Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 10-4197
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(B RIAN D AVID M ITCHELL AND THE U NITED S TATES, R EAL P ARTIES IN INTEREST)
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STEVEN KILLPACK
UTAH FEDERAL DEFENDER
PARKER DOUGLAS
ASSISTANT FEDERAL DEFENDER
46 West Broadway, Ste 110
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Phone: (801) 524-4010
Fax: (801) 524-4060
Email: Parker_Douglas@fd.org
Appellate Case: 10-4197 Document: 01018527548 Date Filed: 11/04/2010 Page: 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. The empaneling of the jury does not affect the issues raised by the Petition
nor alter in any way this court’s ability to grant relief. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
United States v. Tafoya, 557 F.3d 1121, 1125-226 (10th Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
18 U.S.C. § 1651 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
By order dated November 4, 2010, this Court directed the parties to file
simultaneous briefs addressing two issues: whether the jury has been empaneled in this
case, and if so, whether the petition for mandamus is moot. Approximately one hour
before this court ordered a stay of the trial, the jury was sworn and opening arguments
had begun. It is clear, therefore, that the jury has been empaneled, and the trial has, at
least nominally, begun. However, the petition is in no way rendered moot by this
circumstance. The petition for mandamus sought intervention from this court to stop the
trial proceedings below, no matter what stage they were at. The swearing-in of the jury
is, of course, a significant step in a criminal trial for the limited purpose of determining
the existence of double jeopardy, but that act in no way renders this Petition moot, and
this Court still has the power under 18 U.S.C. § 1651 to order relief.
II. ARGUMENT
A. The empaneling of the jury does not affect the issues raised by the
Petition nor alter in any way this court’s ability to grant relief.
The empaneling of a jury, of itself, does not preclude this court from reviewing the
actions of a trial court and ordering mandamus relief if appropriate, even during trial. See
Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988) (mandamus petition granted to require
trial court to proceed with previously empaneled jury). Indeed, this court may order that a
mistrial be declared if necessary to grant the relief requested. United States v. Newman,
549 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977) (mandamus relief granted; district court ordered to
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declare a mistrial and reassign the case for a new trial, if defendants did not agree to
alternative remedy); see also In re Allied Signal, Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 973 (1 st Cir. 1989)
under Rule 21 is not rendered moot by trial proceedings, including jury selection or even
trial and conviction. As this Court noted in denying Mr. Mitchell’s prior petition, a trial
court’s denial of a Rule 21 transfer is reviewable on direct appeal. The only type of
pretrial legal issue which might be mooted by some later act (such as a trial) would be
where an issue loses all significance in light of the later developments. The prime
example of an issue which is rendered moot by trial is a challenge to the grand jury’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the earlier grand jury decision regarding probable cause
is not considered after conviction, because that decision to indict has been rendered moot
by the verdict. See United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999).
Indeed, this court’s prior order denying Mr. Mitchell’s petition as “premature”
precludes any finding of mootness arising out of the fact of jury selection or
empanelment; by indicating that it wished to see the results of voir dire prior to evaluating
Mr. Mitchell’s request pursuant to Rule 21, this Court has already implicitly held that the
conduct of voir dire and jury selection itself does not preclude it from ruling on the Rule
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21 issue. The fact that a further, entirely formal process has also taken place in the course
of trial proceedings, i.e., the swearing of the jury, does not alter the legal issues presented
to this Court in any way whatsoever. To the extent that stopping a trial just after
empanelment of the jury is seen as somewhat more intrusive than stopping that trial just
prior to empanelment, it is also true that interrupting a jury trial before any evidence is
presented is a far less onerous intrusion than a later reversal of a jury verdict after a
appropriate time, and it is clear that this remains a live issue and is in no way mooted by
the mere act of seating a jury. It is as true today as it was yesterday that this Court’s
decision to grant or deny the petition should be based upon the existence of serious error
and irreparable harm. In issuing a stay, this Court determined that the costs associated
with the stay are counterbalanced by the need to review the venue issue and avoid further
unwarranted costs to the parties and irreparable harm to the defendant. See In the Matter
of Balsimo, 68 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The filing of a petition for mandamus will
interrupt a criminal proceeding only if the court of appeals grants a stay, which it will not
do if, in the circumstances, the cost to the criminal justice system of the delay caused by
the stay exceeds the benefit to the legitimate interest of the defendants, witnesses, and
others whose convenience might be served by a change of venue.”). That balancing issue
is exactly the same at this time as it was prior to the jury having been sworn. Neither the
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issues nor this Court’s ability to address them are changed by the ministerial act of
swearing in the jury. If the district court’s legal error in denying Mr. Mitchell’s motion
for transfer of venue is clear, as the petition shows, then relief by this Court is appropriate
to forestall any irreparable harm, both to Mr. Mitchell’s prospects for obtaining a fair trial
in another jurisdiction, as well as to the court system and to all of the parties to this case,
including the community in which it is taking place, which would arise should this
The only issue arising out of the fact that a jury has been empaneled is whether the
balancing inherent in the equitable determination of whether irreparable harm exists such
that the nature of the relief that should be granted has been in some way altered. Since
the jury has been empaneled, the only addition to the relief requested in the petition is that
the order transferring venue as requested by Mr. Mitchell would require the district court
to halt a trial which has just barely begun, rather than halting the trial just before it has
begun. Such an order to halt the trial is not more intrusive or drastic a remedy merely as a
result of the fact that jurors have been sworn: the legal issues and the burdens inherent in
the Court’s ruling on this Petition are exactly the same just after the jury is sworn as
would be the case just before the jury is sworn. Given the timing of the jury selection
process and the filing of this Petition, it would inevitably have been the case that the jury
would have been completely chosen prior to this court’s ruling. The only act further than
this was the actual swearing of the jury. The swearing of the jury is legally significant
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only for purposes of determining when jeopardy attaches, and simply has no effect on any
of the issues presented to this Court for consideration. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35
(1978) (“The reason for holding that jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and
sworn lies in the need to protect the interest of an accused in retaining a chosen jury.”).
In addition, since no witnesses have been called and no evidence has been presented, the
trial itself has not begun, and there can be no implication that some significant step has
been taken to affect this Court’s evaluation of the issues presented in this petition, or its
Mr. Mitchell concedes that if the empaneling of the jury were to take on
significance as a point of no return under double jeopardy rules, then the court’s
consideration of irreparable harm might be affected thereby. Thus, if this Court were to
order that trial proceedings in this case be halted and transferred to another venue, and, as
a result, Mr. Mitchell had a claim that he could not be retried under the prohibition
against double jeopardy, then such a result could give this court pause. However, it is
clear that if this trial, now only nominally begun, were halted at Mr. Mitchell’s express
1
It is true that the government also presented its opening argument prior to the stay.
However, even if the Court were to view this as in some way significant in terms of its
consideration of the appropriateness of relief, it should be noted that, at the end of voir dire,
counsel for Mr. Mitchell strongly argued for a limited stay of the beginning of the trial for only
the limited time it would take this Court to rule on his motion for a stay. The government urged
the district court to deny that request and proceed with trial even while Mr. Mitchell’s stay
request in this Court was pending.
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request, a new trial in the new venue could not be prevented under double jeopardy rules.
allowed without any limitation from double jeopardy rules. In order for a retrial to be
precluded under double jeopardy, the court would have to find that the government
deliberately provoked the defendant to seek a mistrial. United States v. Tafoya, 557 F.3d
1121, 1125-226 (10th Cir. 2009). There is certainly nothing in the record to support such
a finding in this case, and Mr. Mitchell disavows any intent to argue such. Indeed, he
expressly waives any argument or rights he might have to avoid a retrial in this case on
double jeopardy grounds based on the venue transfer relief he has requested in this
petition.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Mitchell requests that his Petition be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
STEVEN B. KILLPACK
Federal Defender
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filed with the Clerk and has been scanned for viruses with the Symantec Endpoint
AntiVirus Virus Definition File Dated 11/4/2010, rev. 2, and, according to the program, is
free of viruses.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
QUESTIONS , was sent to the following and a copy of the digital submission in
electronic form was served via the ECF system, emailed, or mailed, postage prepaid, to
the parties named below, on this the 4th day of November, 2010.
Elizabethanne Stevens
Assistant United States Attorneys
185 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1506