People v.

Morial, 15 August 2001

Facts: On January 6, 1996, Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial, and Nonito Abinon killed
Paula Bandibas and her grandson, Albert Bandibas and stole 11 thousand pesos
from their house. The incident was witnessed by Gabriel Guilao. The following day,
when the bodies were discovered by Bandibas’ husband, Benjamin, Gabriel Guilao
told Banjamin about the incident and added that he should not tell it to anyone
because on of the killers is an Abinon, which is a feared family in their place.
Benjamin then disclosed the information to the police and told them to only get the
Morials and not Abinon.

The police came to get both Edwin and Leonardo Morial and subjected them to
torture in order to reveal who really killed the Bandibases. Leonardo admitted that
both Edwin and Nonito killed the Abinons and he only served as look out. The police
reduced the statements into writing and brought Leonardo to a certain Atty.
Aguilar’s office in order to be his counsel and instructed him to say “yes” when
investigated. When they were already in Atty. Aguilar’s office, Leonardo signed the
extra judicial confession without informing his counsel that he was abused. During
the meeting, Atty. Aguilar asked for Leonardo’s consent to answer the police even
with his absence, Leonardo consented. Leonardo and Nonito were sentenced to
death while Edwin was sentenced to prison as he was still a minor. On appeal,
Leonardo told about the extra judicial confession.

Issue: Whether or not Leonardo’s waived right is void.

Ruling: First, SPO4 Fernandez volunteered a counsel for Leonardo, which is Atty.
Aguilar. This violated Leonardo’s right to select a counsel, but he consented
nonetheless. Second, the Court stressed that an accused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a counsel by his side. However, Leonardo
allowed Atty. Aguilar to step out of the room and continued answering the police’s
questions even in the absence of his counsel. Both rights waived are actually rights
vested upon him by Sec. 14, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, both rights
that Leonardo waived are void and his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence against him.

Pesca v. Pesca, 17 April 2001

Facts: Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca got married on 03
March 1975 and begot 4 children. Like all couples, their first few years were blissful.
But sometime on 1988 that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological
incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. She observed that Zosimo is
emotionally immature, cruel, and irresponsible. He was a habitual drinker and
prefers to stay with his friends daily from afternoon to dawn. When she tries to stop
him, he would instead hurt her and their children at times. This prompted the
petitioner, along with their children, to leave their conjugal abode.

Two months later, respondent went to apologize and eventually got them back. But
on March 22, 1994, the respondent severely beat the petitioner and this made the
petitioner leave their abode for good and filed a case to the petitioner for slight
physical injuries. The court ruled that the marriage of Pesca is void ab initio.

On appeal, the respondent vehemently claimed that he was not psychologically

incapacitated. The Appellate court ruled in favour of the respondent and reversed
the former decision as there were no signs of psychological incapacity as stated in
Section 68 of the family code that there should be a grave, juridical antecedence,
and incurability.

Lorna Pesca appealed that the decision should have been like that of Santos v.
Santos.

Issue: Whether or not the mention of Santos and Moline case is an obiter dictum?

Ruling: Yes, because it is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life
to the term psychological incapacity. Molina, that followed, has additionally
provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases
for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has
strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint
and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and
the foundation of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court
commiserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent,
totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting
denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should the
court.

Ayala Corp. v. Rosa Diana Realty, 1 December 2000

Facts: On April 20, 1976, Ayala Corporation sold a land with Transfer Certificate
Title No. 233435 to Manuel Sy and Sy Kia Keng with Special Conditions and Deed
Restrictions. The first condition is that the vendeed shall build on the lot and submit
the building plans to the vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latter’s
approval. Second, the construction should start on or before March 30, 1977 and
completed before 1979 with the release of neither the deed of sale nor the title
unreleased even if it is fully paid. Then third and last, there should be no release of
the property. Sy and Keng were unable to comply with the conditions and restriction
set by Ayala Corporation because when they sold the lot to Rosa Diana Realty and
Development Corporation, Rosa-Diana did a project completely different from what
was agreed upon with Ayala when it their (Rosa-Diana’s) plan was approved. Ayala
filed for a complaint for Rosa-Diana to comply with contract obligations, but was
denied. The Land Registration Authority reversed the decision, but the Court of
Appeals overturned it.

The trial court said that Ayala was guilty of abandonment and estoppels due to the
fact that it failed to enforce the terms of restrictions and conditions against Sy and
Keng. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling and pronounced the case C.A G.R S.P
No. 29517, ruling that Ayala is barred and estopped from enforcing the deed
restrictions. The same court also cited the case of Ayala Corp. vs. Ray Burton
Development. Ayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the
Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R S.P
No. 29517 is obiter dicta.

Ruling: The court was not yet able to resolve the issue of barring and estopping
Ayala from enforcing the deed of restrictions and special sale conditions. Therefore,
the pronouncement is only an obiter dicta because there was no support of law and
evidence to come up with such pronouncement.

Villanueva v. CA, 19 March 2002

Facts: Francsico Villanuva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against IBC 13 and
several parties. The labor arbiter ruled in favour of Villanueva so IBC 13 filed for an
appeal to the National Relations Commission (NLRC). The appeal bond No. G(16)
00136 along with its confirmation letter dated September 20, 1993, were found to
be falsified. Both people who were allegedly involved in this falsification, Roque
Villadores and Atty Eulalio Diaz III were dismissed. But a petition before the
Department of Justice affirmed the dismissal against Diaz but not against Villadores.

The private prosecutor for Villlanueva Jr., Rico and Associates, filed a Moition to
Admit Amended Informations alleging that the damages suffered by Villanueva
were a result of the crimes committed by the accused. On October 10, 1997, the
motion was granted. Villadores filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
Villadores interposed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the
previous decisions, but was also denied. This made Villadores move for a
disqualification of Villanueva’s prosecutor because of the appellate court’s
announcement that Villanueva was not the offended party in the falsification, but it
is IBC 13 because it purchased the fake bond.

Rico and Associates opposed Villadores motion saying that the pronouncement was
only an obiter dictum. The trial court denied Villadores’ motion as its reason is
merely an obiter dictum. Villadores filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The
appellate court reversed their decision and strike out Villanueva’s name as an
offended party.

Issue: Whether or not the pronouncement of the appellate court that Villanueva is
not an offended party an obiter dictum.

Ruling: No. The pronouncement of the appellate court was not an obiter dictum as
it touched upon a matter raised by respondent Villadores in his petition assailing the
admission of the Amended Informations and imposing a question on whether
petitioner Villanueva was the offended party.

Pp. v. Veneracion, 249 S 251

Facts: On August 2, 1984, the cadaver of a 7-year old girl named Angel Alquiza was
found wrapped in a sack floating along a river. The body appeared to be raped and
killed. From various statements and reports, Abundio Lagunday and Henry Lagarto
were charged of the crime of Rape and Homicide in August 8, 1994. Subsequently
thereafter, Ernesto Cordero, Rolando Manlangit, Richard Baltazar, and Catalino Yaon
were also accused of the same crime dated August 11, 1984. All accused, except
Lagunday, who was already dead after allegedly shot by a police, pleaded not
guilty.

On January 31, 1995, the trial court found Lagardo and Cordero guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and Homicide and was sentenced with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The city prosecutor disagreed with the sentence and
prayed that the sentence be modified to death penalty under RA 7659. The
respondent judge, Hon. Lorenzo Veneracion, issued an order denying the motion.

Issue: Whether or not the judge erred in his decision, refusing to impose the
penalty of death under RA 7659, after finding the accused guilty of rape and
homicide.

Ruling: Yes. The enforced at the time of the commission of the crime was RA 7659.
The judge was therefore bound by its provisions and must enforce them without
fear and favour under the rule of law. Under Section 11 of RA 7659 which amended
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of homicide and rape is punishable
by death and not reclusion perpetua. The judge’s religious convictions in imposing
the penalty were consideration, but it should be noted that dura lex, sed lex, or the
law may be harsh, but it is still the law.