4. Hein Online
LEXICONS:
1. Aiyar Ramanathan P , Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2005, Wadhwa Nagpur.
2. Garner Bryana, Black‟s Law Dictionary,7th Edition,1999.
LEGISLATIONS:
1. The Constitution of India, 1950

2. Labour Law Act
3. Maternity Benefit Act, 1961
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner humbly submits this memorandum for the petition filed before this Honourable
Court. The petition invokes its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It
sets forth the facts and the laws on which the claims are based.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mohan Lal filed an application under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923,
claiming compensation from the respondent Madan Mohan Verma on the following allegations.
Mohan Lal was employed by Madan Mohan Verma as mechanic/workman for installing a cotton
ginning machine and chalf cutting machine on the daily wages of Rs. 15/-. On 8th October, 1973
while Mohan Lal was taking the trial of the churl cutting machine his right hand got stuck into
the teeth of the gear roller of the machine and all his fingers and thumb of his right hand were cut
off resulting in total disability of a permanent character affecting his future earning capacity as
well. He claimed compensation from Madan Mohan Verma, his employer, but the latter declined
to give any compensation. Thereupon Mohan Lal moved the application under Section 3 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, claiming compensation on the basi.sol the monthly wages of Rs.
450/-. 'The application was contested by Madan Mohan Vernia. His case was that Mohan Lal had
sustained the injuries during the process of getting his own fodder cut into pieces in the machine
installed by him. Under the circumstames, the employer could not be held liable to pay
compensation. Furthermore, the injuries had been caused by the negligence of Mohan Lal. It was
also denied that Mohan Lal was a workman.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I:
1. Whether employee can claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's

Compensation Act ?
No, the employee can’t claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, Madan Mohan Verma shall be directed to pay Mohan Lal a sum of
Rs. 5,880/. Madan Mohan Verma shall also pay to Mohan Lal an interest on this amount
at the rate of 6% from 8th October 1973 upto the date of payment. . It was contended that
the interest should have been calculated, if at all, from the date of the passing of the
award. It should not have been calculated from the date of the accident. It was submitted
that the compensation becomes payable only after the liability of the employer had been
determined by the Commissioner. The submission is without any merit.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

Compensation Act?
The council find no substance in the first point urged on behalf of the employer. The only ground
upon which the employer claimed that Mohan Lal was not a workman within the meaning
of Section 2(n) was that he sustained the injuries while he was cutting his own fodder. Hence, he
was excluded from the definition of 'workman'. It does not seem to have been urged or pleaded
before the Commissioner that Mohan Lal was employed to do the work of a casual nature. The
Commissioner examined the evidence led by the employer as well as the workman and rejected
the case of the employer. He held that Mohan Lal sustained the injuries while he was working as
workman employed by Madan Mohan Verma and that the injuries have been caused while he
was taking the trial of the machine in the course of his employment. This is a finding of fact
which not being vitiated by any error of law cannot be reviewed in this appeal. Furthermore, the
only ground on which the learned Counsel for the employer contended that the employment of
Madan Lal was of a casual nature was that he had been engaged merely to install the machine
and that his employment ceased on the very third day when he sustained the injuries. We find no
substance in this ground either. Fixation of the machine and taking of trials were all part of the
business of the employer. The mere ground therefore that Mohan Lal had been employed merely
to install the machine could not take him out of the purview of the definition of 'workman'.
Similarly, the mere fact that Mohan Lal sustained injuries three days after his employment would
also not be relevant or conclusive for holding that Mohan Lal's employment was of a casual
nature. We, therefore, find no substance in the first point.
Coming to the second point we find that there is no substance in this submission either, Under
Sub S.(3) of Section 4A the Commissioner is empowered to direct payment of simple interest
where the employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act and if in the
opinion of the Commissioner there is no justification for the delay a further sum not exceeding
50% for such amount may be recovered from the employer by way of penalty. The provision for
penalty has been left to the discretion of the Commissioner. He is not bound to direct payment of
penalty in every case. The Commissioner has not considered the present to be a fit case for
awarding penalty We see no reason to take a different view. In our opinion no ground has been
made out for awarding penalty in the present case.
The third point urged in support of the employer's appeal has no substance. It was contended that
the interest should have been calculated, if at all, from the date of the passing of the award. It
should not have been calculated from the date of the accident. It was submitted that the
compensation becomes payable only after the liability of the employer had been determined by
the Commissioner. The submission is without any merit. The liability to pay interest arises
under Section 4A of the Act as soon as the injury is caused to the workman as the employer is
under a duty to pay the compensation at the rate as provided by Section 4. Under Sub-section (2)
of Section 4A the employer is required to make provisional payment of compensation even if he
disputes his liability to pay compensation to the extent claimed by the workman. He is required
under that provision to deposit with the Commissioner an amount based on the extent of liability
which he accepts. The view which we are taking finds full support from the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Pratap Narain v. Srinivas 1976-1 L.L.J. 235, in which it has been
held that in the case of a personal injury, the employer becomes liable to pay compensation as
soon as the personal injury is caused and that where the employer fails to pay the compensation
as provided under Section 4A(1) and also makes no provisional payment under Section 4A(2) the
employer is liable to pay interest from that date. The Commissioner was, therefore, right in
calculating the amount of compensation from the date of the accident.
PRAYER
In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may this Hon’ble
Court be pleased to:
1. The employee can’t claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's

Compensation Act.
AND/OR
Pass any other order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
And for this, the Petitioner as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.
COUNSELS FOR THE RESPONDENT

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF INDIA
Mohan Lal…………………………….................................................................PETITIONER
v.
Madan Mohan Verma.................…………...................................................RESPONDENT
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Whether employee can claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act ?...................................................9
18. Prayer..........................................................................................................................10
¶ Para
¶¶ Paras
All Allahabad
Art. Article
Cal Calcutta

Del Delhi
Ed. Edition

1966
u/a Under Article

BOOKS:
Law House.
Publication Nagpur.
Rawat Publications.
Wadhwa.
LEGAL DATABASE:
5. Manupatra
6. SCC Online
7. West Law
8. Hein Online
LEXICONS:
LEGISLATIONS:

5. Labour Law Act
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mohan Lal filed an application under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923,
claiming compensation from the respondent Madan Mohan Verma on the following allegations.
Mohan Lal was employed by Madan Mohan Verma as mechanic/workman for installing a cotton
ginning machine and chalf cutting machine on the daily wages of Rs. 15/-. On 8th October, 1973
while Mohan Lal was taking the trial of the churl cutting machine his right hand got stuck into
the teeth of the gear roller of the machine and all his fingers and thumb of his right hand were cut
off resulting in total disability of a permanent character affecting his future earning capacity as
well. He claimed compensation from Madan Mohan Verma, his employer, but the latter declined
to give any compensation. Thereupon Mohan Lal moved the application under Section 3 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, claiming compensation on the basi.sol the monthly wages of Rs.
450/-. 'The application was contested by Madan Mohan Vernia. His case was that Mohan Lal had
sustained the injuries during the process of getting his own fodder cut into pieces in the machine
installed by him. Under the circumstames, the employer could not be held liable to pay
compensation. Furthermore, the injuries had been caused by the negligence of Mohan Lal. It was
also denied that Mohan Lal was a workman.
ISSUE I:

Compensation Act ?
Yes, the employee can claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, Madan Mohan Verma shall be directed to pay Mohan Lal a sum of
Rs. 5,880/. Madan Mohan Verma shall also pay to Mohan Lal an interest on this amount
at the rate of 6% from 8th October 1973 upto the date of payment. These amount shall be
deposited by Madan Mohan Verma in the Court of the Commissioner for Workmen's
Compensation.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

Compensation Act, 1923?
Firstly, that Madan Lal was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the aforesaid Act,
as he was doing work of a casual nature; Second, that the Commissioner committed a patent
error of law in applying the amended provisions of the IV Schedule. He should have applied the
Schedule as it existed on the date of the accident, i.e., 8th October, 1973; Third, that the
commissioner was not right in awarding interest from the date of the accident. If at all, he should
have awarded interest only from the date of the order.
However, seems to be on a firm ground so far as the second point is concerned. By the
amendment of 1976 referred to above the IV Schedule to the aforesaid Act was amended. The
original applicable figure was Rs. 9,800/- which was substituted by the figure of Rs. 16,128/- by
the aforesaid amendment. Under S. l(2) of the amending Act the IV Schedule was amended
retrospectively with effect from the 1st of October, 1975. The retrospectivity was, however,
expressly confined to the 1st October, 1975, The accident took place in the present case on 8th
October, 1973. Evidently, therefore, the Schedule, which was in operation on that date ought to
be applied in determining the compensation. The employer placed reliance on a decision of the
Orissa High Court where a similar question arose for consideration. See Oriental Fire and
General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Mst. Bibi and Ors. 1972 A.C.J. 187 (Orissa).
The Counsel, however, placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Pratap
Narain v. Srinivas (Supra). In that case the Supreme Court was considering a case where the left
hand above the elbow of the workman, who was a carpenter by profession, had been amputated.
Their Lordships, held, inter alia that the case was clearly one of permanent total disablement as
the carpenter could not possibly work with one hand. That case is clearly distinguishable on
facts. In the present case, as mentioned above, it cannot be said that the carpenter cannot use his
right hand at all. We are of the opinion that on the facts of the present case the Commissioner
rightly applied Part II of the Schedule I as the present is not a case where the workman might
have been incapacitated for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the
accident.
The rights and liabilities under the Workmen's Compensation Act become crystallised on the
date of the death of the workman and the making of the application is only procedural and unless
the Act seeking to amend the Schedules is expressly or by necessary implication made
retrospective it will operate only prospectively and the amendment shall not apply. The
compensation will have to be computed according to the Schedule as it stood on the date of the
accident and not as it did after that date. This decision fully supports the contention of the
Counsel for the employer. A similar view has been expressed in another decision cited by the
learned Counsel for the appellant reported in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Moola
Singh1970 A.C.J. 401 (P. & H.).
PRAYER
2. The employee can claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act.
AND/OR
COUNSELS FOR THE PETITIONER

HIGH COURT OF INDIA
Municipal corporation of Delhi.........................................................................PETITIONER
v.
Female workers (muster roll) and amr..............................................................RESPONDENT
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Whether the female workers working on Muster Roll should be given any maternity
benefit?...................................................9
27. Prayer..........................................................................................................................10
¶ Para
¶¶ Paras
All Allahabad
Art. Article
Cal Calcutta

Del Delhi
Ed. Edition

1966
u/a Under Article
p. Page Number
BOOKS:
Law House.
Publication Nagpur.
Rawat Publications.
Wadhwa.
LEGAL DATABASE:
9. Manupatra
10. SCC Online
11. West Law
12. Hein Online
LEXICONS:
LEGISLATIONS:

8. Labour Law Act
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Union filed a statement of claim in which it was stated that Municipal Corporation of Delhi
employs a large number of persons including female workers on muster roll and they are made to
work in that capacity for years together though they are recruited against the work of perennial
nature. It was further stated that the nature of duties and responsibilities performed and
undertaken by the muster roll employees are the same as those of the regular employees. The
women employed on muster roll, which have been working with the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi for years together, have to work very hard in construction projects and maintenance of
roads including the work of digging trenches etc. but the Corporation does not grant any
maternity benefit to female workers who are required to work even during the period of mature
pregnancy or soon after the delivery of child. It was pleaded that the female workers required the
same maternity benefits as were enjoyed by regular female workers under the Maternity Benefit
Act, 1961. The denial of these benefits exhibits a negative attitude of the Corporation in respect
of a humane problem.
ISSUE I:
1. Whether the female workers working on Muster Roll should be given any maternity
benefit?
NO, It is not disputed that the benefits available under this Act have been made available
to a class of employees of the petitioner-Corporation. But the benefit is not being made
available to the women employees engaged on muster-roll, on the ground that they are
not regular employees of the Corporation. As we shall presently see, there is no
justification for denying the benefit of this Act to casual workers or workers employed on
daily wage basis.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
benefit?
The Corporation in their written statement, filed before the Industrial Tribunal, pleaded that the
provisions under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 or Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules were
not applicable to the female workers, engaged on muster roll, as they were all engaged only on
daily wages. It was also contended that they were not entitled to any benefit under the
Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. It was for these reasons that the Corporation contended
that the demand of the female workers (muster roll) for grant of maternity leave was liable to be
rejected.
The Tribunal, by its Award dated 2nd of April, 1996, allowed the claim of the female workers
(muster roll) and directed the Corporation to extend the benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act,
1961 to muster roll female workers who were in the continuous service of the Corporation for
three years or more. The Corporation challenged this judgment in a Writ Petition before the
Delhi High Court which was dismissed by the Single Judge on January 7, 1997. The Letters
Patent Appeal (LPA No. 64 of 1998), filed thereafter by the Corpo-ration was dismissed by the
Division Bench on March 9, 1998 on the ground of delay.
Learned counsel for the Corporation contended that the Division Bench was not justified in
rejecting the appeal on the ground of delay which ought to have been condoned as there was only
a 33 days' delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal which was caused on account of the opinion
of different Departments which had to be obtained before filing the Letters Patent Appeal. Since
the High Court has already exercised its discretion and has not condoned the delay in filing the
appeal, we find it difficult to enter into that controversy and examine the reasons why the appeal
was filed before the Division Bench after the expiry of the period of limitation. However, since
the question involved in this case is important, we deem it fit to express ourselves on the merits
of the matter as we have heard the counsel for the Corporation on merits also.
Not long ago, the place of a woman in rural areas has been traditionally her home; but the poor
illiterate women forced by sheer poverty now come out to seek various jobs so as to overcome
the economic hardship. They also take up jobs which involve hard physical labour. The female
workers who are engaged by the Corporation on muster roll have to work at the site of
construction and repairing of roads. Their services have also been utilised for digging of
trenches. Since they are engaged on daily wages, they, in order to earn their daily bread, work
even in advance stage of pregnancy and also soon after delivery, unmindful of detriment to their
health or to the health of the new-born. It is in this background that we have to look to our
Constitution which, in its Preamble, promises social and economic justice. We may first look at
the Fundamental Rights contained in Chapter III of the Constitution. Article 14 provides that the
State shall not deny to any person equality before law or the equal protection of the laws within
the territory of India. Dealing with flu's Article vis-a-vis the Labour Laws, this Court
in Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd v. Workmen, AIR (1967) SC 948=[1967] 1 SCR 652, has held that
labour to whichever sector it may belong in a particular region and in a particular industry will
be treated on equal basis. Article 15 provides that the 'State shall not discriminate against any
citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Clause (3) of
this Article provides as under: -
"(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women
and children."
In Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR (1954) SC 321=[1954] SCR 930, it was held
that Article 15(3) applies both to existing and future laws. From Part III, we may shift to Part IV
of the Constitution containing Directive Principles of State Policy. Article 38 provides that the
State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting, as effectively
as it may, a social order in which justice, social, economic and political shall inform all the
institutions of the national life. Sub-clause (2) of this Article mandates that the State shall strive
to minimise the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities
and opportunities.
Article 39 provides, inter alia, as under :
"39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State - The State shall, in particular, direct
its policy towards securing -
(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood;
(d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women;
(e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are
not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to
their age or strength;
(f) Articles 42 and 43 provides as under :
"42 provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief - The State shall make
provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief.
43. Living wage, etc., for workers - The State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or
economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise,
work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of
leisure and social and cultural opportunities and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to
promote cottage industries on an individual or co- operative basis in rural areas."
It is in the background of the provisions contained in Article 39, specially in Articles 42 and 43,
that the claim of the respondents for maternity benefit and the action of the petitioner in denying
that benefit to its women employees has to be scrutinised so as to determine whether the denial
of maternity benefit by the petititoner is justified in law or not.Since Article 42 specifically
speaks of "just and humane conditions of work" and "maternity relief, the validity of an
executive or administrative action in denying maternity benefit has to be examined on the anvil
of Article 42 which, though not enforceable at law, is nevertheless available for determining the
legal efficacy of the action complained of. The Parliament has already made the Maternity
Benefit Act, 1961. It is not disputed that the benefits available under this Act have been made
available to a class of employees of the petitioner-Corporation. But the benefit is not being made
available to the women employees engaged on muster-roll, on the ground that they are not
regular employees of the Corporation. As we shall presently see, there is no justification for
denying the benefit of this Act to casual workers or workers employed on daily wage basis.
PRAYER
1. the female workers working on Muster Roll should not be given maternity benefit.
AND/OR
COUNSELS FOR THE PETITIONER

HIGH COURT OF INDIA
Municipal corporation of Delhi.........................................................................PETITIONER
v.
Female workers (muster roll) and amr..............................................................RESPONDENT
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Whether the female workers working on Muster Roll should be given any maternity
benefit?...................................................9
36. Prayer..........................................................................................................................10
¶ Para
¶¶ Paras
All Allahabad
Art. Article
Cal Calcutta

Del Delhi
Ed. Edition

1966
u/a Under Article

BOOKS:
Law House.
Publication Nagpur.
Rawat Publications.
Wadhwa.
LEGAL DATABASE:
13. Manupatra
14. SCC Online
15. West Law
16. Hein Online
LEXICONS:
LEGISLATIONS:

11. Labour Law Act
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Union filed a statement of claim in which it was stated that Municipal Corporation of Delhi
employs a large number of persons including female workers on muster roll and they are made to
work in that capacity for years together though they are recruited against the work of perennial
nature. It was further stated that the nature of duties and responsibilities performed and
undertaken by the muster roll employees are the same as those of the regular employees. The
women employed on muster roll, which have been working with the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi for years together, have to work very hard in construction projects and maintenance of
roads including the work of digging trenches etc. but the Corporation does not grant any
maternity benefit to female workers who are required to work even during the period of mature
pregnancy or soon after the delivery of child. It was pleaded that the female workers required the
same maternity benefits as were enjoyed by regular female workers under the Maternity Benefit
Act, 1961. The denial of these benefits exhibits a negative attitude of the Corporation in respect
of a humane problem.
ISSUE I:
benefit?
YES, the Industrial Tribunal shall be complied with by the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi by approaching the State Government as also the Central Government for issuing
necessary Notification under the Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Maternity
Benefit Act, 1961, if it has not already been issued. In the meantime, the benefits under
the Act shall be provided to the women (muster roll) employees of the Corporation who
have been working with them on daily wages.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
benefit? If so, what directions are necessary in this regard?
A woman employee, at the time of advanced pregnancy cannot be compelled to undertake hard
labour as it would be detrimental to her health and also to the health of the foetus. It is for this
reason that it is provided in the Act that she would be entitled to maternity leave for certain
periods prior to and after delivery. We have scanned the different provisions of the Act, but we
do not find anything contained in the Act which entitles only regular women employees to the
benefit of maternity leave and not to those who are engaged on casual basis or on muster roll on
daily wage basis.
The Industrial Tribunal, which has given an award in favour of the respondents, has noticed that
women employees have been engaged by the Corporation on muster roll, that is to say, on daily
wage basis for doing various lands of works in projects like construction of buildings, digging of
trenches, making of roads, etc., but have been denied the benefit of maternity leave. The Tribunal
has found that though the women employees were on muster roll and had been working for the
Corporation for more than 10 years, they were not regularised. The Tribunal, however, came to
the conclusion that the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act had not been applied to the
Corporation and, therefore, it felt that there was a lacuna in the Act. It further felt that having
regard to the activities of the Corporation, which had employed more than a thousand women
employees, it should have been brought within the purview of the Act so that the maternity
benefits contemplated by the Act could be extended to the women employees of the Corporation.
It felt that this lacuna could be removed by the State Govt. by issuing the necessary notification
under the Proviso to Section 2 of the Maternity Act. This Proviso lays down as under:
"Provided that the State Government may, with the approval of the Central Government, after
giving not less than two month's notice of its intention of so doing, by notification in the Official
Gazette, declare that all or any of the provisions of this Act shall apply also to any other
establishment or class of establishments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise."
It consequently issued a direction to the management of the Municipal Corporation, Delhi to

extend the benefits of Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 to such muster roll female employees who
were in continuous service of the management for three years or more and who fulfilled the
conditions set out in Section 5of the Act.
We appreciate the efforts of the Industrial Tribunal in issuing the above directions so as to
provide the benefit of the Act to the muster roll women employees of the Corporation. This
direction is fully in consonance with the reference made to the industrial Tribunal. The question
referred for adjudication has already been reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment. It falls
in two parts as under :
(i) Whether the female workers working on muster roll should be given any maternity benefit?
(ii) If so, what directions are necessary in this regard.

The award made by the Industrial Tribunal completely answers the question in both the respects.
"Indeed the concept of social justice has now become such an integral part of industrial law that
it would be idle for any party to suggest that industrial adjudication can or should ignore the
claims of social justice in dealing with industrial disputes.. The concept of social justice is not
narrow, one-sided, or pedantic, and is not confined to industrial adjudication alone. Its sweep is
comprehensive. - It is founded on the basis ideal of socio-economic equality and its aim is to
assist the removal of socio-economic disparities and inequalities; nevertheless, in dealing with
industrial matters, it does not adopt a doctrinaire approach and refuses to yield blindly to abstract
notions, but adopts a realistic and pragmatic approach."
A just social order can be achieved only when inequalities are obliterated and everyone is
provided what is legally due. Women who constitute almost half of the segment of our society
have to be honoured and treated with dignity at places where they work to earn their livelihood.
Whatever be the nature of their duties, their avocation and the place where they work; they must
be provided all the facilities to which they are entitled. To become a mother is the most natural
phenomena in the life of a woman. Whatever is needed to facilitate the birth of child to a woman
who is in service, the employer has to be considerate and sympathetic towards her and must
realise the physical difficulties which a working woman would face in performing her duties at
the work place while carrying a baby in the womb or while rearing up the child after birth. The
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 aims to provide all these facilities to a working woman in a
dignified manner so that she may overcome the state of motherhood honourably, peaceably,
undeterred by the fear of being victimised for forced absence during the pre or post-natal period.
Next it was contended that the benefits contemplated by the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 can be
extended only to workwomen in an 'industry' and not to the muster roll women employees of the
Municipal Corporation. This is too stale an argument to be heard. Learned counsel also forgets
that Municipal Corporation was treated to be an 'industry' and, therefore, a reference was made to
the Industrial Tribunal, which answered the reference against the Corporation, and it is this
matter which is being agitated before us.
Now, it is to be remembered that the Municipal Corporation or Boards have already been held to
be "industry" within the meaning of "Industrial Disputes Act", in Udge Budge Municipality v.
Sri. P.R. Mukherjee, (1953) 1 LLJ 195 (SC), it was observed that the Municipal activity would
fall within the expression "undertaking" and as such would be an industry. The decision was
followed in Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen, (1957) 1 LLJ 8 (SC), in which the
Court observed that those branches of work of the Municipalities which could be regarded as
analogous to the carrying-on of a trade or business, would be "industry" and the dispute between
the Municipalities and their employees would be treated as an "industrial dispute". This view
was reiterated in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees and Others, (I960) 1
LLJ 523 (SC). In this case, various Departments of the Municipality were considered and certain
Departments including General Administration Department and Education Department were held
to be covered within the meaning of "industry". The Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Municipal Committee, Bhiwani v. Padam Singh and Others, 1973 Labour and Industrial Cases
1512, held that fire-brigade service, maintained by Municipal Committee, was an "industry". But
a contrary view was taken by the Bombay High Court in Administrator of the City of Nagpur
Municipal Corporation v. Labour Court, Nagpur, 1967 Labour and Industrial Case 107, which
held that the fire-brigade service, maintained by the Municipal Corporation, was not an
"industry". We are not, in this case, attempting to resolve the conflict between the Punjab and
Haryana High Court and the Bombay High Court but what we intend to emphasise is that this
Court has already held some of the Departments of the Municipal Corporation to be an
"industry". The High Courts have also held the running of dispensary as also sanitary and
conservancy activities to be an "industry". (See : Sirur Municipality v. Its Workmen, (1960) 2
LLJ 657;, Municipal Council, Washim v. MangujiZendujiDhamane, 1978 Labour and Industrial
Cases 881). The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rajendranagar Municipality v. B.V. Perraju,
1995 Labour and Industrial Cases 2102, has held that storing and distribution of water was a
systematic activity of the Corporation which would fall within the definition of "industry".
Taking into consideration the enunciation of law as settled by this Court as also the High Courts
in various decisions referred to above, the activity of the Delhi Municipal Corporation by which
construction work is undertaken or roads are laid or repaired or trenches are dug would fall
within the definition of "industry". The workmen or, for that matter, those employed on muster
roll for carrying on these activities would, therefore, be "workmen" and the dispute between
them and the Corporation would have to be tackled as an industrial dispute in the light of various
statutory provisions of the Industrial Law, one of which is the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. This
is the domestic scenario. Internationally, the scenario is not different.
Delhi is the capital of India. No other City or Corporation would be more conscious than the City
of Delhi that India is a signatory to various International covenants and treaties. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations on 10th of December, 1948, set in
motion the universal thinking that human rights are supreme and ought to be preserved at all
costs. This was followed by a series of Conventions. On 18th of December, 1979, the United
Nations adopted the "Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination against
women". Article 11 of this Convention provides as under :-
"Article 11
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in
the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same
rights, in particular;
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same
criteria for selection in matters of employment;
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security
and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational training and
retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational train-ing and recurrent training;
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work
of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retire-ment, unemployment, sickness,
invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave.
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the
safeguarding of the function of repro-duction.
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and
to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures :
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or
of maternity leave and discrimi-nation in dismissals on the basis of marital status;
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of
former employment, seniority or social allowances;
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to
combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in
particular through promoting the establishment and develop-ment of a network of child-care
facilities;
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be
harmful to them.
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed periodically
in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or extended
as necessary."
These principles which are contained in Article 11, reproduced above, have to be read into the
contract of service between Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the women employees (muster
roll); and so read these employees immediately become entitled to all the benefits conceived
under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. We conclude our discussion by providing that the
direction issued by the Industrial Tribunal shall be complied with by the Municipal Corporation
of Delhi by approaching the State Government as also the Central Government for issuing
necessary Notification under the Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Maternity Benefit
Act, 1961, if it has not already been issued. In the meantime, the benefits under the Act shall be
provided to the women (muster roll) employees of the Corporation who have been working with
them on daily wages.
PRAYER
2. the female workers working on Muster Roll should be given maternity benefit.
AND/OR
COUNSELS FOR THE RESPONDENT

SAVEETHA SCHOOL OF LAW
CLASS MOOT COMPETITION, 2018
BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF TAMIL NADU
PREETHI…………………………………………………………...PETITIONERS
v.
UNION OF INDIA……………………………………………. RESPONDENTS
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HONOURABLE HIGH COURT OF INDIA
Memorial on behalf of the Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
● Whether the instant case is maintainable or
not............................................................................................................10
● Whether the Employer is liable for
compensation..........................................................................................................12
9. Prayer..........................................................................................................................13
S Section
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
Art Article
Hon’ble Honourable
No. Number
Ors Others
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
v. Versus
Sd/- Signed
BOOKS:
Publication Nagpur.
2. Workman Compensation Act, 1923, Eastern book Company, 2008 Edition
Rawat Publications.
LEGAL DATABASE:
1. Indiankanoon
2. Manupatra
3. SCC Online
LEGISLATIONS:

2. Workman Compensation Act, 1923
The petitioner has filed this writ petition under article 226 of the constitution of India. the
honourable high court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant case under article 226 of the
constitution of india.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Petitioner a woman was injured by the fall of a wall which had no connection with her
employment. But the immediate cause of the injury was the collapse of the shed in which she
was working and the collapse of the shed is due to the fall of the wall.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I:
WHETHER THE INSTANCE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
ISSUE II:
WHETHER IT HAD NO CONNECTION WITH EMPLOYMENT AND IT DOESNOT ARISE

OUT OF HER EMPLOYMENT?
ISSUE I:
Whether the instant petition is maintainable or not?
Yes, the instant petition is maintainable. In the instant case the injured women’s rights were
violated by the gross hurt to her by the fall of the wall and the falling of the shed which was a
chain of events that took place at the place of employment holding the employer liable.
ISSUE II:
Whether it had no connection with employment and it does not arise out of her
employment?
National extension does not apply because she was not asked by employer to do any act as
mentioned in the fact and it the fact and it does not arise out of her employment
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. WHETHER THE INSTANCE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and
certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for
any other purpose
(2) The power conferred by clause ( 1 ) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to
the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such
power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such
person is not within those territories
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in
any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause ( 1 ),
without
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for
such interim order; and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for
the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour
such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the
application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date
on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High
Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on
which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall,
on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power
conferred on the Supreme court by clause ( 2 ) of Article 32.1
In the instant case the injured women’s rights were violated by the gross hurt to her by the fall of
the wall and the falling of the shed which was a chain of events that took place at the place of
employment holding the employer liable to pay compensation with reference to Section 3 of
Workman’s Compensation Act 1923, as explained in the next issue.
1
Sri B Athaulla Khan vs State Of Karnataka on 3 May, 2017
II. WHETHER IT HAD NO CONNECTION WITH EMPLOYMENT AND IT DOESNOT
ARISE OUT OF HER EMPLOYMENT?
Section 3(1) Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 provides that the injury must be caused to
workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Employment does not
necessarily ends when the tool down signal is given or when the workman leaves the actual
workshop. There is a notional extension at both the entry and exit time and space. As
employment may end or may begin not only when the employee begins to work or leaves his
tools but also when he used the means of access and egress to and from the place of employment.
As a rule, the employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of
employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and
from the place of employment being excluded. It is now well-settled, however, that this is subject
to the theory of notional extension of the employer’s premises so as to include an area which the
workman passes and re passes in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be
some reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the
course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer’s premises.
The facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined very carefully in order to
determine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of a workman,
keeping in view at all times this theory of notional extension.
Various judgments of Supreme court and different high Courts have considered the concept of
notional employment and said that if the employee dies due to accident while going to work
place from residence or while returning from work place to residence, as an accident arising out
of and during the course of employment and as such entitled for compensation in accordance
with provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.
PRAYER
1. The instant petition is not maintainable.

2. Hence the Respondent not liable to pay compensation caused to the workmen by the fall
of the ceiling of the workplace.
AND/OR
And for this, the Respondent his in duty bound, shall humbly pray.
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT

SAVEETHA SCHOOL OF LAW
CLASS MOOT COMPETITION, 2018
BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF TAMIL NADU
PREETHI…………………………………………………………...PETITIONERS
v.
UNION OF INDIA……………………………………………. RESPONDENTS
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HONOURABLE HIGH COURT OF INDIA
Memorial on behalf of the Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Whether the instant case is maintainable or
not................................................................................................................10
 Whether the Employer is liable for
compensation..........................................................................................................12
45. Prayer..........................................................................................................................13
S Section
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
Art Article
Hon’ble Honourable
No. Number
Ors Others
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
v. Versus
Sd/- Signed
BOOKS:
Publication Nagpur.
22. Workman Compensation Act, 1923, Eastern book Company, 2008 Edition
Rawat Publications.
LEGAL DATABASE:
17. Indiankanoon
18. Manupatra
19. SCC Online
LEGISLATIONS:

14. Workman Compensation Act, 1923
The petitioner has filed this writ petition under article 226 of the constitution of India. the
honourable high court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant case under article 226 of the
constitution of india.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Petitioner a woman was injured by the fall of a wall which had no connection with her
employment. But the immediate cause of the injury was the collapse of the shed in which she
was working and the collapse of the shed is due to the fall of the wall.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I:
WHETHER THE INSTANCE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
ISSUE II:
WHETHER THE EMPLOYER IS LAIBLE FOR COMPENSATION

ISSUE I:
Whether the instant petition is maintainable or not?
Yes, the instant petition is maintainable. In the instant case the injured women’s rights were
violated by the gross hurt to her by the fall of the wall and the falling of the shed which was a
chain of events that took place at the place of employment holding the employer liable.
ISSUE II:
Whether the employer is liable for compensation?
Yes, the employer is liable for compensation as under Section 3(1) Workmen’s Compensation
Act, 1923 provides that the injury must be caused to workman by an accident arising out of and
in the course of employment. Employment does not necessarily ends when the tool down signal
is given or when the workman leaves the actual workshop.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. WHETHER THE INSTANCE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and
certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for
any other purpose
(2) The power conferred by clause ( 1 ) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to
the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such
power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such
person is not within those territories
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in
any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause ( 1 ),
without
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for
such interim order; and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for
the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour
such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the
application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date
on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High
Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on
which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall,
on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power
conferred on the Supreme court by clause ( 2 ) of Article 32.2
In the instant case the injured women’s rights were violated by the gross hurt to her by the fall of
the wall and the falling of the shed which was a chain of events that took place at the place of
employment holding the employer liable to pay compensation with reference to Section 3 of
Workman’s Compensation Act 1923, as explained in the next issue.
2
Sri B Athaulla Khan vs State Of Karnataka on 3 May, 2017
II. WHETHER THE EMPLOYER IS LIABLE FOR COMPENSATION?
Section 3(1) Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 provides that the injury must be caused to
workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Employment does not
necessarily ends when the tool down signal is given or when the workman leaves the actual
workshop. There is a notional extension at both the entry and exit time and space. As
employment may end or may begin not only when the employee begins to work or leaves his
tools but also when he used the means of access and egress to and from the place of employment.
As a rule, the employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of
employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and
from the place of employment being excluded. It is now well-settled, however, that this is subject
to the theory of notional extension of the employer’s premises so as to include an area which the
workman passes and re passes in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be
some reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the
course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer’s premises.
The facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined very carefully in order to
determine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of a workman,
keeping in view at all times this theory of notional extension.
Various judgments of Supreme court and different high Courts have considered the concept of
notional employment and said that if the employee dies due to accident while going to work
place from residence or while returning from work place to residence, as an accident arising out
of and during the course of employment and as such entitled for compensation in accordance
with provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.
PRAYER
1. The instant petition is maintainable.

2. Hence the Respondent liable to pay compensation caused to the workmen by the fall of
the ceiling of the workplace.
AND/OR
COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

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Labour Law Class Moot – 2018

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

HIGH COURT OF INDIA

Madan Mohan Verma.................…………...................................................RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON‟BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION

JUSTICES OF THE HIGH COURT OF INDIA

UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

AIR All Indian Reporters

CITES Convention of International trade in endangered species of wild

CMS Convention of Migratory Species 1983

ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

ILO International Labour Organisation

IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature

u/a Under Article

1. The Constitution of India, 1950

1. Whether employee can claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's

1. Whether employee can claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's

1. The employee can’t claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's

COUNSELS FOR THE RESPONDENT

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF INDIA

Madan Mohan Verma.................…………...................................................RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON‟BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION

JUSTICES OF THE HIGH COURT OF INDIA

UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

10. Table of Contents.........................................................................................................1

AIR All Indian Reporters

CITES Convention of International trade in endangered species of wild

CMS Convention of Migratory Species 1983

ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

ILO International Labour Organisation

IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature

u/a Under Article

4. The Constitution of India, 1950

2. Whether employee can claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's

3. Whether employee can claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's

COUNSELS FOR THE PETITIONER

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

HIGH COURT OF INDIA

Municipal corporation of Delhi.........................................................................PETITIONER

Female workers (muster roll) and amr..............................................................RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON‟BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION

JUSTICES OF THE HIGH COURT OF INDIA

UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

19. Table of Contents.........................................................................................................1

AIR All Indian Reporters

CITES Convention of International trade in endangered species of wild

CMS Convention of Migratory Species 1983

ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

ILO International Labour Organisation

IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature

u/a Under Article

7. The Constitution of India, 1950

Article 39 provides, inter alia, as under :

(f) Articles 42 and 43 provides as under :

COUNSELS FOR THE PETITIONER

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

HIGH COURT OF INDIA

Municipal corporation of Delhi.........................................................................PETITIONER