G.R. No.

184836, December 23, 2009

SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N.
TALABONG, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
WILFREDO F. ASILO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his

term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or
the Local Government Code)?

The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive

suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public
official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term
should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

The present petition[1] seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

THE ANTECEDENTS

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City
for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007
terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office,
the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a
criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan's
suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and
Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo's
certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected
and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore
violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

The COMELEC's Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo's
favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-
term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the
2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Division's ruling in its
October 7, 2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the
following ISSUES:

1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an

interruption of the three-term limit rule; and

2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation

as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160

Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilo's preventive
suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.

THE COURT'S RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

General Considerations

The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit
provision of the Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive
suspension on the continuity of an elective official's term. To be sure,
preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public
official, has been mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on Elections.[2]
Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive
suspension, but with the application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective official
acquired by succession.

a. The Three-term Limit Rule:

The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and

any difference in wording does not assume any significance in this case.

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office
and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is
the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.

Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time - three years -

during which an official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of
Appeals,[3] a Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses
what a "term" connotes, as follows:

The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of
time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According
to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held.
Upon expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to
holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease.
In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a
public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he
was elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].

A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,[4] reiterated that "[T]he term means
the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes
the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another."

The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the
negative - "no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms."
This formulation - no more than three consecutive terms - is a clear command
suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication
of what to "serve. . . three consecutive terms" exactly connotes, the meaning is
clear - reference is to the term, not to the service that a public official may render. In
other words, the limitation refers to the term.

The second branch relates to the provision's express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the
public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office "shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected." This declaration complements the term limitation
mandated by the first branch.

A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that
voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not
affect "continuity of service for a full term" for purposes of the three-term limit
rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as an interruption
of service for a full term, but the phrase "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is
not without significance in determining constitutional intent.

The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To

renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign.[5] It is an act that emanates from its
author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read with the
definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second
branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting
short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word "voluntary" linked
together with "renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based on the
surenderee's own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by
conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is
not considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to
avoid the application of the term limitation.

The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission

on the term "voluntary renunciation" shed further light on the extent of the
term "voluntary renunciation":

MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the

Committee? This term "voluntary renunciation" does not appear in Section 3 [of
Article VI]; it also appears in Section 6 [of Article VI].
MR DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution.

Could the Committee please enlighten us exactly what "voluntary renunciation"
mean? Is this akin to abandonment?

MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot

circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second
term.

MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term "voluntary

renunciation" is more general than abandonment and resignation?

MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.[6]

From this exchange and Commissioner Davide's expansive interpretation of the

term "voluntary renunciation," the framers' intent apparently was to close all gaps
that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that
voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the
three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision,
we note further that Commissioner Davide's view is consistent with the negative
formulation of the first branch of the provision and the inflexible interpretation
that it suggests.

This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the

circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to
make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective whose terms must
be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values
of less than equal constitutional worth. We view preventive suspension vis-à-vis
term limitation with this firm mindset.

b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the

Three-term Limit Rule

Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the
concepts within the provision's contemplation, particularly on the "interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term" that it speaks of.
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections[7] presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the
public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public
official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and
executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully
served three consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said:

The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided
by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with
the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]

Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to
be exact, loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.

Ong v. Alegre[8] and Rivera v. COMELEC,[9] like Lonzanida, also involved the issue
of whether there had been a completed term for purposes of the three-term
limit disqualification. These cases, however, presented an interesting twist, as
their final judgments in the electoral contest came after the term of the
contested office had expired so that the elective officials in these cases were
never effectively unseated.

Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never
validly elected), the Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election and
service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule based on the
following premises: (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the election
was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the
term of the contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and
continuously exercised the functions of the office from the start to the end of
the term. The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious effect of a
contrary view - that the official (referring to the winner in the election protest)
would, under the three-term rule, be considered to haveserved a term by virtue
of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served
the term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. This
factual variation led the Court to rule differently from Lonzanida.

In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who
finally lost the election contest was merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere
"de facto officer." The Court obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official fully served in
the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de
facto" officer, he exercised the powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office
that enabled him "to stay on indefinitely."

Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation
because of what they directly imply. Although the election requisite was not
actually present, the Court still gave full effect to the three-term limitation
because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service
for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term
limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation
rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.

Adormeo v. Commission on Elections[10] dealt with the effect of recall on the three-
term limit disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the
disqualification applies if the official lost in the regular election for the supposed
third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that term. The Court
upheld the COMELEC's ruling that the official was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a
private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the election
for the third term.

Socrates v. Commission on Elections[11] also tackled recall vis-à-vis the three-term limit
disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was
disqualified to run for a fourth term, he did not participate in the election that
immediately followed his third term. In this election, the petitioner Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 ½ years after Mayor
Socrates assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated
against him, leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate
of candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his
disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms
prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run because of the
three-term limit rule. We decided in Hagedorn's favor, ruling that:

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall
election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive
terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service.

When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local
officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election
after three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after
three terms.

xxxx

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a

fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does
not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is
not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election
mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of
office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.[12]

Latasa v. Commission on Elections[13] presented the novel question of whether a

municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run as city
mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the municipality into a city.
During the third term, the municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood
charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover
capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were
held for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the conversion of the
municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a
local government post different from the office of the city mayor - the territorial
jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants
were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3
consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal
mayor held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The
Court said:

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically

included an exception to the people's freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the
position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when
they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms
as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office
as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total
of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.[14]

Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates,

that no three-term limit violation results if a rest period or break in the service
between terms or tenure in a given elective post intervened. In Lonzanida, the
petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective office for a few
months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the
private respondents lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months,
respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the law contemplates a complete break from
office during which the local elective official steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority
over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.

Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on

Elections,[15] where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the
position of vice-mayor by operation of law. The question posed when he
subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor was
an interruption of his term as councilor that would place him outside the
operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had
intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result seemingly
deviates from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective
official continued to hold public office and did not become a private citizen
during the interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest,
however, is that the elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the
higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be
councilor - an interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the
three-term limit rule.

c. Conclusion Based on Law

and Jurisprudence

From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an
elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his
office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur.
This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent
are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official's continuous stay in
office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation"
as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary,
is an effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On
the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions
of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective
interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at
least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining
title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law.

An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost
the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to
render service. The latter occurs during an office holder's term when he retains
title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by
law. Of course, the term "failure to serve" cannot be used once the right to
office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be
rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X - both
by structure and substance - fixes an elective official's term of office and limits
his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed,
no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The
provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context
of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position.
The "voluntary renunciation" it speaks of refers only to the elective official's
voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not
speak of the temporary "cessation of the exercise of power or authority" that
may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of
them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:[16]

Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps
down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. [Emphasis supplied].

Preventive Suspension and

the Three-Term Limit Rule

a. Nature of Preventive Suspension

Preventive suspension - whether under the Local Government Code,[17] the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[18] or the Ombudsman Act[19] - is an
interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have been charged
administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or
potential for eventual guilt or liability.

Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code "when the
evidence of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a
possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence." Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a
valid information (that requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in
court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of
the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred

from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the
meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a
consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-

controlled conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to
the interests of the individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes
only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the official's
office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the
preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the
exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is
preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.

That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is

true in the exercise of all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and the
laws. The imposition of preventive suspension, however, is not an unlimited
power; there are limitations built into the laws[20] themselves that the courts can
enforce when these limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse
of discretion is present. In light of this well-defined parameters in the
imposition of preventive suspension, we should not view preventive suspension
from the extreme situation - that it can totally deprive an elective office holder
of the prerogative to serve and is thus an effective interruption of an election
official's term.

Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an
elective officials' service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned
above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the
people being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising
the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an
elective official has served his three terms in office without any break. Its
companion concept - interruption of a term - on the other hand, requires loss of
title to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have
any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to the
discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they
merely run parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its
nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the
context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the
term.

b. Preventive Suspension and

the Intent of the Three-Term
Limit Rule

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an
elective official's stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension
cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues
to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the
suspended official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement
and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and

prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional
violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the
functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional
provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or
involuntary - some of them personal and some of them by operation of law -
that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the
functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious
extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a
suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an
office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time without
forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts
actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of
actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under
the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing
this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be
interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce
the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-
sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
c. Preventive Suspension and
Voluntary Renunciation

Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not

involve a voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the
indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act that became the
basis of the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive suspension
does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation
embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to
office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that
an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is - by its very
nature - the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and
temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the
office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and
non-comparable.

But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more
important consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.

Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to
render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a
term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit
rule.

Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption

of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and
consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive
suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not
require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely
requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon
after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing
preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a
circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.

Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilo's 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the
Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive
suspension does not interrupt an elective official's term. Thus, the COMELEC
refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
when it granted due course to Asilo's certificate of candidacy for a prohibited
fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal
to perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was
one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.[21]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and

accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private
respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and
perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term.
Costs against private respondent Asilo.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. L-24554, May 31, 1977

MATIAS S. CARILLO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
CESAR U. DE LA VICTORIA, CORNELIO DE LA REY, AND
MUNICIPALITY OF MATANAO, DAVAO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

The lone point of controversy in this seventeen-year old Quo Warranto suit
[1]

which commenced on March 16, 1960 before the Court of First Instance of
Davao centers on the interpretation and application of Sec. 1, R.A. 1551 which
provides:

"Section 1. Hereafter, all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general
funds of the municipality shall, subject to the civil service law, be appointed by
the Municipal Mayor upon the recommendation of the corresponding chief of
office; Provided, That in case of disagreement between the chief of office
concerned and the municipal mayor, the matter shall be submitted for action to
the proper provincial department head whose decision shall be final: Provided,
further, That the chief of police and members of the police force of the
municipality shall be appointed by the mayor with the consent of the municipal
council."

In his complaint, petitioner herein, Matias S. Carillo, sought his reinstatement as

chief of police of the municipality of Matanao, province of Davao, claiming that
he was validly appointed to said position but was subsequently replaced by the
respondent Municipal Mayor Cesar U. de la Victoria with the appointment of
the other respondent Cornelio de la Rey as chief of police.

The Court of First Instance on motion of respondent-public officials dismissed

Carillo's complaint holding that the evidence of Carillo does not establish an
essential element for the validity of his appointment which is the approval or
consent of the municipal council. Carillo appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the latter court affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal. Hence, this Petition
[2]

for Review on Certiorari.

The uncontroverted facts as summarized in the brief filed by the Solicitor

General for the respondents-appellees, follow:

"Petitioner-appellant was appointed Chief of Police of Lower Matanao effective

July 8, 1957; (Exh. E).
"He was again appointed to that position effective July 8, 1958, but his
appointment was 'subject to the provision of Section 1 of Republic Act No.
1551.' (Exh. F).
"Petitioner-appellant had previously qualified in the examinations for Chief of
Police conducted on January 11, 1963 (Exh. G) and for patrolman taken on
August 21, 1937 (Exh. H).
"Pursuant to Memorandum No. 1 s. 1960, issued by the newly elected Mayor
Cesar U. de la Victoria, petitioner-appellant was called to the Mayor's Office and
asked to resign (Exhs. J, J-1 and J-2).
"On January 11, 1960, petitioner-appellant applied for and was granted leave of
absence for sixty days (Exhs. B and B-1).
"On March 13, 1960, the petitioner-appellant notified the appellee Mayor that
he was not willing to serve as detached service but that he will serve only as
Chief of Police (Exh. A or 1).
"On May 15, 1960, appellee de la Rey was appointed Acting Chief of Police of
Matanao, Davao, vice 'Matias S. Carillo (Lesser Civil Service Eligibility),'
effective May 16, 1960, and was attested by the Provincial Treasurer under
Section 20, Republic Act No. 2260. This appellee was then a regular junior
teacher and regular senior teacher civil service eligible.
"On May 16, 1960, appellant could not discharge his duties as Chief of Police
because appellee de la Rey had already assumed office (Exh. D)." (pp. 1-2,
appellee's brief)

It is claimed by petitioner that the requirement of the law that an appointment

of a chief of police be made with the consent of the municipal council was
complied with in his case when the municipal council of Matanao in a special
session held on July 11, 1957, approved the plantilla of personnel with his name
appearing as incumbent in the position of chief of police for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1958. Such approval to all intents and purposes constituted
consent by the municipal council to his appointment, petitioner asserts.

Petitioner's submittal is without legal basis.

We hold that under the law the approval by the municipal council of an
appointment of a chief of police must be express and should appear on the
appointment itself; the consent is not to be presumed or implied. It is the
approval of the municipal council which gives validity to the appointment
extended by the municipal mayor. The raison d'etre of the requirement is to be
found in the nature of the functions of members of the police force. The
maintenance of peace and order is of vital concern to the community and more
than any where else appointments to the police force are to be based on
integrity, honesty, and competence of the appointees to be adjudged not only by
the mayor who may be guided solely by political considerations and personal
loyalties but also by members of the municipal council which after all is the
legislative governing body of the municipality. The approval of the
Commissioner of Civil Service attests solely to the appointee's civil service
eligibility, the attestation being "merely a check to assure compliance with the
civil service law."
[3]

In Torres vs. The Municipal Council of Malalag, Davao, et al., 1959, which the
court a quo correctly applied in deciding this case, the arguments to the contrary
of petitioner Carillo notwithstanding, this Court held inter alia that inasmuch as
Torres' appointment as patrolman showed neither approval of the municipal
council nor that of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the right to the office
cannot be based on a mere presumption, there was no valid appointment
extended to him and his petition for reinstatement necessarily must fail. [4]

Moreover, petitioner Carillo's assertion of a substantial compliance with the law

loses its validity in the face of the uncontrovertible - that the approved plantilla
carrying his name as chief of police was only for the fiscal year 1957-58, after
which he accepted a new appointment effective July 8, 1958 which was "subject
to the provisions of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1551" (Exh. F, per appellee's
brief). Inasmuch as the new appointment of Carillo states expressly that it is
subject to the consent and approval of the municipal council (Sec. 1, R.A. 1551),
and the record of the case is ominously silent on the existence of such a
consent, express or implied, there is no complete appointment to speak of.

At the most, pending compliance with the condition, all that petitioner Carillo
was holding was a temporary appointment as chief of police which could be
terminated at any time with or without cause. [5]

In Taboada vs. Municipality of Badian, May 31, 1961, L-14604, this Court stated
that one who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his
employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there
being no need to show that the termination is for cause. [6]

It is argued that Carillo was the only one qualified to the position of chief of
police as there was nobody in the ranks of the police force of Matanao with
higher civil service eligibility than him. That fact, however, even if true is
[7]

inconsequential, for his civil service eligibility affords him no protection or

guarantee of security of tenure of office after he had accepted a conditional
appointment which was temporary in nature while the condition was not
fulfilled.

"Petitioner's appointment being temporary, it can be terminated at pleasure even

if he is a civil service eligible. And this holds true notwithstanding his badge of
eligibility for, having accepted a temporary appointment, he cannot invoke the
security of tenure guaranteed by our Constitution. In fine, to him cannot apply
the safeguard embodied in Section 32 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which
provides: 'No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process.'"
(Edgardo R. Hojilla vs. Hon. Salvador L. Mariño, et al., L-20574, Feb. 26, 1965,
13 SCRA 293, 296. See also Tolentino vs. De Jesus, supra).

Petitioner Carillo argues further that his appointment (Exh. F) was duly attested
to and approved by the Civil Service Commissioner and it was such approval
which gave validity to his appointment. This alleged approval is not admitted
[8]

however in appellee's brief. At any rate, We repeat that Carillo's appointment,

Exhibit F, was by its very terms subject to Section 1, Republic Act 1551, and
that the appointment was not completed since the condition imposed by the
foregoing provision of law had not been fulfilled. An appointment becomes
complete upon the performance of the last act required by law of the appointing
power. The last act is the approval of the municipal council. It is preposterous
[9]

to state that the consent or approval of the municipal council provided for in
the law can be substituted by the approval of the appointment by the Civil
Service Commissioner. The purpose of one is distinct from the purpose of the
other as We have indicated earlier.

"The approval by both the President and the Director of the Civil Service of
'acting' appointments does not make the appointments permanent. For the
President or the Director of the Civil Service to convert an 'acting' appointment
into a permanent one would infringe the constitutional provision (Article VII,
section 10 (1) limiting the power of the Chief Executive over local governments
to 'general supervision as may be provided by law.' To change the character of a
municipal appointment beyond doubt transcends 'General supervision.'" (Juan
B. Mendez vs. Rodolfo Ganzon, et al., L-10483, 1957, 101 Phil. 48, 49)

It now follows that inasmuch as petitioner Carillo holds no valid right or title to
the position of chief of police, the dismissal of his quo warranto suit is in order.

Long standing jurisprudence upholds the rule that in a quo warranto proceeding
the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held
unlawfully by another. Absent that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of
the supposed usurper is immaterial. [10]

We agree with respondent appellate court that "one who cannot show that he is
entitled to occupy a public office, lacks the legal personality to institute quo
warranto proceedings; in which case, it is not necessary to inquire into the right
of the respondent to occupy said office (Guekeko vs. Santos, 76 Phil. 237;
Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12)." It is axiomatic that where there is a
[11]
right, there is a remedy. In the instant case petitioner has not established any
right to the office he claims, hence, no remedy or relief of reinstatement may be
accorded him.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the dismissal of petitioner's

complaint without pronouncement as to costs.

So Ordered.

G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO AND ARTURO C. MOJICA, PETITIONERS, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO AND
SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated
5 June 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated
20 July 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-006”) of respondent Commission on
Elections (“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates
elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006
declared “official and final” the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in
Resolution No. 01-005.

The Facts

Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (“Senator
Guingona”) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator
Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.

Following Senator Guingona’s confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001

passed Resolution No. 84 (“Resolution No. 84”) certifying to the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the
vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due
to be elected in that election.[1] Resolution No. 84 further provided that the
“Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only
for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,” which
ends on 30 June 2004.[2]

On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all
the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-
005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution
No. 01-005 also provided that “the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a
term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired
term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed
Vice-President.”[3] Respondents Ralph Recto (“Recto”) and Gregorio Honasan
(“Honasan”) ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.

On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica

(“petitioners”), as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition,
impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin
COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving
the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single
three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of
Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect.

Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without

jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be
filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No.
6645 (“R.A. No. 6645”);[4] (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate
in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or
regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881;[5] and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the
Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or
regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4
of Republic Act No. 6646 (“R.A. No. 6646”).[6] Petitioners add that because of
these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial
candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that “there
were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single
election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.”[7]
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a
regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of their results. To support their claim, petitioners cite the special
elections simultaneously held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951
and 8 November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and
Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their tenures
in the Senate.[8] Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC
separately canvassed the votes cast for the senatorial candidates running under
the regular elections from the votes cast for the candidates running under the
special elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners in each of
those elections.[9]

Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the

pendency of their petition.

Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to Comment on

the petition.

On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the
provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01-006 declaring “official and final” the
ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13
Senators took their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.

In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners
to file an amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional
respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which they
reiterated the contentions raised in their original petition and, in addition,
sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.

In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special
election to fill the seat vacated by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May
2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the
mootness of the petition and on petitioners’ standing to litigate. Honasan also
claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is
actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of
jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a
proper party to this case because the petition only involves the validity of the
proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.

The Issues

The following are the issues presented for resolution:

(1) Procedurally –
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;

(b) whether the petition is moot; and

(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.

(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term
Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On the Preliminary Matters

The Nature of the Petition and the Court’s Jurisdiction

A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a
public officer in the exercise of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if
his claim is not well-founded.[10] Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate.

A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however,

that what petitioners are questioning is the validity of the special election on 14
May 2001 in which Honasan was elected. Petitioners’ various prayers are,
namely: (1) a “declaration” that no special election was held simultaneously with
the general elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring
anyone as having won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos.
01-005 and 01-006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the
winner in the special election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on COMELEC’s
alleged failure to comply with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of
that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to determine
Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office as Senator. Petitioners’ prayer for
the annulment of Honasan’s proclamation and, ultimately, election is merely
incidental to petitioners’ cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly
exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition.

On the Mootness of the Petition

COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators

and its subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13
Senators render the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-
006 moot and academic.

Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or

board to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[11] Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done.[12]
However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[13] Thus, in
Alunan III v. Mirasol,[14] we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order
canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (“SK”) on 4
December 1992 despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election
had already taken place. We noted in Alunan that since the question of the
validity of the order sought to be annulled “is likely to arise in every SK
elections and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such
elections,” the mootness of the petition is no bar to its resolution. This
observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question of the validity of a
special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELEC’s failure
to comply with requirements on the conduct of such special election is likely to
arise in every such election. Such question, however, may not be decided before
the date of the election.

On Petitioners’ Standing

Honasan questions petitioners’ standing to bring the instant petition as

taxpayers and voters because petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally
disbursed public funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal
injury because of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.

“Legal standing” or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a

case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act.[15] The requirement of standing, which necessarily
“sharpens the presentation of issues,”[16] relates to the constitutional mandate
that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.[17] Thus, generally, a
party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[18]

Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant
petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special
election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a “generalized
grievance.” This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure
by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that
election.[19] Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that
the Court should give due course to the petition because in the special election
held on 14 May 2001 “tax money [was] ‘x x x extracted and spent in violation of
specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power’ or that
there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money
[was] deflected to any improper purpose.”[20]

On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised
our discretion to give due course to voters’ suits involving the right of
suffrage.[21] Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora,[22] we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”). The IBP questioned the validity of a
Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and
the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP
presented “too general an interest.” We held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold
the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the
IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by
the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is
too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x
x x.

Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of
a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount
interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude
on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view
of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace
and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing
tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare
us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity
as voters since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage,
considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.

Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term

Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called

to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives “in the
manner prescribed by law,” thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special
election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but
the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve
only for the unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No.
6645, which provides in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months
or in the House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular
election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt
of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election,
shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an
official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special
election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve
only for the unexpired term.

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special
election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety
(90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among
other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within
the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election
shall be held simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. – x x x In case a permanent
vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1)
year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a
special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than
ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such
vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the
next succeeding regular election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration
of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1)
to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not
be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of
the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be
held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give
notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.

Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously

with the 14 May 2001 regular elections, comply with the requirements in Section
2 of R.A. No. 6645?

A survey of COMELEC’s resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May

2001 elections reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a
compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions[24] or even in its
press releases[25] did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a
single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on
14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as
winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in
the special election.

The controversy thus turns on whether COMELEC’s failure, assuming it did

fail, to comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, invalidated the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May
2001 and accordingly rendered Honasan’s proclamation as the winner in that
special election void. More precisely, the question is whether the special election
is invalid for lack of a “call” for such election and for lack of notice as to the
office to be filled and the manner by which the winner in the special election is
to be determined. For reasons stated below, the Court answers in the negative.

COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice

of the Time of the Special Election Did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election

The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its
occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the
duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election’s validity.[26] In a general
election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without
any call by the body charged to administer the election.[27]

In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly
provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general
elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as
the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus
prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the
duty of calling the election failed to do so.[28] This is because the right and duty
to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the
election by some authority[29] and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of
the time and place of the election.[30]

Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special
election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the
happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of
notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a
nullity.[31]

In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of
vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the
special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona’s
appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other
time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections
on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory
notice and COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the
calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.

Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special
election to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives. In such a case, the
holding of the special election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the
vacancy should take place at least one year before the expiration of the
term. The time of the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC subject
only to the limitation that it holds the special election within the range of time
provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory
the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to
“call x x x a special election x x x not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90
days after the occurrence of the vacancy” and give notice of the office to be
filled. The COMELEC’s failure to so call and give notice will nullify any
attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh
impossible for the voters in the congressional district involved to know the time
and place of the special election and the office to be filled unless the
COMELEC so notifies them.

No Proof that COMELEC’s

Failure to Give Notice of the Office
to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special
Election Misled Voters

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure
to give notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted
in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the
special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of
voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy,
a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void.[32]

The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election
covers two matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a
vacant single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular
elections scheduled on the same date. Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as
winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the
special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC’s
failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would
change the result of the special senatorial election or led them to believe that
there was no such special election.

Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give
such notice, no special election took place. This bare assertion carries no
value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged those who voted in the
elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy in the Senate
arising from Senator Guingona’s appointment as Vice-President in February
2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001.
Similarly, the absence of formal notice from COMELEC does not preclude the
possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special election, the office to
be voted in that election, and the manner by which COMELEC would
determine the winner. Such actual notice could come from many sources, such
as media reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda
during the campaign.[33]

More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who
stands most prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise
those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC’s
omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to
negate the holding of the special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to annul
elections and will only do so when it is “impossible to distinguish what votes are
lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that
the great body of the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation, and
threats from exercising their franchise.”[34]
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorate’s will and let
the results of the election stand, despite irregularities that may have attended the
conduct of the elections.[35] This is but to acknowledge the
purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as ours, which is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either
in determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some question
of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be
permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done
and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should not be
declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of
their government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they are in
no way responsible. A different rule would make the manner and method of
performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty itself.[36] (Emphasis
in the original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing
not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,

Neither is there basis in petitioners’ claim that the manner by which

COMELEC conducted the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a
nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to
canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements
exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645
is that COMELEC “fix the date of the election,” if necessary, and “state, among
others, the office or offices to be voted for.” Similarly, petitioners’ reliance on
Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on
Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally
sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in
general and in no way require separate documentation of candidates or separate
canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.

Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special

election on 14 May 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the
Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of Resolution No. 84 as
introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad (“Senator Tatad”) made no mention of
the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be
filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco (“Senator Roco”),
the Senate agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears,
that “the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of
votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr.” Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC
and the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further inconvenience,
thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider Proposed
Senate Resolution No. 934 [later converted to Resolution No. 84].

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order. With

the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title and text of the
resolution.

T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled

RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN
THE SENATE AND CALLING ON THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH
ELECTION TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR
ELECTION ON MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED
TO SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of
the Philippines in 1998 for a term which will expire on June 30, 2004;

WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal

Arroyo nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by a

majority vote of all the members of both House of Congress, voting separately;

WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of

the Philippines on February 9, 2001;

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12)
Senators, all elective Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective
provincial city and municipal officials shall be held on the second Monday and
every three years thereafter; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it hereby certifies,
the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through election to be held
simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senator thus
elected to serve only for the unexpired term.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD

Senator

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this

resolution.

S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). Mr. President.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmeña is recognized.

S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the distinguished
Majority Leader, Chairman of the Committee on Rules, author of this
resolution, yield for a few questions?

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]

S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]

Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a special
election for a vacant seat in the Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was
elected in that special election was then Congressman, later Senator Feli[s]berto
Verano.

In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other
words, the electorate had to cast a vote for a ninth senator – because at that
time there were only eight – to elect a member or rather, a candidate to that
particular seat.

Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA revolution,
twice there were 24 candidates and the first 12 were elected to a six-year term
and the next 12 were elected to a three-year term.

My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is the
candidate with the 13th largest number of votes going to be the one to take a
three-year term? Or is there going to be an election for a position of senator for
the unexpired term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the

mechanics to the Commission on Elections. But personally, I would like to
suggest that probably, the candidate obtaining the 13th largest number of votes
be declared as elected to fill up the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.

S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to
conduct such an election? Is it not the case that the vacancy is for a specific
office? I am really at a loss. I am rising here because I think it is something that
we should consider. I do not know if we can… No, this is not a Concurrent
Resolution.

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate

President.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act
No. 6645, what is needed is a resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the
need for the holding of a special election to fill up the vacancy created, in this
particular case, by the appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice
President.

It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the

particular candidate to fill up would be that reserved for Mr.
Guingona’s unexpired term. In other words, it can be arranged in such a
manner.

xxxx

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus,
wordings to the effect that in the simultaneous elections, the 13th placer be
therefore deemed to be the special election for this purpose. So we just
nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It
is also less expensive because the ballot will be printed and there will be less
disfranchisement.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to

be such a special election, maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the
Comelec.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. – to implement.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the

forthcoming elections that will be held simultaneously as a special election under
this law as we understand it.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe
it will be better, Mr. President.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal

because I do not believe that there will be anyone running specifically –
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. – to fill up this position for three years and

campaigning nationwide.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th

candidate will be running with specific groups.

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of

this resolution.

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if

there will be no other amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.

xxxx

ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934

If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this

resolution.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any

objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.[37]
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and
methods to conduct the special election within the confines of R.A. No. 6645,
merely chose to adopt the Senate’s proposal, as embodied in Resolution No.
84. This Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELEC’s wide
latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring
free, orderly, and honest elections subject only to the limitation that the means
so adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.[38]
COMELEC’s decision to abandon the means it employed in the 13 November
1951 and 8 November 1955 special elections and adopt the method embodied
in Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate exercise of its discretion. Conversely,
this Court will not interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent special senatorial
elections, choose to revert to the means it followed in the 13 November 1951
and 8 November 1955 elections. That COMELEC adopts means that are novel
or even disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of
discretion. As we have earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a
distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of
its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully
warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may
err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in
devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great
objective for which it was created — free, orderly and honest elections. We may
not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.[39]
A Word to COMELEC

The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the
electorate of necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an
informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to
the present case have led us to conclude that COMELEC’s failure to so call and
give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May
2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections. We remind
COMELEC to comply strictly with all the requirements under applicable laws
relative to the conduct of regular elections in general and special elections in
particular.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. L-25554, October 04, 1966

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS.
ISMAEL MATHAY AND JOSE VELASCO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The Philippine Constitution Association , a non-stock, non-profit association duly incorporated and organized under the laws of
the Philippines, and whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, has filed in this Court a suit against the former Acting
Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, duly assigned thereto by the
Auditor General as his representative, seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit
the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and members
of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay, present Auditor General, was
substituted for Amable M. Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor General.

Section 1, paragraph A, of Republic Act No. 4134 provided, inter alia, that the annual salary of the President of the Senate and
of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be P40,000.00 each; that of the Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, P32,000.00 each (thereby increasing their present compensation of P16,000.00 and P7,200.00 per annum for
the Presiding officers and members, respectively, as set in the Constitution). The section expressly provides that "the salary
increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution". Section 7 of the same Act provides
"that the salary increase of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall take effect on
the effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.

The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) contained the following
items for the House of Representatives:

"SPEAKER

"1. The Speaker of the House of Representatives at P16,000 from July 1 to December 29, 1965 and P40,000 from December 30,
1965 to June 30, 1966-------P29,129.00

"MEMBERS

"2. One hundred three Members of the House of Representatives at, P7,200 from July 1 to December 29,1965 and P32,000 from
December 30, 1965 to June 30,1966 --------------P2,032,866.00"

while for the Senate the corresponding appropriation items appear to be:

1. The President of the Senate--------P16,000.00

2. Twenty-three Senators at P7,200------165,600.00

Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R. A. No. 4642) implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of
the House of Representatives set by Republic Act No. 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.

The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as amended in 1940,
that provides as follows:

"SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an
annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and
exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives,
and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos." (Emphasis supplied)

The reason given being that the term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of Republic Act
No. 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969 ; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval
of said Act expired on December 30, 1965 .

From the record we also glean that upon receipt of a written protest from petitioners (Petition, Annex "A"), along the lines
summarized above, the then Auditor General requested the Solicitor General to secure a judicial construction of the law involved
(Annex "B"); but the Solicitor General evaded the issue by suggesting that an opinion on the matter be sought from the Secretary
of Justice (Annex "C", Petition). Conformably to the suggestion, the former Acting Auditor General endorsed the PHILCONSA
letter to the Secretary of Justice on November 26, 1965; but on or before January, 1966, and before the former Justice Secretary
could act, respondent Aguiluz, as Acting Auditor General, directed his representative in Congress, respondent Velasco, to pass
in audit and approve the payment of the increased salaries within the limits of the Appropriation Act in force; hence the filing
of the present action. The answer of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of personality of petitioners to institute the action,
for lack of showing of injury; and that the Speaker and Members of the House should be joined parties defendant. On the merits,
the answer alleges that the protested action is in conformity with the Constitutional provisions, in so far as present members of
the Lower House are concerned, for they were elected in 1965, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act 4134. Their stand, in
short, is that the expiration of the term of the members of the House of Representatives who approved the increase suffices to
make the higher compensation effective for them, regardless of the term of the members of the Senate.

The procedural points raised by respondent, through the Solicitor General, as their counsel, need not give pause. As taxpayers,
the petitioners may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law (cf. PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965; Tayabas vs. Perez, 56 Phil. 257;
Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825,
December 24, 1965; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Asso. vs. Feliciano, G.R. No. L-24022, March 3, 1965). Moreover, as stated in
52 Am. Jur., page 5:

"The rule that a taxpayer can not, in his individual capacity as such, sue to enjoin an unlawful expenditure or waste of state funds,
is the minority doctrine.”

"On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House of Congress as parties defendants, suffice it to say that since
the acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents1 passing in audit and the approval of the payment of the Representatives'
increased salaries, and not the collection or receipt thereof, only respondent auditors were indispensable or proper parties
defendant to this action.

These preliminary questions out of the way, we now proceed to the main issue: Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the Constitution
require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must
have fully expired before the increase becomes effective? Or, on the contrary, as respondents contend, does it allow the payment
of the increased compensation to the members of the House of Representatives who were elected after the expiration of the
term of those House members who approved the increase, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of office of the Senators
who, likewise, participated in the approval of the increase?
It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to
increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to
elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt"
(Tañada & Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867).

Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes
fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" in the
same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact
that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term" of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure,
using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for
Representatives), thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components
of one single Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined with the following phrase "all the members
of the Senate and of the House", underscores that in the application of Article VI, section 14, the fundamental consideration is
that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or Representatives) must
have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the
whole, accords in turn with the fact that the enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire Legislative body; responsibility
therefor is not apportionable between the two chambers.

It is also highly relevant, in the Court's opinion, to note that, as reported by Aruego (Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, p. 296,
et. seq.), the committee on legislative power in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, before it was decided that the Legislature
should be unicameral in form, initially recommended that the increase in the compensation of legislators should not take effect
until the expiration of the term of office of all members of the Legislature that approved the increase. The report of the committee
read as follows:

"The Senators and Representatives shall receive for their services an annual compensation of four thousand pesos including per
diems and other emoluments or allowances and exclusive of travelling expenses to and from their respective residences when
attending sessions of the National Legislature, unless otherwise fixed by law: Provided. That no increase in this yearly compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the terms of office of all the Members of the Legislature that approved such increase." (Emphasis supplied)

The spirit of this restrictive proviso, modified to suit the final choice of a unicameral legislature, was carried over and made more
rigid in the first draft of the constitutional provision, which read:

"Provided, That any increase in said compensation shall not take effect until after the expiration of the term of office of the
Members of the National Assembly who may be elected subsequent to the approval of such increase." (Aruego, 1, p. 297)

As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally approved and enacted, Article VI, section 5, of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth, provided that:

"No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the National
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase."

Finally, with the return to bicameralism in the 1940 amendments to our fundamental law, the limitation assumed its present
form:
"No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such increase."

It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the plain spirit of the restriction has not been altered. From the first
proposal of the committee on the legislative power of the 1934 Convention down to the present, the intendment of the clause
has been to require expiration of the full term of all the members of the Legislature that approved the higher compensation,
whether the Legislature be unicameral or bicameral, in order to circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of self-interest in its
adoption.

The Solicitor General argues on behalf of the respondents that if the framers of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution had
intended to require the expiration of the terms not only of the Representatives but also of the Senators who approved the
increase, they would have just used the expression "term of all the members of the Congress" instead of specifying "all the
members of the Senate and of the House". This is a distinction without a difference, since the Senate and the House together
constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the reason for specifying the component chambers was rather the desire to
emphasize the transition from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature as a result of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution.

It is also contended that there is significance in the use of the words "of the" before "House" in the provision being considered,
and in the use of the phrase "of the Senate and of the House" when it could have employed the shorter expression "of the Senate
and the House". It was grammatically correct to refer to "the members of the Senate and (the members) of the House", because
the members of the Senate are not members of the House. To speak of "members of the Senate and the House" would imply
that the members of the Senate also held membership in the House.

The argument that if the intention was to require that the term of office of the Senators, as well as that of the Representatives,
must all expire the Constitution would have spoken of the "terms" (in the plural)" of the members of 3 the Senate and of the
House", instead of using "term" in the singular (as the Constitution does in section 14 of Article VI), has been already considered.
As previously observed, the use of the singular form "term" precisely emphasizes that in the provision in question the
Constitution envisaged both legislative chambers as one single unit, and this conclusion is reinforced by the expression employed,
"until the expiration of the full term of ALL the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase".

It is finally urged that to require the expiration of the full term of the Senators before the effectivity of the increased compensation
would subject the present members of the House of Representatives to the same restrictions as under the Constitution prior to
its amendment. It may well be wondered whether this was not, in fact, the design of the framers of the 1940 constitutional
amendments. For under either the original limitation or the present one, as amended, a maximum delay of six (6) years and a
minimum of four(4) is necessary before an increase of legislators’ compensation can take effect.

If that increase were approved in the session immediately following an election, two assemblymen’s terms, of 3 years each, had
to elapse under the former limitation in order that the increase could become operative, because the original Constitution required
that the new emolument should operate only after expiration of the term of assemblymen elected subsequently to those who
approved it (Art. VI, sec. 5), and an assemblyman's term was then 3 years only. Under the Constitution, as amended, the same
interval obtains, since Senators hold office for six (6) years.
On the other hand, if the increase of compensation were approved by the legislature on its last session just prior to an election,
the delay is reduced to four (4) years under the original restriction, because to the last year of the term of the approving
assemblymen the full 3-year term of their successors must be added. Once again, an identical period must elapse under the 1940
amendment: because one-third of the Senators are elected every two years, so that just before a given election four of the
approving Senators' full six-year term still remain to run.

To illustrate: if under the original Constitution the assemblymen elected in, say, 1935 were to approve an increase of pay in the
1936 sessions, the new pay would not be effective until after the expiration of the term of the succeeding assemblymen elected
in 1938; i.e., the increase would not be payable until December 30, 1941, six years after 1935. Under the present Constitution, if
the higher pay were approved in 1964 with the participation of Senators elected in 1963, the same would not be collectible until
December 30, 1969 , since the said Senators' term would expire on the latter date.

But if the assemblymen elected in 1935 (under the original Constitution) were to approve the increase in compensation, not in
1936 but in 1938 (the last of their 3-year term), the new compensation would still operate on December 30, 1941, four years
later, since the term of assemblymen elected in November of 1938 (subsequent to the approval of the increase) would end in
December 30 of 1941.

Again, under the present Constitution, if the increase is approved in the 1965 sessions immediately preceding the elections in
November of that year, the higher compensation would be operative only on December 30, 1969, also four years later, because
the most recently elected members of the Senate would then be Senators chosen by the electors in November of 1963, and their
term would not expire until December 30, 1969.

This coincidence of minimum and maximum delays under the original and the amended constitution can not be just due to
accident, and is proof that the intent and spirit of the Constitutional restriction on Congressional salaries has been maintained
unaltered. But whether designed or not, it shows how unfounded is the argument that by requiring members of the present
House to await the expiration of the term of the Senators, who concurred in approving the increase in compensation, they are
placed in a worse position than under the Constitution as originally written.

The reason for the minimum interval of four years is plainly to discourage the approval of increases of compensation just before
an election by legislators who can anticipate their reelection with more or less accuracy. This salutary precaution should not be
nullified by resorting to technical and involved interpretation of the constitutional mandate.

In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative
until December 30, 1969 , when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it in June 20, 1964 will have
expired. Consequently, appropriations for such increased compensation may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969 . In so
far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior
to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the items of the Appropriation
Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) purporting to authorize the disbursement of the increased
compensation to members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void,
as violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor
General and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from approving and passing in audit
any disbursements of the increased compensation authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and members of the House
of Representatives, before December 30, 1969. No costs.

G.R. NO. L-34676, April 30, 1974

BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PETITIONER, VS. ISMAEL MATHAY, AUDITOR
GENERAL AND JOSE V. VELASCO, AUDITOR, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms the Auditor-
General's decision that petitioner as a Congressman whose term of office
expired on December 30, 1969 and qualified for retirement benefits by virtue of
a minimum of twenty years of government service is entitled to a retirement
gratuity based on the salary actually received by him as a member of Congress of
P7,200.00 per annum. To grant petitioner's contention that the retirement
gratuity of members of Congress such as himself whose terms expired on
December 30, 1969 should be computed on the basis of an increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum under Republic Act 4134 which could only be operative
with incoming members of Congress whose terms of office would
commence on December 30, 1969, by virtue of the Constitutional mandate that
such salary increases could take effect only upon the expiration of the full term
of all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased
salary, (since petitioner and other outgoing members of Congress were
constitutionally prohibited from receiving such salary increase during their term
of office) would be a subtle way of going around the constitutional prohibition
and increasing in effect their compensation during their term of office and of
doing indirectly what could not be done directly.

Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress

of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year
span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.

During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing
the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national
government" was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on
July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressmen)
were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the
Act expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution." (section 1)

Petitioner was reelected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30,
1969) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such
third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay[1]
"that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the
Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue
of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
which provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives approving such increase."

Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his
term having expired on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act 186, section 12(c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which
provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or
elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of
which are continuous on the basis therein provided "in case of employees based
on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as
provided by law."[2]

On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the

sum of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress which he
never received during his incumbency and which under this Court's above-
quoted decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay could become operative only on
December 30, 1969 with the expiration of the full terms of all members of
Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary.

Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant, however,
pending resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former
Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman likewise
expired on December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to
return the warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his
retirement claim, enclosing therewith copy of the Auditor General's adverse
decision on ex-Congressman Singson's claim for retirement gratuity as
computed on the basis of the salary increase of P32,000.00 per annum for
members of Congress under Republic Act No. 4134.

Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due course on January 20,
1972, by the Auditor General through respondent Auditor who further advised
petitioner and furnished him with copy of the 2nd indorsement of June 29,
1971, of the Office of the President, dismissing the appeal of Congressman
Singson from the Auditor General's adverse decision disallowing the claim for
retirement gratuity, computed on a salary basis of P32,000.00 per annum.

Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal from the adverse
decision of the Auditor General.

The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for
members of Congress (which was not applied to him during incumbency which
ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that
such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected
to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969 should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for
members of Congress "as provided by law" (under Republic Act 4134) was
already (P32.000.00 per annum.

Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:

1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress
under Republic Act 4134 could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for
incoming members of Congress when the full term of all members of Congress
(House and Senate) that approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have
expired, by virtue of the constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the
1935 Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for
members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner must
necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum. The compensation they received "as
provided by law" and the Constitution during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired
on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from
receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited
emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were
permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed
by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner's
colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would contravene the
Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling
administrative authorities to do indirectly what can not be done directly."[3]

The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not escape notice
that during his entire tenure as Congressman (Dec. 30, 1965 to December 30,
1969) comprising the last four years of his government service, the herein
claimant-retiree was unable to receive the increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum for Members of Congress precisely because of the constitutional
ban. To allow him now to collect such amount in the guise of retirement
gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand to reason that while he could not legally
receive such rate as salary while still in the service, he would now be allowed to
enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his retirement."[4]

3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per

annum was already operative when his retirement took effect on December 30,
1969, his retirement gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot be
sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose
term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason
that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the
purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and "other
emoluments" to their salary as provided by law.

This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez.[5] In striking down Republic
Act No. 3836 as null and void insofar as it referred to the retirement of
members of Congress and the elected officials thereof for being violative of the
Constitution, this Court held that "it is evident that retirement benefit is a form
or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services
of one possessing any office" and that "Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an
increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June
22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to
the prohibition in Article VI, section 14 of the Constitution.''[6]

It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow petitioner
a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be
a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of
achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly."

4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his claim were amply
refuted by the Office of' the President in dismissing the appeal in the similar
case of ex-Congressman Singson and therefore likewise serve to show the
untenability of petitioner's stand in this appeal, mutatis mutandis, as follows:
"It is evident, therefore, that the increased compensation of P32.000 is the rate
of pay prescribed by Republic Act No. 4134 for Mr. Singson's successor in
office, while Mr. Singson and his colleagues of the same term are limited to the
annual compensation of P7,200 fixed in the Constitution. To compute his
retirement gratuity at the rate of P32,000 per annum after the expiration of his
term of office would effectively give him the benefits of increased compensation
to which he was not entitled during his term, thereby violating the constitutional
prohibition against increased compensation of legislators during their term of
office (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Const.) which was presumably in the mind of Congress
when it stated in Republic Act No. 4134 that 'the salary increases herein fixed
shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Neither an argument of logic nor a judicial pronouncement supports the

proposition that, as Mr. Singson's retirement legally started simultaneously with
the beginning of the term of his successor and the effective rate of pay of his
successor and all incoming members of Congress was already the new rate of
P32,000 per annum, it is this new rate of pay that should be made the basis in
computing his retirement gratuity. Suffice it to say that P7,200 per annum is Mr.
Singson's authorized compensation during his term of office and, therefore, the
rate of pay prescribed by law for him on his retirement, while P32,000 per
annum is the allowable compensation of incoming members of Congress during
their term and, hence, the rate of pay prescribed by law for them on their
retirement. There is, then, no basis for equating a constitutionally prohibited
compensation for Mr. Singson with a statutory prescribed rate of pay for his
successor in computing his retirement gratuity.

"It is likewise contended by Mr. Singson that the new rate of pay P32,000
authorized in Republic Act No. 4134 would be used in the instant case, not to
compensate him for services during the constitutionally prohibited period, but
would simply serve as basis for computing his retirement gratuity for services
rendered by him not only as a member of Congress but in other branches of the
government as well. The foregoing contention carries its own
refutation. Retirement benefit is compensation for services rendered
(PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ, supra). Since Mr. Singson applied for
retirement as an 'elected official,' it is evident that he seeks compensation not
only for services rendered in other branches of the Government but also for his
services as member of Congress using P32,000, an amount prohibited for him
but allowed for his successor, in the computation of his retirement gratuity."[7]
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 03, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMEO G.
JALOSJOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress

who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts[1] is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in
the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

The issue raised is one of first impression.

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are
called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial
interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.

The accused-appellant’s "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As

Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that –

1. Accused-appellant’s reelection being an expression of popular will cannot

be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest –
not even the police power of the State.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to

taxation without representation.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his

suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by
the people.

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their
voice to be heard.

5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend

sessions of the U.S. Congress.

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and

urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty
of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions

when allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He

states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He
calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of
the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints
arising from pending criminal cases.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the
exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of
government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.

We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-
executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to
high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints
of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties
of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of
obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House
of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from
a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the
privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting
an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:

Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; xxx.
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted
under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary
immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all
persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the
same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent
to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding
portion of the provision, to wit:
xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or
for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the
obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of
the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee
meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that
Congress is in session.

The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress’ function to attend

sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which
states that–
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as
such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is
not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Accused-appellant’s reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[2], which states,

inter alia, that –
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must
be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of
any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-
quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply
to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the
same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending
appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress
or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final

conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an
example and warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,[3] it is the injury to
the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury
to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused
may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his
absconding.[4]

The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into
office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular
place of confinement.

It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant’s arrest was issued,
he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to
the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned
which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not
be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-
defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State’s
penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City
Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan
Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from
the House of Representatives;

b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in

Makati City;

c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center,

Makati City;

d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-

appellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the
prison premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose
of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees,
at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and
allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project
area and his place of confinement.

b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati
City.

c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart
condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a
member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or
upon court orders.

What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing

accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for
five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in
this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:[5]
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy
considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it
comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a
privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability
for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their
attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is
likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any
transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to
pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong
public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear
that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might
unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that
precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution,
solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an
attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary
would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation
of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated
as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept
of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his
mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when
he is allowed to leave jail.

We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated
at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex,
Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by
Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an
office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he
attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under
detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has
been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated,
accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House
of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under
detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been
allowed by the prison authorities at the National Pentientiary to perform these
acts.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they
did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did
so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which
he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from
a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve
his full term in office.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of

constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws."[6] This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The
organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows

different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by
the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of
its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest
for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for
its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under
the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call
of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious

discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.[8]

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by

public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.[9]

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a

reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties
of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and
apply to all those belonging to the same class.[10]

Imprisonment is the restraint of a man’s personal liberty; coercion exercised

upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.[11]

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one’s

liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal,
and is personal to the accused.[12] The term refers to the restraint on the
personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to
place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will.[13]
Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving him of his power
of locomotion[14] and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes
the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."[15]

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individual’s status in society.[16] Prison officials have the difficult and often
thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well
as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into
the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment
and elimination of certain rights.[17]

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant’s

claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest,
including the police power of the State.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, PETITIONER, VS. HON. OSCAR
PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN
DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed
soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the
Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.[1] A series of negotiations quelled the
teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the
militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident,"
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with
coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."

Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,[2] threw his
hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term
commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.[3]

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with
the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to
be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests"[4] (Omnibus
Motion). Among his requests were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the
Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is
in session, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate,
committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations, investigations and
hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are
normally held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial
Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to
7:00 p.m.);

(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the

Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a
personal desktop computer and the appropriate communications equipment
(i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in order that he may be able to
work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or
when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working
area and the related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the
budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;

(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his
place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day particularly during
 working days for purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or
coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the
performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;

(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or
opinions to the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting
the country and the public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the
performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in the
light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks
and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government;

(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his
custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and
other members of the media who may wish to interview him and/or to get
his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of confinement at the
Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City,
particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate
or when the Senate is not in session; and

(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers

of the Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00
a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS
Financial Center, Pasay City.[5]
By Order of July 25, 2007,[6] the trial court denied all the requests in the
Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his
requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.[7] The
trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007.[8]

Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial
court, and for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning
the Senate staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or
transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct
respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests
and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate.
Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of
having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and guests[9] at
the Marine Brig.

Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of

Staff, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy's Flag Officer-in-
Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines' Commandant,
Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding
Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obeña (Obeña).

Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since
November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula
Hotel[10] the day before or on November 29, 2007.

Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as

against the above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in
relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile,
against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from
this Court.[11] Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police
officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he did not
satisfactorily show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of
the former custodians.[12]

Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised
in his Motion for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:
I.

THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO

IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF
THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A.

UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS

ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN
THE INSTANT CASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN
CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

B.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH

TWO (2) COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE. HEREIN ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH
THE OFFENSE OF "COUP D'ETAT", A CHARGE WHICH IS
COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;

C.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE

PRIOR TO BEING ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER
VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE
AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS
ACTS AT OAKWOOD;

II.

GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF

THE MARINE BRIG'S COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW
PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS;

III.

ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE

PEOPLE, IN THEIR SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE
POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE
PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK AND
SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;

- AND -

IV.
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW
LIBERAL TREATMENT OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE
HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR
MISUARI.[13]
The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos,

petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was
already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a
motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a
mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political
rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving
moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of
lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a
"political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in

expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized
practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

In sum, petitioner's first ground posits that there is a world of difference

between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the
stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the
inapplicability of Jalosjos.[14]

A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in

Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.[15]
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody
for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution
provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.[16]
(Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,[17] or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
action.[18]

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua,[19] is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction
as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and
for release on recognizance was denied.[20] The determination that the evidence
of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail[21] or
imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction,[22] justifies the detention of
an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is
"regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for
confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense[23] applies
equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants
like Jalosjos.

As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,[24] it is impractical to draw a line

between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of
maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their
constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their
rights more limited than those of the public.
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:[25]
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is
deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of
liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against
him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage
in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.[26]
(Underscoring supplied)
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the
extent that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical
movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month
after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish
legislative results.[27]

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does
not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the
presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their
respective motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption
of innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on
appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation
of final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of
innocence prevails.[28]

In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither
denied nor disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media
access to him should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on
Elections.[29]

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he
is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and
such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his
place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured
well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some
reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain
statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident,"[30]
proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape
ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became
real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a

factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a
discretionary grant of bail.[31] In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is
controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a
matter of right nor of discretion.[32]

Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo[33] to buttress his plea for
leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano
Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder,[34] was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu
dignum is this Court's pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized
in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the
defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of
the jury."[35] At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were
non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,[36] the Court noted the obvious
reason that "one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong
temptation to flee."[37] Petitioner's petition for bail having earlier been denied,
he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him
out.

Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court's findings, Esperon did
not overrule Obeña's recommendation to allow him to attend Senate
sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment[38] of Obeña that he interposed no
objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults
the trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to
the performance of petitioner's duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what
Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military
installation owing to AFP's apolitical nature.[39]

The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a

valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of
pre-trial detention.[40] The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee
may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the
safety and prevent the escape of the detainee.[41] Nevertheless, while the
comments of the detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they
are not binding on the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not
impositions upon a court.

Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow
him to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected
him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to
removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation,
denying the people's will, repudiating the people's choice, and overruling the
mandate of the people.

Petitioner's contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a

public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of
the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor."[42]

The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in

nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases,[43] the
Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not
obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies
pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison."[44]

In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,[45] it is opportune to

wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice
of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the
Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to
the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the
rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by
the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members
of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x
x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.[46]
(Underscoring supplied)
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain
detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like
former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were
allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial
of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps
on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention

prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek
preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or
house arrest,[47] yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest
to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to

all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.[48] That
this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial
court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file
his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be
proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office[49] on June 29, 2007. In a
seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of
taking a complete turn-around,[50] petitioner largely banks on these prior grants
to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
Petitioner's position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests
alone, petitioner's case fails to compare with the species of allowable
leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:
x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a
free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.[51]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures,

Antero J. Pobre invites the Court's attention to the following excerpts of
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago's speech delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I

am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel
like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the
speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members
of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks
that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the
lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago,
through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She,
however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of
her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial
anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred
that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial
Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for nomination
to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform
applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced
advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be
considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of

Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or
Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress
is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof." Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision,
the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental

privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old
as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty
of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one,
however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion
offense."[1]

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long
experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning
process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity,
parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective
debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the
public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to
the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge's
speculation as to the motives.[2]

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free
speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and
oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies,
and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not
interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the
member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.[3] The disciplinary
authority of the assembly[4] and the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity.[5]

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the
complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her
privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under
the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on
the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator
Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the
administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper
in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on
the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots."

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her attention to the
ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be
driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
would be the result.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts
should be allowed to erode the people's faith in the judiciary. In this case, the
lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.--A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.--A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements

speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law
professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an
author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless
to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like
any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and
to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers
of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.[7] Senator Santiago should
have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would
make on the people's faith in the integrity of the courts.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to

crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an
afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the
passage once more:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I

am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel
like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements
were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for
the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the
pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must
not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the
reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and
disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual
privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for
their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the
institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without
indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago's outburst was directly traceable to what

she considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her
application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under
the Court's supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief
Justice who sits as the JBC's ex-officio chairperson,[8] have no official duty to
nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The
Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago's wholesale and
indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec.
11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate
rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of
the Bar will, among other things:

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its
own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and
assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

xxxx

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10] we reiterated our
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys to
the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any
disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court
wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is
the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against
"unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds
him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts."

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board
v. Cloribel[12] that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve.
For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it
been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."[13]

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting
injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the
administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a
lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless
said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.[14]

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor,[15] a good character being an essential qualification for the admission
to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or
"misconduct," the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers
any misconduct, which--albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
profession--would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which their license and the law invest in them.[16]

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people's faith in courts and
trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on
lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the
orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and
embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have
done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty.
Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v.
Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent
manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on

Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of
utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and
legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even
without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration
dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator's offensive and
disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by.
It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to
respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to
protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the people's representatives, to perform the functions of their office without
fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against
government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making
prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive
or improper language against another Senator or against any public
institution."[19] But as to Senator Santiago's unparliamentary remarks, the
Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the
matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the
Rules dictates under such circumstance.[20] The lady senator clearly violated the
rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and
avoided imposing their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre's motives in filing his complaint, stating
that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare.
We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senator's use of
intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a
clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.[21]

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she
in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that,
although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has
unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied
admission is good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty.

Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-15905, August 03, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and
Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the
publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the
ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said
letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the
lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding
order of dismissal. The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in
question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or
not. The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication,
defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:

"The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place." (Article VI, Section 15.)

The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the

aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or
debate therein" - that is to say, in Congress - used in this provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance

of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and
of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such,
at the time of the performance of the acts in question. [1]

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the
Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in
session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that,
in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee
thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said
communication is not absolutely privileged.

Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the
President, the communication began with the following paragraphs:

"In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had
nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair
attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing
and rumormongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to
focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present
circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose.

"It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational
plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists."

Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the
second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan for a massive
political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by
propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to
become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said
to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public
Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and
psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense, and the
"Peace and Amelioration Fund" - the letter says - are "available to adequately
finance a political campaign". It further adds:

"It is reported that the 'Planners' have under their control the following: (1) Col.
Nicanor Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos
Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS, (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala
of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the
Public Information Office, DND. To insure this control, the 'Planners'
purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS, to Europe to study and while
Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llmas. They also sent Lt.
Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to
USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose
Regala. The 'Planners' wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS
(PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon, is considered a missing link in the intelligence
Network. It is, of course, possible that the officers mentioned above are
unwittingly tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge."
(Underscoring ours.)

Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan, the letter lists, under the
heading "other operational technique", the following:

(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary
Vargas to talk on "Communism" and "Apologetics" on civilian supremacy over
the military;

(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters - "typed in two
(2) typewriters only" - to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling
Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957
elections";

(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;

(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an
attempt to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with
men belonging to his clique;

(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the
impression that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties,
to undermine the administration. Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in
connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning
stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future
developments". Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by
trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in
connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the
authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of
the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.

The letter in question recommended: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to

resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that
the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man;
(4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be
asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence
agencies in the Armed Forces, including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other
intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned,
considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano",
and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all
military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except
those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the
AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by battalion strength to the
various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that
Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking
an investigation of the planned "coup d'etat".

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs'
action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control
of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong
to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise,
added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the
plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very
document upon which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitly indicates that they
might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may
be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is
derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages,
considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by
law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of
Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein
described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.

It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written
by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach
plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and
ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are
mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and
cannot prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too,
when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they
could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage
a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the “planners”. Again, the
aforementioned passage in the defendant’s letter clearly implies that plaintiffs
were not among the “planners” of said coup d’etat, for, otherwise, they could
not be “tools”, much less, unwittingly on their part, of said “planners”.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, AND SALVADOR M.
VIARI, PETITIONERS, VS. RICHARD J. GORDON, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having

forfeited his seat in the Senate.

The Facts

Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari

(petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having
Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of
the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.

During respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the

Philippines,[1] he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February
2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by
accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has
ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he
be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,[2] which held that the PNRC is a

government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in
accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate,
pursuant to Flores v. Drilon,[3] which held that incumbent national legislators lose
their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office.

In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this
petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition
alleges that respondent committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes
a ground for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do not claim to be
entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office
usurped or unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo warranto in
his own name. If the petition is one for quo warranto, it is already barred by
prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
action should be commenced within one year after the cause of the public
officer's forfeiture of office. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red
Cross volunteer for the past 40 years. Respondent was already Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having
been elected Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.

Respondent contends that even if the present petition is treated as a taxpayer's

suit, petitioners cannot be allowed to raise a constitutional question in the
absence of any claim that they suffered some actual damage or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal act of respondent. Furthermore, taxpayers are
allowed to sue only when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds,
or that public money is being diverted to any improper purpose, or where
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results
in wastage of public funds.

Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one for declaratory
relief, this Court would have no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for
declaratory relief lies with the Regional Trial Court.

Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or

controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of
the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the
PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.

In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an action for quo
warranto nor an action for declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that the
present petition is a taxpayer's suit questioning the unlawful disbursement of
funds, considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries and other
compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office.
Petitioners point out that this Court has jurisdiction over this petition since it
involves a legal or constitutional issue which is of transcendental importance.

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a

government- owned or controlled corporation;
 2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution
applies to the case of respondent who is Chairman of the
PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate;

3. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a

Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution; and

4. Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition against

respondent.[4]

The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of the PNRC Chairman
is a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
Constitution.

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition without merit.

Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition

A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto.
Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. - An action for the

usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a
verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without

being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis
supplied)

Petitioners allege in their petition that:

4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC when he was elected as such
during the First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the Board of Governors of the
PNRC held on February 23, 2006, the minutes of which is hereto attached and
made integral part hereof as Annex "A."

5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors,

during his incumbency as a Member of the House of Senate of the Congress of
the Philippines, having been elected as such during the national elections last
May 2004.

6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, which

position he duly accepted, respondent has been exercising the powers and
discharging the functions and duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still
a senator.

7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by accepting the

chairmanship of the Board of Governors of the PNRC, respondent has
ceased to be a Member of the House of Senate as provided in Section 13,
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, x x x

xxxx

10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of Chairman of

the Board of Governors of the PNRC on February 23, 2006, respondent
has automatically forfeited his seat in the House of Senate and, therefore,
has long ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to the ruling of this Honorable
Court in the case of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON, G.R.
No. 104732, x x x

11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent continues to act
as such and still performs the powers, functions and duties of a senator,
contrary to the constitution, law and jurisprudence.
12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to falsely act and
represent himself as a senator or member of the House of Senate, collecting the
salaries, emoluments and other compensations, benefits and privileges
appertaining and due only to the legitimate senators, to the damage, great and
irreparable injury of the Government and the Filipino people.[5] (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in
the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office
against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an
action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules
of Court.

Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party

plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual
may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office
allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own
name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must
claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise
the action may be dismissed at any stage.[6] In the present case, petitioners do
not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners
have no standing to file the present petition.

Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a
taxpayer's suit, the petition would still fail on the merits.

PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions

On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95,[7]
otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-
funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely,
effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable
without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or
political affiliation.[8] The PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services,
Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social
Services and Voluntary Service.[9]
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions,
established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated
in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929.[10] The Whereas clauses of the
PNRC Charter read:

WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva, Switzerland, on August 22, 1864, a

convention by which the nations of the world were invited to join together in
diminishing, so far lies within their power, the evils inherent in war;

WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the world have ratified or adhered to
the subsequent revision of said convention, namely the "Convention of Geneva
of July 29 [sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick of Armies in the Field" (referred to in this Charter as the Geneva Red
Cross Convention);

WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages the

establishment in each country of a voluntary organization to assist in
caring for the wounded and sick of the armed forces and to furnish
supplies for that purpose;

WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent

nation on July 4, 1946 and proclaimed its adherence to the Geneva Red
Cross Convention on February 14, 1947, and by that action indicated its
desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the
suffering caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary
organization for that purpose as contemplated by the Geneva Red Cross
Convention;

WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a Charter of the

American National Red Cross which must be terminated in view of the
independence of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in the other countries

which have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Red Cross Convention assist in
promoting the health and welfare of their people in peace and in war, and
through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly and through their
international organizations promote better understanding and sympathy among
the peoples of the world. (Emphasis supplied)

The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement (Movement), which is composed of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies (International Federation), and the National Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies). The Movement is united
and guided by its seven Fundamental Principles:

1. HUMANITY - The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,

born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on
the battlefield, endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent
and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to
protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes
mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all
peoples.

2. IMPARTIALITY - It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious

beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of
individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most
urgent cases of distress.

3. NEUTRALITY - In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all,

the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in
controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

4. INDEPENDENCE - The Movement is independent. The National

Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their
governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must
always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to
act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE - It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted

in any manner by desire for gain.

6. UNITY - There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in
any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work
throughout its territory.

7. UNIVERSALITY - The International Red Cross and Red Crescent

Movement, in which all Societies have equal status and share equal
responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide. (Emphasis
supplied)

The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all

members of the Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the
Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the
Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be
autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles
of the Movement.[11]

The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring

belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts,
the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed
conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim
separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or
controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government
personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or
separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to
the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.

Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous,
neutral and independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the
Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or
agency that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust
of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross
Society.[12] It is imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and
independent in relation to the State.

To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC
cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine
government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government
assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.[13]
The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and
private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board
of Governors, as provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter:

SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National

Red Cross shall be financed primarily by contributions obtained through
solicitation campaigns throughout the year which shall be organized by
the Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in their respective
jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be conducted independently
of other fund drives by other organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as
amended, only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors
are appointed by the President of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four
members, or four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not
appointed by the President. Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended,
provides:

SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of

Governors composed of thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected by chapter delegates in
biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four
members of the Board already chosen. x x x.

Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board, eighteen are elected by
the chapter delegates of the PNRC, and six are elected by the twenty-four
members already chosen -- a select group where the private sector members
have three-fourths majority. Clearly, an overwhelming majority of four-fifths
of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private sector members
of the PNRC.

The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the
PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The
incumbent Chairman of PNRC, respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all
PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board
four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC
Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government
official.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,[14] the President appoints all
officials and employees in the Executive branch whose appointments are vested
in the President by the Constitution or by law. The President also appoints
those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under this
Section 16, the law may also authorize the "heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in rank than such heads of
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.[15] In Rufino v. Endriga,[16] the
Court explained appointments under Section 16 in this wise:

Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints
three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The
second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law.

Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers
whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x

xxx

In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may
not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint
lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is
vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the
agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission.
In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three
situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the
agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.

xxx

The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-

ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of the specified offices, and in no
other person. The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions
or boards and not to their members, for several reasons.

The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the
head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC
Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion
that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine
Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC
Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,[17] the President exercises
control over all government offices in the Executive branch. If an office is
legally not under the control of the President, then such office is not part
of the Executive branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,[18] the Court explained the
President's power of control over all government offices as follows:

Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive,
Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent
constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial body or local government unit.
Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and
constitutional basis for its existence.

The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government.
The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the
CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall
under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any specific
department" falls "under the Office of the President."

Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP
which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President
"shall have control of all executive . . . offices," Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office -- one performing
executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies -- from the
President's power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs
executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.

The President's power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all

officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are
appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise
or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the
exercise of discretion.

In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises
"control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no
instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is
outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there
is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the
entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under
the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any
legal or constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied)

An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector

individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the
PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The
PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the
PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The President cannot
reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither
can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of
the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government office.

Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies of a National

Society, this can be justified by the need for proper coordination with the public
authorities, and the government representatives may take part in decision-
making within a National Society. However, the freely-elected representatives of
a National Society's active members must remain in a large majority in a
National Society's governing bodies.[19]
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority
of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including
students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund
campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year.
Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one
year upon contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year.[20] Even
foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Section 5 of
the PNRC Charter, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264,[21] reads:

SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be open to the
entire population in the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any contribution
to the Philippine National Red Cross Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the
contributor to membership for one year and said contribution shall be
deductible in full for taxation purposes.

Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run
charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation.

Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC,[22]

which ruled that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation.
In ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the
simple test used was whether the corporation was created by its own special
charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the
general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter,
the Court then ruled that it is a government corporation. However, the
Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a government-owned or
controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987:

SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. - x x x

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency

organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature,
and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to
the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That
government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by
the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the
Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such
corporations.(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the

government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its
capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock
corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government
officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the
government. Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does
not own or control PNRC.

The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against

the Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law

The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created
by special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution, as amended, reads:

SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.

The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions

prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by general law.
Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a "body
corporate and politic," thus:

SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a

body corporate and politic to be the voluntary organization officially
designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the
obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such
other duties as are inherent upon a National Red Cross Society. The
national headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in Metropolitan
Manila. (Emphasis supplied)
In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,[23] the Court explained the constitutional
provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations in this wise:

We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The
Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private
corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-
owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. Section 16, Article
XII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-
owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic
viability.

The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations

except by general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this
constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special
charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens.

In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a

special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private
corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is
private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently,
only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private
corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code,
except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.

The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or

controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations
cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations
with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or
controlled.[24] (Emphasis supplied)

In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are government-owned
or controlled corporations since they exist by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
198, which constitutes their special charter. The seed capital assets of the Local
Water Districts, such as waterworks and sewerage facilities, were public property
which were managed, operated by or under the control of the city, municipality
or province before the assets were transferred to the Local Water Districts. The
Local Water Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA). In fact, under the 2009 General
Appropriations Act,[25] the LWUA has a budget amounting to P400,000,000 for
its subsidy requirements.[26] There is no private capital invested in the Local
Water Districts. The capital assets and operating funds of the Local Water
Districts all come from the government, either through transfer of assets, loans,
subsidies or the income from such assets or funds.

The government also controls the Local Water Districts because the municipal
or city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of the
Local Water Districts. Furthermore, the board directors and other personnel of
the Local Water Districts are government employees subject to civil service laws
and anti-graft laws. Clearly, the Local Water Districts are considered
government-owned or controlled corporations not only because of their
creation by special charter but also because the government in fact owns and
controls the Local Water Districts.

Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special
charter. However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements of
government ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus,
although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a
government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential
elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as
a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However,
the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by
special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable
corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC
as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers,[27] is void for being
unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,[28] 2,[29] 3,[30] 4(a),[31] 5,[32] 6,[33] 7,[34] 8,[35] 9,[36]
10,[37] 11,[38] 12,[39] and 13[40] of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.

The other provisions[41] of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can be
considered as a recognition by the State that the unincorporated PNRC is the
local National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, and thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth
in the PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the PNRC Charter implement
the Philippine Government's treaty obligations under Article 4(5) of the Statutes
of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which provides
that to be recognized as a National Society, the Society must be "duly
recognized by the legal government of its country on the basis of the Geneva
Conventions and of the national legislation as a voluntary aid society, auxiliary
to the public authorities in the humanitarian field."

In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a
private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code
and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a
private corporation.

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine

National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross,
or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and
1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant
it corporate powers.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO AND SALVADOR M.
VIARI, PETITIONERS, VS. RICHARD J. GORDON, RESPONDENT.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, INTERVENOR.

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration[1]
filed on August 10, 2009 by respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the
Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the Decision), the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration[2] filed on August 27, 2009 by movant-
intervenor Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the latter's
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper[3] filed on
December 23, 2009.

In the Decision,[4] the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the
Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
as "the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in
a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition
in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution."[5] The Decision, however,
further declared void the PNRC Charter "insofar as it creates the PNRC as a
private corporation" and consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate
under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation."[6] The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine

National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross,
or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and
1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant
it corporate powers.[7]

In his Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration, respondent

raises the following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 95 was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the case in
deciding such issue; and (2) as the Court decided that Petitioners did not have
standing to file the instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court on the
validity of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter.[8]

Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue; therefore, it
was unnecessary for the Court to decide on that question. Respondent cites
Laurel v. Garcia,[9] wherein the Court said that it "will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can
be disposed of on some other ground" and goes on to claim that since this
Court, in the Decision, disposed of the petition on some other ground, i.e., lack
of standing of petitioners, there was no need for it to delve into the validity of
R.A. No. 95, and the rest of the judgment should be deemed obiter.

In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, PNRC prays that the Court sustain
the constitutionality of its Charter on the following grounds:

A. THE ASSAILED DECISION DECLARING

UNCONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95 AS
AMENDED DEPRIVED INTERVENOR PNRC OF ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

1. INTERVENOR PNRC WAS NEVER A PARTY TO

THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY.
2. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 95, AS AMENDED WAS NEVER AN ISSUE
IN THIS CASE.

B. THE CURRENT CHARTER OF PNRC IS

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1264 AND NOT
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 1264 WAS NOT A CREATION OF CONGRESS.

C. PNRC'S STRUCTURE IS SUI GENERIS; IT IS A CLASS

OF ITS OWN. WHILE IT IS PERFORMING
HUMANITARIAN FUNCTIONS AS AN AUXILIARY
TO GOVERNMENT, IT IS A NEUTRAL ENTITY
SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT OF
GOVERNMENT CONTROL, YET IT DOES NOT
QUALIFY AS STRICTLY PRIVATE IN CHARACTER.

In his Comment and Manifestation[10] filed on November 9, 2009, respondent

manifests: (1) that he agrees with the position taken by the PNRC in its Motion
for Partial Reconsideration dated August 27, 2009; and (2) as of the writing of
said Comment and Manifestation, there was pending before the Congress of the
Philippines a proposed bill entitled "An Act Recognizing the PNRC as an
Independent, Autonomous, Non-Governmental Organization Auxiliary to the
Authorities of the Republic of the Philippines in the Humanitarian Field, to be
Known as The Philippine Red Cross."[11]

After a thorough study of the arguments and points raised by the respondent as
well as those of movant-intervenor in their respective motions, we have
reconsidered our pronouncements in our Decision dated July 15, 2009 with
regard to the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions
of the PNRC Charter, R.A. No. 95, as amended.

As correctly pointed out in respondent's Motion, the issue of constitutionality of

R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined
in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We
have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of
constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,[12] thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass
upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may
[rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question
will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.[13]

Under the rule quoted above, therefore, this Court should not have declared
void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have
exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other
ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the
PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of
unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being
compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and
incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of
existence in this country.

Its existence as a chartered corporation remained unchallenged on ground of

unconstitutionality notwithstanding that R.A. No. 95 was enacted on March 22,
1947 during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, which provided for a
proscription against the creation of private corporations by special law, to wit:

SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned and controlled by the Government or any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof. (Art. XIV, 1935 Constitution.)

Similar provisions are found in Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution
and Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The latter reads:

SECTION 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-
owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic
viability.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly
on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979,
by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643,
respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC's corporate
existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on
the creation of private corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is
not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid
constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it
not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and
official status accorded to it by the State and the international
community. There is merit in PNRC's contention that its structure is sui
generis.

The PNRC succeeded the chapter of the American Red Cross which was in
existence in the Philippines since 1917. It was created by an Act of Congress
after the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 6,
1946 and proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence to the Convention of
Geneva of July 29, 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick of Armies in the Field (the "Geneva Red Cross Convention"). By that
action the Philippines indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the
world in mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish in the
Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose and like other volunteer
organizations established in other countries which have ratified the Geneva
Conventions, to promote the health and welfare of the people in peace and in
war.[14]

The provisions of R.A. No. 95, as amended by R.A. Nos. 855 and 6373, and
further amended by P.D. Nos. 1264 and 1643, show the historical background
and legal basis of the creation of the PNRC by legislative fiat, as a voluntary
organization impressed with public interest. Pertinently R.A. No. 95, as
amended by P.D. 1264, provides:

WHEREAS, during the meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on 22 August 1894,

the nations of the world unanimously agreed to diminish within their power the
evils inherent in war;

WHEREAS, more than one hundred forty nations of the world have ratified or
adhered to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the Field and at
Sea, The Prisoners of War, and The Civilian Population in Time of War referred
to in this Charter as the Geneva Conventions;

WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent

nation on July 4, 1946, and proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence
to the Geneva Conventions of 1929, and by the action, indicated its desire
to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering
caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization
for that purpose as contemplated by the Geneva Conventions;

WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a chapter of the

American National Red Cross which was terminated in view of the
independence of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in other countries which

have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Conventions assist in promoting the
health and welfare of their people in peace and in war, and through their
mutual assistance and cooperation directly and through their international
organizations promote better understanding and sympathy among the people of
the world;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant
to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1
dated September 22, 1972, do hereby decree and order that Republic Act No.
95, Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) as amended by
Republic Acts No. 855 and 6373, be further amended as follows:

Section 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a

body corporate and politic to be the voluntary organization officially
designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the
obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such
other duties as are inherent upon a national Red Cross Society. The
national headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in Metropolitan
Manila. (Emphasis supplied.)

The significant public service rendered by the PNRC can be gleaned from
Section 3 of its Charter, which provides:

Section 3. That the purposes of this Corporation shall be as follows:

(a) To provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armed forces in time of
war, in accordance with the spirit of and under the conditions prescribed by the
Geneva Conventions to which the Republic of the Philippines proclaimed its
adherence;

(b) For the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-section, to perform all
duties devolving upon the Corporation as a result of the adherence of the
Republic of the Philippines to the said Convention;

(c) To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with the authorities of
the armed forces as a medium of communication between people of the
Republic of the Philippines and their Armed Forces, in time of peace and in
time of war, and to act in such matters between similar national societies of
other governments and the Governments and people and the Armed Forces of
the Republic of the Philippines;

(d) To establish and maintain a system of national and international relief in time
of peace and in time of war and apply the same in meeting and emergency needs
caused by typhoons, flood, fires, earthquakes, and other natural disasters and to
devise and carry on measures for minimizing the suffering caused by such
disasters;

(e) To devise and promote such other services in time of peace and in time of
war as may be found desirable in improving the health, safety and welfare of the
Filipino people;

(f) To devise such means as to make every citizen and/or resident of the
Philippines a member of the Red Cross.

The PNRC is one of the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which,
together with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the
IFRC and RCS, make up the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement (the Movement). They constitute a worldwide humanitarian
movement, whose mission is:

[T]o prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to protect
life and health and ensure respect for the human being, in particular in times of
armed conflict and other emergencies, to work for the prevention of disease and
for the promotion of health and social welfare, to encourage voluntary service
and a constant readiness to give help by the members of the Movement, and a
universal sense of solidarity towards all those in need of its protection and
assistance.[15]

The PNRC works closely with the ICRC and has been involved in humanitarian
activities in the Philippines since 1982. Among others, these activities in the
country include:

1. Giving protection and assistance to civilians displaced or otherwise

affected by armed clashes between the government and armed
opposition groups, primarily in Mindanao;
 2. Working to minimize the effects of armed hostilities and violence
on the population;
3. Visiting detainees; and
4. Promoting awareness of international humanitarian law in the
public and private sectors.[16]

National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities
of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services
including disaster relief and health and social programmes.

The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies
(RCS) Position Paper,[17] submitted by the PNRC, is instructive with regard to
the elements of the specific nature of the National Societies such as the PNRC,
to wit:

National Societies, such as the Philippine National Red Cross and its sister Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, have certain specificities deriving from the
1949 Geneva Convention and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement (the Movement). They are also guided by the seven
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement:
Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service,
Unity and Universality.

A National Society partakes of a sui generis character. It is a protected

component of the Red Cross movement under Articles 24 and 26 of the First
Geneva Convention, especially in times of armed conflict. These provisions
require that the staff of a National Society shall be respected and protected in all
circumstances. Such protection is not ordinarily afforded by an international
treaty to ordinary private entities or even non-governmental organisations
(NGOs). This sui generis character is also emphasized by the Fourth Geneva
Convention which holds that an Occupying Power cannot require any change in
the personnel or structure of a National Society. National societies are
therefore organizations that are directly regulated by international
humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities, including
NGOs.

xxxx
In addition, National Societies are not only officially recognized by their public
authorities as voluntary aid societies, auxiliary to the public authorities in the
humanitarian field, but also benefit from recognition at the International
level. This is considered to be an element distinguishing National Societies from
other organisations (mainly NGOs) and other forms of humanitarian response.

x x x. No other organisation belongs to a world-wide Movement in which all

Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping
each other. This is considered to be the essence of the Fundamental Principle
of Universality.

Furthermore, the National Societies are considered to be auxiliaries to the

public authorities in the humanitarian field. x x x.

The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the
same time a private institution and a public service organization because
the very nature of its work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link
with the State. In carrying out their major functions, Red Cross Societies give
their humanitarian support to official bodies, in general having larger resources
than the Societies, working towards comparable ends in a given sector.

x x x No other organization has a duty to be its government's

humanitarian partner while remaining independent.[18] (Emphases ours.)

It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has
remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947
under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
and the 1987 Constitution.

The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or
challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court
now.

In the Decision, the Court, citing Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,[19] explained

that the purpose of the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from
creating private corporations was to prevent the granting of special privileges to
certain individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to other
groups. Based on the above discussion, it can be seen that the PNRC Charter
does not come within the spirit of this constitutional provision, as it does not
grant special privileges to a particular individual, family, or group, but creates an
entity that strives to serve the common good.

Furthermore, a strict and mechanical interpretation of Article XII, Section 16 of

the 1987 Constitution will hinder the State in adopting measures that will serve
the public good or national interest. It should be noted that a special law, R.A.
No. 9520, the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, and not the general
corporation code, vests corporate power and capacities upon cooperatives
which are private corporations, in order to implement the State's avowed policy.

In the Decision of July 15, 2009, the Court recognized the public service
rendered by the PNRC as the government's partner in the observance of its
international commitments, to wit:

The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization,

whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian
assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race,
religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC provides six
major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services,
Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.

The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions,

established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated
in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929. x x x.[20] (Citations omitted.)

So must this Court recognize too the country's adherence to the Geneva
Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance
with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect
of law.[21] Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.[22] This
constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII,
Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former.

By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any
other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC's
special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the
State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions. Although the PNRC is called to be independent under its
Fundamental Principles, it interprets such independence as inclusive of its duty
to be the government's humanitarian partner. To be recognized in the
International Committee, the PNRC must have an autonomous status, and carry
out its humanitarian mission in a neutral and impartial manner.

However, in accordance with the Fundamental Principle of Voluntary Service of

National Societies of the Movement, the PNRC must be distinguished from
private and profit-making entities. It is the main characteristic of National
Societies that they "are not inspired by the desire for financial gain but by
individual commitment and devotion to a humanitarian purpose freely chosen
or accepted as part of the service that National Societies through its volunteers
and/or members render to the Community."[23]

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, can neither "be classified as an instrumentality of the State,
so as not to lose its character of neutrality" as well as its independence, nor
strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian
law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.[24]

Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently
established. Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of
the government, nor a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a
subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so
much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his
position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a "private corporation"
within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be
organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice
Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of
the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments
under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize
its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC
has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to
provide a substantial portion of the country's blood requirements. Its
humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to
the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative
consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed
hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the
international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were
declared void must therefore stay.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Richard J. Gordon's

Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration and movant-
intervenor PNRC's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision in
G.R. No. 175352 dated July 15, 2009 are GRANTED. The constitutionality of
R.A. No. 95, as amended, the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, was
not raised by the parties as an issue and should not have been passed upon by
this Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis¸ being neither strictly private
nor public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its
entirety. The dispositive portion of the Decision should therefore be
MODIFIED by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine

National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982

EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES,
ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and
REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners, vs. HON. SIXTO T. J. DE
GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange
Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M.
BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO
MERCADO, and ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This suit for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised
against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez
leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.

A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates
and allegations are being given and made:

a) May 14, 1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe
Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge
ruled that the following were elected as Directors:

Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero

Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius

Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo

Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina

Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado

Rafael R. Recto

Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right,
the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and
of the management of IPI.

b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) quowarranto proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the
SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group
claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.

c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties
with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A.
Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected
on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution,
then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before x
x x any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally,
the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited
Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not
continue his appearance for respondent Acero.

d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:

(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased

from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon
request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.

(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was
sought to be registered on said date.

(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman
Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in
the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the
matter in litigation.

e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty.
Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares.[1] It is this Order allowing
intervention that precipitated the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction.

f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Buinzen-
fabrieken Excelsior - De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and
others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero
(CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for
defendant Excelsior. In L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could
not appear as counsel in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as
in such situation the Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."

On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order

enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the
participation as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao
Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports
the stand of the latter in allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November
6, 1979, resolved to consider the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.

The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as

a then stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC Case without violating
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as amended, now reads:

"SEC. 11.

No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court
without appellate jurisdiction,

before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,

or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is

accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,

or before any administrative body.

Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract

with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation, during his term of office.

He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he

may be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis and paragraphs
supplied)

What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case,
Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly,
before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.

Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez

cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on
behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not
for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective
capable and respected counsel.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of

Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00
worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding
shares. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on May 30, 1979, after the
contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had
been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled
hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before
he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for
respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, [2] but which was objected to by
petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead,
to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And
it may be noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-
51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of
respondent Acero therein.

Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has
been an indirect "appearance as counsel before x x x an administrative body"
and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed
purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director
in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure
naiveté. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision

ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an
administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the
client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution
directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act
which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly
prohibited.[3]

In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC No.

1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article
VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of
the constitutional prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any
stockholder, or any number of stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any
controversy before the SEC relating to intra-corporate matters. A resolution of
that question is not necessary in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao

A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and
set aside. The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO AND SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD,
PETITIONERS, VS. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AND SEN.
MARCELO B. FERNAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters
falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.

Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate.
Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the
Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within
their competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp;
rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of
the law.

The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad
instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of
Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader
of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority
leader.

On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the
respondents and the solicitor general "to file COMMENT thereon within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice." On August 25, 1998, both
respondents and the solicitor general submitted their respective Comments. In
compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners
filed their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this
Court gave due course to the petition and deemed the controversy submitted
for decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.

In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent
jurisdiction[1] to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts
impels a filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals.[2] However, for special
and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in
the present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine.[3] In fact,
original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing
acts of legislative officers like the Senate President[4] and the Speaker of the
House[5] have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.

The Facts

The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña as presiding
officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh
Congress. At the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the
Senate was as follows:[6]
10 members -Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members - Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member - Liberal Party (LP)
1 member - Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member - People’s Reform Party (PRP)
1 member - Gabay Bayan
2 members - Independent
----------
23 - total number of senators[7] (The last six members are all classified by
petitioners as "independent".)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas
F. Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen.
Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam
Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2,[8] Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate.

The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and
Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator

Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the
position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator
Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen.
Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP Party -- numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was
arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with
Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session
day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt
of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,[9] stating that they
had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the
Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader
of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the
subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had
been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues

From the parties’ pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for
resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the

position of Senate minority leader?

4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing

Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
The Court’s Ruling

After a close perusal of the pleadings[10] and a careful deliberation on the

arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity
or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into
office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.

First Issue: The Court’s Jurisdiction

Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco[11] in arguing that this Court has
jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They
submit that the definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an
interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof,
stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members."

Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in

common that the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal
matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the
Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the
fundamental law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the
Senate. The legislature alone has the full discretion to provide for such office
and, in that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.

Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no
question involving an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws
or even the Rules of the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circumstances"
impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor
general adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the
petitioners’ theory that a senator who votes for the winning Senate President is
precluded from becoming the minority leader.

To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated
on the various important cases involving this very important and basic question,
which it has ruled upon in the past.

The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court’s power
of judicial review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of
a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of
Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on
the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever
the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies."[12]

In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question
of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political
controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion
for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in
the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the
resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session[13] and therein elect a
Senate President.

Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority
that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present x x x so as to establish
in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well."[14]
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:

"Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper

chamber of Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of
Representatives. It has already involved the President of the Philippines. The
situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution
cannot be expected from any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon
which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned."[15]

"x x x This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or
decide if this Court should refuse to decide them."[16]

"x x x The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered."[17]

In Tañada v. Cuenco,[18] this Court endeavored to define political question. And
we said that "it refers to ‘those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government.’ It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
[the] legality, of a particular measure."[19]

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of
these members did not depend on the Senate’s "full discretionary authority," but
was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations.[20] Thus, the Court held that
not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the
issue.

In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia,[21] Chief Justice Roberto

Concepcion wrote that the Court "had authority to and should inquire into the
existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of
the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]." This ruling was made in spite of the
previous pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker[22] and Montenegro v. Castañeda[23]
that "the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring
suspension (of the privilege x x x) belongs to the President and his ‘decision is
final and conclusive’ upon the courts and upon all other persons." But the Chief
Justice cautioned: "the function of the Court is merely to check -- not to supplant -
-- the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act."

The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary:[24]
"The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar
character are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal
bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of
separation of powers -- characteristic of the presidential system of government -
- the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into
three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the making of laws, which are
allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerning mainly with the
enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting
the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with
the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned
to courts of justice. Within its own sphere -- but only within such sphere each
department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of
authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to
any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made
by the other departments -- provided that such acts, measures or decision are
within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution."

"Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to

limitations, the issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or
conditions have been met, or the limitations respected is justiciable or non-
political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested
act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations --
particularly those prescribed by the Constitution -- would be set at naught. What
is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the
main functions of the courts of justice under the presidential form of
government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and
balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the
authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the
ineluctable obligation -- made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our
oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the
Constitution -- to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589,
18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts have a ‘duty, rather than a power,’ to
determine whether another branch of the government has ‘kept within
constitutional limits.’"
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining
the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the
political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."[25]
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute
pronouncements of the Court. Daza v. Singson,[26] Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.[27] and
Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales[28] similarly resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders
of both houses of Congress in apportioning among political parties the seats to
which each chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments. The
Court held that the issue was justiciable, "even if the question were political in
nature," since it involved "the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling
the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of]
the Constitution."

The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Tañada v. Angara,[29] wherein the
petitioners sought to nullify the Senate’s concurrence in the ratification of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute." The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking
jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political departments of
government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action,
and will strike it down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or
illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.

Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives[30] (HRET), the

Court refused to reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing
that said tribunal had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred upon the
electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications
of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive.[31] The
Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only if such
"decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion."[32]

Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia,[33] was asked to reexamine the

enrolled bill doctrine and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act
8240, was properly approved by the legislative body. Petitioners claimed that
certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the passage of the
bill. They averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated
House rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.

The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of
concerned the internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no
concern. It enucleated:[34]
"It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because
the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum
when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has
not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power
and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. x x x In
the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress
or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment
of that body."
In the instant controversy, the petitioners -- one of whom is Senator Santiago, a
well-known constitutionalist -- try to hew closely to these jurisprudential
parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has
not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also
invoke the Court’s "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.

Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has
no jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is
entitled to the relief asserted.[35] In light of the aforesaid allegations of
petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well
within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial
question: In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader,
did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the
Constitution or the laws?

Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by
majority vote of all its members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the
concepts of "majority" and "minority," as well as who may elect a minority
leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision
refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President
and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for
the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority,
to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result,
petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority
leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore,
the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader,
because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and
accepted committee chairmanships.

We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no

clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even
from practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When
referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the
number greater than half or more than half of any total."[36] The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the
Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators.
Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority,"
much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the
framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these
terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must
be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall
ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader.
Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.

The Comment[37] of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents,

which were not contested in petitioners’ Reply. During the eighth Congress,
which was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
the nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a
member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada.[38] During the ninth
regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in
1993, a consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all
senators, including those belonging to the minority.[39] This practice continued
during the tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair
a committee.[40] History would also show that the "majority" in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of
lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a
lesser number of members.

Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority."

Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number
of votes,"[41] not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as
plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller
number of votes or adherents than the majority."[42] Between two unequal parts
or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously
be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are
more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority
entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with
a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners
themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be
identified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the
general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members
either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional
or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority
leader.

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President

and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that
"[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary."[43] To
our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to
determine the rules of its proceedings."[44] Pursuant thereto, the Senate
formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs.[45] Pertinent
to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
"Rule I

ELECTIVE OFFICERS

"SECTION 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a

President, a President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.

"These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge
of their duties.
 Rule II

ELECTION OF OFFICERS

"SEC. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its
Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the same office, a
nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by
resolution."
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing
specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them
or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid
of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation
of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how
to do its work.[46] Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano,
this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them,
before the courts may intervene.[47]

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they
"are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them."[48] Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of
no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body[49] at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to
provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own
jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this
prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally
intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional
principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that
justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard
for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying
into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be
neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious
in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically

amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition
would easily fail.

While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the
practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the
legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or
its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion.[50] This is the plain
implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly
confers upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,"
but likewise "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government."

Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was
a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part:[51]
"xxx the powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy[, the] power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice.

"Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies
and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words,
the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

"This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the

courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question."
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the
actions, first, of Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of

power[52] by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto.[53] A
quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title
to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.[54] The
action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor[55] or any
person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another.[56] The action shall be brought against
the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding or
exercising such office.[57]

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must
show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise
the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent.[58] In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.

As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in

determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid
down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power
has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that
illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and exercise
of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave
abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as
minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernan’s Recognition of Guingona

The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government" is restricted only by the definition and confines of the term "grave
abuse of discretion."
"By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility."[59]
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse
his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority
parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the
members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such
by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came
only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be

accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of
the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly
shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority.

WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2821, March 04, 1949

JOSE AVELINO, PETITIONER, VS. MARIANO J. CUENCO,
RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
In G. R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices
against four resolved to deny the petition.

Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now

written briefly to explain the principal grounds for the denial.

The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:

In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada
requested that his right to speak on the floor on the next session day, February
21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be
reserved. His request was approved.

On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada
and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution
enumpvsi+inoflinrcps against, the then Senate President and

Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the

Senate session hall at the appointed time (10:00 A. M.), and the petitioner was
already in his office, said petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall
until about 11:35 A. M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not
immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy
of the resolution submitted by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence
of the public he read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called
and conferred with his colleagues Senators Francisco and Tirona.

Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad and
Cuenco that the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to
order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator
Confesor who is in the United States, all the Senators were present.

Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call
be dispensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in
pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and his partisans to make use of
dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his privilege speech.
The roll was called.

Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the
reading of the minutes, but this motion was likewise opposed by Senators
Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned
conspiracy.

Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes,
Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour
privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding, continuously ignored him;
and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada insisted on being
recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest
of any senator who would speak without being previously of his follower,
Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of
order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.

At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if
by pre-arrangement. At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one
of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for
adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned
conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tañada.

Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and
this opposition was seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion
of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued.

Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent
also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the
motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.

Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly
walked out of the session hall followed by Senators David, Tirona, Francisco,
Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the senators remained.
Whereupon Senator Melecio Arranz, Senate President Pro-Tempore, urged by
those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.

Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record—it was so made—
that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it
incumbent upon Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate. Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz then suggested
that respondent be designated to preside over the session, which suggestion was
carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the Chair.

Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved, Gregorio Abad was
appointed Acting Secretary, because the Assistant Secretary, who was then
acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the
session.

Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to
deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete
text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof
and the same was unanimously approved.

With Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the
respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No.
67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the
Senate and designating the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President
of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.

Senator Cuenco took the oath.

The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as
acting president of the Philippine Senate.

By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioner asks the Court to
declare him the rightful President of the Philippine Senate and oust respondent.

The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that
these are the crucial points:

a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subjectmatter?

b. If it has, were resolutions Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

c. Should the petition be granted?

To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of
powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46
Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1)
and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of
the electors of the suspended senators were allegedly affected without any
immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of
the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at
any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the
petition must imply to be acceptable, the majorityjrfthe Senators want petitioner
to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall—not in the Supreme
Court.

The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that
our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of
things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as a
peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should not allow ourselves to be
stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should characterize
judicial deliberations.

The precedent of Werts vs. Rogers does not apply, because among other
reasons, the situation is not where two sets of senators have constituted
themselves into two senates actually functioning as such, (as in the said Werts
case), there being no question that there is presently one Philippine Senate only. To
their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected
themselves into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent
has not been duly elected in his place in the same one Philippine Senate.

It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive

to the respondent makes it adviseable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off
policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.

The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of
the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with
twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a
quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it
useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do,
that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of
the other four on those sub-questions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the
session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and
that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other
twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous
endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved
only by ten or less.

If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly
constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution
for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo and
Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minutes say so, secondly, because at
the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from
the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of
the Senate of twenty three senators^ When the Constitution declares that a
majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean
"all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House".
(Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference
between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the
House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice
Pablo believes furthermore that even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum,
they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one
had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator
Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be
eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

In fine, all the four justices agree that the Court being confronted with the
practical situation that of the twentythree senators who may participate in the
Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators
will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino,
it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of
the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President
of that body being amendable at any time by that majority. And at any Session
hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy
arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit
of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein
involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of
a doubt.

As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the
petition. Without costs.

G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, PETITIONERS,
VS. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of

Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes” (actually specific taxes)
on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
“constitutionally mandated” so that their violation is tantamount to a violation
of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill
was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on
September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments
on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions
of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m.
on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier,
chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his
sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento
was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and
asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza)
declared the presence of a quorum.[1] Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the
Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the
sponsor thereafter proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the

order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep.
Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that
he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his
interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following
transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of
Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December
5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the
conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to
know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority
Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one
minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o’clock, Wednesday,
next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four
o’clock, Wednesday, next week.

(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the
House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,
1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript
of this portion of Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound
recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C.
Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of
the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified
by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also
obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m.
to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman;
and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four
versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word
“approved,” which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be
heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the word “no” on
line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times;
and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence “(Y)ou better
prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum,” which
appears in the other versions.

Petitioners’ allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is

no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to
expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the
correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree
that for purposes of this proceeding the word “approved” appears in the
transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference

committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners’ principal
argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the “constitutional
mandate” in Art. VI, §16(3) that “each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings” and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation
of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De
Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35 and
Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House,[2] the Chair, in submitting the
conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but
simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo
from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX,
§112,[3] the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo’s question, “What is that . . .
Mr. Speaker?” and did not repeat Rep. Albano’s motion to approve or ratify; (3)
in violation of Rule XVI, §97,[4] the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and
instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano’s motion and afterward declared the
report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123,
and Rule XVIII, §109,[5] the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on
Rep. Arroyo’s question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged
motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo’s query should have been resolved upon
the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary
situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the
session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent
petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and
asking for a reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker
of the House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Court’s
power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the
other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[6] which affirmed the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.

The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition,

respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents’ defense is
anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine.
They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the
rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the
enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for
the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the
rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement
constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate
days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in
passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as
parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere
motion, were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his

certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the
journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed,
Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of
November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that “On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being
no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House
Bill No. 7198.”[7] This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone
objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.[8]

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A.
No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was
no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules
of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum.

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that “each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings”[9] and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin
with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases,[10] the
constitutional provision that “each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings” was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to
support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free
from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite
purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to
the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House
of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun,[11] it was held: “At any rate, courts have
declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has
been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by
the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’”

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[12] the rule was stated thus: “The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.
But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination
of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge
of any other body or tribunal.”

In Crawford v. Gilchrist,[13] it was held: “The provision that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a
mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in
ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and
when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends
to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the
body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any
business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the
Constitution.”

In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,[14] the Supreme Court of
Ohio stated: “The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution
and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having
made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-
matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of
many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act
will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules.”

In State v. Savings Bank,[15] the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

declared itself as follows: “The Constitution declares that each house shall
determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary
for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of
proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This
authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly
within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of
the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because
it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of
procedure.”
In McDonald v. State,[16] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: “When it appears
that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the
two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their
procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The
presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever
declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of
procedure made by itself, or the respective branches thereof, and which it or
they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we
decline to follow them.”

Schweizer v. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893

Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill
may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of
an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the
operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of
a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute
was not properly passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on
three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote.
Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a
bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it
sees fit, either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or
without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a
statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon
proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it
exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh
and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might
be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone,
even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had
made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the court’s refusing
its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the
legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of
the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made
by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W.
185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E.
641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have
the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other
than members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily
judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private
rights are involved.[18]
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government
has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the
delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the
working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels
reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the
rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our
power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion’s

sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII,
§1, “nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the
government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial
review.”[19] Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and
controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a
justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions
such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1
has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the
political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security,[20] it
has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise
in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1,
this Court’s function

is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise
its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent
error.[21]

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by
itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch
of the government has “gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction”
so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.

Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was
“railroaded.” They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair
when the latter declared Rep. Albano’s motion approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none,
approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo
was asking, “What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to
the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report
had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the
gavel.

Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano’s
motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been
stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have
been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislator’s nightmare
because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report.

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically

requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee
report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal
voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner
in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by
no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the
conference committee report on the bills which became the Local Government
Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending the
Tariff and Customs Code were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House.
The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer
became the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a
precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in
this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate,
then the voting comes in.

....

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I
wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. I should just like to state
that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The
Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement,
and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair
announces the vote by saying “Is there any objection?” and nobody objects,
then the Chair announces “The bill is approved on second reading.” If there
was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So,
if that motion is not presented, we assume that the House approves the
measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants
a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce
how many are in favor and how many are against.[22]
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would
be better, more accurate and even more just.[23] The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration.[24] In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, “this
Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to
individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a
whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to
manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the
problem.”[25]

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be
taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances:
upon the last and third readings of a bill,[26] at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present,[27] and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.[28]
Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of
the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer
tedium to repeat the process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration

allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment
of the session.[29] It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to
allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on
that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the
Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the
following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything
he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of
November 21, 1996 of the House shows:

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the
session adjourned until four o’clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November
27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its
approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners’ predicament was largely of their own making.
Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners
insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo’s question as an obstacle to the passage
of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo’s question was not, in form or substance, a point of
order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep.
Arroyo’s question were so, Rep. Albano’s motion to adjourn would have
precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration of the
question.[31]

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in
signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House
be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase “grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” has a settled meaning in
the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount
to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this
provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1 extends to cases
where “a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.”[32]

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the

House with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is
not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly — especially when the quorum is obviously present — for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.[33] Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in
effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.[34]

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found
to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case,
are questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to
have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John
Henry Osmeña did not participate in the bicameral conference committee
proceedings.[35] Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report[36] but not
to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been
conducted, Rep. Tañada would have voted in favor of the conference
committee report.[37]

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by
the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted
in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing
this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the
EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies
a conclusive presumption. In one case[38] we “went behind” an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had
been approved by the Senate.

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect
the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been
duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the
three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution
had not been obtained, because “a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts.”[39] This Court quoted from
Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-
fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check
at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the
Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher
Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful
Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by
asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect
credit upon the name of popular government.[40]
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to
the President contained provisions which had been “surreptitiously” inserted in
the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills
have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee “surreptitiously” inserted provisions into a bill which it
had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of
the bill. To disregard the “enrolled bill” rule in such cases would be to disregard
the respect due the other two departments of our government.[41]
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, §26(2) of the Constitution that “upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed.” [42]

In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was
otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited

with approval by text writers here and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on
the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having
the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.[45]
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive
teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the

rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three
new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the
enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and
Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT
cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco,
Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking
on the change in the membership of the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is

confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that
the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240,
was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the
Constitution. Art. VI, §16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national
security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth
of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required
by the Constitution to be recorded therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded
conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as “public memorials of
the most permanent character,” thus: “They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired
today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed
tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the
memory of individuals.” As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240
is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department

for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court
thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not
been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power
and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The
suggestion made in a case[48] may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners
can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No.
8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct
was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the
judgment of that body.[49]

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, AND
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 179275

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA AND OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI,

PETITIONERS, VS.THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, RESPONDENT.

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,

RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A.
JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, AND ANTONIO F. TRILLANES,
RESPONDENTS-INTERVENORS.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped

conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-
ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They
captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a
controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line,
and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the
President's instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.[1]

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor

Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes,"
and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the
Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense
and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several
versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia
and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the
respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the
supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned
debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the
recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.[2]

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the

hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports
based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.[3]

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano)

filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction[4] docketed
as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be
restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained"
wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose.
He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be
ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House
Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the
House proceedings.[5]
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the
"Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the
slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought
Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the
whole unvarnished truth -- the what's, when's, where's, who's and why's" of the
alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.

On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson's speech was referred

to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator
Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills[6] seeking to regulate the sale,
purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.[7]

In the Senate's plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when
Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200[8] if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry
on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the
Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of
the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a
legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP
(ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the
alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.[9]

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili,

retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[10] docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking
to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued
in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.[11]

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its
public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,[12] 17[13] and
October 1,[14] 2007.
Intervening as respondents,[15] Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno
Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda,
M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment[16] on
the petition on September 25, 2007.

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.[17]

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one
of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its
hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.[18]

On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338
and 179275.[19]

It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings,
they have different objectives--the first is poised at preventing the playing of the
tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and
the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the
wiretapped conversation.

The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second,
G.R. No. 179275.

-I-

Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue
on the parties' standing, argued at length in their pleadings.

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,[20] we explained that "`[l]egal standing' or locus standi

refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act
x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.[21]
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."[22]

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the

Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo[23] articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing
ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and
rulings."[24] The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales[25] even permitted a non-member
of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the
National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case,
echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently
refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and
resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in
keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine
whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them."[26]

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the
petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes.
Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings.[27] Obviously, therefore,
petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees'
actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to
institute the petition for prohibition.

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by
alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP.
They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes
will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of
public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings.
They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights,
and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct
of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.[28]
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he
is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of
his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation
which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing
the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of
the questioned hearings.[29]

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of
the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due
process,[30] they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.

Following the Court's ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,[31] we

find sufficient petitioners Ranada's and Agcaoili's and intervenor Sagge's
allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned
legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.[32] It
should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as
in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights--as
taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and
members of the bar and of the legal profession--which were also supposedly
violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.[33]

Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the
petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not
only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for
the guidance of all.[34]

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has
shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court
recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor
Sagge.
 - II -

The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic.
Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by
this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of
actual cases and controversies.[35] By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for
otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The
power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.[36] Neither will the Court
determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted.
A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.[37] It is unnecessary to
indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, cannot be enforced.[38]

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as

aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent
House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the
same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken
off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the
recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members.[39] There
is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello
Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the
respondent committees.[40] Having been overtaken by these events, the
Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all,
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be
done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.[41]
- III -

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate
cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.[42] Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.[43] What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the
Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following
the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."[44]

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995
and in 2006.[45] With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,[46] we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees
likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the
inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We
quote the OSG's explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.
Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senate's membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of
each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit.
Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid
of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally
infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces
this ruling with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing
legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom
are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of
twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of
Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the
1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do
business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under
the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the
Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of
Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of
twelve Senators.[47]
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution[48] (On the Motion
for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a
clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
"continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or
change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-
to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently
of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms
this when it states:

RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the
next session in the same status.

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration
of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present
for the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e.,
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular
Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and
it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering
that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts
and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a
continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending
matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but
will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the

opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules
of the Senate (i.e. the Senate's main rules of procedure) states:

RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the
preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse
the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be

presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority
of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.

RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall
remain in force until they are amended or repealed.

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the
amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the
newly elected Senators shall begin their term.

However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are
intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply
state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view
of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next
Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for
its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules
for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published
rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or
until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries
to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same
language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senate's internet web page.[49]

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senate's defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that
the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether
or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by
the Senate.

Justice Carpio's response to the same argument raised by the respondents is

illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the
rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person's liberty at risk. A person
who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,[50]
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their
claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A.
8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.[51] In
other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their
being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.[52]
It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not,
in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008
issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the
recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be
prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules
governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the
other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the

petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued
enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its
committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the
"Hello Garci" tapes.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009
SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (RET.) AND MARIA FE
C. DELA PAZ, PETITIONERS, VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND THE SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS JOSE BALAJADIA,
JR.,RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court filed on October 28, 2008 by petitioners-spouses General (Ret.) Eliseo D.
dela Paz (Gen. Dela Paz) and Mrs. Maria Fe C. dela Paz (Mrs. Dela Paz)
assailing, allegedly for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the orders of respondent Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (respondent Committee), through its Chairperson,
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Senator Santiago), (1) denying petitioners'
Challenge to Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoenae and (2)
commanding respondent Senate Sergeant-at-Arms Jose Balajadia, Jr. (Balajadia)
to immediately arrest petitioners during the Senate committee hearing last
October 23, 2008. The petition thus prays that respondent Committee be
enjoined from conducting its hearings involving petitioners, and to enjoin
Balajadia from implementing the verbal arrest order against them.

The antecedents are as follow -

On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine

National Police (PNP) officers arrived in Moscow, Russia to attend the 77th
General Assembly Session of the International Criminal Police Organization
(ICPO)-INTERPOL in St. Petersburg from October 6-10, 2008. With the
delegation was Gen. Dela Paz, then comptroller and special disbursing officer of
the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however, was to retire from the PNP on October 9,
2008.

On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities
at the Moscow airport departure area for failure to declare in written form the
105,000 euros [approximately P6,930,000.00] found in his luggage. In addition,
he was also found to have in his possession 45,000 euros (roughly equivalent to
P2,970,000.00).

Petitioners were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen.
Dela Paz and the PNP delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but
the Russian government confiscated the euros.

On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs.
Dela Paz. Awaiting them were subpoenae earlier issued by respondent
Committee for the investigation it was to conduct on the Moscow incident on
October 23, 2008.

On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of
attending the hearing, petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading
denominated Challenge to Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoena.[2] Senator
Santiago emphatically defended respondent Committee's jurisdiction and
commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners argue that respondent Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to

investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state
relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that respondent Committee
violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest without the
required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee.
They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not
published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis
of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident.

Respondent Committee filed its Comment[3] on January 22, 2009.

The petition must inevitably fail.

First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:

"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."

This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary
authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and
promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally
exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of
due process.[4]

The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into
a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the
nature of a political question that, in Tañada v. Cuenco,[5] was characterized as a
question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further,
pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to
determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at
any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and
publication.

Thus, it is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy,
an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate's action.

Second. Even if it is within our power to inquire into the validity of the exercise
of jurisdiction over the petitioners by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
we are convinced that respondent Committee has acted within the proper
sphere of its authority.

Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides:

12) Committee on Foreign Relations. - Fifteen (15) members. All matters relating to
the relations of the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and
consular services; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the United
Nations Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all
international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.
A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation of
the Moscow incident involving petitioners is well within the respondent
Committee's jurisdiction.
The Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations between the
Philippines and Russia. Gen. Dela Paz went to Moscow in an official capacity, as
a member of the Philippine delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in St.
Petersburg, carrying a huge amount of "public" money ostensibly to cover the
expenses to be incurred by the delegation. For his failure to comply with
immigration and currency laws, the Russian government confiscated the money
in his possession and detained him and other members of the delegation in
Moscow.

Furthermore, the matter affects Philippine international obligations. We take

judicial notice of the fact that the Philippines is a state-party to the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime. The two conventions contain
provisions dealing with the movement of considerable foreign

currency across borders.[6] The Moscow incident would reflect on our country's
compliance with the obligations required of state-parties under these
conventions. Thus, the respondent Committee can properly inquire into this
matter, particularly as to the source and purpose of the funds discovered in
Moscow as this would involve the Philippines' commitments under these
conventions.

Third. The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be
jointly conducted by the respondent Committee and the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee).

Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue
Ribbon Committee may conduct investigations on all matters relating to
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office by officers and employees
of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and instrumentalities,
and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its
attention by any of its members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon
Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP general and member of
the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in Russia, who had
with him millions which may have been sourced from public funds.

Fourth. Subsequent to Senator Santiago's verbal command to Balajadia to arrest

petitioners, the Philippine Senate issued a formal written Order[7] of arrest,
signed by ten (10) senators, with the Senate President himself approving it, in
accordance with the Senate Rules.

Fifth. The Philippine Senate has already published its Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in two newspapers of general
circulation.[8]

Sixth. The arrest order issued against the petitioners has been rendered
ineffectual. In the legislative inquiry held on November 15, 2008, jointly by the
respondent Committee and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Gen. Dela Paz
voluntarily appeared and answered the questions propounded by the Committee
members. Having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Senate
Committees, there was no longer any necessity to implement the order of arrest.
Furthermore, in the same hearing, Senator Santiago granted the motion of Gen.
Dela Paz to dispense with the presence of Mrs. Dela Paz for humanitarian
considerations.[9] Consequently, the order for her arrest was effectively
withdrawn.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being
moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187714, March 08, 2011

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO,
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, AND ALAN PETER S.
CAYETANO, PETITIONERS, VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for prohibition[1] with prayer for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order filed by Senators
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel), Manuel B. Villar (Senator Villar),
Joker P. Arroyo, Francis N. Pangilinan, Pia S. Cayetano, and Alan Peter S.
Cayetano (petitioners). Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the
Whole (respondent) from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by
Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal) against Senator
Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the
alleged double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in
the 2008 General Appropriations Act.

The Antecedents

On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a

privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"[2] In his privilege speech,
Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008
General Appropriations Act, particularly the P200 million appropriated for the
construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat
Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City including Right-of-Way
(ROW), and another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road
including ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C-5 is what was formerly called
President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation covers the
same stretch - from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City.
Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the
double entry and was informed that it was on account of a congressional
insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail
leading to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President.

On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706,[3] the full
text of which reads:

WHEREAS the Senate President has repeatedly and publicly "advocated" (sic)
the construction of the C-5 Road/Pres. C.P. Garcia Avenue Extension linking
Sucat Road in Parañaque City to the South Luzon Expressway;

WHEREAS it was discovered that there was a double insertion of P200 million
for the C-5 Road Extension project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act;

WHEREAS Committee on Finance Chair Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile confirmed

that the double insertion for the C-5 Road Extension Project was made by the
Senate President;

WHEREAS this double insertion is only the tip of the iceberg;

WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President,

from the time he was member of the House of Representatives, used his
influence on the executive to cause the realignment of the C-5 Road Extension
project to ensure that his properties in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City
and Barangays Pulang Lupa and Mayuno Uno, Las Piñas would be financially
benefited by the construction of the new road;

WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President,

through his corporations, negotiated the sale of his properties as roads right of
way to the government, the same properties affected by the projects he
proposed;

WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President

caused the sale of his landholdings to government as a grossly overpriced cost
prejudicial to other lot owners in the area, the government, and the Filipino
people;

WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President,

in the overpriced sale of another property, used his power and influence to
extort from the original landowner the profit made from the overprice by the
Villar owned corporations;

WHEREAS these acts of the Senate President are in direct violation of the
Constitution, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards of Public Officers;

WHEREAS the Senate President has violated the public trust of the people in
order to serve his personal interests thereby sacrificing the people's welfare;

WHEREAS the illegal and unethical conduct of the Senate President has
betrayed the trust of the people, and by doing so has shamed the Philippine
Senate;
WHEREAS it is incumbent upon the members of the Senate now to reclaim the
people's trust and confidence and show that the illegal conduct of any of its
member, even of its leaders, shall not go unpunished;

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, TO

DIRECT THE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PRIVILEGES TO
INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR. FOR USING HIS POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C-5 ROAD EXTENSION
PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND
TO NEGOTIATE THE OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD RIGHTS
OF WAY THRU SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED BY HIS
CORPORATIONS REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL FINANCIAL
BENEFITS FOR HIM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A BLATANT CONFLICT OF
INTEREST.

Adopted,

(Sgd.)
M.A. MADRIGAL[4]

On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics and
Privileges (Ethics Committee) which at that time was composed of the
following members:

Sen. Pia S. Cayetano - Chairperson

Sen. Loren Legarda - Member in lieu of Sen. Madrigal
Sen. Joker Arroyo - Member
Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano- Member
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago- Member
Sen. Gregorio Honasan - Member
Sen. Panfilo Lacson - Inhibited and replaced by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon

On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected
Senate President. The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of
Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio
Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the Majority. On 16
December 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to
name their representatives to the Ethics Committee.[5] After consultation with
the members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there
would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee.[6] On 26
January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate
their representatives to the Ethics Committee.[7] Senator Pimentel stated that it
is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics
Committee, but he promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minority's
decision on the matter is final.[8] Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the
Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules) which was
published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.[9]

On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech[10] where he stated

that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before
the Ethics Committee. On 27 April 2009, Senator Lacson delivered another
privilege speech[11] where he stated that the Ethics Committee was not a
kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee
could not act with fairness on Senator Villar's case, Senator Lacson moved that
the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting
as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with ten members
voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.[12]

Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May

2009, with eleven Senators present, and on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators
present. On both hearings, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules
of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. In particular,
petitioners questioned the determination of the quorum. On 11 May 2009,
petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that
would constitute the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which
three amendments were adopted. On 14 May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as
an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the
Preliminary Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706. On 18 May 2009, the Chairman
submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a directive to all Senators to
come up with a decision on the preliminary report on 21 May 2009. On 21 May
2009, respondent declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with
the adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference was set on 26 May 2009.
Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following grounds:

1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar's
constitutional right to equal protection;

2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the
investigation of the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is
violative of Senator Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum
requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and

3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process clause
of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision [which] require[s] its
effectivity upon publication.[13]

In its Comment, respondent argues that:

1. The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an

indispensable party. In the alternative, the instant petition should be archived
until such time that the said indispensable party has been joined or impleaded
and afforded the opportunity to be heard;

2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee;

3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee of the Whole;

4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;

5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners failed
to observe the doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort;

6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly

behavior;

7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political

question which exclusively pertains to Congress;

8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion; [and]

9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and
adopted[,] allow the adoption of supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory
hearings.[14]

The Issues

The issues for the Court's resolution are the following:

1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is
an indispensable party in this petition;

2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction or prior resort;

3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar's
right to equal protection;

4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villar's right to due
process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of
the Constitution; and

5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is

required for their effectivity.

The Ruling of this Court

Indispensable Party
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 7 - Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without

whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs
or defendants.

The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows:

An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or

subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the
subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a
final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that
an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a
determination between the parties already before the court which is effective,
complete or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be
included in an action before it may properly go forward.

A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the

controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties,
so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which
does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable
party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief between him and
those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter
of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an
indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.[15]

In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before
the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this
case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of
jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole
which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal's interest. The nature
of Senator Madrigal's interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could
not be resolved without her participation.
 Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "simply calls for the
determination of administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact,
by administrative agencies rather than by courts of justice."[16] Citing Pimentel v.
HRET,[17] respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have
been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the separation of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches of the government.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has
ruled:

x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a

particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character.
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first
be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court.
x x x[18]

The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here
are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of
the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.[19]

As regards respondent's invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates

that "the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative,
executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental
power assigned to it by the sovereign people."[20] Thus, it has been held that "the
power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this
Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of
that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of
separation of powers."[21] The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving
the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of
separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
 Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee
to the Senate Committee on the Whole

Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar to the
Senate Committee of the Whole violates his constitutional right to equal
protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the Whole was
constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint
against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory
and removed Senator Villar's recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics
Committee to the Senate as a body.

We do not agree with petitioners.

Reviewing the events that led to the constitution of the Senate Committee of
the Whole, the Court notes that upon the election of Senator Enrile as Senate
President on 17 November 2008, the Ethics Committee was also reorganized.
Senator Lacson, who first called the Senate's attention to the alleged
irregularities committed by Senator Villar, was elected as Chairperson. On 16
December 2008, when Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready
to name their representatives to the Ethics Committee, Senator Pimentel
informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the
Ethics Committee. On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to
the Minority to nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee. Senator
Pimentel informed him that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any
of their members to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel promised to
convene a caucus to determine if the Minority's decision on the matter is final
but the records did not show that a caucus was convened.

On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated

that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before
the Ethics Committee. It was because of the accusation that the Ethics
Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar's case that Senator
Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by
the Senate acting as a Committee of the Whole, which motion was approved
with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.

The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating to the
conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate
and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate
Committee on Ethics and Privileges."[22] However, in this case, the refusal of the
Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation.
In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members' alleged
irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee,
the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they
refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator
Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would
answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics
Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the
Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics
Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate.

Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee

by the Senate Committee of the Whole

Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the
Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar's right to due
process.

We do not agree.

Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral
of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the
Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villar's right to
due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the
Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar's
right to due process.

The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of

proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. Thus:

First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House
shall determine the rules of its proceedings."

This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary

authority to the House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and
promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally
exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of
due process.

x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the
Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his constitutional
grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is
at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to
the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.[23]

The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the
observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these
requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of
Congress to amend its own rules.

Prior Publication

Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of

the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the
Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics
Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.
Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the
Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole.

In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,[24] the

Court declared void unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries insofar
as such rules affect the rights of witnesses. The Court cited Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution which mandates:

Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court explained in the Resolution[25] denying the motion for

reconsideration:
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules of
its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules
clearly state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent Congresses or
until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries
to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same
language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders
issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void.
Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be
considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the
publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as expressed in
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and
proceedings are considered valid and effective.[26] (Emphasis supplied)

In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et

al.,[27] the Court further clarified:

x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the

Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical
directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in
Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling
on the 1987 Constitution's directive, without any reliance on or reference to the
1986 case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Tañada naturally could neither have interpreted a
forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitution's
intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a
general sense of making known the issuances.[28]

The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House
or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members
are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless
such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take
effect.
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect
only members of the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senate's exercise
of its disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81,
Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides:

Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.[29]

Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect.
Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of
the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules
expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the Senate
approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication
requirement which they adopted should be considered as the will of the
majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement just
because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published in the
Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
expressly require publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with
due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the
rights of its own members are affected.

Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate

Committee of the Whole[30] is an exact reproduction of Section 4, Rule 1 of the
Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges[31] which states that the
Ethics Committee shall be composed of seven members, contrary to the fact
that the Senate Committee of the Whole consists of all members of the Senate.
In addition, Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole[32] is an exact reproduction of Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the
Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges[33] which states that only two
members of the Ethics Committee shall constitute a quorum, contrary to
respondent's allegation in its Comment that eight members of the Senate
Committee of the Whole shall constitute a quorum.[34]

However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority

of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution.[35] Otherwise, there will be a
circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum
requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which
the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict
between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution,
the latter will of course prevail.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the

complaint by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee
of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 22041, September 11, 1924

JOSE ALEJANDRINO, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL L. QUEZON ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J.:

The petitioner in this original proceeding in mandamus and injunction is Jose

Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor-General to represent the
Twelfth Senatorial District. The respondents are Manuel L. Quezon, President
of the Philippine Senate; Isabelo de los Reyes, Santiago Fonacier, Alejo
Mabanag, Bernabe de Guzman, Ramon Fernandez, Emiliano T. Tirona, Antero
Soriano, Juan B. Alegre, Vicente de Vera, Jose Ma. Arroyo, Francisco Enage,
Tomas Gomez, Sergio Osmeiia, Celestino Rodriguez, Francisco Soriano, Jose A.
Clarin, Hadji Butu, Espiridion Guanco, Hermenegildo Villanueva, Jose
Hontiveros, Teodoro Sandiko, and Santiago Lucero, all members of the
Philippine Senate; Faustino Aguilar, Secretary of the Philippine Senate; Bernabe
Bustamante, Sergeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate, and Francisco Dayaw,
Paymaster of the Philippine Senate.

The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the
respondent Senators, on February 5, 1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all
the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one
year from the first of January, 1924. The resolution reads as follows:

"Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District,
be, as he is. hereby, declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation
of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable
Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of certain
phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the
credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino;

"Resolved, further: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino be, as he is hereby,

deprived of all of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments as such Senator,
during one year from the first of January, nineteen hundred and twentyfour;

"And resolved, lastly: That the said Honorable Jose Alejandrino, being a Senator
appointed by the GovernorGeneral of these Islands, a copy of this resolution be
furnished said Governor-General for his information." The burden of
petitioner's complaint is that the resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and
entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court: (1) To issue a
preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing
the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void;
and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and
injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the
petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoy all of his
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing
the petitioner from exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the
order of suspension into effect. By special appearance, the Attorney-General, in
representation of the respondents, has objected to the jurisdiction of the court,
and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same point.

In order that an obvious angle to the case may not subsequently embarrass us,
we desire first of all to say that looking through the form of the action to the
substance, this is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the Philippine
Senate against the Philippine Senate and certain of its official employees. May
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands by mandamus and injunction annul
the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to
reinstate him in his official position? Without, therefore, at this time discussing
any of the other interesting questions which have been raised and argued, fr
proceed at once to resolve the issue here suggested.
There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the Government
of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to students of public law. It is here
only necessary to recall that under our system of government, each of the three
departments is distinct and not directly subject to the control of another
department. The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to
abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly
restrain the others.

It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the
Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a
department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of
legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To
this extent, do the courts restrain the other departments.

With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised to find the
general rule of mandamus to be, that the writ will not lie from one branch of the
government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is
inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative
in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over
which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this
respect without a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that where a
member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power,
irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
compel his reinstatement. (Code of Civil Procedure, sees. 222, 515; 18 R. C. L.,
186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 190; French vs. Senate [1905], 146
Cal., 604; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass., 468; Ex parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala.,
698; State vs. Bolte [1889], 151 Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of Delegates
[1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17
Colo., 156; State ex rel. Cranmer vs. Thorson [1896], 33 L. R. A., 582; People ex
rel. Billings vs. Bissell [1857], 19 111., 229; People ex rel. Bruce vs. Dunne [1913],
258 111., 441; People ex rel. La Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs.
Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612.)

The authorities which support the doctrines above announced are numerous
and instructive. They are found among the decisions of our own court, of the
United States Supreme Court, and of other jurisdictions. If some of these cases
relate to the chief executive rather than to the legislature, it is only necessary to
explain that the same rules which govern the relations of the courts to the chief
executive likewise govern the relations of the courts to the legislature.

The controlling case in this jurisdiction on the subject is Severino vs. Governor-
General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros ([1910], 16 Phil., 366). This
was an original application made in this court praying for a writ of mandamus to
the Governor-General to compel him to call a special election as provided by
law. The AttorneyGeneral demurred to the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and the court, after an elaborate discussion, reached the conclusion
that "we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these
Islands, as the head of the executive department, in the performance of any of
his official acts." The demurrer was accordingly sustained and the complaint
dismissed. It is noted that in this decision reliance was placed on the cases of
Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord ([1867], 4 Wall., 475, and Sutherland vs.
Governor ([1874], 29 Mich., 320), whichwe will now proceed to notice.

State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, supra,
concerned a bill praying the United States Supreme Court to enjoin and restrain
Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General
Commanding in the District of Mississippi and Arkansas from executing certain
Acts of Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivering the opinion of the court
said the single point which required consideration was this: Can the President be
restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged to
be unconstitutional? He continued:

"The Congress is the Legislative Department of the Government; the President

is the Executive Department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the Judicial
Department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its
cognizance.

"The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon consideration of its possible
consequences.

"Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the President refuse obedience,
it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other
hand, the President complies, with the order of the court and refuses to execute the Acts of
Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur between the Executive and Legislative
Departments of the Government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the
President for such refusal? And in that case could this court interfere in behalf
of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain
by injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of
impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public wonder of
an attempt by this court to arrest proceedings, in that court?

"These questions answer themselves.

*******

"We are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to
be received by us.

"It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if the relief sought
cannot be had against Andrew Johnson, as President, it may be granted against
Andrew Johnson as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is plain that relief as against
the execution of an Act of Congress by Andrew Johnson, is relief against its
execution by the President. * * *"

Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan, supra, well known to the legal fraternity on
account of being written by Judge Cooley, related to an application for
mandamus to the Governor to compel him to perform a duty imposed upon
him by statute. Judge Cooley; in part, said:

"* * * Our government is one whose powers have been carefully apportioned
between three distinct departments, which emanate alike from the people, have
their powers alike limited and defined by the constitution, are of equal dignity,
and within their respective spheres of action equally independent.

*******

"It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all respects
independently of the others, and that what are called the checks and balances of
government constitute each a restraint upon the rest. * * * But in each of these
cases the action of the department which controls, modifies, or in any manner
influences that of another, is had strictly within its own sphere, and for that
reason gives no occasion for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The Legislature in
prescribing rules for the courts, is acting within its proper province in making
laws, while the courts, in declining to enforce an unconstitutional law, are in like
manner acting within their proper province, because they are only applying that
which is law to the controversies in which they are called upon to give
judgment. It is mainly by means of these checks and balances that the officers of
the several departments are kept within their jurisdiction, and if they are
disregarded in any case, and power is usurped or abused, the remedy is by
impeachment, and not by another department of the government attempting to
correct the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the
constitution is its equal.

"It has long been a maxim in this country that the Legislature cannot dictate to
the courts what their judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such judgments
after they have been rendered. If it could, constitutional liberty would cease to
exist; and if the Legislature could in like manner override executive action also,
the government ^would become only a despotism under popular forms. On the
other hand it would be readily conceded that no court can compel the Legislature to make or
to refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any
action whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the
laws. In these cases the exemption of the one department from the control of
the other is not only implied in the framework of government, but is
indispensably necessary if any useful apportionment of power is to exist.

*******

"It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the relators that any other
course than that which leaves the head of the executive department to act
independently in the discharge of his duties might possibly lead to unseemly
conflicts, if not to something worse, should the courts undertake to enforce
their mandates and the executive refuse to obey. * * * And while we should
concede, if jurisdiction was plainly vested in us, the inability to enforce our
judgment would be no sufficient reason for failing to pronounce it, especially
against an officer who would be presumed ready and anxious in all cases to
render obedience to the law, yet in a case where jurisdiction is involved in doubt
it is not consistent with.the dignity of the court to pronounce judgments which
may be disregarded with impunity, nor with that of the executive to place him in
position where, in a matter within his own province, he must act contrary to his
judgment, or stand convicted of a disregard of the laws."

We only take space to notice one more case, which concerns specifically the
right of the judiciary to control by mandamus the action of the legislature.
French vs. Senate of the State of California, supra, was an original proceeding in
mandamus brought by the petitioners who were duly elected senators of the
state to compel the Senate of California to admit them as members thereof. It
was alleged that the petitioners had been expelled without hearing or
opportunity for defense. The writ was denied, Mr. Justice Shaw delivering the
opinion of the court, saying:

"Even if we should give these allegations their fullest force in favor of the
pleader, they do not make a case justifying the interposition of this court. Under
our form of government the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary
and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of
the power committed exclusively to that department by the constitution. * * *"

There can be noted as specific corroborative authority, State vs. Bolte, supra,
Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Mellon,
Secretary of the Treasury ([1923], 262 U. S., 447), the latest expression of
opinion by the United States Supreme Court. The record discloses that it was
the firm opinion of our late Chief Justice that the court should not assume
jurisdiction of the proceedings.

So as to be perfectly fair to the petitioner, it is but proper to state that the

principles laid down in some of the preceding authorities have been the subject
of adverse criticism. It is said that the fallacy of the argument lies in the
statement that the three departments of the government are independent of
each other. "They are independent in so far as they proceed within their
legitimate province and perform the duties that the law requires; yet it has never
been held that the executive was the sole judge of what duties the law imposes
upon him, or the manner in which duties shall be exercised. The final arbiter in
cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive
department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary.
* * * It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is
directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of
issuing a mandamus is to be determined." (2 Bailey on Mandamus, pp. 926-927.)
But these were arguments which should have been presented years ago in this
court, and which when recently presented by counsel in his argument for the
petitioner in the case of Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No. 20867,[1] met with no
favorable response from the court. It is now too late to go back and revise
previous decisions and overturn them; in fact this would be not only
impracticable but impossible since at least two decisions of the United States
Supreme Court seem to us to be controlling.

No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold that it
possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature or a branch
thereof to take any particular action. If a court should ever be so rash as to thus
trench on the domain of either of the other departments, it will be the end of
popular government as we know it in democracies.

It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference to the
right of the Supreme Court to issue mandamus directed to the Philippine
Senate, yet we would be justified in having our mandate run not against the
Philippine Senate or against the President of the Philippine Senate and his
fellow Senators but against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the
disbursing officer of the Senate. But this begs the question. If we have no
authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have no authority to control the
actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senai^e. The
secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents
of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the
Court do as requested, we might have the spectacle presented of the court
ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the
Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to
do another thing. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly
appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute
it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95 Mich., 314; Abueva vs. Wood, supra.)

The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing difficulty. On the

one hand, no consideration of policy or convenience should induce this court to
exercise a power that does not belong to it. On the other hand, no consideration
of policy or convenience should induce this court to surrender a power which it
is its duty to exercise. But certainly mandamus should never issue from this
court where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should not be
awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should not be awarded
where mischievous consequences are likely to follow. Judgment should not be
pronounced which might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts or which might be
disregarded with impunity. This court should offer no means by a decision for
any possible collision between it as the highest court in the Philippines and the
Philippine Senate as a branch of a coordinate department, or between the Court
and the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive and the Legislature.

On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act
authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two
senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the
Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until
removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, sees. 16, 17.) They may not
be removed By the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the
House of Repesentatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel
an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an
appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an
appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is
then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of
the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power
granted to the GovernorGeneral by the Constitution, it would appear that
neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from
the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to
suspend an appointive member of the Legislature.

It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not in all its long
history suspended a member. And the reason is obvious. Punishment by way of
reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without
depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible,
likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the
constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without that district being afforded any means by
which to fill the vacancy. JBy suspension, the seat remains filled but the
occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion
or removal.

It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine

Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed by the
Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the Organic Law. This was, in
effect, our holding in the comparatively recent case of Concepcion vs. Paredes
([1921], 42 Phil., 599), when we had under particular consideration a legislative
attempt to deprive the Chief Executive of his constitutional power of
appointment. What was there announced is equally applicable to the instant
proceedings.

While what has just been said may be unnecessary for a correct decision, it is
inserted so that the vital question argued with so much ability may not pass
entirely unnoticed, and so that there may be at least an indication of the attitude
of the court as a restraining force, with respect to the checks and balances of
government. The Supreme Court, out of respect for the Upper House of a
coordinate branch of the government, takes no affirmative action. But the
perfection of the entire system suggests the thought that no action should be
taken elsewhere which would constitute, or even seem to constitute, disregard
for the Constitution.

Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for
disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member
from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well
stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet
the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme
Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate
take any particular action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner
without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all
wisdom and all power. It would hardly be becoming for the judiciary to assume
the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight,
who passes down the halls of legislation and of administration giving heed to
those who have grievances against the Legislature and the Chief Executive.

We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be
directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial
process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the
demurrer must be sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended
to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the
judgment of the court. So ordered.
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SALIPADA K.
PENDATUN,LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO
TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOSE J. ROX, FAUSTO DUGENIO,
ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE
ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B.
FERNANDEZ, AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS
 MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE CREATED BY HOUSE
RESOLUTION NO. 59, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a
verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen
other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such
Resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; he
also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined
from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them
to require him to substantiate his charges against the President, with the
admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House,
should not punish him.

The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent
portions of which read as follows:

"Whereas, on the 23rd day of June, 1960, the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,
Member of the House of Representatives from the Second District of "the
province of Cebu, took the floor of this Chamber on the one hour privilege to
deliver a speech, entitled A Message to Garcia;'

Whereas, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second
District of Cebu stated the following:

*******

"The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your
unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government
are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and
that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can
always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a
handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on
the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. * * *."
Whereas, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if
made maliciously or recklessly and without.basis in truth and in fact, would
constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of the
President, which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino
people, and would expose said office to contempt and disrepute; * * *

Resolved by the House of Representatives, that a special committee of fifteen Members

to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate
the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960, and for
such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., to
appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or
subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production
of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so
to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House.-
The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and
recommendations before the adjournment of the present special session of the
Congress of the Philippines."

In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged r first, the Resolution

violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct;
and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up
other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if
other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in
debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the
House.

Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of

action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter
further, and required respondents to answer without issuing any preliminary
injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and
pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session,
the special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving
Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its report on July
18,1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and
acting on such report, the House approved on the same day-before closing its
session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.

Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of

Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Baltao)[1] filed
their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition,
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension,
upheld House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that
Congress having ended its session on July 18,1960, the Committee-whose
members are the sole respondents-had thereby ceased to exist.

There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered

before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President
which are quoted in Resolution No. 59, and that he refused to produce before
the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such
imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and
for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the
House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months, for serious
diorderly behaviour.

Resolution No. 175 states in part:

"Whereas, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No.
59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of
serious diorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact,
scurrilous, malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of
the Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and

Whereas, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and
degraded the dignity of the House of Representatives: Now, Therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives, That Representative Sergio Osmeña,

Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and * *
*."

As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the

Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words
spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech
constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3)
supposing he could be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House had lost
the power to do so because it had taken up other business before approving
House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the
House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or
debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives
"shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy
of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that
country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress,
the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.
Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.

Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked
(Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible
"for words spoken in debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental

privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old
as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty
of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."
[2] Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliament as

construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and
application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before
us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before ttye legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct
are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the
United States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was
censured for using the following language on the floor of the House: "A
monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the
infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2, pp. 798-799). Two other
congressmen were censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2
Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was
summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his
parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents
123-124.)

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have

been, or could be censured, committed to prison[3], suspended, even expelled by
the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attests to the
consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power
of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a
legislator in a foreign country.

And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a
senator for one year.

Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that

the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.

This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take
action against me, he argues, because after my speech, and before approving
Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that
Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval
amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent. .

Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspend the operation of
its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its right to take action
which had already lapsed.

The situation might thus be compared to laws[4] extending the period of

limitation of actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The
Supreme Court of the United States has upheld such laws as against the
contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views.
At any rate, courts have declared that "the rules adopted by deliberative bodies
are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them,"[5]And it been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with, their observance, the courts have no concern. They may
be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure."[6]

The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme Court of

Tennessee:

"The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly

held that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or
waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly conduct of business,
and as security against hasty action." (Bewiet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433;
Holt vs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App.
595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc, of Albany, 23 Wend. CN.Y.] 277, 280 j
Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. E. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep.
543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;
McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham
Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. 159, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Taken
from the case of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 South Western Reporter, p.
584.]

It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of

Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was
presented, the House approved the resolution, despite the argument that other
business had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents
pp. 799-800.)

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive

constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be disciplined, many
arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the
House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because
the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter
depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but
which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to
determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of
separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such
situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)

"Sec. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature.-The principle is well established that
the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an
interference by the judicial department with the legislature since each
department is equally independent within the powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution.* * *."

"The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions- Thus, where the state
Senate is given the power to expel a member, the courts will not review its
action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision." (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law,
sec. 200, p. 902.) [Italics Ours.]

The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of
Clifford vs. French.[7] In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the
State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceedings
to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a
chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme
Court of California declined to interfere, explaining in orthodox juristic
language:

"Under our form, of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the 'power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has
been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision
conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the general
legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause
which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the
supreme court of Mass, says, in substance, that this power is inherent in every
legislative body; that it is necessary to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is
necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative
body must necessarily be the sole judge tof the exigency which may justify and require its
exercise. '* * *There is no provision authorizing courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid
the exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the
legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the power thus committed to it, the senate
is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either
house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise
legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do."

We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion
emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to
expulsion, they may, as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as
applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no
jurisdiction to interfere.

Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation

due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber.
Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of
constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the
interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of
governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of
Representatives of the United States taking the position on at least two
occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary
conduct or breach of order.[8] And in several instances, it took action against
offenders, even after other business had been considered.[9]

Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the

Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of the
Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another
member of that Body for certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a
debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the
validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the
separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate
petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the
resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the
Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no
power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law
specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly
behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective
member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."

The Jones Law, it must be observed, empowered the Governor General to

appoint "without consent of the Senate and without restriction as to residence
senators * * * who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth District."
Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.

It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension
deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being
afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be
understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected
party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent
the Twelfth District and maybe the views of the Government of the United
States or of the Governor-General, who had appointed him.

It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those
powers which were granted to it by the Jones Law[10]; whereas now the Congress has
the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by
the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the
conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercised-
the power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress
has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension[11] which the Constitution did not
impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a
Senator for 12 months in 1949.

"The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to

such limitations as are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power
deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the
Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)

In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's

representation can not be more weighty in the matter of suspension than in the
case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in
proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.[12]

Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to

prevent the Special Committee from acting in pursuance of House Resolution
No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee
performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the
suspension order. The House has closed its session, and the Committee has
ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed
for having become moot or academic.[13] Of course, there is nothing to prevent
petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all members of the House as
respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause.
Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a
pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino [14] and Alejandrino
vs. Quezon.[15]

At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of

political law, the Court thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions
on such issues as were deemed relevant and decisive.

Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE
FIRST DIVISION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it
can go, in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending criminal cases filed
against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then
CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from Investigator
Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon upon petitioner's request, came up with a resolution which it referred,
for approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the
Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman
directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13
May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance;
approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.

In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was
indicted thusly:

"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,

in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application
for legalization of the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra,
Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong
Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin
Quiu, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu Yin
Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian,
Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin,
Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @
Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @
Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order no. 324 dated
April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens
knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified, thereby giving unwarranted
benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by
said accused."[1]

Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and no. 91-94897.

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice

Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the
bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail
without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries
sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional
liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her
physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman,
however, that petitioner was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991,
Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.

Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed
that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance.

On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with

Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No.
99289-90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her
arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition issued a temporary
restraining order.

The Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's

arraignment and the consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until
further advice from the court.

On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and
lifting the temporary restraining order. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.

On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's intention

to accept a fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from
leaving the country.

On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding

Justice Garchitorena from the case and to defer her arraignment pending action
on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court,
docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for
bill of particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the
aliens whose applications she purportedly approved and thereby supposedly
extended undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the complaint.

The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan

to reset petitioner's arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice
thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner
moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations. The court, in its 11th March
1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and
directed her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No.
18371-18402, filed against her.

Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for
Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of
the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well
as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and
seeking the nullification thereof.

Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding

Justice Garchitorena to cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from
enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to post bail bonds
for the 32 amended informations, and from proceeding with her arraignment on
12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved
by the Court.

On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the
OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended informations.
Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were consolidated into one
information under Criminal Case No. 16698.

Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine

probable Cause" and to dismiss or quash said information. Pending the
resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.

On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one

Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15
September 1995.

In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to

the 31st July 1995 motion for the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for
reconsideration of its 03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony
of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to
the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled "Miriam Defensor-
Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan," docketed G.R. No. 123792.

On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the

prosecution to suspend her. On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:

"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion
under consideration and hereby suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-
Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and
from any other government position she may be holding at present or
hereafter. Her suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect
immediately upon notice.

"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate
President, Senate of the Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila,
through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the implementation of the
suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this court
of the action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of
implementation of the suspension order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth
day thereof so that the same may be lifted at the time."[2]

Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the
Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an

incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the
statute provides:
"SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation,
is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but
if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated
from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute
the same to the Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."

In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan,[3] the Court reiterated:

"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended --- treating of the suspension
pendente lite of an accused public officer --- may no longer be put at issue, having
been repeatedly upheld by this Court.

"xxx xxx xxx

"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a
valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials;
or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career
service."[4]

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of

suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before
it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the
court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there
seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."[5] Explaining the nature of the preventive
suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan[6] observed:

"x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial

proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension."[7]

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely

adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted
before it.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.[8]

En passan, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative

as the validity of the information must be determined in a pre-suspension
hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been said
that-

"'x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension

hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of
due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not
constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery
provisions of the revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory
suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion
to quash the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court x x x.'

"xxx xxx xxx

"Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution

on the ground that the acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation
of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code,
and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any other
grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground
that the acts for which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of
the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the revised
Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the
criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in
Paragraph (a), section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the
challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be
limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under
Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code."[9]

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a
pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of
culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or
not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records an other evidence before the court could
have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the
case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not
been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to
him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension
from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information
is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.[10]

The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's
case before the Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous
occasions, the Court has been called upon the resolve several other matters on
the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez,[11] petitioner sought to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal case No. 16698 for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez,[12] petitioner sought the
nullification of the hold departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a
"Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure
Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in
Santiago vs. Garchitorena,[13] petitioner sought the nullification of the
resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena
disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March
1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 amended informations against her; and (4)
in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan,[14] petitioner assailed the denial
by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for her reconsideration from its 03rd
August 1995 order allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases,[15]
the Court declared:

"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving
Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No.
107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of the
delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against
her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of
causes of action, is self-defeating.

"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any
offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts
complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that
the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy
of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor
children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines
after December 31 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not
granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

"In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact
in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore,
petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:

(1) She was a public officer;

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who
arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;

(3) Those aliens were disqualified;

(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

(5) She acted in `evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions.'

"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined
in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019."[16]

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against

petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith
issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from
the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which
provides that each-

"x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days."[17]

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive

measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its
resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr., vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[18] the
Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the
Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on
the prerogatives of congress. The Court ruled:

"x x x. Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution -

which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to `punish its
Members for disorderly behavior,' and `suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of
two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of
suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days - is unavailing, as it
appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding
from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior
as a Member of the House of Representatives."
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have
effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor
from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government - the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary - has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within
its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.

Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the

1987 Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of
"actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The provision
allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of discretion
committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in
general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light
of any emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply
an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an
affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to
the view[19] that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional
proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its
own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of
government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific
constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for
judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be,
responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must
promptly react in the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been
decided by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999,
acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to
render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.