ARTICLE 48.

COMPLEX CRIMES

COMPOUND CRIME
PEOPLE V CASTROMERO (G.R. No. 118992, October 09, 1997).................................................... 2
PEOPLE V COMADRE (G.R. No. 153559, June 08, 2004)................................................................... 7
PEOPLE V MELECIO ROBINOS (G.R. No. 138453, May 29, 2002) ............................................... 14
PEOPLE V BALOTOL (G.R. No. L-1935, August 11, 1949)................................................................ 22
PEOPLE V MACAGALING (G.R. Nos. 109131-33, October 03, 1994) ........................................... 24
PEOPLE V ANTONIO SANCHEZ (G.R. No. 131116, August 27, 1999) ......................................... 35
LONTOK V GORGONIO (G.R. No. L-37396, April 30, 1979) ............................................................. 42
PEOPLE V ADRIANO (G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015) ..................................................................... 44
JASON IVLER V MODESTO (G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010) ........................................... 50

COMPLEX CRIME PROPER

PEOPLE V TALO (G.R. No. 125542, October 25, 2000) ..................................................................... 61
PEOPLE V JIMMY SABREDO (G.R. No. 126114, May 11, 2000) .................................................... 72
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES V PEOPLE (G.R. No. 181409, February
11, 2010) .............................................................................................................................................................. 76

CONTINUED CRIME/DELITO CONTINUADO

PEOPLE V TUMLOS (G.R. No. 46428, April 13, 1939) ........................................................................ 88
PEOPLE V JARANILLA (G.R. NO. L-28547, February 22, 1974) ..................................................... 90
SANTIAGO V GARCHITORENA (G.R. No. 109266, December 02, 1993) .................................... 96
ILAGAN V CA (G.R. No. 110617, December 29, 1994)...................................................................... 102
SANTIAGO PAERA V PEOPLE (G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011)................................................ 109
PEOPLE V AARON (G.R. NOS. 136300-02, September 24, 2002) ............................................... 113
PEOPLE V MANOLITO LUCENA (G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014) ................................... 119

DOCTRINE OF ABSORPTION
PEOPLE V HERNANDEZ (G.R. Nos. L-6025 & L-6026, May 30, 1964) ....................................... 126
ENRILE V SALAZAR (G.R. No. 92163, June 05, 1990) ..................................................................... 141
ENRILE V AMIN (G.R. No. 93335, September 13, 1990) .................................................................. 149

TRANSITORY CRIMES - SEC. 15, RULE 110 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PEOPLE V CECILIA YABUT (G.R. No. L-42847, April 29, 1977).................................................... 154
ARTICLE 48. COMPLEX CRIMES
COMPOUND CRIMES

G.R. No. 118992, October 09, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

CELERINO CASTROMERO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Rape is consummated by the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of
the pudendum. Complete penetration is not required. The rapist is likewise liable for the injury
suffered by the rape victim as a result of her attempt to escape the assault.

The Case

This is an appeal from the August 17, 1994 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 10[2] stationed in Balayan, Batangas in Criminal Case No. 3509 finding
appellant guilty of rape with serious physical injuries.

The Complaint[3] against Appellant Celerino Castromero reads:

“The undersigned offended party under oath accuses Celerino Castromero of the Complex
Crime of Rape with Serious Physical Injuries, defined and penalized under Article 335, in
relation to Article 48 and 263 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of February, 1993, at about 2:00 o’clock in the morning, at
Barangay Tanggoy, Municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife (balisong)
and by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with the offended party Josephine Baon against her will and consent
and as a consequence thereof, the said offended party suffered serious physical injuries which
injuries required medical attendance and incapacitated her from performing her customary work
for a period of more than ninety (90) days by jumping down through the window of her house.

Contrary to law.”

The Complaint[4] was treated as the Information with the approval of Provincial Prosecutor
Carmelo Q. Quizon, after Fourth Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando E. Silang added his sworn
certification that a “preliminary investigation was conducted in accordance” with law. When
arraigned on July 20, 1993, the accused-appellant, assisted by Counsel de Oficio Hermogenes
De Castro, pleaded not guilty.[5]

After a pre-trial conference, trial ensued in due course. Subsequently, the trial court rendered
the assailed Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Celerino Castromero GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape With Serious Physical Injuries and hereby sentences him to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the victim Josephine Baon in the sum of P40,000.00, to pay
Josephine Baon the sum of P20,378.95 representing actual damages and to pay the costs.
 Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, he shall be credited with the period of
his detention during his preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.”[6]

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Josephine Baon, the victim; (2) her
husband, Esmeraldo Baon, who testified on the medical expenses for the injuries his wife
suffered because of the crime; and (3) Felipa Baon. The facts gleaned by the trial court from
their testimonies are as follows:

“Felipa Baon is the mother-in-law of the alleged victim and was presented to prove
circumstances of the incident which form part of the “res gestae.” She testified that the accused
is her nephew because the accused’s father is her first cousin. On February 6, 1993 at around
2:00 o’clock in the morning while asleep in their house in Barangay Tangoy, Balayan, Batangas,
she was awakened by a scream of her daughter-in-law whose house is situated just five (5)
armslength away from theirs. When she came out to help her daughter-in-law (Josephine Baon),
the latter was lying in front of the window so, she and her husband carried Josephine into their
house. Thereat, Josephine related what happened to her. According to Josephine, the accused
forcibly entered her room, placed himself on top of her and made his penis touch her vagina for
several times. The accused was then holding a knife. When Josephine was able to free herself
from the accused, she jumped out of the window where she fell into the ground. Thereafter, the
assistance of Barangay Captain Codizal was sought who reported the incident to the police.
Felipa Baon executed a sworn statement when investigated by one SPO2 William C. Dimaala in
the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital where Josephine was confined for treatment.

The next witness was the private complainant who gave her testimony while lying on a bamboo
bed. She averred that she knows the accused because the latter is the nephew of her mother-
in-law. On February 6, 1993, at around 2:00 o’clock in the morning while asleep, she was
awakened by the slam of the kitchen door. She rose and went out of the bedroom to check what
happened and outside the room she met the accused. The accused pointed a knife at her and
warned her not to shout or else she would be killed. She got scared.

The accused, while holding a knife on the right hand, embraced her behind the neck, kissed her
cheek, and touched her breasts. Then he pulled her panty until the garter got loose and touched
her private parts. Next, accused pulled down his jogging pants and brief. She kept herself still
because of the accused’s threat to kill her. Accused then removed her skirt, placed himself on
top of her, and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. Because of the accused’ movement
sideways and her struggle, his penis touched her private parts.

When she noticed that the accused was no longer holding the knife, she pushed him away. As
she rose up, the accused grabbed her hands and was about to stab her. So, she immediately
jumped out of the window. When she fell down, she yelled for help from her in-laws who
responded and carried her to their house because she could not move her feet. She requested
her mother-in-law to bring her to the emergency hospital because of the intense pain she was
then suffering. Her in-laws reported the incident to the barangay captain who looked for the
accused and to whom the accused surrendered.

From the emergency hospital, she was later transferred to the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital.
Upon examination, it was found out that her spinal column was broken which required her to
undergo surgical operation. (Exhs. “E”, “E-1” to “E-5”).
On cross-examination, private complainant averred that it is her habit to sleep at night with lights
on in and out of her room especially when her husband is not around. In the night of February 5,
1993 she slept with the lights on together with her children, namely: Joanna Marie and
Romualdo. It was at around 2:00 o’clock the following morning when she was awakened by a
slam of the door, reason for her to rise-up to check what happened and she met the accused
just outside her room as she went out. The accused then pulled her and pointed a knife on the
left side of her neck and touched her private parts while they were both standing with the
accused in front of her.

When she was already lying down (upon the orders of the accused) the accused went on top of
her embracing her with his right arm which also held a knife and touched her private parts. The
accused tried to insert with his left hand his penis into her vagina.

As the knife was pointed at her, the accused warned her not to shout or she would be killed. It
was the accused’s left hand that touched her breast because his right hand held the knife. The
accused used both hands in removing her panty with the knife still on his hand. The accused
removed his jogging pants and brief and the knife was still pointed in her neck. When the
accused tried to insert his penis, it touched her vagina as she put up resistance and as both of
them moved sideways.

The next witness was Esmeraldo Baon, the husband of the offended party whose gist of the
testimony relates to the civil aspect of the crime charged. He testified on the hospital and
surgical expenses and cost of medicines incurred on account of the injury suffered by the
offended party caused by her jumping out of the window. The witness also identified the receipts
and other relevant documents in support of the expenses incurred. Although he claimed having
incurred expenses in the amount of P242,198.00, the witness was able to present receipts
covering P20,378.95 only (Exhs. “D-1” to “D-25”).”[7]

Version of the Defense

Raising denial and alibi, the defense presented two witnesses in the person of Appellant
Celerino Castromero and his wife Juliana. The appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office,
narrated the following version of the facts:[8]

“Juliana Castromero testified that she is the wife of the accused. She said that at around 6
o’clock in the evening of February 5, 1993 she was with her husband (accused) and their three
(3) children at their house in Tanggoy, Balayan, Batangas. They took their dinner. At about 7
o’clock of the same night her husband went out. Her husband returned before midnight and
slept right away. She was awake till 1 o’clock because one of their children had a stomach ache.
When she woke up at 5 o’clock in the morning, her husband was still sleeping. Her husband
woke up at 6:00 A.M. After taking his breakfast, her husband went to his work in Dalig, Balayan,
Batangas. Her husband is a threshing machine operator. While her husband was on his job,
some policemen came to their house and were looking for him. Her husband was being
suspected of entering other’s (sic) dwelling. (TSN, pp. 2-8, April 7, 1994 and pp. 2-9, April 28,
1994)

Celerino Castromero testified that at around 6 o’clock in the evening of February 5, 1993 he
took his supper together with his wife and children. At about 7 P.M. he left and played (or
gambled) in a nearby house. At 11:30 P.M., he went home. After his arrival at their house, he
went to sleep right away. He woke up at 5 o’clock of the following morning. He reported for work
in Dalig, Balayan, Batangas being a threshing machine operator. When he went home at 12
o’clock noon, their barangay captain arrived and informed him that he was being suspected of
having committed a crime. The police invited him to the police station. And at the police station,
the police did not conduct any investigation. He was merely placed or locked up in the jail. He
went to the police station, together with their barangay captain, to explain his side and not to
surrender. He denied vehemently to have committed any crime. (TSN, pp. 2-18, May 19, 1994).”

Error Assigned

The defense raises one error: “the court a quo erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant of
the crime charged.”[9] Appellant denies the accusation against him and insists that he was inside
his own house at the time of the alleged rape.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is not meritorious.

Credibility of Witnesses

In his brief, the appellant simply denies the charge of rape with serious physical injuries and
insists on his alibi.[10] He also alludes to the following as indications of his innocence: he
voluntarily went to the police station with the barangay captain; [11] he pleaded not guilty to the
charge;[12] and he vehemently denied committing the crime.[13] Finally, he adds, “if a reasonable
doubt exists, the verdict must be one of acquittal.”[14]

In deciding this appeal, we are guided by the following principles formulated specifically for the
review of rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape, while easy to make, is difficult to prove and
even harder for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) because rape, by its very
nature, involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
the greatest caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and must not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [15]
On the other hand, the complainant’s credibility assumes paramount importance because her
testimony, if credible, is sufficient to support the conviction of the accused.[16]

After a thorough review of the records in the case at bar, we see no reason to reverse the trial
court’s factual finding and conclusion on the credibility of Josephine Baon’s testimony;[17] we are
likewise unpersuaded by accused-appellant’s asseverations. “Well-settled is the rule that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by
the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. Findings of the trial court on
such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.”[18]

Josephine Baon’s testimony on how her honor was defiled by appellant that early dawn was
clear, direct and honest.[19] Josephine never wavered in her account of the rape in spite of the
long browbeating she received during her cross-examination.[20] Her identification of Appellant
Castromero as her violator cannot be disputed because she personally knew appellant who,
aside from being a neighbor, was also a relative of her mother-in-law. Moreover, she had the
opportunity to identify her assailant, since the crime scene was illuminated by the lights inside
and outside her room which she usually left on, specially in the absence of her husband as was
the case that night.[21] Besides, it is inconceivable that complainant, a decent 26-year old
married Filipina with two young children, would suffer the embarrassment of having to reveal
intimate details of her violation and to undergo all the difficulties and indignities of a rape
prosecution, if her sole motivation was not to have the real culprit arrested and punished for the
outrage committed against her. Indeed, a rape victim “will not come out in the open if her motive
[is] not to obtain justice.”[22] In any event, it was not shown that complainant had any ill motive to
falsely testify against Accused Castromero. The accused himself and his wife Juliana both
admitted during trial that they had no knowledge of any “bad blood” between them and
Josephine Baon or her family.[23]

Hence, Josephine’s testimony, which we find credible and worthy of belief, is sufficient to convict
the accused-appellant of the crime charged. The reliability and credibility of her testimony are
bolstered by her narration of the sordid incident immediately thereafter to her mother-in-law,
Felipa Baon. Based on the foregoing, we are convinced that appellant sexually assaulted
Complainant Josephine Baon.

Appellant Castromero’s defense of denial and alibi is inherently weak and certainly insufficient to
outweigh Josephine’s positive and categorical assertion of her violation by the former. [24]
Furthermore, “(f)or alibi to serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established with clear and
convincing evidence. The requisites of time and place must be strictly met. Appellant must
convincingly demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.”[25] Appellant’s evidence falls far short of this
requirement because his house, where he was allegedly sleeping at the time the crime was
committed, was a mere fifty meters from the crime scene.[26] Hence, it was not at all physically
impossible or even difficult for appellant to have been at complainant’s home at the time of the
crime. It seems to this Court that the defense of denial and alibi was routinely raised faute de
mieux.

Was Rape Committed?

In determining whether the rape was consummated or merely attempted, we observe that in this
case there was no complete or perfect penetration of the complainant’s sex organ. The salient
portions of her testimony are as follows:

Q While he was on top of you, what was he doing?

A He tried to insert his penis to my vagina.

Q When he was trying to insert his private part to your private part, what happened?
A His penis touched my vagina.

FISCAL CASTILLO:

May I request Your Honor, that the Tagalog word “Ang kanyang pag-aari ay lumapat sa aking
pag-aari).

Q What happened next?

A Because of the movement sideways his penis touched my private parts.” [27] (Underscoring
supplied.)

On cross-examination, Eden stated further:

“Q Mrs. witness, you testified that while the accused was on top of you, he tried to insert his
penis, did the accused insert his penis on your private part?
A Yes sir, the opening of my vagina was touched.”[28] (Underscoring supplied.)

Felipa Baon, on the other hand, declared:

“Q When Josefina Baon asked your help and the first time you see (sic) her at that morning,
what was her physical condition?
A She was lying in front of the window.

Q And what did she tell you if she told you anything?
A Josephine Baon told me that the accused forcibly enter her room and placed himself on top
of her and the penis of the accused was made to touch the vagina for several times. ‘Idinuldol
ng idinuldol ang kanyang pag-aari sa harap ni Josephine Baon’.”[29] (Underscoring supplied.)

To consummate rape, perfect or complete penetration of the complainant’s private organ is not
essential. Even the slightest penetration by the male organ of the lips of the female organ, or
labia of the pudendum, is sufficient.[30] In People vs. Dela Pena,[31] this Court held that “the mere
touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act constitutes
carnal knowledge.” Josephine’s testimony that appellant’s organ touched the opening of her
vagina can lead to no other conclusion than that the appellant’s manhood legally invaded,
however slightly, the lips of her private organ. Clearly, rape was consummated in this case.
Because the sexual assault was perpetrated by force and intimidation, Appellant Castromero is
thus guilty of rape pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, we
stress the settled principle that a person who creates in another’s mind an immediate sense of
danger that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever the other person may
consequently suffer.[32] In this case, Josephine jumped from a window of her house to escape
from Appellant Castromero; as a result, she suffered serious physical injuries, specifically a
broken vertebra which required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days. This
being the case, the court a quo correctly convicted Appellant Castromero of the complex crime
of rape with serious physical injuries.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. However, the
indemnity in favor of Josephine Baon is hereby INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) in line with current jurisprudence.[33]
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153559, June 08, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO COMADRE, GEORGE

COMADRE AND DANILO LOZANO, APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano were charged with Murder
with Multiple Frustrated Murder in an information which reads:
That on or about the 6th of August 1995, at Brgy. San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery
and evident premeditation, availing of nighttime to afford impunity, and with the use of an
explosive, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lob a hand grenade that landed
and eventually exploded at the roof of the house of Jaime Agbanlog trajecting deadly shrapnels
that hit and killed one ROBERT AGBANLOG, per the death certificate, and causing Jerry
Bullanday, Jimmy Wabe, Lorenzo Eugenio, Rey Camat, Emelita Agbanlog and Elena Agbanlog
to suffer shrapnel wounds on their bodies, per the medical certificates; thus, to the latter victims,
the accused commenced all the acts of execution that would have produced the crime of
Multiple Murder as consequences thereof but nevertheless did not produce them by reason of
the timely and able medical and surgical interventions of physicians, to the damage and
prejudice of the deceased’s heirs and the other victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, appellants pleaded “not guilty”.[2] Trial on the merits then ensued.

As culled from the records, at around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog,
Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday,[3] Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking
spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father, Barangay Councilman Jaime Agbanlog,
situated in Barangay San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Jaime Agbanlog was seated on the
banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the companions of his son. [4]

As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre,
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his
companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace.
Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school.[5]

The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the
house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio
were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor.[6] They were all rushed to the San
Jose General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija for medical treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog
died before reaching the hospital.[7]

Dr. Tirso de los Santos, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of
Robert Agbanlog, certified that the wounds sustained by the victim were consistent with the
injuries inflicted by a grenade explosion and that the direct cause of death was hypovolemic
shock due to hand grenade explosion.[8] The surviving victims, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Jaime
Agbanlog and Gerry Bullanday sustained shrapnel injuries.[9]

SPO3 John Barraceros of the Lupao Municipal Police Station, who investigated the scene of the
crime, recovered metallic fragments at the terrace of the Agbanlog house. These fragments
were forwarded to the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Division in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
where SPO2 Jesus Q. Mamaril, a specialist in said division, identified them as shrapnel of an
MK2 hand grenade.[10]

Denying the charges against him, appellant Antonio Comadre claimed that on the night of
August 6, 1995, he was with his wife and children watching television in the house of his father,
Patricio, and his brother, Rogelio. He denied any participation in the incident and claimed that
he was surprised when three policemen from the Lupao Municipal Police Station went to his
house the following morning of August 7, 1995 and asked him to go with them to the police
station, where he has been detained since.[11]

Appellant George Comadre, for his part, testified that he is the brother of Antonio Comadre and
the brother-in-law of Danilo Lozano. He also denied any involvement in the grenade-throwing
incident, claiming that he was at home when it happened. He stated that he is a friend of Rey
Camat and Jimmy Wabe, and that he had no animosity towards them whatsoever. Appellant
also claimed to be in good terms with the Agbanlogs so he has no reason to cause them any
grief.[12]

Appellant Danilo Lozano similarly denied any complicity in the crime. He declared that he was at
home with his ten year-old son on the night of August 6, 1995. He added that he did not see
Antonio and George Comadre that night and has not seen them for quite sometime, either
before or after the incident. Like the two other appellants, Lozano denied having any
misunderstanding with Jaime Agbanlog, Robert Agbanlog and Jimmy Wabe.[13]

Antonio’s father, Patricio, and his wife, Lolita, corroborated his claim that he was at home
watching television with them during the night in question.[14] Josie Comadre, George’s wife,
testified that her husband could not have been among those who threw a hand grenade at the
house of the Agbanlogs because on the evening of August 6, 1995, they were resting inside
their house after working all day in the farm.[15]

After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and convicted appellants
of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder,[16] the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Finding accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder
and sentencing them to suffer the imposable penalty of death;
2. Ordering Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Robert Agbanlog P50,000.00 as indemnification for his death,
P35,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages;
3. Ordering accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano to pay jointly
and severally Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Gerry Bullanday and Jaime Agbanlog
P30,000.00 as indemnity for their attempted murder.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred: (1) when it did not correctly and judiciously interpret
and appreciate the evidence and thus, the miscarriage of justice was obviously omnipresent; (2)
when it imposed on the accused-appellants the supreme penalty of death despite the evident
lack of the quantum of evidence to convict them of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt;
and (3) when it did not apply the law and jurisprudence for the acquittal of the accused-
appellants of the crime charged.[17]

Appellants point to the inconsistencies in the sworn statements of Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat,
Lorenzo Eugenio and Gerry Bullanday in identifying the perpetrators. Wabe, Camat and
Eugenio initially executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on August 7, 1995 at the hospital wherein
they did not categorically state who the culprit was but merely named Antonio Comadre as a
suspect. Gerry Bullanday declared that he suspected Antonio Comadre as one of the culprits
because he saw the latter’s ten year-old son bring something in the nearby store before the
explosion occurred.

On August 27, 1995, or twenty days later, they went to the police station to give a more detailed
account of the incident, this time identifying Antonio Comadre as the perpetrator together with
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano.

A closer scrutiny of the records shows that no contradiction actually exists, as all sworn
statements pointed to the same perpetrators, namely, Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano. Moreover, it appears that the first statement was executed a day after the
incident, when Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were still in the hospital for the
injuries they sustained. Coherence could not thus be expected in view of their condition. It is
therefore not surprising for the witnesses to come up with a more exhaustive account of the
incident after they have regained their equanimity. The lapse of twenty days between the two
statements is immaterial because said period even helped them recall some facts which they
may have initially overlooked.

Witnesses cannot be expected to remember all the details of the harrowing event which
unfolded before their eyes. Minor discrepancies might be found in their testimony, but they do
not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole, nor should they reflect
adversely on the witness’ credibility as they erase suspicion that the same was perjured. [18]
Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the
credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when, as in the instant case, the crime is
shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses.[19]

Moreover, it was not shown that witnesses Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and
Gerry Bullanday had any motive to testify falsely against appellants. Absent evidence showing
any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists, and their testimony is thus worthy of full faith and credit.

The trial court is likewise correct in disregarding appellants’ defense of alibi and denial. For the
defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at
the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.[20]

Apart from testifying with respect to the distance of their houses from that of Jaime Agbanlog’s
residence, appellants were unable to give any explanation and neither were they able to show
that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime. Hence, the positive
identification of the appellants by eyewitnesses Jimmy Wabe, Jaime Agbanlog, Rey Camat and
Gerry Bullanday prevails over their defense of alibi and denial.[21]

It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy
Wabe and Gerry Bullanday were able to identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio
Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano because there was a lamppost in front of the
house and the moon was bright.[22]

Appellants’ argument that Judge Bayani V. Vargas, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of San Jose City, Branch 38 erred in rendering the decision because he was not the judge
who heard and tried the case is not well taken.

It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record for the
trial judge might have died, resigned, retired, transferred, and so forth. [23] As far back as the
case of Co Tao v. Court of Appeals[24] we have held: “The fact that the judge who heard the
evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment and that for that reason the latter did not
have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied
on the records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous.” This rule had been
followed for quite a long time, and there is no reason to go against the principle now. [25]

However, the trial court’s finding of conspiracy will have to be reassessed. The undisputed facts
show that when Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement
or performed any act to assist him. The trial court held that the mere presence of George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano provided encouragement and a sense of security to Antonio
Comadre, thus proving the existence of conspiracy.

We disagree.

Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of
actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required. [26]

A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to

exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a
person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends
companionship.[27]
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in
the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene
of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish
conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime.

Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of giving moral
assistance to his criminal act. The ratiocination of the trial court that “their presence provided
encouragement and sense of security to Antonio,” is devoid of any factual basis. Such finding is
not supported by the evidence on record and cannot therefore be a valid basis of a finding of
conspiracy.

Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men
who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime
he did not commit.[28] There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the
crime.

Coming now to Antonio’s liability, we find that the trial court correctly ruled that treachery
attended the commission of the crime. For treachery to be appreciated two conditions must
concur: (1) the means, method and form of execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) such means, methods and form of execution
was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused. Its essence lies in the adoption of
ways to minimize or neutralize any resistance, which may be put up by the offended party.

Appellant lobbed a grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace where the unsuspecting victims
were having a drinking spree. The suddenness of the attack coupled with the instantaneous
combustion and the tremendous impact of the explosion did not afford the victims sufficient time
to scamper for safety, much less defend themselves; thus insuring the execution of the crime
without risk of reprisal or resistance on their part. Treachery therefore attended the commission
of the crime.

It is significant to note that aside from treachery, the information also alleges the “use of an
explosive”[29] as an aggravating circumstance. Since both attendant circumstances can qualify
the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,[30] we should determine which
of the two circumstances will qualify the killing in this case.

When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be
considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence [31] support this view but
also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this
attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then be
relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.[32]

Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic Act No. 8294 [33] which also
considers the use of explosives as an aggravating circumstance, there is a need to make the
necessary clarification insofar as the legal implications of the said amendatory law vis-à-vis the
qualifying circumstance of “by means of explosion” under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
are concerned. Corollary thereto is the issue of which law should be applied in the instant case.

R.A. No. 8294 was a reaction to the onerous and anachronistic penalties imposed under the old
illegal possession of firearms law, P.D. 1866, which prevailed during the tumultuous years of the
Marcos dictatorship. The amendatory law was enacted, not to decriminalize illegal possession of
firearms and explosives, but to lower their penalties in order to rationalize them into more
acceptable and realistic levels.[34]

This legislative intent is conspicuously reflected in the reduction of the corresponding penalties
for illegal possession of firearms, or ammunitions and other related crimes under the
amendatory law. Under Section 2 of the said law, the penalties for unlawful possession of
explosives are also lowered. Specifically, when the illegally possessed explosives are used to
commit any of the crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which result in the death of a person,
the penalty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but it shall be considered only as an
aggravating circumstance. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 8294
now reads:
Section 2. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended
to read as follows:

Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives.

The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal and a fine of not less
than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s),
and other explosives, including but not limited to “pillbox,” “molotov cocktail bombs,” “fire
bombs,” or other incendiary devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous
objects or causing injury or death to any person.

When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special
law with the use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary
devises, which results in the death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives,
detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. (shall be punished with the penalty of death is DELETED.)
x x x x x x x x x.

With the removal of death as a penalty and the insertion of the term “xxx as an aggravating
circumstance,” the unmistakable import is to downgrade the penalty for illegal possession of
explosives and consider its use merely as an aggravating circumstance.

Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to reduce the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Also, Congress clearly intended RA No. 8294 to consider as
aggravating circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal possession of firearms and
explosives when such possession is used to commit other crimes under the Revised Penal
Code.

It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend the definition of murder under
Article 248, but merely made the use of explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted
to in committing “any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code.” The legislative purpose
is to do away with the use of explosives as a separate crime and to make such use merely an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crime already defined in the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of unlicensed explosives as one of the
aggravating circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like the
aggravating circumstance of “explosion” in paragraph 12, “evident premeditation” in paragraph
13, or “treachery” in paragraph 16 of Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance added by RA
No. 8294 does not change the definition of murder in Article 248.

Nonetheless, even if favorable to the appellant, R.A. No. 8294 still cannot be made applicable in
this case. Before the use of unlawfully possessed explosives can be properly appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately established that the possession was illegal or
unlawful, i.e., the accused is without the corresponding authority or permit to possess. This
follows the same requisites in the prosecution of crimes involving illegal possession of firearm[35]
which is a kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866, as amended. This proof does not obtain
in the present case. Not only was it not alleged in the information, but no evidence was adduced
by the prosecution to show that the possession by appellant of the explosive was unlawful.
It is worthy to note that the above requirement of illegality is borne out by the provisions of the
law itself, in conjunction with the pertinent tenets of legal hermeneutics.

A reading of the title[36] of R.A. No. 8294 will show that the qualifier “illegal/unlawful
...possession” is followed by “of firearms, ammunition, or explosives or instruments...” Although
the term ammunition is separated from “explosives” by the disjunctive word “or”, it does not
mean that “explosives” are no longer included in the items which can be illegally/unlawfully
possessed. In this context, the disjunctive word “or” is not used to separate but to signify a
succession or to conjoin the enumerated items together.[37] Moreover, Section 2 of R.A. 8294,[38]
subtitled: “Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Explosives”, clearly refers to the unlawful manufacture, sale, or possession of explosives.

What the law emphasizes is the act’s lack of authority. Thus, when the second paragraph of
Section 3, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by RA No. 8294 speaks of “the use of the
aforementioned explosives, etc.” as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of crimes, it
refers to those explosives, etc. “unlawfully” manufactured, assembled, dealt in, acquired,
disposed or possessed mentioned in the first paragraph of the same section. What is per se
aggravating is the use of unlawfully “manufactured … or possessed” explosives. The mere use
of explosives is not.

The information in this case does not allege that appellant Antonio Comadre had unlawfully
possessed or that he had no authority to possess the grenade that he used in the killing and
attempted killings. Even if it were alleged, its presence was not proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires
the averment of aggravating circumstances for their application. [39]

The inapplicability of R.A. 8294 having been made manifest, the crime committed is Murder
committed “by means of explosion” in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code. The same, having been alleged in the Information, may be properly considered as
appellant was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusation against him.[40]

The trial court found appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted
murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means of committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro
reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the
crimes committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single
criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by
different acts and several criminal resolutions.

The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster
of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be
considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the
offender was impelled by a “single criminal impulse” which shows his lesser degree of
perversity.[41]

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances, including the generic
aggravating circumstance of treachery in this case.[42] Applying the aforesaid provision of law,
the maximum penalty for the most serious crime (murder) is death. The trial court, therefore,
correctly imposed the death penalty.

Three justices of the Court, however, continue to maintain the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7659
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority
to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in
the case at bar.

Finally, the trial court awarded to the parents of the victim Robert Agbanlog civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00, P35,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages. Pursuant to existing jurisprudence[43] the award of civil indemnity is proper. However,
the actual damages awarded to the heirs of Robert Agbanlog should be modified, considering
that the prosecution was able to substantiate only the amount of P18,000.00 as funeral
expenses.[44]

The award of moral damages is appropriate there being evidence to show emotional suffering
on the part of the heirs of the deceased, but the same must be increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with prevailing judicial policy.[45]

With respect to the surviving victims Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and Gerry
Bullanday, the trial court awarded P30,000.00 each for the injuries they sustained. We find this
award inappropriate because they were not able to present a single receipt to substantiate their
claims. Nonetheless, since it appears that they are entitled to actual damages although the
amount thereof cannot be determined, they should be awarded temperate damages of
P25,000.00 each.[46]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose City, Branch 39 in Criminal Case No. L-16(95) is AFFIRMED insofar as appellant
Antonio Comadre is convicted of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P18,000.00 as
actual damages and likewise ordered to pay the surviving victims, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy
Wabe, Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday, P25,000.00 each as temperate damages for the
injuries they sustained. Appellants Gregorio Comadre and Danilo Lozano are ACQUITTED for
lack of evidence to establish conspiracy, and they are hereby ordered immediately RELEASED
from confinement unless they are lawfully held in custody for another cause. Costs de oficio.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138453, May 29, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. MELECIO ROBIÑOS Y DOMINGO,

APPELLANT.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, as in the present case
for parricide with unintentional abortion, the lesser one shall be applied in the absence of any
aggravating circumstances. Hence, the imposable penalty here is reclusion perpetua, not
death.
 The Case

For automatic review by this Court is the April 16, 1999 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 95-45, finding Melecio Robiños[2] y
Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion and sentencing him to death. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robiños guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby renders judgment
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is also ordered to pay
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim; and P22,800.00 as actual damages.”[3]
In an Information dated May 31, 1995,[4] appellant was accused of killing his pregnant wife and
the fetus inside her. It reads thus:
“That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m. in Brgy. San Isidro, Municipality of
Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused Melecio Robinos, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab by
means of a bladed knife 8 inches long, his legitimate wife Lorenza Robinos, who was, then six
(6) months pregnant causing the instantaneous death of said Lorenza Robinos, and the fetus
inside her womb.”[5]
When arraigned on July 27, 1995, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, [6] pleaded not
guilty.[7] After due trial, the RTC convicted him.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the prosecution’s version of how appellant
assaulted his pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal bloodbath, as follows:
“1. On March 25, 1995, at around seven o’clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo
Robiños was in his parents’ house at Barangay San Isidro in Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo
was cooking, he heard his parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and the victim Lorenza Robiños,
who were at the sala, quarrelling.

“2. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, ‘Why did you come home, why don’t you just
leave?’ After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about five meters, saw
appellant, with a double-bladed knife, stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from
where Lorenza was hit and she fell down on the floor. Upon witnessing appellant’s attack on his
mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house and ran to his grandmother’s house where he
reported the incident.

“3. At around eight o’clock in the morning of the same day, Benjamin Bueno, the brother of
the victim Lorenza Robiños, was at the house of his mother Remedios Bueno at Barangay San
Isidro. Benjamin, a resident of Barangay Mabilang in Paniqui, Tarlac, went to his mother’s
house for the purpose of informing his relatives that on the evening of March 24, 1995, appellant
had killed his uncle, Alejandro Robiños, at Barangay Mabilang. However while Benjamin was at
his mother’s house, he received the more distressing news that his own sister Lorenza had
been killed by appellant.

“4. Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did not go to her house because he
was afraid of what appellant might do. From his mother’s house, which was about 150 meters
away from his sister’s home, Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him, ‘It’s good you would
see how your sister died.’

“5. Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain Virgilio Valdez who called the police
station at Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3 Tirso Martin, together with the other
members of the PNP Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac, immediately went to Barangay San
Isidro. The police, together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and barangay
folk, proceeded to the scene of the crime where they saw blood dripping from the house of
appellant and Lorenza. The police told appellant to come out of the house. When appellant
failed to come out, the police, with the help of barangay officials, detached the bamboo wall from
the part of the house where blood was dripping. The removal of the wall exposed that section of
the house where SPO1 Lugo saw appellant embracing [his] wife.

“6. Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant, who was lying on his side and
holding a bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand, was embracing his wife. He was
uttering the words, ‘I will kill myself, I will kill myself.’ Lorenza, who was lying on her back and
facing upward, was no longer breathing. She appeared to be dead.

“7. The police and the barangay officials went up the stairs of the house and pulled appellant
away from Lorenza’s body. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken by SPO3
Martin. Appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with
the help of the barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope. However,
before he was pulled away from the body of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant
admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed his
wife, showing him the bloodstained knife.

“8. Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that she was already dead. She was pale
and not breathing. The police thus solicited the services of a funeral parlor to take Lorenza’s
body for autopsy. Appellant was brought to the police station at Camiling, Tarlac. However, he
had to be taken to the Camiling District Hospital for the treatment of a stab wound.

“9. After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B. Orante, the Chief of Police at Camiling,
Tarlac, prepared a Special Report which disclosed that:
‘The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds on the
different parts of her body.

‘That suspect (Melecio Robiños) was under the influence of liquor/drunk [who] came home and
argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect got irked, [drew] a double knife and delivered
forty one (41) stab blows.

‘Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was] brought to the Provincial Hospital.

‘Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade sharp knife about eight (8) inches long
including handle.’
“10. During the trial of the case, the prosecution was not able to present the doctor who
conducted the autopsy on Lorenza Robiños’ body. Nor, was the autopsy report presented as
evidence.”[8]
Version of the Defense

Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed killed his wife,
but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense of insanity as follows:
“Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant interposed insanity. The defense presented
the testimonies of the following:

“FEDERICO ROBIÑOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robiños, testified that his parents had
occasional quarrels[. B]efore March 23, 1995, his father told him that he had seen a person
went [sic] inside their house and who wanted to kill him. On March 23, 1995, he heard his father
told the same thing to his mother and because of this, his parents quarreled and exchanged
heated words.

“LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that she came to know
Melecio Robiños only in May to June 1996. Every time she visited him in his cell, accused
isolated himself, ‘laging nakatingin sa malayo’, rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured
alone.

“BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that he and
the accused were seeing each other everyday from 6:00 o’clock in the morning up to 5:30
o’clock in the afternoon. He had observed that accused sometime[s] refused to respond in the
counting of prisoners. Sometimes, he stayed in his cell even if they were required to fall in line
in the plaza of the penal colony.

“DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that
as the accused’s inmate, he had occasion to meet and mingle with the latter. Accused
sometimes was lying down, sitting, looking, or staring on space and without companion,
laughing and sometimes crying.

“MELECIO ROBIÑOS, herein accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in
their house and there was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He did not know that
he was charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not remember
when he was informed by his children that he killed his wife. He could not believe that he killed
his wife.”[9]
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this case was automatically elevated to this
Court for review.[10]

The Issues

Appellant submits for our consideration the following assignment of errors:

“I

The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and psychiatric evaluation
of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-appellant to be suffering from psychosis or
insanity classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type.

“II

The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant’s defense of insanity.”[11]

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Main Issue
Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance

At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not present any evidence to contravene the
allegation that he killed his wife. Clear and undisputed are the RTC findings on the identity of
the culprit and the commission of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. Appellant, however, interposes the defense of insanity to absolve himself of criminal
liability.

Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime.[12] A defendant in a criminal case who
relies on the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at
the very moment when the crime was committed.[13] Only when there is a complete deprivation
of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of
insanity be considered.[14]

The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind.[15] Accordingly, one who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it. [16] Failing this, one will be
presumed to be sane when the crime was committed.

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant’s claim of insanity is unsubstantiated
and wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show
no substantial evidence that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when
he perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife.

As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation
preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked his wife for no
reason at all and without knowledge of the nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing
her was a deliberate and conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had hurled at him as
attested to by their 15-year-old son Lorenzo Robiños. We reproduce Lorenzo’s testimony in
part as follows:

“Q: Before your father Melecio Robiños stabbed your mother, do you recall if they talked
to one and the other?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. IBARRA:

Q: Did you hear what they talked about?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you hear?

A: ‘Why did you come home, why don’t you just leave?’, Sir.

COURT:

In other words, you better go away, you should have not come back home.

ATTY. IBARRA:

Q: After your mother uttered those words, what did your father do?

A: That was the time that he stabbed my mother, sir.”[17]

Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his wife. He was even
bragging to her brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her. Bueno testified thus:

“ATTY. JOAQUIN:
Q: Now, from the house of your mother, can you see the house of your sister?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When you arrived at the house of your mother, Lorenzo Robiños was already there in
the house of your mother, is that right, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And he was the one who informed you about your sister already dead?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Did you go near the house of your sister upon learning that she was already dead?

A: No, sir.

ATTY. JOAQUIN:

Q: Why?

A: My brother-in-law was still amok, Sir.

COURT:

Q: Why do you know that he was amok?

A: Yes, sir, because he even shouted at me, sir.

Q: How?

A: It’s good you would see how your sister died, Sir.”[18]

Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed his
wife may have been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of a
husband who had realized the wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing
and immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of what he
had just done. Barangay Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated the clarity of mind of appellant
when the latter confessed to the former and to the police officers, and even showed to them the
knife used to stab the victim. Valdez’s testimony proceeded as follows:

“Q: And what did you discover when you went there at the house of Melecio Robiños?

A: When we arrived at the house of Melecio Robiños, it was closed. We waited for the
police officers to arrive and when they arrived, that was the time that we started going
around the house and when we saw blood, some of our companions removed the
walling of the house and at that time, we saw the wife of Melecio Robiños lying down
as if at that moment, the wife of Melecio Robiños was already dead, Sir.
Q: When you were able to remove this walling, what did you do?

A: We talked to Melecio Robiños, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What was he doing when you talked to him?

A: When we saw them they were both lying down and when we got near, he said he
killed his wife and showing the weapon he used, sir.

Q: What is that weapon?

A: Double bladed weapon, Sir.

COURT:

What is that, knife?

A: It’s a double bladed knife, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

He admitted to you that he killed his wife?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How did he say that, tell the court exactly how he tell you that, in tagalog, ilocano or
what?

A: What I remember Sir he said, ‘Pinatay ko ni baket ko’ meaning ‘I killed my wife’,
Sir.”[19]

Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the
atrocity of his act.

Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly supports his claim of
insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental condition
after the commission of the crime. Except for appellant’s 19-year-old son Federico Robiños,[20]
all the other defense witnesses testified on the supposed manifestations of his insanity after he
had already been detained in prison.

To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the
accused must have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally
responsible.[21] Verily, his alleged insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at the
precise moment when the criminal act was committed, not at anytime thereafter. In People v.
Villa,[22] this Court incisively ratiocinated on the matter as follows:
“It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the center. But,
in all probability, such insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending
trial. He was without contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He was troubled by his
conscience, the realization of the gravity of the offenses and the thought of a bleak future for
him. The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental
equilibrium. But, it must be stressed, that an inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant
should relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is
the subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is
inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability. In fine, this Court needs more
concrete evidence on the mental condition of the person alleged to be insane at the time of the
perpetration of the crimes in order that the exempting circumstance of insanity may be
appreciated in his favor. x x x.”[23] (Italics supplied)
Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the
evidence must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution. If the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the
accused cannot be acquitted.[24]

The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the psychiatrist who conducted an examination
of the mental condition of appellant, does not provide much help in determining his state of mind
at the time of the killing. It must be noted that she examined him only on September 11, 1995,
or six months after the commission of the crime.[25] Moreover, she was not able to make a
background study on the history of his mental condition prior to the killing because of the failure
of a certain social worker to gather data on the matter.[26]

Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the accused had already been suffering
from psychosis at the time of the commission of the crime,[27] she likewise admitted that her
conclusion was not definite and was merely an opinion.[28] As correctly observed by the trial
court, her declarations were merely conjectural and inconclusive to support a positive finding of
insanity. According to the RTC:
“The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who examined accused at the National Center
for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, that at the time of examination accused Melecio Robiños
was still mentally ill; that accused was experiencing hallucination and suffering from insanity and
it is possible that the sickness have occurred eight (8) to nine (9) months before examination;
and in her opinion accused was suffering from delusion and hallucination. And her opinion that
at the time accused stabbed himself, he was not in his lucid interval, is merely her conclusion.
xxx xxx xxx Aside from being her opinion, she conducted the mental, physical and neurological
examinations on the accused seven (7) months after the commission of the offense. That span
of seven (7) months has given accused an opportunity to contrive and feign mental
derangement. Dr. Mendoza had no opportunity to observed (sic) and assessed (sic) the
behavior of the accused immediately before, during and immediately after the commission of the
offense. Her finding is conjectural, inconclusive. She did not conduct background examination
of the mental condition of the accused before the incident by interviewing persons who had the
opportunity to associate with him.”[29]
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already been completely
deprived of reason when he killed the victim.[30] Verily, the evidence proffered by the defense did
not indicate that he had been completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of will when he
stabbed his wife to death. Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and,
as such, clear and convincing proof is required to establish its existence. [31] Indubitably, the
defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required to overthrow the presumption of sanity.
 Second Issue:
Proper Penalty

Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the
death penalty on appellant. It imposed the maximum penalty without considering the presence
or the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The imposition of the capital
penalty was not only baseless, but contrary to the rules on the application of penalties as
provided in the Revised Penal Code. Even the Office of the Solicitor General concedes this
error in the imposition of the death penalty.[32]

Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the
penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide. This is in
accordance with the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: “When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, x x x.”

The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to

death. In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties,
the court is mandated to impose one or the other, depending on the presence or the absence of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.[33] The rules with respect to the application of a
penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
“In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

xxx xxx xxx

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.” (Italics supplied)
Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be imposed. [34]
Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were established in this case,
the imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.[35]

Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se, it is not always punishable
with death. The law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death -- two
indivisible penalties, the application of either one of which depends on the presence or the
absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.[36]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68) in
Criminal Case No. 95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is
REDUCED to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with current jurisprudence, appellant shall pay the
heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P22,800 as actual damages,
which were duly proven. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-1935, August 11, 1949

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ELADIO BALOTOL,

DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

OZAETA, J.:
This is an appeal from a sentence of the Court of First Instance of Samar convicting the
appellant of double murder and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Potenciano Sabasido and Bernardino Lacambra in the sum of P2,000,
respectively, and to pay the costs.
In 1941 the deceased Potenciano Sabasido wounded the appellant. He was prosecuted for less
serious physical injuries, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to suffer fifteen days of
imprisonment.

On the afternoon of May 24, 1942, the appellant saw Potenciano Sabasido for the first time
since the latter was released from jail, at a cockpit in the barrio of Silaga, municipality of Santa
Rita, Samar. According to the witnesses for the prosecution Sabasido was standing outside the
ring close behind Bernardino Lacambra with his two hands holding the shoulders of the latter,
witnessing a cockfight. The appellant approached Sabasido from behind and stabbed him with a
bolo in the back. The weapon pierced thru the body of Sabasido at the abdominal region and
wounded Lacambra also. Sabasido fell face downward and the appellant stabbed him again in
the back near the right shoulder, the bolo again piercing thru his body. Sabasido died
instantaneously and Lacambra, seven days later.

The appellant admits having caused the death of Potenciano Sabasido but denies having
wounded Bernardino Lacambra. "I do not know who caused the wound of Bernardino
Lacambra," he testified. According to him, while he was walking around the ring of the cockpit
looking for a bet, Potenciano Sabasido saw him and said to him: "So you are the one who filed a
complaint against me. I am going to kill you." At that very moment, he said, Sabasido stabbed
him and hit him on the left forearm above the elbow; that Sabasido again stabbed him and hit
him on his left buttock; that then he held the right arm of Sabasido with his left hand and
stabbed Sabasido on the right side of his body, "which is a little bit to the back. Sabasido
released my hand which was holding his right arm and then stabbed me from left to right. Then I
held his right wrist with my left hand and pushed same towards Sabasido's body and I thrust him
on his abdomen." After that he ran away, he said.

The accused called two witnesses, Celso Palo and Basilio Lacambra, to corroborate his story.
These two witnesses testified in substance to the same effect as the accused, except that they
added that it was the deceased Potenciano Sabasido who wounded Bernardino Lacambra
accidentally while the accused was running away and Sabasido was pursuing him.

The trial court did not believe the testimony of the accused and his witnesses and believed that
of the witnesses for the prosecution.

After a careful and thorough study of the record we agree with the trial court. The nature and the
position of the wounds of Potenciano Sabasido completely belie the theory of the defense. Both
wounds pierced thru the body from back to front and could not have been inflicted by the
accused in the manner claimed by him, that is to say, in a face-to-face fight. Moreover, the story
of the witnesses for the defense as to how Bernardino Lacambra was wounded, namely, that
Sabasido accidentally hit him while he was pursuing the appellant after the latter had wounded
him twice, is unbelievable. No man with two bolo wounds thru his body, one thru the abdominal
region and the other thru the thorax, could possibly run in pursuit of another. Those wounds
were necessarily so fatal as to cause instantaneous death. On the other hand, the testimony of
the witnesses for the prosecution as to how both Sabasido and Lacambra were wounded, is
confirmed by the nature and the position of the wounds of the two victims.

The crime committed by the appellant was murder, defined and penalized in article 248, in
relation to article 48, of the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 provides that when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Since under article 48 this penalty must be applied in
 its maximum period, the appellant should be sentenced to death. However, in view of the lack of
the necessary number of votes to impose the death penalty, we are constrained to apply the
penalty next lower in degree, which is life imprisonment.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

G.R. Nos. 109131-33, October 03, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEONITO MACAGALING Y

ATILLANO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

On July 19, 1991, two separate informations were filed against accused-appellant Leonito
Macagaling y Atillano for the crimes of murder and homicide and, on October 29, 1991, for an
additional charge of illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition, which were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 1814, 1815 and 1834, respectively, before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon.[1]

Assisted by counsel de parte, appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned in Criminal Cases
Nos. 1814 and 1815 on August 28, 1991.[2] Likewise, appellant pleaded not guilty when
arraigned in Criminal Case No. 1834 on May 28, 1992.[3] The three cases were thereafter
consolidated and jointly tried under the continuous trial system.

On September 14, 1992, the lower court rendered its decision on the aforesaid three
indictments with the following dispositions:

"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused LEONITO MACAGALING Y ATILLANO GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of:
1) Homicide under the Information, dated July 19, 1991, in Criminal Case No. 1814, and
sentences him to an indeterminate prison term of from TEN (10) years and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalties therefor. The accused is
ORDERED to pay the heirs of DENNIS MACAGALING the following amounts:
a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and

b) P34,000.00 as actual damages

without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

2) Homicide under the information, dated July 19, 1991, in Criminal Case No. 1815, and
sentences him to an indeterminate prison term of from EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalties therefor. The accused is
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the deceased TEOTIMO FAMERONAG the following amounts:
a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for death;

b) P64,000.00 as actual damages; and

c) P350,000.00 by way of lost earnings

without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

3) Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition under the Information, dated October 29,
1991, in Criminal Case No. 1834, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and to pay the costs.
The .38 caliber revolver (Smith and Wesson original without serial number) (Exh. E); the five (5)
empty shells (Exhs. E-1 to E-5); and the live bullet (Exh. E-6) are confiscated in favor of the
government.
After the judgment has become final, the Clerk of Court is ordered to deliver and deposit the
foregoing Exhibits E, E-1 to E-6, inclusive, to the Provincial Director, PNP, of the Province of
Romblon properly receipted. Thereafter, the receipt must be attached to the record of the case
and shall form part of the record.
The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited in his favor
to its full extent and the penalties herein imposed shall be served successively in accordance
with Articles 29 and 70, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code."[4]
The prosecution's version of the incident, as culled from the testimony of its witnesses in open
court, is to the effect that in connection with the barangay fiesta of Calabasahan, Concepcion,
Romblon, a coronation ball was held in the evening of May 2, 1991 at the public plaza. Present
on said occasion, among others, were Antonieto Fabella, barangay captain of San Pedro,
Concepcion, Romblon; Anita Macagaling, mother of the deceased Dennis Macagaling; Pfc.
Roque Fesalbon, investigator of the local police station; and Roger Lacambra, stepson of
Teotimo Fameronag.

At about 10:00 P.M., the aforesaid Antonieto Fabella, who was also the brother-in-law of Dennis
Macagaling, was watching the festivities when all of a sudden he noticed Leonito Macagaling
point and then fire a gun at his own nephew, Dennis Macagaling. The bullet missed Dennis but
wounded Teotimo Fameronag on the right chest causing the latter to collapse in front of Dennis.
Dennis, on his part, tried to escape from Leonito by running away from the scene. [5]

At this juncture, Anita saw that her son Dennis was running in a wobbly manner and she
embraced him to prevent him from falling. Leonito grabbed the hair of Dennis and yanked his
head, pulling the latter away from his mother. Anita pleaded to Leonito saying, "Don't, Leonito,"
but the latter pointed the gun at the temple of Dennis and shot him point-blank. Dennis fell down
("sumubasob") on the cement floor. Leonito then shot the prostrate Dennis three times
successively on the neck, uttering the expletive "Putang ina mo," and then tried to leave the
vicinity.[6]

At that very moment, Pfc. Roque Fesalbon was at the barangay tanod outpost near the plaza,
having been dispatched by his station commander to maintain peace and order there. Hearing a
gunshot, he immediately went out to investigate and, on his way, he saw Teotimo Fameronag
fall down on the floor of the plaza. He proceeded to the place of the incident and saw Dennis
Macagaling lying on the floor while Leonito Macagaling was holding a firearm. At that time, he
had with him his service pistol and he was also holding an M16 armalite rifle. Sensing that
Leonito was about to flee, he fired three warning shots to prevent him from doing so. Initially,
Leonito refused to hand over his gun but he later relented. Together with Pfc. Sofronio
Fabregas, Fesalbon arrested Leonito and took him to the latter's house which was near the
scene of the incident. Fesalbon inspected the gun which he had retrieved from Leonito and
found five empty shells and one live bullet. The serial number of the gun had been erased. [7]

Meanwhile, Roger Lacambra, a stepson of Teotimo Fameronag and a member of a dance

group, also heard the gunshots. He noticed that people were screaming and scampering away
from the dance hall. Wanting to know the cause of the commotion, he went near the dance hall
and saw Fameronag staggering towards him. Fameronag fell down on the floor and asked for
his help. With the assistance of his co-dancers, he brought Fameronag to a hospital in
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro and, later, to the provincial hospital of Calapan where the latter
expired.[8]

On the other hand, after talking to Leonito Macagaling in the latter's residence, Fesalbon
decided to go back to the crime scene to proceed with the investigation. He verified that
Fameronag had one gunshot wound while Dennis was shot four times. He also found out that
the motive of the killing might have been Leonito's suspicion that Dennis was divulging
information about the former's participation in illegal fishing. It appears that Leonito was
previously charged with illegal fishing but the case was later dismissed. [9]

According to Anita Macagaling, her family incurred funeral and burial expenses in the sum of
P15,000.00. For their trips to and from Corcuera, they spent P2,000.00 for herself and their
witnesses' transportation, aside from P19,000.00 incurred as litigation expenses. [10] On the other
hand, Concepcion Vda. de Fameronag, testified that she spent P40,000.00 for the burial and the
wake of her deceased husband, and incurred litigation, transportation and other incidental
expenses in the sum of P31,500.00.[11]

As was to be anticipated, the defense had a different account of the incident. Rosauro Fabreag,
Jr. testified that between 5:30 to 6:00 P.M. of the same day, he saw Dennis Macagaling,
together with Nonoy Fabellon, Roger Lacambra and two others whose names he does not
know, drinking in a store near his house. Dennis asked him to join them and he accepted the
invitation. While they were drinking, Dennis showed him a gun tucked on his waist. At about
6:00 P.M., after having taken a couple of drinks, he decided to leave the group which appeared
to be very drunk at that time.[12]

William Ferrancullo, a barangay tanod of Calabasahan and a relative of appellant, was also
called to testify for the defense. He averred that in the evening of May 2, 1991, he and other
barangay officials were assigned by Barangay Captain Feras to oversee the proceedings and
maintain peace and order at the plaza. At about 9:30 o'clock that evening, he was at the gate
and there he noticed a group of five apparently drunken men enter the dance hall.[13]

Later, he decided to go to the barangay tanod outpost located a few meters from the gate.
Abruptly, he heard a gunshot coming from the direction where the intoxicated persons were
seated. Rushing towards that area to investigate, he met Teotimo Fameronag who appeared to
have been shot. He saw Fameronag fall to the floor and it was then that he noticed Dennis
Macagaling holding a gun and threatening to shoot anyone who would come near him.
Frightened, he did not move from the spot where he was standing. [14]

While all these things were happening, appellant Leonito Macagaling claims that he was in his
residence at Calabasahan, getting ready to rest for the night. He was startled when he heard a
gunshot coming from the direction of the plaza. Still in his short pants and undershirt, he hurried
to the plaza and saw the group of Dennis Macagaling, Willy Ferrancullo, Willito Bruit, and Carlito
Macagaling. He approached them and when he was about two meters from the group, he
became aware of Dennis Macagaling who was intoxicated and holding a gun. Leonito asked
Dennis to drop the gun but the latter retorted, "Isa ka pa." Without warning, Dennis fired at him
but missed. Leonito dashed towards Dennis and tried to wrestle the gun away from him. A
struggle for the firearm ensued and they grappled for it on the floor. While they were thus
wrestling for the gun, it went off and hit Dennis. Leonito then stood up, went home, and informed
his wife of what had just happened.[15]

Leonito's wife, after observing that he had some bruises, proceeded to clean them. Shortly
thereafter, policemen Roque Fesalbon and Sofronio Fabregas, together with Ferrancullo,
arrived and inquired if the gun was his. He denied ownership of the firearm. Informed by them
that Dennis was dead, Leonito said it was not his fault. The policemen then left. [16]
Fesalbon, Fabregas and Ferrancullo thereafter went back to the crime scene and decided to
bring Fameronag, then still alive, to Pinamalayan for treatment. There being no doctor then
available in the barangay, the body of Dennis Macagaling was examined by a rural health
midwife, Avemie F. Fabroa, who submitted her medical findings.[17]

Queried as to what might have motivated the deceased Dennis Macagaling to harbor any ill
feelings against him, Leonito recounted an incident that took place in October, 1990 when he
slapped Diomedes, the younger brother of Dennis Macagaling. It appears that Leonito and
Diomedes had a previous agreement that the latter would work in the former's fishing
operations. Due to Diomedes' commitment to work for him, Leonito advanced him some money
but, much to his dismay, Diomedes decided to join another group. Leonito waited for Diomedes
along the shore to demand an explanation. An argument ensued and Leonito slapped Diomedes
when the latter cursed him. Having learned of the slapping incident ten days later, Dennis
confronted Leonito. There was a heated exchange of words between them, with Dennis later
warning him, "You watch out."[18]

Seeking to discredit Pfc. Fesalbon's testimony, Leonito told the court that Fesalbon had reason
to hate him. He claimed that in 1976, due to an incident in a dance hall at Sampong,
Calabasahan, he filed an administrative case against Fesalbon, Luvizmindo Fabroa and
Sofronio Fabregas before the National Police Commission. In retaliation, Fesalbon filed a
criminal case for less serious physical injuries against him. However, both cases were
dismissed after they decided to settle the matter among themselves.[19] Appellant opined that
Pfc. Fesalbon continued to hold a grudge against him.

1. In a long line of cases, it has been held that where the accused admits the killing of the victim
but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he indeed acted in legitimate defense of himself.[20] As the burden of proof is shifted to him,
he must consequently rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that
of the prosecution. Accordingly, the proverbial bone of contention with respect to a killing under
such circumstances, is whether or not the accused has presented sufficient evidence to support
his claim of self-defense.[21]

A careful analysis of appellant's version and a thorough evaluation of the evidence presented by
the parties fail to persuade this Court to rule in appellant's favor.

For one, Leonito's version of the incident appears to be too good to be true. Leonito was
confronted by an armed Dennis Macagaling who apparently was prepared to shoot him. In
addition, he and Dennis did not exactly part as good friends when they last saw each other. In
fact, the latter had threatened him to "watch out." Despite all these, Leonito is supposed to have
nonchalantly directed Dennis to hand over his gun. Not heeding his order, Dennis fired at him,
whereupon Leonito heroically rushed towards Dennis and tried to wrestle the gun away from
him, seemingly unconcerned for his safety. And then, after Dennis was shot "accidentally" while
they were wrestling for the gun, Leonito just calmly got up and went home, as if nothing had
happened.

If, as Leonito asserted, he had tried to get Dennis to hand over the gun because he was even
concerned that an innocent bystander might be hurt, it baffles the Court why he did not
immediately rush his own nephew Dennis to the hospital for medical care and attention when
the latter was shot. It is a most unusual reaction for one who had accidentally shot another to
just leave the vicinity with the victim unattended to or without even making arrangements for his
care. Furthermore, as will hereafter be discussed, the number of wounds sustained by the victim
completely demolishes this theory of accidental shooting.

Principal defense witness William Ferrancullo, who was presented in court obviously to
corroborate the version of appellant, miserably failed to do so. He is one witness the defense
could have done without, for this star witness could not seem to get his story straight,
conveniently changing his testimony to suit his purpose at the particular moment, without taking
into consideration the statements he had previously made, some instances of which we shall
illustrate.

For example, Ferrancullo earlier testified that when he was asked by Pfc. Roque Fesalbon as to
who started the trouble, he pointed to Leonito Macagaling as the culprit. [22] Later, however, he
insisted that he did not inform the policemen as to what he knew, giving the flimsy reason that
"there was no chance for us to talk."[23] How he could justify that excuse is beyond
comprehension since he himself asserted that he was all the while with the policemen when
they went to appellant's residence after the shooting and he also tagged along when they went
back to the scene of the crime where they conducted further investigations.

Evidently, Ferrancullo had definite knowledge that Leonito was a suspect in these cases. His
statements, however, would show that he does not have the uncanny knack for lying and getting
away with it. In an earlier testimony, he said if was only on July 2 or 5, 1992, when so informed
by the wife of Leonito, that he came to know that Leonito was a suspect in the cases.[24] Yet, he
subsequently admitted that as early as June, 1992, he had visited Leonito at the provincial jail
where the latter was detained because of the killings in question.[25]

The trial court, posing clarificatory questions, asked Ferrancullo about the persons to whom he
had confided what he knew about the case. He said he first narrated the incident to his mother
who lives in the mountains of San Pedro on the morning of May 3, 1991. [26] Pressed further by
the court, he amended that by saying that he had informed his wife thereof after he left the
dance hall of that fateful night. He also told Atty. Ferancullo about the incident in November,
1991 and, naturally, when he testified in court. Asked if he told any other person, he said there
was none. Later, he claimed that he also told Leonito's wife. [27]

The court, not satisfied with the answers it was getting from the witness, inquired why
Ferrancullo, being a barangay tanod, did not tell the barangay captain who had assigned him at
the plaza as to what he knew. This time, Ferrancullo suddenly recalled that, from Leonito's
house, he did in fact go to the barangay captain's house purposely to inform the latter of the
incident.[28]

Ferrancullo's propensity for prevarication is further demonstrated by his varying accounts as to

the wounds sustained by the victim. First, he asserted that while Leonito and Dennis were
grappling for the gun, he heard only two shots[29] which meant that Dennis could have sustained
only two gunshot wounds at the most. Thereafter, he said that he was sure that the victim
sustained one shot on the head and three on the neck, having been present when the
photographs of the cadaver of Dennis was taken. Later, he changed his mind, stating that the
victim suffered only one wound on the neck and one on the head.[30]

This brings us to the matter of the number of wounds sustained by the victim, which physical
evidence is vital since it could lend credence to appellant's claim of self-defense. However, as
earlier stated, appellant's version and concomitant claim of self-defense is belied and negated
precisely by the number of wounds sustained by the deceased and the location thereof.
Appellant maintains that while both he and Dennis were struggling for control of the gun, the
same accidentally fired, hitting the latter. If indeed the firing of the gun was merely accidental
and it fired only once, it would be impossible for Dennis to sustain four gunshot wounds, one in
the temple and three in the neck.[31] Furthermore, the number of wounds indicate that the act
was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined effort to kill the victim.[32] Such wounds
are indicative of aggression and confirm the theory of the prosecution that appellant assaulted
the deceased.[33]

Considering the grave contradictions in Ferrancullo's testimony on issues of serious importance,

this Court agrees with the court a quo which, after chronicling twelve instances undermining the
credibility of said witness, trenchantly concluded that "the principal witness of the defense,
William Ferrancullo, did not see the incident that evening or if he did, he narrated it
differently."[34]

In his brief, appellant makes an issue of the fact that although Antonieto Fabella categorically
testified in court that it was Leonito Macagaling who shot and killed Dennis Macagaling, he did
not mention their specific names in his affidavit. This argument is misleading and specious, to
say the least. A careful perusal of said affidavit shows that when asked to narrate what
happened, Fabella indeed did not refer to the parties involved by their given names. However,
immediately after said narration, he was asked whether he knew their names and he answered
in the affirmative, giving their first and family names.[35]

Appellant, in his desperate bid for acquittal, even questions the fact that the lower court, instead
of granting his own counsel's motion for a postponement, appointed Atty. Cesar M. Madrona of
the Public Attorney's Office as counsel de oficio. Appellant asserts that, in doing so, the trial
court deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented by a counsel of his choice. We
reject this pretension.

The records show that appellant was given the right to choose his own counsel. However, the
court in its desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system
made appropriate arrangements to avoid unnecessary delay and postponements of the trial in
case of the absence of appellant's counsel de parte. Thus, in its December 12, 1991 order, the
trial court set out the specific dates for the presentation of the prosecution witnesses, noting that
the prosecution witnesses were all from the far-flung island municipality of Concepcion in
Maestre de Campo Island, Romblon, which is about seven hours away by boat. It also advised
appellant of the availability of Atty. Madrona as counsel de oficio any time Atty. Sancho
Ferancullo was not available. Appellant was properly forewarned that any legal maneuvers
meant to unduly delay these cases would not be entertained by the court.

Furthermore, after the presentation of the prosecution witnesses, Atty. Ferancullo took over the
conduct of the defense of appellant. Thus, in all stages of the trial, his own counsel was in
charge except when the prosecution witnesses were testifying. The Court, after a review of the
records, agrees with the Solicitor General's position that "with the demonstrated strength of the
prosecution evidence, it is unlikely that Atty. Ferancullo's presence during the entire proceedings
would have materially affected the result of the cases."[36]

Appellant would discredit the prosecution witnesses by adverting to the fact that, except for Pfc.
Roque Fesalbon, they are all very close relatives of the victims.[37] A witness' relation to the
victim does not necessarily mean that he is biased. There is absolutely nothing in our laws to
disqualify a person from testifying in a criminal case in which said person's relative is involved, if
the former was really at the scene of the crime and was a witness to the execution of the
criminal act. Precisely, being blood relatives of the deceased, these witnesses would not just
indiscriminately impute the crime to anybody but would necessarily identify and seek the
conviction of the real culprit himself to obtain justice for the death of their relative.

Still bent on assailing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, appellant cites alleged
inconsistencies in their testimonies. Firstly, Antonieto Fabella had testified that when he heard
the first gunshot, Leonito was inside the dance hall of the barangay plaza.[38] On the other hand,
appellant claims that Roger Lacambra testified that he saw Leonito on the street at that time.
This is, of course, not an inconsistency on the part of Fabella since the supposed variant version
was made by a different witness, Lacambra. Just to satisfy appellant, however, we have verified
from the transcripts that what Lacambra said was that he saw Leonito on the street before the
first shot was fired, to wit:

"Q: If you heard the first shot while you were on your way, you did not see Leonito before the
first shot, am I correct?
A: I saw him.
xxx
Q: Where was Leonito?
A: He was in the street."[39]
A second flaw, according to appellant, is the fact that Fabella testified that he heard Fesalbon
fire two warning shots,[40] whereas Fesalbon declared that he fired three times.[41] This is clearly
an insignificant and minor detail which would not affect the credibility of the witnesses'
testimonies. As long as the witnesses concur on the material points, slight differences in their
remembrance of the details do not reflect on the essential veracity of their statements, [42] more
so where the trivial issue is the number of shots one hears from rapid gunfire.

Thirdly, appellant insists that Fabella testified that when appellant was running away from the
crime scene after the incident, Fesalbon and Fabregas blocked his path while Fesalbon stated
that he was alone when he approached the suspect. However, nowhere in his testimony did
Fesalbon state that he alone blocked the path of Leonito. In fact, when queried as to what he did
with appellant after he got the gun from him, Fesalbon answered, "We arrested him,"[43] thereby
affirming the fact that he was not alone at that time but that Fabregas was working in concert
with him.

On the charge of homicide for the killing of Teotimo Fameronag, appellant did not offer any
defense. When Ferrancullo was asked if he knew who killed Fameronag, he said he did not
know.[44] Neither did appellant offer any explanation on the death of Fameronag despite the
positive statements of the prosecution witnesses that while trying to shoot Dennis, appellant
instead hit Fameronag. The only defense, then, of appellant for the death of Fameronag is a
complete denial. Denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the
positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses that the accused committed the
crime,[45] especially where, as in these cases, such denial is unexplained and is contradicted by
eyewitnesses.

For the death of Dennis Macagaling, although the information in Criminal Case No. 1814
charges the felony of murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation,
the People's evidence does not prove the attendance of these circumstances. They cannot,
therefore, be appreciated against appellant and the lower court correctly convicted him of
homicide in Criminal Case No. 1814.

For the killing of Teotimo Fameronag, the same cannot be said to be accidental as it was the
result of an aberratio ictus, or miscarriage of the blow. As a matter of law, since such death
resulted from a culpable aberratio ictus, appellant should be punished under Article 48, in
relation to Article 4, of the Revised Penal Code. Having committed attempted homicide as
against Dennis Macagaling and consummated homicide with respect to Teotimo Fameronag
when he fired the first shot, appellant committed two grave felonies with one single act and,
accordingly, he would be liable for a complex crime in the nature of a delito compuesto, or a
compound crime.[46] However, not having been so charged, he cannot be convicted of a
complex crime,[47] hence the court below did not err in finding him guilty of simple homicide in
Criminal Case No. 1815.

2. The charge of illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition merits a more extended
consideration. It will be recalled that this third accusation was filed as Criminal Case No. 1834
on October 29, 1991, or more than three months after the filing of the first two indictments in the
same court, under an information which alleged that during the same incident involved in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1814 and 1815 -?
"x x x the said accused, did then and there, without legal authority therefor, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one Cal. 38 Revolver
(Smith and Wesson without serial number) with one live bullet and five empty shells which he
used in shooting Dennis Macagaling and Teotimo Fameronag."[48]
Prefatorily, we note from appellant's brief his position that the lower court erred in holding that
the gun was owned by him without being supported by convincing proof. He asserts that
assuming arguendo that the gun was handed by him to Pfc. Fesalbon immediately after the
former arrived at the scene of the crime, this is not sufficient proof that he owned the gun.[49]
Appellant's theory is off-tangent.

Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the gravamen of the offense is basically the
fact of possession of a firearm without a license, it being assumed that it was so possessed with
animus possidendi. We have heretofore explained that, in view of the text of said decree, the
crime may be denominated as simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from the aggravated
form wherein such firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder. [50] However, to be
liable for the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm which entails the capital
punishment, such illegal possession must be the specific and principal offense charged, with the
fact of killing being included in the particulars of the indictment.[51]

In either case, the offense is committed not on the basis of ownership but of possession of the
firearm without the requisite license or permit, and this disposes of appellant's objection on this
score. What, however, is of greater concern to the Court is whether the prosecution has
discharged the burden of proof on this charge. Corollarily, the inquiry should be whether there
was sufficient identification of the firearm presented in the trial court and, more importantly,
whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the negative allegation that appellant
possessed the gun "without legal authority therefor."

On the identification of the gun, these exchanges in the courtroom during the cross-examination
of Pfc. Fesalbon, the lone prosecution witness on this issue, give us ground to pause and doubt:

"Q - You also stated that this was the gun you got from Leonito Macagaling that evening of May
2?
A - Yes sir, that is the gun.
Q - How did you know that this is the gun?
A - Because it was really the gun I took from him.
Q - How do you know that this is really the gun?
A - Because at the bottom of the bat (sic, should be butt) there is a serial number and it was
erased by grinding and the serial number was erased.
Q - When did you discover that the serial number here was erased?
A - Immediately after my inspection I discovered that there is no serial number.
Q - When did you make your inspection?
A - Immediately after his arrest.
xxx
Q - But there were many guns like this whose serial number has been erased, do you think
serial number -
A - I don't know, that is the only gun I saw with erased serial number, even paltik guns have
serial numbers.
Q - So that is the only distinguishing mark that you can tell us how you recognized this gun to be
the gun which you took from Leonito Macagaling that evening?
A - Not only that serial number but the whole body of the gun.
COURT:
Did you not place your own personal identification mark in Exhibit E?
A - My personal identification is that I could identify paltik and those genuine guns.
COURT:
You did not answer the question, answer the question.
A - I did not put any distinguishing mark.
COURT:
That should be answered that way. That can be answered by yes or no. Next time again you
should place again your own identification in guns and even ammos. (I)n Exhibits E-1 to E-6, did
you place your own identification mark in each of them?
A - No, sir.
COURT:
Next time you place your own mark. Because from apprehension up to this very moment, it is a
long, long time, it crossed the very handle (sic) by many hands. Proceed.
xxx
ATTY. MADRONA:
Q - What I mean with general appearance li(k)e this gun, would you agree with me that there
are thousands of (S)mith and (W)esson guns with the general appearance like this?
A - Yes, sir."[52]
It is a curious fact that although the incident took place on May 2, 1991, the information in
Criminal Case No. 1834 for illegal possession of the gun was filed only on October 29, 1991.
Pfc. Fesalbon testified thereon on May 29, 1992 and yet, although the firearm was in the
possession of the police for more than a year, there was no attempt to ensure its positive
identification through standard police procedure of which Pfc. Fesalbon, as a police investigator,
could not have been unaware.

For that matter, the efforts exerted to obtain evidence proving that appellant was not a licensed
holder of the firearm was lackadaisical at best. This is the prosecution's only evidence to prove
the allegation in the information that appellant's possession of a firearm was "without legal
authority therefor," again through the bare testimony of Pfc. Fesalbon:

"Q - You made mention that you conducted an investigation after taking Exhibit D (sic, should be
E) from the accused, did you find out whether that gun is licensed or not?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - What did you find out?
A - I found out that the gun has no license.
Q - Do you mean to tell this Honorable Court that the accused Leonito Macagaling is not a
firearm licensee of your town?
A - Yes, sir."[53]
That is all. Nor did the witness deign to explain how he arrived at his conclusion. No other
evidence was presented on this serious charge which, in its aggravated form could, at the least,
be punished by reclusion perpetua due to the proscription against the death penalty.* Yet,
despite the opportunity and intervening time to do so, not even a certification that appellant was
not a licensed firearm holder was obtained from the Firearms and Explosives Office or the local
command of the Philippine National Police. And this brings us to the question of the necessity
and the quantum of evidence for proving a negative allegation in an information, in this case the
lack of a firearms license or permit.

The evidentiary rule on negative averments in the 1940 Rules of Court [54] as adopted in the
1964 Rules of Court[55] in criminal cases was as follows:

"Sec. 2 Burden of proof in criminal cases. - In criminal cases the burden of proof as to the
offense charged lies on the prosecution. A negative fact alleged by the prosecution need not be
proved unless it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged." (Italics ours.)
While the italicized portion was not carried over to the revised Rules on evidence, there is no
reason to believe that such requirement for proof of a negative element of the offense charged
has been dispensed with, since it is specifically provided therein that the "(b)urden of proof is the
duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law." [56]

As applied to prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, the present rule on
proving the negative fact of lack of a license actually harks back to the case of People vs.
Quebral,[57] where we find this passage clarifying the seemingly contentious pronouncements on
the matter:

"The rule is, and has always been, that, if the subject of the negative averment, like, for
instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law, inheres in the offense as an
essential ingredient thereof, the prosecution has the burden of proving the same (Sec. 297, Act
No. 190; U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303, 306, 307). In view, however, of the difficult office of proving
a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such circumstance, need do no more than make a
prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. (U.S. vs. Tria, supra) It would certainly be
anomalous to hold 'x x x that mere difficulty in discharging a burden of making proof should
displace it; and as a matter of principle the difficulty only relieves the party having the burden of
evidence from the necessity of creating positive conviction entirely by his own evidence so that,
when he produces such evidence as it is in his power to produce, its probative effect is
enhanced by the silence of his opponent' (22 C.J., pp. 81, 82).
xxx
"Section 770 of the Administrative Code provides that 'no person shall practice medicine in the
Philippine Islands without having previously obtained the proper certificate of registration issued
by the Board of Medical Examiners x x x.' This provision clearly includes the want of certificate
as an essential element of the offense charged. The negative fact is not separable from the
offense as defined. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that negative fact,
and failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal." (Italics in the original text.)
While the offenses involved or discussed therein were illegal practice of medicine without the
certificate of registration and the unlawful act of voting without the qualifications required by law,
the rationale evidently applies to illegal possession of firearms without a license. Thus, although
there were some supervening departures from the doctrine announced therein, the principle in
Quebral was adopted in People vs. Pajenado[58] where we held:

"Upon the question of whether or not appellant should also be convicted of the crime of illegal
possession of a firearm, We agree with both appellant's counsel and the Solicitor General that
the appealed decision should be reversed.
"It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758 could be
invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal possession of
a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm, but We are of the
considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which
provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the
prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if 'it is an
essential ingredient of the offense charged', the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this
case to prove that the firearm used by appellant in committing the offense was not properly
licensed.
"It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the
offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant x x x
specifically alleged that he had no 'license or permit to possess' the .45 caliber pistol mentioned
therein. Thus, it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative
fact but to prove it. x x x." (Emphasis supplied.)
This doctrinal rule was reiterated in People vs. Tiozon,[59] People vs. Caling, supra, People vs.
Ramos, et al.,[60] People vs. Arce,[61] and People vs. Deunida,[62] and this constitutes the present
governing case law on this question. We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is
the inescapable duty of the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offense as alleged
against the accused in an information, which allegations must perforce include any negative
element provided by the law to integrate that offense. We have reiterated quite recently the
fundamental mandate that since the prosecution must allege all the elements of the offense
charged, then it must prove by the requisite quantum of evidence all the elements it has thus
alleged.[63]

Applied to the cases at bar, we cannot conceive of how, under the demonstrated circumstances
herein, we can sustain a judgment of conviction on this particular charge. It may be well to recall
that how the firearm came into appellant's possession is a seriously contested issue, with the
prosecution witnesses merely stating that they saw the gun only when appellant aimed and fired
at the victims, but with appellant contending that he actually wrested it from Dennis Macagaling.
As to who in truth was the possessor of the firearm prior to the incident cannot be determined
with certitude due to the paucity of the evidence thereon. In fine, since all that can be deduced is
that appellant was in possession of the gun only on that occasion for a transitory purpose and
for the short moment coeval therewith, it cannot be concluded that he had the animus
possidendi which is required for the offense charged.

The highly unsatisfactory identification of the gun, coupled with the intervening time between its
retrieval from appellant to its presentation in the court below, increases our misgivings on
whether it was in fact the weapon involved. Indeed, such lack of positive identification is virtually
equivalent to the non-production of the real firearm in court and is analogous to the situation in
People vs. Caling, supra, where the rifle allegedly involved in the case was not presented in
evidence. We held that such failure effectively closed the door to any proof of the negative fact
that no license or permit therefor had been issued to the accused therein.

The foregoing disquisitions in Quebral, Pajenado and other cited cases have inevitably clinched
the case for herein appellant on this accusation, this time by reason of the abject failure of the
prosecution to adduce the requisite evidence on its negative averment. Even on the assumption
that mere prima facie evidence of the lack of a license or permit on the part of appellant would
suffice, still the self-serving, unexplained and undocumented conclusion thereon of Pfc. Roque
Fesalbon could not even assume a rough approximation of that evidential quantum.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court finding accused-appellant Leonito Macagaling y
Atillano guilty of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1814 and also of homicide in
Criminal Case No. 1815 is hereby AFFIRMED. However, its judgment in Criminal Case No.
1834 for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition is REVERSED and said accused-
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged therein on reasonable doubt, with costs
de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131116, August 27, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ,

ARTEMIO AVERION, LANDRITO “DING” PERADILLAS AND LUIS CORCOLON, ACCUSED.
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ AND ARTEMIO AVERION, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

What is before this Court is an appeal from the decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 160,
Pasig City,[1] finding accused Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon y Fadialan, Landrito "Ding"
Peradillas and Artemio Averion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder committed against
Nelson Peñalosa and Rickson Peñalosa, and sentencing each of the accused, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused Antonio Sanchez, Landrito
"Ding" Peradillas, Luis Corcolon, and Artemio Averion GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER punishable under ART. 48 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
each of said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally,
the heirs of the victims each the sum of P100,000.00 for the death of Nelson Peñalosa and
Rickson Peñalosa, P50,000.00 as actual damages and moral damages of P 50,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs."

"SO ORDERED.

"City of Pasig.

"December 27, 1996.

"(s/t) MARIANO M. UMALI

"Judge"[2]
On March 1, 1994, Senior State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Calamba, Laguna, an information for double murder against accused Antonio L.
Sanchez, Luis Corcolon y Fadialan, Landrito "Ding" Peradillas and Artemio Averion, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
"That on or about April 13, 1991, at about 7:45 p.m. more or less, in Barangay Curba,
Municipality of Calauan, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding one another, with
treachery and evident premeditation, and with the use of a motor vehicle, at night time, all the
accused then being armed and committed in consideration of a price, reward or promise and of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shoot with the use of
automatic weapons inflicting multiple gunshot wounds upon Nelson Peñalosa and Rickson
Peñalosa which caused their instantaneous deaths to the damage and prejudice of their heirs
and relatives.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."[3]
On March 16, 1994, the case was raffled to Branch 34, Regional Trial Court, Calamba,
Laguna.[4] On March 17, 1994, the court ordered the arrest of accused Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis
Corcolon and Ding Peradillas. On the same date, Artemio Averion voluntarily surrendered to the
court, which ordered Averion's transfer to the provincial jail, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. [5]
Thereafter, the trial court committed the accused to the custody of proper authorities. [6]

Upon arraignment on April 10, 1995, all the accused pleaded not guilty. [7] The trial of the case
thereby ensued. On December 27, 1996, the trial court convicted all the accused of the complex
crime of double murder, as charged, the dispositive portion of which is set out in the opening
paragraph of this opinion.

On February 27, 1997, all the accused, except Ding Peradillas, were present for the
promulgation of the decision. Peradillas was a member of the Philippine National Police and
was under the custody of his superiors. The trial court ordered his custodian to explain
accused's non-appearance. On March 14, 1997, P/C Supt. Roberto L. Calinisan, Chief, PNP-
PACC Task Force Habagat, denied any knowledge of the murder case against Peradillas.
Hence, Peradillas was not suspended from the service pending trial. However, at the time that
Peradillas was to be presented to the court for the promulgation of the decision, he had
disappeared and could not be located by his custodian.[8] The promulgation of the decision as to
him was in absentia. Peradillas and Corcolon did not appeal from the decision.

Accused Antonio L. Sanchez and Artemio Averion filed their respective appeals to this Court.

The facts are as follows:

On April 13, 1991, at around 10:00 in the morning, state witness Vivencio Malabanan, team
leader of a group of policemen, went to the Bishop Compound in Calauan, Laguna, as part of
the security force of mayor Antonio L. Sanchez. After a while, accused Ding Peradillas arrived
and asked for mayor Sanchez. Peradillas informed mayor Sanchez that there would be a
birthday party that night at Dr. Virvilio Velecina's house in Lanot, Calauan, Laguna, near the
abode of Peradillas. Peradillas assured mayor Sanchez of Nelson Peñalosa's presence thereat.
Dr. Velecina was a political opponent of mayor Sanchez for the mayoralty seat of Calauan,
Laguna. Mayor Sanchez then replied, "Bahala na kayo mga anak. Ayusin lang ninyo ang
trabaho," and left the premises. Peradillas immediately called Corcolon and Averion and relayed
the message - "Ayos na ang paguusap at humanap na lang ng sasakyan." All the accused,
including Malabanan, understood it as an order to kill Nelson Peñalosa, one of the political
leaders of Dr. Velecina.[9]

Afterwards, Peradillas, Corcolon and Averion made arrangements to acquire two-way radios
and a vehicle for the operation. At around 2:30 in the afternoon, Malabanan and the three
accused went their separate ways and agreed to meet at mayor Sanchez' house at 6:00 in the
evening. Malabanan returned to his detachment area at Dayap, proceeded to the municipal hall,
then went home where Peradillas fetched him at 6:00 p.m. They proceeded to mayor Sanchez'
house where they met Averion and Corcolon, with the car and two-way radios.[10]

At around 7:00 in the evening, Malabanan and the three accused boarded the car and went to
Marpori Poultry Farm in Barangay Lanot, near Dr. Velecina's house. Peradillas alighted and
walked towards his own house, near Dr. Velecina's house, to check whether Nelson Peñalosa
was at the party.

Thereafter, using the two-way radio, Peradillas informed the occupants of the car that Nelson
Peñalosa's jeep was leaving the Velecina compound. Accused Averion immediately drove the
car to the front of Peradillas' house and the latter hopped in the car's back seat. Corcolon sat in
the front seat beside him; witness Malabanan sat at the left side of the backseat and Peradillas
stayed at the right side of the back seat. The group pursued Peñalosa's jeep. When the
accused's car was passing Victoria Farms, located about 100 meters from Peñalosa compound,
Corcolon ordered Averion to overtake Peñalosa's jeep. As the car overtook the jeep, Peradillas
and Corcolon fired at Peñalosa's jeep, using M-16 and baby armalite rifles, executed in
automatic firing mode. There were three bursts of gunfire. Based on the sketch prepared by
Malabanan, illustrating the relative position of their car and Nelson's jeep at the time of the
shooting, the assailants were at the left side of the jeep.[11]

Rickson Peñalosa, son of Nelson Peñalosa, fell from the jeep. The jeep, however, continued
running in a zigzag position until it overturned in front of Irais Farm. After the shooting, the
accused proceeded to the house of mayor Sanchez in Bai, Laguna, and reported to mayor
Sanchez that Peñalosa was already dead.[12]

Together with his superior SPO4 Lanorio and photographer Romeo Alcantara, policeman Daniel
Escares went to the crime scene. There, he saw the body of Nelson Peñalosa slumped at the
driver seat of the owner-type jeep. They recovered the body of Rickson Peñalosa slumped on a
grassy place not far from where they found Nelson Peñalosa. After all the evidence and
photographs were taken, they brought the cadavers to Funeraria Señerez. Daniel Escares
submitted his investigation report of the incident to the Provincial Director, Laguna PNP
Command.[13]

Dr. Ruben B. Escueta, Rural Health Physician, Rural Health Unit, Calauan, Laguna, conducted
an autopsy on the bodies of Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa. Nelson Peñalosa suffered massive
intra-cranial hemorrhage and died of cranial injury due to gunshot wounds. Rickson Peñalosa
died of massive intra thoracic hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds.[14] Dr. Escueta, as a defense
witness, testified that based on the points of entrance and exit of the wounds sustained by the
Peñalosas, it was not possible for the assailants to be at the left side of the victims. [15] It
contradicted Malabanan's testimony that they were at the left side of the victims when the
shooting took place. He further stated that based on the wounds inflicted on the victims, the
assailants were either in a sitting or squatting position when they shot the victims. Some of the
wounds indicated an upward trajectory of the bullets.

On September 15, 1993, Janet P. Cortez, PNP ballistician, completed the ballistic tests
conducted on the twelve (12) empty shells found at the crime scene and the M-16 baby armalite
surrendered by Corcolon.[16] She concluded that the 12 empty shells were fired using three (3)
different firearms, one of which was the M-16 baby armalite.[17]

On August 18, 1995, Adelina Peñalosa, common law wife of Nelson Peñalosa and mother of
Rickson, testified that the whole family was in mourning and could not eat after what
happened.[18] She testified that the family incurred P250,000.00 for funeral expenses, but failed
to present the appropriate receipts. She also stated that Nelson Peñalosa was earning one (1)
million pesos per annum from his businesses. However, no income tax return or other proofs
were shown to substantiate the statement.[19]

The accused interposed the defense of alibi and denial.

Luis Corcolon stated that he spent the whole day of April 13, 1991, until 8:30 in the evening,
supervising the poultry farm of his employers, Edgardo Tanchico and Orlando Dizon. He denied
that he was in the company of Averion and Peradillas that day, and that he participated in the
Peñalosa killings. He denied that he was ever assigned as a security guard of mayor Sanchez.
He claimed that the murder charges were concocted against them for his refusal to testify
against mayor Sanchez in the Gomez-Sarmenta case. He alleged that he was maltreated,
tortured, electrocuted and forced to implicate mayor Sanchez in the Gomez-Sarmenta rape-
slayings. He denied that he owned the M-16 baby armalite used in killing the Peñalosas.[20]

Detention prisoner George Medialdea corroborated Corcolon's statement that they were
implicated in the Peñalosa killing for their refusal to testify against mayor Sanchez. He claimed
that Malabanan confessed to him that the latter had killed the Peñalosas, but with the aid of
CAFGU men and not herein accused. He averred that Corcolon and Averion were wrongfully
implicated in the murder charges in deference to the wishes of the investigators. [21] Zoilo Ama,
another detention prisoner, claimed that Malabanan confessed that he killed the Peñalosas, but
did not mention the involvement of Corcolon, Averion and mayor Sanchez. [22]

Accused Artemio Averion, a godson of mayor Sanchez, denied that he was involved in the
Peñalosa slayings. On April 13, 1991, he claimed that he was in Lucena City, attending to his
ailing father. He stayed there until April 15, 1991. He maintained that he was wrongfully
implicated in the Peñalosa killings for his refusal to testify against mayor Sanchez regarding the
Gomez-Sarmenta rape-slayings. Malabanan asked for his forgiveness for falsely incriminating
them in the Peñalosa case.[23]

Jesus Versoza, PNP Officer, Camp Crame, denied the allegations of Medialdea and Averion
that they were tortured and forced to testify against mayor Sanchez. [24]

Accused mayor Antonio L. Sanchez stated that on April 12, 1991, he went to Anilao, Batangas,
with his family. Around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 13, 1991, his family went to Tagaytay City
and stayed overnight at Taal Vista Lodge. Around 10:00 in the morning of April 14, 1991, they
went home to Calauan, Laguna. After reaching his abode in Calauan around 12:00 noon, mayor
Sanchez learned of the ambush-slayings of the Peñalosas. He immediately ordered an
investigation of the case. He denied any involvement in the killing of the victims. [25]

The trial court ruled that the prosecution's evidence clearly and convincingly established the
participation of the four (4) accused in killing the Peñalosas. Malabanan gave a sincere, frank
and trustworthy account of the circumstances surrounding the killing. Furthermore, the trial court
explained the discrepancies between Malabanan's recollection of how the victims were shot and
Dr. Escuesta's conclusion on what transpired based on the injuries sustained by the victims.

The trial court stated that the doctor's conclusion was based on the assumption that the victims
were in a sitting position inside the jeep. However, it was possible that after the first burst of
gunfire, the victims were hit and fell. During the second burst of gunfire, the victims were lying
down or in a crouching position. Thus, the entry-exit points of the bullets did not entirely
correspond to Malabanan's account, which was based on the assumption that the victims did
not change their positions during the shooting incident.

The trial court ruled that the accused conspired in committing the crime. Treachery was present,
thereby qualifying the crime to murder. It appreciated the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, nighttime and use of motor vehicle.

The trial court considered the crime as a complex crime of double murder punishable under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, at the time of the commission of the offense on
April 13, 1991, there was a constitutional proscription on the imposition of the death penalty.
Thus, each of the accused was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and to pay damages to the
heirs of the victims, as earlier quoted.

Accused mayor Antonio L. Sanchez and Artemio Averion jointly appealed from the decision to
the Supreme Court.

In their sole assignment of error, accused mayor Sanchez and Averion contended that the trial
court failed to recognize the material inconsistencies between Malabanan's testimony and the
physical and scientific evidence presented before it. They pointed out the following
inconsistencies, to wit:
1. Malabanan testified that a) when they fired at the victims, they were about
the same elevation;[26] b) they used two (2) guns in killing the vicitms;[27] c)
they were at the left side of the victims when the shooting incident
occurred.[28] However, Dr. Escueta's autopsy report revealed that: 1) the
assailants were at a lower elevation; 2) three (3) kinds of guns were used;
 and 3) based on the injuries, assailants were on the right side of the
victims.

2. Malabanan's affidavit "Exhibit V" made on August 16, 1993, and sworn to
on August 17, 1993, bears two (2) signatures of the affiant Malabanan and
dated September 15, 1993. However, during cross-examination,
Malabanan stated that he executed and signed the affidavit on one
occasion only, August 15, 1993.

3. Aurelio Centeno testified in the case of Gomez-Sarmenta slayings that

Malabanan only responded to the report that Peñalosa had been killed. He
averred that contrary to Malabanan's report, the latter was not at the crime
scene.

The two accused further averred that the material inconsistencies between Malabanan's
testimony and the autopsy and laboratory findings and conclusions seriously affect his
credibility. They stressed that Malabanan has sufficient motive to implicate mayor Sanchez and
Corcolon in the Peñalosa killings due to threats of mayor Sanchez. They alleged that although
generally alibi is considered a weak defense, there are times when it is worthy of credence,
such as in this case.

The Solicitor General supports the trial court's ruling that the prosecution adequately established
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Malabanan positively identified the accused
as the perpetrators. He testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner. The defense failed to satisfactorily show that Malabanan had an ill motive to testify
falsely against the accused. The alleged threat to Malabanan's life was not adequately
established or sufficient for him to falsely implicate the accused. As regards the supposed
inconsistencies between Malabanan's account of the event vis á vis the autopsy and ballistic
reports, the Solicitor General pointed out that both vehicles were running at the time of the
ambush. It was a matter of instinct for the victims to shift positions as they were fired upon.
Thus, contrary to Dr. Escueta's conclusion, it was not impossible that the victims were hit from
the right side of their bodies, even if assailants were physically situated at the victims' left side.
Hence, the apparent inconsistencies do not affect witness Malabanan's credibility.

After a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, we agree with the trial court that the
prosecution adequately established accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Malabanan gave a detailed account of the planning, preparation and the shooting incident. He
narrated the participation of each of the accused, to wit: (1) the order given by mayor Sanchez
to execute Peñalosa; (2) Averion's acquisition of a vehicle and two-way radios to be used for the
operation and in driving the car; (3) Peradillas' act of relaying the information that Nelson
Peñalosa's jeep was leaving the Velecina compound; 4) the way they pursued the victims; and
5) Corcolon and Peradillas' act of firing and killing the Peñalosas.

The accused concentrated mainly on the seeming contradiction between the narration of
Malabanan on how the victims were shot, and the physician's report on the location of injuries
sustained by them.

However, as the Solicitor General stated, both vehicles were running at the time of the shootout.
It was unlikely that the victims drove in a straight line parallel to that of the assailants. In fact,
Malabanan testified that while being fired at, Peñalosa's jeepney was running in zigzag
manner.[29] It was a natural reaction for Peñalosa to evade the assailants as much as possible
and to try to dodge the bullets. Furthermore, the assailants fired the guns in automatic firing
mode. Thus, the bullets burst out in different directions simultaneously. Hence, it was not
impossible for the victims to be hit in different parts of the body.
"This Court has held time and again that any minor lapses in the testimony of a witness tend to
buttress, rather than weaken, his or her credibility, since they show that he or she was neither
coached nor were his or her answers contrived. Witnesses are not expected to remember every
single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."[30]

Furthermore, the fact that the trial court relied on the testimony of a single witness does not
affect the verdict of conviction. Criminals are convicted, not on the number of witnesses against
them, but on the credibility of the testimony of even one witness, who is able to convince the
court of the guilt of the accused beyond a shadow of doubt. [31] What witness can be more
credible than someone who was in the planning, preparation and execution of the crime.

The inconsistency between the affidavit and testimony of Malabanan is too minor to affect his
credibility. At any rate, we have held that affidavits are generally subordinate in importance to
open court declarations. Affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in
mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply
signs them after the same have been read to him.[32]

Accused-appellants raised that Malabanan's delay in reporting the involvement of the accused
in the crime casts doubt on his credibility. However, jurisprudence teaches us that delay in
revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of
a witness, especially where such witness gives a sufficient explanation for the delay.[33] It was
natural for Malabanan to keep silent during that time for, aside from being a co-conspirator,
mayor Sanchez was a powerful opponent.

Consequently, we find that accused-appellants' defenses of alibi and denial are bereft of merit.
The defenses of alibi and denial are worthless in the face of positive testimony of a witness
showing the involvement of each of the accused.

However, we disagree with the trial court that the accused committed a single complex crime of
double murder. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means of
committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be
imposed.

The question is whether the act of shooting the victims using armalites in automatic firing mode
constitutes a single act and, thus, the felonies resulting therefrom are considered as complex
crimes. We rule in the negative.

In People v. Vargas, Jr., we ruled that "several shots from a Thompson sub-machine, in view of
its special mechanism causing several deaths, although caused by a single act of pressing the
trigger, are considered several acts. Although each burst of shots was caused by one single act
of pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, in view of its special mechanism the person firing
it has only to keep pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his finger and it would fire
continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be considered as
producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them." [34] In
the instant case, Malabanan testified that he heard three bursts of gunfire from the two armalites
used by accused Corcolon and Peradillas. Thus, the accused are criminally liable for as many
offenses resulting from pressing the trigger of the armalites. Therefore, accused are liable for
two counts of murder committed against the victims, Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa, instead of
the complex crime of double murder.

Evidently, treachery was present in the execution of the crimes. The attack against the victims,
who were unarmed, was sudden, catching them unaware and giving them no opportunity to
defend themselves.[35] The presence of treachery qualifies the crimes to murder.
Conspiracy is likewise adequately established. Notwithstanding the fact that mayor Sanchez
was not at the crime scene, we are convinced that he was not only a co-conspirator, he was the
mastermind of the ambush slayings or the principal by inducement.[36] Malabanan testified that
Nelson Peñalosa was killed upon order of mayor Sanchez. After the commission of the crime,
the assailants reported to mayor Sanchez. In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the
conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What is important is that the participants
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a
common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim. Conspiracy renders
appellants liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation
because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.[37]

The trial court properly appreciated the existence of evident premeditation. The prosecution
clearly showed the presence of the following requisites: a) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to
their determination; and c) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to
allow them to reflect upon the consequences of their acts.[38] As early as 10:00 in the morning,
the accused had conspired to kill Nelson Peñalosa. They even looked for two-way radios and a
vehicle to be used for the operation. Indeed, sufficient time had lapsed to allow the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of their actions.

Accused specifically used a motor vehicle to execute the crime. Thus, the aggravating
circumstance of use of a motor vehicle must be appreciated.

However, we cannot appreciate the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime; while the
crime was committed at night, the prosecution failed to show that the malefactors specifically
sought this circumstance to facilitate the criminal design.[39] The fact that the crime happened at
7:00 in the evening does not indicate that accused made use of the darkness to conceal the
crime and their identities.

At the time of the commission of the crime on April 13, 1991, the penalty for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Considering the presence of aggravating circumstances, the accused should be sentenced to
the death penalty for each murder. However, in view of the constitutional proscription of the
death penalty at that time, each of the accused is sentenced to two (2) penalties of reclusion
perpetua.

Regarding the civil liability of the accused, the trial court ordered the accused to pay the heirs of
Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa each, the sum of P100,000.00, P50,000.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

The P50,000.00 award as actual damages should be deemed as indemnity for the untimely
demise of the victims. We have held that only expenses supported by receipts and which
appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death of the victims may be
allowed.[40] No proof was presented to sustain the award of actual damages.

Similarly, we can not award damages for loss of earning capacity. All that was presented in
evidence was the testimony of the common law wife, Adelina Peñalosa, that Nelson earned
P1,000,000.00 a year. We have held that "for lost income due to death, there must be unbiased
proof of the deceased's average income. Self-serving, hence unreliable statement, is not
enough."[41]

Considering the attendance of aggravating circumstances, we sustain the award of exemplary

damages of P30,000.00, per victim, in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code. [42]
As regards moral damages, we affirm the P50,000.00 awarded to the heirs of Rickson
Peñalosa. [43] His mother, Adelina Peñalosa, testified to the suffering caused by his death.[44] We
also sustain the award of moral damages to the heirs of Nelson Peñalosa. His common law wife
testified to the mental anguish suffered by the family due to Nelson's death.[45] Under Article
2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased. However, the common law wife is not entitled to share in the award of moral
damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 160, Pasig
City, and finds accused-appellants Antonio L. Sanchez and Artemio Averion guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder, and sentences each of them to suffer two (2)
penalties of reclusion perpetua, and each to pay jointly and severally the respective heirs of
victims Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa, as follows:
1) Indemnity for death - P 50,000.00
2) Moral damages - 50,000.00
3) Exemplary damages - 30,000.00
Total P130,000.00
With costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37396, April 30, 1979

MARCELINO LONTOK, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALFREDO GORGONIO, AS

PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF SAN JUAN, RIZAL, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the propriety of an information containing the charge of "reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries".

On March 29, 1973, Marcelino Lontok, Jr. was charged with that delito compuesto in the
municipal court of San Juan, Rizal. In the information, it was alleged that on November 14,
1972, while Lontok was recklessly driving his Mercedes Benz car, he bumped a passenger jeep
and caused damage to it in the sum of P780 and that the bumping also caused physical injuries
to three passengers who were incapacitated from performing their customary labor for a period
of less than ten days (Criminal Case No. 26116).

Lontok filed a motion to quash that part of the information wherein the offense of lesiones leves
through reckless imprudence is charged. He contended that, because that offense prescribes in
two months and it was committed on November 14, 1972, the last day of the sixty-day period for
filing the charge as to that offense was January 14, 1973. He prayed that the information be
amended by excluding that light offense.

The fiscal opposed the motion to quash. The municipal court denied it. Lontok pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment. But instead of going to trial, he filed in this Court on August 30, 1973 a
petition wherein he prayed that the amendment of the information be ordered by deleting the
portion thereof wherein the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence is
charged.

The Solicitor General in his comment agrees with Lontok's view that damage to property through
reckless imprudence cannot be complexed with a light offense, that the light offense had already
prescribed, and that two informations should have been filed. He manifested that he would ask
the prosecuting fiscal to amend the information. Nevertheless, he concluded that since Lontok
did not raise any jurisdictional issue, his petition for certiorari was not proper and, therefore, it
should be dismissed.

The issue is whether Lontok, over his objection, can be tried by the Municipal court on an
information charging the complex crime of damage to property in the sum of P780 and lesiones
leves through reckless imprudence.

We hold that he should be tried only for damage to property through reckless imprudence,
which, being punished by a maximum fine of P2, 340, a correctional penalty, is a less grave
felony (Arts. 9, 25 and 26 and 365, Revised Penal Code). As such, it cannot be complexed with
the light offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence which, as correctly contended
by Lontok, had already prescribed since that crime prescribes in sixty days.

There is a complex crime when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
or when a grave or less grave offense is a means of committing another grave or less grave
offense.

As originally enacted, article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provided that the crime is complex
when a single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when an offense is a necessary means of
committing the other. Commonwealth Act No. 4000 amended article 48 by substituting the
words "grave or less grave felonies" for the word "crimes" in the original version, thus eliminating
a light felony as a component part of a complex crime.

Parenthetically, it may be noted in passing that the concept of complex crime was applied in
criminal negligence or quasi-offenses (People vs. Lara, 75; Phil. 786 and People vs. Agito, 103
Phil. 526, regarding multiple homicide through reckless imprudence; People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil.
1294, regarding malversation through falsification by reckless negligence; Samson vs. Court of
Appeals, 103 Phil. 277, regarding estafa through falsification by reckless negligence; Angeles
vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151; Lapuz vs. Court of Appeals, 94 Phil. 710 and People vs. Vendiola, 115
Phil. 122, regarding homicide, grave physical injuries and grave damage to property, all through
reckless imprudence).

In all the foregoing cases, it is assumed that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but is
simply a way of committing a crime and it merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability. Negligence becomes a punishable act when it results in a crime (People vs. Faller, 67
Phil. 529).

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting
offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave
felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting
from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in
one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50
Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to
property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a
separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos
graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363,
365).

A chief of police likewise did not err in filing separate complaints for slight physical injuries and
grave oral defamation committed on the same occasion by one person against the same victim
(Manduriao vs. Habana, L-28069, August 18, 1977, 78 SCRA 241).
Where a complaint for slight physical injuries and grave threats was filed in the justice of the
peace court under the old Judiciary Law, the said court had jurisdiction to try the slight physical
injuries case and could only undertake the preliminary investigation of the latter offense (People
vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 586. See People vs. Acierto, 57 Phil. 614 and People vs. Benitez, 73 Phil.
671).

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by the investigating fiscal, is different from the
instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos
graves and damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore,
constituted a complex crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light
offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok's s criminal liability therefor was already
extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule
117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining
Lontok's motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that light offense.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of May 21 and July 12, 1973 are set aside. It is ordered
to try Lontok only for damage to property through reckless imprudence. The information need
not be amended, it being understood that Lontok has no more culpability for the offense of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence charged therein. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ROLLY ADRIANO Y

SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA SANTIAGO Y ADRIANO, JOHN DOE AND
PETER DOE, ACCUSED, ROLLY ADRIANO Y SAMSON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 04028, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court dated 7 April 2009,
convicting accused-appellant Rolly Adriano y Santos (Adriano) for the crime of Homicide (Crim.
Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of Ofelia Bulanan (Bulanan) and for the crime of Murder
(Crim. Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of Danilo Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in "People of the
Philippines v. Rolly Adriano y Sales."

Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2) sets of Information read:
Crim. Case No. 13159-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot
several times with assorted firearms Ofelia Bulanan, hitting her on the different parts of her
body, resulting in her death to the damage of her heirs.[3]

Crim. Case No. 13160-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot
several times with assorted firearms Danilo Cabiedes, hitting him on the different parts of his
body, resulting in his death to the damage of his heirs.[4]
Version of the Prosecution:

On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles (PO1 Garabiles)
and PO2 Alejandro Santos (PO2 Santos), in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road.[5]

While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corollo
(Corollo) with plate no. WHK 635, heading towards the same direction, overtook them and the
car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV (CRY) with plate no. CTL 957. [6]

When the Corollo reached alongside the CRY, the passenger on the front seat of the Corollo
shot the CRY and caused the CRY to swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four
(4) armed men then suddenly alighted the Corollo and started shooting at the driver of the CRY,
who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was
standing near the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men hurried back
to the Corollo and immediately left the crime scene. PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos followed
the Corollo but lost track of the latter.[7]

Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was pronounced
dead on arrival (DOA) at the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot wounds
on the left side of his chest while Bulanan died on the spot after being shot in the head.

During the investigation, the police learned that the Corollo was registered under the name of
Antonio Y. Rivera (Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corollo but
clarified that the Corollo is one of the several cars he owns in his car rental business, which he
leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's shop with the Corollo, where he
was identified by PO2 Santos and PO1 Garabiles as one of the four assailants who alighted
from the passenger's seat beside the driver of the Corollo and shot Cabiedes. He was
immediately arrested and brought to the Provincial Special Operations Group (PSOG)
headquarters in Cabanatuan City.[8]

In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered
one (1) deformed fired bullet from a .45 caliber firearm and five (5) cartridges from a .45 caliber
firearm.[9]

Yersion of the Defense

Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of the incident, he was
at his house in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child. After doing the
laundry, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop and left it there. [10]

At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari), to ask for a
lighter spring needed to repair his motorcycle. After having coffee in Mallari's house, Adriano
went home and brought his child to his mother. On his way to his mother's house, he met his
brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After leaving his child at his mother's house,
Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights, where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon
(Dizon). After the fights, he left the cockpit at about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest.[11]

After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store and stayed there. At
around 5:00 p.m., he went back home. After a while, he received a call from a certain Boyet
Garcia (Garcia), who borrowed the Corollo from him, which he rented from Rivera.[12]

At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corollo back. After dropping Garcia off, Adriano went
to Rivera to return the Corollo, where he was arrested by police officers, thrown inside the
Corollo's trunk, and brought to a place where he was tortured.[13]

The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga, and Dizon corroborated
Adriano's testimony.[14]

When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean Adriano alias "Denden,"
Abba Santiago y Adriano, John Doe, and Peter Doe remained at large.

During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1) PO1 Garabiles, (2) PO2 Santos,
(3) Police Senior Inspector Roger V. Sebastian, (4) SPO2 Alejandro Eduardo, (5) PO2 Jay
Cabrera, (6) PO3 Antonio dela Cruz, (7) Adelaida Cabiedes, widow of Cabiedes, and (8) Ricky
Flores.

On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga, Mallari, and Dizon as
witnesses.

Ruling of the Lower Courts

After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's defense of alibi on the
ground that it was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. According to the RTC,
Adriano's alibi cannot prevail over the testimonies of credible witnesses, who positively identified
Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Also, contrary to the allegations of the defense,
the RTC gave full credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, PO1 Garabiles and PO2
Santos. The RTC determined that the defense failed to show proof that will show or indicate that
PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos were impelled by improper motives to testify against Adriano.

The RTC found as proven the assessment of damages against the accused. Thus did the RTC
order Adriano to pay the heirs of Cabiedes the amount of P222,482.00 based on the following:
(1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as funeral expenses; (2) Sixty Thousand
Pesos (P60,000.00) as expenses for the food served during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand
Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos (P12,482.00) as groceries used and served during the wake;
and Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) for the parts and service repair of the CRV. [15]

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision dated 7 April 2009 reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder,
as charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Danilo Cabiedes in the amount of Php50,000.00 and to pay the sum of Php222,482.00 as actual
damages.

And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for
the death of Ofelia Bulanan, likewise, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that
attended the commission of the offense, he is further sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the amount of Php50,000.00. [16]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the RTC erred when it failed to
appreciate his defense of alibi, as well as the testimonies of the other defense's witnesses.
Adriano contended that the RTC erred when it gave credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses which are inconsistent and contradictory. In detail, Adriano referred to the
following particulars: 1) whether the culprits started shooting when the victim's vehicle was still
in motion; 2) which side of the vehicle did the shooters alight from; 3) the identity of the culprit
who triggered the fatal shot; 4) whether the trip of PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos going to
Camp Olivas, Pampanga was official business; 5) the precise distance of the assailants' vehicle
from that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the precise minutes of the shooting incident.

The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses. According to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution witnesses' positive identification
of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime cannot be overcome by minor inconsistencies
in their testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that these trivial differences in fact constitute
signs of veracity.

On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC that Adriano's claim
that he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of the incident does not convince
because it was not impossible for Adriano to be physically present at the crime scene, in
Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, which can be reached by car in less than an hour.[17]
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City,
Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in Crim. Case Nos. 13159-07 and 13160-07 is AFFIRMED subject to the
Modification that the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity to the
heirs of Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00). In
addition, the Accused-Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes the amount of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia
Bulanan the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[18]
Our Ruling

In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following elements:
1. That a person was killed.

2. That the accused killed him.

3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances

mentioned in Art. 248.

4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements of murder:
(1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive identification of Adriano as one of
perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as generic aggravating
circumstances.

Death of Cabiedes

The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried out to ensure
that the victim is killed and at the same time, to eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or
retaliation from the victim[19] ambush exemplifies the nature of treachery.

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the direct
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated,
two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods or forms of attack employed by him.[20] The "essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any
chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself." [21]

Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed defenseless at the
time of the attack. Adriano, together with the other accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following
the unsuspecting victim along the national highway and by surprise, fired multiple shots at
Cabiedes and then immediately fled the crime scene, causing Cabiedes to die of multiple
gunshot wounds. When the Corollo swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was forced to swiftly
tum to the right and on to the road embankment, finally falling into the canal where his CRV was
trapped, precluding all possible means of defense. There is no other logical conclusion, but that
the orchestrated ambush committed by Adriano, together with his co-accused, who are still on
the loose, was in conspiracy with each other to ensure the death of Cabiedes and their safety.
The means of execution employed was deliberately and consciously adopted by Adriano so as
to give Cabiedes no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.[22]

All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was committed with the presence of
the aggravating circumstances of treachery, which absorbs the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength, and use of firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no way of escaping or
defending himself.

Death of Bulanan

We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was merely a bystander, was killed
by a stray bullet. He was at the wrong place at the wrong time.

Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding the
unknowing victim from repelling the attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had no
intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's
death was random and unintentional and the method used to kill her, as she was killed by a
stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of
Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,[23] pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio
ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano's
intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan's death caused by the bullet
fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault
against Cabiedes.

As we already held in People v. Herrera[24] citing People v. Hilario,[25] "[t]he fact that accused
killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original
intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray
bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting
Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v.
Herrera citing People v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be
different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for
all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la causa es
causa del mal causado', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. [26]
As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida.[27] In the
aforesaid case, we ruled that accused-appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime
but of separate crimes of two counts of murder and seven counts of attempted murder as the
killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single act but of several acts. [28] The
doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.

In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper, when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. Moreover, we also made a distinction
that "when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes,"[29] not a complex crime.

As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered six (6)
cartridges of bullets from a .45 caliber firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a single
burst. Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or more of which, though fired to kill
Cabiedes, killed Bulanan instead. There is thus no complex crime. The felonious acts resulted in
two separate and distinct crimes.

Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing
jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora,[30] where the Court ruled that treachery may be
appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of two separate counts of
murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by
a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery,
qualified both killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus,
we follow the Flora doctrine.

Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan's death was not established, a perusal of
the records would reveal that Bulanan's fact of death was duly established as the prosecution
offered in evidence Bulanan's death certificate.[31]

On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials, are inherently weak
and unreliable because they can easily be fabricated.[32] For alibi to prosper, the accused must
convincingly prove that he was somewhere else at the time when the crime was committed and
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.[33] In the case at bar, Adriano
claimed he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's claim failed
to persuade. As admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour away from
the crime scene, Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it was not physically
impossible for Adriano to be at the crime scene at the time of the incident.

It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when corroborated not by
credible witnesses but by the accused's relatives and friends. Therefore, the defense's evidence
which is composed of Adriano's relatives and friends cannot prevail over the prosecution's
positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. In the case at bar, as the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with
treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance present, the lower penalty should be imposed, which is reclusion perpetua, in
accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that the claimant must establish
with a reasonable degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss by means of competent proof or
the best evidence obtainable.[34] Documentary evidence support the award of actual damages in
this case. The RTC computed the amount of actual damages as P222,482.00. However, a
perusal of the records reveals that the amount of award of actual damages should be
P232,482.00 as duly supported by official receipts.[35] Therefore, we hereby increase the award
of actual damages from P222,482.00 to P232,482.00.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 04028 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant-appellant ROLLY
ADRIANO y SAMSON is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case
No. 13160-07) for the killing of DANILO CABIEDES and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to
pay the heirs of DANILO CABIEDES the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages,
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Two Hundred Thirty Two
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos (P232,482.00) as actual damages.

Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of OFELIA BULANAN
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY
ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of OFELIA BULANAN in the amount of the
amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages in
lieu of actual damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER Y AGUILAR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO- SAN
PEDRO, JUDGE OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 71, PASIG CITY, AND
EVANGELINE PONCE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review[1] of the Orders[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming
sub-silencio a lower court's ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a
second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accused's previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.[3]
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile,
petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366,
including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because
of petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. [4] Seven days later, the MeTC
issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.[5] Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner's loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its
ruling on petitioner's forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC's
order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.[6]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him
to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes
his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding
appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial
relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.[7]

Petitioner laments the RTC's failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having
been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC's decision forfeiting
petitioner's standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Court's attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General's motion not to
file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and
private respondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek
relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner's
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner's non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did
not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection
afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner's Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant's escape from custody or violation of the terms
of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,[8] in relation to
Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the
Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.

The RTC's dismissal of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC's reliance on
People v. Esparas[9] undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC's ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an
accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped
bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the
mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8
of Rule 124.[10]

The mischief in the RTC's treatment of petitioner's non-appearance at his arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Court's treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114[11] of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant's absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond
(subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the
defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and
could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce
the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused's status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC's observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend
the scheduled proceeding"[12] at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the
arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC's proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC's refusal to
defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner's
arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this
petition.

Petitioner's Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused's negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense"[13] protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.[14] It is not disputed that petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."[15]

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. -- Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first
two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to
give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2)
a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a
generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize
"the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible,"[16] unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional
criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the
mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As
early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting
in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not
a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"[17] on three points of analysis: (1) the
object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent
to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is
not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of
criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious
mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification
or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence,
what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce
the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13,
specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed.
Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But
instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave
felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor
to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence
bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.[18] (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.[19]

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying
charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element
of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law[20] (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and
since repeatedly reiterated,[21] stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller[22] that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but]
simply a way of committing it x x x,"[23] has long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon
rejected Faller's conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article
365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found
expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence[24] only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising
from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the
complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be
shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian
conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging
one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting
act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was
based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,[25] decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for
"reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had
been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the
Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga[26]
(promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero[27] (promulgated in
1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas[28] (promulgated in 1960 by the Court
en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva[29] (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per
Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay[30] (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan[31] (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L.,
acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals[32] (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per
Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila[33] (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per
Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan,
where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused's prior acquittal of "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court
explained:[34]

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.[35] x x
x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of
authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,[36]
decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution
of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous
conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor
vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estipona's inconsistency with the post-
war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this
matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.[37] There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals'
conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior
conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from
the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on
Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:[38]

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs.
Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes,
held that -

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.[39]
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva,
joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court's attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining petitioner's plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated
January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property
through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double
jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the
same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage
to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a
vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle
arising from the same mishap."[40] (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner's submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend
in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner's case than People v. Silva, [41] a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court
initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused's claim and dismissed
the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue
following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:[42]

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the
case, holding: --

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were
charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by
them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in
connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and
another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed
by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose
Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case
No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending
that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just
been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted,
whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for
damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles
involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose
Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of
the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the
Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ...
thereby causing an accident.' After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed
in that court ῾for failure of the Government to prosecute'. But some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused
with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to
be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the
Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice
Montemayor --

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests
of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113,
Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to
say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support
the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution
obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice
of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior
court.[43]

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz)
"for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."[44] We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of
double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight
Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor
General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x
x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General,
however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or
disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those
in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is
nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It
was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the
identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.[45] (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible
substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code.
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies[46]); and (2) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit
the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the
mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x
x,"[47] a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models - that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple
non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less
grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a
quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48's framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-
offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light
offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single
charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized
separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the
issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences[48] unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges
were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave
felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts
amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts. [49] Expectedly, this is
the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though
under Republic Act No. 7691,[50] the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the
most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double
jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are
penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and
the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave
or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the
effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,[51] penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,[52] we
interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount
fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an
additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical
injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.[53] (Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-
crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-
conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its
conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a
quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal
code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-
crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and
severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct
concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double
jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.

A becoming regard of this Court's place in our scheme of government denying it the power to
make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes
under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary
means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor
General's argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be
joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing
of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this
Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which
the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x
x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and
the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second
jeopardy for the same offense.[54] (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under
Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will
do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.[55]

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave
or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of
culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and
2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information
in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

COMPLEX CRIME PROPER

G.R. No. 125542, October 25, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ERLINDO TALO,

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Ozamis
City, finding accused-appellant Erlindo Talo guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentencing
him to death and to pay complainant Doris Saguindang the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages and the costs of the suit.

The information against accused-appellant recited —

That on or about the 12th day of May, 1995, at about 2:00 o'clock dawn, in barangay Gata
Daku, municipality of Clarin, province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused ERLINDO TALO, entered the dwelling by
destroying some portion of the toilet of the offended party, armed with a bolo and hunting knife,
and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats, did then and there, with lewd and
unchaste designs, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take and carry away MISS DORIS
SAGUINDANG against her will from the house of her parents, and upon reaching the ricefield,
by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge of her against her will.[2]

The evidence presented by the prosecution shows the following:

At around 9 o'clock in the evening of May 11, 1995, complainant Doris Saguindang retired for
the night in her family's house in Gata Daku, Clarin, Misamis Occidental. At about 2 o'clock in
the morning of the following day, she was awakened by the presence of an intruder in her room,
who identified himself as a rebel and claimed that his "commander" wanted to see complainant.
The man poked a knife at her and covered her mouth to prevent her from making an outcry. He
was wearing briefs, her father's overseas cap, and her sister's shirt. Complainant was led out of
the house through the back door. Outside, the man twice called out, "Commander, we are here,"
but no one responded. The man dragged Doris towards the ricefield about 800 meters from their
house and there, at knife point, forced Doris to have sexual intercourse with him. Doris tried to
fight back but the man was too strong for her. Doris noticed that, aside from a knife, the man
had a bolo with him.[3]

As the man rolled to his side after consummating the sexual act, Doris immediately picked her
clothes and ran naked as fast as she could towards the nearby house of her uncle, Margarito
Saguindang, who later brought her home. Complainant was then accompanied by her parents to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) station where she reported the incident. Complainant
described to SPO2 Jesus Macala her attacker. Seven suspects were presented to her but none
was her assailant. For this reason, the incident was entered in the police blotter of the PNP, but
no complaint was filed in court.[4]

Complainant and her mother also sought the help of their pastor, Ponciano Ayop, Sr., who
arranged for the medical examination of complainant by Dr. Daniel Medina, municipal health
officer of Clarin.[5] Dr. Medina conducted the examination at around 2 o'clock that afternoon and
later issued the following report:

PHYSICAL FINDINGS:

-Vagina slightly hyperemic with whitish muco[u]s fluid at base of the vagina[.] [N]o more hymen
found at the vagina.

- 3 cm. l[i]near abrasion at the right lower thigh 2 in numbers.

- 2 cm. hematoma at right postero lateral aspect of the chest posterior axillary line level 5th rib.

- 1.5 cm. hematoma at left posterior chest at med scapular line level 6th rib.

- 1 cm curvel[i]n[e]ar abrasion at right neck above scapula. . . . .

Conclusions:

1). The above described physical injuries are found in the body of the subject, the age of which
is compatible to the alleged date of infliction. . . . .

Remarks:

5 slides negative for sperm determination . . . .[6]

Dr. Medina testified that the perforation of complainant's hymen could have been caused by
sexual intercourse. As for the mucous found in her genitalia, he said that although it did not
contain any spermatozoa, it was a sign of recent sexual contact. He stated that the absence of
sperm in complainant's genitalia could be due to the fact that she took a bath after the
incident.[7]

With regard to his external examination of complainant, Dr. Medina said that the injury in her
neck was caused by a fingernail and is consistent with complainant's claim that she was choked.
The abrasion on her right thigh, on the other hand, was caused by a rough but not hard object,
while the hematomas on it and on her chest were caused by a hard object.[8]

On cross-examination, Dr. Medina admitted that, although forcible sexual intercourse could
produce lacerations in the vaginal orifice, he did not find any in complainant. With regard to the
perforation of complainant's hymen, he stated that the same could be caused by other factors
such as riding a bicycle, horse, or carabao, and that the perforation could have occurred earlier
than May 12, 1995.[9]

Pastor Ayop and his family took complainant to Bukidnon for a vacation because she was
having nightmares, coming back to Clarin after three weeks, in May 1995. [10]

Then, at around seven o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1995, while Doris and her friends were
walking along the road in Tinaclaan, a neighboring barangay of Gata Daku, she saw accused-
appellant in a nearby ricefield, distributing seedlings to farm workers. Because accused-
appellant was not facing her, complainant could not clearly make out his features but she could
see that his body build resembled that of her attacker. She asked one of her companions, a
certain Enan Undag, accused-appellant's name.[11]

A week later, on June 3, 1995, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, while complainant and a
friend, Grace Endab, were walking along the road in Tinangay Sur, she again saw accused-
appellant coming from the opposite direction. When accused-appellant saw them, he hurriedly
walked past them. Doris, thoroughly shaken, told Endab, who knew of the rape, that the man
they had just encountered was the one who raped her. The latter corroborated complainant on
this matter.[12]

After consulting Ayop and her parents, Doris, on the following Monday, June 5, 1995, filed a
complaint for rape against accused-appellant.[13] She later amended her complaint to charge
accused-appellant with forcible abduction with rape.

Doris positively identified accused-appellant in court as the man who, on May 12, 1995,
abducted and later raped her. She said she saw his face when she was awakened in her room
and in the ricefield where the moon was bright.[14]

Upon cross-examination by the defense, complainant stated that, although she was born in
Gata Daku, she did not know everybody in the barangay since she stayed in Iligan City for three
years to study. Before May 12, 1995, she admitted she had seen accused-appellant once but
she did not know his name. She added that when she was in high school in Clarin, she had
heard of a peeping tom named Erlindo Talo.[15]
Accused-appellant, 50, denied the charge against him. He testified that he was a resident of
Barangay Gata Daku and that he managed a farm in the neighboring barangay Tinaclaan. He
further stated that until he met complainant in court, he had never known her. [16]

As to his whereabouts at the time of the incident, accused-appellant said that at 9 o'clock in the
evening of May 11, 1995, he was in the house of Otelo Londera in Barangay Kinangay Sur,
playing mahjong. Aside from Londera, the other mahjong players were Laureano Basaya and
Buena Narbay. He said that except for a few breaks, they played mahjong until 5 o'clock in the
morning of May 12, 1995. An hour later, accused-appellant allegedly went home to Barangay
Gata Daku. Afterwards, at around 9:30 in the morning, he went to Barangay Tinaclaan, to the
house of Leonardo Fuentes, whose son, Celso, wanted him to procure a piglet. It was there that
he allegedly heard that someone had been raped in Gata Daku. [17]

Although he had a farm in Barangay Tinaclaan, accused-appellant denied that he went there at
7 o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1995, when complainant said she saw him. Accused-
appellant said that at that time, he was in Barangay Kinangay Sur with Celso Fuentes buying a
piglet because the latter's son was celebrating his birthday. Accused-appellant said he went to
his farm in Tinaclaan only at around 11 o'clock to pay his workers.[18]

Accused-appellant likewise denied that he was in Kinangay Sur at around 5 o'clock in the
afternoon of June 3, 1995, because at that time he was allegedly in his farm in Barangay
Tinaclaan gathering shells, locally called kuhol.[19]

On cross-examination, accused-appellant said that Londera's house, where he was allegedly

playing mahjong in the morning of May 12, 1995, is about 500 meters from Gata Daku. He
admitted he used to deliver rice to complainant's house.[20]

Corroborating accused-appellant's alibi were his three alleged mahjong playmates, Otelo
Londera, Buena Narbay, and Laureano Basaya. Londera stated that the distance between his
house and Barangay Gata Daku could be negotiated in 10 minutes by foot. Narbay, for her part,
said she cannot remember whether she played mahjong in Londera's house on the dates in
question.[21]

Other witnesses were presented by the defense, namely, Celso Fuentes, Angel Saldaña, and
Flaviano Narbay, who corroborated accused-appellant's testimony that he was not in his farm in
Barangay Tinaclaan at 7 o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1995. On cross-examination, Narbay,
who had testified that he was in accused-appellant's farm on the date and time in question and
that the accused-appellant did not arrive therein until about 11 o'clock, admitted that he did not
know the year when the events he testified to took place and that the date May 27 was only
supplied to him by the defense counsel.[22]

The defense likewise presented the then incumbent barangay chairman of Gata Daku, Joven
Japay. He said that at around 4:00 in the morning of May 12, 1995, Cesar and Margarito
Saguindang, complainant's father and uncle respectively, went to his house to report that
complainant had been raped at around 2 o'clock that morning. Thereafter, the three of them
went to the house of Cesar Saguindang where he and SPO2 Macala questioned complainant.
She allegedly described her attacker to be around 30 years old, curly haired, bearded, and with
a big body build. On the basis of this alleged description, they did not include accused-appellant
among the possible suspects because, although the latter matches Doris' description as to body
size and height, he is not curly haired nor bearded.[23]

The prosecution recalled complainant to rebut Japay's testimony. She denied having told Japay
that her attacker was curly haired (kulot) because what she said was that his hair was close-
cropped or kopkop. She also denied having said that her attacker was bearded, because
although she used the local term bangason, which, loosely translated, means bearded, what
she really meant was that the man had newly-grown facial hair.[24]
The prosecution also presented two other witnesses to refute accused-appellant's testimony that
he had never been to complainant's house and that there was an all-night mahjong session on
May 11, 1995 in the house of Otelo Londera in Kinangay Sur.

Cesar Saguindang, father of complainant, testified that for three years, accused-appellant
regularly delivered rice to their house in Gata Daku.[25] On the other hand, Antonina Mutia,
whose house in Barangay Kinangay Sur is about 200 meters from that of Otelo Londera,
testified that at around 10 o'clock in the evening of May 11, 1995, she passed by the Londera
residence on her way home from Barangay Tinaclaan. She noticed that the house was very
quiet and, although the adjoining nipa hut where the mahjong sessions were usually played was
lighted, there was no mahjong game being played therein. Before 11 o'clock that night, she
again passed by Londera's house on her way back to Barangay Tinaclaan to look for her
husband who had gone there for the barangay fiesta. She again noticed that Londera's house
was quiet.[26]

As sur-rebuttal to Mutia's testimony, the defense presented Catalina Londera, wife of Otelo
Londera, who said that at around 8 o'clock in the evening of May 11, 1995, she met Mutia and
her husband in the house of a certain Tagaloguin in Barangay Tinaclaan. The three allegedly
went back to Barangay Kinangay Sur on board the Mutia spouses' truck. After arriving home at
around 9 o'clock, her husband, Laureano Basaya, Buena Narbay, and accused-appellant
allegedly started playing mahjong.[27]

The case was thereafter submitted for decision. On April 26, 1996, the trial court rendered its
decision, finding accused-appellant guilty of forcible abduction with rape. The dispositive portion
of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
forcible abduction with rape aggravated by dwelling and nocturnity and qualified by use of a
deadly weapon, sentencing him to DEATH and ordering him to indemnify the complainant
P30,000.00 as moral damages. With cost.[28]

Hence this appeal.

First. Accused-appellant contends that he and complainant had a "previous understanding" and
that their sexual intercourse was consensual. This allegedly explains why (1) there was no
commotion when he and complainant went out of the latter's house as shown by the fact that not
a member of the household was awakened when he dragged her out of her parent's house; and
(2) when he removed her pajamas and underwear, or when he undressed, she did not push him
which would then have allegedly allowed her to escape.[29]

This contention has no merit.

Accused-appellant never claimed that he and complainant had any relationship. In fact, he
claimed he had never met her before. Thus accused-appellant testified:

Do you know the private offended party of this

Q
case, Doris Saguindang?

I don't know her, sir, I have never met her, only

A
here in Court.

Do you still remember that time when did you

Q
first see or meet her in Court?

A The fourth time I attended the hearing, sir. . . . .

 ...

[D]o you know the residence of the parents of

Q
Doris Saguindang?

A I don't know, sir.

Q You have not gone there ever since?

A Never, sir.[30]

Indeed, apart from his bare assertion that he and complainant were lovers, accused-appellant
has shown no other evidence of such relationship, such as love letters, photographs, or other
tokens of endearment. On the contrary, complainant stoutly maintained that she had never
known accused-appellant before and that the latter, at knife point, forced her to go with him and
molested her in a ricefield. Complainant's testimony must be quoted to appreciate her claim:

Now, as you were awaken[ed] . . . by the

Q
accused, what happened?

A He choked me up.

Q What did he say?

He ordered me to stand up because he has

A
some questions to ask.

Q Now, what was your reaction?

A I was nervous and shocked.

....

Q Now, after the accused woke you up, choked

you and commanded you to stand up, what
happened?

A He covered my mouth.

Q Why did he cover your mouth?

A So that I could not shout.

Q Why, did you try to shout for help?

A I was trying to shout but no voice will come out.

Q So, what happened afterwards?

A He forced me to go outside.

Q How did he force you to go outside?

He covered my mouth and the other hand has

A
knife pointing near my chest.

....

Q: Despite of the fact that you were led by that

man outside you did not resist or make any
noise in order your parents to be awaken?
 A I tried my best but he was so strong.

Q You mean he has big muscles?

A Yes, sir. Strong arms.[31]

Accused-appellant makes much of the fact that he was able to take complainant out of her
parent's house without rousing the household from their sleep. That was because complainant
was alone in her room, far from where the other members of her family were sleeping. Her
parents, her twin siblings, and her nephew were the other people in the house when accused-
appellant broke in and abducted complainant. Her parents slept in a separate room furthest from
her room and, while her twin siblings and nephew slept in the room adjoining hers, their rooms
were separated by a concrete wall with an opening near the roof. Accused-appellant prevented
complainant from making an outcry by covering her mouth and poking a knife at her. She was
resisting but she was overpowered. After all, what could an 19-year old girl do to resist a 50-
year old man? As complainant testified:

Q By that time when you were led to that dry

ricefield he was no longer dragging you, am I
correct?

A Still he drag me and he was holding me.

Q He was holding both of your hands?

A He was walking ahead of me and kept on

pulling me. (Witness keep on crying since the
beginning of her testimony)

Q If you have resisted at that time when you were

brought to the dry land or ricefield you could
have escape him away from the hold of that
man?

A How can I escape from him he was holding me

so tightly. It was so painful as if my arm will be
broken.

Q But he did not twist your arms?

A I could not remember but that my shoulder was

sprained.

....

PROS. MEDINA:

Q Now, when you reached to that ricefield which

was harvested together with the accused
Erlindo Talo, forcing you to go there,
threatening you, pointing a knife, did you try to
escape?

A Yes, sir.
 How did you do it? (While answering, witness
Q
was crying)

A I was trying to fight but he was very strong.

....

Q Upon reaching that place, what happened,

upon reaching there, did you try to stop him?

A Yes, sir.

How did you do it? (Witness burst into tears

Q
continuously)

I kicked him because he was trying to remove

A
my pajama.

Q And what happened?

A He successfully removed my pajama.

Q How about your panty?

A Including my panty.

Q How about your blouse?

After removing my panty, he was also removing

A
my blouse.

Q What did you do?

I was trying to grapple the knife because he

A
kept on threatening to stop me.

Q Afterwards, what happened?

....

A He pushed me to lie down on the ground.

Q Did he remove your clothes when you were

standing up or when you were already pushed
down?

A While I was still standing up, he removed my

pants, when I was lying down, he removed my
blouse.

Q All the while, when he was removing your

pants, panty and blouse, what did you do?

A I slapped him.

Q You mean to say, you fought him?

A Yes, sir.
 Q Now, when he successfully removed all your
clothes and you were already down, what did
he do next?

A He lowered his brief.

Q And what did he do to you?

A Then, he raped me.

....

You mean to say, he placed his penis inside

Q
your vagina?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did his penis penetrate your vagina?

A Yes, sir.

You mean to say, his penis stayed inside your

Q
vagina?

A Yes, sir.

....

Q At that time, did you fight him?

A Yes, sir.

Q How did you fight him?

A I kicked him.

Q When you kicked him, what did he do?

A Again, he attempted to stop me.[32]

It is settled that a rape victim is not required to resist her attacker unto death. [33] Force, as an
element of rape, need not be irresistible; it need only be present, and so long as it brings about
the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the
point.[34] Indeed, physical resistance need not be established in rape when, as in this case,
intimidation was exercised upon the victim and she submitted to the rapist's lust because of fear
for her life or for her personal safety.[35] .

The findings of the medical examination conducted by Dr. Medina a day after the incident
confirm complainant's claim that she had been forced to have sexual intercourse by accused-
appellant. Dr. Medina found abrasions on her neck and right thigh as well as hematomas on her
chest, in addition to the complete perforation of her hymen. These clearly establish that
accused-appellant employed force and intimidation to make complainant submit to him.

Finally, complainant's conduct after she had been abused negates any probability that she and
accused-appellant had consented sexual intercourse. After accused-appellant had finished
ravishing her, she ran away naked. She fled to the house of her uncle to whom she reported
what had happened to her. This is not the natural reaction of one who had engaged in
consensual sex. It has been observed that the conduct of a woman following the alleged assault
is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of her claim. [36]
Second. In a complete turnabout from his theory that he and complainant were lovers, accused-
appellant contends that complainant's failure to file the criminal complaint renders her claim of
abduction with rape suspect.[37]

This contention has no merit, either. Complainant filed this case less than three weeks after the
incident. The delay was due to the fact that accused-appellant's identity was not ascertained
until June 3, 1995 when complainant came face to face with accused-appellant and learned that
his name was Erlindo Talo.

While it is true that Cesar Saguindang, complainant's father, testified that accused-appellant had
been delivering rice to their house for a period of three years, there is no evidence to show that
complainant knew accused-appellant. Accused-appellant himself testified that he stayed in
Cebu City for sometime to study college, went back to Data Daku, Clarin, Misamis Occidental in
1982, and decided to work on the farm. It was probably then that he delivered rice for the
barangay captain of Gata Daku, Japay. At that time, complainant was only eight years old.
Furthermore, complainant studied at the Clarin National High School in the poblacion of Clarin
and went to Iligan City for her college education. It is probable, therefore, she really did not
know accused-appellant.

Moreover, the delay in the identification of accused-appellant was due mainly to the failure of
the Gata Daku police, specifically of SPO2 Jesus Macala, to include accused-appellant in the
lineup of suspects presented to complainant on May 12, 1995. Macala admitted that
complainant's description of her attacker in fact matched that of accused-appellant, but he did
not include the latter in the lineup because he thought that accused-appellant, whom he
admitted was a childhood friend, was innocent.[38]

Accused-appellant points out the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of complainant as to

his age, type of hair, and whether he is bearded or not. As complainant explained, however, she
did not really say that accused-appellant was curly haired or that he had a beard. She testified:

Q Miss Doris Saguindang, the Barangay Captain

of Gata Daku, Joven Japay, have testified
before this Honorable Court that you specifically
described to him the person responsible [for]
raping you in the dawn of May 12, 1995, and he
said you specifically described . . . him to be
curly hair[ed], and that his face was full of
beard, what can you say to that statement?

A That's not true.

Q Why do you say that's [a] lie?

A Because what I told . . . the Barangay Captain

is that, the hair of the rapist is short to the scalp.
In fact, the Barangay Captain asked, was it
curly hair, I said "no", his hair is short and his
head is somewhat bald because at that time he
was wearing my father's hat.

Q What about the beard?

A I did not say beard. I did not mention that the

face of the man is full of beard because when
we say "bangason" or bearded he has full of
beard. What I told . . . the Barangay Captain
[was] that he has a beard because I have
 touched the face of the man, not exactly that he
was bearded.

Q Did you mention to the Barrio Captain that the

person responsible in raping you that you were
able to touch his face, his mustach[e]?

A I did not tell him that he has mustach[e], I only

told him a few beard newly grown in his face.

Did you also mention . . . the age . . . of the

Q
person responsible in raping you?

A No, sir. I did not mention to him the age, what I

described to him only that the man was similar
to the age of my father.[39]

We find complainant's testimony to be credible. As earlier stated, her story is corroborated by

the findings of the medical examination. On the other hand, the defense has not shown any ill
motive on the part of complainant to falsely implicate accused-appellant in a very serious
charge. As we have said in a number of cases, no woman would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts and expose herself to the stigma and humiliation of a
public trial if she is not motivated by a desire to seek justice against the one who had defiled
her.[40]

Third. Accused-appellant's defense is that on May 12, 1995, he was in the house of Otelo
Londera in Barangay Kinangay Sur. However, Londera himself said that Barangay Gata Daku
could be reached in 10 minutes by foot from his house. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it
must be shown not only that accused-appellant was somewhere else at the time the crime was
committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed.[41]

The same is true with regard to accused-appellant's claim that on May 27, 1995 and June 3,
1995, when complainant said she saw him after the incident, he was in some other place and
could not possibly have been seen by her. Defense witness Narbay, who was supposed to
corroborate accused-appellant's testimony that he was not in his farm in Barangay Tinaclaan at
around 7 o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1995, admitted on cross-examination that he did not
know the year when the events he testified to took place and that the date May 27 was just
given to him by the counsel for the defense. On the other hand, accused-appellant's testimony
that he was in his farm in Barangay Tinaclaan and not in Barangay Kinangay Sur at about 5
o'clock in the afternoon of June 3, 1995 is not only uncorroborated but also self-serving. It
cannot prevail over the testimony of complainant which was corroborated by Grace Endab.

Fourth. The trial court correctly found accused-appellant guilty of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. As provided in Arts. 342 and 335, in relation to Art. 48, of the Revised
Penal Code, the elements of this crime are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman,
regardless of her age, civil status or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; (3) that the
abduction is with lewd design; and (4) that the abducted woman is raped under any of the
circumstance provided in Art. 335.[42] The evidence shows that, at knifepoint, accused-appellant
forcibly took complainant from her parents' house and, in a ricefield about 800 meters away,
forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.

In the event of conviction in cases of complex crimes, the penalty for the most serious crime
should be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.[43] Forcible abduction is
punishable by reclusion temporal,[44] while rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, unless it is
committed with the use of deadly weapon, in which case the penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death.[45] Thus, in this case, it is the penalty for rape which should be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. However, the use of deadly weapon, being a qualifying
circumstance, must be alleged in the information, otherwise it should be treated only as a
generic aggravating circumstance and the lower penalty (reclusion perpetua) should be
imposed.[46]

In the case at bar, the information alleged that "armed with a bolo and hunting knife, and by
means of force, violence, intimidation and threats," accused-appellant, "did then and there . . .
with lewd and unchaste designs . . . take and carry away complainant" and that, "upon reaching
the ricefield, by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats," he had carnal knowledge of
her. The allegation of the use of deadly weapon thus refers not to the rape but to the crime of
forcible abduction. We have affirmed convictions for forcible abduction with rape qualified by the
use of deadly weapon in cases where the use of deadly weapon was alleged in the information
with respect to the crime of forcible abduction,[47] or with respect to the complex crime of forcible
abduction and rape,[48] or to the portion referring to the crime of rape.[49] Accordingly, to justify
the imposition of the death penalty in this case, the use of deadly weapon should be alleged
with respect to the rape or with respect to both the forcible abduction and rape. Since, in this
case, this qualifying circumstance was alleged only with respect to the commission of the
forcible abduction, it cannot be taken to qualify the crime of rape. The use of a deadly weapon
can be appreciated only as a generic aggravating circumstance.

The trial court correctly appreciated other generic aggravating circumstances, namely, dwelling
and nighttime. Dwelling was correctly taken into account as an aggravating circumstance as the
evidence shows that complainant was forcibly taken from the house of her parents. Such was
the ruling in People v. Lacanieta,[50] where, similar to the case at bar, the complainant was
forcibly taken from her house, brought to a nearby barangay, and then raped by the accused.

The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also correctly held to be present. Accused-
appellant sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime. In People v.
Grefiel,[51] it was held that forcible abduction with rape, committed at 2 o'clock in the morning,
was attended by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime.

The crime was likewise attended by the aggravating circumstance of unlawful entry. The
barangay chairman of Gata Daku, Joven Japay, testified that when he went to the house of the
victim the day after the rape incident, he noticed that a baluster in the ceiling at the rear part of
the house had been forcibly removed and that there was a ladder propped nearby.[52] There was
thus entry to complainant's house through an opening which was one not intended for that
purpose.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant is reclusion

perpetua. Under Art. 63, a single indivisible penalty should be imposed regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance which may have attended the commission of the deed.
The damages awarded by the trial court should be modified. In accordance with recent rulings of
this Court,[53] complainant Doris Saguindang must be paid P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the additional amount of P25,000.00, as exemplary
damages, in view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstances, pursuant to Art. 2229 of
the Civil Code.[54]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Ozamis City, is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay complainant Doris
Saguindang the amounts of P50,000.00, as civil indemnity, P50,000.00, as moral damages, and
P25,000.00, as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126114, May 11, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JIMMY SABREDO Y GARBO,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch
44, dated May 13, 1996, in Criminal Case No. 7454, imposing the penalty of death on accused-
appellant, Jimmy Sabredo y Garbo, for the complex crime of abduction with rape of complainant
Judeliza Sabredo.

The facts of this case on record are as follows:

Appellant is the uncle of complainant. He is the younger brother of her father. In 1993, Jimmy
arrived from Masbate to reside with Judeliza's family in Cagtagong, Caguyong, Borbon, Cebu,
where he stayed with them for more than a year.

On June 27, 1994, Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy
grabbed and forcibly dragged her at knife's point, to the highway where he made her board a
truck for Bogo, Cebu. Impelled by fear, she complied, since Jimmy continuously poked a knife
under cover of his jacket at her. From Bogo, he took her by passenger motorboat to Placer,
Masbate. Thence he brought her to Estampar, Cataingan, Masbate, where they stayed at the
house of Conchita Tipnit. Conchita was Jimmy's sister and Judeliza's aunt, though aunt and
niece did not know each other. In Estampar, Judeliza tried to escape but was caught by Jimmy,
who severely mauled her until she lost consciousness.

Suspecting that Conchita would report the matter to the police, Jimmy took Judeliza by jeepney
to Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate. They stayed with Roberto Sabredo, his nephew and Judeliza's first
cousin. The two cousins, however, had not met before and Jimmy was able to pass her off as
his wife. They stayed in Cagba from June 29 to July 5, 1994, with Jimmy closely guarding
Judeliza.

On July 4, 1994, at around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually assaulted Judeliza.
He covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. After satisfying his lust, Jimmy inserted
three fingers into her vaginal orifice and cruelly pinched it. Judeliza screamed and cried for help.
Their host, Roberto, was awakened but could not do anything to assist her. Later, Jimmy struck
Judeliza with a piece of wood, rendering her unconscious. Much later, he brought her to the
house of his sister, Nilda Polloso, also at Cagba.

Nilda noticed the victim's weak and wan condition and offered her medicine. Catching Jimmy in
the act of boiling water, she asked what it was for and was told that it would be poured over
Judeliza to finish her off. Nilda, however, stopped him. On July 8, 1994, Judeliza recovered
sufficiently from her injuries. Nilda brought her to the police where Judeliza reported her ordeal.
That same day, while Jimmy was sleeping, Nilda managed to take away from him the blade,
made of stainless steel, which he had used in the rape of Judeliza. After the initial police
investigation, Judeliza was brought to Masbate Provincial Hospital, where she was confined for
four days. The medico-legal officer, Dr. Artemio Capellan, examined her.

On August 11, 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate filed an information for forcible
abduction with rape, which alleged:
"That on or about June 27, 1994, and days thereafter from sitio Caglagang, barangay
Caguyong, Burbon, Cebu the said accused with force and intimidation and against the consent
of complainant Judeliza E. Sabredo abduct the latter to sitio Cagba, barangay Tugbo,
Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this court
and on (sic) the house of one auntie Nilda, accused with a bolo did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse of (sic) said Judeliza E. Sabredo on the night
of July 4, 1994, against her will and consent.

"Contrary to law."[1]
At the arraignment, Jimmy, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then
ensued.

Jimmy admitted having sexual relations with Judeliza, but insisted that it was consensual. He
claimed that they were lovers and had been engaging in sexual intimacies for three months
before running away. He explained that they had gone to Masbate after Judeliza had revealed
to him that she was not really her father's daughter. They then lived together as husband and
wife. He admitted having boxed and kicked her but claimed that he got mad at her after she
confided that she really was his niece, contrary to what she earlier told him. He likewise
admitted having pinched the victim's vagina, but only to punish her for deceiving him about their
kinship. He claimed the instant case was filed against him because of the maltreatment she
received. Appellant likewise admitted that he was facing another rape case before Branch 45 of
the same court, which a certain Juanita Turing had filed against him in 1992. He, however,
denied having fled to Cebu to escape prosecution for said case.

The trial court found appellant's version of the incident preposterous and his defense untenable.
Choosing to believe the prosecution, the trial judge convicted appellant, and sentenced him
thus:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape under Article 48 in relation to Article[s] 335 and 342 of the
Revised Penal Code and is meted the extreme penalty of death.

"The accused is likewise ordered to pay Judeliza Sabredo the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of moral damages.

"SO ORDERED."

Before us, on automatic review of the case, appellant assigns the following errors:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS EVALUATION OF THE HONESTY OF

PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, IN EFFECT GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION THAN THAT OF THE DEFENSE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
In sum, the issues for resolution now concern the credibility of the testimony of the offended
party; the correctness of appellant's conviction for forcible abduction with rape, and the propriety
of the imposition of the death penalty on him.

Appellant submits that Judeliza was neither a reliable nor credible witness since both the
information and her affidavit[2] showed that the rape took place in Nilda's residence, while on
direct examination, Judeliza testified that she was raped at Roberto's house. He claims these
inconsistencies cast doubt on Judeliza's credibility.
However, we have previously held that some discrepancies between the affidavit and the
testimony of the witness in open court do not necessarily impair credibility of the testimony, for
affidavits are generally taken ex parte and are often incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of
searching inquiries by the investigating officer.[3] Note that here both the affidavit and the
testimony of complainant in open court are consistent as to the fact that Jimmy raped her while
he threatened her with a deadly weapon on July 4, 1994. Her sworn affidavit and her testimony
in open court establish the basic elements of rape. These are: the commission of sexual
intercourse, by the accused against complainant, with the use of force and intimidation, without
her consent and against her will. Suffice it to stress that the trial court found that the accused
abducted his niece by force, mauled and maltreated her repeatedly, instilling fear in her,
dragged her to different places and any house he pleased, and ravished her on the night of July
4, 1994. Whether the house belonged to Nilda or Roberto, both of whom they had stayed with,
is not here crucial, for the houses are both in Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate.

Here, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of complainant's testimony is entitled to great
weight, absent any showing that some facts were overlooked which, if considered, would affect
the outcome of the case.[4] We find no reason to overturn the trial court's detailed evaluation of
the evidence for both the prosecution and the defense. Complainant Judeliza's testimony was
given in a straightforward, clear, and convincing manner, which remained consistent even under
cross-examination. The trial court found her testimony believable and convincing, while
appellant's version of events incredible and outrageous. Moreover, as testified by the medico-
legal officer, he found that her body bore evidences of physical and sexual assault. Appellant's
bare denial could not prevail over said positive evidence.

Appellant next insists that the intercourse between him and Judeliza was consensual, since they
were sweethearts. A "sweetheart defense" should be substantiated by some documentary
and/or other evidence of the relationship.[5] In this case, there is no showing of mementos, love
letters, notes, pictures, or any concrete proof of a romantic nature. Besides, as observed by the
trial judge, it is contrary to human experience that a naive rural lass like Judeliza, barely
nineteen years old, would willingly consent to be her uncle's paramour. Nor, would he if he were
indeed her sweetheart maltreat her repeatedly for no justifiable cause, without over-straining our
credulity.

Was appellant's conviction by the trial court for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape
correct? The elements of forcible abduction are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman,
regardless of age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is against her will; and (3)
that the abduction is with lewd designs. The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that the victim
was forcibly taken at knifepoint from Borbon, Cebu by appellant and through threats and
intimidation brought to various towns in Masbate, where he passed her off as his "wife". That
appellant was moved by lewd designs was shown in regard to rape by his having carnal
knowledge of private complainant, against her will, on July 4, 1994 at Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate.
While it may appear at first blush that forcible abduction, as defined and penalized by Article 342
of the Revised Penal Code was also committed, we are not totally disposed to convict appellant
for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. We note that while the information
sufficiently alleges the forcible taking of complainant from Cebu to Masbate, the same fails to
allege "lewd designs." When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is
charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege
and prove the presence of all the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of
the crime of rape.[6] When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the
purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then absorb forcible
abduction.[7] Hence, the crime committed by appellant is simple rape only.

The imposable penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. But where the rape is committed with the use of deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to
death. The use of the bladed weapon already qualified the rape. [8] Under Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, the crucial factor in determining whether appellant should be meted the
death penalty is the presence of an aggravating circumstance which attended the commission of
the crime.[9] A perusal of the record shows that none of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was alleged and proven by the prosecution.
Where there is no aggravating circumstance proved in the commission of the offense, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.

In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted that the victim was his niece, a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree. Section 11 (1) of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death
penalty when the rape victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. However, R.A. No. 7659 cannot be made to
apply in the instant case for two reasons: First, at the time the rape was committed, private
complainant was already more than eighteen years of age. [10] Second, the information did not
allege that offender and offended party were relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
We have held that the seven circumstances in R.A. No. 7659 which warrant the automatic
imposition of the death penalty partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and as such
should be alleged in the information to be appreciated as such.[11] In view of the failure of the
information to comply with this requirement, said degree of relation could not be taken into
account in considering the penalty to be imposed. For these reasons, the sentence on appellant
should only be reclusion perpetua.

We note that the trial court did not award any indemnity ex delicto, which current jurisprudence
has fixed at P50,000.00. Accordingly, appellant is further sentenced to indemnify private
complainant in the amount of P50,000.00 for the rape he committed against her. As to moral
damages, we find the trial court's award of P50,000.00 in her favor duly supported by evidence
on record and is in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44, in
Criminal Case No. 7454, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Jimmy Sabredo y Garbo is declared
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape only as defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty imposed on him is hereby REDUCED to reclusion
perpetua. He is also ordered to indemnify the victim, Judeliza Sabredo y Espinosa, in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity, and to pay her FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG,

REPRESENTED BY MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, AS ADMINISTRATRIX, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILLIAM SATO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. - No criminal, but only civil liability shall result
from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused
mutually by the following persons:
 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the
same line;

2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession
of another; and

3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living

together.

The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the
commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)

For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the
husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives
of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created
such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification?

Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix[1] of petitioner

intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a
complaint-affidavit[2] for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national.
Her complaint-affidavit read:

I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of

Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being
duly sworn, depose and state that:

1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y

Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration
dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.

2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the Intestate
Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or properties
as property belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession or control of other
parties.

3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children of my
sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.

4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and
24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through
fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my mother
on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only
twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces
of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX
"A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother
because William Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign involved her
taxes. At that time, my mother was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years
prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of Wendy,
my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez
who later became the second wife of my sister's widower William Sato.

6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the belief that
they were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in
fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.

7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the
property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor
of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B.
Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary
Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series
of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x

8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the deeds of
absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her father William Sato
from the buyers of her grandmother's properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually paid
P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148 and P7,034,000.00 for the property
covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were turned over to William Sato who
undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita Carungcong
Gonzale[s].

9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid P8,000,000.00 for
the property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were
likewise turned over to William Sato.

10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato
has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since
she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].

11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse
her father's orders.

12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of attorney
fraudulently secured from my mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account
for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the
latter died on June 8, 1994.

13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the
proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother's estate, but he refused and failed,
and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of the
deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six (6) children
with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x[3]

Wendy Mitsuko Sato's supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by
the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the
complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.

In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the
complaint.[4] On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution
dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information
against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code. [5] Thus, the
following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
87:[6]
 INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a)
of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already then blind
and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24,
1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said
document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes
Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any
person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City, as follows:

1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more
or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;

2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by
T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No.
7106;

3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by
T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No.
7104;

4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;

registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the possession
of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy
Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title
[TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for P250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-
016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above
properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda.
De Carungcong who died in 1994.

Contrary to law.[7]

Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase
the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to
P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato.

Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was
his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.

The prosecution disputed Sato's motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.

In an order dated April 17, 2006,[8] the trial court granted Sato's motion and ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutor's contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the
relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of
protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.

A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this
Court of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of
Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase
the fact that accused and Zenaida's mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and
mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond the death of
Zenaida.

Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal, but
only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or
relatives by affinity in the same line."

Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves
family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief,
where the crime is committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his
grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the accused only civil
(Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).

Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.

WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is
GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[9] (underlining supplied in the original)

The prosecution's motion for reconsideration[10] was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.[11]

Dissatisfied with the trial court's rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by
Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals[12] which, however, in a decision[13]
dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:

[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the
relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita,
and does not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the
Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.

We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing
in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death
of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato,
and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code from said
private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato
remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As
further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the criminal case for estafa against private
respondent Sato already created havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families
as private respondent's daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her aunt [Mediatrix]
Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private respondent, William Francis and
Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.

There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of Article

332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the
exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being
"relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article 332(1) of the same Code. We cannot draw
the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private respondent Sato is no longer
the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from the exempting circumstance
provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction
that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no
distinction in the application of law where none is indicated. The courts could only distinguish
where there are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or
qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgiver's intent. The
solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to
correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.

Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code's simple language is most favorable to Sato.[14]

The appellate court denied reconsideration.[15] Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court.
It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal
liability is that the law recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the
offender and the offended party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned
by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato's wife), died on January 28,
1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the
three parcels of land could have arisen only after her mother's death. Since Zenaida
predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the mantle of
protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.

Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in
case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the
death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and
mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaida's mother, Manolita.

For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal
liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioner's
claim that Zenaida's death dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it
is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and
Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332's provision exempting a
family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing
his/her liability to the civil aspect only.

The petition has merit.

The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code.
In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the
relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.

Effect of Death on Relationship

By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause[16] in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and
malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from
criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended party.

In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included
in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.[17] By virtue thereof, no
criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious mischief against his
stepson;[18] by the stepmother who commits theft against her stepson;[19] by the stepfather who
steals something from his stepson;[20] by the grandson who steals from his grandfather;[21] by the
accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;[22] and by the son who steals a ring from
his mother.[23]

Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a
relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage.[24] It is a fictive kinship, a
fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.

If marriage gives rise to one's relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one's spouse, does
the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?

Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case.
That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or
commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are two views on
the subject. As one Filipino author observed:

In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views.
There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are
children or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better
view supported by most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no
living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It
follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the marriage which
produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the
relationship by affinity is continued despite the death of one of the spouses where there are
living issues or children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of the parties are
commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the issue of
the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).[25]

The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the
dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of
affinity between the parties.[26] Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive
and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily
determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage
subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the
surviving spouse to the deceased spouse's blood relatives.

The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death
of one spouse when there is a surviving issue.[27] The rationale is that the relationship is
preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is
commingled.[28]

The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the
surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the
deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.[29] Under this
view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced
it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that,
where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity"
between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon
the death of one of the married parties.[30]

After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the
second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised
Penal Code.

First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and
incest.[31] On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of
laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in
Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under
the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.

Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is
couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse
of one's living child and the surviving spouse of one's deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or
daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law)[32] can be drawn from Article 332(1) of
the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.

Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic
autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to
strengthen the solidarity of the family.[33] Congress has also affirmed as a State and national
policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family.[34] In this connection, the spirit of
Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.[35] The view that relationship by
affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in
accord with family solidarity and harmony.

Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all
doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.[36] This is
in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent
unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.[37]

Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.[38] The rule applies when
the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to
the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an
interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.

Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic
purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an
absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should
adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that
interpretation is the continuing affinity view.

Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by
affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse
survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle
applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one's relatives under Article 11 [2] of the
Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense
committed against one's relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause
of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)

SCOPE OF ARTICLE 332 OF

THE REVISED PENAL CODE

The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the
criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an
act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves
the private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.

However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The
plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to
the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the
crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through
falsification or estafa through falsification.[39]

The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense. [40] What
controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts
recited in the Information.[41] In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the
offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the
Information.[42] It is the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is
named.[43] The determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime
committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on the court.[44]

A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with
simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. In
particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita
committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and induced
her to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes when it
was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell,
assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolita's properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Sato's inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked the
SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the
proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and despite repeated demands, he failed
and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.

The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to
Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document) statements other than those in fact
made by her. Manolita's acts of signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document
were the very expression of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her
signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only
signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read) because of
Sato's representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking
the document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to
what the document was all about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark,
therefore, served as her conformity to Sato's proposal that she execute a document to settle her
taxes.

Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his
daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or
otherwise disposing of Manolita's Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita signed
and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes.
Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to
Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent
documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale"
and

(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit"

raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one who
benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the
Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. This
was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant
that the amended Information would now state that, while the total amount of consideration
stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only P1,150,000, Sato actually received the total
amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita's properties. [45] This also meant that
the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were also falsified by making untruthful
statements as to the amounts of consideration stated in the deeds.

Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple
estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of
attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.

Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the
absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.

EFFECT OF ABSOLUTORY CAUSE UNDER

ARTICLE 332 ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS

The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by
virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be
absolved also from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents? No.

True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public
document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.[46] It means that the prosecution
must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document as a necessary
means to commit the crime of estafa.

However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, simply because the accused
may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article
332.

The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property,
namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes,
whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the
said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to
one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of
that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article
332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to
mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime that
it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and
falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa
through falsification of public document.

Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender
criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers
the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family
members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not
apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably
intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of
public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the
property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest.

The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.[47] Thus, the
action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as
family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party.
When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document, however, the matter
acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of
family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that
breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property
rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause
under Article 332.

In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each
other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents),
both felonies are animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there
is only one criminal liability.[48] That is the concept of a complex crime. In other words, while
there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.

As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g., homicide
which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property),[49] a complex crime
constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of
which is a simple crime in itself.[50] Since only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts,
however, the component crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, the complex
crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code.

In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where
the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime
for which there is only one criminal liability.[51] (The complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public document falls under this category.) This is different from a material (or real) plurality of
crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for each of which the
accused incurs criminal liability.[52] The latter category is covered neither by the concept of
complex crimes nor by Article 48.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus
delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the
imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one crime
in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting the same
are more conveniently termed as component crimes.[53] (emphasis supplied)

-- ∞ -- -- ∞ -- -- ∞ --

In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only
one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has
only one criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one.[54]

For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires
that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability
for estafa may be determined and considered independently of that for falsification. The two
crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but
component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public
documents.

Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered
separately from the liability for falsification of public document. Such approach would disregard
the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material
plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are considered as
separate crimes to be punished individually.

FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE

A NECESSARY MEANS FOR COMMITTING
ESTAFA EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3[A])

The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal
Code are as follows:

(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;

(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;

(3) the offended party personally signed the document and

(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.

While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that
the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of
the document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that
provision.

The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the
offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the
latter and would be an ingredient thereof.[55] In People v. Salvilla,[56] the phrase "necessary
means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of
the other.[57] In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a
"necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively his
evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay
properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like
estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same
Code.[58] The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of
committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or
commercial document.[59] In other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to the
consummation of the crime of estafa.[60] Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa.[61] The damage to another is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. [62]

Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the
falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to
Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with her taxes.
While the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of
the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had
the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to
Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the
property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by the
subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document was
used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.

The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita
sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case,
the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the
document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple
crime of estafa.[63] On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had
been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature,
but what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been
the simple crime of falsification.[64]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the
resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the
accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.

SO ORDERED.

CONTINUED CRIME/ DELITO CONTINUADO

G.R. No. 46428, April 13, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. IRINEO TUMLOS,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

VILLA-REAL, J.:

The defendant Irineo Tumlos appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo finding him guilty of the crime of theft of large cattle defined and punished in
article 310, in relation to article 309, of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of from two months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four
months and one day of prision correccional, with the accessories prescribed by law and costs,
by virtue of an information reading as follows:

"The undersigned acting provincial fiscal accuses Irineo Tumlos of the crime of qualified theft
committed as follows:
"That on or about November 21,1937, in the municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this court, said defendant, wilfully and without using force upon
things or violence or intimidation against persons, took, with intent to gain and without the
consent of their owner, five cows valued at P39 and belonging to Ambrosio Pecasis.

"An act punishable by law.

"Iloilo, July 11, 1938."

In support of his appeal the appellant assigns as the only error allegedly committed by the lower
court in the aforesaid judgment its failure to sustain the defense of "autrefois convict" or double
jeopardy, interposed by said defendant.
On or about November 21, 1937, eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega and five
belonging to his son-in-law, Ambrosio Pecasis, then grazing together in the barrio of Libong-
cogon, municipality of Sara, Province of Hollo, were taken by the herein defendant without the
knowledge or consent of their respective owners. The deputy fiscal of Iloilo filed on July 11,
1938, an information against the said defendant for the offense of theft of the eight cows
belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega, which resulted in his being sentenced, on July 15, 1938, to
an indeterminate penalty of from one year, eight months and twenty-one days to five years, five
months and eleven days of prision correccional, with the accessories prescribed by law and
costs. In the information filed in the present case the same defendant is charged with the theft of
five cows belonging to Ambrosio Pecasis, committed on November 21, 1937, the date of the
commission of the theft of the eight cows of Maximiano Sobrevega charged in the previous
information.

The question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the conviction of the accused
for the theft of the eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega constitutes a bar to his
conviction for the theft of the five cows belonging to Ambrosio Pecasis, which were grazing
together with the aforesaid eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega in the same place
from which they were stolen at the same time, under the legal procedural principle of "autrefois
convict" or double jeopardy.

The theft of the thirteen cows committed by the defendant took place at the same time and in
the same place; consequently, he performed but one act. The fact that eight of said cows
pertained to one owner and five to another does not make him criminally liable for two distinct
offenses, for the reason that in such case the act must be divided into two, which act is not
susceptible of division.

The intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose of appropriating or selling the
thirteen cows which he found grazing in the same place. As neither the intention nor the criminal
act is susceptible of division, the offense arising from the concurrence of its two constituent
elements cannot be divided, it being immaterial that the subject matter of the offense is singular
or plural, because whether said subject matter be one or several animate or inanimate objects, it
is but one.

Therefore, as the five cows alleged to be stolen by Irineo Tumlos were integral parts of the
thirteen cows which were the subject matter of theft, and as he had already been tried for and
convicted of the theft of eight, he cannot now be convicted of the theft of the other five.
Wherefore, as he had already been put in jeopardy of being convicted of the theft of the five
cows in question when he was tried for and convicted of the theft of the eight which together
with the five form an integral part of the thirteen which were the subject matter of the offense,
the conviction of the herein defendant Irineo Tumlos for the said five cows in the present case
would be the second, in violation of his constitutional right not to be punished twice for the same
offense; hence, he is acquitted of the charge, which is dismissed, with costs de oficio. So
ordered.

G.R. NO. L-28547, February 22, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ELIAS JARANILLA,
RICARDO SUYO, FRANCO BRILLANTES AND HEMAN GORRICETA, ACCUSED, ELIAS
JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, AND FRANCO BRILLANTES, DEFENDANTS AND
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

This is an appeal of defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, which convicted them of robbery with homicide,
sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordered them to pay solidarily the sum of six
thousand pesos to the heirs of Ramonito Jabatan and the sum of five hundred pesos to Valentin
Baylon as the value of five fighting cocks (Criminal Case No. 11082).

The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around eleven o'clock in the evening of January
9, 1966, Heman Gorriceta, who had just come from Fort San Pedro in Iloilo City, was driving a
For pickup truck belonging to his sister, Remia G. Valencia. While he was in front of the
Elizalde Building on J.M. Basa Street, he saw Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco
Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the truck. Jaranilla requested Gorriceta to bring
them to Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred. He told Jaranilla
that he (Gorriceta) was on his way home.

Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had
to get something from his uncle's place. So, Jaranilla, Brillantes and Suyo boarded the pickup
truck which Gorriceta drove to Mandurriao.

Upon reaching Mandurriao, Gorriceta parked the truck at a distance of about fifty to seventy
meters from the provincial hospital. Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted from the
vehicle. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. The trio walked in the direction of the
plaza. After an interval of about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared. Each of them was
carrying two fighting cocks. They ran to the truck.

Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta drove
the truck to Jaro (another district of the city) on the same route that they had taken in going to
Mandurriao.

It is important to note the positions of Gorriceta and his three companions on the front seat of
the truck. Gorriceta, as the driver, was on the extreme left. Next to him on his right was
Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes. On the extreme right was Jaranilla.

While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under
construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the road Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and
Benjamin Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after Patrolman
Jabatan had fired a warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that the truck should
stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan approached the right side of the
truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of the truck to go down. They did not heed
the injunction of the policeman.

Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it. Suyo did nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot
Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened Gorriceta. He immediately started the motor of the
truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the city. Jaranilla kept on firing
towards Jabatan.

Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front of Gorriceta's house. Gorriceta parked the truck
inside the garage. Jaranilla warned Gorriceta not to tell anybody about the incident. Gorriceta
went up to his room. After a while, he heard policemen shouting his name and asking him to
come down. Instead of doing so, he hid in the ceiling. It was only at about eight o'clock in the
morning of the following day that he decided to come down. His uncle had counselled him to
surrender to the police. The policemen took Gorriceta to their headquarters. He recounted the
incident to a police investigator.

Victorino Trespeces, whose house was located opposite the house of Valentin Baylon on Taft
Street in Mandurriao, testified that before midnight of January 9, 1966, he conducted a friend in
his car to the housing project in the vicinity of the provincial hospital at Mandurriao. As he
neared his residence, he saw three men emerging from the canal on Taft Street in front of
Baylon's house. He noticed a red Ford pickup truck parked about fifty yards from the place
where he saw the three men. Shortly thereafter, he espied the three men carrying roosters. He
immediately repaired to the police station at Mandurriao. He reported to Patrolmen Jabatan and
Castro what he had just witnessed. The two policemen requested him to take them in his car to
the place where he saw the three suspicious-looking men. Upon arrival thereat, the men and
the truck were not there anymore.

Trespeces and the policemen followed the truck speeding towards Jaro. On reaching the detour
road leading to the airport, the policemen left the car and crossed the runway which was a
shortcut. Their objective was to intercept the truck. Trepeces turned his car around in order to
return to Mandurriao. At that moment he heard gunshots. He stopped and again turned his car
in the direction where the shots had emanated. A few moments later, Patrolman Castro came
into view. He was running. He asked Trespeces for help because Jabatan, his comrade, was
wounded. Patrolman Castro and Trespeces lifted Jabatan into the car and brought him to the
hospital. Trespeces learned later that Jabatan was dead.

Doctor Raymundo L. Torres, the chief medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City police department,
conducted an autopsy on the remains of Patrolman Jabatan. He found:
(1) Contusion on left eyebrow.

(2) Bullet wound one centimeter in diameter, penetrating left anterior axilla, directed diagonally
downward to the right, perforating the left upper lobe of the lungs through and through, hitting
the left pulmonary artery and was recovered at the right thoracic cavity; both thoracic cavity was
full of blood.

Cause of death: Shock, hemorrhage, secondary to bullet wound.

Valentin Baylon, the owner of the fighting cocks, returned home at about six o'clock in the
morning of January 10, 1966. He discovered that the door of one of his cock pens or chicken
coops (Exhs. A and A-1) was broken. The feeding vessels were scattered on the
ground. Upon investigation he found that six of his fighting cocks were missing. Each coop
contained six cocks. The coop was made of bamboo and wood with nipa roofing. Each coop
had a door which was locked by means of nails. The coops were located at the side of his
house, about two meters therefrom.
Baylon reported the loss to the police at Mandurriao. At about ten o'clock, a group of detectives
came to his house together with the police photographer who took pictures of the chicken
coops. The six roosters were valued at one hundred pesos each. Two days later, he was
summoned to the police station at Mandurriao to identify a rooster which was recovered
somewhere at the airport. He readily identified it as one of the six roosters which was stolen
from his chicken coop (Exh. B).

Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robo con homicidio with the
aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle, nocturnity, band, contempt of or with insult
to the public authorities and recidivism. The fiscal utilized Gorriceta as a state witness. Hence,
the case was dismissed as to him.

On February 2, 1967, after the prosecution had rested its case and before the defense had
commenced the presentation of its evidence, Jaranilla escaped from the provincial jail. The
record does not show that he had been apprehended.

The judgment of conviction was promulgated as to defendants Suyo and Brillantes on October
19, 1967 when it was read to them in court. They signed at the bottom of the last page of the
decision.

There was no promulgation of the judgment as to Jaranilla who, as already stated, escaped
from jail (See Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court).

However, the notice of appeal filed by defendants' counsel de oficio erroneously included
Jaranilla. Inasmuch as the judgment has not been promulgated as to Jaranilla, he could not
have appealed. His appeal through counsel cannot be entertained. Only the appeals of
defendants Suyo and Brillantes will be considered.

In convicting Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes of robo con homicidio, the trial court assumed that
the taking of the six fighting cocks was robbery and that Patrolman Jabatan was killed "by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery" within the purview of article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.

In this appeal the appellants contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Gorriceta was
the one who shot the policeman and that Jaranilla was driving the Ford truck because Gorriceta
was allegedly drunk. Through their counsel de oficio, they further contend that the taking of the
roosters was theft and, alternatively, that, if it was robbery, the crime could not be robbery with
homicide because the robbery was already consummated when Jabatan was killed.

After evaluating the testimonies of Gorriceta and Brillantes as to who was driving the truck and
who shot the policeman, this Court finds that the trial court did not err in giving credence to
Gorriceta's declaration that he was driving the truck at the time that Jaranilla shot Jabatan.

The improbability of appellants' theory is manifest. The truck belonged to Gorriceta's sister. He
was responsible for its preservation. He had the obligation to return it to his sister in the same
condition when he borrowed it. He was driving it when he saw Brillantes, Jaranilla and Suyo
and when he allegedly invited them for a paseo. There is no indubitable proof that Jaranilla
knows how to drive a truck.

The theory of the defense may be viewed from another angle. If, according to the appellants,
Gorriceta asked Jaranilla to drive the truck because he (Gorriceta) was drunk, then that
circumstance would be inconsistent with their theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan. Being
supposedly intoxicated, Gorriceta would have been dozing when Jabatan signalled the driver to
stop the truck and he could not have thought of killing Jabatan in his inebriated state. He would
not have been able to shoot accurately at Jabatan. But the fact is that the first shot hit
Jabatan. So, the one who shot him must have been a sober person like Jaranilla.

Moreover, as Jaranilla and his two comrades were interested in concealing the fighting cocks, it
was Jaranilla, not Gorriceta, who would have the motive for shooting Jabatan. Consequently,
the theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan and that Jaranilla was driving the truck appears to be
implausible.

Was the taking of the roosters robbery or theft? There is no evidence that in taking the six
roosters from their coop or cages in the yard of Baylon's house violence against or intimidation
of persons was employed. Hence, article 294 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be invoked.

Neither could such taking fall under article 299 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes
robbery in an inhabited house (casa habitada), public building or edifice devoted to
worship. The coop was not inside Baylon's house. Nor was it a dependency thereof within the
meaning of article 301 of the Revised Penal Code.

Having shown the inapplicability of articles 294 and 299, the next inquiry is whether the taking of
the six roosters is covered by article 302 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
"ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in private building. — Any robbery committed in
an uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of article
299, if the value of the property exceeds 250 pesos, shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods provided that any of the following circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for
entrance or egress.

2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.

3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or
other similar tools.

4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle

has been broken.

5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding

paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open
elsewhere.

xxx xxx xxx."

In this connection, it is relevant to note that there is an inaccuracy in the English translation of
article 302. The controlling Spanish original reads:
"ART. 302. Robo en lugar no habitado o edificio particular. — El robo cometido en un lugar no
habitado o en un edificio que no sea de los comprendidos en el parrafo primero del articulo 299,
x x x." (Tomo 26, Leyes Publicas 479).
The term "lugar no habitado" is erroneously translated as "uninhabited place", a term which may
be confounded with the expression "uninhabited place" in articles 295 and 300 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is the translation of despoblado and which is different from the term lugar no
habitado in article 302. The term lugar no habitado is the antonym of casa habitada (inhabited
house) in article 299.

One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under articles 299 and 302 is that the
malefactor should enter the building or dependency where the object to be taken is
found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should enter the building
(casa ha bitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If the culprit did not enter the building, there
would be no robbery with force upon things. (See Albert, Revised Penal Code, 1932 edition,
page 688).

Thus, where the accused broke the show-window of the Bombay Palace Bazar at Rizal Avenue,
Manila and removed forty watches therefrom, the crime was theft and not robbery because he
did not enter the building. The show-window was outside the store. (People vs. Adorno, CA 40
O.G. 567, per Montemayor, J., who later became a member of this Court). [*]

In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be considered a
building within the meaning of article 302. Not being a building, it cannot be said that the
accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery by means of any of the five
circumstances enumerated in article 302.

The term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code, was construed as
embracing any structure not mentioned in article 299 (meaning not an "inhabited house or public
building or edifice devoted to worship" or any dependency thereof) used for storage and
safekeeping of personal property. As thus construed, a freight car used for the shipment of
sugar was considered a private building. The unnailing of a strip of cloth nailed over the door,
the customary manner of sealing a freight car, was held to constitute breaking by force within
the meaning of article 512, now article 302. (U.S. vs. Magsino, 2 Phil. 710).

The ruling in the Magsino case is in conflict with the rulings of the Supreme Court of Spain that a
railroad employee who, by force, opens a sealed or locked receptacle deposited in a freight car,
does not commit robbery. He is guilty of theft because a railroad car is neither a house nor a
building within the meaning of article 302 which corresponds to article 525 of the 1870 Spanish
Penal Code. Article 302 refers to houses or buildings which, while not actually inhabited, are
habitable. Thus, a pig sty is not a building within the meaning of article 302. The stealing of
hogs from a pig sty is theft and not robbery, although the culprit breaks into it. Article 302 refers
to habitable buildings. (Guevara, Revised Penal Code, 1939 Edition, pages 555-6, citing II
Hidalgo Codigo Penal 636-7, 642, which in turn cites the decisions of the Spanish Supreme
Court dated March 2, 1886 and April 25, 1887).[**]

As may be seen from the photographs (Exhs. A and A-1), Baylon's coop, which is known in the
dialect as tangkal or kulungan, is about five yards long, one yard wide and one yard high. It has
wooden stilts and bamboo strips as bars. The coop barely reaches the shoulder of a person of
average height like Baylon. It is divided into six compartments or cages. A compartment has an
area of less than one cubic yard. A person cannot be accommodated inside the cage or
compartment. It was not intended that a person should go inside that compartment. The taking
was effected by forcibly opening the cage and putting the hands inside it to get the roosters.

Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not
robbery. The assumption is that the accused were animated by single criminal impulse. The
conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is
punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking of two roosters in the
same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes of theft (People vs. De
Leon, 49 Phil. 437, citing decision of Supreme Court of Spain dated July 13, 1894 and 36 C.J.
799; People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320; People vs. Villanueva, 49 O.G. 5448, L-10239, August 7,
1953).

Nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle are aggravating. Those circumstances facilitated the
commission of the theft. The accused intentionally sought the cover of night and used a motor
vehicle so as to insure the success of their nefarious enterprise (People vs. Tan, 89 Phil. 647,
660; People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372).

Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the aggravating circumstance
of recidivism which was alleged in the information. They admitted their previous convictions for
theft (130, 132 tsn; Exhs. I and J; Art. 14[9], Revised Penal Code).

The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods (Art. 309[3], Revised Penal Code). That penalty should be
imposed in its maximum period because only aggravating circumstances are present (Art. 64[3],
Revised Penal Code).

Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They are
entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act No. 4103).

With respect to the killing of Patrolman Jabatan, it has already been noted that the evidence for
the prosecution points to Jaranilla as the malefactor who shot that unfortunate peace
officer. The killing was homicide because it was made on the spur of the moment. The
treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately adopted by the offender (U.S.
vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926; People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738; People vs. Abalos, 84 Phil. 771).

The twenty-four year old Jabatan was an agent of authority on night duty at the time of the
shooting. He was wearing his uniform. The killing should be characterized as a direct assault
(atentado) upon an agent of authority (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code) complexed with
homicide. The two offenses resulted from a single act. (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code; People
vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People vs. Lojo, Jr., 52 Phil. 390).

The evidence for the prosecution does not prove any conspiracy on the part of appellants
Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes to kill Jabatan. They conspired to steal the fighting cocks. The
conspiracy is shown by the manner in which they perpetrated the theft. They went to the scene
of the crime together. They left the yard of Baylon's residence, each carrying two
roosters. They all boarded the getaway truck driven by Gorriceta.

The theft was consummated when the culprits were able to take possession of the roosters. It is
not an indispensable element of theft that the thief carry, more or less far away, the thing taken
by him from its owner (People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665; Duran vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 476; U.S. vs.
Adiao, 38 Phil. 754).

It is not reasonable to assume that the killing of any peace officer, who would forestall the theft
or frustrate appellants' desire to enjoy the fruits of the crime, was part of their plan. There is no
evidence to link appellants Suyo and Brillantes to the killing of Jabatan, except the circumstance
that they were with Jaranilla in the truck when the latter shot the policeman. Gorriceta testified
that Suyo did not do anything when Jabatan approached the right side of the truck and came in
close proximity to Jaranilla who was on the extreme right. Brillantes pulled his revolver which he
did not fire (47, 53-55 tsn). Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not necessarily make
a person a co-principal thereof.

Jaranilla heard Gorriceta's testimony that he (Jaranilla) shot Jabatan. Instead of taking the
witness stand to refute the testimony of Gorriceta, Jaranilla escaped from jail. That
circumstance is an admission of guilt.

The instant case is different from People vs. Mabassa, 65 Phil. 568 where the victim was killed
on the occasion when the accused took his chickens under the house. It is distinguishable from
the People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372 and People vs. Salamudin No. 1, 52 Phil. 670 (both cited
by the Solicitor General) where the robbery was clearly proven and the homicide was
perpetrated on the occasion of the robbery. As already noted, theft, not robbery, was committed
in this case.

The situation in this case bears some analogy to that found in the People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil.
493 where the homicide committed by a member of the band was not a part of the common plan
to commit robbery. Hence, only the person who perpetrated the killing was liable for robbery
with homicide. The others were convicted of robbery only.

There is a hiatus in the evidence of the prosecution as to the participation of Suyo and Brillantes
in the killing of Jabatan by Jaranilla. As already stated no robbery with homicide was
committed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that those two appellants have any responsibility
for Jabatan's death. Their complicity in the homicide committed by Jaranilla has not been
established.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellants Ricardo Suyo and Franco
Brillantes of robbery with homicide is reversed. They are acquitted of homicide on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

As coprincipals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six fighting cocks, they are (a) each
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum and (b) ordered to indemnify
solidarily the complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum of five hundred pesos (P500). Each
appellant should pay one-third of the costs.

As to the liability of Elias Jaranilla for theft and homicide, with direct assault upon an agent of
authority, the trial court should render a new judgment consistent with this opinion (See Sec. 19,
Art. IV, Constitution).

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109266, December 02, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS

GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the
Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan,
disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the Resolution of said court promulgated
on March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner
(Rollo, pp. 2-35 and pp. 36-94).

On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits
of the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).

On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as
G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case
was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that
this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona
fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena,
which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).

On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice
Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00
A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)

On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was
a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars
(Rollo, pp. 43-44).

On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the
arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).

On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The
motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the application for
legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the
favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities
of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.

On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R. No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan (First Division) to reset the
arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending before it (Re:
disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion for bill of particulars).

At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution
stated categorically that they would file only one amended information against petitioner.

However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to admit the 32 Amended
Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).

On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated
March 11, 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).

On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the
32 Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within
ten days from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended
Informations was set for April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).

Hence, the filing of the instant petition.

Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated
March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in
the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from
enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32
Amended Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p.
194).

Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice

The petition for the disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication
of his letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the
validity of the information filed against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena
"cannot be expected to change the conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public
statements x x x when he sits in judgment on the merits of the case x x x" (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the
July 22, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11,
1992 a hold-departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a
"perverse morality" of the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice,
thus:

"I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena
who would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship
because of graft charges against her. Some of the most perfidious Filipinos I know have come
and gone, left and returned to these shores without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of
rumpus. Compared to the peccadilloes of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is
accused of is kindergarten stuff. The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for
stopping Miriam but I contend this is the kind of perverse morality we can do without" (Rollo, p.
156).
The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable,
reads as follows:

"(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of her intention to
travel, whether the Regional Trial Court where she is charged with soliciting donations from
people transacting with her office at Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan where she is
charged with having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization
Program nor even the Supreme Court where her petition is still pending" (Rollo, p. 158).
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored
unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."

The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said
Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:

"That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor--
Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation,
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not
allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving
unwarranted benefits and advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and
administrative functions of said accused" (Rollo, p. 36).
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the
Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as
uncalled for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and
integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court,
with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the
merit of the charge against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have been no
occasion for the letter had Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the
Sandiganbayan.

Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the

Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity among the
three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5).
The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of
prejudice and bias on the part of Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29
SCRA 688 [1969]).
Re: Claim of denial of due process

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason
of the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her, while the
offense was allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information was filed only
on May 9, 1991 and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad,

there indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the
simplicity of the legal and factual issues involved therein.

In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled
because of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original
information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the
January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory
process was set in motion. The investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto
dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who
submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution
had to undergo the hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until
it reached the Ombudsman in March 1991.

We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No.
16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed
to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information
against her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of
action, is self-defeating.

Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau
of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines
after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her
motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information
(People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her
motion that:

(1) She was a public officer;

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984;

(3) Those aliens were disqualified;

(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official
functions."

The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e)
of R.A. No. 3019.
The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324,
that petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners
and that the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for
legalization of stay, are matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.

Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused
"undue injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government; and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference.

In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:

"The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3
(a). In other words the act of giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference is not an indispensable element of the offense of 'causing any undue injury to any
party' as claimed by petitioners although there may be instances where both elements concur."
Re: Delito Continuado

Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public
prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the
Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also
noted that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended
Informations, the splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of
justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plaint, which petitioner
failed to pursue with vigor in her petition.

We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and
hence, there should only be one information to be filed against her.

The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime"
and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."

In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that
the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law – difficult as it is to
define and more difficult to apply.

According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts
performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent
or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in
one and the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose
or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed).

According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in

reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised
Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).

Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).

Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the
following cases:

(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the
same place and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939]).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the
same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974]).

(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon,
49 Phil. 437 [1926]).

(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects
veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of
said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964]). The collections of the legal fees were
impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of
collection were made under the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955]).

On other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:

(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to
December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil.
306 [1961]). The said acts were committed on two different occasions.

(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal
the said offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications
"were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify x x x"
(People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938]).

(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to
turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the
installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976]

(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of
the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been
applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the
charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v.
Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964]).

Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws,
unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code
may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.

The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense
or separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts
as shown by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.

The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of
several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place
constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine,"
under which there was a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was
the doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused for one offense or
for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (Annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).

The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different
criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same
"occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45
NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against
putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another
court observed that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for
each act, the accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation,
28 ALR 2d 1179).

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal
act - that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to
enjoy such privilege.

The original information also averred that the criminal act: (i) committed by petitioner was in
violation of a law - Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to
one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about
October 17, 1988.

The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information,
except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information
states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.

At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they
would file only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As
stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):

"On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded categorically that the
accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of law represented by the
approval of the applications of 32 foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization
Program. In this respect, and responding directly to the concerns of the accused through
counsel, the prosecution is categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but only one x x x"
(Rollo, p. 59).
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of
time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of
the application for the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the
pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.

Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars
that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated
November 13, 1992 stated as follows:

"x x x Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the
government is concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of the violation of
law itself but because of the adverse effect on the stability and security of the country in granting
citizenship to those not qualified" (Rollo, p. 59).
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in
Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of
the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal
Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original
case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March
25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is
concerned.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110617, December 29, 1994

GERUNCIO H. ILAGAN, CLARO PIÑON AND ROSENDO PIÑON, PETITIONERS, VS. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. ROMERO, SALVADOR Q. QUIMPO AND
HOMETRUST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

This case presents another instance of the mode of advocacy that bedevils our criminal justice
system, evoking thereby the jeremiad of herein respondent corporation against the abuse of
certiorari for unnecessary delay in the resolution of a mere interlocutory order. Indeed,
considering its revelations and the supporting annexes to its comment, [1] this appeal as initially
resolved by the First Division was advisedly accepted by the Court En Banc so that we may
write finis to such a simple incident as a motion to quash which for years has regrettably held up
the adjudication on the merits of the main criminal actions.

The records show that on July 21, 1992, eight informations were filed and docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. C-40482 to C-40489 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Kalookan City,
charging herein petitioners Geruncio H. Ilagan, Claro Piñon and Rosendo Piñon as co-
conspirators in the crime of estafa.

The information in Criminal Case No. C-40482[2] contained the following accusatory allegations:

That on or about covering the period from July, 1990 up to December, 1991 in Kalookan City,
MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
bei(ng) then the President, Finance Manager and Sales Director, respectively, of the Apple
Realty and Development Corporation, a Corporation duly appointed Agent of the HOMETRUST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by its Manager, one SALLY S. GO,
defrauded and deceived the latter in the following manner, to wit: said accused conspiring and
confederating with one another, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which they made to the prospective lots and houses and lots buyers, namely:
Erlinda Sayasa, Rogelio Damasco, Gina G. Teston, Filomena Lanoz(o), Natividad Diaz, Florida
Gargoles and Marce(l)ita Ranara, that is, by representing themselves that they are authorized to
collect/receive and issue receipts of payments from said buyers, accused knowing fully well that
they are not authorized to do so, induced and convinced herein buyers to give and deliver, as in
fact, the latter did give and deliver to said accused the total amount of P353,500.00, Philippine
Currency, who instead of remitting the same amount to the Hometrust Development
Corporation, with deliberate intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and benefit the said
amount and despite repeated demands made upon them, refused and failed and still fail and
refuse to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of the said Corporation, in the
aforementioned total amount of P353,500.00. (Corrections in parentheses ours.)’
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. C-40483,[3] the information alleged as follows:

That on or about the first week of June to Nov. 23, 1991 in Kalookan City, MM, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then a
President, Finance Manager and Sales Director, respectively, of the Apple Realty and
Development Corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another, defrauded and
deceived the HOMETRUST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by its
MANAGER, one SALLY S. GO, in the following manner, to wit: said accused being then duly
appointed as Agents of the said Corporation in a Contract of Agency dated July 30, 1990 and
they are authorized to sell lots and/or houses and lots to prospective buyers on a commission
basis with the restrictions however, that herein Agents cannot receive any form of payment from
buyers as well as to issue any receipt therefor, accused knowing fully well of the said agreement
the terms and conditions of which are embodied in the said Contract, induced and convinced
one MARCELITA RANARA to buy and purchase lots and/or house and lots and receive
payments and issue receipts therefor, as in fact herein complainant did give the total amount of
P24,000.00 to said accused, representing as the reservation fee/downpayment of the lots and/or
houses and lots purchase price, when in truth and in fact, they are not entitled to do so, much
less, have no personality to collect whatever amount from said prospective buyers, but said
accused, once in possession of the said amount, with deliberate intent to defraud, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert to their own
personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite repeated demands made upon them to
return/deliver the said amount, failed and refused and still fail and refuse to restitute the same,
to the damage and prejudice of the complainant thereof, in the aforementioned amount of
P24,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Uniformly, all the indictments in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40484 to 40489[4] contained the same
allegations as those in Criminal Case No. C-40483, except with respect to the offended party,
the date of commission of the offense, and the amount subject of the offense, thus:

CASE NO. OFFENDED DATE OF COMMISSION AMOUNT

PARTY
C-40484 Rogelio Damasco April 30, 1991 to P60,000.00
August 22, 1991
C-40485 Gina G. Teston June, 1991 to 169,000.00
November 4, 1991
C-40486 Natividad Diaz May, 1991 to July, 19,000,00
1991
C-40487 Erlinda Sayasa July 21, 1991 to 133,500.00
October 18, 1991
C-40488 Filomena Lanozo May, 1991 to July, 19,000.00
1991
C-40489 Florida Gargoles May, 1991 to July 29,000.00
1991
I

According to petitioners, on July 30, 1992 they moved to quash the informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 on the ground of duplicity of offenses charged therein. The
same was dismissed by the trial court in its order of December 10, 1992 which is hereunder
reproduced:

Acting on the "Motion to Quash” and the "Opposition" thereto, and considering, as urged, that
each Information filed against the accused in Crim. Cases Nos. 40482, 40483, 40484, 40485,
40486, 40487, 40488 and 40489 indubitably show different private complainants involving
different transactions committed on different dates, which assertion is further reinforced by the
averment in the affidavit-complaints executed by the complainants in each (of the) aforesaid
criminal cases, the movant's contention therefore that the ground alleged in the Motion to Quash
is within the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 117, is untenable.
The applicable rule on the question of duplicitous Information is Sec. 2(e), Rule 117, not Sec. 3
of Rule 117 as urged.
As correctly pointed out by the public prosecutor, the duplicitous Information presupposes one
or more offenses contained in one or (a) single Information under Sec. 2(e), Rule 117, Rules of
Court.
But read as it should be, each Information here clearly alleges only one offense for one single
act, consequently, the Rule in question does not apply.
Accordingly, the Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED.[5]
Unfazed, and obviously for the same purpose since they raised exactly the same contentions,
petitioners sought the extraordinary writ of certiorari and prohibition from the Court of Appeals to
set aside the aforesaid denial order of the trial court. In its decision[6] in CA-G.R. SP No. 31021
promulgated on June 22, 1993, said appellate court made short shrift of the pretensions of
petitioners in these terse observations:

Petitioners allege that the informations are duplicitous and the trial court should have quashed
them. They contend that the complainants in Criminal Case No. 40482 and the individual
complainants in the seven other cases (Criminal Case No. 40483-40489) are one and the same
and that the acts alleged in the first case (No. 40482) to have been committed during the period
July, 1990 to December, 1991 are the same acts charged individually in the other seven cases
(Nos. 40483-40489) on dates covered by the same period alleged in the first case. Petitioners
argue that in refusing to quash the informations, the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
These contentions are without merit. To be sure, an information is considered duplicitous and
therefore subject to dismissal if it charges more than one offense except in cases in which a
single punishment is prescribed for various offenses. (Rule 117, Sec. 3(e]). In the case at bar,
each information charges only one offense of estafa and, therefore, there is no basis for moving
to quash on the ground of duplicity of offense.
Nonetheless, in an apparent gesture of understanding accommodation and by way of guidance
to petitioners on the error of their ways even on such elementary procedural matters,
respondent court deigned to proceed further and extended this solicitous explanation to them:

What probably petitioners want to say is that for the same act alleged to constitute the crime of
estafa they are being held liable to two complainants. For the theory of the prosecution appears
to be that during the period July 1990 to December 1991, petitioners, as agents of the
respondent Hometrust Development Corp. defrauded and deceived both Hometrust
Development and the lot buyers by representing to the latter that they (petitioners) were
authorized to receive payments when in fact they were not, and were thus able to collect from
the lot owners the total amount of P353,000.00 which they subsequently misappropriated and
converted to their personal use and benefit. For this reason eight informations were filed against
petitioners from which it is clear that the cases involve different parties and amounts and that
the acts alleged to constitute estafa were committed on different dates, to wit:
xxx
Thus for every single act of misappropriation both those from whom the amounts were received
and the Hometrust Development to which the payments were intended have brought estafa
cases against the herein petitioners in (the) latter's capacity as president, finance manager and
sales director respectively of the Apple Realty and Development Corp., sales agent (without
authority to receive payments) of Hometrust Development Corp. It is clear that each information
charges only one offense.[7]
That was all, that was enough, and that was correct. In fine, respondent Court of Appeals
frontally and succinctly confronted the sole issue of the alleged multifariousness of the
informations which was the same and only ground invoked by petitioners in both the trial court
and the respondent court. It did not digress into the arcanum of the application to said criminal
cases of the rule on a delito continuado or the inapplicability of a supposed non-existent rule of
litis pendentia as applied to double jeopardy, as was done during the deliberations in this case.
Rationally, it did not have to and, legally, it could not do so.

For, in no uncertain terms, Section 2, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
intentionally amended for that purpose, mandatorily provides that "(t)he motion to quash shall be
in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal
grounds therefor and the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged" (Stress supplied).

All the way from the lower court, through the respondent court, and now before this Court,
petitioners have at least been consistent in obdurately cleaving and limiting their plaint to the
lone issue of supposed duplicitous informations. We cannot, therefore, conceive of how the
foregoing pithy dispositions of the two courts before us could have failed to put that matter to
rest. We also cannot understand why, despite the aforecited prohibition in Rule 117, this Court
should still be expected to consider other grounds intrusive upon the merits of the criminal cases
involved which would disturb the correct pronouncements of the two lower courts, instead of
summarily denying this petition. However, if only to dissipate intransigent reservations on our
decision on this incident, and to serve as bearings to the court a quo with regard to our ultimate
resolution thereof, we shall tread on the virtual merits of the estafa cases in question as the
facts thereof appear from the pleadings of record.

II

Indulging all inferences in favor of petitioners, what appears to be the implication in their
otherwise defective submissions is that despite the number of aggrieved parties, they committed
only one offense of estafa, and solely against respondent corporation which is now the subject
of Criminal Case No. C-40482. They would postulate that into said case should be deemed
integrated the separate offenses complained of by the seven individual lot buyers, instead of the
latter being made the respective subjects of Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489.

What would seem to be the reason for that theory is that the essential allegations of facts and
the specifications of the offenses charged in the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to
C-40489 are supposedly the same as those stated in the information in Criminal Case No. C-
40482, hence respondent corporation is the offended party in all the eight informations. They
would rebuke respondent Court of Appeals for holding that the seven complainants in the seven
other informations are different from the complainant corporation in Criminal Case No. C-40482.
Their thesis would be that since the informations also state that petitioners had defrauded
respondent corporation, the allegations in the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to
C-40489 that the acts of petitioners caused damage and prejudice to the individual
complainants mentioned therein should be treated as superfluities.

Now, the function of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, as it is here invoked, would be to annul
and set aside a purported grave abuse of discretion by the prosecutor in filing several
informations involving, according to petitioners' theory, one and the same offense. This
argument, however, would completely ignore the fact that the ground of double jeopardy was
never raised in a motion to quash, hence that ground cannot be made the basis for attributing
grave abuse of discretion to the prosecutor. It is also inconsistent with the reasoning advanced
during our deliberations that these cases would fall within the purview of the constitutional right
against double jeopardy were it not for the failure of existing rules on criminal procedure to
address the instant situation. If ex hypothesi there is no rule on double jeopardy to govern such
situation and, for that matter, it has not even been invoked in the motion to quash, it is then
unpardonably absurd to claim that its non-application by the prosecutor could constitute grave
abuse of discretion on his part.

The core issue is, therefore, whether the offenses separately charged in the eight informations
actually constitute only one offense or were correctly considered as eight separate crimes of
estafa. No hearing on this issue was ever conducted in the court below as it was never raised
therein; and the sole ground of multifariousness was, since it could properly be, resolved by the
court only on the bases of the allegations in the motion to quash without introduction of evidence
aliunde.

The issue of double jeopardy should properly have been raised in and resolved by the trial court
in the first instance as it would necessitate evidence on the terms of the contracts or
documentation of the transactions with the lot buyers, the rights and obligations of the parties
thereunder, the binding effects thereof, the resolutory conditions or grounds for rescission, any
confirmation or repudiation thereof as may have been made by respondent corporation, and the
like. In any event, the present petition could also have been rejected outright, without thereby
causing any undue prejudice to the parties, even merely on the bases of the present contents
and state of the records before us.

1. The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the one hand, and those
committed against the lot buyers, on the other, are definitely separate felonies. They were
dictated by different criminal intents, committed under different modes of commission provided
by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts, consummated on different occasions, and
caused injury to different parties.

The crime of estafa against respondent corporation was committed through unfaithfulness or
abuse of confidence, specifically as provided in Paragraph 1(b) of Article 315, Revised Penal
Code. The operative act in the perpetration thereof was the failure to turn over or deliver to
respondent corporation the amounts collected by the accused, despite their duty to do so. The
felony was consummated on the dates when and at the places where such amounts were to be
delivered to respondent corporation under the agency agreement therefor or within a reasonable
time from receipt of the payments made by the lot buyers. The aggrieved party was respondent
corporation which suffered damages basically to the extent of the sums collected in its behalf
but not delivered or accounted for by the accused.

With respect to the lot buyers, the offense of swindling was committed by deceit or false
pretenses employed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, more
specifically as provided in Paragraph 2(a) of the same article of the Code, that is, by the
accused falsely pretending to possess the power to collect the payments due from said buyers,
despite the peculiar but specific prohibition imposed by their said principal. The felony was
perpetrated through the aforesaid the deceitful misrepresentations which made possible the
unauthorized collections. The offense was consummated upon receipt by the accused of the
amounts in the different occasions and places where the payments were made by the lot
buyers. The aggrieved parties were the lot buyers who individually and separately suffered
damages by being deprived not only of their money but primarily of their property rights to and in
the lots they respectively purchased.

In either instance, the requisite ingredients of estafa as separate offenses are present, that is,
for respondent corporation the elements of abuse of confidence and damage, and for the lot
buyers the elements of deceit and damage. It has been held that estafa can be committed with
the attendance of both modes of commission, that is, abuse of confidence and deceit employed
against the same victim and causing damage to him. Thus, where an agent deliberately
misrepresented to the landowner, the real position of the prospective buyer of the land in order
to induce said owner to agree to a lower price and, thereafter, the agent sold the land for the
higher amount which was actually agreed upon by him and the buyer, and he then clandestinely
misappropriated the excess, the crime of estafa was committed under both modes and he could
be charged under either.[8] Withal, it has also been held that such estafa is more properly
categorized as one committed through abuse of confidence.[9]

With much more reason, therefore, should the offense of estafa against respondent corporation
be considered discretely and separately from those committed against the lot buyers since, inter
alia, different modes of commission and different parties are concerned. Furthermore, to
underscore the distinction between the estafa committed against respondent corporation and
the lot buyers, in estafa through abuse of confidence prior demand should be made by the
offended party on the accused to comply with the obligation before the latter may be charged
criminally,[10] but there is no such requirement where the estafa was committed through
deceit.[11]

As earlier stated, the damage sustained by the lot buyers is distinct from that suffered by
respondent corporation, since, primarily, the injury to the lot buyers was the deprivation of their
rights or the exercise thereof over the properties they respectively purchased. It has long been
the rule that actual damage is not necessary in estafa, as long as it is capable of pecuniary
estimation, hence mere temporary disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage. [12]
Even if the prejudice is temporary, that would suffice for the element of damage in estafa. [13]
Here, the lot buyers involved in the criminal cases subject of the present recourse have, as a
direct consequence of the acts of petitioners, been deprived of the exercise of their rights of
actual or potential ownership over their properties since 1991 up to the present.

That the names of the seven lot buyers and the amounts they paid are mentioned in the
information in Criminal Case No. C-40482 does not have the significance claimed by petitioners.
These were only mentioned therein to explain the source of and the amounts involved, the
totality whereof constituted the element of damage to respondent corporation. On the other
hand, the statement in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 that the accused "defrauded
and deceived" respondent corporation is the phrase which should be considered as a
surplusage. The information in each of the latter seven cases specifically refers to the individual
complainant therein, alleges how the accused "induced and convinced (the complainant) to buy
and purchase lots and/or houses and lots and receive(d) payments and issue(d) receipts
therefor," which amounts they represented "as the reservation fee/downpayment" for the
properties sold "when in truth and in fact they were not entitled to do so x x x to the damage and
prejudice of the complainant thereof." Such allegations constitute the estafa contemplated in
Paragraph 2(a) of Article 315, with the respective complainants as the offended parties
separately from respondent corporation.

2. Consequent to the theory of identity of the offense committed against respondent corporation
vis-a-vis those against the lot buyers, we reject petitioners' plea for the dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 which were filed each with one lot buyer as the offended party
therein. While the felonious acts perpetrated against said lot buyers do not constitute a delito
continuado, there must be an explicitation as to whether, under the taxonomy in the Spanish
concept of concurso de delitos, the seven acts of defraudation under said informations
constitute material or real plurality, hence there are seven crimes of estafa, or should be
considered as in the nature of formal or ideal plurality, hence there is only one crime of estafa.
We rule that said seven cases fall under the category of concurso real, hence there are seven
juridically independent crimes involving said lot buyers.

The series of acts committed against the seven lot buyers was not the product of a single
criminal intent. The misrepresentation or deceit was employed against each lot buyer on
different dates and in separate places, hence they originated from separate criminal intents and
consequently resulted in separate felonies.[14] Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the
defraudations were pursuant to an identical design, they were committed over a period of about
one and a half years and at substantial intervals both in time and in distance of situs.

More conclusive is the fact that, after the commission of one estafa, the accused could not have
had the foreknowledge as to when or whether they could replicate the same felony against
another victim still necessarily unknown. This lack of prevision on their part definitely proves that
the criminal intent entailed in a preceding swindle could not operate as the same criminal intent
in futuro as regards another subsequent estafa.[15] The inescapable conclusion is that, all told, a
total of eight crimes of estafa were actually committed by the accused against different victims.
3. There is, therefore, no cogency in the proposition that the prosecutor acted with grave abuse
of discretion in filing eight separate charges of estafa, or, for that matter, that the trial court and
respondent court are guilty of the same discretional error in refusing to quash the eight
informations.

If, as petitioners seem to apprehend, the adverse actions of two lower courts could create a
scenario of multiple prosecutions for the same offense or, more candidly expressed, of double
jeopardy, then this is neither the procedural stage nor the proper occasion to pass upon that
possibility. For, squarely imputable to petitioners is the evident lack of factual basis for and a
grossly defective presentation of that issue for this Court to rule thereon in this proceeding and
at this time.

However, this observation would not foreclose relief to petitioners if at the trial of this case the
evidence presented and the developments therein suffice to establish the supervenient fact that
indeed there could possibly be a breach of the rule of double jeopardy. Under Section 8 of Rule
117, they can still hereafter raise that defense of non bis in idem, provided that they can lay the
evidentiary bases therefor and refute from the standpoint of substantive penal law what was
earlier said on the nature and the non-identity of the several crimes of estafa involved which, to
repeat, we pronounced purely on the bases of existing records sans the benefit of any
evidentiary fact since none has been adduced.

ACCORDINGLY, the impugned decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the
instant petition is hereby DENIED, with treble costs against petitioners. This judgment is
immediately executory and, upon entry thereof in due course, the record of this case is ordered
to be forthwith remanded to the court a quo which is hereby DIRECTED to take appropriate
action therein with all deliberate and practicable dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011

SANTIAGO PAERA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This resolves the petition for review[1] of the ruling[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City[3] (RTC) finding petitioner Santiago Paera guilty of three counts of Grave Threats, in
violation of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera

(petitioner) allocated his constituents' use of communal water coming from a communal tank by
limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the
neighboring barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by complainant Vicente Darong
(Vicente), father of complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite petitioner's scheme,
Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner reminded Indalecio
of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecio's access.

The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water supply
interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected. To
stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a
wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived. What happened next is contested by
the parties.

According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged
towards Indalecio, shouting "Patyon tikaw!" (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for safety, passing
along the way his wife, Diosetea Darong (Diosetea) who had followed him to the water tank.
Upon seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying, petitioner
shouted "Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw!" ("I don't spare anyone, even if you are
a woman, I will kill you!"). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house
of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As
petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his
bolo towards him, shouting "Bisag gulang ka, buk-on nako imo ulo!" ("Even if you are old, I will
crack open your skull!").

According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily
inquiring why petitioner had severed his water connection. This left petitioner with no choice but
to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to scamper.

Except for Vicente, who was seriously ill, the Darongs testified during trial. Petitioner was the
defense's lone witness.

The Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

The 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valencia-Bacong, Negros Oriental (MCTC) found
petitioner guilty as charged, ordering petitioner to serve time and pay fine for each of the three
counts.[4] The MCTC found the prosecution evidence sufficient to prove the elements of Grave
Threats under Article 282, noting that the Darongs' persistent water tapping contrary to
petitioner's directive "must have angered" petitioner, triggering his criminal behavior. [5] The
MCTC rejected petitioner's defense of denial as "self-serving and uncorroborated."[6]

Petitioner appealed to the RTC, reiterating his defense of denial.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latter's finding on petitioner's motive. The RTC
similarly found unconvincing petitioner's denial in light of the "clear, direct, and consistent"
testimonies of the Darongs and other prosecution witnesses.[7]

Hence, this appeal.

Abandoning his theory below, petitioner now concedes his liability but only for a single count of
the "continued complex crime" of Grave Threats. Further, petitioner prays for the dismissal of
the case filed by Vicente as the latter's failure to testify allegedly deprived him of his
constitutional right to confront witnesses. Alternatively, petitioner claims he is innocent of the
charges for having acted in defense of the property of strangers and in lawful performance of
duty, justifying circumstances under paragraphs 3 and 5, Article 11 of the RPC. [8]

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) finds merit in petitioner's concession of
liability for the single count of the "continued complex crime" of Grave Threats. The OSG,
however, rejects petitioner's prayer for the dismissal of Vicente's complaint, arguing that
petitioner's guilt was amply proven by the prosecution evidence, not to mention that petitioner
failed to raise this issue during trial. Further, the OSG finds the claim of defense of stranger
unavailing for lack of unlawful aggression on the part of the Darongs. Lastly, the OSG notes the
absence of regularity in petitioner's performance of duty to justify his conduct.[9]
 The Issue

The question is whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the affirmative, deny the petition and affirm the RTC.

Due Process Mischief in Raising

New Issues on Appeal

Although uncommented, petitioner's adoption of new theories for the first time before this Court
has not escaped our attention. Elementary principles of due process forbid this pernicious
procedural strategy - it not only catches off-guard the opposing party, it also denies judges the
analytical benefit uniform theorizing affords. Thus, courts generally refuse to pass upon freshly
raised theories.[10] We would have applied this rule here were it not for the fact that petitioner's
liberty is at stake and the OSG partially views his cause with favor.

Petitioner Liable for Three Counts

of Grave Threats

To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of the case to
the concept of "continued crime" (delito continuado) which envisages a single crime committed
through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.[11] To fix the penalty for his
supposed single continued crime, petitioner invokes the rule for complex crime under Article 48
of the RPC imposing the penalty for the most serious crime, applied in its maximum period.

The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of
continued and complex crimes preclude the adoption of petitioner's theory.

Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall threaten another
with the infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a
crime[.]" This felony is consummated "as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the
person threatened."[12]

Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioner's threat to kill Indalecio and Diosetea and
crack open Vicente's skull are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the very least) homicide
and serious physical injuries as penalized under the RPC. These threats were consummated as
soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard petitioner utter his threatening remarks. Having
spoken the threats at different points in time to these three individuals, albeit in rapid
succession, petitioner incurred three separate criminal liabilities.

Petitioner's theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he only had "a
single mental resolution, a single impulse, and single intent"[13] to threaten the Darongs assumes
a vital fact: that he had foreknowledge of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente's presence near the
water tank in the morning of 8 April 1999. The records, however, belie this assumption. Thus, in
the case of Indalecio, petitioner was as much surprised to see Indalecio as the latter was in
seeing petitioner when they chanced upon each other near the water tank. Similarly, petitioner
came across Diosetea as he was chasing Indalecio who had scampered for safety. Lastly,
petitioner crossed paths with Vicente while running after Indalecio. Indeed, petitioner went to the
water tank not to execute his "single intent" to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente but to
investigate a suspected water tap. Not having known in advance of the Darongs' presence near
the water tank at the time in question, petitioner could not have formed any intent to threaten
any of them until shortly before he inadvertently came across each of them.
The importance of foreknowledge of a vital fact to sustain a claim of "continued crime"
undergirded our ruling in Gamboa v. Court of Appeals.[14] There, the accused, as here,
conceded liability to a lesser crime - one count of estafa, and not 124 as charged - theorizing
that his conduct was animated by a single fraudulent intent to divert deposits over a period of
several months. We rejected the claim -

[f]or the simple reason that [the accused] was not possessed of any fore-knowledge of any
deposit by any customer on any day or occasion and which would pass on to his possession
and control. At most, his intent to misappropriate may arise only when he comes in possession
of the deposits on each business day but not in futuro, since petitioner company operates only
on a day-to-day transaction. As a result, there could be as many acts of misappropriation as
there are times the private respondent abstracted and/or diverted the deposits to his own
personal use and benefit.[15] x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, petitioner's intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily harm arose
only when he chanced upon each of his victims.

Indeed, petitioner's theory holds water only if the facts are altered - that is, he threatened
Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same time. Had this been true,
then petitioner's liability for one count of Grave Threats would have rested on the same basis
grounding our rulings that the taking of six roosters[16] or 13 cows[17] found at the same place
and taken at the same time results in the commission of only one count of theft because -

[t]here is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only of
one which was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime. The act of
taking the roosters [and heads of cattle] in the same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not two
distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.[18] (Emphasis in
the original)

Having disposed of petitioner's theory on the nature of his offense, we see no reason to
extensively pass upon his use of the notion of complex crime to avail of its liberal penalty
scheme. It suffices to state that under Article 48 of the RPC, complex crimes encompass either
(1) an act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave offenses; or (2) an offense which is
a necessary means for committing another[19] and petitioner neither performed a single act
resulting in less or less grave crimes nor committed an offense as a means of consummating
another.

The Prosecution Proved the Commission

of Grave Threats Against Vicente

We find no reversible error in the RTC's affirmance of the MCTC's ruling, holding petitioner
liable for Grave Threats against Vicente. The prosecution's evidence, consisting of the
testimonies of Indalecio, Diosetea and two other corroborating witnesses, 20 indisputably show
petitioner threatening Vicente with death.[21] Vicente's inability to take the stand, for documented
medical reason,[22] does not detract from the veracity and strength of the prosecution evidence.
Petitioner's claim of denial of his constitutional right to confront witnesses is untenable as he had
every opportunity to cross-examine the four prosecution witnesses. No law requires the
presentation of the private complainant as condition for finding guilt for Grave Threats,
especially if, as here, there were other victims and witnesses who attested to its commission
against the non-testifying complainant. Significantly, petitioner did not raise Vicente's non-
appearance as an issue during the trial, indicating that he saw nothing significant in the latter's
absence.
 No Justifying Circumstances Attended Petitioner's
Commission of Grave Threats

There is likewise no merit in petitioner's claim of having acted to "defend[] and protect[] the
water rights of his constituents" in the lawful exercise of his office as punong barangay.[23] The
defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of the RPC, which negates criminal
liability of -

[a]nyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and
second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the
person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.

requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) absence of evil motives such as revenge and
resentment.[24] None of these requisites obtain here. Not one of the Darongs committed acts of
aggression against third parties' rights when petitioner successively threatened them with bodily
harm. Indeed, all of them were performing ordinary, peaceful acts - Indalecio was standing near
the water tank, Diosetea was walking towards Indalecio and Vicente was standing in the
vegetable garden a few meters away. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry
on the reasonableness of the means petitioner used to prevent or repel it is rendered irrelevant.
As for the third requisite, the records more than support the conclusion that petitioner acted with
resentment, borne out of the Darongs' repeated refusal to follow his water distribution scheme,
causing him to lose perspective and angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm.

Lastly, the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5 th
paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed was the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of office.[25]
Arguably, petitioner acted in the performance of his duty to "ensure delivery of basic services" [26]
when he barred the Darongs' access to the communal water tank. Nevertheless, petitioner
exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the Darongs with a bladed
weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for violating his order. A number of options
constituting lawful and due discharge of his office lay before petitioner[27] and his resort to any of
them would have spared him from criminal liability. His failure to do so places his actions outside
of the ambit of criminally immune official conduct. Petitioner ought to know that no amount of
concern for the delivery of services justifies use by local elective officials of violence or threats of
violence.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 November 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 39.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. NOS. 136300-02, September 24, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EMMANUEL AARON,

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 3,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 6730, 6731 and 6732 convicting herein appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, of
one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
victim P50,000 as civil indemnity.
The appellant, Emmanuel Aaron y Dizon, was charged with three counts of rape defined and
penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,[2] respectively, in three
separate criminal complaints filed and signed by the private complainant, Jona G. Grajo, and
subscribed and sworn to on January 17, 1998 before 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar
M. Lasam. Save for their docket numbers, the said criminal complaints are identically worded
thus:

That on or about 16 January 1998 at Brgy. San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a knife and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having
sexual intercourse with the offended party JONA G. GRAJO, against the will and consent of the
latter, to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment on January 30, 1998, the accused, Emmanuel Aaron, assisted by counsel of
his choice, entered the plea of “not guilty” to each of the three complaints in Criminal Cases
Nos. 6730, 6731 and 6732. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence of the prosecution shows that, on January 16, 1998, at around 7:00 o’clock in the
morning, the private complainant, Jona Grajo, was asleep in bed (“papag”) inside her room on
the second floor of the apartment unit which she shared with her sister and her brother-in-law,
herein appellant Emmanuel Aaron. Jona was wearing only a panty and was covered with a
blanket. Sensing that someone was inside her room, Jona opened her eyes and was surprised
to find Emmanuel sitting beside her in bed totally naked. Emmanuel immediately went on top of
Jona and poked a knife on her neck. Jona’s attempt to cry for help proved futile as Emmanuel
quickly covered her mouth with his left hand.[3]

Emmanuel removed her panty and succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Jona who could
only manage to cry. Subsequently, Emmanuel withdrew his penis and ordered Jona to lie down
on the floor. He inserted his penis into her vagina for the second time with the knife still poked
on Jona’s neck. Thereafter, Emmanuel stood up and commanded Jona to lie down near the
headboard of the “papag” bed where he inserted his penis into her vagina for the third time, still
armed with a knife, and continued making pumping motions (“umiindayog”).[4]

After the incident, Jona pleaded to be released but Emmanuel initially refused. He budged only
after Jona told him that she urgently needed to relieve herself (“Ihing-ihi na ako, puputok na ang
pantog ko.”) but not before warning her not to tell anyone about the incident. Jona quickly put on
her panty and hurried down the street in front of the apartment with only a blanket covering
herself. Her cries drew the attention of a neighbor, Lilibeth Isidro, who tried to persuade Jona to
go back inside the apartment, to no avail, for fear of Emmanuel. Upon the prodding of another
neighbor, a certain Agnes, Jona revealed that she was raped by her brother-in-law,[5] the
appellant herein.

Jona proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady upon the latter’s arrival from the market
and she related the misfortune that had befallen her. At that instance, Emmanuel approached
and warned her to be careful with her words. Then he left for the house of Bong Talastas. [6]

After Emmanuel left, Jona went back to their house and dressed up. Thereafter, she went to the
police station in Balanga, Bataan to report the incident.[7] Police Officers Rommel Morales and
Edgardo Flores proceeded to the residence of the private complainant who appeared very tense
but the neighbors informed them that Emmanuel had left. The police officers then proceeded to
the house of Bong Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, where the victim told them
Emmanuel could have possibly gone. On arrival there, they found Emmanuel conversing with
Bong Talastas and they immediately arrested the appellant herein upon ascertaining his
identity.[8]
After bringing Emmanuel to the police station, Police Officers Morales and Flores accompanied
Jona to the provincial hospital in Bataan for physical examination. Thereupon, the attending
physician at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, Dra. Emelita Firmacion, M.D., found “multiple
healed laceration(s) at 1, 3, 5, 6, 9 o’clock position(s), incomplete type” in Jona Grajo’s private
part.

At the trial, Dra. Firmacion identified her signature[9] appearing on the lower right portion of the
medical certificate[10] and affirmed the medical findings contained therein. The multiple hymenal
lacerations sustained by Jona which were respectively indicated in the medical certificate as 1
o’clock, 3 o’clock, 5 o’clock, 6 o’clock and 9 o’clock could have been caused by sexual
intercourse, masturbation, strenuous exercises or penetration of any hard object. The
appearance of a lacerated hymen could indicate the approximate time when the laceration was
sustained. In the case of Jona Grajo, her hymenal lacerations were completely healed,
indicating that the same were sustained at least one month before she was examined on
January 16, 1998. However, it was possible that she had sexual intercourse immediately before
the said examination.[11]

The defense denied any liability for the three counts of rape charged. Appellant Emmanuel
Aaron testified that he and his wife were residing in an apartment unit together with his sister-in-
law, herein private complainant, Jona Grajo.[12] Jona occupied a room on the second floor while
the couple stayed at the ground floor.[13]

On the date of the incident, Emmanuel admitted that he and Jona were the only persons inside
the apartment. He had just arrived from work as a night-shift waiter at Base One restaurant in
Balanga, Bataan. He had earlier met Bong Talastas at 7:00 o’clock in the morning as Bong was
preparing to leave his house while his wife had gone to the market. Emmanuel changed his
clothes upstairs where the cabinet was located opposite the room occupied by Jona. Emmanuel
noticed that the door of Jona’s room was partly open so he peeped through the narrow opening
and saw her wearing only a panty. He was about to close the door when Jona woke up and
began shouting.[14]

Emmanuel did not know why Jona kept on shouting. She even followed as Emmanuel
descended the stairs and she proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady. Emmanuel went
her to the store to caution Jona about her words (“Ayusin mo ang sinasabi mo”) because she
was telling their landlady that he raped her. However, Jona ignored him so he left and decided
to see Bong Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan to inquire from the latter why Jona was
accusing him of having raped her. Emmanuel denied that he was armed with a knife during the
incident, much less threatened Jona with it.[15]

On October 14, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision,[16] the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for the single act of rape having been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalty provided by law. The accused is further required to indemnify the
complainant the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, Emmanuel Aaron interposed the instant appeal.
In his Brief,[17] appellant raised a single assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT

Appellant argues that the account of the private complainant, Jona Grajo, of the alleged
incidents of rape appears incredible and contrary to common human experience. Based on her
testimony, the appellant suddenly placed himself on top of her with his right hand poking a knife
on her neck and with his left hand covering her mouth. Subsequently, the appellant removed her
panty and succeeded in inserting his penis into her private part even without previously opening
his zipper or removing his pants. Likewise, the private complainant did not offer any resistance
although she could have done so. After the alleged acts of rape, the victim did not even
complain to her sister who, by then, had already arrived from the market. The uncharacteristic
behavior of the private complainant could only be explained by the fact that she admittedly had
several sexual experiences in the past with her boyfriend and live-in partner Bong Talastas. The
appellant theorizes that private complainant wanted to get back at him for the embarrassment of
being seen by him in her panty after her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, left the apartment. Appellant
downplays the testimony of PO1 Rommel Morales as not worthy of credence for lack of
corroborative evidence. [18]

On the other hand, the prosecution showed that the appellant was already naked even before
the private complainant was awakened by his presence; that the private complainant could not
effectively offer any resistance as the appellant was armed with a knife which he used to
intimidate her; and that the private complainant’s being a non-virgin did not discount rape on
January 16, 1998.[19]

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed.-- Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above are present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Article 266-B of the same Code provides:

Article 266-B. Penalties.—Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxx xxx xxx

It should be stressed that in the review of rape cases, this Court is almost invariably guided by
three principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution and (3) the evidence of the prosecution stands
or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.[20] In other words, the credibility of the private complainant is determinative of the
outcome of these cases for rape. Her consistency on material points, or lack of it, that can
sustain or negate conviction, becomes the single most important matter in inquiry. [21]

After a thorough review, we find that the testimony of private complainant, Jona Grajo,
sufficiently established all the elements of rape committed under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (a)
of the Revised Penal Code, namely: a) that the offender, who must be a man, had carnal
knowledge of a woman and (b) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.[22]
The gist of private complainant’s testimony clearly shows that the appellant, Emmanuel Aaron,
forced himself on her at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning on January 16, 1998. The sexual
assault started on the “papag” bed inside her room on the second floor of their apartment unit.
After going on top of the private complainant, the appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into
her vagina after which he made pumping motions while poking a knife on her neck. He then
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina two more times on the same occasion after
transferring locations inside the room, with the knife continuously poked on her neck.

We also find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial court of private complainant’s
credibility. Her testimony during the trial was completely credible as it was given in an honest
and straightforward manner. As noted above, she gave a lucid and consistent account of the
commission of the crime and did not waiver in pinpointing her brother-in-law, herein appellant,
as the perpetrator thereof. Likewise, her actuation after the incident vividly portrayed a confused
and traumatized woman typical of victims of rape. Thus, after she broke free of the appellant on
the pretense that she urgently needed to relieve herself, the private complainant quickly put on
her panty and rushed to the street with only a blanket to cover her naked body. Her neighbors
took note of her obviously troubled condition and admonished her to go back inside the
apartment but she refused, claiming that she had been raped. She sought refuge at the nearby
store of their landlady to whom she confided that she was raped by her brother-in-law. Private
complainant hurried back to their apartment to get dressed only upon making sure that the
appellant had already left the place. Without losing time, she proceeded directly to the police
station and lodged a complaint for rape against the appellant.

Prosecution witness PO1 Rommel Morales of Balanga, Bataan, who was the police officer on
duty at the time Jona Grajo came to the police station, recounted during the trial that the private
complainant was crying and trembling on arrival at the Balanga, Bataan police station on
January 16, 1998. Private complainant took time to answer the queries of the police officer since
she was crying uncontrollably. When she finally got hold of herself, the private complainant
reported that she had been raped by the appellant who was subsequently arrested by the
police. The actuations of the private complainant immediately after the incident may be
considered as part of the res gestae that substantially strengthens her claim of sexual assault by
the appellant.[23]

On the other hand, all the appellant can offer in his defense is bare denial. He claims that he
had just changed his clothes on the second floor of their apartment where his cabinet was
located when he chanced upon the private complainant naked inside her room as the door was
then slightly ajar. He did not do anything further as the private complainant was awakened and
she already started shouting. In view of the positive and convincing testimony of the private
complainant, however, the defense of denial must fail. It is well-settled that denial is an
intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credibility.[24]

The appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have inserted his penis into the private
part of the complainant without first opening his zipper or removing his pants. This argument of
the appellant is misleading for the reason that, per the testimony of the private complainant, the
appellant was already naked when his presence roused her from her sleep:

PROS. LASAM:
Q: While you were in your room on that time and date, do you remember of any incident that
happened?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that incident?

A: While I was inside my room, I sensed that there was a person inside my room and when I
opened my eyes, I saw that he is my brother-in-law.

Q: And that brother-in-law of yours is the person whom you pointed a while ago. Is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How does he look when you saw him inside your room?

A: He was naked sitting beside me. [25]

That the private complainant did not offer sustained resistance despite having been ordered
twice by the appellant to change location inside the room can easily be explained by the fact
that the appellant was threatening to stab her if she resisted. The private complainant was
obviously overwhelmed by intense fear when she woke up with a knife pointed at her neck. The
continuing intimidation of private complainant cowed her into helpless submission to appellant’s
lechery. She could only express her disgust over the sexual attack of her brother-in-law silently
in tears. In this connection, it has been ruled that physical resistance need not be established in
rape when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to
the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety.[26]

The failure of the private complainant to confide the sexual assault to her sister who, appellant
claimed, had arrived from the market before she (private complainant) went to report the matter
to the police is quite understandable and far from being uncharacteristic of a rape victim, as
what appellant would like to make it appear. The workings of the human mind which is under a
great deal of emotional and psychological stress are unpredictable and different people will
react differently to a given situation.[27] Besides, the private complainant did not want to drag her
sister into the controversy and hurt her in the process. During the trial, the private complainant
revealed that she kept from her sister the previous sexual advances of the appellant in order not
to destroy their good relationship. Private complainant explained that she did not leave the
apartment despite the said harassments of the appellant inasmuch as she had no other place to
go. However, she confided her ordeal to their landlady, a certain Elsa Navarro. At any rate, what
is important is that the private complainant reported the rape immediately to the police.

Admittedly, private complainant was having an affair with a certain Bong Talastas [28] and that
she was not innocent to the ways of the world. However, such fact alone does not negate the
commission of rape by the appellant against her. Dra. Firmacion testified that although the
lacerations found in the private part of Jona Grajo were completely healed, such fact did not
discount the possibility that she was sexually molested immediately before she was examined
on January 16, 1998. We emphasize that moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and
conviction of the offender in the crime of rape. The Court has ruled time and again that even a
prostitute can be a victim of rape[29] as the essence is the victim’s lack of consent to the sexual
act.

Significantly, the appellant failed to advance any credible motive that could have impelled the
private complainant to testify falsely against him.[30] In a desperate attempt to avoid any
responsibility for his crime, however, the appellant theorizes that the private complainant merely
wanted to exact revenge from him for the embarrassment she experienced when he chanced
upon her clad merely in a panty inside her room. This alleged motive on the part of the private
complainant is too shallow to merit even scant consideration from this Court. If appellant were to
be believed, would not private complainant have instead opted to keep quiet about the incident
to spare herself from further embarrassment? Common experience dictates that no woman,
especially one of tender age, will concoct a rape complaint, allow a gynecological examination
and permit herself to be subjected to public trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to
have the culprit apprehended and punished.[31] Indeed, coming out in the open with the
accusation of sexual assault on her by her brother-in-law inevitably entailed risking her
relationship with her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, and with her sister. However, the rape simply
proved too much for her to bear.

We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be convicted of only one count of rape. It
may appear from the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the
private part of Jona Grajo. However, the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act
of rape in which the appellant was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. There is no
indication in the records, as the trial court correctly observed, from which it can be inferred that
the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his
lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed.

Considering that the crime of rape was committed by the appellant with the use of a deadly
weapon, the imposable penalty under Article 266-B is reclusion perpetua to death. In the
absence of any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant. She is also entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000). And due to the emotional distress suffered by the private
complainant who was only nineteen years old at the time of the rape, she is also entitled to an
award of moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).[32]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo convicting the appellant Emmanuel Aaron of
one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
private complainant the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) as civil indemnity is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that said appellant shall pay an additional fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000) by way of moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANOLITO LUCENA Y

VELASQUEZ, ALIAS "MACHETE," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The subject of this appeal is the Decision[1] dated 24 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03371 affirming the Decision[2] dated 30 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-0763 to 03-0765, finding
herein appellant Manolito Lucena y Velasquez alias "Machete" guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of three counts of rape, thereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count and ordering him to pay AAA[3] the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity also for each count.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,[4] all dated 24 June 2003 allege:

That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], a Barangay Tanod Volunteer,
who took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by means of force,
threat or intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age,
against her will and consent. (Emphasis and italics supplied).

The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges against
him.[5] Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.

The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child
Protection Unit, University of the Philippines – Philippine General Hospital (UP-PGH), who
examined the victim.

The testimonies of the above-named prosecution witnesses established that on 28 April 2003, at
around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old, having been born on 10 July 1986,
was walking and chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio, Parañaque
City, two (2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed them
that they were being arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing curfew against minors.
AAA's companions, however, managed to escape, thus, she alone was apprehended. [6] AAA
was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the
night in jail, AAA pleaded with them and protested that she did not commit any offense as she
was just chatting with her friends. AAA’s plea, however, remained unheeded. [7]

AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San Dionisio
Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went inside the barangay
hall. The appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a while, the
barangay tanod, the one who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the appellant told the
former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to her house. [8]

But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in
San Dionisio, Parañaque City. While on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would
kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to
alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what he would do with her but the former did
not respond. The appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a
grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to
take off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis
into AAA’s vagina despite the latter’s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But,
after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis
into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted again his
penis into AAA’s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered
AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell
anyone about what happened between them.[9]

The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in front of a
school in Parañaque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant repeated his threat
to kill her should she tell anyone about the incident.[10]

The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay kagawad,
who simply advised her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the
appellant. AAA and her mother subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected to physical
examination by Dr. Tan,[11] which resulted in the following findings:

Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 o’clock area with petechiae, fresh
HYMEN laceration at 9 o’clock area with eccymosi at 8-10 o’clock area, Type of Hymen:
Crescentic
xxxx

Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12 and 1 o’clock area. No evident

ANAL EXAMINATION
injury at the time of examination.

xxxx

IMPRESSIONS

Disclosure of sexual abuse.

Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or Penetrating Trauma. [12]
(Emphasis supplied).

AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she executed her sworn
statement accusing the appellant of rape. AAA was able to identify the appellant as her
assailant because the former was wearing a jacket emblazoned with “Barangay Police,” as well
as a Barangay Identification Card, at the time of the incident.[13]

The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the defense.

In the course of Corpuz’s direct examination, however, the parties made the following
stipulations: (1) that the [herein appellant] was the assigned barangay radio operator on that
date, [28 April 2003], and he stayed at the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2)
that the witness was there up to 12:00 midnight, but at about past 12:00, he left and returned
after two (2) hours, at 2:00 o’clock a.m.; and (3) that when he woke up at 5:00 o’clock in the
morning, the [appellant] was still there. With these stipulations, Corpuz’s testimony was
dispensed with.[14]

The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus, offered a
different version of the story.

On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio operator at the barangay
hall. His task as such was to receive complaints from the residents of the barangay, as well as
to receive calls from fellow barangay officials who are in need of assistance. On the same day,
he received a call from his companion, who is also a barangay tanod. He cannot, however,
recall any unusual incident that transpired on that day. [15]

The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a complaint against him but he
denied that he knew her personally. He also vehemently denied the following: (1) that he raped
AAA; (2) that he was one of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for violating the
curfew ordinance of their barangay; and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle in going to
the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant claimed that after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he
went home already. In fact, he was shocked when he was arrested on 25 September 2003 as
he did not commit any crime.[16]

In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the categorical,
straightforward and positive testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of sexual
abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3) counts of rape as defined and penalized under
paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, as amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant] MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ
alias MACHETE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Rape (under Art.
266-a par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266-B of the RPC as amended by RA 8353) and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of Rape. In addition, the
[appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count.[17] (Emphasis and italics theirs).

The appellant appealed[18] the trial court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals with the following
assignment of errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [HEREIN APPELLANT] OF

RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF FORCE
AND INTIMIDATION.

II.

GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED,

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF
RAPE.[19]

After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision
dated 24 August 2009 sustaining appellant’s conviction for three (3) counts of rape, as well as
the damages awarded to AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals explained that the facts
revealed that the appellant succeeded thrice in inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina. The said
three (3) penetrations happened one after another at an interval of five (5) minutes, wherein the
appellant would take a rest after satiating his lust and after regaining his strength would again
rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of
sexual assault on AAA. Thus, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is irrefutable. [20]

Hence, this appeal.[21]

Both parties in their manifestations[22] before this Court adopted their respective appeal briefs[23]
filed with the Court of Appeals in lieu of Supplemental Briefs.

In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation
attended the commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not even attempt to resist his
alleged sexual advances over her person. Instead, AAA opted to remain passive throughout her
ordeal despite the fact that during the three (3) episodes of their sexual intercourse he was
unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to escape, which she never did. These reactions
of AAA were contrary to human experience, thus, cast serious doubts on the veracity of her
testimony and on her credibility as a witness.

The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAA’s medical examination is quite disturbing as
it appears that her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object though nothing was said to
this effect in her testimony.

The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The
intervening period of five (5) minutes between each penetration does not necessarily prove that
he decided to commit three separate acts of rape. He maintains that what is of prime importance
is that he was motivated by a single criminal intent.

With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt; hence, his acquittal is inevitable.
This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus, stands but the damages
awarded in favor AAA must be modified.

Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is
even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the
intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense.[24]

Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the accused and the
complainant. Following the above principles, this Court is duty-bound to conduct a thorough and
exhaustive evaluation of a judgment of conviction for rape.[25]

After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds no justifiable reason to
reverse the rulings of the lower courts.

All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under paragraph 1(a), Article
266-A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These
provisions specifically state:

ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended
party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.

xxxx

ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis supplied).

Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes rape:
(1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age.[26]

The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so
great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.[27]
Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as
to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it
produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.[28]
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and as
observed by the trial court, which the Court of Appeals sustained, AAA’s categorical,
straightforward and positive testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the
same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which
she acceded because of fear for her life and personal safety. The appellant then put the gun
down on the ground and successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, not only once but
thrice. This happened despite AAA’s plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the
appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This
same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the former was still inside the
tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.[29] It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and
intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires.

While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he
inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of
sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had
already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was
still within appellant’s reach, therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime
the latter would show any resistance to his evil desires. AAA’s lack of physical resistance,
therefore, is understandable and would not in any way discredit her testimony.

It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot be
expected to think and act coherently. Further, as has been consistently held by this Court,
physical resistance is not an essential element of rape and need not be established when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will, to the
rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety. The victim’s failure to shout or
offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of her
aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape victim can be expected to act with reason or in
conformity with the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed
under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently. Some may shout, some
may faint, while others may be shocked into insensibility.[30]

In his attempt to ruin AAA’s credibility in order to exculpate himself from all the charges, the
appellant puts stress on the portion of the result of AAA’s medical examination disclosing that
even her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object, which she never mentioned in her
testimony.

To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not even work
to appellant’s advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAA’s
testimony. As this Court has previously stated, a medical examination and a medical certificate,
albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful
prosecution for rape.[31] Moreover, even though AAA made no mention of any anal penetration,
such omission would not change the fact that she was, indeed, raped by the appellant. As
succinctly found by both lower courts, AAA categorically, straightforwardly, clearly and positively
narrated her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant. She recounted in detail how
the appellant took advantage of her by bringing her to Kabuboy Bridge, where nobody was
present; commanding her to lie down and undress herself at a point of a gun; and successfully
inserting his penis into her vagina, not only once but thrice. AAA stated that after the first
penetration the appellant stopped. After about five minutes, however, the appellant, once again,
inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, the appellant stopped. For the third and last time,
the appellant again inserted his penis into her vagina. This narration was consistent with the rest
of the medical findings showing fresh hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina, which according to
Dr. Tan is a clear evidence of “blunt force or penetrating trauma” - a disclosure of sexual abuse.

For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these defenses
are totally inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was committed without force or
intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses, unless
supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the victim who, in a simple and straightforward manner, convincingly identified
the appellant as the defiler of her chastity.[32] Simply put, the positive assertions of AAA that he
raped her are entitled to greater weight. While denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape
cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim, [33]
as in this case.

Also, appellant’s alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at the barangay hall
doing his job as radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went home, failed to sufficiently
establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. Moreover, the corroborating testimony of defense witness Corpuz that the appellant
left at about past 12:00 midnight, almost the same time the rape incident happened, and then
returned after two (2) hours, even bolster the possibility of the appellant’s presence at the scene
of the crime.

This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the part of AAA to testify
falsely against him. This bolsters the veracity of AAA’s accusation since no woman would
concoct a tale that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to herself and
her family, and submit herself to the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the prosecution of
rape, unless she is motivated by her quest to seek justice for the crime committed against
her.[34]

In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the appellant’s guilt for the crime of
rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron Case),[35]
insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations
because he was motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.

In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then withdrew it
and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his
penis into the victim’s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie
near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis into
the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping motions. From these sets of facts, this Court
convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape despite the three successful
penetrations because there is no indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the
accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his
lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This
Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in
which the accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.

The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case. Here,
we quote with approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial
court, to wit:

We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3) counts
of rape. It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into
the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of
five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim
and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be
clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a
single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3)
counts of rape is indubitable.[36] (Emphasis supplied).
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA
were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant’s
conviction for three counts of rape is proper.

As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides that “[w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.” As it was properly alleged and proved that the
appellant used a gun in order to consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly
imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.

As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of rape is distinct from and
should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations
and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. [37] The award of moral damages,
on the other hand, is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other
than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered
moral injuries entitling her to such award.[38] Hence, this Court upholds the P50,000.00 civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages, for each count of rape, that were awarded by both
lower courts in favor of AAA.

In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in favor of AAA. The award
of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.[39] In this case, since the qualifying circumstance
of the use of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of the crime, exemplary damages
in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in
line with recent jurisprudence, the interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all
damages awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid. [40]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03371 dated 24 August 2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA; and
(2) the appellant is ordered to pay AAA the interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE OF ABSORPTION

G.R. Nos. L-6025 & L-6026, May 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF and APPELLEE, VS. AMADO V.

HERNANDEZ, ET AL., ACCUSED. AMADO VS. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS and
APPELLANTS. THE PEOPLE Of THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF andAPPELLEE, VS.
BAYANI ESPIRITU, ET AL., ACCUSED. BAYANI ESPIRITU AND TEOPISTA VALERIO,
DEFENDANTS and APPELLANTS.

DECISION

LABRADOR, J.:

This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841,
People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani
Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the charge is for Rebellion with
Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies; the appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz,
Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Permin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol,
Adriano Samson and Andres Balsa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed
from, but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the
charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings; theaccused are Bayani Espiritu,
Teopista Valerio and Andres Baisa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres Baisa, Jr. withdrew his
appeal.

The Information filed against defendants Hernandez and others in Criminal Case No. 15481
alleges:
I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had
chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as
well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082,
14270, 14315 and14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and
also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and their
other co-conspirators, being then high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated
with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged in an
armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru acts theretofore committed and
planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of which party
the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayani (H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the
'Hukbalahaps' (Huks),is the armed force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan' (H.M.B.) or the 'Hukbalahaps' (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic
of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of
removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof
as in fact the said 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan' or 'Hukbalahaps' have risen publicly and
taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and
ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent
civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith
and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting,
plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property to create and spread
chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose,
as follows, to wit:
(Enumeration of thirteen attacks on government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946,
August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949,
August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and
March 29, 1950.)
II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated the
said accused In the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several others
as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or maintained
the Congress of Labor Organization (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor
Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated
labor unions and other ‘mass organisations’ in different places in the Philippines, as an active
agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and as
such agency, organ., and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and synchronize its activities-as
the CLO. . .thus organized, established, led and/or maintained by the herein accused and their
co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and synchronized its activities—with the activities
of the ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan’ (HMB) and other organs, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate,
and effect the complete and permanent success of the above-mentioned armed rebellion
against the Government of the Philippines.
The information filed against the defendants in Criminal Case No. 154-79, Bayani Espiritu,
Andres Balsa, Jr. and Teopista Valerio, alleges:
"That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946,and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto and
continuously up to the present time, in the City of Manila, the seat of the government of the
Republic of the Philippines, which the herein accused have intended to overthrow, and the place
chosen for that purpose as the nerve center of all their rebellious atrocities in the different parts
of the country, the said accused being then high ranking officials and/or members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and/or of the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan'
(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the 'Hukbalahaps’(HUKS), the latter being the armed
forces of said Communist Party of the Philippines; ha-ving come to an agreement with the 29 of
the31 accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071, l4082, 14270, 14315, 14344 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and decided to commit the crime of rebellion, and therefore, conspiring and
confederating with all of the 29 accused in said criminal cases, acting in accordance with their
conspiracy and in furtherance thereof, together with many others whose whereabouts and
identities are still unknown up to the filing of this information, and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command
the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan’ (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) to rise publicly and
take arms against the Government or otherwise participate therein for the purpose of overthrowing
the same, as in fact, the said 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya NgBayan' or Hukbalahaps (HUKS) have
risen publicly and taken arms against the Government, by then and there making armed raids,
sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments, and as a
necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance
thereof, by then and there committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage, looting, arson,
kidnappings, planned destruction of private and public buildings to create and spread terrorism in
order to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows, to wit:

(Enumeration of thirteen attacks on Government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946,

August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August
25,1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950,September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29,
1950)

A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the
present appeals.
APPEAL OF AMADO V. HERNANDEZ

After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
following: (1)that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had
aliases, namely, Victor or Soliman; (2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist
publication, as well as other publications of the Party; (3) that he hold the position of President of
the Congress of Labor Organizations; (4) that he had close connections with the Secretariat of
the Communist Party and held continuous communications with its leaders and its members; (5)
that he furnished a mimeographing machine used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and
supplies for the military operations of the Huks; (6) that he had contacted well-known Communists
coming to the Philippines and had gone abroad to the WFTU conference at Brussels, Belgium as
a delegate of the CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by the court that Hernandez made various
speeches encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement in the provinces.

The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the
Congress of Labor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress
was organized by Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano
Balgos, Guillermo Capadocia, etc.
We will now consider the nature and character of both the testimonial as well as the documentary
evidence, independently of each other, to find out if the said evidence supports the findings of the
court.

Testimonial Evidence

Amado V. Hernandez took the oath as member of the Communist Party in the month of October,
1947, at the offices of the Congress of Labor Organizations at 2070 Azcarraga in the presence of
Guillermo Capadocia, Hamon Espiritu, Pedro Castro, Andres Balsa, etc. As a Communist he was
given the pseudonyms of Victor and Soliman, and received copies of the Communist paper "Titis".
He made various speeches on the following dates and occasions:

(1) On August 29, 1948 before the Democratic Peace Rally of the CLO at Plaza Miranda, in which
he announced that the people will soon meet their dear comrade in the person of Comrade Luis
Taruc.

(2) On September 4, 1948 he conferred with Hindu Khomal Goufar at the Escolta, at which
occasion Balgos told Goufar that the PKM, CLO and the Huks are in one effort; that the PKM are
the peasants in the field and the Huks are the armed forces of the Communist Party; and the CLO
falls under the TUD of theCommunist Party.

(3) On October 2, 1948 he went abroad to attend the Second Annual Convention of the World
Federation of Trade Unions and after arrival from abroad a dinner was given to him by the people
of Gagalangin, at which Hernandez delivered a speech and he said that he preferred to go with
the Huks because he felt safer with them than with the authorities of the Government.

(4) In April, 1949, he made a speech be-fore a group of tenants in Malabon attacking the frauds
in the 1947 elections, graft and corruption in the elections and that if improvement cannot be made
by the ballots, they could be made by bullets; and enjoined the people to go to the hills and join
Luis Taruc, the head of the dissidents in the Philippines.

(5) On October 2, 1949 he delivered a speech on the occasion of the commemoration of the World
Peace at the CLO head quarters at 330 P. Campa. He attacked the city mayor and incited the
people to go to Balintawak and see Bonifacio there and thereafter join “our comrades under the
leadership of Luis Taruc”.

(6) On October 16, 1949 he delivered a speech before a convention of the une mploy-.ed at 330
P. Campa. He asked the unemployed to approve a resolution urging the Govern-ment to give
them jobs. In conclusion he said that if the government fails to give them jobs the only way out
was to join the revolutionary forces fighting in the hills. He further said that Mao Tse Tung, leader
of the People's Army in China., drove Chiang Kai Shek from his country, and that Luis Taruc was
also being chased by Government forces run by puppets like Quirino, etc.

(7) On January 13, 1950 there was another meeting at 330 P. Campa. In his talk Hernandez
expressed regret that two foremost leaders of the CLO, Balgos and Capadocia, had gone to the
field to join the liberation army of the HMB, justifying their going out and becoming heroes by
fighting in the fields against Government forces until the ultimate goal is achieved.

The above evidence was testified to by Florentino Diolata who was the official photographer of
the CLO since August, 1948.

On the tie-up between the Communist Party and the CLO, Guillermo Calayag, a Communist and
a Huk from 1942 to 1950, explained:

(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the present government by force of
arms and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it with the so-called dictatorship of the
proletariat; the Communist Party carries its program of armed over-throw of the present
government by organizing the HMB and other forms of organizations such as the CLO, PKM,
union organizations, and the professional and intellectual group; the CLO was organized by the
Trade Union Division (TUD) of the Communist Party.

(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the
CLO were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by the TUD -
the vital undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the organizational bureau
of the Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO, especially the Executive Committee.
And it is a fact that since a good majority of the members of the Executive Committee are party
members, there is no time, there is no single time that these directives and decisions of the
organizational department, thru the TUD, are being objected to by the Executive Committee of
the CLO. These directives refer to how the CLO will conduct its functions. The executive
committee is under the chairmanship of accused Amado V. Hernandez.

(3) The CLO played its role in the over-all Communist program of armed overthrow of the present
government and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of propaganda -
by propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other
forms of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very constitution of the CLO itself
which expounded the theory of classless society and the eradication of social classes (par. 5,
Sec. 1, Art. 2, page 18 of the CLO Constitution contained in the Fourth Annual Convention
Souvenir Program of the CLO, Exh. "V-1579"). Thru propaganda, the CLO promoted the alms of
Communist Party and disseminated Communist ideas by:

(a) The conspicuous display of the portrait or pictures of Crisanto Evangelista (Exh. V-1662),
founder of Communism in the Philippines, in the session hall of the CLO headquarters at 2070
Azcarraga and then at 330 P. Campa.

(b) The distribution of foreign communist reading materials such as the World Federation of Trade
Union Magazine, International Union of Students magazine, Voice magazine of the marine cooks
of the CIO, World Committee of the Defenders of the Peace magazine, Free Bulgaria magazine,
Soviet Russia Today magazine and World Federation of Democratic Youth magazine (Exhs.V-
911, V-907, V-910, V-899, V-912, V-853. V/996 and V-967);

(c) The publication and distribution of some local subversive publications such as the "Titis",
"Bisig", Kidlat", which are Communist Party organs; "The Philippine Labor Demands Justice" and
"Hands Off Korea" authored by accused Amado V, Hernandez;

(d) Principles of Communism were also propagated thru lectures, meetings, and by means of
organization of committee in the educational department as well as researches in the Worker's
Institute of the CLO.

(4) The CLO also helped carry out the pro-gram of the Communist Party thru infiltration of party
members and selected leaders of the HMD within the trade unions under the control of the CLO.
The Communist Party thru the CLO assigned Communist Party leaders and organizers to different
factories in order to organize unions. After the organization of the union, it will affiliate itself with
the CLO thru the Communist leaders and the CLO, in turn, will register said union with the
Department of Labor; and the orientation and indoctrination of the workers is continued in the line
of class struggle. After this orientation and infiltration of the Communist Party members and
selected leaders of the 1MB with the trade unions under the control of the CLO is already achieved
and the group made strong enough to carryout its aims, they will begin the sporadic strikes and
the liquidation of anti-labor elements and anti-Communist elements and will create a so called
revolutionary crisis. That revolutionary crisis will be done for the party to give directives to the
HMB, who are fight-ing in the country sides and made them come to the city gates. The entry of
the HMB is being paved by the simultaneous and sporadic strikes, by ultimate general strikes thru
the management of the CLO.
 Important Documents Submitted At Trial

1. Documents which prove that Amado V. Hernandez used the aliases "Victor", or was
referred to as "Victor" or "Soliman".

(a) Letter dated April 23, 1950 (signed) by Victor addressed to Julie telling the latter of his
sympathies for other communists, describing his experiences with Communists abroad, telling
Julie to dispose of materials that may be sent by Victor. (Exh. D-2001-2004)

(b) "Paano Maisasagawa, etc." – mentions different groups of labor unions of which Victor heads
one group, consisting of the MRRCO, PTLD, PGWU, EMWU and IHWU. (Exh. C-2001-2008)
Cadres assigned to different industries. (Exh. V-40-41)

(c) Handwritten certificate of Honofre Mangila states that he knew Amado Hernandez as Victor
from co-party members Hugo and Ely. (Exh. LL)

(d) Letter of Ellas to Ka Eto requesting the latter to deliver attached letter to Victor. (Exh. 1103)

(e) Saulo's letter about his escape, asks Victor why his press statement was not published in the
newspapers. (Exh. C-362) Letter was however published by Hernandez in the Daily Mirror.

(f) Letter of Taruc to Maclang directing the latter to give copy of Huk Story to Victor. (Exh. D-463-
64)

(g) Notes of Salome Cruz, Huk courier, stating that she went to Soliman at Pampanga St. to bring
to the latter communications from the Communist Party.(Exh. D-1203) That Soliman was given
copies of "Titis". (Exh. D-1209)

(h) SEC directions to Politburo members, Soliman not to be involved with Nacionalista Rebels.
(Exh. F-92-93-SEC)

(i) Letter of SEC to Politburo reporting that Saulo be sent out and Soliman has "tendencies of
careerism and tendency to want to deal with leaders of the party"; that he should be asked to
choose to go underground or fight legally. (Exh. P-562)

(k) Explanation given by Hernandez why he did not join Saulo in going underground. (Exh. V-87)

(1) His election as councilor until December, 1951. (Exh. V-42, W-9)

(2) His election as President of CLO until August of following year.(Exh. V-42, W-9)

2. Letters and Messages of Hernandez.

(a) To Lyden Henry and Harry Reich, tells Huk still fighting. (Exh. V-80)

(b) To SOBSI Jakarta - that Filipinos are joining other communist countries of the East. (Exh. V-
82)

(c) Press release on Saulo's disappearance published by Amado Hernandez. (Exh. W-116-120)

(d) To Hugh and Eddie, July 8, 1949 - Extends greetings to National Union of Marine Cooks and
Stewards, states that labor has one common struggle - "the liberation of all the peoples from the
chains of tyranny, fascism and imperialism." (Exh. V-259)
(e) To Kas. Pablo and Estrada - talks of the fight - fight of labor. (Exh. V-85-98)

(f) Appeal to the Women of Asia. (Exh. V-5-10)

(g) Letter to Julie (Exh. V-2001-2004)

(h) Letter to Chan Lieu - states that leaders during the war are being persecuted, like Taruc. Tells
of reward P100,000.00 on Taruc’s head. (Exh. X-85-88)

(i) Letter to John Gates of the Daily Worker - condemns Wall Street maneuvers; corruption and
graft in Quirino administration, etc. (Exh. V-83)

(j) Cablegram: CLO join ILWU, commands Harry Bridges, US Communist. (Exh.V-79)

(k) Communication of Hernandez to CLO at MRRCO - Praises Balgos and Capadocia for joining
the Huks. (Exh. V-12-22, V-289)

(l) "Philippine Labor Demands Justice" -Attacks czars of Wall Street and U.S. Army and
Government. (Exh. V-94)

(m) Letter to Taruc - June 28, 1940. -States solidarity among the CLO, Huks and FKM. Attacks
North Atlantic Pact. Praises Mao Tse Tung, (contained in Exh. V-94)

(n) "Philippines Is Not A Paradise" -States of a delegation to Roxas attacking unemployment.

(Exh. V-90-93)

(o) Article "Progressive Philippines" - (Exh. V-287)

(p) Article "Hands Off Korea" - (Exh. V-488-494, '495-501, 509-515, 17-25-26)

(q) "Limang Buwang Balak Sa Pagpapalakas Ng Organisasyon" - (Exh. X-35-38)

(r) Press statement of Hernandez - opposes acceptance of decorations from Greece by Romulo.
(Exh. V-72)

3. Other Activities of Hernandez.

(a) Hernandez received clothes from Pres. Lines thru P. Campa, which clothes he sent to
the field. Letters show of sending of supplies to Huks. (Exh. S-383)

(b) Hernandez was asked to furnish port-able typewriter, which he did furnishto Huks. (Exh.
C-364)

(c) Hernandez brought Taruc's letter about facts and incidents about Huks to Bulosan for
inclusion In Bulosan's book.(Exh. FF-l)

(d) Had conference with Kumar Goshal, a Hindu, about the Huks and their armed forces.
(Photographs, Exh. X-6, RR-54-55A)

(e) Supervised taking of pictures of sons of Capadocia and Joven, (Photographs, Exh. T-l,
RR-136-138A)

(f) Had knowledge of the going underground of Capadocia and Balgos and issued press
release about their going under-ground. (Exh. F-91)
 (g) Victor mentioned to continue as con-tact for Chino. (Exh. C-362)

(j) Taruc's letter to Maclang shows that Soliman had sent 7 lessons to Taruc. (Exh. D-451
-451-A)

(k) Associated with follow ranking Communist leaders.

The Court upon consideration of the evidence submitted, found (l) that the Communist Party was
fully organized as a party and in order to carry out its aims and policies established a National
Congress, a Central Committee (CC), Politburo (PE), Secretariat (SEC), Organization Bureau
(OB), and National Courier or Communication Division (NCD), each body performing functions
indicated in their respective names; ('2) that in a meeting held on August 1.1, 1950 the SEC
discussed the creation of a Military Committee of the Party and a new G-HQ, under which on
September 29, 1950 the SEC organized a special warfare division, with a technological
division;(3) that on May 5, 1950 a body known as the National Intelligence division was created,
to gather essential military intelligence and, in general, all information useful for the conduct of
the armed struggle; (4) that a National Finance Committee was also organized as a part of the
Politburo and answerable to it; (5) that the country was divided into 10 Recos, the 10th Reco
comprising the Manila and suburbs command; (6) that since November1,1949 the CPP had
declared the existence of a revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone under-
ground and the CPP Is leading the armed struggle for national liberation, and called on the people
to organize guerrillas and coordinate with the HMB on the decisive struggle and final armed
overthrow of the Imperialist government; (7) that in accordance with such plan the CPP prepared
plans for expansion and development not only of the Party but also of the EMB, the expansion of
the cadres from 3,600 in July 1950 to 56,000 in September 1951,the HMB from 10,800 in July
1950 to 172,000 in September 1951, et. seq.

Around the month of January, 1950 it was decided by the CPP to intensify 1MB military operations
for political purposes. The Politburo sanctioned the attacks made by the Huks on the anniversary
of the HMB on March 25, 1950. The HMB attacks that were reported to the PB were those made
In May, 1945; June 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; August 25, 1950; August
26,1950; October 15 and 17, 1950; May 6, 1946; August 6,19^6; April 10, 1947.; May 9, 1947;
August 19, 1947; April 29, 1949; August 25, I950.; August 26, 1950; September 12, 1950; March
26, 1950; March 29, 1950.

The theory of the prosecution, as stated in the lower court's decision, is as follows:

"The evidence does not show that the defendants in these cases now before this Court had taken
a direct part in those raids and in the commission of the crimes that had been committed. It is not,
however, the theory of the prosecution that they in fact had direct participation in the commission
of the same but rather that the defendants in these cases have cooperated, conspired and
confederated with the Communist Party in the prosecution and successful accomplishment of the
aims and purposes of the said Party thru the organization called the CLO (Congress of Labor
Organizations)."

The Court found that the CLO is independent and separate from the CPP, organized under the
same pattern as the CPP, having its own National Congress, a Central Committee (which acts in
the absence of and in representation of the National Congress), an Executive Committee(which
acts when the National Congress and the Executive Committee are not in session), and seven
permanent Committees, namely, of Organization, Unemployment and Public Relations, Different
Strikes and Pickets, Finance, Auditing, Legislation and Political Action. Members of the
Communist Party dominate the committees of the CLO.

The supposed tie-up between the CPP and the CLO, of which Hernandez was the President, is
described by the court below in its finding, thus:
"Just how the CLO coordinates its functions with the Communist Party organ under which it
operates was explained by witness Guillermo S. Calayag, one-time ranking member of the
Communist Party and the CLO, who typewrite the 'Patnubay sa Education' from a handwritten
draft of Capadocia, which is one of the texts used in the Worker's Institute of the CLO. According
to him, the CLO plays its role by means of propaganda, giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine
and other material forms of help to the HMB, which constitutes the armed forces of the Communist
Party. Propaganda is done by lectures, meetings, and the organization of committees of the
educational department as well as researches at the CLO Worker's Institute.

"Another way of helping the Communist Party of the Philippines is by allowing the Communist
Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories in forming a union. These Party
Members help workers in the factories to agitate for the eradication of social classes and ultimately
effect the total emancipation of the working classes thru the establishment of the so-called
dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the duty of these Communist Party members to indoctrinate
uninitiated workers in the union to become proselytes of the* Communist Party ideology. After the
right number is secured and a union Is formed under a communist leader, this union is affiliated
with the CLO and this in turn registers the same with the Department of Labor. The orientation
and indoctrination of the masses is continued with the help f the CLO. The primary objective of
the CLO is to create what is called a revolutionary crisis. It seeks to attain this objective by first
making demands from the employers for concessions which become more and more
unreasonable until the employers would find it difficult to grant the same. Then a strike is declared.
But the strikes are only preparation for the ultimate attainment of the Communist goal of armed
overthrow of the government. After the workers in the factories have already struck in general at
the behest of the Communist Party thru the CLO, a critical point is reached when a signal is given
for the armed forces of the Communist Party, the HUB, to Intervene and carry the revolution now
being conducted outside to within the city."

On the basis of the above findings, the court be-low found Hernandez guilty as principal of the
crime charged against him and sentenced him to Buffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.

Our study of the testimonial and documentary evidence, especially those cited by the Court in its
decision and toy the Solicitor General in his brief, discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, as a Communist, was an active advocate of the principles of Communism, frequently
exhorting his hearers to follow the footsteps of Taruc and join the uprising of the laboring classes
against capitalism and more specifically against America and the Quirino administration, which
he dubbed as a regime of puppets of American imperialism. But beyond the open advocacy of
Communistic Theory there appears no evidence that he actually participated in the actual
conspiracy to overthrow by force the constituted authority.

Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO. As such, what was his relation to the rebellion?
if, as testified to by Guillermo S. Calayag, the CLO plays merely the role of propagation by
lectures, meetings and the organization of committees of education by Communists; if, as stated,
the CLO merely allowed Communist Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories,
to indoctrinate the CLO members into the Communist Party and proselytize them to the
Communist ideology; if, as also indicated by Calayag, the CLO purports to attain the ultimate
overthrow of the Government first by making demands from employers for concessions until the
employers find it difficult to grant the same, at which time a strike is declared; if it is only after the
various strikes have been carried out and a. crisis is thereby developed among the laboring class,
that the Communist forces would intervene and carry the revolution — it is apparent that the CLO
was merely a stepping stone in the preparation of the laborers for the Communists' ultimate
revolution. In other words, the CLO had no function but that of indoctrination and preparation of
the members for the uprising that would come. It was only a preparatory organization prior to a
revolution, not the revolution itself. The leader of the CLO, therefore, namely Hernandez, cannot
be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or of the actual uprising subject of the accusation.
Hernandez, as president of the CLO, therefore, by his presidency and leadership of the CLO,
cannot be considered as having actually risen up in arms in rebellion against the Government of
the Philippines, or taken part in the conspiracy to commit the rebellion as charged against him in
the present case; he was merely a propagandist and indoctrinator of Communism, he was not a
Communist conspiring to commit the actual rebellion by the mere fact of his presidency of the
CLO.

The court below declares that since November 1949 the Communist Party of the Philippines had
declared the existence of the revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone
underground, with the CPP leading the struggle for national integration, and that in the month of
January 1950, it was decided by the said Party to intensify the HMB military operations for political
purposes. The court implicates the appellant Hernandez as a co-conspirator in this resolution or
acts of the Communist Party by his mere membership thereto. We find this conclusion
unwarranted. The seditious speeches of Hernandez took place before November., 1949 when the
GPP went underground. The court below has not been able to point out, nor have We been able
to find among all acts at bid-touted to Hernandez, any single fact or act of his from which it may
be inferred that he took part in the deliberations declaring the existence of a revolutionary
situation, or that he had gone underground. As a matter of fact the prosecution's evidence is to
the effect that Hernandez refused to go underground preferring to engage in what they consider
the legal battle for the cause.

We have also looked into the different documents which have been presented at the time of the
trial and which were confiscated from the office of the Politburo of the Communist Party. The
speeches of Hernandez were delivered before the declaration by the Communist Party of a state
of revolutionary situation in 1949. Neither was it shown that Hernandez was a member of the
Executive Committee, or of the SEC, or of the Politburo of the Communist Party; so NO
presumption can arise that he had taken part in the accord or conspiracy declaring a revolution.
In short, there has been no evidence, direct or indirect, to relate or connect the appellant
Hernandez with the uprising or the resolution to continue or maintain said uprising, his
participation in the deliberations leading to the uprising being inferred only from the fact that he
was a Communist.

The practice among the top Communists, as declared by the trial court, appears to have 'been for
important members, if they intend actually to join the rebellion, to go underground, which meant
leaving the city, disappearing from sight and/or secretly joining the forces in the field.

The document Exhibit F-562, which is quoted in the decision, contains the directive of the SEC of
September 1, 1950, to Saulo and Hernandez, which reads:

"11. In view of the new developments in the city, send out Elias who prefers to work outside.
Present problem of fighting legally to Com. Soliman. If Soliman is prepared for martyrdom, retain
him to fight legally. If not, send him out with Elias. Same goes with Com. Mino and other relatively
exposed mass leaders."

And the lower court itself found that whereas Saulo went underground and joined the underground
forces outside the City, Hernandez remained in the City, engaged in the work of propaganda,
making speeches and causing the publication of such matters as the Communist Party leaders
directed him to publish.

That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact which is further corroborated by the following
reasons (excuses) given by him for not going underground, namely:(l) that his term of councilor
of the City of Manila was to extend to December, 1951; and (2) that he was elected President of
the CLO for a term which was to end the year 1951.

As a matter of fact the SEC gave instructions to Hernandez not lo be involved with Nacionalista
Rebelns, and reported to the Politburo that Hernandez "has tendencies of careerism and tending
to want to deal with leaders of the Nacionalista Party instead of following CPP organizational
procedures."

The court below further found that Hernandez had been furnishing supplies for the Huks in the
field. But the very document dated December 3, 1949, Exhibit D-420-422, cited in the decision
(printed, p. 49), is to the effect that clothes and shoes that Hernandez was supposed to have sent
have not been received. It is true that some clothes had been sent thru him to the field, but these
clothes had come from a crew member of a ship of the American President Lines. He also, upon
request, sent a portable typewriter to the SEC or Politburo. furthermore, a certain Niagara
Duplicating machine received by Hernandez from one Rolland Scott Billiard, a crow member of
the SS President Cleveland, appears later to have been forwarded by him to the officers of the
SEC or the Politburo.

Lastly, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant
Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His
acts in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his
actions as a Communist.

The acts of the appellant as thus explained and analyzed fall under the category of acts of
propaganda, but do not prove that he actually and in fact conspired with the leaders of the
Communist Party in the uprising or in the actual rebellion, for which acts he is charged in the
information. And his refusal to go underground because of his political commitments occasioned
by his term of election as president of the CLO, and the impressions caused by his acts on the
Communist leaders., to the effect that he was in direct communication or understanding with the
Nacionalista Party to which he was affiliated, creates in Us the reasonable doubt that it was not
his Communist leanings but his political ambitions, that motivated his speeches sympathizing with
the Huks. For which reason We hold that the evidence submitted fails to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he has conspired in the instigation of the rebellion for which he in held to ac-count In
this criminal case.

The question that next comes up for resolution la:Does his or anyone's membership in the
Communist Party per se render Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code? The pertinent provision
reads:

"ART. 136. CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT REBELLION OR INSURRECTION. –

The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished, respectively,
by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine "which shall not exceed P5,000 pesos,
and by prision correccional in its medium period and afine not exceeding 2,000 pesos."

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a

criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very
nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist
advocates action, immediate and positive the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion,
or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow
constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated
or intended or contemplated, the Communist Is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the
supremacy of the proletariat; a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of
Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the
criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual
uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Borrowing
the language of the Supreme Court of the United States:

"In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or on
conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other
concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship must be
sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an organization
engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized by this Court to
be such a relationship. X X X

"What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when accompanied by the
elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an insufficient quantum of participation in the
organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and
encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be
recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal organization, by that 'act'
alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent to its purposes and activities on one
hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort or moral encouragement which comes from the
knowledge that others believe in what the organization is doing. It may indeed be argued that
such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus given to a criminal
enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part of the conspirator to act in
furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as distinguished from a conspirator, may indicate his
approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of his membership without thereby necessarily
committing himself to further It by any act or course of conduct whatever." (Scales vs. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 Led 782)

The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of improvement
of conditions of labor through his organization, the CLO. While the CLO, of which he is the founder
and active president, has communistic tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the
unity and cooperation between labor elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet
indoctrinated in the need of an actual war with or against Capitalism. The appellant was a politician
and a labor leader and it Is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in
connection which the CLO and other trade unions, were impelled and fostered by the desire to
secure the labor vote to support his political ambitions. It Is doubtful whether his desire to foster
the labor union of which he was the head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause
of Communism, not merely to advance his political aspirations.

Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are concerned. We have not found,
nor has any particular act on his part been pointed to Us, which would indicate that he had
advocated action or the use of force in securing the ends of Communism, True it is, he had friends
among the leaders of the Communist Party, and especially the heads of the rebellion, but this
notwithstanding, evidence is wanting to show that he ever attended their meetings, or collaborated
and conspired with said leaders in planning and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing
the cause thereof. Insofar as the furnishing of the mimeograph machine and clothes is concerned,
it appears that he acted merely as an intermediary, who passed said machine and clothes on to
others. It does not appear that he himself furnished funds or material help of his own to the
members of the rebellion or to the forces of the rebellion in the field.

But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in spite of the apparent desire of
the chief of the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-participation in the conspiracy to engage in or
to foster the rebellion or the uprising.

We next consider the question as to whether the fact that Hernandez delivered speeches of
propaganda in favor of Communism and in favor1 of rebellion can be considered as a criminal act
of conspiracy to commit rebellion as defined in the law. In this respect, the mere fact of his giving
and rendering speeches favoring Communism would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because
there was no evidence that the hearers of his speeches of propaganda there and then agreed to
rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as
envisaged by the principles of Communism. To this effect is the following comment of Viada:

"CUESTION 10. El que hace propaganda entre sus convecinos, induolendoles a que el dia que
se anunciara la subasta de consumos se echaran a la calle para conseguir aunque fuera preciso
acudir a la fuerza, el reparto entre los vecinos ricos solamente, sera responsable de un delito de
conspiracion para la sedicion? - El Tribunal Supremo ha resulto la negativa al casar cierta
sentencia de la Audiencia de Valencia, que entendio lo contrario: 'Considerando que, con arreglo
a lo que dispone el art., 40 del Codigo Penal, hay conspiracion cuando dos o mas personas se
conciertan para la ejecucion de un delito y resuelven cometerlo; y no constando que existiera ese
concierto en cuanto a los hechos que se refieren en la tercera pregunta del veredicto, pues en
ella solo se hable de los actos de induccion que el procesado realizo, sin expresar el efecto que
la misma produjo en el animo de las personas a quienes se dirigian, ni si estas aceptaron o no lo
quese las propuso, resulta evidente que faltan los elementos integrantes de la conspiracion, etc.”
(S. de 5 de Julio de 1907, Gaceta de 7 de enero de 1909.)" (Viada, Tomo I, Codigo Penal, p.152)

In view of all the above circumstances ;,re find that there is no concrete evidence proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez) actually participated in the rebellion or in any act
of conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion. We are constrained, in view of the
these circumstances, to absolve, as We hereby absolve, the appellant Amado V. Hernandez from
the crime charged, with a proportionate share of the costs de oficio.

APPEAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in
the information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10years and 1 day of prision
mayor, with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share ofthe coats.

Legal Considerations. - Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is
believed useful if not necessary to lay down the circumstances or facts that may be determinative
of their criminal responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have
exhaustively discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, We do not believe that mere
membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable either of rebellion
or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies
advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such
advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual
rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same.

On the other hand, membership In the HMB (Hukbalahap) Implies participation in an actual
uprising or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasant and laboring
class from thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of
force, and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of
the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty
of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law.

And when a Huk member, not content with his member-ship, does anything to promote the ends
of the rebellion like soliciting contributions, or acting as courier, he thereby becomes guilty of
conspiracy, unless he takes to the field and joins in the rebellion or uprising, in which latter case
he commits rebellion.

In U.S. vs. Vergara, infra, the defendants organized a secret society commonly known as the
"Katipunan", the purpose of which was the overthrow the government by force. Each of the
defendants on various times solicited funds from the people of Mexico, Pampanga. The Court
held that the defendants were guilty of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection
and not of rebellion or insurrection itself. Thus, the Court ruled that:

"From the evidence adduced in this case we are of the opinion that the said defendants are guilty,
not of inciting, setting on foot, or assisting or engaging in rebellion, but rather of the crime of
conspiring to over-throw, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the United States in
the Philippine Islands, and therefore we find that said defendants, and each of them, did, together
with others, in the months of February and March, 1903, In the Province of Pampanga, Philippine
Islands, conspire to over-throw, put down, and to destroy by force the Government of the United
States in the Philippine Islands," (U.S. vs. Vergara, et al., 3 Phil. 432, 434.)

JUAN J. CRUZ

The court found him to be a Communist with various aliases, a member of the Central Committee
of the CLO, member of the Central Committee of the CPP and as such committed to the
establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. To the same effect is the testimony of Guillermo
Calayag.

There Is no evidence to connect him with the rebel-lion or to the conspiracy to commit rebellion.
He should therefore be absolved of the charges contained In the in-formation.

AMADO RACANDAY

The trial court found him guilty as a Communist, a Secretary and Executive Committee member
of the CLO, a communications center of the Communist Party, having been found in possession
of letters from Federico Maclang to Salome Cruz, and solicitor of contributions for the Huks.

Racanday admits being a member of the Executive Committee of the CLO, Editor of the Kidlat of
the Government Workers Union, receiving copies of the Titis. Calayag testified that he was a
member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party entrusted with the duty of receiving
directives of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party.

The letters found in his possession are dated February 14, 195O, before the Communist Party
went underground. We have been unable to find the evidence upon which the court bases its
conclusion that he received contributions for the Huks. With these circumstances in mind We are
not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that as a Communist he took part in the conspiracy
among the officials of the Communist Party to take part and support the rebellion of the Huks.

We are, therefore, constrained to absolve him of the charges filed against him.

GENARO DE LA CRUZ

The court found him to be a Communist since 1945, an officer of an organized Communist branch
in Pasay City, a member of the Central Committee and treasurer of the CLO. He admitted his
membership and his position as member of the executive committee and treasurer of the CLO,
these facts being corroborated by the witness Guillermo Calayag.

His membership in the Communist Party dates as far back as the year 1945. As a communist,
Genaro de la Cruz received quotas and monetary contributions coming from the areas under his
jurisdiction, and one time he made a receipt from a member from Caloocan at the CLO
headquarters at 2070 Azcarraga signing the receipt as"Gonzalo" which is one of his aliases. He
also distributed copies of the "Titis" magazine.

While his membership in the Communist Party plus his having received contributions for the party
indicate that he is an active member, it was not shown that the contributions that he received from
Communist Party members were received around the year 1950 when the Central Committee of
the Communist Party had already agreed to conspire and go underground and support the Huk
rebellion. Under these circumstances We cannot find him guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion
because of the lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

JULIAN LUMANOG

The court found him to be an organizer of HKB among the mill workers, solicited contributions for
the HMB and Central Committee member of the CLO as per testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
He admitted that he joined the Communist Party because he was made to believe that the Party
is for the welfare of the laborers. He also admitted being a member of the Central Committee of
the CLO. Calayag testified that Lumanog organized the HMB units of the Communist Party in the
Lumber Unions and attended a Communist meeting held by Maclang.

Domingo Clarin testified that he (Julian Lumanog)used to give the money collected by him to one
Nicasio Pamintuan, one of the members of the HMB Special Unit (Trigger Squad) in Manila for
the use of the said unit.

Considering that the HMB was engaged in a rebellion to overthrow the government, it is evident
that by giving his contributions he actually participated in the conspiracy to overthrow the
government and should, therefore, be held liable for such conspiracy, and should be sentenced
accordingly.

FERMIN RODILLAS

The trial court found that Fermin Rodillas was a member of the CCP and the CLO; that his
activities consisted in soliciting contributions, in cash and in kind, from city residents for the use
of the HMB, turning over said collections to the Party; that he has also given asylum to a wanted
Hukbalahap at his house at Juan Luna St. Gagalangin, which house was used as Military post.
The above findings of the court are fully supported by the testimony of Domingo Clarin.

Considering that while he has not actually taken part in the rebellion, he has shown sympathy with
the cause by soliciting contributions for it and had given shelter to the Huks. We feel that the court
was fully justified in finding him guilty, but We hold that he should be declared liable merely as a
co-conspirator in the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, and should be sentenced
accordingly.

BAYANI ESPIRITU

This appellant was found by the court to be a Communist, he having admitted membership in the
Communist Party since 1945; that his duties as a Communist was to help in the office of the
national Finance Committee, assorting papers and written documents; that sometimes he
accompanied the purchaser of medicines, shoes, papers, foodstuffs and clothing to be given to
the Huks; that he is a member of the Communication Division of the CPP in Manila, in charge of
distribution of letters or communications; that he admits having written to Salome Cruz, courier of
the Communist Party, when he asked for his necessities, such as money and shoes, etc.

The facts found by the court are sufficiently supported "by the communications and evidence
submitted by the prosecution. The exhibits show that he was in constant communication with the
Communists, serving them as courier. His oath as a member of the Communist Party was
submitted in court and in it he admits obedience to all orders of the Party and to propagate the
stability of the PKP .

Considering that the PKP was engaged in an actual uprising against the constituted Government
and that Bayani Espiritu was in constant communication with the Communist Party and served it
as courier, We believe that the court was fully justified In finding him guilty. However, We believe
that not having actually taken up arms in the uprising he may only be declared guilty of conspiracy
to commit rebellion.

TEOPISTA VALERIO

The court below found that this appellant joined the Communists in 1938 in San Luis, Pampanga,
under Casto Alejandrino, who later became her common-law husband; that her aliases are
"Estrella" and "Star"; that she was found in possession of various documents written to top
Communists like Aiejandrino, Lava and Romy, as well as a letter from Taruc congratulating her
for the delivery of a son.

Jose Taguiang testified that she was a member of the Provincial Committee of the CPP In Nueva
Ecija, later Chairman of the Finance Department, and then promoted to Finance Officer of the
Central Luzon Committee, Alicia Villegas, a Huk courier, testified that she delivered letters from
the mountains to Teopista Valerio, who was in turn also a courier.

Without considering the close relationship that she had with top Communist Casto Alejandrino,
We are satisfied that she herself was aside from being a Huk courier, also a Huk, a member of
the HMD from 1942 to 1951. As she was a Communist and at the same time a member of the
HMB, and considering that the HMB was engaged in an uprising to uproot the legitimate
government, there cannot be any question that she was in conspiracy with the other members of
her Party against the constituted government. We hold, therefore, that the evidence proves
beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.

DEFENDANTS NOT INCLUDED IN DECISION

In Crim. Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the charge against Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P.
Balgos, Alfredo B. Saulo and Jacobo Espino was dismissed because they have not been
apprehended at the time of the trial.

PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA, 57 PHIL., 354 AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700,
DISTINGUISHED

In the case at bar the prosecution is for actual rebellion which consists in rising publicly and taking
arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government
or its laws, the territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, etc., a crime defined in Article 134
of the Revised Penal Code; whereas Evangelista was charged and convicted for inciting to
rebellion under Art. 138, Revised Penal Code (formerly Sec. 2, Act No. 292). As the specific
charge against appellants is that of rising up in arms in actual rebellion against the Government,
they cannot be held guilty of inciting the people to arms under Article 138, which is a different
offense.

On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the Anti-Subversion Act, which penalizes
membership in any organization or association committed to subvert the Government, cannot be
applied to the appellants because said t was approved on June 20, 1957 and was not in force at
the time of the commission of the acts charged against appellants (committed 1945-1950); the
Anti-Subversion Act punishes participation or membership in an organization committed to
overthrow the duly constituted Government, a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion with which
appellants are charged.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, in Criminal Case No. 13341 (G.R. No. L-6025) defendants-appellants Amado V.
Hernandez., Juan J.Cruz, Armado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the
charges contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio. The
defendants-appellants Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R.
No. L-6025) and the defendants-appellants Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio in Criminal Case
No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) are hereby found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit
rebellion, as defined and punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and
everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and 21
days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay their proportionate share of the costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 92163, June 05, 1990

 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY

[BR. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR

FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO
MANANGUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG.
GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (SUPERINTENDENT OF THE NORTHERN POLICE
DISTRICT) AND/OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER
THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 92164. JUNE 5, 1990]

SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, PETITIONERS, VS.

PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, AND HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH
103, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

NARVASA, J.:

Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez[1]
once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not
the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a
number of similar cases[2] that took issue with the ruling -- all with a marked lack of success --
but none, it would seem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to
attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none,
certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on
the same question.

The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor
Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim
of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 90-10941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda PanIilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and
held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been
recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning,
February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was
given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.
Edgardo Dula Torres.[3]

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:

(a) held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it
first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. [4]
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on
March 6, 1990.[5] On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return[6] for the
respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164,[7] which had been contemporaneously but
separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall
within the Hernandez ruling because -- and this is putting it very simply -- the information in
Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for
the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder
and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated
otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo")
arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in
the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling,
and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which
Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.

The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
issued its Resolution of the same date[8] granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio Spouses
provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds
of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The
Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the
matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the
legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court[9] voted against granting bail to
Senator Enrile, and two[10] against granting bail to the Panlilios.

The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator
Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.

The parties oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:

(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice
Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common
offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument
although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Fernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary
means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion
which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its
course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez.
Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined.10-A In the view of the majority,
the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent
challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete
reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President,
exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others,
Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize
Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect
that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter
(Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver
penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its
maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."[11] In thus acting, the President in effect
by legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can
do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against
so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or
should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the
compelling of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were
not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what
appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made
clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:

"There is one other reason -- and a fundamental one at that -- why Article 48 of our Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties
would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not
exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the
crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances,
the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty
would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance.
Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be
unfavorable to the movant.
"Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of
sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
‘La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo
(75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.’ (II Doctrina Penal
del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)

"We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish
Penal code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
‘Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho
constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el
otro.

'En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado
maximo, hasta el limite que represente la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.

‘Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado.'
(Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)

and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting
the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it
does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with
separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect
substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses,
there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said
offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case,
imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The
reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes
are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said
crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently
from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.”[12]
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here
inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The
Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to
the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he
has taken.

The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does
in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple
rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:

"In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against
defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein
are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means
"necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable
under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H, HHH;
and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to
a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail.”[13]
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed
as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed
charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.

Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for
simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the
strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent
prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned information.[14] There is nothing inherently
irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different
from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during
the preliminary investigation.

It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or
affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the
Constitution.[15] This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the
judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established
procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor.[16] Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty
minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. [17]
Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period
within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not
have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a
petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction
to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to
invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se or
by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by
the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information
charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more
than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal
action before the respondent Judge.[18]

There thus seems to be no question that all the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the
present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or
imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in
dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said
Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond
the ability or competence of the respondent Judge -- indeed such an assumption would be
demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such
complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from
deciding them; none, in short that would justify by-passing established judicial processes
designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthetically, this is
the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner:
the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail and, if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It
makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.
Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail,
though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing
where a capital offense is charged.[19] It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom
no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to
proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.

It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other
parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of
the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such
pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming
directly to this Court.

Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but
also because to wash the Court's hands off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the
delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so
doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered
and orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached
this Court only if the relief applied for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the
Court of Appeals on review.

Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short
shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with
the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts.

What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio
spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu
and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have
uncontestedly pleaded[20] that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner
Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim
in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the
strength of said warrants in violation -- they claim -- of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that
quintessentially quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and
punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for
power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of
human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this
aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as
against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be
part of, an ongoing rebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause -- and the Court is no exception -- that not even the crowded
streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public
peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to
restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and
delimit the other offenses to be considered at absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The
Court has no power to effect such change, for can only interpret the law as it stands at any
given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the
need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence
said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's
earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both
cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted
by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond filed with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93335, September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. OMAR U. AMIN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 134, PAIRING
JUDGE, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM OF: SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO
TRAMPE, STATE PROSECUTOR FERDINAND ABESAMIS AND ASST. CITY
PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having
committed rebellion complexed with murder[1] with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads:

"That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having
reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed
a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede,
frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring
or concealing him in his house,"
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance
of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to
dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge
Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was)
probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the
Information on the grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against
Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting
on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the
Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration
for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.

The petitioner comes to this Court on Certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/dismiss the
information on the following grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting
on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion
presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of
the same meeting on 1 December 1989;
III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the
component acts of rebellion;
IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of presidential Decree No.
1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities
resulting in denial of due process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this
Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law
while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil.
515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan
Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. No. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case
gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the
component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure
reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:

"The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court. Which is
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion." (Emphasis
supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex
crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for
two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in
furtherance of rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c)
which states:

"SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from
1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws
in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction."
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accomodated
Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that
Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have
Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col.
Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits
executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive
Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday
party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The
information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989,
Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The
prosecution thereby concluded that:

"In such a situation Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his
house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred
that they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup." (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis
supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or
include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree
No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo p. 49) there is only one
crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101
separate and independent prosecutions for "harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other
armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo
Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioner's alleged act of harboring
or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constituting a component thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit
the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:

"In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the
intent or motive." (p. 535)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us
that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People
v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28
SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a
mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It
cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto[2] (80
Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:

"In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental
operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a
criminal offense under another penal statute or provision, Even so, when the deed is charged as
an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48
of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in
a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made
liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason."
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is
punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code;
hence prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This agument is
specious in rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains
the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime
of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:

"This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and
parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.xxx (People v.
Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery,
kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the
instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must
not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel
Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for
practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his act of
conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and
must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and identified with the crime of rebellion
punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

"Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the
proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of
their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty."
(People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and
convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms. The Court ruled:

"An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is
charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is
already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the
same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty
and was convicted." (at page 662)
xxx xxx xxx
"xxx[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the
present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to
place him in double jeopardy." (at. page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G. R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where
the Court had occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas,
an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his
motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez and
Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common crimes in rebellion. The Court,
however, clarified, to wit:

"x x x in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED
WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez,
Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case."
The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD
1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. [3] The
prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone
or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and
also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of P.D. 1829 in
Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution
under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile
is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because
the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if
the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it
should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to
his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to
pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is
QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their
successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the
arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.

TRANSITORY CRIMES – SEC. 15, RULE 110 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. L-42847, April 29, 1977

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. CECILIA QUE YABUT AND HON.
JESUS DE VEGA, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN,
BRANCH II, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. L-42902

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. GEM1NIANO YABUT, JR.,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

MARTIN, J.:

Two novel questions of law are presented to Us in these petitions to review on certiorari the
quashal orders of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, sitting at Malo!os,//m, the rule on venue
or jurisdiction in a case of estafa for postdating or issuing a check without or with insufficient
funds, and second, whether the new law on checks punishes the postdating or issuance thereof
in payment of a pre-existing obligation.

Private respondent Cecilia Que Yabut in L-42847 was accused of estafa by means of false
pretenses before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, presided over by respondent Judge
Jesus de Vega. The information, docketed as Criminal Case 1404, charges:
''That during the period from February 22, to February 26, 1975, in the Municipality of Malolos,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Cecilia Que Yabut, as treasurer of the Yabut Transit Line, by means of false pretenses
and pretending to have sufficient funds in the Merchants Banking Corporation, located and
doing business in Caloocan City, prepared, issued and make out Check Nos. CB-19035 B, CB-
190396 and CB-190397. dated February 22, 1975, February 24, 1975 and February 26, 1975. in
the total sum of £6,568.94, drawn against the Merchants Banking Corporation, payable to
Freeway Tires Supply, owned and operated by Alicia P. Andan. in payment of articles and
merchandise delivered to and received by said accused, gave and delivered the said checks to
the said Freeway Tires supply, the said accused Cecilia Que Yabut well knowing that at the time
there was no or insufficient funds in the said Merchants Banking Corporation, and upon
presentation of the said checks to the bank, the checks were dishonored and inspite of repeated
demands by the owner of the Freeway Tires Supply to deposit the necessary funds to cover the
checks within the reglementary period enjoined by law, failed and refused to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of Alicia P. Andan, owner and operator of the Freeway Tires Supply, in
the total amount of P6,568.94."
Instead of entering a plea, respondent Cecilia Que Yabut filed a motion to quash on September
1, 1975, contending that the acts charged do not constitute the offense as there is no allegation
that the postdated checks were issued and delivered to the complainant prior to or
simultaneously with the delivery of the merchandise, the crime of estafa not being indictable
when checks are postdated or issued in payment of pre-existing obligation; and the venue was
improperly laid in Malolos, Bulacan, because the postdated checks were issued and delivered
to, and received by. the complainant in the City of Caloocan, where she (respondent Que Yabut)
holds office.
An opposition was interposed by the People, maintaining that the new law on checks (Rep. Act
No. 4885, amending Art. 315, par. 2 (d), Revised Penal Code) penalizes the postdating or
issuance thereof in payment of pre-existing obligation and that the Malolos court can exercise
jurisdiction over the case, since the last ingredient of the offense, i.e., damage, transpired in
Bulacan (residence of complainant) after the dishonor of the checks for lack of funds.

Judge Jesus de Vega quashed the information, as prayed for by respondent Que Yabut, on
November 10, 1975 for the reason "that the proper venue in this case is Caloocan City and not
Bulacan.'' Whether estafa lies for postdating or issuing a check in payment of a pre-existing
obligation was not resolved by respondent Judge.

The People's motion for reconsideration of this dismissal order was denied on January 12, 1976.

The other private respondent, Geminiano Yabut, Jr. (L-42902), husband of respondent Cecilia
Que Yabut, stood charged in Criminal Case 1405-M before the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, presided over by Judge Edgardo L. Paras, of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2
(d) of the Revised Penal Code in that:
"(D)uring the period from February 23 to April 9, 1975, in the municipality of Malolos, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court, the said accused
Geminiano Yabut, Jr., as president of the Yabut Transit Line, by means of false pretenses and
pretending to have sufficient funds in the Merchants Banking Corporation and Manufacturers
Bank and Trust Company, located and doing business in Caloocan City, prepared, issued and
make out Check Nos. CB-192041 B, CB-192043 B, 423123, CB-191988 B, 423124, CB-192044
B, CB-192045 B, CB-193737 B, CB-193738 B, CB-193739 B,CB-199953B,CB-199954B,CB-
199955B, and CB-199956B, dated February 23, 26, 27, March 1,3, 10, 11, 12, April 4, 7, 8 and
9, 1975 in the total sum of £37,206.00, drawn against the Merchants Banking Corporation and
Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company, payable to the Freeway Tires Supply and Freeway
Caltex Station, owned and operated by Alicia P. Andan, in payment of articles and merchandise
delivered to and received by said accused, gave and delivered the said checks to said Freeway
Tires Supply and Freeway Caltex Station, the said accused Geminiano Yabut, Jr. well knowing
that at the time there was no or insufficient funds in the said Merchants Banking Corporation
and Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company, and upon presentation of the said checks to the
bank, the checks were dishonored and inspite of repeated demands by the owner of the
Freeway Tires Supply and Freeway Caltex Station to deposit the necessary funds to cover the
checks within the reglementary period enjoined by law, failed and refused to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of Alicia P. Andan, owner and operator of the Freeway Tires Supply and
Freeway Caltex Station in the total sum of P37,206.00."
Like his wife, respondent Geminiano Jr. moved to quash the information on two grounds: (1) the
facts recited do not constitute an offense because the checks were issued in payment of a pre-
existing obligation; and (2) the venue was improperly laid, considering that the postdated checks
were issued and delivered to and received by the complainant in the City of Caloocan, where
respondent holds office.

On October 13, 1975, Judge Paras quashed the information because "(t)he elements of the
crime (issuance of the rubber check, attempted encashment, and refusal to honor) alleged in the
Information all took place within the territorial jurisdiction, not of Bulacan, but of Caloocan City."

The People moved for reconsideration, but on February 9, 1976, the motion was denied.

Hence, the two petitions for review on certiorari were filed by the People of the Philippines.

We find both petitions to be impressed with merits.

1. Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal
Code may be a transitory or continuing offense.[1] Its basic elements of deceit and damage[2]
may independently arise in separate places. In the event of such occurrence, the institution of
the criminal action in either place is legally allowed. Section I4(a), Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in
the Court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place ."The theory is that a person indicted with a transitory
offense may be validly tried in anyjurisdiction where the offense was in part committed.[3]
However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation
occurred in one municipality or province, the court of that municipality or province has the sole
jurisdiction to try the case.

The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before Us appears to be
transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage
in Caloocan City, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction
can, therefore, be entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the
subject checks were written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not completely made
or drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were uttered and delivered. That is the
place of business and residence of the payee. The place where the bills were written, signed, or
dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of
decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act
essential to its consummation as an obligation.[4] An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until
delivery, the contract is revocable.[5] And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must
be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "(Ota payee or indorsee of a bill or note,
who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof."[6] Delivery of the check signifies transfer of
possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer
title thereto.[7] Thus, the penalizing clause of the provision of Art. 315, par. 2 (d) states: "By
postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check." Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and delivery of the worthless
checks to the complainant took place in Malolos, Bulacan, conferring upon a court in that locality
jurisdiction to try the case.

Modesto Yambao's receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia Que Yabut or Geminiano Yabut Jr. in
Caloocan City cannot, contrary to the holding of the respondent Judges, be licitly taken as
delivery of the checks to the complainant Alicia P. Andan at Caloocan City to fix the venue
there. He did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as "payee" or "indorsee." And there
appears to be no contract of agency between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the latter for the
acts of the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in that sworn testimony before the investigating
fiscal that Yambao is but her "messenger" or "part-time employee."[8] There was no special
fiduciary relationship that permeated their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist, the
consent of both parties is essential, the principal consent of both parties is essential, the
principal consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents
so to act.[9] It must exist as a fact. The law makes no presumption thereof. The person alleging it
has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its existence, but also its nature and
extent.[10] This is more imperative when it is considered that the transaction dealt with involves
checks, which are not legal tender, and the creditor may validly refuse the same as payment of
obligation.[11]

Furthermore, the place of business of the offended party, the Freeway Tires Supply and
Freeway Caltex Station, is at Malolos, Buacan, from where the tire and gas purchases were
made by the two private respondents. As a consequence, payment thereof should be
considered effected at Malolos, Bulacan. "(I)f the undertaking is to deliver a determinate thing,
the payment shall be made wherever the thing might be at the moment the obligation was
constituted.[12] The receipt by the two private respondents at Caloocan City of the tires and gas
supplies from Malolos, Bulacan, signifies but the consummation of the contract between the
parties. It was the result of an obligation previously contracted at Malolos, Bulacan.[13] The
averments in the informations do not indicate that the complainant is an ambulant peddler of
tires and gas, but maintains a fixed and determinate place of business at Malolos, Bulacan.
Obligations, therefore, contracted as regards her business must presumptively be at her place
of business.

2. In general terms, a prosecution for issuing a worthless check with intent to defraud is in the
county where the check was uttered and delivered.[14] Thus, where a check was drawn in
Merced County and made payable at a Merced County bank, but delivered to a merchant in
Sacramento County by the drawer's agent, the Sacramento County courts had jurisdiction of a
prosecution against the drawer for uttering a check without funds or credit with intent to
defraud.[15] The venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and
delivered to the payee[16] Since in the instant case it was in Malolos, Bulacan where the checks
were uttered and delivered to complainant Andan, at which place, her business and residence
were also located, the criminal prosecution of estafa may be lodged therein.[17] As earlier
pointed out, the giving of the checks by the two private respondents in Caloocan City to
Modesto Yambao cannot be treated as valid delivery of the checks, because Yambao is a mere
"messenger" or "part-time employee" and not an agent of complainant Alicia P. Andan.

3. The next point of inquiry is whether or not the postdating or issuing of a worthless check in
payment of & pre-existing obligation constitutes estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised
Penal Code. We feel, however, that due to the absence of concrete evidence on the specific
nature of the obligation assumed or supposedly discharged by the issuance of the bad checks,
resolution of this controversial issue on the basis of the averments in the criminal informations
alone is not yet ripe. As revealed by the pleadings, the parlies are at divergence on the
character of the obligation for which the private respondents issued the checks intended as
payment thereof. Private respondents maintain that the obligation is a pre-existing one. The
prosecution, on the other hand, represented to the trial courts in its Opposition to the Motions to
Quash: "We will prove by our evidence that said checks are not in payment of a preexisting
obligation'[18] The deferment of the resolution becomes more imperative when it is considered
that the question raised is one of first impression and of consequential far-ranging effects on
transactions in checks.

4. Ad interim, We hold that the facts charged in the informations against private respondents,
contrary to their claim, constitute estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. In
considering a motion to quash based on the ground "(t)hat the facts charged do not constitute
an offense,"[19] the point of resolution is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
would meet the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. [20] The facts alleged in
the criminal charge should be taken as they are.[21] An analysis of the two informations involved
in the present case convinces Us that the facts charged therein substantially constitute the
integral elements of the offense as defined in the law. And the averments in the two informations
sufficiently inform the two private respondents of the nature and cause of the accusations
against them, thereby defeating any constitutional objection of lack of notice. [22]

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed orders of the respondent trial courts ordering the quashal of the
estafa informations against the two private respondents in the petitions at bar are hereby
reversed and set aside. The informations, as they are, substantially conform with the crime
charged as defined in the law. Let the arraignment of the private respondents in the criminal
cases below be set at the earliest date and, thereafter, the trial on the merits to proceed
immediately. No costs.

SO ORDERED.