1. G.R. No. 131282.

January 4, 2002]

GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and

BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated September 17, 1997, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 2340- UDK, entitled Bernardo Eradel vs. Hon.
Ermelino G. Andal, setting aside all proceedings in Civil Case No. 1075, Gabriel L.
Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, before the Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Tandag,
Surigao del Sur.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private respondent Bernardo
Eradel[2] entered and occupied petitioners land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-
302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the
land had an assessed value of P5,240. When petitioner politely informed private
respondent that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate the land, private
respondent refused, but instead threatened him with bodily harm. Despite repeated
demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorneys Fees against private
respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner
appended to the complaint the aforementioned tax declaration. The counsel of the
Ruenas asked for extension to file their Answer and was given until July 18,
1995. Meanwhile, petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which
became the trial courts basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In
this agreement, the Ruenas through their counsel, Atty. Eusebio Avila, entered into a
Compromise Agreement with herein petitioner, Gabriel Duero. Inter alia, the agreement
stated that the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership and
possession of Duero.[3] Herein private respondent Eradel was not a party to the
agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the
complaint.[4]
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996,
judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to peacefully
vacate and turn over Lot No. 1065 Cad. 537-D to petitioner; pay petitioner P2,000
annual rental from 1988 up the time he vacates the land, and P5,000 as attorneys fees
and the cost of the suit.[5] Private respondent received a copy of the decision on May 25,
1996.
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he
has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He
explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest
belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to
defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.
Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No. 1029, an administrative case between petitioner
and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained pending with
the Office of the Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in Davao City. Eventually, it was forwarded to the DENR Regional Office in
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from
Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred that
unless there is a determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate
the land. He also averred that the judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch as the
heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded.
On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana Soledad and Virginia, all surnamed
Laurente, grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming ownership of the land, filed a
Motion for Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.
On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief
from Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private respondent
alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was
only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. On
November 22, 1996, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted
on January 28. On February 18, 1997, Entry of Judgment was made of record and a
writ of execution was issued by the RTC on February 27, 1997. On March 12, 1997,
private respondent filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that private
respondent is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, Branch 27 in
Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when private respondent filed with said court his Motion for
Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment. The Court of Appeals decreed as
follows:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. All

proceedings in Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, et. al. Civil Case 1075 filed in
the Court a quo, including its Decision, Annex E of the petition, and its Orders and
Writ of Execution and the turn over of the property to the Private Respondent by the
Sheriff of the Court a quo, are declared null and void and hereby SET ASIDE, No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. [6]

Petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it held
that:
I.

THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

OF THE CASE.

II

PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THEREBY ESTOPPED FROM

QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT EVEN AFTER
IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF THEREFROM.

III

THE FAILURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS ANSWER IS JUSTIFIED.[7]

The main issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion when it held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and that private
respondent was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had
filed several motions before it. The secondary issue is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that private respondents failure to file an answer to the complaint was
justified.
At the outset, however, we note that petitioner through counsel submitted to this
Court pleadings that contain inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition,[8] we
find that to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in holding that the RTC had
no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed to Annex E [9] of his petition which supposedly is the
Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao, specifically
containing the notation, Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994. But it
appears that Annex E of his petition is not a Certification but a xerox copy of a
Declaration of Real Property. Nowhere does the document contain a notation, Note:
Subject for General Revision Effective 1994. Petitioner also asked this Court to refer
to Annex F,[10] where he said the zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40 per sq.m.,
thus placing the computed value of the land at the time the complaint was filed before
the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within
the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, we find that these annexes are both
merely xerox copies. They are obviously without evidentiary weight or value.
Coming now to the principal issue, petitioner contends that respondent appellate
court acted with grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or a
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[11] But here we find that in its decision
holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction over the case and that private
respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, respondent
Court of Appeals discussed the facts on which its decision is grounded as well as the
law and jurisprudence on the matter.[12] Its action was neither whimsical nor capricious.
Was private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC? In
this case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that he was not. While
participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from
challenging the courts jurisdiction,[13] we note that estoppel has become an equitable
defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a
right and not merely its equitable enforcement.[14] Hence, estoppel ought to be applied
with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal
and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice. [15]
In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag,
Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it was petitioner who filed the complaint
against private respondent and two other parties before the said court, [16] believing that
the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 7691[17] amending
BP 129 had become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but
to the MTC pursuant to said amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in
the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr.,
his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of
Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the
complaint, private respondent was declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New
Trial in the same court and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit
ought to be answered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the
evidence to prove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land because of his
long, continuous and uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the
land.[18] But his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the
RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion,
hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he
raised for the first time the RTCs lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again
denied. Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when
the case was already on appeal, but when the case was still before the RTC that ruled
him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and
denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to
reconsider the denial of private respondents motion for relief from judgment, it went on
to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.
Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling
the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction
of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their
silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. [19] Further, a party may assail
the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on
appeal.[20] The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared
itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively
participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be
properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at anytime and at any stage of the action.[21] Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the
jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue
of conferment as a matter of law.[22] Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to
confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional
circumstances.[23] The Court of Appeals found support for its ruling in our decision
in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, thus:

x x x The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or
proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act
may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result
of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If
any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the
blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby
lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct
forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Sec. 2, Rule 9,
Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such
judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132,
Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. [Emphasis ours.] [24]

Indeed, the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its
jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its decision a lawless thing.[25]
Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically
never become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be out
of the question. Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals was in order.
In holding that estoppel did not prevent private respondent from questioning the
RTCs jurisdiction, the appellate court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel must be
applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of
justice. Here, we find that petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed his
complaint before a court without appropriate jurisdiction. Defendant, a farmer whose
tenancy status is still pending before the proper administrative agency concerned, could
have moved for dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as
defendant therein could not be expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related
issues. This farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not to be penalized when
he claims that he made an honest mistake when he initially submitted his motions
before the RTC, before he realized that the controversy was outside the RTCs
cognizance but within the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel
as the RTC did would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of
his case. Furthermore, if the RTCs order were to be sustained, he would be evicted
from the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No. 1029 would remain
unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is
later found that he has a legal right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.
Having determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the appellate
court in ruling that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the RTC, we need not tarry to consider in detail the second issue. Suffice it to say
that, given the circumstances in this case, no error was committed on this score by
respondent appellate court. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, private
respondent had justifiable reason in law not to file an answer, aside from the fact that he
believed the suit was properly his landlords concern.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1075
entitled Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, its Order that private respondent turn
over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, are ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on official leave.

2. [G.R. No. 129638. December 8, 2003]

ANTONIO T. DONATO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

FILOMENO ARCEPE, TIMOTEO BARCELONA, IGNACIO
BENDOL, THELMA P. BULICANO, ROSALINDA CAPARAS,
ROSITA DE COSTO, FELIZA DE GUZMAN, LETICIA DE LOS
REYES, ROGELIO GADDI, PAULINO GAJARDO, GERONIMO
IMPERIAL, HOMER IMPERIAL, ELVIRA LESLIE, CEFERINO
LUGANA, HECTOR PIMENTEL, NIMFA PIMENTEL, AURELIO G.
ROCERO, ILUMINADA TARA, JUANITO VALLESPIN, AND
NARCISO YABUT, respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed on July 17, 1997 which
should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It
assails the Resolutions dated March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997issued by
[1]

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394. [2]

The factual background of the case is as follows:

Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property
located at Ciriaco Tuason Street, San Andres, Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 131793 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City
of Manila on November 24, 1978. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 26) of Manila (MeTC) for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and all unknown
occupants of the subject property. [3]

Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that
expired at the end of each month but were impliedly renewed under the same
terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped
paying rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written demand to vacate;
the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him to file the
ejectment case against them. [4]

Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private respondents, for brevity)

[5]

filed a consolidated Answer dated June 29, 1994 wherein they denied non-
payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted because the
Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right to
purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the
purchase of the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a
passive stage, they decided to continue payment of rentals and tendered
payment to petitioners counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for
consignation of the rentals in Civil Case No. 144049 while they await the
outcome of the negotiation to purchase.
Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MeTC rendered
judgment on September 19, 1994 against the 23 non-answering defendants,
ordering them to vacate the premises occupied by each of them, and to pay
jointly and severally P10,000.00 per month from the date they last paid their
rent until the date they actually vacate, plus interest thereon at the legal rate
allowed by law, as well as P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs of the
suit. As to the 20 private respondents, the MeTC issued a separate
judgment on the same day sustaining their rights under the Land Reform
[6]

Law, declaring petitioners cause of action as not duly warranted by the facts
and circumstances of the case and dismissing the case without prejudice.
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing the complaint as against the
private respondents, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (Branch
47) of Manila (RTC). In a Decision dated July 5, 1996, the RTC sustained
[7] [8]

the decision of the MeTC.

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
(CA for brevity), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41394. In a Resolution dated
March 21, 1997, the CA dismissed the petition on two grounds: (a) the
certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners counsel and not
by petitioner himself, in violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91; and, (b) the
[9]

only annex to the petition is a certified copy of the questioned decision but
copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition are not annexed, contrary to Section 3,
paragraph b, Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
(RIRCA). [10]

On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching

[11]

thereto a photocopy of the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by

petitioner himself and the relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC. Five
[12] [13]

days later, or on April 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplement to his motion
[14]

for reconsideration submitting the duly authenticated original of the

certification of non-forum shopping signed by petitioner.
[15]

In a Resolution dated June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioners motion for
[16]

reconsideration and its supplement, ruling that petitioners subsequent

compliance did not cure the defect in the instant petition.
[17]

Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:

I.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

PETITION BASED ON HYPER-TECHNICAL GROUNDS BECAUSE:

A. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH

SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91. MORE, PETITIONER
SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF
THE PROCEEDINGS A DULY AUTHENTICATED CERTIFICATE
OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WHICH HE HIMSELF SIGNED
AND EXECUTED IN THE UNITED STATES.

B. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SECTION

3, RULE 6 OF THE REVISED INTERNAL RULES OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS. MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY
SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
 COPIES OF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS IN THE CASES
BELOW.

C. PETITIONER HAS A MERITORIOUS APPEAL, AND HE STANDS

TO LOSE SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY IF THE APPEAL IS NOT
GIVEN DUE COURSE. THE RULES OF PROCEDURE MUST BE
LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.

II.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING

THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE PRESENT IN
THE CASE AT BAR.

III.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE

RTC MANILA, BRANCH 47, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF MTC MANILA, BRANCH 26, THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
WITHOUT VIOLATING THEIR SECURITY OF TENURE EVEN IF THE TERM
OF THE LEASE IS MONTH-TO-MONTH WHICH EXPIRES AT THE END OF
EACH MONTH. IN THIS REGARD,

A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT RULING THAT TENANTS UNDER P.D. 1517 MAY BE
EVICTED FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT, TERMINATION OF
LEASE OR OTHER GROUNDS FOR EJECTMENT.

B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED PRIORITY RIGHT TO
BUY THE LOT THEY OCCUPY DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE
LANDOWNER DOES NOT INTEND TO SELL THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR.

C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN RULING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED
WITHIN A ZONAL IMPROVEMENT AREA OR APD.
 D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED
THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS UNDER THE LAW
RESULT IN THE WAIVER OF PROTECTION AGAINST
EVICTION.

E. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE
ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER P.D. 2016 SINCE THE
GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF ACQUIRING THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.

F. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN FINDING THAT THERE IS AN ON-GOING NEGOTIATION
FOR THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND THAT IT
RENDERS THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
PREMATURE.

G. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED CASE FOR
CONSIGNATION DOES NOT BAR THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.

IV.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING

THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER A REASONABLE
COMPENSATION FOR THEIR USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IN THE AMOUNT OF AT LEAST P10,000.00 PER MONTH FROM
THE DATE THEY LAST PAID RENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ACTUALLY
VACATE THE SAME, WITH LEGAL INTEREST AT THE MAXIMUM RATE
ALLOWED BY LAW UNTIL PAID.

V.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING

THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES AND
EXPENSES OF LITIGATION OF AT LEAST P20,000.00, PLUS COSTS.
[18]
 Petitioner submits that a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure
is called for in view of the attendant circumstances showing that the objectives
of the rule on certification of non-forum shopping and the rule requiring
material portions of the record be attached to the petition have not been
glaringly violated and, more importantly, the petition is meritorious.
The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However,
if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As
enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona: [19]

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is
proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error
of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the
other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by
the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. (Emphasis supplied).
[20]

Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the

petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court a
quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
At the time the instant petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17, 1997,
the prevailing rule is the newly promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, considering that the CA Resolution being assailed was
rendered on March 21, 1997, the applicable rule is the three-
month reglementary period, established by jurisprudence. Petitioner received
[21]

notice of the assailed CA Resolution dismissing his petition for review on April
4, 1997. He filed his motion reconsideration on April 17, 1997, using up only
thirteen days of the 90-day period. Petitioner received the CA Resolution
denying his motion on July 3, 1997 and fourteen days later, or on July 17,
1997, he filed a motion for 30-day extension of time to file a petition for review
which was granted by us; and petitioner duly filed his petition on August 15,
1997, which is well-within the period of extension granted to him.
We now go to the merits of the case.
We find the instant petition partly meritorious.
 The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum
shopping in cases filed before the CA and the corresponding sanction for non-
compliance thereto are found in the then prevailing Revised Circular No. 28-
91. It provides that the petitioner himself must make the certification against
[22]

forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of
personal execution of the certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only
the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated
similar actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even counsel of
record may be unaware of such fact. The Court has ruled that with respect to
[23]

the contents of the certification, the rule on substantial compliance may be

availed of. This is so because the requirement of strict compliance with the
rule regarding the certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with
or its requirements completely disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. [24]

The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification against
forum shopping but said certification was signed by petitioners counsel. In
submitting the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by himself in his
motion for reconsideration, petitioner has aptly drawn the Courts attention to
[25]

the physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal considering that he is a resident of 1125 South
Jefferson Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. were he to personally accomplish
and sign the certification.
We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the
petition to have been prepared and sent to the petitioner in the United States,
for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine Consulate in
Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the certification before the
Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the Philippines
within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, we find that petitioner has
adequately explained his failure to personally sign the certification which
justifies relaxation of the rule.
We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of
[26]

forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the

[27]

petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial

compliance, pro hac vice.
 In like manner, the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3,
paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of
the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support the
petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be
emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to
require parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the
interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of the
RIRCA, the CA may require the parties to complete the annexes as the court
[28]

deems necessary, and if the petition is given due course, the CA may require
the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under Section
3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA. At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the
[29]

pleadings and other material portions of the records below with his motion for
reconsideration. In Jaro vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the
[30] [31]

doctrine laid down in Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. [32]

National Labor Relations Commission that subsequent submission of the

[33]

missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial

compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. We find no
cogent reason to depart from this doctrine.
Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on
technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.
Needless to stress, "a litigation is not a game of technicalities." When [34]

technicality deserts its function of being an aid to justice, the Court is justified
in exempting from its operations a particular case. Technical rules of [35]

procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting substantial justice
is an even more urgent ideal. [36]

The Courts pronouncement in Republic vs. Court of Appeals is worth [37]

echoing: cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity

to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of
justice would be better served. Thus, what should guide judicial action is
[38]

that a party litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor or property on mere
technicalities. This guideline is especially true when the petitioner has
[39]

satisfactorily explained the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in his motion
for reconsideration, as in this case.
[40]

In addition, petitioner prays that we decide the present petition on the

merits without need of remanding the case to the CA. He insists that all the
elements of unlawful detainer are present in the case. He further argues that
the alleged priority right to buy the lot they occupy does not apply where the
landowner does not intend to sell the subject property, as in the case; that
respondents cannot be entitled to protection under P.D. No. 2016 since the
government has no intention of acquiring the subject property, nor is the
subject property located within a zonal improvement area; and, that assuming
that there is a negotiation for the sale of the subject property or a pending
case for consignation of rentals, these do not bar the eviction of respondents.
We are not persuaded. We shall refrain from ruling on the foregoing issues
in the present petition for certiorari. The issues involved are factual issues
which inevitably require the weighing of evidence. These are matters that are
beyond the province of this Court in a special civil action for certiorari. These
issues are best addressed to the CA in the petition for review filed before
it. As an appellate court, it is empowered to require parties to submit
additional documents, as it may find necessary, or to receive evidence, to
promote the ends of justice, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 9,
B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
to wit:

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated

March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
41394 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings in CA-G.R. No. 41394, entitled,
Antonio T. Donato vs. Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 47, Filomeno Arcepe, et al.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
3THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144025. December 27, 2002]

SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA, petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO
G. DEFENSOR, Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Sixth Judicial Region,
Iloilo City, and LUCKY HOMES, INC., represented by WILSON
JESENA, JR., as Manager, respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal
of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1999 and its
[1]

resolution dated June 1, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54587.

The records disclose that, sometime in 1970, petitioner-spouses
purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc.,
situated in Iloilo and containing an area of 240 square meters. Said lot was
specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 28254 and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as
security for their housing loan. Petitioners then started the construction of their
house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly
identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private
respondent, through its general manager, informed petitioners of such mistake
but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Thus,
petitioners continued with the construction of their house. However, petitioners
defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot
No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners certificate of title was cancelled
and a new one was issued in the name of SSS. After Lot No. 19 was
foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded
from private respondent that their contract of sale be reformed and another
deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their
house was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This prompted
petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 17115.
On January 15, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the
[2]

complaint for lack of merit and ordering herein petitioners to pay private
respondent the amount of P10,000 as moral damages and another P10,000
as attorneys fees. The pertinent conclusion of the trial court reads as follows:

Aware of such fact, the plaintiff nonetheless continued to stay in the premises of Lot 18 on the
proposal that he would also buy the same. Plaintiff however failed to buy Lot 18 and likewise
defaulted in the payment of his loan with the SSS involving Lot 19. Consequently Lot 19 was
foreclosed and sold at public auction. Thereafter TCT No. T-29950 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof TCT No. T-86612 (Exh. 9) was issued in favor of SSS. This being the situation
obtaining, the reformation of instruments, even if allowed, or the swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19
as earlier proposed by the plaintiff, is no longer feasible considering that plaintiff is no longer the
owner of Lot 19, otherwise, defendant will be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore
(sic). Upon the other hand, plaintiff will be unjustly enriching himself having in its favor both
Lot 19 which was earlier mortgaged by him and subsequently foreclosed by SSS, as well as Lot
18 where his house is presently standing.

The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the defendant. It is evident
that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant is Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which
parcel of land has been properly indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by the
plaintiff. The contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the parties,
besides the plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on mutual mistake, hence the same need no
longer be reformed.[3]

On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Thus,
on September 17, 1998, petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of
execution, alleging that the court a quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as it
was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective
Decree). Conformably, petitioners filed a new complaint against private
respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, on June 30, 1999, petitioner-spouses
filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment,
premised on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide
Civil Case No. 17115.
In a decision rendered on December 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals
denied the petition for annulment of judgment, relying mainly on the
jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel as laid down in the case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy. [4]

Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied,

petitioners filed this instant petition, contending that the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing the petition by applying the principle of estoppel, even if
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to decide
Civil Case No. 17115.
At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking from us the
annulment of a trial court judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. Because it is
not an appeal, the correctness of the judgment is not in issue
here. Accordingly, there is no need to delve into the propriety of the decision
rendered by the trial court.
 Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already
abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. We do not [5]

agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an
order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court
which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its
jurisdiction. As we held in the leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy: [6]

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches.

xxx

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question
that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for
reasons of public policy.

Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Thus, in Orosa vs.
Court of Appeals; Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals; Salva vs. Court of
[7] [8]

Appeals; National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals; Province of

[9] [10]

Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals; PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation

[11]

vs. Court of Appeals, this Court affirmed the rule that a partys active
[12]

participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, which includes
invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops such
party from later challenging that same courts jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the
jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of
contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings
before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to
finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts
jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was
only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution
against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it
was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus
effectively waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the case
they themselves filed.
 Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be
allowed to profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the
private respondent. This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment but only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.
[13]

Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-
dealing by parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately
taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the elementary principles of
justice and good faith. There is no denying that, in this case, petitioners
[14]

never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the
trial court. Instead, they voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of said court. It is now too late in the day for them to repudiate the
jurisdiction they were invoking all along.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales,
JJ., concur.
4